CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE
DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM

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COE-DAT;

Your gate to get information.

Editorial

Newsletter's eighth issue has four main sections. First of all, we share the information and the analysis of the data related to terrorist incidents took place in the previous three months. Second, we share the findings of the *Transportation Security Against Terrorism NATO Advanced Research Workshop (ARW)* which took place on 05-06 May 2008 in Ankara/Turkey. Third, we have articles on terrorism related issues. Lastly, brief information about the training activities of our centre is provided in the bulletin.

In his article on *Suicide Bombers*, Mr. Ercan ÇİTLİOĞLU, argues the reasons lying behind the dedication and fanaticism of the suicide bombers that draw them to give up their own lives and kill innocent people without feeling any sense of guilt from a psychological perspective. He introduces psychological autopsy as an appropriate method to investigate the mental conditions of a suicide bomber.

Col. Mete TAHMİSOĞLU, in his report on *Transportation Security Against Terrorism NATO ARW*, analyzes the issue of transportation security and terrorism with regard to the rationale of the current transportation security policies and systems as related to terrorism.

LTC Dan-Radu VOICA, in *Small Boat Threat: Water Born Improvised Explosive Devices*, starting with the vulnerability of maritime transportation infrastructures, of both military and merchant shipping, examines the threat of Water Born Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIED). He predicts that in the future world will witness attacks that will include multiple boats and identifies possible countermeasures.

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General Overview of the Terrorist Activities (July - September 2008)

Ergün ERÜN
Major (TUR AF)
COE-DAT

Terrorist incidents increased roughly 10% in the third quarter of 2008, totaling 2550[1] versus 2396 from the second quarter. In this most recent quarter, 38 countries were afflicted by terrorist attacks resulting in 4,326 lives lost, 8,900 injured and 538 reported abductions by unknown assailants. These statistics are a minor increase from the previous quarter. Iraq suffered by far the most attacks with 773 separate attacks claiming 1,249 lives and injuring 3,038 others. The level of violence in Iraq remains nearly the same as the previous two quarters and accounts for 30% of the total attacks, 28% of the total fatalities, and 34% of the total casualties for worldwide terrorist attacks.

The capital of **Iraq**, Baghdad saw the most attacks with 227 separate terrorist incidents, claiming 364 lives and wounding 1,126 people. The deadliest attack in months was conducted on September 12th when a car bomb killed **30** and wounded **47** outside a police station in a predominantly Shi'ite town north of Baghdad. The bomb was detonated just before dusk as many were on the streets before breaking their fast during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Outside of Baghdad, Mosul was the second most volatile city with 226 attacks claiming 245 lives and injuring 482 people. In the third quarter Iraq had 46 abductions by unknown assailants.

Sri Lanka, with intensified clashes between security forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), suffered the second most terrorist attacks in the world for the quarter. The level of violence in Sri Lanka has doubled this quarter versus last quarter with **573** incidents resulting in **315** deaths, including both civilians and security forces, and 1,**258** injured. The number of terrorists neutralized was much higher than the losses suffered by security force. In general, close quarter armed attacks, indirect fire and landmines were the predominating tactics used by the terrorists, however there was one reported suicide attack that claimed eight lives and injured two others. The deadliest incident was a clash in the Wanni battlefront where **11** soldiers have lost their lives with **20** more injured. In addition, two civilians were abducted in Trincomalee on July 15th and LTTE terrorists looted United Nations (UN) offices on September 21st.

	Country	Event Count	KIA	WIA	AIA
1	Iraq	773	1249	3038	46
2	Sri Lanka	573	315	1258	5
3	Afghanistan	358	689	883	215
4	Pakistan	291	903	1590	119
5	India	186	335	597	20
6	Turkey	87	92	269	13
7	Somalia	61	289	244	8
8	Thailand	53	43	170	0
9	Russia	36	47	81	9
10	Philippines	19	79	135	7

Table1 - **The Most Hit Countries Worldwide**



Graphic 1 - **Worldwide Most Hit Countries in the Third Quarter of 2008**

(1) All figures mentioned in the report are totally procured from the open sources and any dispute in figures used in similar works is a matter of capability to reach the same source. Neither NATO nor COE-DAT is responsible for the disputes but the analyst.

The violence continued in **Afghanistan** in the third quarter with **358** separate attacks. These attacks claimed **689** lives and injured **883**, a small increase from the second quarter. There were 215 people abducted in the same time period. The single deadliest attack in the country was reported from the capitol city of Kabul on July 7th when a car bomb detonated at the **Indian Embassy** killing **41** and wounding **139**. This attack was noted as the deadliest attack of the year so far in Afghanistan. The southern province of Helmand was the most volatile with 40 separate attacks where 60 lost their lives and 80 more were injured. In Kandahar province there were 38 attacks claiming 101 lives and injuring 137 others along with abductions by unknown assailants.

Other provinces inflicted with multiple attacks were Ghazni with 36 attacks, Khost with 23 attacks, Loger with 21 attacks, Kabul with 20 attacks, and Paktia with 18 attacks.

In **Pakistan** violence has increased approximately **30%** in the third quarter of 2008 with some **291** terrorist incidents recorded. These attacks claimed 903 lives and causing 1590 casualties. Of these, **259** were killed and **629** were wounded during **14** separate suicide attacks this quarter. The deadliest attack was reported in the capital city of Islamabad on August 21st when **70** people were killed and **67** injured during twin suicide blasts. In this attack two suicide bombers detonated themselves outside the gates of an ordnance factory where hundreds of workers were leaving after a shift change. The first explosion occurred outside the main gate to the factory and was quickly followed by an equal blast at another gate near a busy market. Most of the victims were civilian workers at the factory.

A business center stands damaged near the Indian Embassy in Kabul

Another suicide attack took place in Islamabad on September 20th where 53 people were killed and another 271 wounded at the Marriot Hotel. An explosives laden lorry rammed the security gate, detonating near the hotel and leaving a 60' wide by 20' deep crater. Shots were fired and flames were seen in the cabin moments before the vehicle exploded. The majority of the casualties are believed to be Pakistani, although about 15 foreign casualties were reported. In terms of location, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) had the most activity with 125 attacks claiming 394 lives and 523 injuries.

Terrorism related violence in **India** for the third quarter of 2008 was nearly the same as the previous quarter. In the third quarter 186 separate attacks killed 335 people and wounded 597 others, placing the country as the 5th most targeted country for the quarter. The deadliest attack in the country for the quarter was carried out on July 25th using 16 IEDs. The attack claimed **55** lives and injured **136** in India's commercial city of Ahmedabad. IEDs were detonated in markets, residential areas, hospitals and on public transport within 70 minutes of each other. Three were also defused successfully. Another IED related explosion occurred in the capital city of New Delhi in mid September. On September 13th five bomb blasts in the busy market places of the capital killed 30 people and injured a hundred others. The first explosion took place at Karol Bagh. The second took place near the metro station at Barakhamba Road. Five minutes later, the third took place at the Central Park in Cannaught Place. The last two took place in the M-block market of the Greater Kailash area. The Indian Mujahideen claimed responsibility for the bombings.

Turkey suffered 87 separate terrorist incidents in 22 different cities during

the third quarter, placing it sixth on the list in number of attacks. These attacks claimed 92 lives and injured 269. It is believed that most of the attacks were conducted by the PKK/KONGRA-GEL terrorist organization. The most volatile city for the period was Hakkari where 20 separate terrorist incidents killed 15 and wounded 19 others. There were also four abductions in Hakkari during the same time period. The deadliest attack in Turkey happened in Istanbul on July 27th when 17 people, to include a three year old child, were killed and 154 were injured in two separate bombings in the neighborhood of Gungoren. The two bombs exploded minutes apart.

In addition, a roadside bomb placed by the PKK/KONGRA-GEL terrorists, in Erzincan city killed nine soldiers, a lieutenant colonel, two specialist sergeants, and six privates. Two others were wounded.

Terrorism related violence in **Somalia** claimed 289 lives and injured 244 others in 61 separate attacks, making Somalia the most targeted country in Africa. Once again, poor information flow from the country hampered a comprehensive assessment; however, based on the information available an average of twenty attacks per month were reported. This is 50% reduction from the second quarter. The most significant attack in the country was reported on September 22nd when mortar bombs hit a Mogadishu market, killing at least 42 people. Another significant attack was reported on August 3rd when a roadside bomb killed at least 20 and wounded 47, to include women and children, in the Somali capitol of Mogadishu.

Violence in **Thailand** remained almost the same for the third quarter of 2008 with 53 attacks compared to 55 last quarter. In the 53 attacks this quarter, 43 lives were lost and 170 people were wounded. Among the three troubled southern provinces, Pattani and Yala were the most volatile both in terms of the number of attacks carried out and casualties reported. Each suffered 17 attacks which resulted in 14 people were killed and 35 were injured in Pattani, while 20 people were killed and 41 were wounded in Yala. The province of Narathiwat also suffered a significant number of attacks, 12 for quarter, which claimed six lives and wounded 50. The most significant attack in the country also occurred in the Narathiwat province on August 21st when a car bomb exploded in Su-ngai Kolok, a border town to Malaysia and the capital of the Su-ngai Kolok district. The bomb killed a journalist and wounded 30 government officials and shoppers.



Graphic 2 - **Ten Countries Those Gave the Highest Casualties in the Third Quarter of 2008**

Marriot Hotel after suicide car bomb attacks

The explosion came just minutes after another bomb hidden in a motorcycle was remotely detonated near a busy restaurant and police station.

Russia was ninth most targeted country for the third quarter. Some 36 separate terrorist attacks claimed 47 lives and injured 81 during the quarter. Most attacks were conducted using traditional arms in 21 separate incidents that resulted in 28 dead and 29 wounded. However, there were five IED attacks claiming six lives and injuring 27 and two suicide attacks that included an SVBIED, which killed two and wounded 15 others. Ingushetia was the most targeted city for the period with 21 attacks claiming 27 lives and wounding 39 people.

In the **Philippines** some 19 attacks claimed 79 lives and wounded 135 people during the third quarter of 2008. The deadliest attack was a clash where hundreds of religiously motivated militants attacked two towns in the troubled south on August 18th, killing 34 in the province of Lanao del Norte. The attack was the bloodiest since a territorial deal with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) stalled earlier in the month and comes just days after government troops halted an offensive against MILF rebels in Mindanao. Mindanao was the most volatile city with seven separate attacks claiming 30 lives and injuring 96 during the period. In terms of attack methods, IEDs and armed attacks were the most used with IEDs claiming nine lives and wounding 56 while armed attacks killed 10 people and wounded 19 others

The terrorists used seventeen different tactics in the third quarter of 2008. **Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)** were the most used on 652 separate occasions, targeting both civilians and security forces. At least 876 people were reportedly killed and 2,646 others sustained injuries related to the attacks. Iraq was the most targeted with IEDs, suffering 302 separate attacks. Afghanistan and Pakistan were targeted with approximately 173 IEDs while 70 were reported in Sri Lanka and India.

The second most used tactic was traditional **armed attacks**, with 608 incidents that killed 1037 and wounded 584. Extrajudicial killings posed an important security challenge for Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Algeria, Sri



Graphic 3 - **Ten Countries Those Gave the Highest Casualties in the Third Quarter of 2008.**

Lanka and especially for Iraq where 204 people lost their lives in captivity in 101 separate incidents.

	Event Type	Event Count	KIA	WIA	AIA
1	IED	652	876	2646	0
2	Armed Attack	608	1037	584	32
3	Clash	496	801	1500	4
4	IDF	210	331	688	0
5	VOIED	137	109	323	0
6	Suicide Attack	98	768	2075	0
7	Abduction	91	13	27	438
8	VBIED	86	238	980	0
9	Assassination	55	44	30	0
10	Infrastructure Attack	34	0	0	0

Table 2 - **The Most Used Tactics in the World**

In addition, the **clashes** between security forces and militants caused considerable damage with 801 people, mainly security forces and civilians in the crossfire, losing their lives and over 1,500 sustaining injuries.

A wide usage of **Indirect Fire (IDF)** attacks was also noted during the quarter killing 331 and wounding 688 in 210 attacks. Sri Lanka suffered the most IDF attacks during the quarter with 70 IDF attacks killing 34 and wounding 137.

The **Victim Operated Improvised Explosive Device (VOIED)** attack was the fifth most used tactic for the period. Some 137 attacks claimed 109 lives and injured 323 during the quarter. Sri Lanka suffered the most VOIED attacks with 111 attacks killing five and wounding 153. Also, Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the Philippines saw significant VOIED attacks.

Suicide Bombing was the deadliest form of IED attacks, killing 768 people and wounding 2,075 others during the third quarter of 2008. Iraq reported 47 of these attacks while Afghanistan had 27 suicide bombings. Pakistan was the third hardest hit by this tactic, suffering 15 such attacks. Other countries targeted were Algeria with four, Russia with two, and Turkey, Sri Lanka, and Yemen afflicted with at least one each during the quarter.

Abductions were another tactic used during the period. Some 91 attacks killed 13 people and wounded 27 others. Also, assailants kidnapped 438 people during the quarter.

Another deadly IED tactic, **Vehicle Born Improved Explosive Devices (VBIED)**, usage was the eighth most used tactic. There were 86 separate attacks claiming 238 lives and 980 injuries from VBIEDs during the quarter. Iraq was the most volatile country with 59 separate VBIED attacks that killed 154 people and wounded over 600 others.

Lastly, there were 55 **assassinations**, claiming 44 lives and injuring 30 others, and 34 **infrastructure** attacks during the quarter.



Graphic 4 - **The Deadliest Tactics Used in the World in the third Quarter of 2008**

Suicide Bombers

Ercan ÇİTLİOĞLU
Advisor
COE-DAT

The main and common purpose of the mankind is to achieve higher standards of life.

In order to achieve that common target, people choose to enhance their knowledge and skills, prevent conflicts and live in peace and thus not to loose what they already have.

Within every culture, you may find the traces and evidences of sanctity of human life and how the right of living should be protected and maintained. Regardless of those values accepted by the entire humanity, how could we explain some people choosing to end their own lives as well as killing innocent people and calling this a right? What lies beneath this difference, dedication and fanaticism that draw people to give up their own lives and kill innocent people without feeling any sense of guilt?

More specifically, what are the differences between a regular person and a terrorist, a terrorist and a suicide bomber and what are the reasons creating those differences?

Terrorism is a concept that should be studied with respect to direct science areas such as suicide attacks, criminal psychology, mass psychology, war psychology and political psychology as well as interdisciplinary areas. However, there are not many fact-based scientific researches conducted regarding suicide attacks and suicide bombers.

What is more, because almost all the suicide bombers die in the attacks, investigation of their mental conditions could only be conducted by a method called psychological autopsy instead of studying the subject itself.

It should be accepted that this method is inadequate to achieve absolute facts. Psychological autopsy is a complex concept that is based on retrospective and rational succession interferences and requires individual processes to be evaluated with other effective processes. Therefore psychological autopsy is a series of work that requires studying and questioning the psychology of the bomber conducting the attack as well as studying the groups that the bomber is a member of, their ideologies, dynamics, behaviour and perceptions, identities, life conditions, cultures, and cultural dynamics.

On the other hand for the attacks concluded without the death of the bomber, saying that the state of mind of the bomber is the same with the state of mind of a bomber in which the attack is concluded with death, could be a little misleading. It won't be very accurate to say that the mental condition and the psychology of a suicide bomber who has just abdicated from committing the attack or who has been caught right before the attack, are the same as the mental condition of a bomber who has sacrificed his life and committed the attack. For this reason, the studies and the outcomes are based on some systematics however are not based on modellings.

First I would like to focus on suicide bombers with the question of why a person chooses to become a terrorist. Becoming a terrorist does not contain different processes in individual psychology in terms of conceptual plan. The reason of that is hidden in our human nature. As I have mentioned previously, what people expect from life usually focuses on positive bases. However the negativities we experience, the obstacles we face and cannot overcome can force us to drift away from that positive base, affect our behaviour and make us move outside our regular behaviour patterns. Even though our intrapshycic dynamics, in other words our inner and mental dynamics are very positive, the difficulties we face in life can force us to go to points unconsciously that we had never thought of or wanted to be. Our childhood traumas, difficulties we faced and could not overcome, situations we experienced and could not manage, shortly very simple things can turn into an anger in our inner world and cause a specific value to elevate.

Our belief in our humiliation and damnification can direct us to ethnic nationalism, and our loneliness we feel

and the isolation created by the others can direct us to radical religious movements.

We can seek the answer of who we are in religious and ideological perspectives and leave ourselves to their salvation. We can take this orientation to a greater level of dedication and be a slave of an ironic movement and the idea of our death and death of other people valuing our lives.

The main purpose of suicide attacks is to kill civilians, securities or any people just for the sake of his/her own death. Because the attacker knows that he/she is going to die at the end of the attack.
The western nations are having a difficult time understanding and interpreting these kinds of attacks. We understand that from the question (What kind of a force can make a person to do that) taking place in the western press after suicide attacks. The main reason of this question and the difficulties in understanding is that ``reaching the desired target`` in this way has nothing to do with ethics or humanity. Killing innocent people that have nothing to do with the desired target and are chosen abstractly of course is something that is very hard to comprehend and explain. However it should be agreed upon that it is a very effective message.

The targets of the terrorists could have aims, even though they are not normative for us, however achieving these targets by killing innocent people is like an identity showing that the real aim is not to reach the target in terms of moral plan.

A legitimate individual or social target achieved by killing innocent people does not exist and can never exist. Therefore, the conscience organisations committing suicide attacks could only be possible by acceptance and comprehension of ideologies and belief systems.

Because a person has to think that he/she is killing another person or others for a greater purpose in order to be acquitted in front of their own consciences.

This is the main reason lying beneath the terrorists not feeling guilty and not having a guilty conscience.

For that to happen, organising is necessary. Because organisations form the social base of conscience acquittal. A social level acquittal requires mass support. Because conscience or superego in psychological terms is the most social one among id-ego-superego trio. Therefore, one fact should be accepted and vocalized even though we find it dreadful and unkind. If there is an action, there is also a supporting mass or at least a mass feeling sympathy towards it. For this reason, the criminals of the suicide attacks are not only the individuals but also the sympathizer masses providing them conscience acquittal.

I do not want to mention the history of the suicide attacks since the early ages till today.

But I would like to share some recent statistical information with you. Between years 1980 and 2000, the suicide attacks create one third of the terrorist attacks but are only responsible for %48 of the deaths. Between years 2000 and 2002, suicide attacks create only %1 of the all the actions, however they are responsible for %44 of the entire deaths…

Therefore, suicide attacks have become a very popular method or a new trend to give effective messages and also to ascend feelings in the society such as desperation, helplessness, weakness and insecurity.

Suicide attacks instantly destroy one's trust and defence barriers. The feeling of becoming a victim at any time at any place, can reach to levels where the relation of people with the system is totally destroyed.

It is normal that the media pays attention to these actions with wide news bulletins and feeds suicide attacks by playing a provocative role. Another practical point of suicide attacks for the organisations is that the examination and questioning of the suicide bomber and getting information about the organisation are impossible,

because the suicide bomber is dead. Most importantly, for the same reason, the communal hatred is kept under control. The social conscience faces a dilemma and the hatred is kept inside by misleading the emotions to different places far from the target.

After long years of researches conducted to examine terrorist profiles, today still no common terrorist profile or prototype is determined.

We should not miss to consider that there has been no relation found between suicide attacks and inclined characters and behaviours.

For both, there is the instinct of killing one itself however it should be noted that the motivations and reasons are completely different. For a person to commit suicide he/she has to trivialize himself/herself and has to have no plans and hopes for the future. In suicide attacks, even tough the attacker has no plans and hopes for the future, he/she cares about himself/herself instead of trivializing. He/she believes that he /she has become a role model, taught a lesson to others and reached immortality with his/her death.

This can be called death narcissism. It is like proving his/her difference and the limits of his/her dedication to mortal people by choosing death… The common ideals of the people have a futuristic meaning. We call it: future oriented. This is the thing that connects us with life and makes us hopeful. Therefore, if you want to take someone's identity, you should take their plans, hopes, dreams and ideals away.

People left in uncertainty do not own the past of a country that has no future promises. They even blame that past for the difficult days they had to face. However at the same time loosing of the past means loosing everything we own. This describes a social depression condition. But ironically, people who have lost their past still want to own a past. Instead of the past they have rejected, they search deep down and want to own another one. At this point, their identities start creating primary elements and the process of owning an identity deviates from reality. This identity owning process has no future. Individuals and the society retire into themselves, the whole belief system gets destroyed and a leaning towards the ethereal instead of the mundane, in other words fanaticism starts to take place… Therefore, suicide bombers have no gray in their worlds. Their worlds are made of black and white. There are whites who are same as them, share the same belief and value system and the rest is all black. The separation of us and the others is very distinct in the inner world of the terrorists and especially the suicide bombers. For this very reason, the suicide bombers have feelings like revenge and hatred against the people that they don't accept or feel that they are not one of them. By sacrificing themselves, they believe that they will make the others suffer as they have done before; they feel relieved with all these feelings and assume that they have achieved their target.

At the end they die but also they have caused pain to the other side too. Also when they die, their black side is meant to be destroyed and their good sides become eternal, because suicide attacks are processes where identity and personalities are faded away and recreated at the same time.

The simplest way to define our identity is the existence of the others. Individuals and groups who do not hold any descriptives or roots of their own, usually look for enemies. The easiest and most practical way to maintain their integrity is the existence of an enemy. Dying of the bomber or in other word his rebirth and becoming immortal, instead of shrinking to a nullity in the absence of this enemy, is the point of origin of a suicide bomber. Because death and birth are brothers, he/she would come to world by his/her own death and recreate himself/herself. A patient in depression looses the will to live and can commit suicide. However this feeling of losing the will to live, wanting to destroy the world and creating others includes a destructive and eternal sense of justness.

These reasons lie beneath the passion to kill people with the feeling of justness coming from damnification and the conscientious acquittal.

The question that comes to minds is whether these suicide attacks could be inhibited and the suicide bombers could be rehabilitated.

Could someone who sees the most terrified death as an award, who believes that he is valuing himself and humiliating the other with his death, be regained with psychological methods?

If we were to experience these facts in a singular dimension, then the answer would be yes. However these facts are made up of social and mass elements and concepts that interfere and complete each other, so I should state that I do not find the idea of ending the suicide attacks very believable.

Here we can talk about a long-time education period probably beginning from their infancy. The ones to provide this education are the parents, but especially the mothers. In a society where the mothers are not educated, then who would give this education? Who would monitor the health of identity formation?

Who will make sure that this separated period, the transition period when blacks and whites all combine to form greys, is experienced properly?

If we apply the separated individual ego model, in other words the transition period where blacks and whites turn into greys, to the societies; this process also requires the same things as owning an individual identity.

Then how will we eliminate the forces that prevent societies to act in their own dynamics and own their own identities?
Is it possible for suicide bombers to accept the people, system and methods they see as the source of the disease, also as a healing doctor.

I assume that you would share the impossibility of giving deterministic answers to these questions.

It seems like if a meeting is held in ten years time from now, and I believe it will be held, the people in your places and the speakers will still continue to seek solutions for this very problem and it is probable that the same questions will be under the spot light.

I should emphasize that I am not saying that with despair or resignation. But also I should frankly state that the road for people to quit sacrificing their lives and leave the message giving model behind, is a long, self-sacrificing and rough road.

Small Boat Threat- Water Born Improvised Explosive Devices

Dan-Radu VOICA
LTC (ROU A)
Instructor
COE-DAT

Abstract. Maritime Terrorism has become a buzzword among security experts over the last decade. Incidents such as the attacks on *USS Cole* (October 2000) and *MV Limburg* (October 2002) demonstrated in the most graphic and chilling way the vulnerability of maritime transportation infrastructures, of both military and merchant shipping.

Keywords. Small boat threat, Terrorism, WBIED.

Historically, the world's oceans have not been a major venue for terrorist activity. According to the RAND Corporation's terrorism database, maritime terrorist attacks have accounted for only two percent of all incidents since 1969(1). This number is relatively small due to the fact that security forces have had to deal with traditional terror groups such as the vestiges of political terrorism and separatist-irredentist terrorist groups(2). All these groups are characterized by their hierarchical, pyramidal structure and centralized command system. Almost all groups have a regional or local operational agenda using terrorism to target specific people or places, which as a result reduce the damage to small numbers or individual casualties.

The sophistication, expense, and training to carry out maritime terrorism necessitate considerable overhead. It requires terrorist organizations to acquire appropriate vessels, mariner skills and, specialist weapons/explosive capabilities(3). Many terrorist groups are either not located near coastal regions or do not possess the necessary means to carry out maritime attacks. Limited by scarce financial and operational resources, most traditional terrorist organizations have decided not to venture into the maritime arena, as the ends do not justify their means. Therefore, following more pragmatic methods, many terrorist groups have preferred to stay with proven successful land based terrorism, especially when selected land targets are not too difficult to attack.

Up to now the only organizations that have capabilities for a maritime attempt are Al-Qaida(4), Hezbollah, the Revolutionary Armed Forces from Columbia (FARC) and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Sea Tigers(5).

It seems that Al-Qaida have at this moment approximately 24 boats which can be used for maritime terrorist attacks. Some of the boats are not in direct control of the organization but can be given to, before the planned attack.

The mastermind of maritime terrorist operations for Al Qaeda (until his capture in Aden in November 2002) was Abdul al-Rahim al-Nashiri, otherwise known as the Prince of the Sea. According to Michael Richardson, a visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, al-Nashiri based his operation on four pillars(6):

- using a speed boat packed with explosive to ram warships or other ships;
- using medium sized boats as bombs to be blown up near slips or ports;
- using airplanes to ram boats; and
- having underwater demolition teams.

1.Definition

The definition of "small-boat threat" encompasses a variety of possible weapon-delivery vehicles, tactics, and payloads. Vessels include everything from large craft such as small freighters, large privately owned yachts, fishing trawlers, and commercial tugs to dinghies, jet-skies, and submarines, including mini-submarines like those used by the Japanese in the attack on Pearl Harbor(7).
An attack could involve suicide bombers, as in the case of the attack on the "USS Cole"(8), or vessels on autopilot or remotely controlled. Improvised explosive devices could be delivered or emplaced by boats or swimmers (assisted or unassisted by breathing devices). This could involve placing a "parasite" on the hull of a craft or deploying tethered (anchored to the sea bottom) or untethered (floating) mines in a sea-lane, waterway, or port traffic area. Terrorists can also take advantage of a vessel's legitimate cargo, such as chemicals, petroleum, or liquefied natural gas, as the explosive component of an attack. Vessels can be used to transport powerful

conventional explosives or WMD for detonation in a port or alongside an offshore facility(9).

Attacks could occur while the targeted ship is docked at shore (*M/V Limburg*(10)), approaching a port, sailing in international waters, or in coastal waterways. In addition to ships, attacks could target port facilities; commercial infrastructure (e.g., an entertainment pier, bridge piling, or pipeline); or public events.

The attacks against both *USS Cole* and *M/V Limburg*, brought to light that for these types of targets the use of Water Born Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIED)(11) are the preferred means of attack because they are effective, easily obtained, blend in, and do not look out of place. Also, provide easy methods of transporting the device to targets, enhanced effects due to the boat structure and fuel, have many hiding places, enable large quantities of explosives to be used, easily hide fusing and initiation systems, can cause a spectacular attack causing much death and destruction leading to extensive media coverage.

2.Transport means used for WBIED attacks

Irrespective of type (boat/vessel) they have to:
- blend in disguise with other boats/vessels in the area, by color, shape, destination etc;
- have the technical characteristics necessary and sufficient to accomplish the mission: speed, maneuverability, action range, transport capacity etc.

In this respect, some terrorist groups (like the LTTE Sea Tigers and Al-Qaida) modified the boats to increase the storage area, gain more power and speed (changed the engines).

To attack surface ships/maritime installations the terrorist organizations may use the following types of boats:

- indigenous boats (fishing boats) - assure good camouflage and have large storage areas for explosive.

In April 2004, terrorists using two fishing dhows packed with explosives attacked an Iraqi offshore oil terminal in the North Arabian Gulf, killing one U.S. Coast Guardsman and two U.S. Navy sailors protecting the terminal as they prepared to search one of the boats(12);

- speed boats - fast and relatively easy to maneuver. Although the range and loading capacity are relatively small, these kind of boats where used both in the *USS Cole* and the *Limburg* attacks;

- leisure type boats (yachts) - allow terrorist activity in almost all the harbors without arising suspicion. Some of these kinds of boats are very fast, have big action range and storage area for explosive.

In August 2005, Turkish authorities arrested Louai Sakka, a senior al-Qaeda operative when a one-ton bomb he designed detonated prematurely. Sakka had intended to place the bomb on a yacht and ram a cruise ship carrying vacationing Israeli and US soldiers on rest and recreation in Antalya, Turkey(13);

- life boats - have a good storage area but lack in maneuverability. And further more, to assure the camouflage operation the boat has to be far in the sea, that means another ship has to take it to the attempt area. Only one case is known when it was made an attempt against a patrol vessel. The vessel came to the area after receiving an SOS signal

-auxiliary vessels (usually maintenance/repair vessels) - can be used to launch smaller boats to execute a simultaneous attack upon several targets. In 2002, Al-Qaida had in plan to launch such an attack against US and UK naval ships in the Straits of Gibraltar. Luckily the operation was thwarted.

3. Preparing the attacks

In many respects, WBIED threats resemble other terrorist plots and have similar signatures. To carry such an attack terrorist organizations require recruiting, training and planning, surveillance and intelligence collection, operational security, logistical support, rehearsals, information operations, and execution.

On the other hand, these threats have unique characteristics. They require unique knowledge such as maritime skills

(e.g., sailing and scuba diving); familiarity with the target area (such as traffic patterns near a port facility); or explosives training. Also there are unique environmental concerns that can affect the planning and conduct of maritime attacks that include weather, tides, and other variables that could affect the dependability and reliability of the strike method. For example, salt, water, and wind can adversely affect weapons delivery and detonation.

Terrorists like predictability. They like to know the obstacles that they will face and the probable results of an attack. Uncertainties in the maritime domain could significantly affect the desirability of employing the small-boat attack method. For example, large public events or a national sporting event might seem "inviting targets" because of the large crowds of people and the public attention focused on the events. However, large one-time events are less promising targets because of the additional security and the greater difficulty in predicting the security conditions.

On the other hand, normal commercial traffic and port operations bear many of the same characteristics of a desirable terrorist target, including limited responsive security and highly predictable patterns of behavior. For example, high-value ships such as cruise ships and tankers carrying extremely hazardous materials are much more vulnerable when entering or leaving restricted navigable waters along coastlines, in port areas, or along domestic waterways. During these periods, a large ship typically has a pilot on board, is moving at a low speed, and is following a tight and predictable course because of underwater obstructions and maritime traffic.

Studying the attacks that took place and the unplugged ones we can conclude that:

- preparing the attack begins long before, by activating a surveillance team in the area. Depending of the action range of the organization this can be done with the help of local terrorist cells or groups. Members of these groups blend into society, buy houses, means of transport (cars and boats) to be used in the planned attack and so on. The main mission of the surveillance team is to get information about the chosen target (e.g. security system, legal and illegal avenues of approach, vulnerabilities, frequented routs, habits of the personnel working in the area). Some of the information is gathered from open sources like INTERNET, local newspapers, radio and TV broadcasts and even from the people working in the target area. For example the organization and equipment aboard *USS Cole* were found on the INTERNET, and allowed the terrorists to plan the attack in the place where the damages to the ship will be the greatest. The *Limburg* oil tanker was hit in the only full loaded bunker, information obtained from the ship crue.

- ways of coverting the operation - it's a very important feature in planning the attack. Generally for the boats in the dock area, the disguises used are as fishermen, tourists or maintenance;

- this is the faze in which the potential "suicide bombers" are looked for and recruited;

- before the attack the suicide bombers are brought in the area and the explosive needed for the attack is looked for. Usually it's obtained from criminal activities persons/groups or, it's home made using various chemicals or substances.

4. The execution

Based on the attacks that took place and the ones foiled we can conclude the following:

a) place of attack - the attempts took place near the shore, in port areas, on internal rivers or in bay's. These places are preferred because: the targets are at short distance, don't move or move at small speed to enter/leave the harbors, imply less fuel consumption and minimum navigation skills. But it is not a rule because some of the Al-Qaida affiliated groups planned attacks upon ships in high sea.

b) targets selected - similarities between the methods and means used in attacks against *USS Cole* and *Limburg* (boats of same dimension, approximately same quantity of explosive, both ships were

attacked in Yemenite waters) indicate that terrorist target both military and civilian ships.

c) types of action - in all cases the boats went straight to the target, the only differences being the speed and place of impact.

5. Advantages and disadvantages of using WBIED in maritime attacks

a) Some of the advantages are:

- low cost/great damage;
- relatively simple to accomplish;
- great media impact;
- the only ways to stop the attack are immobilization/destruction of the boats en route to the target.

b) Disadvantages:

- the existence of a large range of activities from "neighborhood watch" and public awareness programs to technologies that provide near and far supervision conditions for civilian ships and air and water defense for military ships;
- the explosive device has to be very well placed on the boat (not to endanger the boat in case of ruff sea, but to assure maximum damage on impact to the target);
- the attacker has to take the boat near the ship, even collide with it but in the same time must not attract attention, at least until the moment of impact. Although is not very difficult to recruit and train a suicide bomber, this is another disadvantage for WBIED attacks because he has to acquire minimum navigation knowledge.

6. Possible Countermeasures

Countermeasures generally fall into one of three categories, and each set of solutions faces significant challenges.

a) Identification and Accreditation. These measures include proposals for new regulatory regimes requiring additional stipulations for licensing individual operators and craft; national standardization of licensing processes and documents; reporting of lost and stolen licenses and craft; and requirements for transponders, which would enable authorities to identify and track small boats.

These proposals raise significant cost and effectiveness issues that need to be addressed, as well as significant issues concerning cost sharing and responsibility among states and local entities.

Finally, identification and accreditation programs are effective when combined with capabilities to investigate fraud, identify and respond to suspicious activities and persons, and prosecute violators.

b) Improving Situational Awareness and Detecting Threats. These measures could involve a range of activities from "neighborhood watch" and public awareness programs to technologies that provide wide-area surveillance and standoff detection of explosives and materials used in weapons of mass destruction.

Identifying and monitoring small craft and swimmers poses serious technological challenges.

c) Controlling Access and Interdicting Threats.

This approach involves restricting access to sensitive areas, which might include critical infrastructure, extremely hazardous material, national icons, high-value ships such as passenger ships or ferries, or densely populated areas.

Interdiction raises issues concerning the manpower and capabilities available to control access and conduct interdiction. For example, significantly enhancing community policing at sea could be extremely costly. In some cases, restricting or controlling passage is impractical or would significantly disrupt the movement of goods, people, and services.

Effective interoperable communications, information sharing, and coordinating joint action among states, local authorities and the private sector remain significant concerns.

d) Mitigating the Threat

The maritime domain has a vast number of vulnerabilities, and terrorists have many options and opportunities for determining how, when, and where to attack maritime infrastructure. Fixating

on a particular method of attack or trying to protect a particular target set is a self-defeating strategy that not only imposes significant costs on the defender, but also can easily be circumvented by an adaptive enemy. In that regard, focusing specifically on the small boat threat is probably not the best way to address the challenge.

Conclusion

Al Qaeda is a network that has so far understood how to adapt to a rapidly changing environment. It was able to rise from its ashes and find vulnerable spots in an open society. Maritime transportation, with its many weaknesses, is one of those weak spots waiting to exploit by Al Qaeda. International counter-measures such as the ISPS code can only be regarded as the first step in order to close this Achilles' heel.

Based on the evidence presented above, we believe that in the future we will witness attacks that will include: multiple boats that will attack simultaneous or, wave attacks aimed first on the target and second upon intervention/rescue means. Also, for such attacks, the explosive charges will be connected to more than one initiating mechanisms that will double or triple the suicide bomber, thus avoiding the risk of not meeting the aims by the attacker.

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(7) Small Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from the Sea, June 11, 2007, by James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.;
(8) The suicide attack took place on October 12, in the port of Aden, Yemen, killing 17 sailors and injuring 39. For this attack the terrorists used a small craft with 270 Kg. of C4 on board. The attack caused $ 250 million in damage to the warship taking 14 months to repair (Department of homeland security small vessel strategy, April 2008).
(9) DHS and DOD. Sept. 2005. p.4;
(10) In October 2002 a small fishing craft packed with explosives attacked the French oil tanker M/V Limburg. Al Qaeda directed the attack that resulted in fires on board the ship, a large oil spill-90 000 barrels of crude oil along 45 miles of coastline, the death of one crew member and the injury of four. It also caused insurance rates among Yemeni shippers to rise 300% and reduced Yemeni port shipping volumes by 50% in the month after the attack (Department of homeland security small vessel strategy, April 2008)
(11) The Free Dictionary by Farlex.
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Report on "Transportation Security against Terrorism" ARW

Mete TAHMİSOĞLU
COL(TUR A)
Instructor
COE-DAT

Even a cursory review of the numerous hijackings, train, and bus bombings reveal beyond doubt that transport systems are particularly vulnerable targets of terrorist attacks. To confront and seek remedies for this problem the "Transportation Security against Terrorism" Advanced Research Workshop took place 05–06 May 2008 in Ankara.

Following a welcoming address by COE–DAT, terrorism expert Ercan Çitlioğlu presented a keynote speech on "Understanding the Roots of Terrorism and Its Future". The speech includes an appeal to scholars to set aside prejudices and labels in favour of unbiased scientific research. The sceptical approach of the expert is apparent the following passage: "... the hope that some states, which know or have created the conditions that give rise to terrorism, and which feed on such circumstances to achieve their national objectives, will contribute positively to the struggle against terrorism is a hollow expectation." Mr. Çitlioğlu argues that no nation is more inclined to violence than another. Rather, violence is part of the human nature.

The broad subject of terrorism having thus been evoked, the first of the five panels provided the theoretical framework for its relationship with transportation. Prof. Joseph Szyliowicz, speaking on "Terrorism, Mobility, and Transportation Security", took us to the heart of the topic by pointing out the dependence of modern economies and societies upon the effective functioning of transportation systems. He focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of the policies that have been implemented to safeguard these systems, underlying the importance not only of international co-operation, intelligence, security and law enforcement, but of addressing the root causes of terrorism: "Transportation security, therefore, must be viewed within a larger context."

The Chair of the Research Society on Methodology Societal Complexity, Dr. Dorien DeTombe, reflects on terrorism from the viewpoint of a social scientist in her address on "Terrorist Attacks as a Social Problem". At the heart of this paper is the six-step Compram Methodology; the analysis of social problems, the identification by experts and actors of interventions and possible reactions, then proceeding to implementing measures. Dr. DeTombe sets out the causes of terrorism, including "the relationship between power and idealism, between fundamentalism, identity and religion, and between poverty and immigration". On the subject of religion, she states that "the major goal of any religion, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Islam or Christianity is to have power over people". She is also critical of the controlling tendency of the Bush administration, which "results in a double threat for the people, that of terrorist attacks and that of their government".

In "The Social Psychology of Terrorism", Prof. Dragan Simeunovic elaborates the sociological evaluation of terrorism on th one hand, and provides an overview of the measures Serbia has taken to ensure transportation security on the other.

In the afternoon, the Second Panel addressed "Terrorism and Critical Transportation Infrastructure", dividing it into the main transport sectors. Although Prof. Col. Taner Altınok entitled his paper "Modelling Homeland Security – Transportation, Including Critical Infrastructures", in fact this presentation begins with a highly theoretical discussion of the distinction between "terror" and "terrorism". More definitions follow, this time of critical infrastructure in the various sectors of energy production, transportation,

communications, and so on. The professor considers the terrorists' motivations and their targeting of transportation before suggesting a model for defence based on planning, security, protection and prevention, and conducting risk assessments. He concludes "it is a must for governments to focus their efforts on the protection of critical infrastructures".

The other being Prof. Ziliaskopoulos, Prof. Harvey Miller was one of the two leading experts on the computer modelling of traffic flows present at the ARW. In particular, the professor, whose paper is entitled "Space-Time Measures of Transportation Vulnerability", pioneered the modelling of traffic flow in the aftermath of disasters like terrorist attacks after he noted that existing methods for analysing transportation network vulnerability do not explicitly recognize potential impacts on human lives, since they focus on network reliability and performance only. In his paper, the professor focused on space-time (transportation) vulnerability (STV) measures that recognize and calculate for human activity patterns. He pointed out, for example, that in a disaster where normal modes of transport are out of action, people's natural tendency is to walk in the direction of their homes, even though these may be many kilometres away. The paper goes on to outline a research agenda based on measurements of the loss of space-time autonomy as a result of transport disruption.

Captain (N) Nihat Altunbulak's paper on "Maritime Transportation Security against Terrorism and Human Smuggling" is a comprehensive treatment of the subject. As well as surveying the ports and shipping and their possible vulnerabilities, the paper has many recommendations for preventing terrorism. In what is generally an up-beat assessment of the effectiveness of security measures, Captain Altunbulak cites studies which conclude that the chances of terrorists blocking maritime choke-points, or using containers on ships, are not great. Generally this transport sector presents hard targets for the potential attacker. The captain goes on to survey the laws and international co-operation in place for maritime security. The second part of the paper looks in greater detail at one issue which is related to terrorism, that of human smuggling and trafficking. These are pressing issues for the Turkish navy, which is actively involved in operations like Active Endeavour and Black Sea Harmony.

The final panel of the first day looked at "Transportation Security Policy Issues" at the UN and EU levels. The UN was represented at the ARW by Ulrik Ahnfeldt-Mollerup, a terrorism prevention expert with the Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). His paper, "The Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism: The Role of the United Nations", was informative. In particular, it explains the responsibilities of the Terrorism Prevention Branch of UNODC in promoting the acceptance and implementation of the relevant agreements. The speaker listed twelve conventions, three protocols and one amendment, and presented the level of their ratification.

Mr. Davide Casale is a specialist on terrorism prevention policy and a founding member of a new Brussels-based EU think tank which receives support from former Chancellor Kohl. Casale's description of "EU Measures on Transportation Security against Terrorism" begins by commenting that freedom of movement and free circulation of goods are fundamental components of the European construction. The EU has, consequently, developed "a vast range" of legislative tools. This paper provides an overview of recent measures to strengthen and co-ordinate air and maritime security in the Union. In doing so, it points out some of the main inadequacies, such as concerns about individual rights, and the lack of efficient action in key sectors such as critical infrastructure.

On the second day of the ARW, the Birmingham University law professor Robert Cryer addressed the "Legal Framework for Defending the Transportation Network". There are a number of instruments specifically addressed to particular transport sectors, notably air and sea travel. Much of anti-terrorism legislation related to transport is subsumed within more wide-ranging security laws. Robert Cryer was able to show the relationships between the levels

of legislation, which together present a formidable raft of controls and interdictions.

The next panel featured another lawyer, and two experienced practitioners in the field of security and intelligence. John Markey worked for US agencies, particularly helping co-ordinate intelligence work in Southeast Europe over many years. He gave a highly systematic paper on "Public Sector Transportation Security and Intelligence". His lengthy paper is structured according to the case study analytical method: A number of successful and unsuccessful terrorist plots, selected according to their relationship to the transport system and how well they demonstrate key aspects of planning and execution, are analysed. In each case, an overview of the incidents is provided, followed by the question of their significance, their consequences, and factors associated with their success or failure. The New York subway plot of 1997, the London bombings, the Aum Shinrikyo sarin attacks, and others, are assessed, each time with the aim of highlighting future policy and strategy.

Jim McKee, who works ostensibly for the British police, delivered a well-informed account and evaluation of the 07 July 2005 London bombings, which affected the underground rail and bus systems, and the subsequent emergency operation. He stated: "Many of the lessons learnt related to communication problems. Different emergency services could not speak to each other…" One problem, which has now been addressed, was the fact that mobile telephones did not function in the underground. Another problem was the large number of victims of psychological trauma who received no attention.

One of the striking presentations in the ARW was the paper on "Cyber-attacks against Transportation Infrastructure" by the young expert in criminal law and cyber-crime, Dr. Marco Gercke. His presentation analysed the vulnerabilities in transportation infrastructure with regard to network-based attacks. With many photographs of vulnerable information technology in transport systems, Gercke drew attention to some of the challenges that go along with the prevention and investigation of computer-based attacks.

In the question and answer session which followed this fourth panel there was an interesting exchange between Jim McKee and Marco Gercke regarding British anti-terrorism laws. McKee considered that Britain's anti-terrorism practices, which include police constraint orders for individuals where there is insufficient evidence for legal action, were justified by "the public good". Dr. Gercke commented that the EU bodies with which he worked have observed Britain's draconian laws with concern. Clearly, "the public good" is a highly subjective guide, and no doubt the terrorists also believe they are doing good. Perhaps if such laws could be shown to be solving the terrorism problem they would be more justified, but that is by no means clear.

The final panel of the ARW focused on the concept of "Intelligent Transportation Systems" (ITS). Prof. Thanasis Ziliaskopoulos is, like Prof. Miller, an established expert on computer-modelled studies of traffic flow. His paper was entitled "Decision Support Systems for Network Management in Crises Using Information Technology". Intelligent transportation involves the management of traffic flow in cities using new technologies. Although his presentation could not be fitted into the half hour available, it gave an impression, among

other things, of the complicated logarithms involved in modelling traffic flow.

Dr. Hediye Tudes of the Middle East Technical University in Ankara is also an expert on the computer modelling of traffic. She delivered a paper on "Traffic Management Challenges in Terrorist Attacks: An Evaluation of Chemical/Hazardous Material Spills and Emergency Operations", which noted that, even if not directly targeted, better management of transportation systems is crucial after terrorist attacks. In particular, evacuations are massive operations that require transportation of large numbers of people from the disaster zone at the same time as the arrival of the emergency services, coming in the opposite direction. The paper looks at different network management strategies for such a situation. Dr. Tudes began studying this problem after it was vividly illustrated by the earthquake disasters in the Marmaris region of Turkey in 1999. Traffic problems in natural disasters and terrorist attacks may be analogous.

COE-DAT Activities

1 A delegation from Indian General Staff visited COE-DAT on 26 August 2008.

2 COE-DAT organized an **Advanced Training Course** on "Use of Force in Combating Terrorism" on 08-12 September 2008 in Bishkek/Kyrgyzstan. For the purpose of highlighting the issue of the use of force in countering terrorism, the practice of human rights and terrorism; the notion of use of force against terrorism in international law with respect to collective military actions and armed self-defence as a counter-measure and international humanitarian law in military counter-terrorist operations; rules of engagement; applicability of law of armed conflict (LOAC) in countering terrorism, the difficulties in defining terrorism and its effects on use of force, NATO and UN Peacekeeping Operations, case studies about the UK and Turkish experience in their struggle against terrorism were elaborated. There were 37 participants from Kyrgyzstan and 10 lecturers from 5 different countries.

3 COE-DAT conducted a **course** on "Defence Against Suicide Bombing" on 22-26 September 2008 in Ankara/Turkey. That was the fifth Defence Against Suicide Bombing Course which has been conducted twice a year since the inauguration of COE-DAT. The course has been designed to elaborate the issue of suicide terrorism and how to defence against it. Accordingly, the present and the future suicide terrorism, the human component in suicide terrorism, the rationale, mind-set and the recruitment of suicide bombers, female suicide bombers, the role of intelligence in countering suicide terrorism and the contribution of international organizations in countering suicide terrorism were discussed throughout the course. 60 participants from 21 different countries and 12 speakers from 4 different countries attended the course.

4 COE-DAT carried out **course** on "Defence Against Terrorism" on 13-17 October 2008 in Ankara/Turkey. The course examined the causes of terrorism, its present and future, the threat of cyber terrorism and the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the role of UN, NATO, and EU and their diverging approaches and efforts in defence against terrorism (DAT), the role of media in DAT, crisis management and border security and the role of intelligence in DAT. There were 35 participants from 17 different countries and 13 speakers from 5 different countries.

"Defence Against IED" Course

5 COE-DAT is also organizing a **course** on "Defence Against IED" on 17-21 November 2008 in Ankara/Turkey. In order to be able to enhance NATO and national defence against IEDs, the issues of terrorism, IED Networks, defence planning and equipment for defence against terrorism will be discussed via case studies.

"Bio-Terrorism" NATO Advanced Research Workshop

6 COE-DAT will organize an **NATO Advanced Research Workshop** on "Bio-Terrorism" on 13-14 November 2008 in Ankara/Turkey. The participants are intended to be engaged in discussing the definition and classification of bio-terrorism taking into account its various dimensions. Exploring the preventive measures that can be taken against bio-terrorism, the ways to promote cooperation among different agencies will also be sought.

COE-DAT

Centre of Excellence
Defence Against Terrorism

PK.57, 06582 Bakanlıklar
Ankara / TURKEY

Tel: 00-90-312-4258215
Fax: 00-90-312-4256489
E-mail: tmmm@tsk.mil.tr

www.coedat.nato.int

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