



CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM



COE-DAT Newsletter

Volume 2 / Issue 5 / February 2008



Contents

3 **General Overview of the Terrorist Incidents in 2007**

by Ömer YILMAZ
Inspector, TUR Police

8 **Money Laundering, Its Dimensions and the 'Mafiocracy'**

by Ahmet TUNCER
Colonel (TUR A)

15 **Defence Against Suicide Bombing**

by Arif EKMEK
Colonel (TUR A)

21 **Organizational & Psychological Profile of Terrorism**

by S. Ahmet EREN
4th Grade Police Superintendent

26 **Criminal Theory in the Service of Counter-Terrorism**

by Andrew BUNCE
Wg Cdr (GBR N)

35 **Port Security- The Port of Singapore**

by Julian CHARVAT
Major (GBR A)

39 **Globalisation and Insecurity**

by Olcay DENİZER
Captain (TUR A)

44 **COE-DAT Activities**

COE-DAT;

Your gate
to get
information.

Editorial

Newsletter's fifth issue has three main sections. First of all, we share the information and the analysis of the data related to terrorist incidents took place in the previous year, 2007. We also have articles on terrorism related issues. Lastly, brief information about the training and education activities of our centre is provided in the bulletin.

COL. Ahmet TUNCER, in his article on Money Laundering, Its Dimensions and Mafiaocracy, scrutinizes the issue of money laundering together with the means, methods and techniques used for it and its links with terrorism in order to display the level this crime has reached at the global level.

COL. Arif EKMEK analyzes the issue of suicide terrorism and its characteristics and thus identifies the vulnerability points, making use of which may provide ground for preventing suicide attacks.

4th Grade Police Superintendent S. Ahmet EREN offers the general concept of the papers presented in the NATO Advanced Training Course on Organizational and Psychological

Profile of Terrorism conducted by COE-DAT on 22-26 October 2007 in Skopje/Macedonia.

WG CDR Andrew BUNCE suggests that an understanding of criminal theory and the adoption of an integrated campaign plan can assist a security manager, operating at a strategic level but with influence over tactical plans, in preventing or reducing terrorism.

Maj. Julian CHARVAT discusses the issue of port security over the case of Singapore with particular reference and special emphasis to security measures and international law in place to protect the port.

Capt. Olcay DENİZER elaborates the notion of insecurity as a result of the process of globalisation. He argues that the process of globalisation creates a global civil society of "have"s which cannot effectively tackle the global challenges without the support of the states whereas it also gives way to the emergence of a global society of "have-not"s which can cause a real threat to the world security with invisible networks of volunteers, without support of any state.



The opinions and comments in the "COE-DAT Newsletter" represent the personal views of the authors. They do not represent the official views of Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism nor NATO.
All the rights of the articles and pictures included in this book are reserved.

General Overview of the Terrorist Incidents in 2007

Ömer YILMAZ
TUR Police, Inspector, Analyst

In the year 2007 some 9.804⁽¹⁾ terrorist incidents were recorded worldwide. These attacks claimed 26.196 lives and 37.510 injuries in sum. 2.465 people were also reportedly abducted by unknown assailants. Among the countries hit most during the year, Iraq was apparently the most hit country. The violence in Iraq, which is shaped by sectarian, ethnical and political violence and the insurgency against the foreign presence, has continued with some 4559 separate attacks in the year 2007, making the country far and away the most volatile one in the world. In these violent attacks, some 16.306 people lost their lives and 22.718 others sustained injuries while some 858 more were abducted by unknown gunmen.


In order to illustrate the level of insecurity in the country, it is believed to be enough to mention that 46,5% of the total terrorist attacks in the world were carried out in Iraq, which claimed 62% of the total fatalities and 60,5% of the total casualties sustained worldwide. Although, the new US plan, which was rooted in six fundamental elements, namely; let the Iraqis lead; help Iraqis protect the population; isolate extremists; create space for political progress; diversify political and economic efforts; and situate the strategy in a regional approach, was implemented by the second week of February in order to maintain the stability in the country, the violence, immediately escalated through March and it wasn't until November that it began to fall to the level of February.

In Afghanistan, where an international security operation is in progress, the violence escalated in the year 2007. After a relatively calm two-month period, the statements of Taliban, promising an escalation in violence in Afghanistan, partly, came true in March with some 94 attacks and the violence in the country reached its peak in July with 155 separate attacks and constantly decreased

	Country	Event Count	KIA	WIA	AIA
1	Iraq	4559	16306	22718	858
2	Afghanistan	1060	2129	2346	256
3	India	1001	1357	2087	194
4	Pakistan	762	2203	3504	278
5	Sri Lanka	598	958	1588	27
6	Thailand	411	444	939	2
7	Somalia	410	780	1162	14
8	Turkey	201	186	395	25
9	Nepal	147	128	387	79
10	Nigeria	78	91	18	218


Table 1 - The most hit countries worldwide

Most Hit Countries in 2007



Graphic 1 - The most hit countries worldwide

(1) All figures mentioned in the report are totally procured from the open sources and any dispute in figures used in similar works is a matter of capability to reach the same source. Neither NATO nor COE-DAT is responsible for the disputes but the analyst.



Graphic 2 - Ten Countries Those Gave the Highest Casualties in 2007

afterwards. In general, some 1.060 attacks, recorded in the country, claimed 2.129 lives and 2.346 injuries. Besides, some 256 people were also abducted. The ever largest and the deadliest single attack in the country was carried out in Baghlan province on November 6 when a suicide bomber exploded himself near a group of Afghan politicians, children and elders who were touring a sugar factory and killed at least 90 people, including many children and five lawmakers, along with 50 injured. In a similar attack, which was conducted in the capital Kabul city on June 17, some 35 people, including 22 police officers, lost their lives and 52 others sustained injuries.


In India, the most hit country in Asia and the third in the world, the violence constantly increased through January to June, when it reached its peak with 138 incidents, and then the number of events decreased to 68 in October. However, the deadliest month for the Indians was August, when 152 people lost their lives and 280 more sustained injuries in 110 separate attacks. On the other hand, the following month, September, became the calmest one with 83 attacks, killing 85 and wounding

130 more. The Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) were the most active terrorist organizations in 2007 in India, where almost 200 terrorist organizations operate.

Pakistan became the second most-hit country in Asia and the fourth in the world, with 762 separate attacks, killing 2.203 people and wounding 3.504 others. The violence in the country mainly originated from the Taliban-inspired activities of the tribes neighboring Afghanistan and the separatist motivations in Baluchistan province. Undoubtedly, the Lal Masjid operation on July 10 and the subsequent terrorist attacks were the turning points for the violence in the country. After **the Operation Silence**, which aimed to put an end to the pro-Taliban activities in the mosque, that had significant role in shaping the whole climate in the country, the violence sharply escalated in the country. The violence in July claimed 331 lives and 806 injuries in 97 attacks. Some 14 suicide attacks, the highest level of the year, and the year's deadliest clashes and armed attacks were the main factors of the high casualty levels

in July. However, the assassination of the former Prime Minister **Benazir Bhutto** marked the violence and the subsequent violence incidents raised the concerns on the prospectus stability of the country. The attack killed at least 31 people, including Bhutto, and wounded 48 more on December 27.

carried out some innovative attacks. The usage of airplanes in terrorist attacks was firstly observed in April and the terrorists bombed an air force base with a possible Czech-designed Zlin-143. A similar attack was also carried out in October.



Graphic 3 -Ten Countries Those Gave the Highest Injuries in 2007


In **Sri Lanka**, some 598 attacks of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam terrorist organization claimed 958 lives and 1.588 injuries in 2007, making the country the fifth most-hit country in the world. The violence in the country reached its peak in March with 94 reported incidents, killing 162 people and wounding 324 more. April and May were also noted as the other troubled months, even the number of attacks decreased to an average 65. The Sri Lankan Army was the main target group of the terrorists in the country and most of the casualties inflicted were sustained in the clashes between the terrorists and the security forces. Besides, the civilians, both from Sinhalese and Tamil origins were the other main target groups of the LTTE. In 2007, the terrorist organization

The violence in **Thailand** claimed 444 lives and 939 injuries in 411 separate attacks in 2007. The ethnic and the religious structures of the southern part of the country were the main reasons of the violence in the country. And although remained vague, the attacks of the year can be regarded as a part of the campaigns of the Pattani separatist groups, most notably the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO), which commenced its terrorist campaign in 2001 and it is alleged that there are some links between PULO and foreign terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. The southern Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkhla and Yala were noted to be the troubled places and the killings of the

	Event Type	Event Count	KIA	WIA	AIA
1	Armed Attack	3450	10773	3141	489
2	IED	1867	2753	7670	0
3	Clash	1036	3058	3911	46
4	IDF	913	1116	3856	0
5	VBIED	502	2713	7926	0

Table 2 - The Most Used Tactics in the World

civilians, mostly in drive-by shooting incidents, by the militants and the IED-strikes were the major tactics used in the country.



Graphic 4 -Most Used Five Tactics in the World

Somalia, the seventh most-hit country in the world, was far and away the most-plagued country in Africa with terrorist attacks despite an improper information flow. In 2007, it was recorded that 780 people lost their lives and 1.162 more sustained injuries in separate 410 attacks. The indirect fire attacks, in which mostly the mortars and the hand grenades were used, and the targeted armed attacks were the tactics the assailants relied on most in 2007.

In **Turkey**, some 201 terrorist attacks were reported during the year. These attacks claimed 186 lives and 395 injuries. 25 others were also abducted by the terrorists. The terrorist campaign of **Marxist-Leninist and ethnic separatist PKK/KONGRA-GEL terrorist organization** marked the year as all of the attacks in the country, except two percussion IED-attacks and a clash, were carried out by this group. The usage of landmines in the attacks, targeting both the civilians and the security forces, was

the main tactic of the terrorist organization. Such 64 attacks killed 44 people and wounded 95 more. However, the **suicide attack** which was carried out on May 22 in the capital city, Ankara, was the most significant attack in the country, as the explosion in front of a crowded shopping mall killed nine people and wounded 80 more.

The terrorists used twenty different tactics in 2007. The traditional tactic of the terrorists, **the close quarter armed attack**, was far and away the first choice of the terrorists and in 3.450 separate occasions, targeting both civilians and security forces, 10.773 people were killed and 3.141 more sustained several injuries. At least 736 of these CQA attacks were the extrajudicial killings, possibly subsequent to the abductions of the victims, and 5.425 people lost their lives in such conditions. As an organized act that gives various messages to several target groups, this kind of attacks poses a real threat to the security level of the countries. Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia and Sri Lanka were the countries where such attacks were reported.

In addition, 1.036 **clashes**, those mainly erupted during the operations of the security forces or due to the pre-planned ambushes or attacks of the terrorists, some 3.058 people, mainly the members of the security forces, were killed and 3.911 more were wounded.

Having destructive consequences, the usage of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is one of the leading dangerous and immediate threats in the world. In 2007, total 3.194 **IED-strikes**, including suicide attacks, vehicle borne IED-attacks, victim operated IED-attacks and the attacks on which no special characteristics attributed, killed 10.251 people and wounded 26.087


	Event Type	Event Count	KIA	WIA	AIA
1	Armed Attack	3450	10773	3141	489
2	Suicide Attack	491	4372	9745	0
3	Clash	1036	3058	3911	46
4	IED	1867	2753	7670	0
5	VBIED	502	2713	7926	0

Table 3 - The Deadliest Tactics Used in the World.

more. Among these types, **suicide bombing**, which was repeated for 491 times, was the deadliest one as 4,372 people lost their lives and 9,745 more sustained injuries. Iraq was the country suffered most from this tactic with 269 attacks while Afghanistan was also hit hard with 135 attacks. Some 58 suicide attacks were also reported from Pakistan. The other countries where such attacks were carried out in 2007 were Algeria (5); India (1); Israel (1); Lebanon (1); Morocco (4); Somalia (5); Sri Lanka (8) and Turkey (4). Although remained low in repetition, the **VBIED-strikes** also caused considerable damages in 2007. Such

502 attacks resulted in the deaths of 2,713 people and wounded 7,926 more. Iraq again headed the list of the most-hit countries by VBIED-attacks with 450 occasions, causing most of the total casualties. In addition, ten such attacks were reported from India while Pakistan was hit for seven times. The remaining 35 attacks were carried out in different 14 countries.

The terrorists continued to use **landmines** in their attacks in 2007 with at least 334 repetitions. Some 80 of these attacks were reported from Sri Lanka, making the country the most-hit one in the world with landmines. Afghanistan was also hit hard in 2007 with landmines as 74 such attacks were reported from this country. In addition, the landmine attacks, targeting both civilians and security forces, became the principal tactic of the **PKK/KONGRA-GEL** terrorists in Turkey and repeated for 64 times.



Graphic 5 -Deadliest Five Tactics in the World

Money Laundering, Its Dimensions and the 'Mafiocracy'

Ahmet TUNCER

Colonel (TUR A)

Director of the COE-DAT

This study is about money laundering, its dimensions and the 'mafiocracy' (rule by the mafia). Illicit money is the money which is acquired through illegal means. Money laundering is the legitimization of the illicit money by bringing it into the mainstream economy and transforming it in order to give it the appearance of legality.

Money laundering is part of the chain of illegal activities which have political, economic, social and moral effects and results. The volume of money laundered is such that it is defined as the second largest business in the world. The largest is the acquisition of this money. As is the case in economics and markets, crime and money laundering have become globalized, too.

The history of illicit money is as old as the history of the money. However, money laundering has been on the agenda of all the world's nations for 10 to 15 years. In this sense, it is not the history of the money laundering that is new, but the international dimensions.

Money laundering was first used for the 200,000 dollars that was laundered in Mexico and used in the campaign of the Republican Party in the Watergate investigation (Ergül 1998:2). According to some points of view, the origins of the word "laundering" dates back to the early twentieth century when American mafiosi were legitimizing their money by buying chains of coin operated laundries. The mafia laundered its money by uniting its money with the legal laundry incomes.

The legislation against illicit money and money laundering is quite new since the presence of the money laundering on the agenda of the nations is new, too. Legal regulations were issued in United States (US) and

Britain in 1986, Australia and France in 1987, Canada in 1988, Italy and Luxembourg in 1989, Switzerland and Belgium in 1990, Japan and Netherlands in 1991, Germany in 1992, Austria in 1993, Brazil and Turkey in 1996. Money laundering activities, the dimensions of which are hard to measure, cannot be easily tracked and found out since they are illegally and secretly carried out.

The illicit money acquired has to be laundered. This causes money laundering to gain a different economic dimension. Money laundering can be defined as "transforming or legalizing the money, or its measurable equivalents, that are obtained via illegal means in order to camouflage or hide its sources" (Quirk 1996:1). Another definition is made by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF):

"Money laundering includes all kinds of actions that are done for hiding the illegal source of the value accrued from the illegal activities or hiding the source, possessor, place, movement or controller of the income acquired from illegal activities or acquisition and using of the wealth obtained via illegal means."

From another point of view, money laundering can be defined as placing the money obtained from illegal means into the economy and the process of using it for legitimate means. (Quirk 1995: 1).

Worldwide research so far displays that the informal economy is 5.8 trillion dollars and the total volume of the money laundered is 590 billion–1,5 trillion dollars for the year 1996. According to the data of the European Union (EU), the annual total amount of money laundered is 1.3 trillion dollars, whereas the data of the OECD indicate the amount of 1.1 trillion dollars. FATF, Tanzi and Quirk, in their research, have come to much the same amount, 1 trillion. Related to this, the money accrued from drug trafficking

constituted 10% of the value of total world exports in 1995. According to United Nations (UN) estimates, drug trafficking in 1995, except for domestic production, was worth around 400-450 billion dollars. However, the money laundering in only 14 countries is 2 trillion 425 billion dollars. This amount of money corresponds to 8.3% of the Gross National Product. When the money laundering taking place in different countries or places is considered, the figure reaches to greater amounts.

When the GNP of the world at 29.1 trillion dollars (1996), total exports at 5.3 trillion dollars (1997), and imports at 5.4 trillion dollars are born in mind, the proportion of the informal economy in the GNP of the world is 18.2%, which includes illicit money with a share of 41.8%. To give an idea of the scale of the informal economy one can say that, at the level of the world economy, its amount exceeds the exports or the imports.

If 10% of the illicit money is spent on costs, and 30% of the rest is used for laundering costs, then the net laundered money corresponds to the amount of 4,811.5 billion dollars as illicit money, that is the equivalent of 16.5% of the GNP. Half of this illicit money derives from the illegal trafficking of drugs.

Statistics On The Scale Of Drug Trafficking

According to the World Drug Report (1998:18), illegal production of the poppy was around 280,000 hectares by the year 1996. 90% of the illegal poppy production is taking place in the Golden Crescent, which is composed of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, and the Golden Triangle, which is composed of Laos PDR, Myanmar and Thailand. These two production centers are followed by

Columbia, Vietnam, Mexico, India, China and Middle Eastern countries. One third of poppy production goes to consumption as food, whereas the rest is transformed into heroine. Every year 300 tons of heroine is produced and exported to other countries. The total volume of annual narcotics production brings in a value corresponding to 600 billion dollars. The income to be obtained from the selling of this amount is 52 trillion dollars. This number is 1.8 times bigger than the world GNP. According to the report of the Office of Narcotics and Drugs Policy (ONDCP) (1998:124), the net income accruing to the narcotics and drug industry is around 400 billion dollars. The loss of 400 billion dollars is equivalent to 7.5% of the world trade.

By the end of the year 1996, the area cultivated for cocoa was 330,000 hectares. 1,000 tons cocaine was produced out of 300,000 tones of the cocoa shrub. Between the years 1985-1994, cocoa production was doubled.

In 1995, 4,000 tons of different kinds of cannabis, 251 tons of cocaine, 31 tons of heroine, 13 tons of morphine and narcotics related substances for 4 billion doses was seized/captured.

According to the Interpol figures, 200 million people are narcotics and drug addicts. 140 million addicts are using cannabis, 13 million cocaine, 8 million heroine and 30 million other narcotics.

On the other hand, according to the UN Narcotics Report, in 1996, altogether 280,000 hectares area of poppy was cultivated illegally and 5,000 tons of opium and 1,000 tons of cocaine was produced at the same time. 251 tons of cocaine, 31 tons of heroin and 13 tons of morphine were captured (Demirer and Özbudun 1997:15). Other narcotics related

substances are not included in these figures. The death toll related to narcotics is 14,000 in America in 1997 and 35.8% of the aids cases are also related to narcotics. Furthermore, 1.5 million people were arrested for narcotic crimes in America in 1996. 1,100 police were killed in action whilst dealing with narcotics crimes. Drug addicts also spent \$57.3 billion on narcotics in America in 1995 (ONDCP-1997). 78% of the crimes that are the sources of the illicit money in USA were connected to drug trafficking. This ratio corresponds to 70% in G-7 countries. Annual worldwide drug trafficking is worth well above 500 billion dollars (Bickford 1997:1-2).

It is declared by officials that the Russian Mafia, which is the nightmare of the world, was responsible for the economic crisis experienced in the country in 1998 because of the illegal activities they conducted either inside or outside the country.

It is estimated that 100,000 to 200,000 drug addicts cost the economy about 4 billion pounds annually in England. Again, the trade in the main illegal drugs in this country of 2.4 billion pounds corresponds to approximately the value of \$4,175,000,000 (Ergül 1998:43). This is about 0.32% of the GNP (Gross National Product) in the country. In terms of what is captured: 54 kilos of heroin, and 1 kilo of cocaine in 1970, but 6 tons of heroin and 14 tons of cocaine in 1990, while 10 tons of heroin and 39 tons of cocaine were taken in Europe.

Statistics indicate that Holland derived revenue from narcotics of about \$5.5 billion (Ergül 1998:44) That figure is about 1.4% of its GNP.

One of the most significant reasons for the economic crisis was bad loans of 800 billion dollars given

to Mafia related entities in Japan in 1998. That figure is equal to 17.4% of its GNP.

It is said that the cost of organized crime to the German economy was 188 billion Deutschmarks in 1990, and the revenues derived from narcotics were about 2-4 billion Deutschmarks (Ergül 1998:43). The economic cost in 1996 was equal to 1.4% of the GNP.

It is stated that the revenues from narcotics trafficked by the PKK, a terrorist organization active in Turkey, were about 4 billion dollars, and their annual heroin production was about 60 tons. According to the Security General Directorate's Narcotics Report for 1998, 2 tons, 627 kilos of heroin was captured; 13 tons, 377,659 kilos of hashish; 4 tons, 255 kilos and 714 grams of base morphine; 2 tons, 125 kilos and 258 grams of cannabis; 22 tons, 440 kilos of acetic acid; 603 kilos, 745 grams of cocaine; 277,000 amphetamine pills, 1 ton, 80 kilos of sodium carbonate, and 1 narcotics mill. Moreover, 659 criminals concerned with narcotics were arrested. Other than those cases 7 tons, 710 kilos, and 1 gram of hashish; 2,984,000 of cannabis; 171 kilos, 155 grams of heroin; 33 kilos of base morphine, and also 1 narcotics mill were captured in operations against the PKK terrorist organization. The total value of captured narcotics was about \$202,845,882 in wholesale, and \$3,936,191,972 in retail markets.

At the same time, as mentioned in the World Narcotics Organization reports, and in US intelligence and counter narcotics reports, the PKK was producing at the minimum 60 tons of narcotics per year in the Bekaa Valley. In narcotics calculations, the total value, without categorizing of the narcotics related substances, was calculated at \$40,000 per kilo in wholesale, and \$550,000 per kilo in

retail markets. Calculating according to these figures, one arrives at a total of \$2.4 billion and \$33 billion respectively.

Furthermore, official records compiled through intelligence operations report that the PKK has developed its operations through the Cali Cartel and established offices to deal in narcotics abroad. According to the research, PKK linked offices number 178 in Germany, 10 in Austria, 6 in Belgium, 23 in France, 9 in Denmark, 2 in Finland, 12 in Holland, 1 in Spain, 10 in England, 20 in Sweden, 13 in Switzerland, 2 in Italy, 5 in both Luxemburg and Norway, 6 in Greece, 1 in Poland, and finally 13 in USA, making a total of 316 offices.

As reflected in the World Drug Report of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in 1998, the PKK runs 20-30% of the European trafficking in drugs. The economic damage caused by that terrorist organization rises to billions of dollars annually. To go into details, the government here spent 65 billion dollars from the national budget in the fight against terrorism during the years 1984-1998. That figure constitutes 31.8% of GNP, and 63.3% of the foreign loan stocks. Moreover, the figure is three times bigger than the foreign exchange reserves of the banking sector apart from the Turkish Central Bank. Annually, 15% of the budget has been allocated for military expenditures.

Due to the terrorist acts of the PKK, hundred of thousands of acres could not be cultivated, and similarly 120 thousand construction projects could not be completed, and the number of livestock dramatically lessened, by 28%, in the last 14 years in the affected area. Whilst average per capita income was about \$3,000 in the western part of Turkey, it was less than \$500 at the eastern and south eastern parts of the country. The numbers of

soldiers martyred in the conflict has reached 3,000 so far.

The continuing presence of that terrorist organization causes significant damage to the economy and hampers development. National resources are being allocated to fight against terrorism instead of to increase production. In a study done by the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey, the average growth rate was 5% between the years 1984-1998, however that would have been 7% if expenditures of about 65 billion dollars had not been used for the fight against the PKK terrorists, but had been directed to development projects.

Methods And Techniques Used For Laundering

There are different methods, means and techniques for laundering. Actually it has become like an art (Rider 1996:28). The well known methods, means and techniques used for laundering are as follows:

1. Money Laundering

Currency smuggling/cash money smuggling is a traditional and common method of money-laundering. Illicit money is physically transferred out of the country in which that money was acquired through messengers, mail services and other means. In that country there may be strict inspection and judiciary arrangements, that cause difficulty for money laundering, or, in contrast, there may be a lack of inspection or free movement of money in the country that the money is transferred into, and there may be many collaborating institutions where the money can safely be laundered or legalized. The criminals prefer countries where there is no inspection of money in cash, and no strict controls on currency, together with a banking system offering guaranteed privacy.

Illicit money is still in cash at the end of that first step, when it is taken out of the country of origin. However, the links between the illicit money and the illegal source from which that money is transferred are severely weakened by this stage. Then the illicit money is brought into the mainstream of the financial system of the second country by utilizing particular conditions and opportunities (Ministry of Interior 1999:97). As a follow up, that processed illicit money is transferred to the country of origin where the money was acquired, directly or through a third country, via electronic fund transfers and the banking system, checks, or other ways. Apart from these methods for moving money, illicit money can be transferred out physically, through air, land, or sea lines, by cargo, post, messengers, or other ways which avoid customs. An increase has been observed in the methods for moving illicit money out of the developed countries in cash. This in itself proves that there are efficient measures to hamper money laundering, or the utilizing of illicit money in investments, in the form of strict inspections and judicial arrangements.

2. Re-structuring

This method is used by criminals who want to avoid being reported to inspection bureaus in the course of processing illicit money (Ministry of Interior 1999:97). There are strict rules for making declarations about cash expenditure that exceeds some specific amounts, and for suspicious spending whatever the amount. At the time Akar collected his figures, the limits for minimum cash spending were 10,000 dollars in the USA, 200,000 Austrian Schillings in Austria, 10,000 Australian dollars in Australia, 10,000 Canadian dollars in Canada, 50,000 French francs in France, 20,000

Deutschmarks in Germany, 20,000 Italian lira in Italy, 30,000,000 yen in Japan, and 2,500,000 Spanish pesetas in Spain (Akar:50). The declaration limit in Turkey was 5 billion TL. When following this method, illicit money is deposited at a bank by separate people, split into parts less than the declaration limits, and in different banks in order not to give rise to any doubt. This labor-intensive method is called “splitting” or “fission”. Once the profit gained through illicit money embedded into the financial system investment phase comes to an end, the splitting process can be easily undertaken. The only respect in which money launderers run the risk of being noticed by banks or financial inspectors is when certain banking procedures are done by separate people and the procedures are suspicious.

3. Fictitious depositing, or depositing for a false name

In this method the bank account is fictitious or money is deposited in a false name. The names of more than one person also can be used. While depositing at a bank it is possible that the criminals will gain the collaboration of the bank/financial institution, such that the identification process can somehow be disregarded. Falsification is also possible in the process. The aim of these actions is either not to draw any attention, or complicating the matter of tracing the process through a careful inspection of the paper trail. It is necessary to have information, not only about the customers inspected, but also about the real offenders/accomplices in order to identify evidence related to money laundering by financial institutions.

4. Loan payments

Laundering can be achieved by

creating fictitious borrower and creditor relations. A fictitious borrower and creditor relation is created, then it is charged through a bill, and finally it is cashed. Bonds, bills and checks are commonly used for this purpose.

5. Utilizing of legally recognized institutions

In this method, illicit money is invested in funds of fully legal and officially recognized financial institutions as a supplement to their funds. That institution must be a company founded for legal purposes, but which comes to be utilized for money laundering, or it may be founded as a new firm for the purpose of laundering. Typically the latter kind of firm is set up with a small amount of capital, and eventually the capital is increased so that it is able to buy new firms through the new funds (Ministry of Interior 1997:97).

6. Utilizing of dummy corporations or false firms

Here the criminal can run casinos, unregistered parking lots, etc., or legal firms like fuel stations, vending machines, take-away restaurants, stock brokers, and exchange offices that exchange mostly in cash. Likewise totally fictitious firms can be set up in this method. The availability of associates in different cities, countries, or often in the center of off-shores, makes it difficult to trace and inspect the money of these companies. Investments can be made through the banking system by transferring illegal funds to the centers where tax advantages are assured by a dummy corporation. The main idea of utilizing a dummy corporation is to make it difficult for the process of tracing or inspecting the money laundering, particularly at the stage of identifying

the fund transfers. As a result of privacy responsibilities that hamper the sharing of information about customers, it is quite difficult to identify those firms which are established at off-shores or in free trade zones in order to utilize tax advantages. Money laundering entities have a lot of such false firms at their disposal, and they transfer funds by using many separated procedures to make the funds more complicated and difficult to trace. There are two different ways of doing this. The first way is to introduce the false firm as a very profitable one. In that way illicit money, gained imaginarily, is deposited to accounts in cash and declared to be the high profits of the firm. This is then apparently legalized by taxing. The only cost for the money launderer is the taxes paid. The second way is that a false firm buys all estates or real estates of other firms.

In general, a money launderer leaves legalized money in a tax haven or off-shore center. Fake invoices or false papers are arranged in order to conceal the sources of the funds. According to the method used, it might be mandatory to pay taxes on the profits. However, money launderers accept this as part of the cost of the laundering of the illicit money. It is estimated that this may account for around 30% of the total cost. On the other hand, those dummy corporations or false firms can declare profits even though they don't have any financial activity. They can legalize illicit money as much as their declared profit by doing so.

7. The underground banking system method

Underground banking, parallel banking, unregistered banking or

alternative banking systems are illegal banking activities known to be used as a money laundering method. At the beginning money laundering was an activity found in the banking system, however, an increase in inspections and new judicial arrangements diverted that process into other financial sectors, and out of banking systems. Eventually new laundering procedures shifted towards the alternative banking sector. The alternative banking system is utilized in sectors related to the unregistered economy, and here many money laundering crimes take place. This sector is out of the range of inspections, and fund transfers

between accounts and individuals in different countries, and some other banking procedures take place without any bureaucracy or registration in any particular name.

To uphold civil law and public authority, it is important that revenue is legally gained and taxed. There are three categories of revenue which can be identified here: legal income declared on the tax return form, undeclared legal income on the tax return form, and illegal income. Governments may choose not to intervene in the first two of them, but they are obliged to act to end the illegal activity regarding the third.

Defence Against Suicide Bombing

Arif EK MEN

Colonel (TUR A)

Course Director, COE-DAT

Introduction

Suicide attacks are one of the most difficult types of terrorist attacks to prevent. Suicide terrorism is the effect of a complex system of causes. As a method of attaining martyrdom it generates many new options for the perpetrators, and hence the great importance ascribed to it. They can choose from among a broad range of targets, deploy a variety of resources that are relatively easy to obtain, and respond to altered circumstances with great flexibility. This 'martyrdom' also runs counter to 'our' sense of logic. It is for this reason that suicide attacks are more difficult to imagine, predict and prevent. An effective response to suicide terrorism lies in a multi-disciplinary, multi-faceted approach. Individual measures, when taken on their own, have limited effectiveness, but together they can reduce the risk of suicide attacks to a certain extent.

From the social angle, explanations of suicide terrorism are largely the same as those for terrorism and radicalisation in general. Explanations specific to this form of terrorism include the acceptance in the society of suicide attacks, their religious glorification and approval, and the occupation of a territory by a foreign power of another religious persuasion. With respect to the terrorist group that deploys suicide attackers, this form of terrorism has been characterised as a weapon of the poor in the absence of other effective weapons. Despite that, suicide attacks have a number of major advantages for a group that chooses this method. Acceptance of suicide terrorism on the part of the society or community to which the terrorists belong is of great significance to the group. An examination of the individuals who carry out suicide attacks led to the conclusion that there is no specific profile for suicide terrorists, given that most of them are perfectly ordinary people. What distinguishes them from others is their need to do something for the society in which they feel at home, or the imagined community to which they believe they belong, combined with their willingness to

sacrifice themselves to achieve this goal. Group pressure, recruitment by terrorist organisations, and online jihadist propaganda all play a role in the process. ⁽¹⁾

What Is a Suicide Attack?

The phenomenon of suicide attacks has attracted the attention of many scholars and many articles and books have recently been written on this subject. In many cases, these scholars' quantitative research and conclusions differ since they are using different definitions of the phenomenon of suicide attacks.

The definition should help in identifying this specific phenomenon and separating it from all other types of terrorism. This is exactly the purpose of the suggested definition in this article – *"A suicide attack is an operational method in which the very act of the attack is dependent upon the death of the perpetrator"*. This is a unique situation in which the terrorist is fully aware that if he does not kill himself, the planned attack will not be carried out. He cannot fulfil his mission and stay alive at the same time. It is important to define correctly a suicide attack since there are different types of attacks that might be mistakenly considered as belonging to this special category:

On many occasions, the perpetrator of an attack sets out with the knowledge that there is a good chance he will be killed in the course of an attack (for example in trying to force a bus over a cliff). In spite of the imminent danger to the terrorist's life, as long as there is a possibility of the attack being successful without him being forced to kill himself during the course of it, this should not be considered a "suicide attack". Sometimes the terrorist even makes concrete preparations for the possibility of death as a result of the attack (preparing a will, carrying out purification ceremonies, etc.), however, these preparations in themselves do not turn the attack into a suicide attack.

In some attacks, terrorists are equipped with "suicide belts" – explosives for

blowing themselves up should anything go wrong – such as if the attack fails or security forces break into a building where terrorists are holding hostages. The existence of such explosives, and even the decision to use them, does not constitute adequate grounds for defining the attack as a suicide attack, since the terrorist attack would occur even without the death of the perpetrator.

As mentioned above, in a suicide attack, the terrorist knows full well that the attack will not be executed if he is not killed in the process. This is important to emphasize since only in this type of attack the terrorist finds himself in a very special psychological mood that can be defined as “tunnel vision”. In this mood, he enters the one end of the tunnel and if he decides to march to the other end of the tunnel and fulfil his mission his death is essential. The terrorist knows he has no other option – either he presses the button and kills himself and others or he refrains from pressing the button and he is not killed and nothing happens. He cannot partially fulfil his mission and he cannot cling to the hope of staying alive after carrying it out.

In Israel, many “killing spree” attacks are mistakenly considered and counted as suicide attacks. In these attacks, the perpetrator goes to a crowded place and uses any weapon that he may possess in order to kill and injure as many people as possible knowing that he will probably die during the course of the attack, or after he runs out of ammunition. Yet, there still is a possibility of fulfilling his mission without killing himself and therefore this shouldn't be considered a suicide attack. This is similar to a soldier fighting in a very difficult battle who is outnumbered by enemy forces – he knows that death could be near, but he still clings to the possibility that he will remain alive at the end of the battle. The suicide attacker does not have this privilege and without understanding this and the special psychological mood the suicide attacker is in at the target scene it will be very difficult to find the right tactics and methods to identify and neutralize him in the last moments

before he detonates himself. (2)

Core Characteristics of Suicide Terrorism

Terrorists have become increasingly attracted to suicide attacks because of their unique tactical advantages compared to those of more conventional terrorist operations. Suicide tactics are devastatingly effective, lethally efficient, have a greater likelihood of success, and are relatively inexpensive and generally easier to execute than other attack modes. The terrorist decision to employ this tactic therefore is neither irrational nor desperate, as is sometimes portrayed; rather it is an entirely rational and calculated choice, consciously embraced as a deliberate instrument of warfare – the “strategic logic” to which Robert Pape refers. For radical Islamic terrorist groups in particular, the religious and theological justification plays an additionally critical role: it ensures the flow of recruits to these organizations that is needed to sustain suicide operations.

Suicide terrorism differs from all other terrorist operations because the perpetrator's own death is an essential requirement for the attack's success. The suicide terrorist is the “ultimate smart bomb”, a human missile relentlessly homing in on its target but with flexibility in timing and access. The suicide terrorist thus has the ability to effect last-minute changes in his or her attack plan, on the basis of ease or difficulty of approach, the paucity or density of people in or around the target, and whether or not security personnel are present or other counter-measures are visible.

Suicide terrorist operations are also inexpensive to mount. According to one estimate, the total cost of a typical Palestinian suicide operation, for example, is about one hundred fifty dollars. Yet this modest sum yields a very attractive return: on average, suicide operations worldwide kill about four times as many people as other kinds of terrorist attacks. In Israel the average is even higher, inflicting six times the number of deaths and roughly twenty-six times more casualties

than other acts of terrorism. These attacks are also less complicated and compromising than other terrorist operations, since no escape plan is needed: if the attack is successful, there is no assailant to capture and interrogate. The very fact that it is a suicide attack obviates the need to formulate a plan for the perpetrator(s) to get away – often the most complicated and difficult aspect of a terrorist operation – and therefore greatly enhances its simplicity. ⁽³⁾

Terrorist Groups That Carry out Suicide Attacks

Not every terrorist group carries out suicide attacks. Suicide terrorism is regarded as the weapon of the poor. It is a suitable weapon for a weak party facing an opponent that is far superior in equipment: It is a weapon of last resort. From the terrorist's perspective there are strategic and tactical advantages to suicide attacks.

1. Suicide attacks are relatively simple and cheap to plan and execute. There is no need for an escape plan, losses are limited and perpetrators are easy to replace.
2. Suicide attacks have the potential to kill and injure many people and cause a lot of damage to the opponent.
3. Perpetrators can determine the time, the location and the circumstances of an attack: they are the ultimate smart bombs. Moreover, they are difficult to detect and are even able to penetrate heavily guarded areas.
4. Perpetrators cannot be arrested afterwards and therefore cannot give away any information to intelligence and investigative services.
5. Suicide attacks have a huge impact on the public and the media due to their high casualty rate and apparently irrational nature.
6. Suicide attacks give the impression that the perpetrators are so resolute that more attacks are likely to follow (psychological warfare).
7. Suicide attacks have the aura of martyrdom, which provides a certain degree of religious justification.
8. Suicide attacks have a positive effect on recruitment and help to strengthen the terrorist group's support base. ⁽¹⁾

The Six Stages of a Suicide Terrorist Operation

A suicide terrorist operation can be broken down into roughly six stages:

1. Opting for suicide terrorism,
2. Recruiting candidates,
3. Training suicide terrorists,
4. Preparing the attack,
5. The attack itself, and
6. The aftermath.

Currently, the assumption is that while a lone individual is capable of carrying out a suicide attack, this scenario is less likely than a suicide attack by a terrorist group.

Among the six stages, the areas for attention in counter-terrorism were highlighted and measures proposed from multiple perspectives. The general impression is that these areas for attention are basically the same for suicide terrorism, 'ordinary' terrorism, and radicalisation: combating polarisation and radicalisation, cracking down on terrorist groups and their efforts to recruit new members, and putting up barriers to potential resources and targets. An important factor for suicide terrorism is a religious climate which sanctions and glorifies martyrdom and suicide attacks, as can be found on the Internet.

All things considered, these findings raise the question of whether there is any sense in drawing a distinction between Islamist terrorism and Islamist suicide terrorism, from the perspective of security. Despite this reasonable doubt, a distinct understanding of the latter phenomenon is plainly relevant. The religious approval and glorification of martyrdom and the pursuit of this goal by the individual generates numerous alternatives and expectations for terrorists, and hence greater fervour. On the other hand, martyrdom has a strong logic, but it is not one that most of us can relate to. This makes it especially difficult for intelligence and investigative agencies to imagine the additional options available to terrorists who have decided to martyr themselves. This is a major handicap. From a

practical point of view, a response must be found to a number of other aspects of suicide terrorism that influence the methods chosen. Finally, suicide attacks have an immense Influence on the public and the media.⁽¹⁾

The Human Component of Suicide Terrorism

In one of his lectures, Dr. Keith Spence addressed the Human Component of Suicide Terrorism. He stated that it a multi-layered approach to the issue was needed, and that did not have a specific single right answer. Any policy developed with regard to Suicide Terrorism, and terrorism in general, must be proactive and adapted to the specific circumstances of the problem in order to achieve the desired results.

To understand the general social concepts of terrorism one has to look at the effects of terror on the society the attackers are attempting to change. We may know about the society and the effects that terrorism has upon it, but we must also understand and learn to recognise the reactions of the individual within that society in order to fully understand them. Our understanding of individuals is always limited and further research in the issue is required. However, if we work within the limits of current knowledge, this can be used for risk management. The act of suicide will always be enigmatic, whatever the cause. Most literature and case histories regarding suicide do not have a general solution, the events tend not to be predictable enough to know the action that will be taken sufficiently in advance to prevent it.

Suicide has many signals including despair and helplessness, and it manifests itself in extremes of behaviour which are almost impossible to understand for someone who has not faced this issue. There is a debate among many commentators as to whether anyone can ever be classed as rational and voluntarily end their own life, or if there will always be some external or internal pressure which takes away, in the mind of the suicide, the act of choice. The limits to understanding are compounded, we think, especially with regard to Afghanistan and Iraq. We

are living in a time of a great proliferation of suicide bombings, particularly in those countries, but getting accurate details from these areas is a genuine problem. There is currently not enough evidence to give clear and accurate data to the real reasons for the causes of the suicide bombings, and therefore not enough evidence for us to work out possible solutions based on fact. Often removing just one single cause of a suicide bombing creates a vacuum, which is then filled by another individual as a suicide bomber. Suicide is unpredictable, but it is also inevitable that it will happen to some people; it is part of the human condition. We should attempt to interdict someone who is potentially a suicide bomber, but that relies on our being able to identify the causes and other factors that may make them candidates.

Suicide terrorism occurs as the culmination of a variety of factors, including the tendency to suicide and the willingness to engage in terrorist acts. It is a very effective form of attack, both psychologically and physically, especially against soft targets. Whatever security measures are put in place there is always going to be the possibility for a suicide bomber to get through, as the human element of the delivery may be able to defeat the human imposed security. Suicide bombing is a truly political act and is powerful as a communicative and ideological tool for publicising the message. In terms of the act itself, the planning period which is secretive leads to a highly public act, a mechanism for publicity, and suicide videos are frequently released made by the bombers before their act to spread their reputation. This is part of the psychological effect of suicide bombing which relies on amplification by the media and public. It can become a rallying cry of support for the weak. The martyrs of the Second Intifada experienced their suicides as a badge of honour and a financial security for their families.

Suicide terrorism is a virus which has now mutated out of control. We have to accept it is here and learn how to deal with it. However, research shows that we should not think of it as always associated with grinding poverty and despair. The scholar Alan Krueger studied the data and tried to identify whether suicide bombers have shared characteristics and to find their core backgrounds and motivations. He failed to find a true common basis, and concluded that there was no single type of suicide bomber. He accepted that there were many untrue myths regarding the reasons people committed suicide attacks. It is not necessarily born of poverty or ill education. Most suicide bombers have a high school or higher education, and are generally from above the poverty line, often with a higher than average wage. Terrorists tend to be educationally or financially advantaged. This means factors related to material distress cannot be a direct cause of rage or destruction. The militants do, however, come from an environment where there is a perceived or actual lack of civil liberty.

Suicide bombers are overwhelmingly single young males. Young males in societies demand civil liberties and may turn to martyrdom when they feel these are being eroded. But there is a question as to who pulls the strings with regard to the coordination and preparation for a suicide attack. There is clearly a higher level in the organisations where people such as Bin Laden stir up moral indignation and draw some towards suicide, and there is also a more tactical level of influence.

“What over 95% of all suicide attacks around the world since 1980 until today have in common is not religion, but a clear, strategic objective: to compel a modern democracy to withdraw military forces from the territory that the terrorists view as their homeland.” Robert Pape.

The religious aspects of terrorism act like a vortex, but there is a debate within the extremist communities as to whether suicide martyrdom can ever be justified. In the scriptures suicide is

universally condemned as sinful, but in some books martyrdom is glorified. The question is always: how are these texts to be interpreted? The concept of jihad, for example, is seen by some as a struggle against despair, while other elements of society give widely differing interpretations.

The conditions and causes of terrorism and suicide are not the same thing. There are general factors that create the conditions but are not the actual cause that pushes an individual or a group into a specific action. To manage the risk we can look at the group or organizational level. The efforts of the security forces can aim de-legitimise the group, or act to contradict the act of terror. If support for the group is eroded in the community then the group will struggle to exist. Without this support it is harder to grow and act. It will take a long time to create these effects, and may even be a generational struggle. Counter terrorism and counter insurgency have human intelligence and local knowledge as key factors in the fight.

The use of intelligence to be able to disrupt terror cells at the planning, research, construction or execution stage of their plan is key. Intervention at the appropriate moment is only possible through good community-based intelligence and also intercepting the terrorists at the stage when they are passing information.

Religion plays a central role in individual and social life, and it must not be made to seem synonymous with terror. The language of terrorism and counter terrorism is very important. Calling a campaign a crusade is insensitive and wrong. The focus should not be on Islam but on the economic, political and civil problems which will allow those struggling to bring peace to concentrate on solvable, practical issues rather than theological ones. It is a global campaign, but also a very local one, as the issue must be addressed at various levels. Fighting the terrorists by addressing the arguments from their perspective and at their level is important.

Situational crime prevention is also a key part in the planning to defeat terrorism. Target hardening, good planning and practicing procedures will help. It cannot deter all suicide attacks but will help defend against some.

The media is also a key battleground. Terrorism will plant seeds in the minds on the susceptible. A multi-dimensional approach is one way to defeat it. The 'terror trap' of overreacting to an incident or group is a danger that society must be cognizant of. ⁽⁴⁾

Preventive Steps That Can Be Taken against Suicide Terrorism

1. Reducing the acceptance of suicide attacks and martyrdom among certain segments of the Muslim community, and the religious approval and glorification of these actions ('the climate'). Relevant measures are:
 - a. Internet surveillance, focusing on the general tone of the discourse, radical individuals and sect formation,
 - b. Luring individuals becoming radicalised and full-fledged terrorists by means of honey pots,
 - c. Identifying and halting sect formation in time with the help of schools, local governments, etc., aided by experts in the psychology of religion,
 - d. Helping mainstream Muslim sites become more resistant to radicalism,
 - e. Shutting down radical sites,
 - f. Circulating counter-arguments to suicide terrorism.
2. Putting up barriers to prevent terrorists from obtaining materials and resources that can be used to make explosives;
3. Tracking down materials and

resources that can be use to make explosives. Relevant measures are:

- a. Placing detection devices in areas that attract large numbers of people, near potential targets, and/or within security rings;
 - b. Using detection devices in the course of standard investigative and surveillance activities;
 - c. Designing architectural facilities that can be used to isolate individuals;
 - d. Investing in and employing detonation-disrupting technology for the police;
4. Raising public awareness:
 - a. Encouraging retailers to report suspect purchases of certain substances to the police;
 - b. Recording the transport and theft of such substances and actual explosives in a registration system;
 - c. Investigating explosions, even those that are seemingly innocuous;
 5. Preventing terrorists from acquiring the knowledge or expert assistance necessary to deploy these resources:
 - a. Gathering intelligence on individuals who are capable of making explosives;
 - b. Gathering intelligence on radical students pursuing certain courses of study;
 - c. Removing books and instructional material on making explosives;
 6. Increasing police and camera surveillance of potential targets.
- It should be noted that the effectiveness of some of these measures is questionable. In addition to the above preventive measures, preparations for dealing with the aftermath of an attack are necessary. There must be facilities in place to trace mobile phone communication in the vicinity of the target, online communication, financial flows, etc.. ⁽¹⁾

Note: Col. Arif Ekmen has in this article prepared a summary of the Centre of Excellence–Defence Against Terrorism's Defence Against Suicide Bombing IV Course, conducted between 19-23 November 2007. This course presented expert analysis and information from civilian and military professionals from around the world. In this summary Col. Ekmen also makes reference to the following:

- (1). *Suicide Terrorism: An In-depth Study with Policy Options (Nov 2005).*
- (2). *Dr. Boaz Ganor, ICT, Herzliya, Israel.*
- (3). *Bruce Hoffman (author of Inside Terrorism, 2006), page: 132-133.*
- (4). *Dr. Keith Spence, Leicester University, UK.*

Overview of the Course “Organizational & Psychological Profile of Terrorism” Held in Macedonia (22-26 October 2007)

S. Ahmet EREN

*4th Grade Police Superintendent
Instructor, COE-DAT*

The Centre of Excellence–Defence Against Terrorism conducted an Advanced Training Course (ATC) on the “Organizational & Psychological Profile of Terrorism”, in Skopje/Macedonia between 22 and 26 October 2007. The course was funded and supported by the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme.

The course featured 12 lecturers, eight from Turkey, and one from each of the following countries: England, the USA, Germany and Macedonia. The lecturers were selected from among experts in the fields of military, police and academic affairs. In total 33 Macedonian officials participated in the course from the Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, from the National Intelligence Agency, Crisis Management Unit, and Civil Aviation Agency.



To looking back at the course, it can be seen that the course handled terrorism in its broad outlines first, and then proceeded to highlight the organizational structures of terrorist groups, their group psychology and group dynamics.

The first speaker of the course was Concept Specialist Miss Zeynep Sütalan, a member of COE-DAT. Despite her youth, she was full of energy and talked with great ability on “The Causes of Terrorism”. She reviewed different dimensions of terrorism, namely its economic, social, psychological and religious aspects. She said terrorism

breeds in any environment it can. Thus, it is hard to identify one specific cause or group of causes that result in terrorism. Different types of terrorism in different cases can derive from different causes. Despite this difficulty, a comprehensive approach towards the political, social and economic environment where terrorism is likely to flourish may result in fruitful approaches for combating terrorism. Within this context, she provided a general framework for understanding the causes of terrorism, rather than proposing methods to cope with them.

Police Superintendent Süleyman Özeren (PhD) from the Turkish Police Academy followed as the second speaker, and he outlined the nature of contemporary terrorism. In his speech he noted: “Modern and technologically enhanced terrorists can engage in operations from very long distances by using advanced technology.” Terror networks have developed new methods and tactics in addition to ones already present to cause more casualties and horror in societies. Terrorism has now become a sector which possesses its own institutions, centres and publications, etc..

When Concept Specialist Zeynep Sütalan took the stage a second time, she mentioned the major ideologies and main characteristics of terrorism: “When an ideology cannot find its place in participatory politics, extremist proponents may turn to terrorism.” She divided terrorism into four types: left-wing, right-wing, separatist, and religious. To summarize the content of her lecture, she pointed out that left-wing terrorism in its modern context originated in the 1848 revolutions in Europe. In the twentieth century and the present, variations of anarchism and Marxism have repeatedly been adapted according to unique socio-political conditions. Right-wing terrorist groups have risen as a reaction to perceived ideological and ethnic enemies. This terrorism is carried out by members of the majority against a minority. Nationalist separatism exists in a continuum from ideology to mobilization of the masses with this ideology to achieve strategic political ends, which may involve other internal and external dynamics.

It may become the instrument in the 'war by proxy' strategy. Changing balances in the international system, societies in transition, economic pressures, etc., all contribute to the rise of religious terrorism. In an individualized world, we will see the mushrooming of extremist ideas, but no single ideology will be able to capture an entire generation as Marxism did. "No ideology, including Islamist extremism, will be hegemonic as a counter-ideology to the liberal paradigm", she observed. The example of the PKK also shows an ideological shift, as the terrorists adapt to the changing circumstances of the modern world.

Later, Major Julian Charvat, from the United Kingdom, who is also a member of COE-DAT, addressed the workshop on "Terrorism Today and in the Future", and he dwelled on possible aspects of terrorism of particular concern or interest. The causes of modern terrorism and the motivation behind contemporary terrorist groups were the main subjects of his lecture. The most visible change between the terrorist events of the past and today is the adoption of the new methods, tactics and approaches for the attacks, and also the common embracing of technology by terrorist networks. On the other hand, almost every country has a concern about terrorist attacks which might be conducted with the use of CBRN, which are termed WMD.



The course hosted a very experienced Police Chief from the Anti-Terrorism Department of Turkish National Police, 3rd Grade Police Superintendent Yavuz Özdemir. He touched upon the recruitment methods of terrorist organizations and the training of militants. In his speech, he said that new recruits to terrorism underwent a rigorous screening which was also a 'process of reconstruction' to raise militants. The terrorist organizations draw individuals in by using social relationships with friends, relatives, and fellow-countrymen, as well as using social activities, ethnic identities and religious values. In the second part of his speech, he examined how terrorists change the recruits' perceptions and subconscious, giving them a militant personality. He said: "One can analyse the recruits' motives by using Maslow's 'hierarchy of needs' theory, which ranges from physiological needs to the needs associated with self-actualization. Hierarchical organizations, working as cells, make use of group dynamics to attract and then intimidate recruits into remaining. A process takes place whereby individual personalities are lost, and the group personality dominates. Books, CDs and magazines are important in shaping the new personality, which becomes ruthless, perceiving the world in a programmed way, and wholly obedient to the organization. One can combat terrorism politically, but unless one addresses these human issues, organizations will continue to be able to recruit." He also indicated the importance of education in helping potential recruits to avoid the 'terrorism disease'.

Superintendent Özdemir lined up the activity methods of terrorist organizations in his second presentation: "Bombing, wounding, murder, abduction, hijacking, hostage taking, arson, raids, ambushes, sabotage, assassinations and suicide bombings are all examples of conventional attacks by terrorist networks", he explained.

Cyber terror is also a threat which must be dealt in a way that will ensure prevention, although no direct cyber attacks have been launched so far.

The Course Director, and one of the instructors, 4th Grade Police Superintendent S.Ahmet Eren, handled the “Profile and Mindset of Terrorists”. He aimed to scrutinize the concepts of terrorists, who either voluntarily commit terrorist attacks or are forced to do so, with various motivational factors. His presentation focused on the mindset of terrorists mainly from Turkey, but also referred to terrorists elsewhere. He said in his speech that: “It is a known fact that terrorist organizations are capable of using some ‘social’ and ‘psychological’ methods as a means of propaganda to influence members”. He also explained the militants’ point of view in interpreting the events taking place around them as the effects of group psychology. The lecture emphasized how this ideology turns into a belief system for the recruit after a certain period in the organization. Superintendent Eren highlighted the importance of ideological publications, which are read continuously during organizational training. He finally reflected on the effects of all these factors in the formation of the suicide bomber.

Another issue handled in the course was an “Overview of Crisis Management” related to terrorist attacks. Lt.-Col. U•ur Ersen mentioned recent global terrorist events that increased the demand for detailed and comprehensive crisis management: “The policy and strategy is developed by the ministry and government, but there are supervisory roles also for the Crisis Management Centre (CMC), on-scene leaders, and response team leaders. The tools for crisis management include logistics, health and safety, information management, public order, and legal support. The CMC, providing centralized control, may be composed of police, army, fire fighters, health workers, municipality, and other experts.” The speaker then analysed the phases of crisis management, from the planning and preparation, including exercises, to the execution.

Major Julian Charvat discussed the responses to terrorism in the Criminal Justice and the War Models. He briefly considered areas of international cooperation, specifically the legal and maritime international agreements to prevent terrorism. He also discussed domestic and intelligence issues during his lecture named “Possibilities of Coordination and Cooperation”.

An important aspect of the course was financial resource of terrorist organizations. Assistant Prof. Michael Freeman from the United States of America touched upon terrorist groups trying to find ways to make money for their organizational activities. He said: “Terrorist organizations must acquire funds to conduct attacks and operate their organizations.” He divided the sources of terrorist funding into five categories: state support, illegal activity, legal activity, popular support, and involuntary support. In each of these different sources there are advantages and disadvantages for terrorist groups, and different opportunities for the state to utilize countermeasures to exploit different vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, targeting terrorist financing is a difficult task because the amounts raised tend to be low and easily raised, and because terrorist organizations are adaptive in the face of government pressure.

Assistant Prof. Michael Freeman touched on terrorism and organized crime in his second lecture. He drew attention to the symbiotic relationship which can develop: “The nexus of organized crime and terrorism is complex and an increasingly important issue for policy makers. Frequently, terrorist groups and organized crime look much alike structurally and engage in similar activities, yet there are also some crucial differences in their acceptance of risk, their motivating ideology, and their use of violence, for example. Furthermore, terrorist and criminal groups often work together and these alliances have a force multiplying effect in terms of the dangers they might pose to the state.”

4th Grade Police Superintendent S.Ahmet Eren talked on “Turkish Police Experience of Suicide Terrorism” when he next took the stage. His second lecture aimed to

scrutinize the types of terrorism threat in Turkey, briefly outlining characteristics of the PKK terrorist organization, and he touched upon the Turkish experience of suicide terrorism. The lecture brought in some specific examples of suicide attacks by the terrorist groups in Turkey, committed either voluntarily or under pressure, and the methods applied. The two case studies attracted the attention of the participants. Many questions were asked by the participants with regard to the psychology of suicide bombers. The lecture taught also the tactical measures that can be taken to protect the individuals confronted by terrorist events.

The Macedonian perspective on countering terrorism was also given to the participants. Mr. Alexandar Bocinov, Head of Department from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Macedonia, said in his speech that: "The Republic of Macedonia does not face classic forms of terrorism, although Macedonians have been killed in Pakistan, in 2002, and in Iraq, in 2004. Nonetheless, in common with elsewhere in the Balkan region, there are security risks because of religious radicalism, political extremism, and organized crime. Macedonia witnessed conflict in 2001. It is a transit zone for extremists travelling north to European countries. Militant groups can be financed by smuggling, particularly of narcotics and weapons, and human trafficking. As Macedonia integrates more with Euro-Atlantic structures, a process of standardization and harmonization is taking place, above all regarding the Penal Code, Criminal Procedures Law, and other laws. The security services and agencies in the country direct their efforts intensively towards preventing and incapacitating the terrorist threats." Religion, Terror and Suicide Attacks were also handled in the course. Dr. M. Selim Saruhan, from the University of Ankara's Faculty of Divinity, explained the point of views of religions in general and Islam religion in particular. In the framework of this lecture, the focus was first on the philosophy of what religions teach in regard to the problem of peace in the midst of a world of

opposing views. Religions in general, and Islam in particular, have as their aim living together in peace. "We should judge religions by their most authentic examples rather than by their worst corruptions," he said. Terror is the result of influences brought to bear on human nature, and cannot be attributed to a religion, just as it cannot be attributed to a nation. Terrorists of all religions may attribute their violence to their beliefs, while in fact they operate for other, human reasons. He showed how the Qur'an teaches tolerance, and condemns murder and suicide. The central point of his thesis was that, in order to overcome terrorism, people have to put forward a true and accurate understanding of religion. Only in this way can we acquire excellence. He also said that the Faculty of Divinity educates its students in the ways of peace. The students in turn carry this message throughout Turkey, which can act as a beacon for other Muslim countries.

Col. Osman Aytaç, a very talented instructor from COE-DAT, by his perfect skills in using body language in addition to his highly appreciated performance, explained the "Rules of Engagement in Combating Terrorism" to the audience. His lecture offered an overview of Rules of Engagement (ROE) when forces face the threat of terrorism. ROE, which define what kind of force to use in which situations, apply on three levels: Force-wide guidance, guidance for commanders, and tactical ROE for soldiers. In developing ROE, national policy, the operational situation and requirements, and the relevant law must all be considered: "Differences in these factors among coalition members undertaking counter-terrorist operations must be taken into account during the planning process if such operations are to be successful," he said.

Lt.-Col. Uğur Ersen mentioned in his second lecture the Role of the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) in Countering Terrorism. The United Nations is the most significant organization in the fight against terrorism.

His presentation detailed the legal basis for the UN's counter-terrorism (CT) role, quoting both the UN Charter and relevant resolutions. Since 2005 the UN has a Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), heading up coordination work with numerous international bodies. The following year saw the adoption of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Also in the wake of 9/11, but also of the Madrid and London bombings, the EU has taken an active role. The EU Action Plan to Fight against Terrorism dates from 21 September 2001. In 2005 The EU committed itself to a CT Strategy, covering four strands of work: prevention, protection, pursuit, and response. The third organization examined in his lecture was NATO, which endorsed a Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism at the 2002 Prague Summit. Here again there are four roles: anti-terrorism, consequence management, CT, and military cooperation. The Alliance has recently developed a NATO Response Force, with over 20,000 troops. There follow details of NATO operations relating to CT. In conclusion he stated that: "Cooperation among UN, EU, NATO and others should be enhanced, since it is necessary to take an integrated approach to CT."

On the last day of the activity, Police Superintendent Süleyman Özeren (PhD) summarized the measures taken by Turkey against terrorist organizations. While talking on the "Turkish Counter-Terrorism Experience", Dr. Özeren described the key terrorist threats to Turkey and the main features of the country's institutional response to these challenges: "Four types of terrorism threaten Turkey," he said, "left-wing groups, right-wing groups, separatist movements, and Al-Qaeda connected international terrorism. Turkey's Interior Ministry is the key agency responding to these threats. The authorities have carried out successful operations through diplomacy and working to address the root causes of terrorism. Nevertheless, Turkey does not always receive the attention it deserves from the international community. Much more work is needed in building an international coalition and addressing terrorism's underlying causes." Dr. Özeren concluded his speech by saying that Turkey could make a much larger contribution to

international counter-terrorism efforts by training other law enforcement agencies.

Working Groups

The course was enriched by the interactive group studies. Working Groups composed of participants discussed a specific scenario given on a daily base to consolidate the topics taught during that day. Each day a part of the scenario was discussed and participants tried to find answers to the questions along with trying to solve the problems at the scenario.

Conclusion

The course handled different dimensions of terrorism and analysed it in its different aspects. It touched upon mostly the main pillars of the struggle against terrorism, but, at the same time, it examined the organizational and psychological aspects of it in more detail.

No doubt in the light of the experiences of the law enforcement agencies, the most important confronting measure taken is to have a strong intelligence unit and equipped personnel capable of analysing the incoming data, interpreting it, and also guiding the relevant units responsible for taking necessary steps. The sharing of information between all relevant governmental organizations is also extremely important.

It is one of the propaganda goals of terrorist organizations to demonstrate the authorities' disregard (perceived or real) for basic human rights. In short, special efforts must be taken to remain within the legal boundaries, and not to victimize the innocent masses under any circumstances. In that respect, the mechanism formed either domestically or internationally to deal with terrorism must be well known and must be implemented justly.

The human component is of vital importance for terrorist networks. Accordingly, the youth must be protected from being recruited.

Lessons learned must be shared, without jealousy or a competitive spirit, within national and international organizations for combating terrorism. Terrorism has gained an international dimension, and because of this characteristic it is too difficult to overcome unless true and open international cooperation is realized.

Criminal Theory in the Service of Counter-Terrorism

Andrew BUNCE

WG CDR (GBR N)

Chief, Doctrine and Policy

“If you know the enemy and you know yourself, you need not fear the results of a hundred battles.” (Sun Tzu¹) In 1969 the British military personnel deployed to Northern Ireland were welcomed by the Catholic community as a force to protect them against Protestant violence. Within a year the situation had changed to one of confrontation between predominantly Catholic Republicans and the British Army. This change was the result of many factors but key was the failure of the British government to implement political reforms to Northern Ireland’s system of government, better known as the Stormont regime. In a relatively short period of time this situation led to the emergence of a new terrorist group, which became recognized around the world as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). The Army’s response to a rapidly deteriorating political situation and the increasing unlawfulness were curfews, intrusive searches in Catholic areas and internment. Not only did these prove counter-productive but they actually increased the support that PIRA derived from their community and from other parts of the world.⁽²⁾

On 11 September 2001 four airliners were hijacked in the USA by Al-Qaeda inspired Islamic extremists. Three were deliberately crashed into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon; it is presumed that its passengers crashed the fourth before it hit its target. These actions combined to claim over 2981 lives in the single most destructive coordinated terrorist attack ever recorded.^(3,4) In the 1980s, the principal leader of this group, Osama bin Laden, had been supported by the USA and encouraged to conduct jihad against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Yet, after the US-led restoration of the independent state of Kuwait had left foreign troops stationed in Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden denounced the USA for ‘occupying the lands of Islam’ and opened his terrorist campaign against the West.⁽⁵⁾

These conflicts are just two examples of terrorist actions, or the types of actions that have, or may in the future have, an impact upon local, national and international consciousness and behaviour. At each level, security managers, whether they be military personnel, civilians, or politicians, have

a role to play in countering terrorist acts. Crenlinson argues that terrorist violence is a form of communication and as such, it “... possesses a logic and grammar that must be understood if we are to prevent or control them.”⁽⁶⁾ Accordingly, this paper will argue that if security managers, holding strategic level appointments in Government, the military or police forces, are to contribute effectively in the fight against terrorism they must learn to understand the message that terrorists are trying to send and the reasons for that message. Then, with an understanding of criminal theory relating to terrorism, security managers will be in a position to identify the terrorist’s points of weakness and to produce and implement a successful counter-strategy.

This paper will be divided into 3 main areas; firstly, it will define terrorism as a criminal act. It will address aspects of criminal theory concerning the motivation of terrorists and it will explore crime prevention theory. In combination these will reveal points of potential intervention that can be applied to counter the terrorist groups and the conditions that cause these groups to rise.

Though Bin Laden declared war against the USA in 1998 when he called upon his followers “to abide by Allah’s order by killing Americans ... anywhere, anytime, and wherever possible”, and despite considerable rhetoric by politicians, the USA has actually resisted acceptance that it is at war with terrorists. Instead, the US Government defined terrorism as a crime to be dealt with through the judicial process and made new laws to meet this threat.⁽⁷⁾ A year after terrorist attacks against the rail network in Madrid, a meeting of former leaders of democratic countries supported this stance⁽⁸⁾. Thus, from a Westernised democratic perspective, terrorism is considered to be crime, where a crime is defined as ‘an act or omission prohibited and punishable by law’.⁽⁹⁾ If this is the case, terrorism might be defined as crime where violence is used for political ends.⁽¹⁰⁾ However, this definition is crude and a more complete understanding of the problem can be gained from Crelinsten, who argues that terrorism is:

“... [T]he combined use and threat of violence, planned in secret and usually executed without warning, that is directed against one set of targets

(the direct victims) in order to coerce compliance or to compel allegiance from a second set of targets (targets of demands) and to intimidate or to impress a wider audience (target of terror or target of attention).⁽¹¹⁾

This definition makes it clear that terrorism is not directed at its immediate victims, indeed they are incidental to the offence; in fact the objects of the offence are the decision-makers of the target population and the community in which the terrorists live and operate. However, in a rapidly changing world the security manager should also be able to distinguish between what might be termed 'traditional' and 'new' terrorism.

'New' terrorism is characterised by the terrorists' "determination to inflict mass casualties upon innocent civilians, ... willingness to kill themselves as well as their victims during an attack and the increased threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction."⁽¹²⁾ Conversely, traditional terrorists generally set out to achieve maximum effect with minimum casualties, striking a balance between spreading fear and creating widespread revulsion against their acts.⁽¹³⁾ Irrespective of whether terrorists follow 'traditional' or 'new' methodologies, it is clear that their crimes can possess tactical and strategic components to influence local, national and international governments, and are aimed at producing an effect which far outweighs the costs to the terrorist. This suggests that, at least at the level of leadership, terrorism may be sophisticated and rational; therefore, factors that motivate terrorists merit consideration. Just as understanding his language will reveal the terrorists' message, understanding his motivation may reveal opportunities for intervention which could reduce the impact of terrorism upon communities. Having defined terrorism, the paper will consider aspects of terrorist motivation.

The emotional response to acts of terrorism is that perpetrators are psychopaths, but Dingley⁽¹⁴⁾ and Oberschall⁽¹⁵⁾ argue that there is little evidence to imply that this is the case. If these offences are not the act of a deranged mind it follows that there must be a positive motivation for individuals to commit these crimes. Oberschall suggests that terrorism is a response to

"... a failed political process engaging political regimes and ethnic and ideological adversaries over fundamental governance issues."⁽¹⁶⁾ Cohen argues that individuals who have shared, similar beliefs that their 'legitimate' demands for political ends have gone unheard may "band together and form a sub-culture that is to some extent in opposition to the dominant culture."⁽¹⁷⁾ Accordingly, the paper will now turn to the theory of sub-culture and its role in terrorism.

Determinists believe that the criminal act is essentially created by circumstances which are outside the ability of the individual to control, but which nurture a criminal disposition. Within the range of circumstances that control the individual, sociological problems concerning environmental and cultural issues are seen as potentially important influences. Sub-cultural Theory explains how a lack of opportunity for reaching conventional goals can lead to the emergence of sub-cultures within society.⁽¹⁸⁾ These are perceived to be exaggerations of many themes that may be found in wider society. Some may be benign; others, such as criminal and terrorist gangs, are malignant. Clearly, security managers are only concerned or interested in those groups which have developed a belief system that condones or promotes criminal acts. However, Rock argues that even these more extreme groups should not be conceived as utterly distinct from their wider community.⁽¹⁹⁾ Hence it should be recognised that some, possibly even many, terrorist demands, including calls for national independence, social justice, equal treatment for minority views, or the establishment of religious law, may resonate with their broader community, and thus develop a degree of popular support. Indeed Oberschall suggests that "... without a legitimising ideology, terrorist violence will lack justification and acceptance within the population that gives cover to the terrorist."⁽²⁰⁾ If this is the case, a terrorist group will lack the cover that would otherwise be provided by communities for their actions and will quickly be exposed to national security forces. With a very basic grasp of Sub-cultural Theory the paper will turn to an explanation of why some people will become involved in terrorism while others do not.

Bernard argues that the disadvantages which generate tension and demands for change need not be absolute; indeed, they may be based on no more than notions of relative disadvantage. However, once 'the rules of anger' are formed they will instruct the group and dictate when they 'should' get angry. He explains that anger may turn to violence, which in some cultures is considered as "... a powerful and definitive response to insult and as a good way of restoring honour."⁽²¹⁾ Matthew *et al.* argue that: "The level of cultural deviance varies directly with the extent of involvement in the subculture itself. Those who are more deeply immersed engage in cultural deviance at higher rates than those who are not."⁽²²⁾ If this is correct, it explains the involvement in terrorism of members of communities at various levels, from supporters to actors, as well as those who play no role in these offences whatsoever. However, once terrorism becomes a way of life, Gunaratna explains that it can develop into a learned behaviour handed down through families and groups through the generations.⁽²³⁾ Davis and Jenkins take this point further in stating that membership and the success of a terrorist group provides "positives – notably status, power, recruits, and psychological rewards ... it becomes the *raison d'être* of these organisations."⁽²⁴⁾ Once a member of a terrorist group, the focus, reward and punishment systems of that group will be totally related to terrorist activity and become self-reinforcing. In these circumstances it may be difficult, even impossible to leave such a group or alter its path even should an individual wish to do so. These arguments may provide a partial explanation for the emergence of terrorists but they do not fully explain the reasons for the rise of 'new' terrorism. It is to this area of the use of more extreme terrorism arguably in its purest and most malevolent form that the paper will turn.

Juergensmeyer argues that, unlike traditional terrorism, 'new' terrorism in the form advocated by Al-Qaeda has not arisen as the result of poverty or social injustice, but is characterised by the imposition of control by the sub-groups over their 'parent' communities through the 'religiousisation' of politics and the satanisation of their enemies.⁽²⁵⁾ In fact the aim of Al-Qaeda is to drive out

Western influence from all Islamic states by exploiting the conditions that breed extremism, particularly in failing states characterised by excessive political and economic stagnation, corruption and repression. To achieve this Bin Laden exploits religion through dissemination of a personally revised version of Islamic theology in order to promote nationalistic fervour.⁽²⁶⁾ However, it is important to note that exploitation of a corruption of theology, though globally important, is not the only manifest methodology for developing 'new' terrorism and 'new' terrorism tactics, and indeed some argue that it may be misleading to think that this is the case. If we consider the tactic of suicide attacks, Pape points out that: "... [T]here is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world's religions. In fact, the leading instigators of suicide attacks are the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka a Marxist-Leninist group whose members are from Hindu families but who are adamantly opposed to religion."⁽²⁷⁾

More recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan may have altered the position of the Tamil Tigers as the leading exponents of suicide tactics; however the argument is that it is the nationalistic component, in terms of a struggle to exert, or create, a national identity and sovereignty that is one of the keys to the rise of 'new' terrorism. Pape suggests that religious and other cultural differences are a method exploited in order to increase the gap between a terrorist group and its supporters and an 'occupying power' in order to create a 'them' versus 'us' situation.⁽²⁸⁾ Having considered sub-cultures and rationalisation in terrorism; the paper will argue that even apparently extreme acts, such as suicide attacks, may in fact be entirely logical.

From a Situationist perspective, Cornish and Clarke commented that "offenders seek to benefit themselves by crime, and make decisions and choices which are characterised by a degree of rationality".⁽²⁹⁾ Clarke argues that decisions and choices to commit crimes are a result of a cost/benefit analysis made in response to an opportunity. This analysis considers the factors of risk to the individual or group, the potential rewards of success and the ease with which a crime may be committed.⁽³⁰⁾ When considering the rationality of suicide bombing it may be

important to distinguish between the individual and the groups that sponsor the attacks.

Sookhdeo states that potential Palestinian suicide bombers are selected, indoctrinated and trained to have a fanatical hatred of the West and to develop a single-minded determination to attack.⁽³¹⁾ This indicates that suicide bombing may be the result of determined behaviour, as factors external to the individual may be exploited in such a way as to direct behaviour without rationalisation on the part of the actor. However, Bloom argues that suicide bombing is adopted as a tactic, following a cost/benefit analysis, after other strategies have been tried and have failed. She suggests that it will be sustained only as long as the host community supports it, as this provides safe havens, recruits and potential political power. Should the host community turn against the tactic, terrorists will quickly cease to use it fearing that they could lose support and be exposed to counter-terrorist campaigns. Bloom maintains that suicide bombing is most likely to be used, and gain momentum, in situations where a number of terrorist groups are competing for political power and financial sponsorship within the same community; in effect they out bid each other for popular support and funding by staging high profile, successful attacks. These attacks can escalate as groups attempt to outdo each other to achieve and maintain a 'market lead' with a view to maintaining their income flow from benefactors.⁽³²⁾ These arguments do not suggest that individuals may not choose to volunteer to act as suicide bombers for very personal reasons, as an act of revenge or to win financial support from a terrorist organisation after a 'successful' attack; however, terrorist organisations will not sponsor these individuals or claim responsibility for their actions if their host society does not support the tactic.

Pape suggests that suicide bombing is most likely to emerge and be sustained as a tactic where conditions of extreme military asymmetry between a 'perceived' occupying force and the terrorist group exist. This is particularly the case where the stronger power represents a

democracy, as democratic systems are perceived, though not always correctly, to be more susceptible to coercion than dictatorships. In this way the terrorist seek to establish a coercive logic of punishment against the government(s) of the superior military force by attacking economic, political, military or civilian targets to convince the opposing society that the costs to it of staying outweigh the benefits.⁽³³⁾ Throughout these arguments is clear evidence of rational behaviour on behalf of the terrorist groups: the common thread is that terrorist groups will carefully and logically determine how to achieve maximum effect and thereby coerce compliance or compel allegiance from Crelinson's targets of demand⁽³⁴⁾ at minimum cost and risk to themselves.

What emerge thus far are the strong themes of sub-cultural identification and the strategic rationality of terrorist groups. While an understanding of these factors may assist a security officer to gain an insight into an enemy it is how this information can be used to counter terrorist acts that are important. Brantingham and Faust identified 3 strategic levels of response to crime. In broad terms these are: Primary Prevention which seeks to reduce crime by reducing criminal opportunities; Secondary Prevention which focuses on altering the social causes of crime, and Tertiary Prevention which aims to limit the criminal career through correctional services.⁽³⁵⁾ The paper will conclude by briefly considering each strategy in turn to identify potential points of intervention that could be employed to counter terrorism.

Primary Prevention seeks to influence a criminal's decision or ability to commit crimes in a particular time or place. South states that the methodology focuses "on the management, design and manipulation of the physical environment, in order to reduce the opportunity to commit crime and increase the risk of detection if deterrence fails."⁽³⁶⁾ In this way the security manager seeks to alter the outcome of terrorist's cost/benefit analysis by reducing their opportunities to successfully attack critical targets and by making the costs, to the terrorist, of

attacking a target prohibitively high. Exploiting this approach, the City of London responded to the PIRA's 1990s bombing campaign by producing the 'Ring of Steel'. This comprised traffic management measures linked to roadblocks and searches covered by sophisticated surveillance systems.⁽³⁷⁾ Later these methods were incorporated into the Home Office publication 'Business as Usual',⁽³⁸⁾ produced to provide guidance on measures aimed at improving the resilience of businesses to attack and their ability to recover should attacks occur. It is arguable that these tactics were successful against both the traditional terrorist group, represented by the PIRA, and, so far, against attacks by groups inspired by Al-Qaeda. Although the plans did not stop the attacks made against the London Underground on 7 July 2005 nor more recent attempts to attack a Night Club in London and Glasgow Airport in July 2007, neither campaign had a strategic effect. In the first campaign, pre-prepared business continuity plans ensured that almost 80% of the London Underground and 100% of the London bus service were functioning within 24 hours.⁽³⁹⁾ While in the second campaign physical security measures coupled with quick thinking and the rapid responses of members of the public and police forces ensured that the only injuries were to the perpetrators of the attacks. In fact early indications were that these attacks may have strengthened the resolve of the British public and their political representatives; presumably, the very opposite of the terrorist's intentions.⁽⁴⁰⁾

Notwithstanding notable anti-terrorism successes and the publication of guidance to businesses, the public, police and military forces, crucial to the successful application of situational crime prevention techniques are consideration of three main factors: the context in which the techniques are applied, the effect that is sought and an understanding of the motivations of terrorists as outlined in earlier paragraphs. Once these are determined for each specific situation, the correct measure or bundle of measures, planned to form a defence in depth, can be applied to deter the criminal or nullify his chance of success. Cornish and Clarke, offer an approach comprising of 25 techniques of situational crime prevention bundled into five groups of five measures based on the checklist reproduced in Table 1 below.

When considering the table and the advice that it contains, two things should be noted. Not all of the measures outlined will be applicable in all situations and should the security manager implement security measures without full consideration of all relevant factors there may be unforeseen outcomes. In such instances, criminals may counter with different, possibly more violent, responses than those anticipated or simply move to a new location for their activities or attacks. This idea of criminal adaptation to produce new tactics, the same tactics in a new geographical location or a revision of the criminals target list is the concept of displacement. However, Hesseling argues that "displacement is a possible but not inevitable consequence of crime prevention, further if it does occur; it will be limited in size and scope."⁽⁴²⁾

Twenty-Five Techniques of Situational Crime Prevention⁽⁴¹⁾

Increase the Effort	Increase the Risks	Reduce the Rewards	Reduce the Provocation	Remove the Excuses
1. Target Harden	6. External guardianship	11. Conceal targets	16. Reduce frustrations and stress	21. Set rules
2. Control access to facilities	7. Assist natural surveillance.	12. Remove targets	17. Avoid disputes	22. Post instructions
3. Screen exits	8. Reduce anonymity	13. Identify property	18. Reduce emotional arousal.	23. Alert conscience
4. Deflect offenders	9. Utilise place managers	14. Disrupt markets	19. Neutralise peer pressure	24. Assist compliance
5. Control tools/ weapons	10. Strengthen formal surveillance.	15. Deny benefits	20. Discourage imitation	25. Control drugs and alcohol

Nevertheless, security managers must be conscious of the fact that in the pursuit of their political and strategic aims, strong motivation and commitment to their cause may enable terrorist groups to overcome this argument. This means that security managers must plan their countermeasures accordingly. PIRA's response to the 'Ring of Steel' was to conduct attacks against Canary Wharf situated outside of London's financial centre. In the case of the 7/7 suicide bomber attacks against the London Transport System the motivation of the terrorists was such that the target hardening and surveillance measures were bypassed with lethal consequences. In these examples the determination of the bombers to complete their attacks enabled them to overcome Primary Prevention measures; however, despite this apparent inability to stop the most determined terrorists from attacking, the security manager may be able to use situational methods to determine, or at least guide, where these criminals conduct their attacks and so reduce their effects.

Planned displacement has been a methodology applied by the Israelis to counter the suicide bomber threat. Though this technique has not been able to stop attacks, the results appear to show a degree of amelioration of the devastating effect that they can have. Perliger and Pedahazur⁽⁴³⁾ report that of five suicide attacks conducted against shopping malls up to 2005, all were prevented from taking place within the building by the situational crime prevention measures in place; in each attack the bombs were exploded at the entrances. As a consequence, the casualty rate per attack was 43.32 compared with a rate of 73.33 for attacks against restaurants where the owners were unable to apply similar measures. The lesson appears to be that if the bombers cannot be stopped it is preferable that they explode against comparatively lower value targets rather than key or critical assets.

In considering potential courses of action against Al-Qaeda, Gunaratna identified the fact that terrorism cannot be resolved through the application of Primary Prevention methods alone. Though these have a role in controlling and suppressing

terrorist acts he suggests that:

"The Donald Rumsfeld model of fighting the terrorists' operational capabilities and not the ideological message has its limitations. Although targeting operational cells has reduced the immediate threat, the failure to target terrorist ideology and motivations is ensuring that the threat continues."⁽⁴⁴⁾

This suggests that security managers can curb but not resolve terrorism through situational measures even where their planning is both meticulous and imaginative. Defeating terrorism should be seen as a cross government, business and community Campaign Plan that comprises many lines of coordinated activity for success. Situational measures may be represented on tactical lines of development, and winning the tactical battle against terrorists is a vital component. However, to win against terrorist groups, and their world view, also requires strategic level activity in which secondary and tertiary crime prevention measures are represented and so the paper will consider these in the final section.

The paper has described how sub-cultural groups form and then act in response to the social and cultural conditions which surround them; therefore, it is apparent that in dealing with these issues, governments have the means to dislocate these groups from their host communities. This provides opportunities to remove the support structures that protect the terrorist and to reduce his supply of recruits and funds. Mockaitis supports this view when he states that "Defeating Al-Qaeda requires not only understanding of its agenda, but, as far as possible, addressing the causes of discontent upon which extremism feeds."⁽⁴⁵⁾ Kitson suggests that winning the battle of hearts and minds against the terrorist group leaches support away from the terrorists. In turn this enables the production of good intelligence, which allows for the focused use of security forces against the terrorists in such a way "so as not to alienate the general population."⁽⁴⁶⁾ Mockaitis adds that "Every action should be weighed to consider whether it would make the situation better or worse. Tactical gains should not be made at the expense of strategic goals."⁽⁴⁷⁾

Thus it is argued, with some justification that though a state may be tempted to adopt a heavy handed approach to terrorism, in the long term, the solution may only be found by addressing the fundamental social, economic and political issues which cause groups to commit or support terrorist acts. Ultimately peace in Northern Ireland was obtained through negotiation and social reform. These undermined Sinn Fein's arguments while Government security forces denied any hope that the terrorists could gain victory.⁽⁴⁸⁾ Utilised in this way Primary and Secondary strategies are complementary. In the case of religiously inspired Muslim terrorism, in addition to these measures, Western governments need to work with Muslim countries to "break the ideology of Al-Qaeda and its associated groups by sending the message that violent Islamist groups are not Koranic but heretical," not religious but seeking to impose themselves upon the community.⁽⁴⁹⁾ In this way, Bloom⁽⁵⁰⁾ and Oberschall⁽⁵¹⁾ argue that once the reasonable demands of terrorists are addressed their purpose will be undermined and terrorist acts will stop. If it does not, the host population will recognise the terrorist as criminals rather than as 'heroic freedom fighters' and cease to nurture or otherwise support them. Thus they will become highly vulnerable to intelligence penetration as the wider social groupings become encouraged to report their activities.

Having considered Primary and Secondary Crime Prevention strategies the paper will now consider Tertiary measures to show how using the 3 strategies in concert can undermine and reduce terrorism.

Tertiary Crime Prevention is a legalistic approach to the problem usually designed to limit a criminal career; however, Pease argues that concentration on incapacitation of the criminal will have at best a modest effect. Indeed if the use of the law is perceived as being targeted against a specific community, rather than for the good of the society as a whole, it can be a factor which promotes discontent.⁽⁵²⁾ However, rather than targeting the individual, measures that deny the group the means to conduct a

concerted campaign are likely to bear greater fruit. One means of complementing a counter-terrorist strategy unlikely to undermine confidence-building measures within the community may be implemented by legally attacking terrorist financing. Utilising this approach, European governments introduced measures to secure and share evidence concerning terrorist groups particularly in relation to cutting financial supply and the means by which money can be transferred around the world.⁽⁵³⁾ The theory behind this measure being that without money these groups will be unable to sustain their terrorist activities. Thus they face three choices: turning inwards towards their supporting communities for a money supply through a combination of 'voluntary' collections, resorting to increasingly transparent criminality or they can end their campaign. Should they overtly leech money from their communities or turn to 'normal' crime a terrorist group runs the risk of becoming dislocated from their non-participating sub-cultural group and they become vulnerable to law enforcement agencies.

Armed with an understanding of criminal theory, security managers will realise that resolution to the problem of terrorism will not occur as a result of quick fixes or harsh responses. Provided that security managers consider crime as "a product of social conditions, genetic factors leading to criminality and readily available opportunities to commit crime" they will be able to identify "possibilities for blocking the path leading to the criminal event."⁽⁵⁴⁾ Accordingly, close study of the terrorists themselves will reveal their weaknesses and the means by which they can be separated from their host community. This suggests that it is only through an understanding of criminal theory, the adoption of an integrated campaign plan that includes winning the kinetic tactical battles as well as winning over community support that a security manager, operating at a strategic level but with influence over tactical plans, can succeed in preventing or reducing terrorism.

References

- (1) Eng Seng A C, 2002, p. 1. *The Motivations and Methods of the Terrorist*. Cited in Pointer V28 N3 (Jul-Sep 2002). , accessed 9 October 2005.
- (2) McInnes C & Kennedy-Pipe C, 2002. *The British Army and the Peace Process in Ireland*. Cited in *The Journal of Conflict* Spring 2001.
- (3) 9/11 Commission Report.,
<http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/22jul20041130/www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/frontmatter.pdf>, accessed 14 October 2005.
- (4) George B, Button M and Whatford N, 2003, p. 231. *The Impact of September 11th on the UK Business Community*. From Gill M (Ed) (2003) *Managing Security*; Leicester: Perpetuity Press.
- (5) Oberschall A, 2004, p. 34. *Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory*. , accessed 20 October 2005.
- (6) Crelinsten R D, 2002, p. 77. *Analysing Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: A Communication Model*. Cited in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol 14, No2 (Summer 2002).
<http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/1ibfddakwpdry14dqjft/contributions/2/b/q/n/2bqnxcn0rgtlewbp.pdf>. Accessed 15 October 2005.
- (7) Sultz R & Vogt A, 2003, p. 3. *It's War! Fighting Post-11 September Global Terrorism through a Doctrine of Preemption*. Cited in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.15, No1 (Spring 2003). Published by Frank Cass, London.
- (8) *The Madrid Agenda: International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security*. 8-11 March 2005, p. 1. <http://english.safe-democracy.org/agenda/the-madrid-agenda.html> . Accessed 20 May 2005.
- (9) Collins, 2005, p. 396. "English Dictionary, Edition 7".
- (10) University of Leicester, Department of Criminology, 2003, p. 8-7. MSc in Security and Risk Management, Module 1.
- (11) Crelinsten R D, 2002, p. 83. *Analysing Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: A Communication Model*. Cited in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol 14, No2 (Summer 2002).
<http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/1ibfddakwpdry14dqjft/contributions/2/b/q/n/2bqnxcn0rgtlewbp.pdf>. Accessed 15 October 2005.
- (12) George B, Button M and Whatford N, 2003, p. 231. *The Impact of September 11th on the UK Business Community*. From Gill M (Ed) (2003) *Managing Security*; Leicester: Perpetuity Press.
- (13) Mockaitis T, 2003, p. 21. *Winning Hearts and Minds in the 'War on Terrorism'*
<http://journalsonline.tandf.co.uk/media/mb9xdnwxcwncwyu7pnqt1/contributions/2/4/f/j/24fjd7dakx5gwc50.pdf>. Accessed 27 November 2005.
- (14) University of Leicester, Department of Criminology, 2003, p. 8-29. MSc in Security and Risk Management, Module 1, Module 1.
- (15) Oberschall A, 2004, p. 26. *Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory*.
<http://www.blockwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2004.00202.x>, accessed 20 October 2005.
- (16) *Ibid*, p. 1.
- (17) Matthew C, Scheider M and Florence J, 2000, p. 254. *Are we explaining different things? The failure to specify the dependent variable in criminology*,
<http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/dfdq68f8wpdynkb9jn9m/contributions/7/7/8/b/778bg8r18h0twxgm.pdf>. Accessed 15 October 2005.
- (18) University of Leicester, Department of Criminology, 2003, p. 1-23. MSc in Security and Risk Management, Module 1.
- (19) Rock P, 2002, p. 73. *Sociological Theories of Crime*. From Maguire M, Morgan R and Reiner R (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology* Oxford University Press.
- (20) Oberschall A, 2004, p. 28. *Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory*. , accessed 20 October 2005.
- (21) Indermaur D (1996) p. 7. *Perceptions of Violence*. From *Psychiatry, Psychology and the Law*.
http://www.crc.law.uwa.edu.au/___data/page/50334/pov.pdf. Accessed 13 November 2005.
- (22) Matthew C, Scheider M and Florence J (2000) p. 253. *Are we explaining different things? The failure to specify the dependent variable in criminology*,
<http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/dfdq68f8wpdynkb9jn9m/contributions/7/7/8/b/778bg8r18h0twxgm.pdf>. Accessed 15 October 2005.
- (23) Gunaratna R (2003) *The New Face of Al-Qaeda: Understanding the Generational Gradient in Local and Global Jihad Campaigns*. From *Pointer Journal* Vol 29 No4 (2003).
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2003/Vol29_4/4b.htm accessed 9 October 2005.
- (24) Davis P and Jenkins B (2004) p. 4. *A System Approach to Detering and Influencing Terrorists*. From *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. Taylor & Francis Group.
<http://journalsonline.tandf.co.uk/media/p612amtbt0qw9xrkc3u/contributions/v/6/4/8/v648cinpc3321v4.pdf> Accessed 15 October 2005.
- (25) Juergensmeyer M (2001) p. 358. *Terror in the Name of God*. From *Current History* November 2001.
http://www.currenthistory.com/org_pdf_files/100/649/100_649_357.pdf. Accessed 13 November 2005.

- (26) Sultz R & Vogt A (2003). *It's War! Fighting Post-11 September Global Terrorism through a Doctrine of Preemption*. Cited in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.15, No1 (Spring 2003), p. 3. Published by Frank Cass, London.
- (27) Pape R A (2005) *Dying to Win. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, Random House Publishing Group, New York, p. 4.
- (28) *Ibid*, p. 80.
- (29) Cornish D and Clarke R (eds) (1986) p. 47. "The Reasoning Criminal" from Coleman C and Norris C (2000) "Introducing Criminology" Willan Publishing.
- (30) Clark (1980) in University of Leicester, Department of Criminology (2003) MSc in Security and Risk Management, Module 1, p. 1-25.
- (31) Sookbdeo P (2004) p. 160. *Understanding Islamic Terrorism*. Isaac Publishing, New York.
- (32) Bloom (2004). *Devising a Theory of Suicide Terror. From Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror*. Columbia University Press.
<http://www.international.ucla.edu/cms/files/bloom.0227.pdf>, accessed 15 October 2005.
- (33) Pape R A (2005) p. 30. *Dying to Win The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*,. Random House Publishing Group, New York.
- (34) Crelinsten R D, 2002, p. 83. *Analysing Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: A Communication Model*. Cited in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol 14, No2 (Summer 2002).
<http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/1ibfddakwpdry14dqjft/contributions/2/b/q/n/2bqnxn0rgtlewhbp.pdf>. Accessed 15 October 2005.
- (35) University of Leicester, Department of Criminology (2003) MSc in Security and Risk Management, Module 1, p. 2-5.
- (36) Gilling D (1997) p. 5. *Crime Prevention: Theory, policy and politics*. UCL Press.
- (37) Gearson J (2003) p. 220. *Managing Terrorist Targeting of Financial Centres: The IRA's City of London Campaign*. From Gill M (Ed) (2003) *Managing Security*; Leicester: Perpetuity Press.
- (38) Home Office/Security (1999) *Business as Usual: Maximising business resilience to terrorist bombings, A handbook for Managers*. <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/>. Accessed 12 October 2005.
- (39) Segell G M, 2006, P. 50. *Terrorism on London Public Transport*. *Defense & Security Analysis Volume 22, Issue 1, 1 March 2006* p. 45-59. Routledge. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751790600577132>, accessed 9 July 2007.
- (40) BBC News 24 Reporting 1-6 July 2007.
- (41) Cornish D B & Clarke R V, 2003, p. 90. *Opportunities, Precipitators and Criminal Decisions: A Reply to Wortley's Critique of Situational Crime Prevention*. , accessed 1 September 2006.
- (42) Pease K, 2002, p. 956. *Crime Reduction*. From Maguire M, Morgan R and Reiner R (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology* Oxford University Press.
- (43) Perliger A and Pedabazur A (2005). *Factors Influencing The Effectiveness of Defensive Measures in Counter-Terrorism*. PowerPoint. http://terrorismexperts.org/terrorism_research.htm. Accessed 13 November 2005.
- (44) Gunaratna R (2005) p. 87. *An Examination of Al-Qaeda and its Methods*. From INTERSEC Vol 15 Issue 3 March 2005.
- (45) Mockaitis T (2003) p. 30. *Winning Hearts and Minds in the 'War on Terrorism'*
<http://journalonline.tandf.co.uk/media/mb9xdmwxcwcyu7pnqt1/contributions/2/4/f/j/24fd7dakx5gvc50.pdf>. Accessed 27 November 2005.
- (46) Kitson F (1971). *Low-Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping*. London: Faber.
- (47) Mockaitis T (2003) p. 31. *Winning Hearts and Minds in the 'War on Terrorism'*
<http://journalonline.tandf.co.uk/media/mb9xdmwxcwcyu7pnqt1/contributions/2/4/f/j/24fd7dakx5gvc50.pdf>. Accessed 27 November 2005.
- (48) McInnes C & Kennedy-Pipe C. *The British Army and the Peace Process in Ireland*. Cited in *The Journal of Conflict* Spring 2001.
- (49) Gunaratna R (2003) p. 8. *The New Face of Al-Qaeda: Understanding the Generational Gradient in Local and Global Jihad Campaigns*. From *Pointer Journal* Vol 29 No4 (2003).
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2003/Vol29_4/4b.htm accessed 9 October 2005.
- (50) Bloom (2004). *Devising a Theory of Suicide Terror. From Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror*. Columbia University Press. , accessed 15 October 2005.
- (51) Oberschall A, 2004. *Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory*.
<http://www.blockwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2004.00202.x>, accessed 20 October 2005.
- (52) Pease K (2002) p. 957. *Crime Reduction*. From Maguire M, Morgan R and Reiner R (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology* Oxford University Press.
- (53) Goldsmith QC, The Rt Hon Lord (2004) p. 314. *Financial Crime, Terror and Subversion – The Control of Risk in a Destabilised World Economy*. From *Journal of Financial Crime* Vol 11 No 4.
- (54) Pease K (2002) p. 948. *Crime Reduction*. From Maguire M, Morgan R and Reiner R (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology* Oxford University Press.

Port Security- The Port of Singapore

Julian CHARVAT

Major (GBR A)

Course Director, COE-DAT

Unique Features of the Port

The Port of Singapore is situated at the tip of the South East Asian peninsular and straddles some of the busiest and most dangerous waterways in the world. Singapore is a stable country with a growing economy, which makes it an attractive option for the location of the region's main super port. Given the political volatility of some of its neighbours Singapore, has remained a strong Western and US ally, which has meant it is an ideal port for international trade. A legacy from the days of British Colonialism and the vision of the British entrepreneur Sir Stamford Raffles, Singapore has punched above its weight in regional trade and economy to become the busiest port in the world.

The port grew steadily from the Old Harbour around the mouth of the Singapore River to a huge mega port spanning into Keppel Harbour with terminals at Pasir Panjang, Jurong and Sembawang⁽¹⁾. The port is expanding but currently has, as a combined entity of the main Port of Singapore Authority and Jurong Port facility, 64 container berths and over 16 km of quay. The huge capacity has made it the busiest port in the world in terms of tonnage handled, transshipment traffic and bunkering⁽²⁾. The sheer size of the port facility and the incredible volume it handles in terms of both ships and cargo are a unique feature of this port.

The Port of Singapore has some unique security issues as its size makes it a highly attractive target to terrorists wanting to cause maximum disruption to world maritime trade. It is also an ally of the West and the US, which will add to its attractiveness as a target for many terrorist organizations. There are 2 major terrorist groups that operate in the South East Asian region. To the East the Philippines dominate the entry to the South China Sea for traffic sailing to Singapore. The Abu Sayyaf Group are Al-Qaeda influenced and have conducted at least one major maritime attack on the M/V Superferry 14 in 2004. Closer to Singapore itself the Jemaah Islamiya organization, and Islamist terrorist group, continues to conduct attacks. They did plan an attack on US Navy interests in Singapore's Changi Naval Base but were forced to abandon the enterprise due to a lack of

available skill. It is assessed by the US that they still plan a maritime terrorist attack⁽³⁾.

The region is rife with criminal and pirate activity and has several maritime choke points. This could increase the selection of shipping in the area as a good terrorist target. The Straits of Malacca are considered the most dangerous shipping lane in the world and are one used by Singapore-bound traffic. Again, this increases the possible threat to the port.

To summarize, the Port of Singapore is unique in its size and volume; in many areas the busiest port in the world. It is also unique in the fact that it has major terrorist groups in the vicinity and as a US ally is a target with political as well as economic value. This combination make the Port of Singapore one of the most potentially threatened in the world.

Commercial Details

The Republic of Singapore has all its Maritime and Port affairs governed by the Maritime and Port Authority, whose officials are responsible for the coordination of all aspects of maritime activity. They oversee all security and legal affairs and will be discussed in more detail later.

The commercial side of the port is dominated by PAS Singapore, which is the largest operator of container handling and warehouse space in the port. Its staff operate 44 container berths with over 140 cranes in a quay length of almost 13KM⁽⁴⁾. In addition to PSA Singapore, Jurong Port has 23 container berths and over 4.5km of quay. This is operated by Jurong Port Pte Ltd which was granted its licence by the Maritime and Port Authority in 2001. As well as containers Jurong Port also has an impressive Bulk Cargo handling capability with pipelines and enclosed conveyer systems that allow for rapid loading of a very wide range of cargos.

As the busiest port in the world, the Port of Singapore handles over 2 million Twenty Foot Equivalent Units (TEU) per month. This is increasing as the port continues to expand, and the preliminary estimates for May 2007 are that the port will break the 2.3 million mark for the first time⁽⁵⁾. The MPA estimate that there

are over 1,000 ships using or at anchor waiting to enter the port at any given time. Some 140,000 commercial vessels trade in the Port of Singapore annually. There are more than 12,000 oil tankers and 3,000 chemical tankers visiting the Port of Singapore annually and there are vast storage facilities for chemicals and oil refining. EXXON has 2 refineries in Singapore which process over 600,000 barrels of crude daily between them⁽⁶⁾.

Given the terrific volume and the obvious need to handle cargo quickly, the Port of Singapore is a key hub of international maritime trade. It is a major link in global maritime trade and is located to service some of the most populated areas in the world. The port is also vital to the Singaporean economy. The small country has little other economic resources and the port and its associated industries are the main source of revenue for the country. As one of Asia's Tiger Economies Singapore has the GDP more akin to a Western European state than a small South East Asian island. The commercial value of the port is essential to the key Western ally, the Republic of Singapore. The effect a major terrorist attack could have is enormous, with consequences both for global sea trade and the local economy. It is estimated that the Port of Singapore has direct connections to over 600 ports worldwide on all 6 continents in 123 countries; the commercial value of the port is immense.

International Laws in Place to Protect the Port

International maritime law has historically been a very complex issue. While most of the world's water will be in the international High Seas all maritime traffic will be, at some time, in national waters. National waters are the sovereign territory of that particular nation and national, not international, law will take primacy. It is therefore important to note that an individual port may accept international initiatives and may add to them with its own. To a port the size of the Port of Singapore, accepting and enforcing international law and regulation initiatives for maritime traffic is vital to keep its credibility and status and one of the world's most trusted ports⁽⁷⁾.

After the *Achille Lauro* hijack in 1985 international shipping authorities began

to pay attention to the security threat from terrorism. After 9/11 this particular threat came to the fore of the international security agenda. The International Maritime Organization began to introduce and obtain agreement on several new initiatives to bolster maritime safety. This led to an addition to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the form of the Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea Convention (SUA).

Post 9/11 the UNCLOS and SUA were seen as insufficient for coping with the emergent terrorist threat. One new initiative, which the Port of Singapore benefits from, is the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS). This agreement was drawn up by the IMO in December 2002 and came into force in July 2004 for all ships engaged on international voyages, covering passenger ships, cargo ships of over 500 gross tonnage, mobile off shore drilling units, and port facilities serving such ships. The IPS code was an amendment to the IMO's Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) code. This introduced the requirement for Voice Data Recorders and Automatic Ship Identification Systems, which help authenticate traffic and reduce the chance of terrorists re-flagging a ship they capture.

The ISPS Code also requires ports to undertake certain safety requirements. This will help ensure that as much effort as possible is made for denying terrorists freedom of action in the port area.

The Container Safety Initiative (CSI) is a US initiative to help identify and pre-screen containers from high-risk sources that are bound for the US. This will help reduce the possibility of the terrorists using a container borne device to attack the US. The Port of Singapore has signed up to this initiative. More ports will be encouraged to do so if they continue to trade with the US. As Dr Peter Lehr said: "... ports which are not a member of the CSI initiative will sooner or later find themselves locked out of business with the USA..."⁽⁸⁾

The Port of Singapore has also adopted additional measures such as the Harbour Craft Safety Code to verify those small vessels making a living trading within port waters. The Port of Singapore has

implemented most international safety initiatives and has included appropriate additional measures of its own.

Security Measures Already In Place To Protect The Port

Undoubtedly most reliable tool for countering the terrorist threat is a well-trained individual working with vigilance and equipped with an understanding of what to look for. However, he/she can be greatly assisted by the appropriate use of modern technologies. With the increased terrorist threat and the advancements of such technologies, the sphere of maritime security has made advancements to enhance security.

There are general international safety measures, which help the Port of Singapore. The Automated Notice to Mariners System (ANMS) is a US led initiative which helps keep ships automatically updated about issues in their shipping lanes. Through various parts of this system any terrorist activity can be reported and warned to nearby shipping.

Container security is another key issue for the Port of Singapore. Given that it expects to handle over 24 million TEUs each year, a fast and robust system has to be in place. Initiatives such as the CSI help target some containers but the remainder are subject to random controls. The Port of Singapore was one of the first 6 in the world to install the scanning equipment for containers as part of the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) to check for radiation to help prevent a container borne "Dirty Bomb"⁽⁹⁾. Although only a tiny percentage of the overall number of containers are scanned, the Port of Singapore has one of the most advanced scanning capabilities in the world.

The Port of Singapore also operates 2 Port Control Centres (PCC) to monitor the maritime traffic in its waters. This uses the Vessel Traffic Information System, which can handle 5,000 ships and monitor voice, track and data recording. This will again reduce the opportunity for a terrorist 'Floating Bomb' to go undetected. The Automatic Identification System is a requirement for all ships of 300 gross tonnage and more engaged in international shipping, and all vessels of 500 gross tonnage. The Port of Singapore

requires this system to be turned on by all eligible ships in its waters.

The Port of Singapore is protected by a robust physical maritime presence adopting a classical layered approach to security. The territorial waters of the republic and the Straits of Singapore are protected by the COSCOM branch of the Singapore Navy. Along with the Coast Guard and Police they provide protection against terrorists 24 hours a day⁽¹⁰⁾. The port itself has a Ship Self-Security Assessment for all shipping prior to entering the port⁽¹¹⁾ and will physically verify the crew of entering ships before they come to port by ID checks as required.

The Port of Singapore has joined the world leaders in its security measures against terrorism. The government is strict on security matters and is supportive of the port maintaining the highest standards. Given its strategic importance and economic value, the US government has helped it with implementing cutting edge technology for SFI accreditation. While no port can eradicate the threat altogether, the Port of Singapore has adopted almost every current aid in reducing the possibility of a terrorist attack.

The Most Likely Threat The Port Has To Face

Geographically, politically and economically the Port of Singapore is one of the most high profile potential targets for a terrorist attack⁽¹²⁾ outside of the United States itself. It is therefore wholly appropriate that both the Singapore government and the Maritime Port Authority pay such great attention to protecting the Port of Singapore from terrorism.

The primary terrorist groups likely to target the Port of Singapore are radical Islamist terrorists who wish to disrupt world trade and target a key US ally. The Port of Singapore has implemented stringent security measures but is still vulnerable to possible attack.

The Port of Singapore has an annual turnover of 3,000 ships carrying chemicals. These would be a possible target for terrorism. The attackers could attempt to capture one and release its

poisonous contents in the harbour area. Although this would cause some damage and inconvenience, it would be unlikely to cause severe damage or loss other than the psychological victory for the terrorist.

The port is also susceptible to internal attacks or terrorist interference with containers. With over 24 million transiting through the Port of Singapore annually there is much scope for terrorist exploitation. To counter this the Singapore authorities mount patrols of container areas, employ strict access control, and adhere to all major container safety initiatives.

The control of the harbour waters is equally well maintained. Small craft need to be licenced in order to ply their trade in the port. This helps reduce the classic terrorist threat of small wolf packs of boats conducting suicide attacks such as that on the USS Cole. This, combined with regular area maritime patrolling by the port authority and the Singapore Navy, helps reduce the possibility of a SCUBA or minisub attack.

The world of Maritime Security has changed drastically over the last quarter of a century. The *Achille Lauro* hijack was the initial catalyst for change, and in this respect Maritime Terrorism was on the agenda long before 9/11. Since the attacks on the USA the threat has been increasingly countered through a series of international and bi or multilateral agreements and conventions. While international security will always be a difficult issue due to the primacy of national law at a port and in territorial waters, the economic practicality of trade will dictate that the ports using the best security measures and cooperating with the initiatives will be the ones used by the world's major maritime players. It is therefore wholly unsurprising that the busiest port in the world, the Port of Singapore, is at the forefront of implementing the best security practice available in the fight against terrorism. It is therefore assessed that, although the threat cannot be taken away entirely, the practices employed by the Maritime and Port Authority minimize this risk as best as can be done at present without placing an unacceptable delay on the processing of cargo through the facility.

References

- (1) *Wikipedia – Port of Singapore*
- (2) *Wikipedia – figures for 2005*
- (3) *Certificate in Terrorism Studies Course lesson 1 of Maritime module.*
- (4) *PSA International website.*
- (5) *MPA website.*
- (6) *Exxon website.*
- (7) *Jane's rates Singapore as very restrictive for terrorist operations.*
- (8) *Course additional reading Maritime Module Lesson 1: Some legal initiatives to combat maritime terrorism, pp. 1.*
- (9) *Government Security News www.gsnmagazine.com*
- (10) *Singapore MOD website.*
- (11) *MPA website.*
- (12) *This refers to global terrorists – separatist terrorist groups such as the LTTE would have different target value selection criteria and probably not target Singapore.*

Bibliography

- <http://www.mpa.gov.sg>
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_of_Singapore
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1143240.stm
<http://www.internationalpsa.com/factsheet/singapore.html>
<http://www.jp.com.sg/>
http://www.exxonmobil.com/AP-English/About/SG_Info_refinery.asp
http://www.gsnmagazine.com/Jun_07/singapore.html
http://www.mpa.gov.sg/circulars_and_notices/pdfs/02-65.pdf
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/navy/about_us.html
Jane's Country Summary Singapore.

Globalisation and Insecurity

Olcay DENİZER

Capt. (TUR A)

Ph.D. Candidate

Research Development Officer,

COE-DAT

The aim of this article is to highlight the relation between the globalisation process and the insecurity it causes. The argument that the globalisation process increases positive, constructive global consciousness and the voice of the global civil society in sensitive world affairs is questioned. And it is claimed that as a result of globalization, two kinds of global consciousness and global civil society have arisen: “The haves’ global civil society”, and “the have-nots’, those who are discriminated against, the poor’s global civil society”. Finally it is emphasized that the former cannot effectively tackle the global challenges without the support of the states, but the later can cause a real threat to the world security with invisible networks of volunteers, without support of any state.

Traditionally, studies on security have focused on military and defense issues. This type of definition of security reflects the considerations in the Cold War era, which was primarily concerned with maintaining stability and the status quo, countering external threats⁽¹⁾.

At present the traditional definition of security in military terms is inadequate. Advocates of a new thinking on security in the post Cold War era emphasize that the focus of attention should no longer be only on external, military threats to states. They argue, rather, that there is now a need to also include potential threats stemming from other areas – economic, environmental, societal etc. – that are referred to as areas of soft security. Soft security issues are factors that can lead to domestic instability, which can then spill across borders and create regional tensions and even conflicts⁽²⁾.

Buzan has identified five security sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. All these sectors are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Thus change in one sector may positively or negatively affect other sectors⁽³⁾. In other words security is a multi-dimensional concept. The transnational and multidimensional character of security means that even the slightest challenge in one layer can cause catastrophic results in other layer(s). This has become more relevant in the globalising world. There is very close relation between the new definition of

security and globalisation.

As a result of the developments in information and communication technologies and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the globalisation process has been accelerated⁽⁴⁾. There are many arguments about the definition of globalisation. Christopher Coker defines it as follows:

Globalisation is the extent to which it promotes global interconnectedness, and the extent to which it promotes global consciousness: the belief that what happens in one part of the world should be of interest of the rest⁽⁵⁾.

Closely related to the new definition of security mentioned above, globalisation first suggests that “many chains of political, economic and social activities are becoming interregional or intercontinental in scope”. Second, interaction and interconnectedness have intensified between states and civil societies, emphasizing not only “individual security”, but also “societal security” which involves the protection of community cultures and values. As a result “global awareness” among individuals and societies has increased. Third, globalization has brought about “a relativization of the importance of the states”.⁽⁶⁾ In addition, Karasmanoğlu argues that the importance of geopolitics has been marginalized due to globalisation.⁽⁷⁾

The close relation between globalisation, economy and security is beyond question. The end of the Cold War has lifted many constraints among states and regions, especially on economic issues. The free flow of goods, services and capital are the characteristics of the new era that is encouraged by the World Bank and IMF.

The fast development of information and communication systems has enabled companies to search for the most suitable, profitable countries and regions for investment. Big companies working in the same field come together or buy small companies to make more profit. The number of big multinational companies has increased since the end of the Cold War.

The big multinational companies don’t invest in every state or region. They are very selective. There are certain states or

regions that are more rational and profitable for investments and joint ventures. Of course, in these regions there are certain countries that are more attractive than others. As a result the big economic gap between the North and the South, or the “haves” and the “have-nots”, is increasing day by day, with serious social and political implications.

It is common that the population growth in undeveloped or developing countries is much higher than that of the developed countries. For example, while the population of the northern shore of Mediterranean is growing by less than 0.3 percent per annum, the population on the southern shore is increasing by more than 2.5 percent per annum.⁽⁸⁾ In 1950 two thirds of the population of the Mediterranean basin lived on its northern shores, by 2025 it is estimated that the situation will have completely reversed itself.⁽⁹⁾ Overpopulation increases unemployment and poverty, which cause migratory pressures to Europe.

In the post war years, due to the labor shortage, immigration was welcomed by the European countries, but the growing unemployment, the social and political problems, and the belief that the immigration creates an environment in which terrorists are able to move with relative ease, forced the European countries to implement tighter immigration policies and repatriation programs.⁽¹⁰⁾

However, today, the EU member states are home to about 5 million immigrants from the non-member Mediterranean states. The presence of a large and growing Muslim population has increased a xenophobic and racist sentiment amongst the Europeans, particularly in the light of high unemployment rates.⁽¹¹⁾ The European governments themselves are greatly concerned about the racist and xenophobic events, because they are harmful for their domestic security, and they have implications for their relations with the South. Any event in the North is perceived as an evidence of a fundamental European-Christian hostility towards Islam, and as a result the Islamic movement, both in Europe and in the South, gains power with significant implications for international relations.⁽¹²⁾

As we all recently observed in France,

one of the most “developed” states, the death of two black people escaping from the police caused chaos, not only in France, but also in some other European countries. More than nine thousand vehicles were burned; many governmental and public buildings were damaged.⁽¹³⁾ The immigrants living in the outskirts of the cities were tired of being discriminated against, living in bad conditions without a job. In spite of the all-too-severe measures taken, the government was not able to stop the violence. As a result, the Ministry of the Interior, in the “France against Terrorism Seminar”, stated that the country was facing serious violence and terrorism.⁽¹⁴⁾ Indeed, what caused the catastrophic events were the developments in the communication and information technologies which enabled the media to reach more people and to make the issue more sensitive.

The rise of global consciousness is the characteristic of the new era. It is argued that globalisation has shattered the state structure as a result of the arising consciousness.⁽¹⁵⁾ Globalisation exacerbates ethnic consciousness.⁽¹⁶⁾ Ethnic minorities are becoming more conscious of their identity and cultural differences in the society. The fast development in the communication and information technologies, and of course the media, have great influence on this arising consciousness.

Indeed, it is not the ethnic identities and minorities that cause the threat to the national security or the unitary state structure. There are no pure nation states in any part of the world. All states consist of different ethnic groups. The demands of the ethnic minorities can be met in the democratic unitary state structure. The problem is that some nations or international organizations try to take advantage of the issue to weaken the state structure.⁽¹⁷⁾ Even some terrorist organizations are labelled as freedom fighters and supported by some states.

As a result, some argue that with the end of the Cold War the number of conflicts and casualties has increased. But, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), on the global scale the number of wars both within and between countries, and the number of those killed in them, are less than that of the Cold War period.⁽¹⁸⁾

Christopher Coker, the author of “Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk”, asks: “So if the situation is not quite as bleak as many people imagine, why do we think it is? Why we are more sensitive to global violence than we were in the past?”⁽¹⁹⁾ And then he answers: “the main explanation is to be found in the rise of global consciousness – and in this case that of global civil society whose origins predate the end of the Cold War. Globalisation has not engendered greater violence, but it has prompted greater interest and moral engagement on the part of a global citizenry which is more aware of the wars that are being fought and which insists on the articulation of global norms. And, where those norms are in danger or challenged, it demands intervention.”⁽²⁰⁾

One might agree, to some extent, that people are more conscious about their identity, culture, world politics, the differences among the societies, the wars, conflicts, and, in short, what is going on around us in the globalising world. But it is hard to believe in that people, global civil societies, states or international organizations show the same interest, sensitiveness or “consciousness” to every similar case. It was not until May 2, 2002 that the European Union finally entered on its list of banned terrorist organizations the two deadliest networks directed against Turkey: the PKK and DHKP-C, which killed thousands of innocent people.⁽²¹⁾ Why did the EU wait so long? Another interesting case is the murder of Özdemiş Sabancı, one of the most prominent businessmen in Turkey. The businessman was killed in his office by a member of the DHKP-C. Turkish authorities did not receive the degree of international cooperation to which they were entitled. The terrorist, a young woman called Fehriye Erdal, who killed the businessman, fled to Belgium, where she was arrested for carrying a false passport and an unlicensed handgun. She spent some time in prison, while her claim to political asylum was being processed. The Belgian authorities were unwilling to extradite her to Turkey.⁽²²⁾ Even though it was beyond question that she was a member of DHKP-C and that she killed Mr. Sabancı (a security camera recorded the event), she was not considered a terrorist, or even a murderer. What about the global norms?

It is not difficult to imagine the reaction of the “sensitive, conscious” European civil society, if a man or woman had killed a European businessman in Europe and then escaped to non-EU country and then was protected by that country and treated as a hero!

It is therefore difficult to think that global consciousness or global civil society has too much affect on the world affairs. It depends on the situation. If the case is in the interest of some groups of states, then suddenly the civil society is conscious about the case and as a result of this some states take action. It is not the “global, universal norms” that force the states to act, it is the national interest. In other words, every nation has its own concerns and every nation follows its own interest. Sometimes, the big powers impose their own security considerations to the smaller ones without respecting their security perceptions, which in turn creates new security problems.⁽²³⁾

Globalisation is an inevitable process with certain security implications. It offers opportunities and challenges. There are many variables that determine the opportunities and challenges. Not all parts of the world experience the same effects of this process. The transnational and multidimensional character of the challenges require global responses, for no single nation can tackle these challenges unilaterally.⁽²⁴⁾

Contrary to Coker’s argument, the situation is quite as bleak as many people think. Thanks to the developments in technology people all around the world are much better informed about what is going on around than their nineteenth century counterparts.⁽²⁵⁾ As a result two kinds of global civil society have risen. The first one is “the haves’ global civil society”, which is dealing with penguins in Antarctica, the other one is “the have-not’s (regional or embryo)⁽²⁶⁾ civil society”, which is tired of the current world affairs, and which suffers severely from identity problems. The former cannot effectively tackle the global challenges without the support of the states, but the later can cause a real threat to the world security with invisible networks of volunteer’s, without support of any state. Unfortunately, the September 11 attack might be just the beginning, not the end.

References

- (1) Gareth Winrow, *Dialogue with the Mediterranean: the Role of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative*, New York, Garland, 2000, p. 24.
- (2) Judith S. Yapbe, "Do No Harm: Thoughts on NATO's Mediterranean Initiative, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol:10, No:4, Fall 1996, p. 56.
- (3) Bary Buzan, *People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-Cold War Area*, London: Harevester Wheatscheaf, 1991.
- (4) Emre Kongar, *Küresel Terör ve Türkiye, Remzi Kitabevi*, 2003, pp. 18-19.
- (5) Christopher Coker, "Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk" *Adelphi Paper 345*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2002, p. 23.
- (6) Laurent Goetschel, "Globalisation and Security: The Challenge of Collective Action in a Politically Fragmented World, *Global Society*, Vol: 14, No: 2 (2000), pp. 276-277, cited in "Globalization and Its Impact on Turkey's Security" by Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu in "The Europeanization of Turkey's Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls" ed. by Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, 2004, p.12.
- (7) Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Globalization and Its Impact on Turkey's Security" in "The Europeanization of Turkey's Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls" ed. by Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, 2004, p.12.
- (8) Tim Niblock, "North-South Economic Relations in the Mediterranean," in *Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region*, p. 126.
- (9) Flippos Pierros, Jacob Meunier, Stan Abrams, *Bridges and Barriers: The European Union's Mediterranean Policy, 1961-1999*, Great Britain, Algate, 1999, p.11.
- (10) Stelios Stavridis and Neville Waites, "The European Union and the Member States," in *The Foreign Policies of the European Union's Mediterranean States and the Applicant Countries in the 1990's*, p. 30.
- (11) *Ibid*, p. 32.
- (12) Roberto Aliboni, "Collective Political Cooperation in the Mediterranean," in *Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region*, ed. by Roberto Aliboni, George Joffe and Tim Niblock, London, Frank Cass, 1996, pp. 129-130.
- (13) www.cnnturk.com/DUNYA/haber_detay
- (14) *Ibid*.
- (15) Coker, p.25.
- (16) Coker. p. 13.
- (17) General Yaşar Büyükanıt, then the Deputy Chief of Turkish General Staff, "Globalisation and International Security", the opening remarks of the Globalisation and International Security, First International Symposium arranged by the S.AREM, in Istanbul, 29-30 May 2003, published in *Birinci Uluslararası Sempozyum Bildirileri (İstanbul, 29-30 Mayıs) "Küreselleme ve Güvenlik"*, Genelkurmay Basım Evi, Ankara, 2003, pp. XV-XVI.
- (18) Coker, p. 27
- (19) *Ibid*.
- (20) *Ibid*.
- (21) Andrew Mango, "Turkey and the War on Terror", Routledge, 2005, p. 1.
- (22) *Ibid*. p. 24.
- (23) Büyükanıt, p. XII.
- (24) *Ibid*. p. 37.
- (25) Coker, p. 30.
- (26) I prefer to call it regional or embryo civil society, because I think that when it really becomes global then it will be a real threat to the world security.

Bibliography

Books

Aliboni Roberto, Joffe George and Niblock Tim, 1996, *Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region* London, Frank Cass.

Buzan Barry *People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-Cold War Area*, London: Harevester Wheatscheaf, 1991.

Büyükanıt Yaşar, 2003, *Birinci Uluslararası Sempozyum Bildirileri (İstanbul, 29-30 Mayıs) Küreselleme ve Güvenlik*, Genelkurmay Basım Evi, Ankara.

Coker Christopher, 2002, *Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk*, *Adelphi Paper 345*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

Karaosmanoğlu Ali L., Taşhan Seyfi, 2004, *The Europeanization of Turkey's Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls* Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara.

Kongar Emre, 2003, Küresel Terör ve Türkiye, Remzi Kitabevi.

Mango Andrew, 2005, "Türkiye'nin Terörle Savaşı", Doğan Kitap.

Pierros Flippas, Meunier Jacob and Abrams Stan, 1999, Bridges and Barriers: The European Union's Mediterranean Policy, 1961-1999, Abgate, Great Britain.

Stavridis Stelios, Coulombis Theodore, Veremis Thanos and Waites Neville The Foreign Policies of the European Union's Mediterranean States and the Applicant Countries in the 1990's, London, Macmillan, 1999.

Vasconceles Alvaro and Joffe, George, 2000, The Barcelona Process: Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community, London, Frank Cass, 2000.

Winrow Gareth, 2000, Dialogue with the Mediterranean: the Role of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative, New York, Garland.

Articles

Perthes, Volker "Germany and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Gradually Becoming a Mediterranean State," EuroMeSCO Papers, February 1998.

Whitman, Richard G., "Core, Periphery and Security in Europe," International Studies Association, March 1998.

Yaphe, Judith S., "Do No Harm: Thoughts on NATO's Mediterranean Initiative, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol:10, No:4, Fall 1996.

Internet

<http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/yazarlar/yazar/0,,authorid~70@sid~9@tarib~2005-05-23>

<http://www.ibm.com/news/tr/2004/12lenova.html>

www.cnnturk.com/DUNYA/baber_detay

COE-DAT Activities

1 COE-DAT organized an **Advanced Training Course (ATC)** on “Organisational and Psychological Profile of Terrorism” on 22-26 October 2007 in Macedonia. During five days’ training program, different dimensions of terrorism in relation with the psychological and organizational profile of terrorism have been elaborated. Within this framework, the aims and strategies of terrorist organisations, their recruitment methods, action methods and financial sources have been discussed. Totally **33** senior officers and officials from Macedonian Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs, National Intelligence Unit, and Crisis



Management Centre participated in the advanced training course. There were **15** trainers composed of academicians, specialists and military personnel from various NATO countries.



2 COE-DAT carried out the “Defence Against Suicide Bombing **Course**” on 19-23 November 2007 in Ankara/Turkey. Throughout the course, the issue of suicide terrorism is analyzed from different dimensions including the psychological, social, legal, financial and intelligence aspects. Assessing the threat of the suicide terrorism, countering suicide terrorism strategies, vulnerabilities, opportunities, needs and capabilities have been discussed and identified. There were **82** participants from **29** different countries and **11** instructors from different NATO countries.

3 COE-DAT conducted the Terrorism and Media **Course** in Ankara /Turkey on 3-7 December 2007. During the course, current media reporting on terrorism, the requirements of the media, increasing awareness on dealing with journalists, information operations and positive use of the media, the best practice in managing information, NATO policy on media and terrorism were discussed. There were **57** participants from **20** different countries.





4 COE-DAT carried out the “Efficient Crisis Management to Mitigate the Effects of Terrorist Activities-II Course” in Ankara/Turkey on 21-25 January 2008. The course was dedicated to elaborate strategical crisis management, interagency policy and strategy development, interagency planning and execution, NATO crisis response system, civil disorder management, public information management, civil and military collaboration, roles and responsibilities of the leaders, the use of force, rules of engagement and the measurements of effectiveness in crisis management. There were **83** participants from **31** different countries.

5 COE-DAT conducted the **ATC** on Legal Aspects of Terrorism on 04-08 February 2008 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the course, legal responses to terrorism, United Nations and terrorism, European Union’s institutional and legal approach to terrorism, diverging approaches to terrorism by nations in terms of laws and legal regulations, legal basis for targeting the funding of terrorism, state responsibility in prevention of arms transfers to non-state armed groups, legal aspects of cyber terrorism, the law of armed conflict, the use of force in law enforcement practices, rules of engagement, human rights and the future of legal aspects of combating terrorism were elaborated and discussed. **33** senior officers and officials participated in the course whereas there were **11** trainers composed of academicians, specialists and military personnel from 7 different countries.



6 COE-DAT carried out the **course** on Cyber Terrorism on 18-22 February 2008 in Ankara/Turkey. The five days’ course elaborated the issue of cyber terrorism with special reference to identifying the ways for international cooperation in countering cyber terrorism. During the course, the threat assessment of cyber terrorism, current modus operandi and cyber defence, the best practices and the needs that should be defined both for forming future policies and field of research are discussed and analyzed. There were **81** participants from **27** different countries.





Global Terrorism and International Cooperation Symposium-II

7 COE-DAT is going to hold an **international symposium** on 10-11 March 2008. The aim of the Symposium is to provide a forum for peace-loving nations to present and discuss their respective positions on terrorism, and then to form a common understanding in solving this global terrorism problem. The symposium aims to develop empathy between sovereign states on issues relating to terrorism, work towards common definitions of terrorism and of terrorists, identify and seek ways of resolving the legal and political differences between countries, which would enable planning and implementation of effective measures to reduce terrorist threats and work towards a comprehensive plan which recognizes the importance of addressing not only military measures but also the political, economic, social and cultural issues which happen to nourish terrorism with the help of its supporters. Distinguished people, who are all experts in their respective fields such as political, diplomatic, military and academic world, are invited to take part in this event as speakers or delegates.

8 COE-DAT is organizing a **NATO Advanced Research Workshop** on “Defence Against WMD Terrorism” on 10-11 April 2008 in Ankara/Turkey. The Centre will bring the western contemporary academic expertise along with Turkish experience of terrorism to a participatory audience from Central Asia, Southeast Europe, Middle East and North Africa in order to deepen the current analyses of WMD terrorism. In this respect, the Centre will bring a common understanding of WMD terrorism and help increase the preparedness to fight terrorism. Lectures will stimulate longer periods of open debate in order to reach appropriate expert analysis of WMD terrorism and increase the level of preparedness against this particular type of terrorism.

**Social and
Psychological
Aspects of
Terrorism and
Countering the
Ideology of
Terrorism
Course**

9 COE-DAT will conduct a **course** on Social and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism and Countering the Ideology of Terrorism on 28 April-02 May 2008 in Ankara/Turkey. The course aims to explain how social and psychological understanding helps determining the nature of terrorism and facilitates the implementation of defensive measures, prospect the current approaches to understand terrorism, list the main analytical frameworks, and identify the most comprehensive and consistent one, build up an intellectual foundation for any cross-disciplinary academic and politics endeavours to counter terrorism and suggest relevant lessons for employing effective counter-terrorism policy instruments. The course is open to all NATO, Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) nations for participation.



COE-DAT

**Centre of Excellence
Defence Against Terrorism**

PK.57, 06582 Bakanlıklar
Ankara / TURKEY

Tel: 00-90-312-4258215

Fax: 00-90-312-4256489

E-mail: tmmm@tsk.mil.tr

www.coedat.nato.int