



CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM



COE-DAT Newsletter

Volume 3 / Issue 16 / July-September 2010

Content

3 General Overview of the Terrorist Activities (July - September 2010)

by Ergün ERÜN
LTC (TUR AF)

Turgut ÖZKAN
1st LT (TUR GEN)

17 The Role of Intelligence in Countering Terrorism

by Oğuz KULPCU
COL (TUR A)

27 Radiological Terrorism: Another Kind of Threat

by Dan-Radu VOICA
COL (ROM AF)

37 Current and Future Trends in Terrorism

by Zeynep SÜTALAN
Civilian (TUR)

50 COE-DAT Activities

COE-DAT;

Your gate
to get
information.

Editorial

Newsletter's sixteenth issue has three main sections. First of all, we share the information and the analysis of the data related to the terrorist incidents which took place all over the world in the previous three months. Second, we have articles on terrorism related issues. Lastly, brief information about the activities of our centre is provided in the bulletin.

Col. Oğuz KULPCU, in his article on *The Role of Intelligence in Countering Terrorism*, first focuses on what intelligence is and then he brings forward the discussions about the new challenges for the intelligence due to the changes in the security environment after the Cold War. Furthermore, he elaborates the importance of intelligence in countering terrorism via discussing what kind of intelligence is required to tackle with the terrorist threat. He underlines that countering terrorism necessitates extensive financial and human resources as well as advanced intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. He asserts that not only interagency cooperation, but also international cooperation in intelligence sharing is critical for the success in the fight against terrorism.

In his article on *Radiological Terrorism: Another Kind of Threat*, Col. Dan-Radu VOICA addresses the threat of radiological terrorism. He asserts that the interest shown by certain terrorist groups in using Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs) or generally called "dirty bombs" or of radiation-emitting devices (REDs), necessitates an increased attention. For

the terrorists, the relative ease to make and use a radiological weapon compared to a nuclear one, makes it more attractive. He also claims despite the fact that RDDs or REDs have not been used yet, during the last decade a series of attempts have been foiled and thus, this should call governments around the world and their citizens to become increasingly aware about the threat of such attacks.

The article on *Current and Future Trends in Terrorism* by Ms. Zeynep SÜTALAN discusses the future trends in terrorism by looking at the changing profile of terrorism over ideology, organization and structure as well as the means and methods used in terrorism. Ms. SÜTALAN examines how the ideologies used by terrorist organizations together with their goals and motivations have changed. Second, she elaborates how the organizational structure of terrorist organizations has changed with reference to the network and hierarchical structures of terrorist organizations. Third, the article is dedicated to look at the means and methods of terrorist organizations with special attention to the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bombing. Other features of terrorism like cyber terrorism, the growing interconnectedness and interdependency between organized crime and terrorism and the nexus between piracy and terrorism is also addressed. In this context, she argues that there is both change and continuity in terrorism since it is a historical phenomenon and intends to contribute to the discussions on the future of terrorism.

TERRORİZMLE MÜCADELE MÜKEMMELİYET MERKEZİ
CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE - DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM



The opinions and comments in thi "COE-DAT Newsletter" represent the personal views of the authors. They do not represent the official views of Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism nor NATO.
All the rights of the articles and pictures included in this book are reserved.

General Overview of the Terrorist Activities (July-September 2010)

LTC Ergün ERÜN*
1st LT Turgut ÖZKAN**

In the third quarter of 2010, terrorist incidents increased roughly 15% and totalled 2,869¹ versus 2,491 from the second quarter of 2010. In this third quarter of 2010, 58 countries were afflicted with terrorist attacks versus 45 in the second quarter of 2010. 2,869 terrorist attacks resulted in 4,367 lives lost and 9,173 injured. Also, 779 people were abducted by unknown

assailants during this period. The deadliest attack for the period was a suicide attack in Pakistan, Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), on July 9. At least 106 persons were killed, including women and children, and 120 persons injured, as two suicide bombers blew themselves up through the political offices in Mohmand Agency. The first bomber, riding a motorbike, hit the main boundary wall of the political offices, while the second attacker, driving an explosive-laden coach, hit the main offices. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan's (TTP) Mohmand Chapter claimed responsibility for the attacks.²



**Suicide attack in FATA claims
106 lives and 120 injuries on
July 9 in Pakistan.**

* (TUR AF), Chief of Information Collection and Management Centre, COE-DAT.

** (TUR GEN), Analyst in the Information Collection and Management Centre, COE-DAT.

¹ All figures mentioned in the report are totally procured from the open sources and any dispute in figures used in similar works is a matter of capability to reach the same source. Neither NATO nor COE-DAT is responsible for the disputes but the analyst.

² <http://www.google.com.tr/imgres?imgurl=http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/48089000>

Another deadliest attack for this quarter was a suicide attack in Uganda, in capital city Kampala, on July 11. Explosions tore through crowds watching the World Soccer Cup final at a rugby club and an Ethiopian restaurant, killing at least 85 people, and wounding 39. The blasts came two days after al-Shabaab, called for militants to attack sites in Uganda

and Burundi, two nations that contribute troops to the African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia. American workers, Ethiopian, Indian and Congolese nationals were also among the people who lost their lives in the attacks. Two suicide bombers took part in the the attacks. Somalia's al-Shabaab terrorist group confirmed that it had carried out the attacks.³



IED attacks in Kampala, Uganda caused 85 dead and 39 wounded on July 11.

Furthermore, another terrorist attack occurred in Pakistan, Baluchistan province on September 3.⁴ At least 73 persons were killed, while over 150 others were injured after a suicide bomber blew himself up amidst participants of a rally held to mark the Al-Quds Day in Quetta. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for the attack.



Suicide attack in Lahore, Baluchistan province resulted in 73 dead and 160 wounded on September 3.

³ http://www.google.com.tr/imgurl=http://news.bbc.co.uk/media/42656000/gif/_42656899_uganda_kampala

⁴ http://www.google.com.tr/imgres?imgurl=http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/40944000/gif/_40944123_pakistan_quetta


As usual, **Iraq** suffered by far the most with 824 separate attacks claiming 1,041 lives and injuring 3,611 others along with eight others abducted during the third quarter of 2010. The level of violence in Iraq increased roughly 11% compared to the previous quarter and accounts for 28% of total attacks, 23% of the total fatalities, and 33% of the total casualties for worldwide terrorist incidents. The capital city,

Baghdad, saw the most attacks with 359 separate terrorist incidents, claiming 493 lives and wounding 1,889 people. The second most hit city in Iraq for the period was Mosul with 187 separate terrorist attacks. In Mosul, the attacks caused 135 dead and 324 wounded.

The deadliest attack in Iraq was the 17 August suicide attack in capital city Baghdad. At least 60 recruits and soldiers were killed and 160 wounded when a suicide bomber blew himself up at an army recruitment centre in Baghdad, two weeks before the end of the US combat mission in Iraq. The blast, which tore through a line of recruits, was one of the bloodiest attacks in 2010.⁵



Suicide attacks in Baghdad claimed 60 lives and 160 injuries on August 17.



⁵ Iraq Map, (accessed October 25, 2005); available from <http://images.google.com.tr/imgress?imgurl=http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk>

	Country	Number of Attacks	K	W	A
1	Iraq	824	1,041	3,611	8
2	Afghanistan	731	1,088	1,314	136
3	Pakistan	391	814	1,571	41
4	India	336	217	174	70
5	Russia	105	122	390	1
6	Thailand	80	62	97	0
7	Yemen	70	171	110	296
8	Turkey	65	48	116	2
9	Somalia	57	418	986	113
10	Philippines	52	63	117	9

Table 1 - **The Most Hit Countries Worldwide during third quarter of 2010.**

In the third quarter of 2010, violence increased roughly 33% in **Afghanistan**. 731 attacks have been recorded during the quarter versus 546 in the second quarter of 2010. These 731 attacks claimed 1,088 lives and injured 1,314 along with 136 people abducted during the period. The deadliest attack for the third quarter of 2010 was the 20 August armed attack in Helmand province, claiming 30 lives.⁶ Taliban insurgents killed up to 30 Afghans working for a road-building company. There was no immediate explanation for the attack in the Sangin district of Helmand province in which the road crew workers and security guards were killed.



The armed attack in Helmand province caused the death of 30 civilians on August 20.

In addition, poll election violence in Nangarhar province was another significant event during September 2010. 26 people were killed and eight wounded across Nangarhar province during the poll election violence, bordering Pakistan's tribal region of Khyber Agency.⁷



Poll election violence in Nangarhar province claimed 26 lives and eight injuries on September 18.

⁶ http://www.google.com.tr/imgres?imgurl=http://2.bp.blogspot.com/qbnI/helmand_map
⁷ Kabul map, available from http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/45040000/gif/_45040017_afghan_Kandabar_2209.gif

Another deadliest attack was the 28 July IED attack in Nimroz province. A roadside bomb hit a passenger bus in Nimruz province in southwest Afghanistan, killing 25 people and wounding 20 others. The tragic incident happened between Dilaram district of the province and Bagwa district of the neighbouring Farah province.⁸



IED attack in Nimroz province claimed 25 lives and 20 injuries on July 28.

In **Pakistan**, violence increased 1% compared to the previous quarter. 391 terrorist incidents were recorded during the third quarter of 2010 versus 364 in the second quarter. These attacks claimed 814 lives and causing 1,571 casualties along with 41 others abducted.

Suicide attacks increased roughly 63% in Pakistan. 18 suicide attacks were recorded in Pakistan during this quarter versus 11 compared to the second quarter of 2010. 340 people were killed and 945 were wounded in 18 suicide attacks.



Suicide attacks in Punjab province claimed 40 lives and 175 injuries on July 1.

The deadliest attack for the third quarter of 2010 was a suicide attack in FATA province on July 9. Also, the September 3 suicide attack in Baluchistan caused 73 dead and 160 wounded. Separately, 40 persons were killed and 175 others injured when three suicide attackers blew themselves up inside the shrine of Lahore's patron saint Syed Ali Hajwairi popularly known as Data Gunj Bakhsh on July 1.⁹

⁸ <http://www.google.com.tr/imgres?imgurl=http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/48512000/nimroz>

⁹ http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/41932000/gif/_41932036_pakistan_punjab2_map203.gif

Meanwhile, another deadliest attack was a multiple attack in Punjab province on September 1. Terrorists targeted Shias marking Hazrat Ali's martyrdom in Lahore, killing 39 people and injuring 241 others in two suicide and one grenade attack. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami has accepted responsibility for the three attacks.¹⁰

In addition, August 23 suicide attack caused 30 people killed and 40 wounded. The suicide blast took place near a mosque in Wana

Bazaar of South Waziristan in northwest Pakistan. The blast happened at the main gate of Mosque wherein there were more than 100 people offering prayers inside.¹¹

336 terrorist incidents put **India** in the fourth place in the world according to number of attacks during the third quarter of 2010. These attacks claimed 217 lives and 174 injuries in sum along with 70 abducted by unknown assailants.



Second significant suicide attack in Punjab province left 39 dead and 241 wounded on September 1.



Suicide attack in FATA, South Waziristan, killed 30 people and wounded 40 others on August 23.

¹⁰ Pakistan Map, http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/45060000/gif/_45060447_pak_fata_nwf_226.gif

¹¹ <http://www.google.com.tr/imgres?imgurl=http://www.topnews.in/files/Waziristan-general-map.gif>

The deadliest attack was a clash on August 30. Maoists killed ten policemen in a clash in India's eastern state of Bihar. More than 150 Maoists battled with the police, who were on patrol in forests in the state capital Patna. The bodies of ten policemen were recovered from the scene, while seven other officers were admitted to hospital with serious injuries. Bihar is one of several states across east and central India where Maoist are active.¹²

Another deadliest attack occurred on September 13, which was an

armed attack in the West Bengal province. Maoists shot dead five supporters of the ruling Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) at Nachupatina village in West Midnapore District. The five persons that included four of a family were dragged out from their homes and killed.¹³

The violence in **Russia** continued in the third quarter of 2010 and increased almost 100%. 105 separate terrorist incidents versus 56 compared to the previous quarter, resulted in 122 dead and 212 wounded.



Clash in Bihar province caused 10 policemen dead and seven wounded on August 30.



CPI-Maoist killed five civilians and wounded another one in West Bengal province on September 13.

¹² http://www.google.com.tr/imgres?imgurl=http://neusing.bbc.co.uk/images/39513000/gif/bihar_assam_map


¹³ http://www.google.com.tr/imgres?imgurl=http://neusing.bbc.co.uk/images/39963000/gif/west_bengal_map

The most significant attack in Russia was the September 9 suicide attack in North Ossetia.¹⁴ A suicide bomber killed 18 people and wounded 150 in the attack in Vladikavkaz, capital of North Ossetia province. The bomber detonated an explosive packed with metal bars, bolts and ball bearings in a car outside the entrance to the market. The bomb was the equivalent of 30-40 kg of TNT.

Armed Attack was the most used tactic during the quarter with 34 occurrences, while IED attack, including six vehicle-borne improved explosive devices (VBIED) attacks, was the most used second tactic with 32 occurrences in Russia. Also, 25 clashes, five suicide attacks, four raids, two arson, one IDF attack, one abduction and one execution were recorded in Russia during the quarter. Of these, 25 clashes claimed 29 lives and 16 injuries, while five suicide attacks caused 26 dead and 218 wounded.



Suicide attacks in North Ossetia claimed 18 lives and 150 injuries on September 9.



¹⁴ http://www.google.com.tr/imgres?imgurl=http://neusing.bbc.co.uk/images/gif/russia_vladikavkaz.gif


Thailand was the sixth most hit country in the third quarter of 2010. 80 terrorist attacks caused 62 people dead and 97 others wounded. Three troubled southern provinces, Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala were the most volatile cities in terms of the number of attacks during the quarter. Pattani suffered 22 attacks that resulted in 28 people killed and 24 wounded, while in Yala 16 people were killed and 17 were wounded in 22 separate attacks. The province of Narathiwat also suffered a significant number of attacks, 21, which claimed 17 lives and wounded 36. The largest attack was July 1 IED attack in Narathiwat province.¹⁵ Suspected insurgents detonated a roadside

bomb and opened fire on security forces in southern Thailand, killing five members of a patrol.

Yemen was the seventh most hit country in the world during the third quarter of 2010. 70 separate terrorist attacks claimed 171 lives and 110 injuries including 296 others abducted. The most deadly attack was the July 14 armed attack, claiming 20 lives.¹⁶ The Shiite rebels killed 20 people, including six policemen, in an ambush on a convoy carrying food supplies for the government forces stationed in the north. 14 of those killed were pro-government tribesmen in the northern Saada province where they were helping the authorities to enforce law and stability in the troubled area.



The IED attack in Narathiwat province caused five dead on July 1.



Armed attack in Saada province claimed 20 lives on July 14.

¹⁵ http://www.google.com.tr/imgres?imgurl=http://neusimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/gif/_40838849_tbai_narathiwat_map203.gif

¹⁶ http://www.google.com.tr/imgres?imgurl=http://neusimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/gif/yemen_saada.gif

Nine different methodologies used by terrorists during this period and the most used one was the armed attack with 28 repetitions, resulting in 60 deaths and 50 woundings, while clash was the most-used second tactic with 18 attacks, causing 87 dead and 27 wounded. Also, abduction, arson, IDF attack, IED attack, piracy, raid and suicide attack were the other methodologies used in Yemen during the period.

65 terrorism related attacks made **Turkey** the eighth most targeted country in the world during the third quarter of 2010. These attacks claimed in 48 lives and 116 injuries along with two abducted.

The most deadly incident was an IED attack, claiming nine lives and four injuries in Hakkari province in September 2010. All the victims were civilian. In addition, another deadliest terrorist attack occurred in Hakkari province during the quarter. Clash between security forces and PKK/KONGRA-GEL terrorists caused six soldiers martyred and nine others wounded on July 20.

PKK/KONGRA-GEL terrorists used seven different methodologies during this quarter, and the most prevalent one was IED attacks with 30 repetitions, claiming 23 lives and 54 injuries, while armed attacks was the second most used tactic with 15 incidents, causing 11 dead and 24 wounded. Also, 14 clashes resulted in 14 deaths and 30 woundings, while three IDF attacks claimed four injuries. In addition, a raid caused four policemen wounded. Lastly, two civilians were abducted in Tunceli province in two separate incidents during the third quarter of 2010.

57 terrorist attacks made **Somalia** the ninth most-hit country in the world during the third quarter of 2010. 57 attacks claimed 418 lives and 986 injuries including 113



Clash in Mogadishu claimed 52 lives and 129 injuries on July 20.

others abducted. The deadliest attack was July 20 clash in capital city Mogadishu, claiming 52 lives and 129 injuries.¹⁷

Seven different tactics were used by the terrorists in Somalia during this period, and the most used one was the clash with 30 repetitions, killing 320 people and wounding 843 others, while the IED attack was the second most used methodology with

seven repetitions, claiming 26 lives and 67 injuries. Piracy was the most used third methodology with six attacks, resulting in 110 people abducted. Indirect fire (IDF) attack was the most used fourth tactic with five separate incidents, claiming 31 lives and 75 injuries in sum. Other tactics used in Somalia were armed attack, raid and suicide attack during the quarter.

The violence increased roughly 21% in **Philippines** and some 52 attacks claimed 63 lives and wounded 117 people along with nine people abducted during the third quarter of 2010. The deadliest attack was August 21 clash in the capital Manila province, claiming nine lives.¹⁸ Eight policemen and a local official killed in coordinated attacks in the central Philippines.

In terms of methodology, clash was conducted 19 times resulting in 17 deaths and 17 wounded, while armed attack occurred 17 times and caused 35 dead and 19 wounded. In addition, six IED attacks claimed three lives and 74



Clash in Manila province claimed nine on August 21.

¹⁷ Mogadishu map, available from <http://1.bp.blogspot.com/s320/somalia+mogadishu+map.bmp>


¹⁸ http://www.google.com.tr/imgres?imgurl=http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/gif/pbil_manila.gif

Event Type	Event Count	KIA	WIA	AIA
1 IED	936	1,048	2,769	0
2 Armed Attack	744	1,116	625	4
3 Clash	419	710	1,275	17
4 IDF	230	149	634	3
5 VBIED	142	296	1,111	0
6 Suicide Attack	98	723	2,552	0
7 Abduction	90	0	0	305
8 Raid	83	224	196	239
9 56	100	4	1	0
10 Arson	38	0	1	0
11 Piracy	12	1	0	210
12 Hoax	12	0	0	0
13 VOIED	6	0	6	0
14 Cyber Attack	3	0	0	0

Table 2 - **The Most Used Tactics in the World during the Third Quarter of 2010.**

injuries, while four raids resulted in five deaths. Also, two IDF attacks left three dead and seven wounded, while nine civilians were abducted in three separate incidents. Lastly, a hoax was reported from Philippines during the quarter.

Lastly, in **Europe** 14 countries were hit by the terrorist attacks during this quarter including Russia and Turkey. The most hit country was Russia with 105 separate attacks, while Turkey was the second one with 65 separate attacks. Also, Belgium, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Kosovo, Norway, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (UK) and Ukraine were the other countries suffered from terrorism during the period.



Terrorists used 14 different tactics in the third quarter of 2010. **IED** attacks were the most used tactic during the quarter with some 936 attacks, claiming 1,048 lives and 2,769 wounded, while traditional **armed attacks** were the most used second tactic with some 744 repetitions, resulting in 1,116 deaths and 625 woundings along with four abducted. Iraq was the most targeted with IEDs, suffering 361 separate attacks. Afghanistan was the second country suffered IED attacks with 251 incidents while Pakistan was the third most targeted country with 107 incidents. In addition, 71 IED attacks reported from India, while 32 IED attacks were reported in Russia. Lastly, 30 IED attacks were reported from Turkey. The deadliest IED attack was 11 July IED attack in capital city of Uganda, Kampala province. At least 85 people were killed and 39 others wounded in the incident.

Extrajudicial killings posed an important security challenge for Afghanistan, India, Mexico, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, and United States of America (USA) and especially for Iraq where 89 people lost their lives in captivity in 55 separate incidents during the third quarter of 2010.

Clashes between security forces and terrorists caused considerable damage. 419 incidents claimed 710 lives and 1,275 injuries along with 17 abducted.

A wide usage of **Indirect Fire** (IDF) attacks was also noted

during the quarter, killing 149 and wounding 634 in 230 attacks.

Another deadly IED tactic, the **vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices** (VBIED) attack, was the fifth most used tactic. There were 142 separate attacks claiming 296 lives and injuring 1,111 during the quarter. Iraq was the most afflicted with 116 separate VBIED attacks that killed 240 people and wounded over 900 others. Other countries with attacks using this tactic during the quarter were Afghanistan, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Thailand and UK during the third quarter of 2010.

Suicide Bombing was the deadliest form of IED attack again with 98 incidents killing 723 people and wounding 2,552 others during this period. Afghanistan was the most volatile country according to the data available about suicide attacks with 37 separate attacks, while Iraq was the second most suffered country from suicide attacks with 29 of these attacks. Pakistan was the third hardest hit by this tactic, suffering from 18 such attacks. Other countries targeted were Algeria with two, Iran with one, Mauritania with one, Russia with five, Somalia with two, Tajikistan with one and Yemen afflicted with two attacks during the quarter.

Abduction was another tactic used during the period. Some 305 people were abducted in 90 different incidents.

Raid was the eighth most used tactic during the period with some 83 separate attacks, claiming 224 lives and 196 wounded along with 239 abducted. Afghanistan was the most hit country with 26 separate attacks, while Yemen was the second most hit country with nine attacks. In addition, Colombia, India, Iraq, Nepal, Philippines, Russia, Somalia, Sudan and Turkey were the other countries afflicted with raid during the quarter.

Execution was the ninth most used tactic during the quarter with some 56 attacks, claiming 100 lives and four injuries, and included one abducted. Iraq and Afghanistan were the most volatile country related to execution with 11 incidents in each other. In Iraq, 11 executions caused 16 dead, while 11 executions in Afghanistan resulted in 25 deaths. Also, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), India, Mali, Pakistan, and Russia were other countries where


execution occurred during the period.

During the quarter, 38 **arson** attacks caused one civilian wounded in Thailand on August 9. India was the leading country with 20 arson attacks. Also, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, Thailand and Yemen were the other countries afflicted arson attacks.

Piracy was another method used during this period, 12 piracy related attacks claimed one life and 210 abducted, while 12 **hoaxes** were reported during the third quarter of 2010.

The **victim-operated improvised explosive device** (VOIED) attack was the thirteenth most used tactic for the period with six attacks, claiming six injuries. Myanmar and Turkey were the countries afflicted VOIED attack during the third quarter of 2010.

The Deadliest Tactics Used in the Third Quarter of 2010



The Role of Intelligence in Countering Terrorism

Col. Oğuz KULPCU*

1. Introduction

The word *intelligence* comes from the Latin verb “*intellegere*” which means to understand. Intelligence includes all the elements regarding national security, defense and foreign policy as well as certain aspects of international security. For a soldier, it might be knowledge of the enemy, an analyst see it as information that is waiting for clarification and policymakers consider it to be the information that meets stated or understood needs.

Today we live in the age of global terrorism which creates a new challenge for security of the world. There are a lot of studies on countering terrorism covering different dimensions of this struggle. On the other hand, the studies on the role and importance of intelligence in countering terrorism are not at the desired level. The ancient Chinese strategist *Sun Tzu* expressed the importance of the role of intelligence in any combat at all times in his following words: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, in a hundred battles you will never be in danger. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chance of winning or losing are equal.”

The role of intelligence in countering terrorism is of high importance. It enables us to determine the capabilities of the terrorists as well as understand the terrorists’ intentions to use those capabilities.

In this paper, first a short information about intelligence will be given, then the new threat of global terrorism and its challenge for the intelligence community will be explained. In addition, this paper seeks to find out what kind of intelligence is needed against this new threat.

2. What Is Intelligence

Intelligence is really a very broad and old discipline. There are so many different definitions for intelligence. The differences among those definitions result from the definers’ area of interest and their perception of intelligence. To give some examples there are three different definitions you can find below;

Intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us – the prelude to decision and action by policy makers.

CIA

Intelligence is the products which are obtained by processing of raw information. It includes planning, investigation, information collection and having a conclusion by processing those information.

MIT¹

The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.

Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis or understanding.

Dictionary of Military Terms, Joint Publ. DoD/USA

* Chief of Intelligence, COE-DAT.
1 Turkish National Intelligence Service

In order to underline some important and common parts of the all definitions, it can be referred that, intelligence is a process and this process must be initiated with the request of the decision makers. The product of this process, along with many other factors, helps decision makers to make precise decisions.

The aim of intelligence activities is determined by the transformation of intelligence interests and the objects of their interest, and it has an influence on the development of intelligence agencies. Today, these agencies are trying to prevent surprises, make predictive and beneficial decisions, provide efficient conduct of state systems and command over the armed forces. Assignments of intelligence activities follow the constantly changing needs of various leaders. Those needs are translated into demands for information on trends and conditions in specific sectors of society or in a society as a whole, as well as on relations between states in the international arena.

The phases of intelligence process can be listed as follows:

- collection;
- processing;
- utilization;
- analysis and production;
- dissemination and consumption;
- feedback.

There are various types of intelligence collection, which are called the collection disciplines. No single method of collection is used in isolation. In addition, the

collection disciplines include variety of different approaches:

1. Signals intelligence, SIGINT, refers to communication intercepts, and is a product of a number of auxiliary collection disciplines.
2. Communication intelligence (COMINT) is the main source of SIGINT.
3. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) contributes to SIGINT by gathering information from telephones, fax machines, copiers, and other electronic devices.
4. Imagery intelligence (IMINT) is derived from airborne and space collection platforms, such as satellites, aircrafts and unmanned air vehicles (UAV).
5. Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) employs resources of both IMINT and SIGINT.
6. Human intelligence (HUMINT) relies less on technology and more on human labor. It involves sending agents to foreign countries, where they try to recruit foreign nationals to engage in espionage. Some intelligence targets, such as terrorism, international crime, or narcotics trafficking are difficult to deal with by technical means or through technical disciplines.

In some instances, HUMINT may be the only available source of intelligence. It is also far less expensive than technical intelligence, but is very liable to deception.

A new form of intelligence collection - open source intelligence (OSINT) - is now

considered by many intelligence officials to be a potentially rich vein of information. It includes media (newspapers, radio, TV, Internet), public data (government reports, speeches, conference proceedings), and professional and academic products (conferences, symposia, academic papers).

The effective use of the intelligence in countering terrorism can only be realized via analysis since collecting intelligence information is of little value unless someone confirms and evaluates the information. Thus, analysis exists in order to make sense of the secret world of intelligence and to communicate those insights to senior decision makers. In this respect, the job of an analyst is to gather and collate all relevant intelligence information, analyze it for relevance and significance, and then draft reports for senior intelligence officials and policymakers. There are two forms of analytic reports: current intelligence, and long-term research. Current intelligence deals with daily issues, while long-term research reports are forward-looking assessments of what might happen.

3. The New Challenge for Intelligence

During the Cold War, the international community was divided into two separate blocs that were completely at odds with one another, and therefore in constant tension. No state felt entirely secure at that time, but somehow, states felt secure in their insecurity. They knew exactly

who their enemy was; how strong it was; and what its interests and goals were. The threat was precise and predictable. There were two blocs, two great powers that opposed each other and were in constant need of increasing their raw military power. International policies revolved around their interests; hence, one always knew what could be expected. Security could be measured exactly. One could even predict who would win in a direct clash by calculating and measuring the military power of the adversaries. That is perhaps one of the reasons why direct conflict between the United States and Russia never actually occurred during the Cold War, because their power was estimated as being roughly equivalent. For Western countries, the most menacing threat to their national security was the growing influence and power of their ideological competitor, the Soviet Union, and ultimately its arsenal of ballistic missiles. The world was divided into Communist and non-Communist states, so for virtually every nation in the world the enemy was well-defined and organized, with a vast military apparatus.

Intelligence agencies were traditional as well. Their tasks and structures were largely similar, no matter which country they belonged to. They were large, formal bodies with major budgets. Technology played a crucially important role (U-2 spy planes, satellites, sensors, cameras, etc.), and a significant percentage of each side's intelligence budget was dedicated to the improvement of technology. The major powers had a global intelligence reach; hence

the intelligence struggle became global. A primary focus of both Eastern and Western intelligence services was the opposition's intelligence service ("spy vs. spy"). The main intelligence methods used during the Cold War were: recruitment of human sources; encouraging the defection of officials and special operations.

Today, the challenge for intelligence is different than during the Cold War era. There are many more potential adversaries, and the targets are increasingly informed and witting of traditional intelligence methods. Where it is possible to have them, secrets are more important than ever for maintaining a security edge in the world. After the Cold War, intelligence agencies lost their primary purpose for existence. They no longer had a priority target, only several small, so-called "flavor of the month" targets that were constantly changing. It was clear that they needed to redefine their missions. Globalization has brought additional challenges. The distinction between military actions and criminal activities—in fact, between states of peace and war—has become blurred in today's world.

The new enemy, no longer attached to a large, predictable state apparatus, has proven it can slip into and out of our nations undetected, reside unnoticed, move money invisibly, and communicate unhindered via everyday means with leadership elements located thousands of miles away. This enemy is not easily defined or identified, which complicates the situation for

military and intelligence planners. Nevertheless, after the terrorist attacks on Washington and New York on 11 September 2001, it was absolutely clear that the world was never going to be the same, and that it faced something new, something for which intelligence organizations as they stood at the time were ill-prepared. After 9/11 attacks, the threat of international terrorism has become a priority for the intelligence organizations of several countries.

At this point, these questions might be asked to clarify the new challenge:

- How can we deal with threats of this kind?
- Is one country able to address such a challenge on its own?
- What role does intelligence play in this security environment?
- What is new in the nature of this threat?
- Are we facing a new enemy?
- How does this new threat challenge intelligence organizations?

Now let's try to find out the answers for these questions:

We are facing a non-state actor that poses a global threat. It is very difficult to locate and understand its nature. Terrorist organizations surround the globe with a great number of small cells. It is very difficult to monitor them by satellite or to track their communication systems. They operate secretly; most of the meetings where they discuss their plans are held in hotel rooms or apartments that are difficult to spy

on. They do not draw attention to themselves. As one security analyst has noted, *“Religious conviction gives them strength, but the armed struggle is what holds them together.”* Furthermore, they measure success differently: They define death and destruction as achievements in themselves. Also, the frequent use of ever-changing actors, aliases, and code words is another unique challenge and significantly increases the chance of confusion and incorrect assessments. The nature of terrorist behavior is the reason why intelligence agencies are facing so many challenges in combating the threat. Terrorists are very disciplined, dedicated, and highly motivated. They will not easily betray their cause. The variety of ways they conduct their operations results in the fact that it is very difficult to predict future targets.

4. The Role of Intelligence in Countering Terrorism

a. The Importance of Intelligence

Unfortunately, more than its successes, the failures of intelligence caused the importance of it to be understood. The 9/11 Commission Report stated that the United States intelligence community was poorly positioned to anticipate the emerging Al Qaeda threat and to deal with it on time. The commission especially faulted the poor level of cooperation between the FBI and the CIA, given that considerable information was either not shared at all, or was shared very inefficiently. Interestingly, following

the July 2005 attacks on the London transit system, similar charges were leveled against the intelligence and law enforcement organizations of the United Kingdom.

Moreover, it is seen by the world that, absence of well organized intelligence against this new threat might end with devastating results and loss of too many lives. In fact, until 9/11 attacks, nobody, including intelligence agencies themselves, noticed that they needed reform. Right after the 9/11, some significant efforts were dedicated to improve intelligence agencies; especially their ability to collect and analyze intelligence on terrorist organizations in order to prevent attacks. Intelligence agencies in democratic states of the twenty-first century are dedicated to confronting transnational targets and non-state actors.

The first necessity of winning over an enemy is to find him. To overcome with global terrorism we have to understand their aims, keep track of their activities and channels of supply, limit their movements and prevent their recruitment efforts. All those mentioned can be provided us by intelligence.

b. What Kind of Intelligence Against Terrorism

It is seen that to overcome this new threat a new intelligence structure is required which possesses extensive financial and human resources and advanced intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. Intelligence fusion is another important requirement for the new structure. Without a well

working fusion, even the best collection and analysis capabilities will not have much value.

Combating terrorism will place intense pressure on all intelligence collection systems, and it may do so for a generation or more. While collection of raw intelligence will remain critical, it will also remain insufficient against an opponent that is a dynamic, constantly evolving, and self-regulating force.

Intelligence remains the first line of defense and the critical element in combating terrorism. However, the adaptable nature of the adversary demands an equally fast intelligence effort. This will require changes in the intelligence craft going much beyond redrawing the organizational chart of intelligence and redesigning its chain of command.

Thus, if there is a need for new approaches to intelligence, this is to be found in at least eight domains or processes: breaking down outdated barriers; encouraging individual initiative; supporting and opening analysis; improving intercourse between analysis and collection; strengthening counterintelligence; promoting research collaboration and better use of technological innovation; establishing metrics for measuring progress; and improving international intelligence sharing and cooperation.

Investment in research and development and better use of technological innovation will undoubtedly strengthen the position of intelligence services and expand their lead in

counterterrorism capabilities. Particularly innovations in intelligence collection and decision support, sensors, monitoring, and a greater emphasis on cross-cultural communication will lead to a more effective response to international terrorism. Among the most promising innovations likely to emerge and having the greatest impact on winning the fight against terrorism are:

Forward-looking intelligence: The greatest value of intelligence is to anticipate terrorist actions and to translate that information into an effective response. Acting quickly in development will provide improved computer-based data fusion capabilities, modeling and simulation to better understand possible scenarios and responses. Moreover, advanced language translation software is in development to better track terrorist communications as a source of intelligence.

Comprehensive space, air, land, and sea monitoring: A network to monitor aircraft in flight already exists as well as extensive tracking and imaging coverage of the earth from space satellites, and selective monitoring of the land surface. Integration of current and new technology will lead to a global surveillance system that covers sea as well as land and airspace. Such a capability will substantially improve security by monitoring vessels bound for Western waters and will improve border and territorial surveillance and security.

Electronic tracking of money: To a large part, terrorism is funded through complicated electronic

transfer of funds. If such money is tagged electronically, it can be tracked worldwide to key operatives to effectively shut down a terrorist operation. New software and tagging technology is being developed that will not only strengthen global counterterrorism investigations, but also law enforcement efforts to bring to justice organized criminal enterprises.

Technologies to neutralize explosive chemicals: Many terrorist bombs today are improvised, made in homes and small laboratories using common chemicals, including ingredients in fertilizers. Terrorists can be denied the opportunity to gain the attention they want by creating, in essence, “bomb-proof chemicals”. A new generation of chemistry could neutralize the explosive compounds contained in these chemicals rendering them unusable as bombs, even as research continues into emerging chemical threats.

Non-invasive and non-destructive imaging: A new generation of X-rays is emerging to identify what is inside shipping containers, trucks, luggage, handbags and sealed packages, etc. Such noninvasive imaging will provide a faster, more reliable level of security at harbors, airports, train and subway stations, and borders, and be commercially viable. A technology under development is terahertz radiation, or T-rays, that offer the potential of seeing the contents of closed containers without opening them or damaging contents. Great strides are also made in using advanced technology for the identification of drugs and explosives.

Non-lethal directed energy: In the arsenal of non-lethal weapons, the Vehicle Mounted Active Denial System offers much promise. Now in advanced development, VMADS uses high-powered directed energy that is capable of stopping people and machinery. It has the potential to interrupt a signal between a terrorist and a detonating device or to set off land mines – all from remote location. The high powered microwave also has potential law enforcement use as the directed energy can be adjusted to focus on making a person's skin uncomfortably hot, but causing no dermal damage.

Distributed forces and an interlocking network: This is military network-centricity taken to the smallest node. It will give the 21st century land warrior continual situational understanding, while being a member of a widely distributed, non-contiguous force. Effective combat operations against terrorists and their allies require widely distributed armed forces. Enabling technologies such as advanced minicomputers and communication networks will turn these forces into distributed sensors, as well as combatants, and allow them to provide information back to command headquarters. The forces are operated like a distributed information system with real-time awareness of the battlefield, giving commanders better data for decision making. Such technologies also will identify friend from foe in combat environments.

Encouraging public awareness and self-identification of terrorists:

The coming years will see innovative applications of behavioral science to combat terrorist activity. In some ways, terrorists operate like criminals, trying to behave secretly and inconspicuously and in the process, sometimes calling attention to themselves. To find criminals, law enforcement relies on a watchful public to provide tips. The worldwide information-saturated culture that we live in will expand further, creating new opportunities to engage the public to ferret out terrorists. A global “Amber Alert” system could be used to distribute multi-lingual information on known terrorists. A “Most Wanted” list could be tailored to help find terrorists hiding in plain sight. In addition, innovative methods will be deployed to coax terrorists into identifying themselves. For example, warning signs might be placed along a controlled access announcing that a security-screening checkpoint is coming up, just before a convenient opt-out or exit point. Anyone avoiding the checkpoint can be watched for further examples of self-incriminating behavior.

Moreover, intelligence components working against terrorist targets should not be forced to deal with a labyrinth of bureaucratic obstacles. Hierarchy and stovepipes prevent too many of the people working against terrorist targets from effectively communicating with each other. In many cases, these barriers even prevent organizations from becoming aware of each other’s existence. There is the need to counter the adaptable adversary

with own adaptation. Hierarchies are handicapped when confronted by flexible, highly adaptable, and networked enemies, thus must be flattened. Reducing bureaucratic barriers, boosting multidisciplinary analysis, rigorously improving interconnectivity and emphasis on individual initiative will remain prime keys in the fight against terrorism.

No intelligence agency in the world, whatever its human and material resources and its technological and human collection capability, can claim or hope to achieve quality of being all-knowing. Intelligence services cannot be expected to be all-knowing in respect of evolving, self-organizing networks of non-state terrorist adversaries. The resulting gap has to be made good by better analysis and utilization of the available intelligence, however sparse it may be, better coordination amongst different agencies of the intelligence community, better physical security and better international cooperation.

Professional networking has to occur at the multilateral as well as bilateral levels. The multilateral networking can take care of the development of appropriate concepts, processes, communication and liaison arrangements; of coordination, use of technologies, and databases, mutual legal assistance in dealing with terrorism, training and other support. But sensitive operational cooperation will have to remain at the bilateral level and cannot be the subject of multilateral discussions since leaks could

come in the way of the effectiveness of such cooperation, which may involve ideas and concepts for joint operations to penetrate terrorist organizations in order to improve the quality of available human intelligence collection.

International intelligence cooperation has three aspects:

- making available technology, training, operational, support, and other facilities to each other;
- sharing of intelligence collected independently;
- and joint operations for the collection of intelligence through penetration, and for neutralizing and disrupting terrorist organizations identified as common enemies.

5. Conclusion

The terrorist threats we confront today will continue for many years. We are still closer to the beginning than the end of this very long campaign. To fight an enemy that uses multiple measures, a government needs the same ability to employ multiple responses. No single security formation (military, police and gendarmerie) possesses that full scope of operational strengths. These capabilities most often rest with intelligence agencies. They can help to “identify those engaged in terrorism at all levels of involvement and reveal their safe havens and sources of recruitment; track down their weapons, channels of supply, and methods of funding terrorism; warn against future attacks, and thus prevent them; manage crisis situations by transmitting the information

decision makers require; disrupt terrorist organizations’ communications networks, and more.”

The greatest problem in conducting global counterterrorism intelligence operations today is that one single intelligence agency cannot possibly have access to all the necessary information. More friendly knowledge of a target is necessary, and only the host country’s intelligence service can provide it. It is logical that more transnational targets need more transnational cooperation. That is why international cooperation of intelligence agencies is the only way to fight transnational terrorist targets.

Political and subjective factors such as “one nation’s terrorist being another’s freedom fighter”, and “one nation’s state sponsor of terrorism being another’s strategic ally against terrorism” continue to come in the way of joint operations. As long as such mental resistance continues, international intelligence cooperation will remain half-hearted and only partially effective. The terrorists and their state sponsors would be the beneficiaries.

In the post 9/11 world, the role of intelligence on countering terrorism has continued to develop. The most remarkable change from the Cold War environment, which was characterized by a lack of information sharing, has been the new emphasis on cooperation between intelligence agencies. It has become critical in this new environment for the intelligence community to change its ways, but this has not necessarily come easily.

Bibliography

- Dahl, Erik J., "Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorism", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 28, Issue 1, 2005, pp.31-55.
- Dictionary of Military Terms, Joint Publ. DoD/USA, 2008.
- Dupont, Alan, "Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century", *Journal of Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 18, No.4, December 2003, pp.15-39.
- Gill, Peter, "What is Intelligence Theory", Toward a Theory of Intelligence Workshop Report, ed.by Gregory F. Treverton, Seth G. Jones, Steven Boraz, Philip Lipsky, RAND Corporation, 2006, pp.4-7.
- Karmon, Ely, "The Role of Intelligence in Counter-Terrorism", *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol. 14, Issue 1, 2002, pp.119-139.
- Köseli, Mutlu, "Terörle Mücadelede İstihbaratın Rolü", *Turkish Journal of Police Studies*, Vol.11, Issue 2, 2009, pp.51-72.
- Kruys, George P.H., "The Role of Intelligence in Countering Terrorism and Insurgency", *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, Vol. 29 Issue 1, 2007, pp.83-103.
- Raman B., "Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism", 2004, reached on 03.11.2009, available at www.saag.org/common/uploaded_files/paper983.
- Scott, Len and Hughes, R. Gerald, "Intelligence, Crises and Security: Lessons From History", *Journal of Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 21, Issue 5, pp.653-674.
- Shulsky Abram N. and Gary J. Schmitt, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, Brassey's, Virginia, USA, 2002.
- Sims, Jennifer, "Intelligence to Counter Terror: The Importance of All-Source Fusion", *Journal of Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 22, Issue 1, 2007, pp.38-56.
- Smith, Daniel, "Background on the Role of Intelligence in Rooting Out Terrorism", Center for Defense Information. 14 September 2001, reached on 18.11.2009, available at www.cdi.org/terrorism/intelligence-role-pr.html.
- USA Senate, "National Counterterrorism Commission Report", 2002.
- Warner, Michael, "Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence, Understanding Our Craft", Center for the Study of Intelligence, CSI Publications, 2008.
-

Radiological Terrorism: Another Kind of Threat

Col. Dan-Radu VOICA*

“...unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.”

Report of the Commission for Prevention of Weapons of Mass
destruction Proliferation and Terrorism,

December 2008.

1. Introduction

Terrorists are influenced by their organization's goals, which could involve achieving independence for a region such as Chechnya from a larger state such as Russia, spurring an apocalypse to cleanse the world of evil, or creating an Islamic caliphate, which would establish Islamic law throughout Muslim-majority countries. To achieve these goals, terrorists can use a variety of means, including improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, airplane hijackings, or, in rare cases, mass casualty weapons such as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.

In this sense, radiological terrorism is a more attractive option than nuclear terrorism because of the relative ease with which a radiological weapon can be made and used. Nuclear terrorism requires obtaining or constructing a nuclear weapon that produces a nuclear explosion. Either of these options requires great technical expertise and access to high-security facilities. Radiological terrorism involves using a radioactive source by itself, packaging radioactive material with a conventional bomb and exploding it in a public area, or attacking an already existing nuclear facility. Thus, although

conducting an act of radiological terrorism is not easy, this option generally requires less expertise than most other forms of unconventional terrorism. Nonetheless, radiological attacks that would result in significant harm to health and damage to property would typically require advanced knowledge and skills.

2. Using the Radiological Device

There are two options: active and passive, for terrorists who wish to use radiological materials to cause fear among the public.

The active option refers to Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs). The aim of a RDD is to contaminate a large area with radioactive material in order to cause maximum havoc and disruption. The most frequently cited scenario is the dispersal of the radioactive material using conventional explosives, although other means, such as aerial dissemination, could also be used. The most likely materials for use in a dirty bomb due to their availability and their relative ease of handling are considered to be Cesium-137, Cobalt-60, and Americium-241. While uranium and plutonium are much stronger and more lethal agents, they are also the significantly more difficult to acquire and control.

* Col. Dan-Radu VOICA is Instructor and Course Director at COEDAT.

The passive option would involve the use of radioactive materials or objects in the form of a radiation-emitting device (RED). A strong RED could be placed in high-profile areas, such as highly trafficked urban sites and government facilities, which could expose a large number of people to the intense radioactive source over a short period of time. An alternative passive option would be the use of a RED to harm a limited number of people over a long period of time. The active option would involve the scattering of radioactive material over a large or confined area using an RDD.

3. Production and Presence of Radioactive Sources

Thousands of radioactive source materials have been produced worldwide. One or a combination of these sources contains sufficient material for an effective RDD. The main producers of radioactive isotopes are Argentina, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Russia and South Africa. Canada is clearly the largest exporter of radioactive isotopes, but it is not easy to determine a clear ranking of the other countries by scale of production, since this depends on which isotope is considered.

Moreover, these data are often not revealed for commercial reasons. France is a minor player, while the US has a substantial market share only for some isotopes of concern (notably californium-252). End-users of radioactive sources are spread all over the world and number in the tens of thousands. They include

hospitals, oil companies, food irradiators, research institutes and gauging companies. The level of security at most of these facilities, even those with strong radioactive sources, like food irradiators and hospitals, is low, since the emphasis is on safety rather than security. Most of them use sources that are not of concern because of their low activity or short half-life. However, for non-state actors it is easier to obtain radioactive material for an RDD from such sources than to obtain safeguarded fissile material.

The portability of certain types of radioactive sources enhances the attractiveness of radiological terrorism. Some Radioactive sources may be relatively big and bulky because of the layers of shielding surrounding the radioactive material (ex. 6 metal containers each weighing 83 Kg filled with cesium-137 were found in Crimea/Ukraine in 2005. Each container had the capacity to hold 30 grams of Cesium)¹, and the difficulty in moving these around may make these sources less attractive to terrorists. Other sources, however, are small enough to fit into your pants pocket or in the palm of your hand. For example, the tubes of cesium that were declared missing from a North Carolina hospital in 1998² were only three-quarters of an inch long by one-eighth of an inch wide.

Radioactive sources are supposed to be regulated and well secured, but security measures may be different for each source and in each country where radioactive materials are stored. In addition, there are

¹ Hamid Mobtadi and Antu Mursbid, "A Global Chronology of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear Attacks: 1950-2005", July 2006, available at www.ncjpd.umn.edu/Ncjpgd/assets/File/pdf/Global/Chron.pdf

² *Ibid.*



Fig. 1 - **Radiography source once used for industrial applications.**

thousands of "orphan sources"³ located throughout the world.

Also, these materials may be stolen⁴, and/or purchased on the black market⁵. Below are some examples:

- In June 2003, Jane's Intelligence Digest reported that since 1992 there were 175 attempts by criminals and/or terrorists to acquire or smuggle radioactive substances.
- In 1998, in Italy, criminals were caught attempting to sell 19.9% enriched uranium, and in April 2000 Colombia, a small consignment of HEU - 66% of which contained uranium-235 - was discovered in the possession of an animal feed salesman. In the same month, an amount of enriched uranium weighing 920 grams was seized in the former Soviet state of Georgia.

- In July 2001, a quantity of 1.7 kilograms of uranium-235 was discovered in Georgia, apparently on its way to Turkey. The material was thought at the time to have come from a Russian submarine. In the same month, five grams of enriched uranium were discovered in Paris, and in Germany, a man was arrested for stealing contaminated plutonium.
- In 2004, in Kyrgyzstan, in Central Asia, a smuggler was found to have kept 60 small containers of weapons-grade plutonium-239 in a sheepfold. Earlier in the same year, two Kyrgyz citizens were jailed for trying to sell 110 grams of the isotope cesium-137 (one of the radioactive byproducts released in the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident), which could have been used to create a "dirty bomb";
- In September 2004, a quantity of 15 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium-235 (enough to create small fissile device) was discovered in Sanliurfa, Turkey. The material was hidden under the seat of a taxi.

4. Groups with Interest in Radiological Terrorism

Given the relative ease with which a radiological weapon can be made and used, terrorist groups that lack a high level of technical and scientific expertise might find this type of radiological terrorism to be an attractive option. These lower-level capabilities also make it less likely that the groups will be monitored by

³ Orphan sources are radioactive sources that were lost, abandoned, stolen, or otherwise fell outside of regulatory control. These sources are outside of government control, and if found by or passed into the hands of terrorists, could be used for radiological terrorism.

⁴ Over the past 10 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has listed 17 incidents of illicit trafficking of highly enriched uranium or plutonium, and 540 incidents of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials, of which the vast majority of cases involved un-enriched material.

⁵ In a troubling disclosure, the Russian Federal Customs Service has revealed that authorities thwarted more than 850 attempts to smuggle highly radioactive materials in and out of Russia in 2007. Eighty-five percent of these smuggling attempts were going into the country, and 15 percent were going out.

intelligence and law enforcement agencies, thus increasing the risk posed by these groups. A radiological attack would likely to result in mass panic, perhaps some human deaths and injuries, extensive physical and economic damage, and a great deal of attention for the terrorists themselves. Theoretically, this outcome might be considered as ideal for groups that seek publicity for their name and their cause, without causing widespread devastation.

In reality, there have been a limited number of parties with a demonstrated interest in radiological terrorism. Chechen rebels have shown on multiple occasions the ability and the willingness to use the threat of both types of radiological terrorism⁶. There have also been assertions of Al Qaeda's⁷ interest in attacking nuclear facilities in the United States and other countries also. In addition, similar claims were made about FARC in terms of committing to use a dirty bomb⁸. The terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo, which in 2000 renamed itself Aleph, reportedly acquired information about nuclear facilities in Russia, Ukraine, Japan, and other countries. Likewise, some radical environmental groups have threatened and have attempted attacks on nuclear power plants to demonstrate their anti-nuclear beliefs.

5. Consequences in case of a Radiological Attack

In this sense, we may state that a terrorist act involving radioactive

substances of any origin can lead to direct and indirect adverse consequences to society. Direct adverse consequences of radiation effects are:

- a. Acute irradiation of humans by significant radiation doses that within a short period of time (hours or days) results in severe consequences to human health and even fatalities,
- b. Prolonged irradiation of humans resulting from environmental contamination with radioactive substances that could trigger long-term adverse radiation effects including an increase in illnesses and fatalities from, for example, cancer.

Indirect consequences can be social, economic, political, psychological, and demographic in nature, including the following:

- a. Radioactive contamination of habitat infrastructure, or loss of property costs associated with the elimination of the consequences of terrorist acts, required increases in radiation monitoring, deployment of systems for large-scale assessment of the actual radiation situation and its projections for the near and distant future, priority to cleanup of contaminated territories,
- b. Degradation of the socio-economic and psychological situation not only in the regions severely affected by radiation contamination, but also in large territories where small changes in the radiation situation would

⁶ In November 1995, Chechen militants under commander Shamil Basayev placed a small quantity of cesium-137 in Moscow's Izmailovsky Park. Rather than disperse the material, however, the Chechens used the material as a psychological weapon by directing a television news crew to the location and thus creating a media storm. The material in this incident was thought to have been obtained from a nuclear waste or isotope storage facility in Grozny. In December 1998, the pro-Russian Chechen Security Service announced it had found a dirty bomb consisting of a land mine combined with radioactive materials next to a railway line. It is believed that Chechen militants planted the device.

⁷ In 2005 an Al Qaeda website presented the details of how to assemble an RDD in the form of an 80-page manual. The Arabic-language website, called Al-Firdaus (Paradise), had received 57,000 hits. It advised readers to seek out radium-226.

⁸ Colombian Vice-President Francisco Santos told the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (2008) that materials found on computers of Raul Reyes, the deputy commander of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), showed the group was in negotiations to get hold of radioactive matter to make a "dirty bomb".

cause hardly detectable effects to human health and the environment, which would likely to trigger population movement from the region and loss of the regional economic potential and increase the tendency of frightened people to leave and take their relatives with them from contaminated areas, and thus possibly changing the entire way of life for those who stayed behind,

- c. Resulting in high costs associated with the withdrawal from the economy of activities in the contaminated territories;
- (1) Possible closure of enterprises;
 - (2) Reduction of consumer interest in items being produced in the region regardless of the real contamination levels;
 - (3) Devaluation of real estate in the contaminated region;
 - (4) Loss of revenues from trade, tourism;
 - (5) Decrease in economic attractiveness of the territory costs resulting from negative attitudes of the society to radiation in general and nuclear power in particular.

Assessments of previous radiation accidents show that the indirect consequences of a radiological terrorism act can lead to economic and social losses that exceed direct losses from radiation impacts on people. This is due to the wide use of radiation sources in various fields of the economy like industry, agriculture, medicine, and independent power sources.

6. Preventive measures

In relation to RDDs, the measures should focus on radioactive material,

since explosives or other means of dispersion can be relatively easily obtained by terrorists, and many states are already trying to control access to such means as part of their general anti-terrorism measures. Keeping track of all potentially harmful radioactive sources requires a series of measures.

In this sense, there are some important measures to be taken, that include:

- a national accountancy and verification system for radioactive sources established by every country. Like the IAEA safeguards system, such a system should account only for strong sources, since, as we have seen, an effective RDD contains in the order of 100–1,000 Ci. However, smaller sources with activity in the order of 10 Ci should not be excluded since several smaller sources can make up a 100-Ci source. A ‘significant quantity’ should therefore be defined as being of the order of 10 Ci. As mentioned above, at present only a few countries have such accountancy and verification system, most of them are voluntary and they are based on safety rather than security considerations.
- an inventory of the present sources should be established and brought into the national verification system. Some international co-ordination could be useful, especially participation by the main producers of radioactive isotopes.
- a system for the return of the sources no longer being used should be established so that owners are encouraged to send them back. When a source is purchased, a deposit should be paid that will be returned when

the source is given back. Unused sources pose a major risk of being stolen because they are probably no longer being closely supervised.

- abandoned (orphaned) sources, which are no longer under anyone's control, should be secured. This could be done in a dedicated repository⁹, preferably the national regulatory authority.

7. International Response

As part of the international response to counter terrorist attacks, the **United Nations** took a number of actions that include provisions relating to radiological terrorism.

The United Nations Security Council adopted *Resolution 1540* in April 2004 requiring states to criminalize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials; to enforce export controls; and secure sensitive materials within their borders.

The *International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism*, provides the legal basis for international cooperation in the investigation, prosecution, and extradition of those who commit terrorist acts involving radioactive material or a nuclear device. Although the General Assembly adopted the Convention in 2005, it was not entered into force until July 2007 after receipt of the twenty-second instrument of ratification.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

The IAEA is the world's nuclear watchdog organization. One focus of the IAEA is maintaining and improving the radiation safety standards and guidelines that are

used throughout the world, including security for both nuclear power plants and radioactive sources. The IAEA has been working for a number of years to increase security standards and measures.

The agency has published a number of guidelines, codes, and technical documents with recommendations on safety and security measures for nuclear facilities. These are meant to help ensure the safety of the people and environment in which nuclear reactors are located.

In 2008, the IAEA issued a nuclear terror prevention guide, "Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material." It contains recommendations on how to prevent, detect, and respond to possible nuclear or radiological attacks, and it calls for cooperation among agencies and governments in dealing with such a threat.

In addition to its radiation safety and security publications, the IAEA conducts a number of international, national and regional training workshops for nuclear authorities. These workshops cover physical protection measures, threat assessment plans, emergency response measures, and other relevant areas. An important assessment system, the *International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS)*, is also organized through the IAEA. IPPAS teams are made up of international and national physical protection experts. Countries voluntarily invite IPPAS teams to visit their nuclear facilities and evaluate their respective nuclear regulatory system. The team then recommends ways for the country and its facilities to improve protection measures. Details and results of each IPPAS mission are kept confidential. But

⁹ Such a repository exists, for example, in Belgium.

this service allows participating countries to learn from each other's and from the IAEA nuclear security expertise and experiences.

The general safety and security standards for radioactive sources are listed in the *International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and the Safety of Radiation Sources* (BSS for short). The BSS requires radioactive source owners to track and secure the sources to prevent theft or damage. To help countries stay in line with the BSS, the IAEA assists countries in establishing regulatory bodies and improving existing regulatory agencies that can inventory and monitor radioactive sources. It provides forums in which countries and international experts can exchange ideas and practices. The IAEA also provides advice on domestic laws, and education and training for radiation safety and customs officials. In addition, the IAEA updated its list of radioactive sources, now organized into categories to reflect their potential danger level and to indicate appropriate security measures. These initiatives are part of the IAEA updated plan of action to combat nuclear and radiological terrorism.

There are several international agreements that countries can abide by as one way to publicly demonstrate their commitment to preventing dangerous acts using radioactive material. These include the *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources* (Code of Conduct, for short) and the *Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material* (CPPNM). In July 2003, an intergovernmental working group completed revisions to the Code of

Conduct to further address the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. The IAEA Board of Governors approved these revisions in September 2003. Although the Code of Conduct is not a legally binding instrument, as of May 2008, 92 countries had expressed their support for it. Similarly, the CPPNM is undergoing revisions to better address security concerns. After many years of failed attempts, on July 8, 2005, delegates from 89 countries agreed to strengthen the CPPNM. A shortcoming of the original CPPNM was that it only applied to physical protection during the international transport of nuclear material intended for peaceful use. By expanding this narrow focus, the amended CPPNM "makes it legally binding" for parties to the convention "to protect nuclear facilities and material in domestic peaceful use, storage as well as transport," according to the IAEA. However, the improved CPPNM will not come into effect until two-thirds of the 112 parties ratify the amendments. The ratification process is expected to take several years.

Also, as part of its updated plan of action, the IAEA has stepped up its efforts in working with other international organizations and national governments to locate and secure orphaned radioactive sources. On June 12, 2002, the IAEA, the United States and Russia signed an agreement to locate, recover, and secure the radioactive sources that pose the greatest danger. At the March 2003 International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Sources, then-U.S. DOE Secretary Spencer Abraham announced an expansion of this tripartite program. As a result of this expansion and the

earlier work, several missions have been carried out in countries of the former Soviet Union, and more are scheduled in countries outside of this region.

The *Global Threat Reduction Initiative* (GTRI) was launched in May 2004. GTRI combined under one umbrella program the previously separate programs of the Offsite Source Recovery Project, work to secure high-risk radioactive sources in about 40 countries, and efforts to secure nuclear fissile materials at research reactors and related facilities in dozens of countries. GTRI partners include the United States, Russia, the IAEA, and countries where radioactive and nuclear materials require additional security. Under the GTRI, the United States and Russia are initiating a cooperative program to secure radioactive sources in Russia, enhance radioactive materials protection at Russian laboratories, upgrade security at radioactive source disposal facilities, and keep weapons experts employed in peaceful pursuits.

The Group of Eight (G-8) nations—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia—is a smaller, but powerful, forum in which countries have decided to work together to address the threat of radiological terrorism. The G-8 includes most of the major producers of commercial radioactive sources. At its June 2003 summit, the G-8 announced that its members would focus on high-priority provisions of the IAEA Code of Conduct. It would also consider ways for national governments to act on those provisions. Some possible areas of emphasis included

improving national regulatory measures for monitoring radioactive sources, improving import and export controls, developing laws to ensure safe and secure disposal options, enforcing penalties for theft or misuse, and building upon existing programs to recover orphan sources.

At the 2007 summit meeting, the G-8 nations hailed progress made in combating the proliferation of radiological weapons, but agreed more had to be done to prevent terrorists from acquiring radioactive materials and to improve detection capabilities. There are numerous instances of countries assisting others in the prevention of radiological terrorism. The U.S. NNSA Second Line of Defense program has provided radiation detection and communication equipment and training of customs officials for border crossings and points of entry in more than 35 nations. In some cases the countries have shared funding with the United States. Russia and the United States have plans to install radiation detectors at all Russian air, sea, and land border posts by 2011. As of July 2008, several hundred installations had already been completed. China received assistance from the United States in moving radioactive sources away from sites planned for the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. In addition, the United States sold China radiation sensors, x-ray systems, and explosive detectors to use during the Olympics.

Under the International Counter Proliferation Program, the United States has trained over 5,000 people in 23 countries on border security, nuclear forensics, and undercover investigations. The United Kingdom,

Canada, New Zealand, South Korea and Norway have provided funding to the United States for its nonproliferation programs worldwide.

National governments are increasingly working together to establish greater safety and security for radioactive sources around the world. In March 2003 the International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Sources was attended by more than 700 delegates from over 100 countries. The conference was sponsored by the United States and Russia and organized by the IAEA. Participants discussed and exchanged ideas and information on additional security measures, ways to prevent illegal smuggling of radioactive sources, and appropriate responses to RDD use. The conference's main findings emphasized the importance of the BSS and the Code of Conduct. The conference also called for an international effort to locate, recover and secure orphaned sources throughout the world.

At a follow-on conference in 2005 in Bordeaux, about 300 delegates from 64 countries assembled to focus on creating a sustainable system of regulatory controls, dealing with the legacy of past activities that resulted in numerous orphaned sources, preventing illicit trafficking of radioactive materials, and preparing emergency first-responders to manage the consequences of an RDD attack.

Local and national governments play a very important role in reducing public fear of the possible use and effects of RDDs. The radiation threat to the public, even in close proximity to the explosion, is relatively low compared to the threat

that would result from an accident at a nuclear facility. Making quick, open and reliable information available to the public will reduce the effect of widespread panic and help confound the purposes of terrorists attempting to use RDDs.

8. Conclusion

In 2009 the threat of al-Qaida and its affiliates carrying out deadly attacks remains very real. Also, the hurdles for terrorists to get a nuclear weapon are extremely high. The availability and use of technology that serves dual purposes as well as the growing nexus between terrorism and organized crime present some serious challenges that are not easily overcome. Such challenges sit within a grey area, where groups blend and cross-collaborate, lone wolves who are inspired by al-Qaida ideology can carry out deadly attacks, and individuals become inspired and engaged by militant videos they find on the internet. This threat is not becoming increasingly transparent but rather more difficult to locate and assess.

While much success has been achieved through military efforts, economic sanctions, and global policing, they only mark the beginning of what should be a multi-pronged strategy that is counter-balanced with non-military approaches, enhanced research, international cooperation, multi-sector partnerships, the collaboration of businesses and community leaders who can work together to address the core social and economic issues, and the creation of transformational structures. The recent findings only confirm that in the 21st century, non-military approaches in the fight against terrorist groups will be essential.

Bibliography

Fergusson, Charles D. and William C. Potter , *The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism*, Monterey Institute-Center for Nonproliferation Studies Nuclear Initiative, California, USA, 2004.

Van Der Mere, Klaas, "The Radiological Threat: Verification at the Source" *The Verification Yearbook 2003*, pp.125-140, available at www.vertic.org/assets/YB03/VY03_VanDeerMeer.pdf.

Fergusson, Charles D. and William C. Potter, *Improvised Nuclear Devices and Nuclear Terrorism, The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission*, Stockholm, Sweden, 2006.

Fergusson, Charles D., *Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism*, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, USA, 2006.

IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database, September 2008, available at www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News.

Gunaratna, Dr. Rohan, *Re-Assessing the Terrorist Threat: The Past, the Present and the Future*, 2009.

<http://www.westernresistance.com/blog/archives/003792.html>

http://www.stratfor.com/dirty_bombs_weapons_mass_disruption

<http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/03/04/2179948.htm>

http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2006/polonium

<http://www.inewsit.com/articles/entry/INDIA-NUCLEAR-CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL-THEFTS-OR-SMUGGLING-by-Saman-Malik>

<http://www.westernresistance.com/blog/archives/003791.html>

http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11698&page=133

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,654969,00.html>

Current and Future Trends in Terrorism

Ms. Zeynep SÜTALAN*

1. Introduction

This article is about the possible future trends in terrorism, bearing in mind the fact that terrorism is a historical phenomenon and there are both continuities and changes in terrorism. Thus, it is important to bear in mind the continuities as well as the changes in terrorism to have a better vision of future. Although it is not possible to get it all right in a prediction of future, but one should at least aim at not getting it all wrong.

For a decade, it has been discussed among the scholars as well as the policy-makers that terrorism has changed. Even some claim that this change is to such an extent that what we confront as terrorism today is 'new terrorism', because terrorism has become more lethal and more dangerous.¹ On the other hand, it is important to note that evaluating what we confront as today as a new enemy is not the right the way to approach to the issue. It is an undeniable fact that terrorism is changing, but this change does not constitute a 'radical break' from the past.² Since all the phenomenon is subject to change, so does terrorism. Rather than searching for radical breaks, what we should do is to analyze the way terrorism has evolved and will possibly evolve. Such approach will enhance our promotion of counter strategies in the sense that we would be looking for common features as well as the differences since we would not be searching totally new methods for

countering totally a new threat. Otherwise, we can easily be drawn into the mistake of ignoring some real causes of terrorism. It can easily lead us to inferring generalizations from rare events or stereotyping of certain cultures as it has been the case after 9/11 terrorist attacks.

2. Ideology

The era of dominant ideologies and a clear-cut left-right axis in politics have been gradually overtaken by the rise of new political movements that defy traditional categorization.³ What is confronted today and what will be confronted in the coming future will be fluidity and rapid changes in terms of extremist ideologies. However, we will not face a single ideology which will be able to capture an entire generation alike Marxism. Instead, we will be seeing the mushrooming of extremist ideas. Despite the rise of Al-Qaeda as a global threat, inhabitants of Western societies no longer have a 'common external threat' after the fall of Soviet Union. What we witnessed in post-Cold War era is in fact, the individualization of the society. The atomization of Western Societies has taken a further step as even the common-enemy image disappeared. In this hyper-individualized postmodern world, everybody has their own enemy indeed, but no longer the same unifying external enemy.⁴

The importance of perceptions reveals itself in the changing profile of terrorism as well. There is a tendency to claim that

* COE-DAT Concept Specialist

¹ For further discussion, see Alexander Spencer, "Questioning the Concept of 'New Terrorism'", *Peace Conflict and Development*, Issue 8, January 2006, www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk

² Martha Crensbaw, "Old and New Terrorism- Lessons Learned", *Keynote Speech, Second IIRI Conference on International Terrorism on Jibadi Terrorism: Where Do We Stand?*, 13 February 2006, <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/speechnotes/06/060213-jibadi.terr/crensbaw.htm>


³ Brynjar Lia, *Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism: Patterns and Predictions*, (New York: Routledge), pp.159-169.

⁴ *Ibid.*

religious fanaticism is the dominant ideological extremism that shapes the contemporary terrorism. However, the reality is far beyond that. Statistics about terrorist incidents and ideologies between the years 1968 and 2004 display that the most powerful ideology behind terrorist violence is nationalist-separatism. It is successively followed by communist-socialist, leftist-anarchist and lastly religious terrorism as the largest share owners. One might claim that the rise of religious extremist motivations for terrorism is relatively new and thus its share is relatively small. However, religious extremism as an ideology is at least two-decades old, and the point that needs to be underlined

is the fact that nationalist separatist terrorism still continues and religious extremism is not as dominant as it is thought to be.

The case of PKK/KONGRA-GEL terrorist organization is a relevant example to see the ideological shift within a terrorist organization. Starting as a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ethnic separatist organization, PKK KONGRA-GEL has become a terrorist organization with solely ethnic separatist purposes. This ideological shift proves us that throughout time ideologies may become less influential or wither away. The terrorist organizations can find different ideological references to justify their acts especially in the eyes of the public.



Graphic 1: *The Terrorist Incidents and Ideologies (1968-2004)*

Source: Data from the RAND MIPT Terrorism Incident Base, see http://mipt.org/mipt_rand.cfm

3. Goals

In terms of goals, the current terrorist trend is identified with 'fanatical millenarians' who have no concrete political objectives. They simply want to destroy. The ones who believe in 'new terrorism' assert that it is more prone to use excessive indiscriminate violence. Laqueur argues that "the new terrorism is different in character, aiming not at clearly defined political demands but at the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the population."⁵ On the other hand, previous terrorist trend was relying upon pragmatic objectives. The terrorists of the previous trend had negotiable demands, which even could be met such as releasing of prisoners, acquiring political rights, autonomy or self-determination. In that respect, they were regarded as reasonable. By contrast, the goals of the 'new' terrorists are unlimited and they are simply unreasonable. Besides, they do not have any intention for negotiation. "Today's terrorists don't want a seat at the table; they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it"⁶

First, let's look at the terrorist in the old trend. Are they really reasonable since their objectives were limited and reasonable? "Sendero Luminoso in Peru was a secular terrorist organization that sought to destroy the existing social and political order in order to create a Maoist regime. It had a strong anti-imperialist agenda. The Peruvian government did not regard its demands as negotiable."⁷

Let's take into account the German and Italian revolutionary groups of 1970s and 1980s, such as the red army factions. They were anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist. They wanted anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist revolutions in the countries they operated. To what extent are these objectives reasonable? Think about anarchists. They were against everything, state and its institutions. Can abolishing the state as an institution be regarded as a reasonable objective? Or think about separatist terrorist organizations. Can targeting a sovereign state's territorial integrity which is internationally recognized, be negotiable?

Furthermore, the applicability of the new terrorism concept to the facts is found problematic by many scholars. They claim that even the strict 'jihadist'⁸ groups are not necessarily without strategy or concrete political demands and it is not certain that their goals are exclusively religious; many are tinged with nationalism. The Oklahoma City Memorial Institution for the prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) and the Rand Corporation is given as an example since few groups are classified as purely 'religious'. Most defined as 'religious' are also classified as 'national separatist'. At least many religious groups began with specific goals such as expelling the Soviets from Afghanistan, overthrowing the regime in Egypt, or removing American troops from Saudi Arabia.⁹

⁵ Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.81.

⁶ Matthew J. Morgan, "The Origin of the New Terrorism", *Parameters*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1, (2004), pp. 30-31.

⁷ Martha Crenshaw, "Old and New Terrorism".

⁸ The author of the article finds that both the notions of 'jihadist' and 'jihadism' is problematic since they hardly reflect the terrorists and the terrorism of Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda inspired terrorist organizations as referred in the mainstream literature. The discussion on 'jihadism' and if it could be recognized as an ideology is out of the scope of this paper and she still uses the term to refer to the discussions in 'new terrorism', but in brackets to express a reservation.

⁹ Crenshaw, "Old and New Terrorism".

4. Organization

Up to now, we have witnessed three types of organizational structure in terrorism. First one is the hierarchical or pyramidal structure which is also referred as the traditional vertical structure. This is the most common type. There is a leader and a quasi military command structure. The ideological or separatist terrorist organizations fall into this category. Second are the small groups and individuals, who generally appear for a single issue. They are localized and limited. These are almost always impossible to infiltrate or predict. And it is almost impossible to know if they exist. Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma bomber in the United States is an example of this. Third one is the network structures composed of loose cells.

Compared to the hierarchical and centralized structure of 'old' terrorism, 'new' terrorism is said to be horizontal and flat since it is based on networks. Thus, it is claimed that today's terrorists are acting out of inspiration rather than issuing orders of their leaders. The groups within the network, despite being linked by the advanced means of communication, are autonomous, self-sufficient and flexible. Therefore, they "can adapt and react more easily to different situations"¹⁰. Even the loss of leadership is not an objection for the cells to operate.

However, once a closer look displays that the 'old' terrorists are not often as tightly structured as they appear to be. The West German terrorists of 1970s and 1980s were composed of different

groups often with varying political objectives. They were not monolithic. Many groups that can be described as cells enjoyed considerable autonomy. The anarchist movement of the 19th century can hardly be regarded as a centralized terrorist organization meaning that network-like terrorist structures existed before what is regarded as 'new' terrorism inspired predominantly from Al-Qaeda. The anarchist movement was mainly active in Russia and Europe. The anarchists were responsible for many high profile attacks like the assassination of political leaders. However, they were loosely networked and even sometimes unconnected and thus they acted out of an inspiration and shared ideology.¹¹

What is more, jihadist groups that are said to be loosely organized may appear to be more organized than they appear. Crenshaw puts forward:

The original Al-Qaeda operation was a top-down structure. It came into being because Bin Laden kept a list of moudjahidin who had fought in Afghanistan. Certainly, the operations of Zarkawi in Iraq are organised in terms of cells. There is central direction. It is thus a mistake to assume that there is no structure to today's terrorism. It may have more self-generating tendencies than some earlier forms of terrorism (not all: consider the anarchists) but it is not without direction.¹²

In line with Crenshaw's argument, Spencer also claim that Al Qaeda is not as loosely structured as it is thought to be and has certain hierarchical command structures.

They do possess a clear leadership, operative units conducting the

¹⁰ Spencer, "Questioning the Concept", p.12.

¹¹ Bruce Hoffman, "Change and Continuity in Terrorism", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 24, 2001, p. 426

¹² Crenshaw, "Old and New Terrorism".

attacks, as well as 'specialized units directly below the top leadership level' who are responsible for issues such as recruitment, finances, procurement and public relations. At the same time terrorist organisations have different types of members including core members or professional terrorists, part-time terrorists or amateurs, who also lead a normal life outside of the organisation, as well as less closely associated supporters.¹³

Additionally, as a future trend or projection, experts today talk about the self-radicalized individuals or small groups who are inspired by some extremist ideologies, without any physical contact with the terrorist organization. This extremist ideology is predominantly thought to be 'jihadism' and the terrorist organization as Al-Qaeda. However, this may not be the case. When we think about the Oklahoma bombing in the United States (US) by Timothy McVeigh, the motivational factors for him was his resentment from the policies of US government in certain cases like the Waco siege.

Within this context, another point to be underlined can be 'home-grown terrorism'. This term is used to refer to the radicalized groups among the immigrants in Europe particularly. Europe perceives a significant threat from homegrown Muslim extremist movement, and the US may do so in the near future. Due largely to the waves of immigration since the 1980s, Islam is has become the fastest-growing religion in both regions. Extremist clerics in Europe are recruiting young Muslims to the cause of 'jihad' against their adopted homes. Although this is how the picture is generally seen, scholars like Oliver Roy, is talking

about a different picture. He says that Islam as a religious or cultural identity is globalizing, but this is in the form of individualization of Islam. This neo-fundamentalist trend in Islam, which does not have to result in radicalization and thus terrorism, is turning to a doctrine, which is just seeking for the fundamentals of Islam regardless of how it is experienced in any other country.¹⁴ This is more to do with changing identities rather than terrorism. This process may serve as a vulnerability for terrorist recruitment, but does not have to bring about terrorism. On the other hand, people may find different motivations like racism for self-radicalization and people can find the means to radicalization by the means of mass communication, particularly via internet very easily.

5. Means and Methods

5.1. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)

The possible access and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) by the terrorists has been a matter of discussion especially after the 9/11 attacks. The end of Cold War and the power vacuum in the ex-Soviet territories and the emergence of non-state actors like terrorist organizations in the international arena have brought in mind the possibility that terrorists can acquire WMDs and know-how and one day may use it. Cases like the 1995 sarin gas attack in Tokyo subway and the 'anthrax' case in US after 9/11 attacks were given as convincing examples for such possibility.

¹³ Spencer, "Questioning the Concept", p.24.

¹⁴ See in Oliver Roy, *Globalised Islam: The Search for New Ummah*, (C. Hurst and Co. Publishers, London, 2004).

No doubt, the lethality of the WMDs attracted the attention of terrorists since the 1970s. In 1972, US white-supremacist group called the 'Order of the Rising Sun' attempted to use biological weapons. Two men affiliated with the group were arrested before they used the 30-40 kilograms of bacteria (Typhoid Bacillus) supposedly they produced to contaminate the water supplies of large cities like Chicago. In 1980, an apartment in Paris affiliated with German Red Army Faction was found with a laboratory in it. There found a culture of a germ called botulinum toxin.¹⁵ There are various failed attempts as such displaying that terrorists have always had the attention to use WMDs.

However, there are two camps in evaluating the possibility of terrorists using WMDs. One camp claims that it is much easier than it has been thought to acquire and use WMDs. By contrast, the second camp asserts that it is not an easy task, which decreases the realization of the worst case scenario. They say that producing the enriched uranium or plutonium, even for making the most primitive nuclear weapon, is much more expensive and harder than it is generally thought to be. They give the example that it took four years' intensive work for the scientists and engineers to make the first weapon in the South Africa. Even if terrorist acquired the materials for the nuclear weapons, it is not possible for them to hide and transport.

Compared to nuclear weapons, it is easier to make 'dirty bombs', but their use for terrorist intentions is

difficult for the same reasons. It is required to have great amount of chemicals in order to conduct a terrorist act with extensive effects. Another discussion is about the biological agents, the use of which may result in mass casualty as well. However, turning biological agents into weapons requires expertise and very developed technology which is far beyond the capabilities of the terrorist organization.¹⁶

One of the most discussed issues regarding the use of WMDs is that terrorists can be supplied with the materials for WMDs by sponsoring states. However, the possibility of such scenario is disputable. Even we think of a state that is supporting a terrorist organization for political reasons, the possibility that the extent of the support may include the supply of WMD material and/or expertise is also questionable due to the deterring factors like international condemnation, isolation or use of force against the country. However, where there are weak state structures in terms of judicial/law enforcement and high corruptibility potential, criminals and/or terrorists can engage in stealing and selling WMD materials.

Within the framework of these discussions, no matter how much the possibility of terrorist access and use of WMDs, whether likely or not, there is a possibility that terrorist can access and use WMDs. It is not because of the fact that the so-called 'new' terrorists have a strong appetite for it, but rather it has become much easier to access anything.

¹⁵ Nadine Gurr, Benjamin Cole, *The New Phase of Terrorism: Threats from the Weapons of Mass Destruction*, (I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd Publications: London, New York, 2005), p.276.


¹⁶ Andrew O'Neil, "Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: How Serious is the Threat?", *Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism*, Russell D. Howard and James J.F.Forest (ed.s), McGraw Hill, 2008, pp. 65-66.

5.2 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

We are all familiar with the increasing tendency of terrorists employ new explosion delivery methods such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Besides, their being the leading cause of fatalities and injuries and they very negatively affect the morale of the counter terrorism forces. In this respect, IEDs are tactical weapons with strategic influence. Just to show how popular and widespread have the IEDs become for terrorists, let's look at the statics of the third quarter of the year 2009. Out of 2782 terrorist

incidents 952 were carried out by using IEDs.

When the figures from the last quarter of the year 2008 to the third quarter of the year 2009 is examined, one can easily recognize the increase in the use of IEDs. In the last quarter of 2008, out of the 2574 terrorist incidents, 601 of them was carried out with IEDs.¹⁷ The number of the terrorist attacks with IEDs corresponds to 772 out of 2403 for the first quarter of 2009¹⁸ and 953 out of 2831 attacks for the second quarter of the year 2009¹⁹. Therefore, such trend promises that IEDs will be the weapon of choice for the terrorist in the future.



Graphic 2: The Deadliest Tactics Used in the Third Quarter of 2009.

Source: Based on the statistics done by the Information Collection and Management Center (ICMC) in the Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT). It is also included in the Ergün Erün and Gökçen Akyüz, "General Overview of the Terrorist Activities (July-September 2009)", Newsletter, Vol.2, Issue.12, COE-DAT, Ankara, July- September 2009, p.14.

¹⁷ Ergün Erün, "General Overview of the Terrorist Activities (October- September 2008)", Newsletter, Vol.2, Issue.9, COE-DAT, Ankara, January 2009, p.8.


¹⁸ Ergün Erün and Gökçen Akyüz, "General Overview of the Terrorist Activities (January-March 2009)", Newsletter, Vol.2, Issue 10, COE-DAT, Ankara, April 2009, p.10.

¹⁹ Ergün Erün and Gökçen Akyüz, "General Overview of the Terrorist Activities (January-March 2009)", Newsletter, Vol.2, Issue 11, COE-DAT, Ankara, July 2009, p. 13.

5.3 Suicide Bombing:

Today, suicide bombing turns out to be another weapon of choice. It is the most radical existential act, unpredictable, very effective against soft targets. Its psychological impact can even be regarded as one of the most effective. It has great tactical advantages. The first significant tactical advantage for the terrorists is its being cost-effective. According

to Hoffman, a single suicide attacks cost as little as \$ 150 with an average of killing twelve people.²⁰ More complicated attacks may cost more, but when compared with the effect of the bombing, the cost of the attack is bearable. The cost of the 9/11 terrorist attacks for the terrorists is estimated as 400.000 to 500.000 \$. The cost of the attack is, without doubt, incomparable to the



Graphic 3: Deadliest Terrorist Tactics Used (Last Quarter of 2008 to Third Quarter of 2009)

Source: Based on the statistics done by the ICMC in the COE-DAT. The graphs are included in the Newsletter (Issues 9, 10, 11, 12) published by the COE-DAT. (See Footnotes 18, 19, 20).

²⁰ Bruce Hoffman, "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment* Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (ed.s), Guilford: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004, pp.260-261.

material cost to the US economy leaving aside the moral impact resulting from the mass casualties.²¹

The second most important tactical advantage for the terrorists is the fact that there is not a chance to interrogate the bomber since he/she is killed during the attack. Hence, there is minimum security risk for the terrorist group. In accordance with that, there is no escape plan required for the bomber, too. Suicide bombers are generally referred as 'smart bomb's since the appropriateness of the time and venue for the attack is in the discretion of the attacker in respect to the targeted audience. When these tactical advantages are combined with the psychological impact of the attack on the target population, it will continue to be one of the most preferred tactics by the terrorists in the future.

5.4 Cyber Terrorism

It is a very well known fact that terrorist use internet for propaganda, recruitment, command and control, research and development. For an attack to be considered as cyber terrorism, "it [an attack] should result in violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear"²². By cyber attacks, the terrorist can inflict much wider damage or change to a country than one could by killing some people. Terrorists can disable a country's military defenses or shut off the power in a large area. Thus, compared to the traditional means,

methods and tactics, "terrorists can affect more people at less risk"²³. Today we know that cyber terrorists can endanger the security of any nation by targeting the sensitive and secret information or destroy the economy of the country by attacking the critical infrastructure in the big towns such as electric power and water supply.

The probability of a cyber attack by terrorists among scholars and experts is very much discussed since there is not evidence that terrorist organizations are actively planning to use computers as a means of attack. There is also disagreement among some experts about whether critical infrastructure computers are effective targets for furthering terrorists' goals. However, can anyone guarantee that the tactics used by hackers today will not be used by terrorists in planning a cyber terrorist attack? We know that computer viruses, worms, spy ware and malicious programs as such enable cyber crime and espionage. Why are not they preferred by terrorists if not today, but tomorrow?

A cyber attack is cheaper than traditional methods. It can be remotely conducted from anywhere in the world and for sure it is difficult to be tracked. Furthermore, the attackers can easily hide their personalities and location and there are no physical barriers or check points that they have to cross. And in the end, through cyber attacks, they can target and affect large numbers of people.

21 "9/11 Panel: Al Qaeda Planned to Hijack 10 Planes", CNN International, 17 June 2004, available from <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/06/16/911.commission/>

22 Gabriel Weiman, "Cyberterrorism: How Real is the Threat?", Special Report 119, United States Institute of Peace, December 2004, <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr119.pdf>.

23 Jimmy Sproles and Will Byars, quoted in Mudawi Mukhtar Elmusberef, "Cyber Terrorism: The New Kind of Terrorism", Computer Crime Research Center, 2004.

5.5 Growing Interconnectedness between Terrorists and Organized Crime Groups

Today “the once clear lines between the international drug trade, terrorism and organized crime are blurring, crossing and mutating as never before.”²⁴ For instance, narco-terrorism has become a worldwide issue regardless of territorial or ideological boundaries. What we know today is that vast majority of terrorist organizations are relying on drug trade as a source of funding themselves.²⁵ Today many terrorist group turn to cooperating with or offering services to transnational organized crime, since it is more profitable and practical. Besides, operating as networks with independent and compartmentalized cell structures and making these networks more complicating with such cooperation, they are concurrently making it harder to investigate them.²⁶

Although the links between transnational crime and terrorism are evident in the ‘jihadist’ groups, it is not confined to them. There exists such links in other regional conflicts such as Peru with the Sendero Luminoso and Nepal with Maoist insurgents. The drug trade in Afghanistan funds Taliban and organized crime activities has sustained the violence in Kosovo.²⁷ International crime in these regions linked to the other parts of the world. This is witnessed in the

drugs from Afghanistan are distributed by local crime groups in. The international crime and terrorist networks particularly intersect generally in the conflict areas, where law enforcement and border control agencies are corrupt.²⁸

Decreasing state-sponsorship is generally counted among the most important reasons for the cooperation between the organized crime groups and terrorists. Another reason can be counted as the ideological bankrupts that the terrorist organizations experienced. When their ideologies bankrupt, and the context is irrelevant for them to adopt another ideology for legitimizing their terrorist activities, and turned towards organized crimes to further their spoiled causes. The reasons for the increasing link between the two cannot be an exhausted list, sometimes very contextual, but it is for sure, very much complicating the countering efforts for both.

5.6 A Terrorism-Piracy Nexus?

The piracy attacks off the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden in 2008 has attracted the world’s attention to the sea once more. However, what complicated the picture of maritime threat is the growing speculation that a tactical nexus could emerge between piracy and terrorism. One of the main concerns is that terrorist groups will seek to overcome their existing operational constraints in sea-based capabilities by working

²⁴ Frank Cilluffo, “Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking and Terrorism”, 2000, available at www.csis.org/bill/ts00121cilluffo.html.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Bartosz H. Stanislauski, “Transnational ‘Bads’ in the Globalized World”, *Public Integrity*, Issue 6, 2004, p.158.

²⁷ Louise Shelley, “The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption and Terrorism”, *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol.11, Issue 2, 2005, p.103.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

in conjunction with or subcontracting out missions to maritime crime gangs and syndicates. In fact, the presumed convergence between maritime terrorism and piracy remains highly questionable.

To date, there has been no credible evidence to support speculation about such a nexus emerging. Just as importantly, the objectives of the two actors remain entirely distinct.²⁹ Besides that, one can assert that piracy, as a type of organized crime has different objectives, predominantly material gain, from terrorism which has a political end. However, nobody can guarantee that the roads of piracy and terrorism will never converge as it as already happened with some other type of transnational organized crime like drug or human trafficking or arms smuggling. Thus, piracy and terrorism may pursue at least a tactical partnership or cooperation in certain contexts where the resulting instability is to the benefit of the two.

That said, the possibility of a possible conflation between piracy and terrorism has informed the perceptions of governments, international organizations and major shipping interests around the world. There have been persistent reports of political extremists boarding vessels in Southeast Asia in apparent effort to learn how to pilot them for a return of 9/11 at sea.

5.7 Conclusion

Within the context of the possible trends discussed throughout the paper, one can conclude that ideology will continue to be an important component of terrorism and shifts in ideologies, in line with the international conjuncture, will easily be witnessed even within the same terrorist organizations. In terms of the structure of the terrorist organization, it can be said that the hierarchical structures of terrorist organizations will continue, but the additional cell structures will harden the task of counter-terrorism strategies. In addition to that, self-radicalized individuals and small groups constitute an important challenge for prevention strategies of terrorism as well as the consequence management strategies due to the high unexpectedness of a possible attack. In terms of means and methods, IEDs and suicide bombings will continue to be the weapons of choice for the terrorists in terms of their tactical advantages. Cyber terrorism constitutes another important terrorist threat for the future. Bearing in mind the terrorist intentions for using WMDs for decades, due to the catastrophic results that is to stem from a possible terrorist attack with WMDs, they continue to have the highest priority in the security agendas of states as well as international organizations.

²⁹ Peter Chalk, *The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy and Challenges for the United States*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Arlington, Pittsburg, 2008

Bibliography

- Chalk, Peter, *The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy and Challenges for the United States*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Arlington, Pittsburg, 2008.
- Cilluffo, Frank, "Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking and Terrorism", 2000, available at www.csis.org/hill/ts00121cilluffo.html.
- Crenshaw, Martha, "Old and New Terrorism- Lessons Learned", Keynote Speech, *Second IIRI Conference on International Terrorism on Jihadi Terrorism: Where Do We Stand?*, 13 February 2006, <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/speechnotes/06/060213-jihad.terr/crenshaw.htm>
- Erün, Ergün, "General Overview of the Terrorist Activities (October-September 2008)", *Newsletter*, Vol.2, Issue.9, COE-DAT, Ankara, January 2009, pp.3- 8.
- Erün, Ergün and Gökçen Akyüz, "General Overview of the Terrorist Activities (January-March 2009)", *Newsletter*, Vol.2, Issue 10, COE-DAT, Ankara, April 2009, pp.3-10.
- Erün, Ergün and Gökçen Akyüz, "General Overview of the Terrorist Activities (January-March 2009)", *Newsletter*, Vol.2, Issue 11, COE-DAT, Ankara, July 2009, pp. 3-13.
- Erün, Ergün and Gökçen Akyüz, "General Overview of the Terrorist Activities (July-September 2009)", *Newsletter*, Vol.2, Issue.12, COE-DAT, Ankara, July- September 2009, pp.3-13.
- Gurr, Nadine and Benjamin Cole, *The New Phase of Terrorism: Threats from the Weapons of Mass Destruction*, (I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd Publications: London, New York, 2005).
- Hoffman, Bruce, "Change and Continuity in Terrorism", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 24, 2001, pp.417-428.
- Hoffman, Bruce, "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment* Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer(ed.s), Guilford: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004.
- Howard, Russell D. and James J. F. Forest (ed.s), *Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism*, McGraw Hill, 2008.
- Laqueur, Walter, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1999).
- Lia, Brynjar, *Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism: Patterns and Predictions*, (New York: Routledge), pp.159-169.
-

-
- Morgan, Matthew J., "The Origin of the New Terrorism", *Parameters*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1, (2004), pp. 30-31.
- O'Neil, Andrew, "Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: How Serious is the Threat?", *Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism*, Russell D. Howard and James J. F. Forest (ed.s), McGraw Hill, 2008, pp.65-77.
- Roy, Oliver, *Globalised Islam: The Search for New Ummah*, (C. Hurst and Co. Publishers, London, 2004).
- Shelley, Louise, "The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption and Terrorism", *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol.11, Issue 2, 2005, pp.101-111.
- Spencer, Alexander, "Questioning the Concept of 'New Terrorism'", *Peace Conflict and Development*, Issue 8, January 2006, www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk
- Stanislawski, Bartosz H., "Transnational 'Bads' in the Globalized World", *Public Integrity*, Issue 6, 2004, p.155-170.
- Weiman, Gabriel, "Cyberterrorism: How Real is the Threat?", *Special Report 119*, United States Institute of Peace, December 2004, <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr119.pdf>.
- "9/11 Panel: Al Qaeda Planned to Hijack 10 Planes", *CNN International*, 17 June 2004, available from <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/06/16/911.commission/>
-

COE-DAT ACTIVITIES



1

COE-DAT was visited by a delegation from HUMINT COE on 20-21 July 2010.



2

COE-DAT hosted the “NATO Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Staff Officer Awareness Course (SOAC)” on 19-23 July 2010 in Ankara/Turkey. The course was intended to familiarize Staff Officers and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers assigned to Battle Staffs at Operational level Headquarters with an overview of the IED system and approaches to attacking it. Having designed for J2, J3 and information operations staff officers, the course focused on battle staff interaction at the operational level. The course covered the following topic areas: Introduction to Asymmetric Threats and IEDs, NATO C-IED doctrine and capability development, key operational activities, and staff interaction and processes for attacking the IED system. There were 29 participants from 8 different countries and 6 lecturers from 3 different countries.



3

COE-DAT was visited by a delegation from United States Office of Naval Research Global (UNRG) on 17 August 2010.

4

COE-DAT was visited by a delegation from Kazakhstan on 15 September 2010.





5

COE-DAT was visited by the Minister of Defence of Maldives, Mr. Ameen FAISAL on 15 September 2010.



6

COE-DAT organized an **Advanced Training Course** on “Enhancing Cooperation in Defence Against Terrorism” on 20-24 September 2010 in Astana/Kazakhstan. The course covered the history, causes and definition of terrorism, terrorism and mass psychology behavior, countering the ideology of terrorism, the challenge of cyber terrorism, critical infrastructure protection, financing of terrorism, energy security, legal aspects of terrorism, WMD terrorism, crisis management in defence against terrorism, role of intelligence in defence against terrorism, NATO’s defence against terrorism policy, public information management for media coverage of terrorist acts, analyzing counter terrorist strategies as well as case studies about analyzing the threat and developing counter terrorism strategies. There were 34 participants from 5 different countries and 11 lecturers from 5 different countries.



7 COE-DAT hosted another “NATO Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Staff Officer Awareness Course (SOAC)” on 20-24 September 2010 in Ankara/Turkey. The course aimed to educate Staff Officers assigned to Brigade Headquarters Level and above with an overview of the threat from IEDs, with the emphasis on staff interaction, responsibilities and approaches to defeating the IED system in accordance with NATO C-IED Doctrine. The course was intended to promote an understanding of Asymmetric and IED threats, an appreciation of NATO C-IED doctrine as well as an understanding of operational headquarters capabilities, requirements and concepts for Countering IEDs in theatres of operation. There were 30 participants from 11 different countries and 7 lecturers from 3 different countries.



8 COE-DAT was visited by the Chief of Operations of the Turkish General Staff, LTG Abdullah RECEP on 24 September 2010.



9

COE-DAT was visited by a delegation of National Military Representatives from SHAPE on 28 September 2010.

10

COE-DAT was visited by the Commander of Special Armed Forces of the Republic of Korea, LTG Yong Rim CHOI on 28 September 2010.



FUTURE ACTIVITIES



1 COE-DAT is going to conduct an Advanced Research Workshop on “Future Trends in Terrorism” on 11-12 October 2010 in Ankara/Turkey. The workshop intends to elaborate the possible future trends in terrorism in terms of means, methods, ideology and organization with reference to the past and present state of terrorism.

2 COE-DAT is going to carry out a course on “Terrorism and Media” on 01-05 November 2010 in Ankara/Turkey. The course aims to examine media coverage of terrorism, the requirements of media as well as how to deal with media and the best practices in managing information in defence against terrorism.

3 COE-DAT is going to conduct an Advanced Research Workshop on “Maritime Security and Defence Against Terrorism” on 08-09 November 2010 in Ankara/Turkey. The workshop intends to discuss the security challenges in the maritime environment and their likely implications on terrorism by bringing together the subject matter experts, academics as well as the practitioners.



4

COE-DAT is organizing an Advanced Training Course on “Defence Against Terrorism: Conceptual Approach in Combating Terrorism” on 22-26 November 2010 in Serbia. The course intends to analyse the current and future terrorist threat with different dimensions and examine counter-terrorism strategies in detail.



COE-DAT

**Centre of Excellence
Defence Against Terrorism**
PK.57, 06582 Bakanlıklar
Ankara / TURKEY

Tel: 00-90-312-4258215
Fax: 00-90-312-4256489
E-mail: info@coedat.nato.int

www.coedat.nato.int