



Vol.4. • 2023

# Defence Against Terrorism Quarterly (DATA-Q)

Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, is the most asymmetric threat to the security of all citizens and to international peace and prosperity.



## **Dear Readers, All Members of our Community of Interest,**

As 2023 ends and we look back on our work and its results, we can state that this year was as hectic as it ever could be. Our Center, COE-DAT has conducted numerous courses, seminars, workshops and our flag events, the Terrorism Expert Conference and Defence Against Terrorism Executive Level Seminar, all of which drew large participation from around the world. I would like to thank our staff for their dedicated and tireless efforts, as well as our esteemed academicians, speakers, subject matter expert and participants for their tremendous support and enthusiasm that helped us maintain our position as the Hub for CT Expertise for NATO and Partners.

We began the year with a fresh initiative, publication of the first volume of Defence Against Terrorism Analysis Quarterly (DATA-Q), with the aim of expanding our audience by reaching out to younger generation with less scientific background in terrorism. We believe that for individuals who are curious about but do not wish to deep dive into counterterrorism and terrorism-related themes, this “easy read” magazine offers a chance to gain up-to-date and relevant knowledge about current security and threat situation worldwide. This new initiative also supports our goal of recruiting more members for our expanding community of interest.

For this current edition of our magazine, we selected two topics that are directly relevant to our work in 2023. Colombia, a distinguished global NATO Partner Nation, shared valuable experience on countering narco-terrorism during a workshop held in October. The goal for the event was to share Colombian expertise with our COI and incorporate their best practices into the NATO Lessons Learned system to improve and contribute to our shared security. While all of the workshop's conclusions are available in a Final Report that you can read on our website, Dr. Basar Baysal, one of the workshop's distinguished speakers, provides you with an intriguing synopsis of the lessons that Colombia and Türkiye have in common. His writing provides a good example of how to understand better and and draw lessons from both our own experiences and those of others fighting the same enemy under different names.

The second article provides you with an overview of our long-term initiative to create a “**Strategic Level Terrorism Exercise Scenario Development Tool**” as a digital training support for COE-DAT courses and educational activities. LtCol Uwe Berger is a member of German Armed Forces-the Bundeswehr, and also the acting Transformation Department Head in COE-DAT. Capitalizing on his active involvement with the Project and the TOBB University, chosen to run the project with COE-DAT, he shares with you the specifics of this challenging but also exciting endeavor.

I hope this magazine will serve the purpose of providing you with interesting and useful knowledge about current CT-related topics as well as sparking your interest in future editions of this magazine together with many other products and events that we develop and organize as COE-DAT..

Last but not least, allow me to use this opportunity to wish you a happy holiday season and a peaceful new year on behalf of the entire COE-DAT staff.

Bülent AKDENİZ  
Colonel (OF-5) TUR-A  
Director, COE-DAT

## About the authors

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# UWE BERGER

Lieutenant Colonel, DEU ARMY



**Born** - 22 December 1962

**Married since 1993 with Heidi**


**2 Kids** - Anna-Lena 22  
Sebastian 18

**Hobbies** - Family, Football,  
Reading, Traveling




**Joined Bw**  
01.07.1982


 **Army  
Armour**

 **NCO and PLT Leader**  
Recce / Armour  
07/82 - 09/90

 **Army Institute for  
Education and Economy**  
10/90 - 03/93

 **S3 Alert/Mobilisation**  
Supply Rgt 7  
04/93 - 06/96

 **S3/MA COS**  
II GE/US Corps  
07/96 - 03/99

 **S3 Plans Officer**  
WBK VI/ 1. Mountain Div  
04/99 - 12/99

 **Chief Registry and**  
Deputy Branch Head PANDA  
RHQ AFSOUTH  
01/00 - 09/04

 **COY Commander**  
Support COY - Arty School  
10/04 - 01/05

 **SO MCA&I**  
CC-Land HQ Madrid  
02/05 - 06/09

 **S3 SO Force Protection**  
DEU Army Office  
07/09 - 09/12

 **SO Liaison and R&S**  
JFC Brunssum J9  
10/12 - 09/14

 **S3 SO Ops Centre**  
Bw Support Service COM  
10/14 - 07/15

 **G3 and Branch Head**  
Ops/Plans/Int Relations  
BwJFOCOM C-IED Centre  
08/15 - 09/19

 **Section Head Liaison**  
JFC Brunssum J9  
01/19 - 09/21

 **Acting Transformation**  
Department Chief  
COE-DAT  
Since 12/21

**Missions**

-  1999
-  2001-2003
-  2011
-  2013/2014

# **Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Wartime Economies: Lessons from/for Colombia and Türkiye**

By Basar Baysal

Türkiye and Colombia are resilient nations with decades-long histories of combating terrorism. Türkiye has been engaged in a protracted struggle against many types of terrorist organizations especially the PKK since the 1980s, while Colombia has grappled with a multifaceted internal conflict involving left-wing armed groups such as the FARC and ELN, as well as paramilitary factions and criminal groups, for over half a century. Both countries have amassed extensive expertise in counterterrorism, refining their strategies over time based on the challenges they have confronted.

The wealth of experiences in counterterrorism from Türkiye and Colombia provides valuable insights that are mutually beneficial. Colombia's encounters with hybrid armed groups, blending political motives with involvement in criminal enterprises, along with its approaches to counter-narcotics, maritime security to combat drug traffickers, peacebuilding initiatives, and the intricate processes of individual and collective disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), offer significant lessons for Türkiye.

On the other hand, Türkiye's journey from large-scale military operations to small unit commando actions, effective border security measures, urban warfare proficiency, the integrated use of ground forces, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and air force fighter jets, as well as advancements in high-tech military base and perimeter security applications, present invaluable lessons for Colombia in its efforts against terrorism.

In addition to these, both nations share experiences in countering the recruitment of minors or forced recruitment by armed groups. While numerous facets of these experiences warrant thorough exploration and in-depth analyses, this paper specifically delves into the impact of drug economies on conflict. Colombia possesses extensive expertise in this realm, given its long-standing battle against drug-related issues. In contrast, the issue has been

relatively underexamined in the Turkish context, despite the PKK's involvement in marijuana production and trafficking in specific regions in Türkiye such as Diyarbakır Lice.

Both Türkiye and Colombia have long been involved in armed conflict with armed groups. In both countries, drug crop cultivation activities are present in regions where armed groups are active and where there is active armed conflict. In both countries armed groups have been involved in the drug business. In Türkiye, most of the illegal cannabis cultivation is controlled by the PKK. Similarly, Colombia has been known for its production of cocaine, and it is one of the main producers of coca leaves in the world. The country has been embroiled in a complex armed conflict involving several different armed groups. The peace process that began in 2012 between the Colombian government and the FARC, which had been involved in the conflict for over five decades, has been seen as a significant development in the country. Despite the peace agreement in 2016, the drug economy in Colombia remains robust, with emerging criminal groups attempting to fill the power vacuum created by FARC's demobilization. This transition has transformed the nature of conflict in these regions from political to criminal, highlighting the challenges of sustaining peace in the aftermath of long-standing armed conflicts.

Illicit drug economies, as part of a protracted and deeply embedded wartime economies, is increasingly recognized as a major policy concern as well as a growing area of interest within the field of conflict and peace studies. Efforts to explain the linkage between conflict, peacebuilding and drugs have varied from simplistic causal explanations, asserting that conflict causes drug production and drugs drive conflict, to more complex and contextualized accounts that incorporate a range of factors including global/national counter-narcotics policies, state capacity, global dynamics, rebel governance practices, contextual factors, differing political settlements like elite coalitions/competitions, and local politics.

There is a vast literature on the relationship between conflict and the economy. Much of this literature focuses on the economic roots of conflict or its economic outcomes. In particular, the literature on drug economies (cultivation, trafficking,

etc.) and conflict has addressed areas such as the financing of armed groups, how conflict-induced disorder leads to the emergence of illicit economies, corruption, and the internationalization of conflict through illicit economies.<sup>1</sup> An influential strand of this literature highlights the role of drug economies in financing armed groups and narco-terrorism.<sup>2</sup> Therefore the mainstream stance towards drug economies focuses on the mutually constitutive relationship between drug economies and conflict and they present how the disorder that is emerged from the conflict itself creates a favorable environment for illicit drug cultivation and trade, and how these activities escalates the violence and conflict particularly by financing terrorist groups.<sup>3</sup>

An emerging body of work is addressing the intricate relationship between illegal wartime economies and conflict/peace processes. The experiences of the author in Colombia indicate the multifaceted roles assumed by armed groups in illegal drug economies, encompassing activities such as coca leaf processing, drug trafficking, and governance/regulation of the drug trade through mechanisms like taxation, price setting, or the establishment of minimum wages/rates. Beyond armed groups, civilians also derive economic benefits from these activities. Primarily, landowners play a pivotal role by cultivating coca in their fields, selling these leaves to armed groups, and generating income. Additionally, vulnerable landless peasants, despite earning relatively modest amounts, participate in these activities by working in the fields and collecting coca leaves. For these individuals, this often represents the sole source of income in remote regions. Consequently, if governments fail to create alternative economic opportunities for these populations, they may resist peace initiatives as the pursuit of peace could jeopardize their only means of sustenance. In some instances, these civilians might inadvertently support the

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<sup>1</sup> Kleiman, M.A.R. 2004. Illicit drugs and the terrorist threat: causal links and implications for domestic drug control policy. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL32334. Washington: The Library of Congress.

<sup>2</sup> Peters, G. 2009. *Seeds of terror: how heroin is bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda*. New York: Thomas Dunne Books; Marshall, D. 2002. Narco-terrorism: The new discovery of an old connection. *Cornell International Law Journal*, 35(3), 599-604; Napoleoni, L. 2004. The new economy of terror: how terrorism is financed. *United Nations Forum on Crime and Society*, 4(1-2), 31-48; Meierrieks, D., Schneider, F. 2016. The short- and long-run relationship between the illicit drug business and terrorism. *Applied Economics Letters*, 23(18), 1274-1277; Piazza, J.A. 2011. The illicit drug trade, counternarcotics strategies and terrorism. *Public Choice*, 149, 297-314; Wardlaw, G. 1988. Linkages Between the Illegal Drugs Traffic and Terrorism. *Journal of Conflict Studies*, 8(3), 5-26; Björnehed, E. 2004. Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror. *Global Crime*, 6(3-4), 305-324; Roth, M. P., Sever, M. 2007. "The Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) as a criminal syndicate: funding terrorism through organized crime. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 30(10), 901-920.

<sup>3</sup> Felbad-Brown, V. 2009. *Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press; Goodhand J. et. al. 2021, Critical Policy Frontiers: The Drugs-Development-Peacebuilding Trilemma. *International Journal of Drug Policy*, 89; Cornell, S. 2005. The interaction of narcotics and conflict. *Journal of Peace Research*, 42 (6), 751-760.



activities of terrorist groups, refusing cooperation with state forces in counterterrorism efforts, as their income is intricately tied to the perpetuation of disorder and violence. Therefore, drug economies contribute to the persistence and intensification of violence not only by financing armed groups but also by influencing the lives and perspectives of the civilians involved.

Regarding the nexus between drug economies and rebel governance, the prevailing perspective contends that the engagement of terrorist groups in the drug industry steers them away from their political objectives, transforming them into criminal entities.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, civilian support for these groups diminishes as they transition from politically oriented armed factions to criminal organizations involved in activities like kidnapping and drug trafficking. However, alternative viewpoints challenge this mainstream position, asserting that it is formulated and wielded to delegitimize armed groups through narco-terrorist allegations as part of counterinsurgency policies.<sup>5</sup> These alternative stances posit that involvement in the drug trade may serve as a means of financing the political goals of armed groups<sup>6</sup>, or the involvement itself may have political significance, influencing the governance practices of the armed factions.<sup>7</sup> Hough contends that controlling the drug economy garners support from civilians actively involved in drug production.<sup>8</sup> Gutierrez and Thomson argue that the involvement of leftist armed groups in the drug economy aligns with their broader political aim of fostering the emergence of a peasant smallholder economy.<sup>9</sup> Phean adds that this involvement and regulation may fortify proto-state authority through eudaemonic legitimation.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Cornell, S. 2007. Narcotics and Armed Conflict: Interaction and Implications. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 30(3), 207–27, p. 208; Abdukadirov, S. 2010. Terrorism: The Dark Side of Social Entrepreneurship. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 33(7), 603–17, p. 611; Schmidt, F. 2010. From Islamic Warriors to Drug Lords: The Evolution of the Taliban Insurgency. *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 21, p. 76.

<sup>5</sup> Acero, C. 2020. Review of the Literature on Illicit Drugs in Colombia. *Drugs & (Dis)order Working Paper*, London: SOAS, p. 25; Ramirez, M.C. 2011. *Between the Guerrillas and the State. The Cocacero Movement, Citizenship, and Identity in the Colombian Amazon*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, p. 61.

<sup>6</sup> Gutierrez, F. 2004. Criminal Rebels? A Discussion of Civil War and Criminality from the Colombian Experience. *Politics & Society*, 32(2).

<sup>7</sup> Gutiérrez D.J.A & Thomson, F. 2020. Rebels-Turned-Narcos? The FARC-EP's Political Involvement in Colombia's Cocaine Economy. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*.

<sup>8</sup> Hough, P.A. 2011. Guerrilla Insurgency as Organized Crime: Explaining the So-Called 'Political Involvement' of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. *Politics & Society*, 39(3), 379–414.

<sup>9</sup> Gutiérrez and Thomson, 2020.

<sup>10</sup> Phean, A. 2019. FARC's Pursuit of 'Taking Power': Insurgent Social Contracts, the Drug Trade and Appeals to Eudaemonic Legitimation. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*.

Involvement of armed groups to drug economy does not only make them to be able to implement governance practices such as setting minimum wage for coca cultivation activities, setting the minimum rate for coca paste to protect farmers or taxation of drug-related incomes. In addition to these, drug economies create a favorable environment for further rebel governance activities by influencing the ideas of civilians who take part in drug cultivation activities. These indicate that drug economies that are controlled by the armed groups deepen the conflict itself.

As the aforementioned literature highlights, the 'mainstream literature' often simplifies the intricate relationship between war/conflict and drugs, employing a top-down analysis that overlooks the perspectives of the drug farmers situated at the bottom of the chain. This perspective characterizes involvement in drug economies solely as driven by economic incentives, framing rebel groups as profit-maximizing entities where farmers' decision-making is purely dictated by price considerations. Importantly, there is a notable absence of analysis concerning the relationships between 'civilians' and terrorist groups,' and the emergence of social contracts between them during wartime or war-to-peace transitions. Understanding this nuanced point is crucial for comprehending the complexity of wartime economies and for developing sustainable solutions. To bring wars to an end and establish 'sustainable peace,' it is imperative to engage with the underlying structures and incentives that drive conflict. Undoubtedly, acknowledging the multifaceted dynamics of wartime economies is a crucial component of this endeavor.

**The Strategic Level Terrorism Exercise Scenario Development Project,  
COE-DATs Contribution to the Digital Transformation of NATO**

By Uwe Berger

“In the future, threats could come from all sides: disinformation, urban warfare, cyber-attacks, civil unrest, robots, drones, and even augmented humans such as organized criminal organizations or terrorist organizations. It is NATO's and the Nations job to imagine every possible threat and plan how to best protect our populations. Gamification can be a valuable tool in getting people to ask questions they haven't asked before. The combination of competition, excitement and fun is crucial when training the next generation of security specialists. Through its Science and Technology Organization, NATO is working with multiple organizations to set up simulations – from board games to future games in virtual reality – that hit the perfect pitch of learning and creativity. In the end, the knowledge and experience gained from these games will help NATO and Allied leaders make better-informed decisions on defense matters.”<sup>11</sup>

According to the action plan “Enhancing NATO’s Role in International Community’s Fight Against Terrorism” and the “Collective Training and Exercise Directive 075-003”, NATO aims, amongst others, to leverage new technologies in the fight against terrorism, in line with ongoing work on Emerging Disruptive Technologies. Modelling & Simulation (M&S) is one of the tools that can be used to achieve that goal. M&S should ensure a consistent time/space/force information representation of a complex scenario, as well as provide an automated feed of information in the proper formats.

Pros & Cons of the implementation of Simulation and Gamification to assist COE-DATs Training & Exercise efforts have been discussed in COE-DAT since late 2021. After the approval of the Steering Committee to conduct the **Strategic Level Terrorism Exercise Scenario Development Project**, the

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<sup>11</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_180639.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_180639.htm)

contract was signed with the contractor of this project, Baškent University (BU), on 09 January 2023.

The collaboration between BU and COE-DAT aims to develop a Strategic Level Terrorism Exercise Scenario Development tool that elevates COE-DAT training to a new level by providing the students in COE-DAT Training events and courses with a “What If” scenario where they can immediately see the consequences of their action, scenario-based, course-tailored and preferably geo-referenced.

A secondary effect that can be achieved with the implementation of such a tool in COE-DAT is that it can be used in concept development at least during the first and probably second phase of the process during the required experimentation stage. Having this possibility saves time in identifying an entity that can support the required experimentation steps as well as additional coordination efforts.

This project is proposed to support and enhance the development of NATO's ability to defend against terrorism. The project will create a multi-layered, interactive, learning-based, scenario-based constructivist learning environment in NATO's defense against terrorism.

The creation of such a structure will allow COE-DAT to create the construction of common sense in defense against terrorism training within NATO. With the implementation of the project;

- The creation of constructivist training in Defence Against Terrorism (DAT) training will be supported.
- It will create common sense in DAT training.
- A scenario-based learning environment will be built in the development of strategic decisions in DAT.
- The database of the training activities will enable the development/discussion of dynamic and NATO-specific approaches.

In the project, a multilayered, interactive, learning-based, scenario-based constructivist learning environment will be created. Within the framework of this objective;

- **A multi-layered training environment will be created:** The training will be built in a dynamic structure in the form of two basic layers and sublayers under these layers. The first of the two basic layers is the "NATO General Framework" layer, which defines global general dynamics and their impact on NATO. Under this layer will be substrates where political, human, technological, economic, and environmental variables are defined.

The second basic layer is the "Country Framework" layer. In this layer, the situation of the country subjected to the scenario, the structural characteristics of the terrorist organization within the country, and the variables related to the situation will be defined.

The "NATO General Framework" layer will be fed by dynamic, and database based on real data. This database will be constantly updated. The "Country Framework" layer can be controlled by the Training Center and will form the structure of the scenario that is requested to be discussed in the training.

- **A learning-based training module will be created:** Participants will be able to produce decisions against the situations presented in scenarios and see the effects of their decisions on the results of the decisions within a computer system.
- **Scenario development module will be created:** Scenarios will be created by computer system. Scenarios will be created by the non-linear dynamic modeling method. A "wild card" can be produced that will require decision-making during training.

The development of the learning system will be based on constructivist learning approach.

The simulation needed to construct scenarios will be developed by non-linear, dynamics approach. Required data gathered from formal open-access sources will be fed automatically by the software.

This new tool is foreseen to be developed over a period of two years. A milestone plan has been developed and agreed by the project teams. Furthermore, initial contacts have been established to the Modeling and

Simulation COE (M&S COE) in Rome, Italy, and the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, United States of America, “Next Generation Project” (NGP) team. Both entities are willing to support the effort by providing expertise and, if required, guidance. With the involvement of the ACT NGP team, we hope to integrate the project, when operational and validated, into the NATO harmonization/ transformation process.

The official kickoff of the project was 01 January 2023. At present the project is in phase 2 of 4. The major task in phase 1 was to execute a literature review on the main indicators for or of terrorism. The BU team conducted research in two major databases, SCOPUS and CLARIVATE ANALYTICS. More than 16.000 documents have been reviewed and analyzed on terrorism indicator content. This phase was key to the later success of the project as long as only a broad base of indicators will enable COE-DAT to use the tool in their own courses. After the review for more indexes and any relevant sub-indicators in order to broaden the database, the BU team completed an indicator list from the existing/ conducted Index Research. The findings of phase 1 were presented and discussed during a BU lead VTC with COE-DAT staff, law enforcement entities and COE-DAT affiliated academicians in June 2023 in order to maximize success by obtaining broad feedback from Terrorism/ Counter Terrorism experts.

Within the contractual framework, BU will also deliver a course, including required Course Control Documents (CCD) and academicians, as testbed for the project without additional costs to the project. BU will also be responsible for the first conduct of the course as well as for the provision of all relevant documentation, such as Train the Trainers booklets, user manuals etc. This course development will be conducted parallel to the development of the tool. To gain knowledge regarding COE-DATs course methodology, selected BU staff has the opportunity to attend courses in COE-DAT during the year 2023. With this approach, COE-DAT will ensure that the final product can be used in COE-DAT courses with only minor adjustments. A meeting with the BU project team was executed to provide the necessary background and knowledge on how to fill the required Course Control Documents I – III. COEDAT staff will support the writing team as deemed necessary.

After the finalization of the first phase, phase 2 started in July 2023. The focus of this phase is on further refining the indicators, constructing the Data Warehouse, and the creation of the simulation system. Furthermore the preparation of the CCD I, II, and III in light of main topics and sub-topics, the preparation of the relevant course materials, books, and presentations in the pdf/ppt format, the preparation of a “train the trainers” program and the preparation of an administrator training manual, videos for the “train the trainers program“, are part of this phase.

Compared to other similar projects, the overall cost for the project is reasonable and below the price of products that are available on the market.



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