



## CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM



# COE-DAT Newsletter

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## Editorial

**N**ewsletter's twenty-first issue begins with the terrorism statistics for the fourth quarter of 2011. Each major area of the world is statistically broken down according to type of weapon used and number of activities with close attention to the effectiveness of the attacks. Lieutenant Colonel Sahin provides an in depth analysis of the UNOSOM and UNITAF missions in Somalia and the far reaching impacts on the United Nations' ability to conduct peace keeping missions. Next LTC Ugur Gurbuz and Capt. Levent Kapici provide a review of the Future Trends and Approaches in Defeating the Terrorism Threat course held in Algeria in October of 2011. Captain Gunduz reviews "Nuclear Terrorism: The Preventable Catastrophe" by Graham Allison. Finally the center presents a quick review of its last quarter events, publications and a quick look ahead.

Lieutenant Colonel Sahin, in his article, Flashbacks from UNOSOM: A Synthesis on the UN's Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia, presents both the chronology and critical analysis of the overlapping missions and the relationships with the popular support for the missions within Somalia and the United Nations arena. Read the article and formulate your own ideas about its successes or mediocre results.

Summarizing the course, Future Trends and Approaches in Defeating the Terrorism Threat, held in October, 2011 in Algeria, LTC Ugur Gurbuz and Capt. Levent Kapici provided insight on the events and in depth discussion points. This article provides a look at the Advance Training Course experience in Algeria. COE DAT deployed a team of experts and presented critical information for the representatives of the Algerian government and several other countries. Subjects included, but not limited to; international law and terrorism, cyber defense, weapons of mass destruction, and financial defense against terrorism.

Cpt. Baki Gunduz reviews the "Nuclear Terrorism: The Preventable Catastrophe". Graham Allison, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, provides a detailed discussion about the steps to be taken by the international community to avoid further proliferation and the use of nuclear devices in a terrorist action.

In the COE DAT Activity summaries, you will find the past quarter's events in review and a quick look ahead at the upcoming events sponsored by COE DAT. For further information on the upcoming courses, please check <http://www.coedat.nato.int/index.htm> and follow the links to each course.

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## General Overview of the Terrorist Activities (October- December 2011)

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There were **2,343**<sup>1</sup> reported terrorist incidents in **53** different countries during fourth quarter of 2011. These incidents claimed **3,153** lives, caused **4,633** injuries and included **283**

abductions. Incidents decreased roughly 27% in the world compared to third quarter of 2011. Incidents in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan account for 43% of all total incidents in the world.




Chart – 1: Some World Security Trends

Country	Number of Attacks	K	W	A
Iraq	566	638	1760	16
Pakistan	488	514	697	64
Afghanistan	344	548	845	12
India	279	124	142	56
Mexico	73	258	36	0
Thailand	67	58	87	0
Somalia	65	197	144	35
Colombia	60	92	147	7
Yeman	52	80	100	13
Philippines	50	66	120	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>2044</b>	<b>2575</b>	<b>4078</b>	<b>210</b>

Table 1 - Attacks of the most hit ten countries during fourth quarter of 2011

<sup>1</sup> All figures mentioned in the report come from publicly available sources, and any discrepancy in figures cited in similar works is the result of varying consultation of these sources. Neither NATO nor COE-DAT is responsible for such discrepancies.  
K: Killed, W: Wounded, A: Abducted

Attack Type	Number of Instance	K	W	A
IED	818	760	1862	0
Armed Attack	559	787	496	2
Clash	318	407	488	0
IDF	158	152	444	0
Execution	132	335	0	0
VBIED	111	168	508	0
Abduction	75	0	0	188
Suicide Attack	72	447	808	0
Arson	46	0	0	0
Raid	34	97	27	16
Cyber Attack	8	0	0	0
Piracy	6	0	0	77
Hoax	6	0	0	0
Total	2343	3153	4633	283


Table 2 - Types of Terrorist Attacks during the fourth quarter of 2011

Iraq was in the first place by the total number of casualties in the world during fourth quarter of the year. The top ten countries, according the number of incidents, are shown above in the Table-1.

Types of attacks, during the fourth quarter of the year, are shown above in the table. Improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, armed attacks and clashes account for 72% of the total attacks in the world during the period. According to attack types, IED attack was the most prevalent methodology during the period.

**“The deadliest attack was a suicide attack in Yobe State in Nigeria on November 4 and claimed 100 lives. The incident happened when six bombs went off in different part of the Damaturu, Nigeria.”**

### MAP OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS OF THE MOST HIT 10 COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD DURING THE FOURTH QUARTER OF 2011<sup>2</sup>



<sup>2</sup> this map shown here is taken from www.presentationmagazine.com

Country	Number of Attacks	K	W	A
Iraq	566	456	1760	16
Yemen	52	80	100	13
Syria	27	125	204	8
Israel	5	0	0	0
Iran	2	3	0	0
Lebanon	3	0	6	0
Bahrain	2	0	0	0
Oman	1	0	0	18
<b>Total</b>	<b>658</b>	<b>846</b>	<b>2070</b>	<b>55</b>

Table 3 - **Incidents per Country in the Middle East in the fourth quarter of 2011**

Attack Type	Number of Instance	K	W	A
IED	274	257	1032	0
Armed Attack	165	175	139	2
VBIED	90	143	398	0
Clash	34	63	87	0
IDF	34	46	57	0
Execution	16	28	0	0
Suicide Attack	16	98	348	0
Abduction	14	0	0	33
Raid	13	36	9	2
Piracy	1	0	0	18
Arson	1	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>658</b>	<b>846</b>	<b>2070</b>	<b>55</b>

Table 4 - **Types of Terrorist Attacks in the Middle East during fourth quarter of 2011**

## THE MIDDLE EAST

Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Israel, Iran, Lebanon, Bahrain and Oman suffered from terrorist attacks in the fourth quarter of 2011. A total of 658 incidents were reported in the region during the period. The number of incidents decreased roughly 20% in the Middle East compared to previous period. The number of incidents in the Middle East accounts for 28% of the total number of incidents in the world in the period. Iraq was the most hit country in the Middle East with 566 incidents. 86% of the incidents in the Middle East occurred in Iraq. Also, Iraq was in the first place by the total number of casualties in the Middle East in the fourth quarter of 2011.

The attack types in the Middle East in the fourth quarter of 2011 are shown above in the table. Improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, armed attacks and VBIED attacks account for 78% of the total attacks in the Middle East in the period. According to attack types, IED attack was the most prevalent methodology during the period.

**“The deadliest attack was a combination of organized multiple VBIED and IED attacks in Baghdad, Iraq on December 22 which claimed nearly 60 lives and 176 injuries. The incident happened when**



The most significant incident was in Baghdad Iraq.

several different bombs went off in different parts of the Baghdad Iraq.”

Map 1<sup>3</sup>: Middle East

Country	Number of Attacks	K	W	A
Somalia	65	197	144	35
Nigeria	35	267	52	5
Kenya	19	7	46	5
Algeria	15	6	14	6
Sudan	4	6	13	0
Burundi	3	6	0	0
DRC	3	13	2	0
Egypt	3	0	0	0
Mauritania	2	0	0	2
Senegal	1	7	0	0
Ivory Coast	1	3	3	0
Mali	1	1	0	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>513</b>	<b>274</b>	<b>56</b>

Table 5 - Incidents per Country in Africa during the fourth quarter of 2011

## AFRICA

Somalia, Nigeria, Kenya, Algeria, Sudan, Burundi, DRC, Egypt, Mauritania, Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Mali suffered from terrorist attacks in the fourth quarter of 2011. A total of 152 incidents were reported in the region during the period. The number of incidents decreased roughly 22% in Africa compared to previous period. The number of incidents in Africa account for 6% of the total number of incidents in the world during the period. Somalia, with 65 incidents, accounts for 43% of the incidents in Africa. Also, Somalia was in the first place by the total

Attack Type	Number of Instance	K	W	A
IED	45	76	79	0
Armed Attack	37	97	47	0
Clash	26	98	59	0
Suicide Attack	11	187	48	0
IDF	9	14	41	0
Abduction	9	0	0	14
Execution	6	17	0	0
Piracy	4	0	0	38
Raid	3	24	0	4
VBIED	1	0	0	0
Arson	1	0	0	0
Total	152	513	274	56

Table 6 - Types of Terrorist Attacks in Africa during the fourth quarter of 2011

number of casualties in Africa in the period.

The attack types in Africa in the period are shown above in the table. IED attacks, armed attacks and clashes account for 71% of the total attacks in Africa in the period. According to attack types, IED attacks was the most prevalent methodology during the fourth quarter of the year.

**“The deadliest attack was a suicide attack in Africa which was also world’s significant attack that occurred in Yobe State in Nigeria on November 4.”**



Map 2: Africa

Country	Number of Attacks	K	W	A
Turkey	44	53	92	23
Russia	32	13	4	1
UK	10	0	0	0
Germany	3	0	0	0
Italy	2	0	1	0
Kosovo	1	1	1	0
Bulgaria	1	0	0	0
Croatia	1	0	0	0
Denmark	1	0	0	0
France	1	0	0	0
Georgia	1	0	0	0
Total	97	67	98	24

Table 7 - **Incidents per Country in Europe during the fourth quarter of 2011**

## EUROPE

Turkey, Russia, UK, Germany, Italy, Kosovo, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, France and Georgia suffered from terrorist attacks in the fourth quarter of 2011. A total of 97 incidents were reported in the region during the period. The number of incidents were decreased roughly 62% in Europe compared to previous period. The number of incidents in Europe accounts for 4% of the total number of incidents in the world in the period. Turkey was the most hit country in Europe with 44 incidents. 45% of the incidents in Europe occurred in Turkey. Also, Turkey was in the first place by the total number of casualties in Europe during the fourth quarter of 2011.

The attack types in Europe in the period are shown above in the table. IED attacks, armed attacks and clashes account for 80% of the total attacks in Europe in the period. According to attack types, IED attacks was the most prevalent methodology during the period.



Map 3: Europe

Attack Type	Number of Instance	K	W	A
IED	36	15	30	0
Armed Attack	25	18	29	0
Clash	17	29	36	0
Cyber Attack	5	0	0	0
IDF	4	1	3	0
Hoax	4	0	0	0
Abduction	2	0	0	3
Raid	2	2	0	0
VBIED	1	2	0	0
Piracy	1	0	0	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>24</b>

Table 8 - **Types of Terrorist Attacks in Europe during the fourth quarter of 2011**

**“The deadliest attack in October in Europe was 19 October clash in Hakkari, a southeastern city of Turkey, which killed 24 soldiers and wounded 22 others.”**

### ASIA

Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Thailand, Philippines, Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan and Kyrgyzstan suffered from terrorist attacks in the fourth quarter of 2011. Total 1290 incidents were reported in the region during the period. The number of incidents decreased roughly 26% in Asia compared to previous period. The number of incidents in Asia accounts for 55% of the total number of incidents in the world in the period.



Map 4: Asia

Country	Number of Attacks	K	W	A
Pakistan	488	514	697	64
Afghanistan	344	548	845	12
India	279	124	142	56
Thailand	67	58	87	0
Philippines	50	66	120	7
Nepal	38	5	25	2
Bangladesh	7	6	16	0
Myanmar	6	13	35	0
Kazakhstan	5	6	2	0
Indonesia	3	9	5	0
Malaysia	1	0	0	0
Japan	1	0	0	0
Kyrgyzstan	1	0	0	0
Total	1290	1349	1974	141

Table 9 - Incidents per Country in Asia during fourth quarter of 2011

Attack Type	Number of Instance	K	W	A
IED	442	374	667	0
Armed Attack	293	394	248	0
Clash	208	175	274	0
IDF	98	79	282	0
Execution	83	123	0	0
Abduction	50	0	0	138
Suicide attack	45	162	412	0
Arson	43	0	0	0
VBIED	14	21	78	0
Raid	11	21	13	3
Hoax	2	0	0	0
Cyber attack	1	0	0	0
Total	1290	1349	1974	141

Table 10 - Types of Terrorist Attacks in Asia during the fourth quarter of 2011

Pakistan was the most hit country in Asia with 488 incidents. 38% of the incidents in Asia occurred in Pakistan. But, Afghanistan was in the first place by the total number of casualties in Asia in the period 2011.

The attack types in Asia during the fourth quarter of the year are shown above in the table. IED attacks, armed attacks and clashes account for 73% of the total attacks in Asia in the period. According to attack types, IED attack was the most prevalent methodology during the period.

**“The deadliest attack in December in Asia was 6 December suicide attack in Afghanistan’s Kabul province. 60 civilians were killed and 160 others were wounded in a suicide attack against mourners around a shrine. The attack happened when mourners gathered to mark the martyrdom anniversary of Karbala incident.”**

Country	Number of Attacks	K	W	A
Mexico	73	258	36	0
Colombia	60	92	147	7
Peru	5	21	29	0
Chile	3	0	0	0
USA	2	0	0	0
Honduras	2	7	4	0
Guatemala	1	0	1	0
Total	146	378	217	7

Table 11 - Incidents per Country in Americas during the fourth quarter of 2011

### THE AMERICAS

Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Chile, USA, Honduras and Guatemala suffered from terrorist attacks in the fourth quarter of 2011. Total 146 incidents were reported in the region during the period. The number of incidents decreased roughly 28% in the Americas compared to previous period. The number of incidents in the Americas accounts for 6% of the total number of incidents in the world in the period. Mexico was the most hit country in the Americas with 73 incidents and 50% of the incidents in the Americas occurred in Mexico. Also, Mexico was in the first place by the total number of casualties in the Americas in the period.



**The most significant attack in America was in Veracruz in Mexico.**

The attack types in the Americas in the fourth quarter of 2011 are shown above in the table. Armed attacks, clashes and executions account for 68% of the total attacks in the Americas in the period. According to attack types, armed attack was the most prevalent methodology during the period.

Map 5: America

Attack Type	Number of Instance	K	W	A
Armed Attack	39	103	33	0
Clash	33	42	32	0
Execution	27	167	0	0
IED	21	38	54	0
IDF	13	12	61	0
VBIED	5	2	32	0
Raid	5	14	5	7
Cyber Attack	2	0	0	0
Arson	1	0	0	0
Total	146	378	217	7

**“The deadliest incident in October in the Americas was an execution in which 32 people were found dead on October 6 in Veracruz, Mexico.”**

Table 12 - **Types of Terrorist Attacks in America during the fourth quarter of 2011**

## Flashbacks from UNOSOM: A Synthesis on the UN's Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia

LTC. Alim ŞAHİN<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

Throughout the history mankind learned many times how a stability of a region can directly or indirectly affect the stability of the whole world. This lesson learned practice urged international community to reestablish the United Nations once again just after World War II in order to prevent future wars and safeguard international peace and security. It's generally accepted that the UN is the only instrument in reaching that goal. But today we should start to ask ourselves this question. "Is the UN umbrella providing enough protection for the people in today's world which is politically, economically and socially becoming interdependent more than ever?" The answer is not a difficult one. You can easily conceptualize what's happening around the globe, if you take a look at the current headlines of the mass media.

The UN's Somalia experience is one of the road accidents indicating that we, international community, have some challenges in reaching that common goal. There may be numerous preparatory reasons creating the Somalia crisis. But the most important one is hidden in half a century long cold war and arms race era. This essay will give you an insight about the vicious circle occurred in Somalia started well before 1990s and make you understand how a humanitarian assistance operation can easily be transformed into a peace making operation. What we understand from the term "civilization" will determine whether we want to see any other Somalia in the world and whether we want to have a well functioning UN.

### Key Words

United Nations, Humanitarian Assistance, Peace Making, International Peace and Security

## **I**ntroduction

Everything started well for the advance party of UNOSOM who arrived in Somalia to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu in July 1992. But what happened there after is completely nothing more than a snowball effect. This essay will not only make a complete assessment, but also it will try to reveal the butterfly effect of the failures experienced in these two UN missions and whether it shaped next UN missions in the right direction.

This research will first take you to the time before December 1992 in Somalia, to the same environment which paved the way for a multinational humanitarian intervention in order to provide a better view for the rest of the study. Then it will strictly focus on

UN missions which took place between 1992 and 1995 examining the legal basis and the execution of the operations in order to understand what went wrong in Somalia. The last part of the essay will establish a connection between UNOSOM and following UN missions. It will also give an idea how instability of a region for a long duration can affect international peace and security.

### Historical Background: Reasons Which Led To a UN Intervention

Not so many people today are aware of a relatively small African country, Somalia, located in the Gulf of Aden bordered with Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya on the east and Indian Ocean on the west, although it has occupied a big portion of the world history

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and politics for the last two decades. Unfortunately, Somalia would be named as a “*syndrome*” by many after a series of catastrophic events which set the terms for a naive attempt to implement benevolent interventionism in a marginal Third World state<sup>2</sup>.

Somalia can be considered a nation which has a common language, religion and social traditions. Contrary to this advantageous bond, Somalia’s history has been predominantly determined by its highly divided clan structures. Apart from six main clan families, dozens of sub-clan groups and hundreds of smaller units compose Somalia’s social structure<sup>3</sup>.

It’s equally imperative to define the circumstances of that period in order to understand the reasons which led to a humanitarian intervention. Somalia had become an experimental field by the superpowers of the Cold War era starting from 1960s until the collapse of Warsaw Pact together with the USSR<sup>4</sup>. Under the cold war terms, Somalia had been ruled by the government of Siad Barre which came into power in the late 1960s. During that period his dictatorship, which was based on violence and manipulation of the clan loyalties, did not experience resistance or objection from either the Somali public or the international

community. But the withdrawal of the cold war era actors from the region triggered a nationwide rebellion in Somalia. His government was overthrown by the two leading members of the Hawiye clan, General Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi in January 1991. But this was just the beginning of the end for Somalis. It was time to unbury the hatchet for the competing clans which would soon start a full-scale civil war with weapons transferred by US and USSR during the cold war and turn the whole country into a battlefield in November 1991. The estimated death toll during this bloody war was 14,000 together with the 30,000 wounded<sup>5</sup>. But devastation of agricultural and livestock production compounded by drought and subsequently famine following the civil war would cost more than 300,000 people’s lives and leave at least 1,5 million lives at risk during 1992. Furthermore, one million Somalis would seek refuge in neighboring countries and elsewhere<sup>6</sup>.

### **UNOSOM I (April 1992-March 1993): Better Late Than Never**

UNOSOM I can be better examined in two phases, since UNITAF involvement in December 1992 completely changed the nature of this UN mission in Somalia.

<sup>2</sup> Clarke, Walter, (1997), “Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia”, Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffrey (Ed.), *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, Colorado: Westview Press, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Clarke, p. 4.

<sup>4</sup> For further insights of this period from a Somali point of view, see interview with president Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal of Somaliland made by Matt Bryden and published in *Africa Report*, “Fiercely Independent”, Nov/Dec 94, Vol. 39, Issue 6.

<sup>5</sup> Wheeler, Nicholas J., (2000), *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, New York: Oxford University Press, p.174.

<sup>6</sup> UN Internet webpage, accessed on 23.10.2010 at: <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html>>

## Phase I: Before UNITAF

### 1. Legal Basis:

Despite the early UN engagement in that country, the first concrete step came with UNSCR 733<sup>7</sup> urging all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, and calling all States to implement an immediate and general embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. The deteriorating and appalling situation in Somalia had finally attracted the attention of international community to this remote region<sup>8</sup>.

Following a ceasefire agreement on 3 March 1992 calling both parties to accept a UN security component for convoys of humanitarian assistance, and the deployment of 20 UNMOs on each side of Mogadishu to monitor the ceasefire, the UNSC, by resolution 746<sup>9</sup>, approved deployment of a technical team to prepare a plan for a ceasefire monitoring mechanism and develop a high-priority plan to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance.<sup>10</sup>

It can easily be understood from these two subsequent resolutions that UN efforts were aiming to secure the environment before a large-scale humanitarian assistance, since the political

chaos, deteriorating security situation, widespread banditry and looting, and extent of physical destruction had severely constrained the delivery of humanitarian supplies until the ceasefire in March 1992.

UNOSOM I was launched under these terms by the UNSCR 751<sup>11</sup>. The Council asked the UNSG, in cooperation with LAS, OAU and OIC, to pursue consultations with all Somali parties towards convening a conference on national reconciliation and unity. It also called on the international community for financial and other support for the UNSG's 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia<sup>12</sup>. An experienced Algerian diplomat, Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun, was appointed as the first special representative of UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali in Somalia to carry out the tasks depicted by the mandate.

### 2. Execution of the Operation

In accordance with the agreements reached with the two main Somali factions in Mogadishu, 50 unarmed uniformed UNMOs along with 500 UN security personnel provided by the Government of Pakistan<sup>13</sup> were deployed to

7 Dated 23 January 1992, UN Internet webpage, accessed on 23.10.2010 at:

<<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/010/92/IMG/NR001092.pdf?OpenElement>>

8 For further details regarding the side effects of UN's delayed humanitarian intervention in Somalia see "The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local-level Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction", Ahmed, Ismail I. and Green, Reginald Herbold, *Third World Quarterly*, 1999, Vol. 20, No. 1, p. 113-127.

9 Dated 17 March 1992, UN Internet webpage, accessed on 23.10.2010 at:

<<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/011/05/IMG/NR001105.pdf?OpenElement>>

10 UN Internet webpage, accessed on 23.10.2010 at:

<<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html>>

11 Dated 24 April 1992, UN Internet webpage, accessed on 23.10.2010 at:

<<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/011/10/IMG/NR001110.pdf?OpenElement>>

12 For further details of the plan see "Security Council establishes new UN operation in Somalia", *UN Chronicle*, September 1992, Vol. 29, Issue 3.

13 The latter arrived in Somali in mid-September 1992 and were able to take control of Mogadishu Airport in the second week of November 1992.

monitor the ceasefire in the capital and to provide protection and security for UN personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centers in the city and its immediate environs<sup>14</sup>.

It later became evident that situation on the ground, especially in central and southern Somalia had been underestimated. Looting, by heavily armed gangs, of supplies from delivery and distribution points, as well as attacks on incoming and docked ships and on airports and airstrips, prevented the assured delivery of humanitarian assistance by overland transport. The UNSC, by resolution 775<sup>15</sup>, approved the UNSG's report and authorized the increase in strength of UNOSOM. Four additional UN security units, each with a strength of up to 750 and three logistics units totaling up to 719 were deployed for this purpose. Consequently, the total strength of UNOSOM reached to 4,219 all ranks in September 1992.

During September and October 1992, UN in coordination with six main UN organizations<sup>16</sup>, ICRC and some other 30 NGOs mainly focused on developing a 100-Day Action Program<sup>17</sup> which was seeking remedies needed to prevent famine and the

unacceptably high levels of death in those areas requiring priority attention.

In October and November 1992, despite all efforts by the international community and the UN, the situation in Somalia started to get worse. Due to the lack of a central government for almost two years, rival militias in the capital Mogadishu and a dozen or more factions throughout the country took the initiative. Several of the Somali de facto authorities refused to agree to the deployment of UN troops to secure delivery of aid in areas of greatest need. UNOSOM troops in Mogadishu were fired upon and their vehicles and arms taken. Relief ships were prevented from docking, threatened and even shelled. Airports and seaports came under fire. Large sums of cash and relief aid were being extorted from donor agencies and organizations, and the lives of their personnel attempting to distribute supplies to starving people were being put in danger. Widespread looting of aid supplies, armed banditry and general lawlessness severely hampered the delivery of humanitarian supplies. According to some estimates, as many as 3,000 persons a day were dying of starvation in Somalia, while warehouses remained stocked.

<sup>14</sup> Lewis, Ioan and Mayall, James, (1996), "Somalia", Mayall, James (Ed.), *The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.109.

<sup>15</sup> Dated 28 August 1992, UN Internet webpage, accessed on 23.10.2010 at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/410/10/IMG/N9241010.pdf?OpenElement>

<sup>16</sup> The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), WFP and the World Health Organization (WHO).

<sup>17</sup> For further details of the program see "100-day relief plan for Somalia launched", *UN Chronicle*, Dec 1992, Vol. 29, Issue 4.

The UN's humanitarian role and efficiency in Somalia during that period was severely criticized by ICRC<sup>18</sup>.

### 3. Assessment of Phase I:

One can't say that UNOSOM I had a robust mandate, since it had been revised many times. UN lost the ground in Somalia at the very beginning not only because of a loose mandate but also the forced resignation of Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun who publicly criticized UN bureaucracy<sup>19</sup>. Somalia had missed a big chance, a person who was unanimously praised not only by all private humanitarian agencies but also a big portion of Somali people at that time<sup>20,21</sup>. Snowball had formed and begun to roll.

## Phase II: UNITAF Deployment

### 1. Legal Basis:

The US in November 1992 offered to organize and lead an operation to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance<sup>22</sup>. On 3 December, the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 794<sup>23</sup>, authorizing the use of "*all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian*

*relief operations in Somalia*". Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, UNSC authorized the UNSG and the participating member states to make arrangements for "*the unified command and control*" of the military forces that would be involved.

### 2. Execution of the Operation

The first elements of UNITAF<sup>24</sup> were deployed in Mogadishu on 9 December 1992<sup>25</sup>. UNITAF's principal goal was to establish in Somalia a secure environment for urgent humanitarian assistance. Once that was accomplished, the military command would then be turned over to the UN. In the meantime, UNOSOM remained fully responsible for the political aspects and for humanitarian assistance to Somalia.

UNITAF deployed approximately 37,000 troops in southern and central Somalia, covering approximately 40 per cent of the country's territory. The presence and operations of UNITAF had a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. Despite the improvements, conditions for an

18 Wheeler, p.175.

19 Lyonce, Terrence and Samatar, Ahmed Ismail, (1995), *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, p.32.

20 Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 - Somalia, 1 January 1993*, available at: <<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca601e.html>> [accessed 2 November 2010]

21 Interdependent e-newspaper webpage, accessed on 23.10.2010 at:

<<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/bitter-tears-as-sahnoun-leaves-mogadishu-un-crisis-deepens-after-dispute-between-secretary-general-and-envoy-to-somalia-1560394.html>>

22 For further details regarding US involvement see Lewis, Ioan and Mayall, James, p.110-111.

23 Dated 3 December 1992, UN Internet webpage, accessed on 23.10.2010 at:

<<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/772/11/PDF/N9277211.pdf?OpenElement>>

24 UNITAF was consisting of troops from 24 countries led by the US. The operation undertaken by UNITAF was named as "Operation Restore Hope".

25 UN Internet webpage, accessed on 23.10.2010 at: <<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm>>

effective relief environment had not yet been established and incidents of violence continued to occur in Somalia which lacked a functioning government, an organized civilian police force and a disciplined national armed force. The security threat to personnel of the UN and its agencies, UNITAF, ICRC and NGOs was still high in some areas of Mogadishu and other places in Somalia. Moreover, there was no deployment of UNITAF or UNOSOM troops to the north-east and north-west, or along the Kenyan-Somali border, where security continued to be a matter of grave concern<sup>26</sup>. Therefore decision on transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II was delayed until the establishment of a ceasefire, the control of heavy weapons, the disarming of lawless gangs and the creation of a new police force.

### 3. Assessment of Phase II:

Due to the continuing humanitarian tragedy, UN had no choice but to allow the transition from a humanitarian assistance mission to a peace making mission<sup>27</sup>. UN had favored the use of force instead of winning the hearts and minds of Somalis. Although second phase of UNOSOM I may be considered successful owing to UNITAF's

involvement, efficiency of the humanitarian assistance and security situation in general, but its success could be questioned since UNITAF could provide coverage only for 40 per cent of Somalia.

### **UNOSOM II (March 1993-March 1995): One Step Forward, Two Steps Back**

#### **Legal Basis:**

Following the three agreements<sup>28</sup> signed at an informal preparatory meeting<sup>29</sup> at ECA headquarters in Addis Ababa from 4 to 15 January 1993, the UNSC adopted resolution 814<sup>30</sup>, by which it decided to expand the size and mandate of UNOSOM. UNOSOM II was endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter so as to be able to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia. To that end, UNOSOM II, under the mandate recommended by the UNSG, would seek to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. The mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation,

26 UN Internet webpage, accessed on 23.10.2010 at: <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2backgr2.html>>

27 Drysdale, John, (1997), "Foreign Military Intervention in Somalia: The Root Cause of the Shift from UN Peacekeeping to Peacemaking and Its Consequences", Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffrey (Ed.), *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, Colorado: Westview Press, p. 118-119.

28 (a) General Agreement of 8 January 1993; (b) Agreement on implementing the ceasefire and on modalities of disarmament; and (c) Agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to help resolve the criteria for participation at, and the agenda for, the conference on national reconciliation held in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993.

29 A total of 14 Somali political movements took part in the meeting, along with the Secretaries-General of LAS, OAU and OIC and the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn, as well as the representatives of the current Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

30 Dated 26 March 1993. UN Internet webpage, accessed on 23.10.2010 at:

<<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/226/18/IMG/N9322618.pdf?OpenElement>>

recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure.

This mandate was revised only once by UNSCR 897<sup>31</sup>. Apart from the previous mandate, the revised mandate specifically focused on cooperative disarmament and ceasefire efforts, protection of major ports, airports and essential infrastructure and gradual reduction of UNOSOM II to a force level of 22,000.

#### **Execution of the Operation:**

Transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II and the transfer of the military command took place on 4 May 1993 in accordance with UNSCR 814. 20,000 military personnel and 2,800 civilian staff to carry out the assigned tasks and an additional 8,000 personnel to provide the logistic support were deployed on Somalia soil. In addition, the US Government joined the mission with a tactical QRF in support of the Force Commander of UNOSOM II<sup>32</sup>.

First major incident occurred on 5 June 1993 when UNOSOM II began to implement the disarmament plan. In a series of armed attacks against UNOSOM II troops throughout south Mogadishu by Somali militia

apparently belonging to General Aidid's faction, resulted in 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed, 10 were reported missing and 54 wounded<sup>33</sup>.

UNOSOM II, acting under the authority of UNSCR 837<sup>34</sup> initiated two major military operations, one on 12 June 1993 and the other on 3 October 1993, as part of a coercive disarmament program. The former resulted in killing of 60 civilians which would have grave consequences. The latter, also known as "*The Battle of Mogadishu*", would raise concerns and severely damage the determination of US and international community to support UNOSOM<sup>35</sup>.

UNOSOM II lasted for almost two years and extended by six UNSCRs<sup>36</sup>. The continuing lack of progress in the peace process and national reconciliation, in particular the lack of sufficient cooperation from the Somali parties over security issues, undermined the UN objectives in Somalia and prevented the continuation of UNOSOM II<sup>37</sup>. The last unit of UNOSOM II left Somalia soil on 3 March 1995.

#### **Assessment of UNOSOM II:**

UNOSOM II assault on 12 June 1993 made it, strictly speaking,

31 Dated 4 February 1994, UN Internet webpage, accessed on 23.10.2010 at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/065/62/PDF/N9406562.pdf?OpenElement>

32 UN Internet webpage, accessed on 23.10.2010 at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2backgr2.html>

33 *Ibid.*

34 Dated 6 June 1993, UN Internet webpage, accessed on 23.10.2010 at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/332/32/IMG/N9333232.pdf?OpenElement>

35 For further details on the political situation developed on the UN side right after these two incidents, see "*Fundamental review of UNOSOM II follows violence*", *UN Chronicle*, Mar 1994, Vol. 31, Issue 1.

36 S/RES/878 (29.10.1993), 886 (18.11.1993), 923 (31.05.1994), 946 (30.09.1994), 953 (31.10.1994) and 954 (04.11.1994)

one of the warring parties in Somalia<sup>38</sup>. This event became a turning point for UNOSOM and unified the Somalis including even moderates against US and UN. Snowball had started to give damage and wouldn't stop even after UNOSOM's departure from Somalia.

### Concluding Remarks

I wish I could say what UN had learned from Somalia had positive effects on its following missions. History is usually considered to be a good teacher. You derive the lessons from the past and you don't necessarily do the same mistakes again in the future. But UN's lessons learned practice would unfortunately cost many lives and create many problems multiplying its adverse effects even today for Somalia people as well as the international community.

After Somalia failure, unlike expectations, the UN couldn't show an attitude of a timely manner to react against similar cases, especially in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. 1994 mass murder of an estimated 800,000 people took place during the UN presence<sup>39</sup> in Rwanda. The largest mass murder in Europe since World War II, known as *Srebrenica Massacre*, also occurred in the presence of UN<sup>40</sup> in July 1995. Even these figures, being concrete evidence, are sufficient

enough to indicate that the UN has some functional problems in implementing its task to maintain international peace and security. Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun won't be the last person who noticed this gap during his service between April and October 1992<sup>41</sup>.

One could claim that the UN missions in Somalia were partially or completely a success<sup>42</sup>. But it would then be too difficult to explain why the current government (Transitional Federal Government) could be established nine years after UNOSOM II and why ups-and-downs in the sense of rule of law and governance dominated Somalia even to date.

It would equally be reasonable to attribute the upsurge in piracy in the Gulf of Aden to situation in Somalia held in the grip of long-lasting instability. This assumption most probably may form an aggregate of opposition by some intellectuals. But, the statistics in the table<sup>43</sup> below are trying to tell us some facts hidden in the time intervals of the near past. Are these pirates taking a kind of revenge from their destiny or are they simply trying to eat their fill? This question is yet to be answered by particularly the ones who rushed into Somalia for arms race during the cold war.

Another assumption which can be derived from these numbers is the

<sup>37</sup> For more information on the situation in Somalia before the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, see "Closing-down sale", *Economist*, 9/24/94, Vol. 332, Issue 7882.

<sup>38</sup> Macqueen, Norrie, (2002), *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960*, London: Pearson Education, p. 214.

<sup>39</sup> UNAMIR

<sup>40</sup> UNPROFOR

<sup>41</sup> IO Watch Internet Webpage, accessed on 01.11.2010 at: <<http://www.iowatch.org/archives/unperprob/humanitarian.shtml>>

<sup>42</sup> Crocker, Chester A., (May/June 1995), "The lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 3, p. 2-8.

<sup>43</sup> ICC International Maritime Bureau, *Annual Report, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, 1 January-31 December 2010, January 2011*, p. 5-6.

Locations	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Gulf of Aden	10	13	92	117	53
Red Sea				15	25
Somalia	10	31	19	80	139
Arabian Sea	2	4		1	2
Oman		3		4	
Total	22	51	111	217	219

Table: **Actual and attempted attacks attributed to Somali pirates between January-December 2006 and 2010.**

unpreventable increase in piracy attacks despite the presence of a strong naval force employed off the Somalia coast by the international community. It's only a matter of time whether the history will repeat itself in this unfortunate region. The current response to piracy may most likely be failing to address the real causes behind the piracy issue and it may sooner or later require a different approach which is focusing on not only using muscles to protect economic interests in the region but also creating an environment to establish an effective civil-military interaction<sup>44</sup>.

### Acronyms

ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
LAS	League of Arab States
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

<sup>44</sup> Weezel, S. Pz. Van, (February 2011), "The International Response to Piracy-Case Study on Somalia", CIMIC Messenger, Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence Information Leaflet, Vol.1, Issue 1, p. 7-8.

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## Future Trends and New Approaches in Defeating the Terrorism Threat Course

LTC Ugur GURBUZ\*

Capt. Levent KAPICI\*\*

### **I** Introduction

COE-DAT conducted an “Advanced Training Course” on Future Trends and New Approaches in Defeating the Terrorism over the period 23-27 October 2011 at Algiers, Algeria. The aim of the course was to inform the senior officers (OF-3 to OF-5) and high level civilians from Algerian Ministry of Defence, Jordan and Egypt on different approaches in the fight against terrorism, while stressing the current and future trends and threats. The secondary aim was to study different strategies that can be used by states while creating a common understanding and awareness on DAT related issues. During the course special attention was also paid to the importance of international cooperation against terrorism threat.

The course was attended by twelve lecturers from five countries and attended by forty five participants from five different countries. All the subjects in the course were discussed in one-hour sessions including fifteen minutes for question & answer parts. Additionally, the attendees were divided into three working groups and each group was requested to discuss the matters related to terrorism and future trends of terrorism. Working group activities were fully interactive, showing the intensity of some of the key debates around defence against terrorism issue. Discussions were supported by two dedicated lecturers working in different groups during the allocated time. Taking into account

all ideas and comments amongst the syndicate and seeking to reach a consensus on the final solution, each group discussed the given topic, recorded its conclusions into 15 to 20 minute presentations, and delivered their findings to the entire audience on the last day of the course. The last day ended with one hour discussion panel with all lecturers.

### **SUMMARY OF THE PRESENTED MATERIAL**

#### **Opening Lecturer-The History and Causes of Terrorism:**

The opening speaker was Col. Ozden CELİK who is the Chief of Education and Training at COE-DAT. He made a presentation on the history and causes of terrorism. He stated that the history of terrorism had been as old as the history of mankind. The history of terrorism was studied in two parts as modern period and previous modern period. Modern period was also divided into four parts and each part was explained by giving historic events.

Col. CELİK touched upon very important points and tried to explain the terrorism in relation to historic events in the world history. There were very productive debates on the definition of terrorism. He clearly explained that there was no unanimity but consensus on some elements of the definition. By the end of the lecture, participants mutually agreed on the need for a definition. To treat an illness, you must first identify its symptoms and name it.

\* (TUR A) Trainer/Instructor COE-DAT

\*\* (TUR A) Concept Specialist COE-DAT

**NATO Defence Against Terrorism Policy:**

LTC Josef GREIPL is the current Chief of Concept at COE-DAT. This presentation is made in accordance with the security classification of the related NATO document. He started the lecture with the history of NATO; foundation, member states and conditions for membership. This part was very beneficial for those participants who were not acquainted with NATO as an organization. Later LTC GREIPL continued with NATO concept and explained the pillars of the concept, giving examples about working fields for each pillar. He also explained the concept of “comprehensive approach.” This explanation assisted both military and civilian attendees.

For the second part of the lecture, LTC GREIPL explained the future developments in concept area and gave information about developing concepts such as “Joint Urban Operations” and “Countering Asymmetric Treats.” The lecture ended with questions mainly on information sharing principle. There were also questions about “comprehensive approach” which helped the participants clearly understand this important concept.

**Terrorism and International Law:**

Dr. Dominika ŠVARC is an Associate Legal Officer in the Office of His Excellency (former) Judge Awn Al-Khasawneh. Previously, she worked as a Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for International Law in Heidelberg, where she conducted

a study on the military detention and prosecution of suspected terrorists. She started with the definition of armed conflict in relation to international law. With this definition Dr. ŠVARC explained that it was possible to divide the armed conflicts into two areas: international and non-international armed conflicts. The participants asked detailed questions about the application international law in such conflicts where the actors were not clearly defined, similar to the latest case between Turkey and Israel.

**Terrorism and Human Rights:**

This was the second and final lecture for Dr. ŠVARC. This lecture spurred numerous and in depth questions. She, at the beginning, clearly stated that everyone was equal before the law and states had to respect the basic human rights of terrorist or suspects. In time of extreme emergencies some human rights could be limited but this could not be a constant policy or a reason for suspending some of the human rights.

With this scope there were questions about the legal status of detainees in Guantanamo Bay. Dr. SVARC explained the situation with the definitions of human rights. Clear explanations were also provided by both Prof. SHULTZ and Prof. VASEASHTA since they were part of the staff who took part in planning stages of Gulf and Afghanistan Operations of USA.

**Suicide Terrorism:**

Dr. Vesna MARKOVIC is the Director of Collection for the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups. Dr.

MARKOVIC delivered the presentation in five parts. On the first part definition of suicide bombings was explained. The lecture continued with the history of tactics. As it was explained the number of the attacks was 38 in 1980 while it increased to 95 in 1990 and it had a peak during 2000-2009 period with a number of more than 2000. Having explained the increasing trends in suicide bombings, she continued with the motivations for this kind of terrorism. According to the latest research, it is possible to mention about strategic and tactical advantages that motivate suicide bombings while there are great and undeniable impacts of these attacks. The most important motivation lies within its strategic advantages by increasing media attention while the difficulties of defending against suicide bombers stand as the main motivation for tactical advantages.

Dr. MARKOVIC explained the typology of a suicide bomber and provided valuable statistical data explaining the relation between different elements like age, sex, level of education and financial status. She concluded at the end that unfortunately there is an increase in the effectiveness of tactics used and greater future research must be made to assess the threat and understand the tactics.

#### **Energy Security and Critical Infrastructure Protection:**

Dr. Ahmet K. HAN is studying at the faculty of International Relations at Kadir Has University in Istanbul. His research interests are strategic thinking, negotiations and foreign

policy analysis. Dr. HAN started the lecture with giving a definition of critical infrastructure. As definition critical infrastructures are the assets, systems and networks, so vital to the state that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economy or public health or safety. Later he gave some examples from different parts of the world about national frameworks for protection.

He later continued with the explanation of energy security, one of the most important terms today. As energy security is important for national and global level in terms of sustainable growth of world economy, Dr. HAN provided examples of challenges ahead. Later he associated the challenges and risks to conclude that the greatest danger in the future is the possible attacks by radical groups against oil production facilities.

Attendees were provided with a case study; attack on Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline which occurred on August 2008. This case study consolidated the contents of the lecture and helped the participants to realize the importance of energy security in relation to critical infrastructure protection.

#### **Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism: Countermeasures:**

Dr. Zafar Nawaz JASPAL is Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan, where he teaches various aspects of Strategic Studies; International Security; Nuclear/

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Missile Proliferation; Arms Control/Disarmament; Domestic and Foreign Policies of the country. He began the lecture with the definition of WMD Terrorism. Later Dr. JASPAL informed the participants of three caveats present. They are the nexus between WMD and terrorism, WMD material availability and the vulnerability of WMD facilities in asymmetrical warfare. Giving valuable information about three questions to consider, he enlightened the participants about the alarming threats and possible countermeasures to be taken.

Dr. JASPAL continued to explain the terms of “Bioterrorism”, “Nuclear Terrorism”, and “Dirty Bombs”. For each, he provided examples of attacks and how the weapons could be used or how to obtain the systems. This part of the lecture showed the participants that WMD terrorism is not a myth but is instead a reality. The possibility to encounter such an attack, a large scale WMD attack seems to have a low expectation rate but it is not impossible.

#### **Defence Against Cyber Terrorism:**

Prof. Dr. Marco GERCKE is director of the Cybercrime Research Institute (Institut fuer Medienstrafrecht) an independent research institute on legal aspects of computer and Internet crime.

Prof. GERCKE explained the term using recent examples of cyber attacks. He explained the attacks against Estonia, which are one of the most widely known cyber terrorist attacks. Later he continued the

lecture with “Stuxnet” case, where specific computer materials were targeted.

Prof. GERCKE carried on with information about studies to create an international law for dealing with crimes committed using cyber methods. Finally he explained the security vulnerabilities that can be caused from malicious software and illegal use data collection tools like USB memory devices.

#### **International Cooperation and Future Trends in DAT:**

This was the second and final lecture for Dr. HAN. At the beginning of the lecture, Dr. HAN defined terrorism by using his own words since it was a problematic area that was discussed the day before. By giving a definition that could be discussed, he continued to explain international cooperation efforts since 9/11 events.

On the second part of the lecture there were fruitful discussions about the portrait of “the new terrorist”. He continued to give valuable information and tried to make the participants to look at the events from a different perspective. He clearly stated that there is a long way for the entire world to go in struggle to understand the term of terrorism. In this regard, Cyber, IED and WMD terrorism issues and counter strategies were discussed.

#### **The Threat of Bio-Terrorism:**

Prof. Ashok VASEASHTA received PhD from the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA in 1990. Before joining as the Director of the Institute

for Advanced Sciences Convergence and International Clean Water Institute, he served as a Professor and Director of research at the Nanomaterials Processing & Characterization Laboratories at Marshall University. Concurrently, he holds visiting professorships at the 3 Nano-SAE Research Centre, University of Bucharest, Romania and Academy of Sciences of Moldova. This lecture was the most challenging one in terms of context. It obvious that he carefully selected the content of his lecture and it was the first time for many participants to face terms like “DNA Synthesizer” or “Nanophotonics”.

Prof. VASEASHTA touched upon very important subjects on four parts. First he started with the history of bio-terrorism later to continue with challenges. While explaining asymmetric threats, he also mentioned IED threat, a growing menace nowadays. After giving brief information about radiological threats, he continued with explanation of bio-terrorism.

The lecturer concluded the presentation with key areas of research and technology gaps in detection and diagnosis of infections.

#### **Public Information Management and Media:**

Ms. Zeynep SUTALAN is currently a PhD student at METU, International Relations department. She is also giving lectures in COE-DAT and Partnership for Peace training Centre. The lecture started with the judgment that terrorism needs publicity, because terrorists strive to instill fear in the public by means of

bombings, attacks and kidnappings. Reciprocally, the needs of terrorists and media overlap. As stated by journalists, bad news is *good* news. This statement explains the mutual need of terrorism and media. Media sometimes intentionally and unintentionally serves the needs of terrorism by spreading fear.

Yet, there are challenges ahead. The first one is that it is not possible to stop the flow of information. So, media must take careful measures when dealing with terrorism. In this regards there is a role for military who should not view media as enemy. Instead, military and government, in general, must make use of “Public Information Management” by satisfying public confidence, safety and expectations.

#### **Terrorist Use of Internet:**

This was the second and final lecture for Prof. Dr. GERCKE. He gave a brief lecture about how terrorist organizations are using cyber space and how they are shaping public opinion by using so called “right messages.” First he mentioned about the weaknesses of some powerful organization in cyber area. Those organizations, military for example, have developed advanced surveillance technology that allows them to intercept communication. But this technology fails when it comes to other communication means like skype or VoIP.

He later mentioned that in the past the debate about terrorist use of the internet concentrated on the risks of network based attacks. Today it is widely recognized that terrorist organizations use the internet for

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several other purposes such as communication, financing of terrorism, recruitment and collection of information.

#### **Strategic Communications:**

This was the second and final lecture for Ms. SUTALAN. She started the lecture by explaining the importance of strategic communication. As Ms. SUTALAN stated, the role of human factor is increasing so is the importance of informing public about the overall aim and mission of the operations. Strategic Communication is about such awareness. In addition the purpose can be summarized by one phrase: “winning the hearts and minds.”

By definition Strategic Communication is an umbrella concept including elements like Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Information Operations, Public Information, Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

Ms. SUTALAN continued the lecture with giving examples from Afghanistan campaign of NATO. She explained how NATO used strategic communication tools for conveying messages to Afghan people. She concluded the lecture with stressing the importance of information as an element of combat power.

#### **The Nexus Between Terrorist, Insurgents, Criminal Organizations and Other Armed Groups:**

Prof. Dr. Richard H. SHULTZ, Jr., is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School, Tufts University, where he teaches graduate-level courses in various areas of

international security affairs, internal/transnational conflict and war studies, intelligence and armed groups. He stated that the sources of violent instability and armed conflict in the 21st century will largely result from the interplay between a proliferation in the number of weak states, and powerful armed groups, some of which are capable of causing major geopolitical damage in their own territory and beyond. His presentation focused on how to understand armed groups today to include terrorist groups, insurgents, criminal organizations, militias and the interconnecting relationships.

Prof. SHULTZ later explained that the security challenges posed by armed groups would assume many forms in the years ahead. Moreover, they are not a temporary disruption of world affairs. Rather, they are symptoms of a new security environment and armed groups would be in “one form or another”; major security threats and sources of conflict in the first part of the 21st century. This presentation highlighted the developments and the challenges they pose.

#### **Financing Terrorism:**

This was the second and final lecture for Dr. MARKOVIC. She delivered the topic in four parts. On the first part she gave some figures for comparison between the cost of the terrorist attack and effect it caused. By the help of those figures participants clearly understood that terrorist organizations could achieve more damage than it would cost originally. Later on the second part she explained ways of terrorist

financing. She mentioned for example “Hawala” system which is based on the payment of money to the terrorist organization advance by a person or an organization based on trust and sending of goods in return including profit margin. The system, she concluded, is difficult to follow but may be destroyed through intelligence.

Dr. MARKOVIC concluded the lecture by giving some case study examples from different parts of the world which helped the participants to understand the importance of financial intelligence.

#### **Theology and Question of Violence:**

Dr. Özlem TUR is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey. She began the lecture with the fact that one of the leading surveys in the late 1990s asserted that “the religious imperative for terrorism is the most defining characteristic of terrorism today”. Based on this fact, there is perception of equation of religion with contemporary terrorism nowadays. Actually, the world opinion had to understand that Holy Scriptures cannot speak but their interpreters speak on their behalf. This is the reason why there are conflicts not just among those that believe or not but also among the members of believers of the same text.

Dr. TUR concluded the lecture with offering solutions for religion problem. As she stated cooperation on all fronts and more dialogue can be options in the struggle to

overcome this perception and its violent interpretation.

#### **Role of Intelligence in DAT:**

This was the second and final lecture for Prof. SHULTZ. He divided the presentation into four parts: first an overview of the functions of intelligence; second a discussion of armed groups as different kind of intelligence target; third an examination of the role of human intelligence in collection against armed groups; and finally an assessment of the role of signals intelligence in collection against armed groups. The presentation began with an introduction to the intelligence elements and how they support decision makers and commanders at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

The second part of the presentation introduced the main proposition/argument that non-state armed groups to include insurgents, terrorist organizations, criminal cartels, and militias all constitute a different kind of intelligence target with different collection requirements from those of state targets.

Part three of the presentation began with the question of which of the intelligence collection disciplines were most effective against armed groups.

On the final part of the presentation he examined how signals intelligence was derived and why it was a powerful tool for learning about armed groups through traffic and content analysis.

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### **PANEL DISCUSSION**

The panel consisted of all the lecturers. Within the framework of the panel discussions the below mentioned results were reached:

- a. States must take more sophisticated measures against the terrorism threat since terrorist organizations are in a constant developmental state and are using every advantage of a changing and growing technology parallel with globalization.
- b. Respecting the International Law and Human Rights while struggling against terrorism will bring success in the long term and will hinder future recruitment to terrorist organizations.
- c. Paying special attention to religious issues and education in general while removing perceptions about terrorism and religion are important in defence against terrorism.
- d. International cooperation is very important nowadays and it will gain greater importance in the future because defence against terrorism is not a process that an individual state can achieve by its own efforts.

### **SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

The course brought together an international mix of theorists, academics and practitioners from a variety of backgrounds to discuss a broad range of terrorism related topics. Upon the talks with

the lecturers and attendees, positive impressions were acquired about the execution and scope of the course. This was clearly seen by the level of interest of the participants reflected by the number and intensity of the questions after the presentations. Most of the time question and answer period exceeded the allocated time and course directorate made alterations in the programme like shortening the coffee and lunch breaks. On one occasion, course directorate created a lecture after the official working hours.

In addition to the results that were reached during the panel discussion, following conclusions were also reached:

1. Although there is need to define terrorism and later seek consensus on it, for the moment this struggle seems hard to overcome. Instead states must agree on some principles for defining terrorism. With this agreement double standards that can be seen will decrease.
2. Exchange of information and experience is crucial when fighting against international and domestic terrorism. In order to achieve this goal, states must seek ways to pass critical knowledge to each other. Yet another point to mention is that every state must take into consideration that no country is immune to terrorism.

3. Police and military are not the only responsible governmental bodies in the fight against terrorism. There must be comprehensive approach that every state body is involved. Likewise, terrorism is not the only problem of some countries; instead it is phenomenon that threatens peace throughout the world.
  4. In defence against terrorism, strategic communication must be used to block the recruitment for terrorist organizations and to prevent military, political and financial support to terrorist organizations by transmitting right messages to regional countries and the world public opinion.
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## Book Review

### “Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe” Graham Allison,

MN: Owl Books, 2005, 275p.  
ISBN-10: 0-8050-7852-5

**Capt. Baki GÜNDÜZ\***

**T**he author, Graham Allison, is one of America's leading experts on nuclear weapons and national security. He is the director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and a professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He served as special advisor to the secretary of defense and as assistant secretary of defense for policy and plans.

Allison emphasizes the nuclear terrorism as the one of the most important problems of our changing security environment and this book is truly alarming about the danger of a nuclear event. He believes that nuclear terrorism may be the ultimate catastrophe, but it is an ultimately preventable if America has the will and shows the determination to cope with it.

Part 1 of the book establishes an overview of the nuclear terrorism. Against that backdrop, part 2 provides an ambitious but feasible agenda of actions that could prevent terrorists from ever being able to explode a nuclear bomb in an American city.

In “who could be planning a nuclear terrorist attack” part of the book, the author states that Al-Qaeda, certainly be the most probable perpetrator, Jemaah Islamiyah, Al-Qaeda affiliate in southeast asia, Chechen insurgents, Hezbollah, and several terrorist organizations in Pakistan are included in a huge gallery of terrorist groups that have actively explored nuclear option or, on current trend lines, could do so in the next few years. What all of these groups have

in common, he says, is a hatred of the America or the West, along with sophisticated organizational structures, motive and capability to seek out nuclear weapons.

Allison makes it clear what nuclear weapons terrorists could use. To achieve a nuclear explosion, a minimum of thirty-five pounds of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), or nine pounds of plutonium, is required. Nuclear terrorists are most likely to use a small weapon stolen from the arsenal of one of the nuclear states, or an elementary nuclear bomb made from stolen HEU or plutonium. The prospect of a terrorist crashing an airplane into a nuclear plant or detonating a powerful truck bomb next to a vulnerable area or sticks of dynamite packed in a briefcase with cesium to a fertilizer-based truck bomb wrapped in cobalt, can be a kind of dirty bomb.

Concerning the question where could terrorists acquire a nuclear bomb. Today there are more than two hundred address around the world from which terrorist could acquire a nuclear weapon or the fissile material from which one could be made. Having 22.000 tactical nuclear weapons, and an inadequate security system Russia is on top of list, additionally Pakistan, North Korea are high on agenda as supply point, the author states.

Allison stresses that national security experts agree on the most likely way terrorist will obtain a nuclear bomb will not be to steal or purchase a fully operational device but to buy fissile material and construct their

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own. If terrorists do get their hands on a nuclear device or HEU or plutonium, they would easily make a operational bomb within a year.

At the end of first section Allison shows vulnerabilities of USA border security at sea, airport and land. He also tells some true stories about old plots how it is easy to pass a nuclear device into America if they use the same way that the drug dealers use.

The author spends the second half of his book arguing that nuclear terrorism is preventable. He asserts that only a fission chain reaction releases the vast blast of energy that is the hallmark of a nuclear bomb. No fissile material no nuclear explosion, no nuclear terrorism. The centerpiece of a strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism must be to deny terrorists access to nuclear weapons or materials. He provides a framework, a very long and challenging process, for a program of policies to prevent nuclear terrorism. First, there must be the "Three No's": No loose nukes, no new nascent nukes, and no additional states with nuclear weapons.

1.No loose nukes: begins with the recognition that insecure nuclear weapon or materials (anywhere) pose a grave threat to all nations everywhere. The first goal in the plan to prevent nuclear terrorism must be to ensure that there is no place in the world where terrorist can acquire nuclear weapons or the materials from which such weapons can be made.

2.No new nascent nukes: would prevent the construction of any

national production facilities for enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium. Author exemplifies Iran as the leading country that is simultaneously exploiting the current nonproliferation regime and sneaking around it.

3.No new nuclear weapons states: draws a bright line under today's eight nuclear power and states unambiguously, "No more". In Allison's book, North Korea poses a decisive challenge for this policy.

Second, there must be the "Seven Yeses": They are; making the prevention of nuclear terrorism an absolute national priority, fighting a strategically focused war on terrorism, conducting a humble foreign policy, building a global alliance against nuclear terrorism, creating the intelligence capabilities required for success in the war on nuclear terrorism, dealing with dirty bombs, and constructing a multilayered defense. For the details of these imperatives, you'll just have to read the book. At the end of the book the "frequently asked questions about nuclear terrorism" section gives explicit answers to readers.

"Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe" is a book that analyzes nuclear terrorism as the focal threat facing America today. At first sight many may think that this book is written for American administration or society but it is indeed a book which must be read by the people who realize the emerging security challenge concerning nuclear terrorism.

## COE-DAT ACTIVITIES

**1** COE-DAT conducted the “Terrorism and Media Course” on 10-14 October 2011 in Ankara / Turkey. The course covered the following topics; Counter Terrorism, the Media and Public Opinion, Terrorism, the Law and the Media, The Role of Strategic Communication in Combating Terrorism, Prevention of Sensationalist Reporting, Dealing with Terrorism from the Media’s Perspective: a Turkish Case

Study, The Internet Media in Terrorist Reporting, Terrorism, the Media and Censorship, TV and the War on Terror, Propaganda and News Management in Combating Terrorism, Terrorist Use of the Internet as a Tool of Publicity and Recruitment, Ethics of Reporting Terrorism: Dealing with the Terrorism from the US Media’s Perspective, The Role and Importance of the Media in Combating Prejudice (caused by Terrorism): a Norwegian Case Study, Information Operations in Response to Terrorism, The Dilemma of Freedom of the Press in Combating Terrorism, NATO Policy on the Media and Terrorism, Media Awareness: How to Manage the Media in Times of Crisis, The Role of the Media in Combating Terrorism: A Northern Ireland case Study. The course was carried out with 35 attendees from 23 countries and 10 lecturers from 5 countries.



**2** COE-DAT conducted an **Advanced Training Course** on “Future Trends and New Approaches in Defeating the Terrorism Threat” on 23-27 October 2011 in Algeria. The course’s contents were; Terrorism overview; history, definition and root causes, Terrorist’s motivation, Dynamics of ideology and target selection, Legal aspects of combating terrorism; an overview, Role of intelligence in DAT, Terrorism and media, public relations and information management, Terrorism and crisis management, NATO’s Counter-Terrorism Policy, Crisis management, Combating the financing of terrorism (Legal responses), Cyber terrorism; an

overview, WMD terrorism; an overview, Suicide bombing, Energy security, Border/Transport Security and Critical Infra. Protection in DAT, Future trends in terrorism. The course was attended by 10 lecturers from five countries and 35 participants from 23 countries.

**3** COE-Dat carried out an **Advanced Research Workshop** on “Dimensions of Technology in Defence against Terrorism” on 2-3 November 2011 in Ankara / Turkey.



The course covered the following topics; Current Technological Advances and their Impacts Terrorism and Counter Terrorism Efforts, The Role of the Commercial World in Enabling DAT, Weaponization and Delivery Systems that Terrorists Use for Biological and Chemical Agents; Bioterrorism, WMD

Technology and Terrorism, Transportation Technology and Its Effect on Speed, Distance and Magnitude of Terrorist Attacks, Terrorist Threats to Energy Critical Infrastructure Technology and Protection Systems, Terrorist Use of Communication Technology and Social Networks, Use of Cyber Space and Technology by Terrorists, The Role of Information Technology in Responding Terrorism; "Immediate Actions and Future Possibilities, Technological Measures to Counter WMD Terrorism, Nanotechnology; Current and Future Applications for Counter Terrorism Efforts, Technological Elements of Intelligence Sharing in DAT. The workshop was attended by 36 participants from 18 countries and 16 speakers from 4 countries.



**4** COE-DAT conducted a **Course** on “Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism” on 21-25 November 2011 in Ankara / Turkey. The course covered the following topics; Terrorism Threats from Nuclear, Chemical, Biological and Radiological Weapons, Nuclear Risks, Orphan Sources and Silent Killers, How Credible is the Threat of Dirty Bombs & Attacks on Nuclear Facilities, Threats Posed by Chemical and Biological Weapons and their Historical Context, Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Terrorism, Role of Armed Forces in Countering WMD Terrorism,

Regional Implications of WMD Terrorism, NATO Policies and Capabilities against WMD Proliferation and WMD Terrorism, International and Other Efforts for Dealing with Terrorism Threats from Mass Destruction Weapons, The International Arms Control Agreements, How Credible is the Threat of Attacks with Chemical Agents, Bio-Terrorism: How Real is the threat?, Verification of Model of Threatening accident/Terrorism Spreading, Means and Methods for First Responders in Chemical-Biological Terrorism, Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Terrorism. The course was attended by 44 participants from 23 countries and 8 speakers.



**5** COE-DAT conducted an **Advanced Research Workshop** “Intelligence Sharing and Terrorism” on 07-08 December 2011 in Ankara/Turkey. The workshop covered the following topic areas; Challenges in intelligence Sharing in Combating Terrorism, DAT Intelligence Sharing in the Fog of Tweets - Contemporary 21st Century Dynamics and Emerging Threats, intelligence Sharing on Countering Financial Aspects of Terrorism, Sociological and Demographic Intelligence in DAT, NATO-Cyber Defense Perspective: How can the international actors contribute to intelligence gathering against Cyber Terrorism, Role of Unmanned Air Vehicles: Obtaining, Sharing and Using Intelligence Against Terrorism, Legal and ethic considerations on intelligence sharing, The role of Intelligence Fusion Centers in DAT. At National and International Level, Law Enforcement & Military Cooperation in Intelligence Sharing, Think tanks and intelligence, Open source intelligence: Role of media, Analysis of intelligence: by whom and how? The course was attended by 24 participants 16 countries and 11 speakers from 6 countries.

## VISITS TO COE-DAT

- Commander of Turkish Armed Forces, General Necdet ÖZEL visited COE-DAT on 18 November 2011,
- Deputy Chief Turkish General Staff, General Hulusi AKAR visited COE-DAT on 01 November 2011.
- Defence Attaché of Japan, Col. Taizo FUJITA visited COE-DAT on 18 November 2011.
- A delegation from Bangladesh paid a visit to COE-DAT on 27 December 2011.

## FUTURE ACTIVITIES

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- 1** COE-DAT will conduct a **Course** on “Defence against Suicide Bombing” on 23-27 January 2012 in Ankara / Turkey. Instructors will present concepts of suicide terrorism, assess the threat of suicide bombing, examine the motivations, recruitment methods and modus-operandi of suicide bombers, examine the various aspects of suicide terrorism and its future trends, discuss responses to the threat as national entities and the requirements for international cooperation.
  
  - 2** COE-DAT will conduct an **Advanced Research Workshop** on “Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism” on 31 Jan- 01 Feb 2012 in Ankara / Turkey. The aims of the workshop are to inform the participants about WMD Terrorism, examine the techniques in fighting WMD Terrorism, seek common ground in fighting against WMD terrorism and determine the measures against this threat, share the information and knowledge compiled by NATO with PfP Country and MD Country members, analyze the details of WMD related conferences and meetings in 2012.
  
  - 3** COE-DAT will conduct a **Course** on “Legal Aspects of Combating Terrorism” on 06 -10Feb 2012 in Ankara/ Turkey. The course intends to inform participants about “Legal Aspects of Combating Terrorism” and provide necessary guidance in order to promote standard training, basic skills to maximize the NATO military mission in defeating the terrorism threat, enable effective support NATO and partner nations’ personnel, whilst they are involved in NATO – led operations to bring peace and stability to conflict areas.
  
  - 4** COE-DAT will conduct a **Course** on “Fighting the Financial Dimensions of Terrorism” on 13 - 17 Feb 2012 in Ankara/ Turkey. The course intends to inform participants about terrorist funding, conceptual framework, relevant crimes and need for funds, the future of terrorist financing and effective measures.
  
  - 5** COE-DAT will conduct a **Course** on “Efficient Crisis Management to Mitigate The Effects of Terrorist Activities” on 27 Feb-2 March 2012 in Istanbul/Turkey. The purpose of the course is to examine efficient crisis management and basic strategies in managing periods of crisis primarily based on terrorist activity, consider the different phases of crisis management and how to mitigate the effects of a crisis.
  
  - 6** COE-DAT will conduct a **Course** on “Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism” on 26-30 March 2012 in Ankara/Turkey. The purpose of this course is to analyze the threat of WMD Terrorism, to examine NBC weapons and missile proliferation in historical context, to overview of measures against the threat posed by WMD terrorism, to be aware of the role of the armed forces against WMD terrorism, to be aware of the regional implications of WMD, to evaluate the future threat assessments posed by WMD terrorism.
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## COE-DAT PUBLICATIONS

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This book presents the lectures from the NATO Advanced Training Course (ATC) held in Tiran, Albania, in April 2009.

The goal of the ATC was to enhance international cooperation in the fight against terrorism by providing the guidance necessary to promote standard training and basic skills for Partner Nation officials. It provided a forum for exchanging views on the latest developments in the area of threats posed by terrorist organizations, their impact on the national, regional and global security environment, as well as ways to prevent, deter, counter and respond to them. It also promoted a wide-ranging partnership of cooperation and dialogue in the fight against terrorism, to boost transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for common and concerted action.

The eleven papers in the book are selected from the lectures and case studies presented during the ATC. They explore the causes and dimensions of terrorism and introduce strategies to counter the terrorist threat, examining different cases related to countering terrorism in detail and explaining the efforts of NATO and the United Nations to counter terrorism.


The course's first paper presented by Ms. Zeynep Sütalan set the stage for later discussions by giving an account of events in the history of terrorism in four waves, and then exploring the four root causes for terrorism.

The second paper, presented by Andreas Blum, looks at the relationship between organized crime and terrorism, and how strategies against the financing of organized crime can be extended to also cover the fight against terrorism.

Professor Robyn R. Mace's contribution, the third article, examines the value of strategic communications, especially with regards to their use by security forces, in maintaining order and countering terrorist messages.

In two separate presentations, Major Julian Charvat first addresses the methods whereby a terrorist organization can create and then exploit an IED event. The second article addresses how a terrorist group could gain access to WMD for use in their attacks. However, both of these papers have also good news in that security forces are indeed capable to counter these specific threats.

In the sixth paper, on the evolving terrorist threat, Jolene Jerard outlines the evolution in terrorism by defining four types of terrorists, and then focuses on smaller groups and individual "home-grown" terrorists,



but shows how they gain strength for world-wide inter-connectivity between terrorists, mainly using the Internet.

The seventh piece, written by Colonel Ömer Akdoğan and Colonel Oğuz Kulpcu, looks into the role of intelligence in the fight against terrorists, stressing how the nature of the terrorist threat demands an equally robust intelligence effort.

Keith Spence's paper, being the eighth paper presented in the ATC, examines the suicide bomber, focusing on the motivations and the link to the religious basis for such action, finding the tie tenuous at best but more closely connected with an indoctrinated basis.

The topic of rules of engagement (ROE) is the subject of the ninth paper by Colonel Osman Aytaç who looked into the sources and types of rules that must be considered at various operational levels in the fight against terrorism.

The tenth paper by Colonel Uğur Ersen looks into the methods used by terrorist groups to recruit members and how this will change based on the characteristics of the target population. The article also examines the reasons for the need for continuous recruitment in terrorist organizations.

The final paper, again by Ms. Zeynep Sütalan, discusses the emerging trends in terrorism and outlines that there is both change and continuity in terrorism since it is a historical phenomenon that continues today.

No nation or culture can achieve peace and security at home while ignoring terrorist threat posed to other nations. This book provides readers with an analysis of the strategies adopted in countering the terrorist threat, and will assist multinational efforts to combat the threat of global terrorism.

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