



CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE
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Editorial

Newsletter's twentieth issue begins with the facts and figures that summarize terrorist activities during the third quarter of 2011. Second, the newsletter contains articles which are written by two personnel of the Centre on terrorism related issues. Third, a book review is provided as a reference to an excellent source on terrorism studies. Last, some brief information on the activities, events and publications of the Centre is provided.

Colonel Özden ÇELİK, in his article on A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPT OF TERRORISM, gives information about the history of terrorism and the need to define terrorism. In the article, he summarizes the difficulties in defining process and mentions some of the actual definitions. General framework for defining terrorism is discussed. Also, the purpose and the causes of the terrorism as well as the classification of terrorist groups are the matters brought under discussion.

In their article on NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL CRITICAL

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION CONFERENCE 20/21 JUNE 2011 Major Matthew EDWARDS and Lieutenant Colonel Oktay URDAY present information about a conference held in Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) over the period 20-21 June 2011 in Ankara. The topics of the sessions were Defence Against Terrorism and Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) and the State of Play, Mapping out the Threat Landscape in Energy Security, Cyber Security, Transportation and CIP, Technology in Defence Against Terrorism and CIP, Managing the Consequences of an Attack on CI and Practical Cooperation in the field of CIP.

Major Arno JANSEN reviews The New Age of TERRORISM and the International Political System. Adrian GUELKE, the writer, examines the barriers in understanding terrorism and the difficulties in finding definition of it. Varieties of terrorism, the legitimization of terrorism and the international dimensions of terrorism are among the topics discussed in the book.





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General Overview of Terrorist Activities (July– September 2011)

Maj. Sabit Atman *

Cvl. Aslihan Sevim **

There were **3,219¹** reported terrorist incidents in **66** different countries during third quarter of 2011. These incidents claimed **4,600** lives, caused **6,920** injuries and included **612** abductions. The incidents were decreased roughly 5% in the world compared to second quarter of 2011.

Incidents in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan consist of 59% of all total incidents in the world.

Iraq was in the first place by the total number of casualties in the world during third quarter of the year. The most hit ten countries according the number of incidents are shown above in the Table-1.




Chart – 1: Some World Security Trends

Country	Number of attacks	K	W	A
Iraq	681	735	2080	19
Afghanistan	610	948	1075	66
Pakistan	605	1014	1228	89
India	296	217	439	50
Russia	99	93	179	0
Turkey	96	82	202	41
Colombia	94	123	207	61
Mexico	92	297	83	32
Thailand	78	75	241	16
Somalia	76	151	152	75
Total	2727	3735	5886	449

Table 1 - Attacks of the most hit ten countries during third quarter of 2011

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¹ All figures mentioned in the report come from publicly available sources, and any discrepancy in figures cited in similar works is the result of varying consultation of these sources. Neither NATO nor COE-DAT is responsible for such discrepancies. K: Killed, W: Wounded, A: Abducted

The attack types in the world during the third quarter of the year are shown above in the table. Improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, armed attacks and clashes consist of 71% of the total attacks in the world during the period.


According to attack types, IED attack was the most prevalent methodology during the period.

“The deadliest attack was a raid in Utoeya Island near Oslo city, in Norway on July 22, and claimed 68 lives and five injuries. The target was a youth camp in Utoeya Island and the assailant was Anders Behring Breivik, who was an extremist having a radical wing views. He killed and wounded victims all by himself shooting on purpose to kill the victims. In the court, he defendend himself showing a 1500-page a manifesto explaining his extreme enmity towards to Islamic world and ethnic minorities in Europe.”

Attack type	Number of Instances	K	W	A
IED	961	938	2438	0
Armed Attack	788	1442	817	0
Clash	549	767	899	51
Execution	203	454	3	0
IDF	198	151	470	0
VBIED	128	229	1057	0
Abduction	109	0	0	420
Suicide Attack	97	472	1163	0
Raid	75	144	69	58
Arson	73	2	4	1
Hoax	18	0	0	0
Piracy	11	1	0	82
Cyber Attack	9	0	0	0
Total	3219	4600	6920	612

Table 2 - Types of Terrorist Attacks during the third quarter of 2011

MAP OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS OF THE MOST HIT 10 COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD DURING THIRD QUARTER OF 2011²



² This map shown here is then from www.presentationmagazine.com

THE MIDDLE EAST

Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia suffered from terrorist attacks in the third quarter of 2011. Total 831 incidents were reported

in the region during the period. The number of incidents in the Middle East consists of 25% of the total number of incidents in the world in the period. Iraq was the most hit country in the Middle East with 681 incidents. 81% of the incidents in the Middle East occurred in Iraq. Also, Iraq was in the first place by the total number of casualties in the Middle East in the third quarter of 2011.

The attack types in the Middle East in the third quarter of 2011 are shown above in the table. Improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, armed attacks and VBIED attacks consist of 73% of the total attacks in the Middle East in the period. According to attack types, IED attack was the most prevalent methodology during the period.


“The deadliest attack in the third quarter of 2011 in the Middle East was 15 August booby-trapped car explosion in the city of Kut, center of southern Iraq’s Wassit province. 34 civilians were killed and 64 others injured in the attack.”

Country	Number of attacks	K	W	A
Iraq	681	735	2080	19
Yemen	74	199	213	54
Syria	38	69	102	24
Israel	23	9	49	8
Iran	12	11	6	0
Lebanon	2	0	8	0
Saudi Arabia	1	0	0	0
Total	831	1023	2458	105

Table 3 - Incidents per Country in the Middle East in the third quarter of 2011

Attack type	Number of Instances	K	W	A
IED	300	197	885	0
Armed Attack	208	299	219	0
VBIED	102	175	806	0
Clash	74	150	124	50
IDF	69	16	100	0
Execution	25	57	0	0
Suicide Attack	24	106	298	0
Abduction	15	0	0	29
Raid	14	23	26	26
Total	831	1023	2458	105

Table 4 - Types of Terrorist Attacks in the Middle East during third quarter of 2011



Map - 1³: Middle East

3 All map shown here are taken from maps.google.com

AFRICA

Somalia, Nigeria, Algeria, Sudan, Kenya, Burundi, Egypt, Mauritania, Libya, Tunisia, Guinea, Benin, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, Niger, Morocco, Ethiopia and Zambia suffered from terrorist attacks in the third quarter

of 2011. Total 195 incidents were reported in the region during the period. The incidents were decreased roughly 19% in Africa compared to previous period. The number of incidents in Africa consist of 6% of the total number of incidents in the world during the period. Somalia was the most hit country in Africa with 76 incidents. 38% of the incidents in the Africa occurred in Somalia. Also, Somalia was in the first place by the total number of casualties in Africa in the period.

The attack types in Africa in the period are shown above in the table. Clashes, IED attacks and armed attacks consist of 71% of the total attacks in Africa in the period. According to attack types, clash was the most prevalent methodology during the third quarter of the year.

“The deadliest attack in the third quarter of 2011 in Africa was 18 September armed attack in Burundi’s Bujumbra province that killed 30 and wounded 20 others.”

Country	Number of attacks	K	W	A
Somalia	76	151	152	75
Nigeria	38	175	69	22
Algeria	35	81	136	0
Sudan	9	19	43	1
Kenya	6	3	6	3
Burundi	5	36	25	0
Egypt	5	2	7	0
Mauritania	4	0	3	0
Libya	3	15	0	4
Tunisia	3	0	0	1
Guinea	2	3	0	0
Benin	2	0	0	23
Rwanda	2	1	23	0
Ivory Coast	1	15	0	0
Niger	1	1	2	0
Morocco	1	1	0	0
Ethiopia	1	0	2	0
Zambia	1	0	0	0
Total	195	503	468	129

Table 5 - Incidents per Country in Africa during the third quarter of 2011

Attack type	Number of Instances	K	W	A
Clash	50	188	161	0
IED	49	57	86	0
Armed Attack	40	131	37	0
Piracy	11	1	0	82
Suicide Attack	10	81	149	0
IDF	10	15	34	0
Abduction	9	0	0	43
Execution	7	18	0	0
Raid	6	12	1	4
VBIED	2	0	0	0
Cyber attack	1	0	0	0
Total	195	503	468	129

Table 6 - Types of Terrorist Attacks in Africa during the third quarter of 2011



Map - 2: Africa

EUROPE

Russia, Turkey, UK, Poland, Norway, Kosovo, Germany, Ukraine, Denmark, Ireland, Czech Republic, Spain, Finland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Belarus and Italy suffered from terrorist attacks in the third quarter of 2011. Total 254 incidents were reported in the region during the period. The incidents were decreased roughly 7% in Europe compared to previous period. The number of incidents in Europe consists of 8% of the total number of incidents in the world in the period. Russia was the most hit country in Europe with 99 incidents. 39% of the incidents in Europe occurred in Russia. Also, Russia was in the first place by the total number of casualties in Europe during the third quarter of 2011.

Country	Number of attacks	K	W	A
Russia	99	93	179	0
Turkey	96	82	202	41
UK	37	1	40	0
Poland	5	5	0	0
Norway	3	76	24	0
Kosovo	2	0	4	0
Germany	2	0	1	0
Ukraine	1	2	4	0
Denmark	1	1	1	0
Ireland	1	0	1	0
Czech Republic	1	0	0	0
Spain	1	0	0	0
Finland	1	0	0	0
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1	0	0	0
Bulgaria	1	0	0	0
Belarus	1	0	0	0
Italy	1	0	0	0
Total	254	260	456	41

Table 7 - Incidents per Country in Europe during the third quarter of 2011

Attack type	Number of Instances	K	W	A
IED	81	46	133	0
Clash	58	58	123	0
Armed Attack	48	61	64	0
IDF	15	4	9	0
Abduction	14	0	0	41
Arson	13	0	0	0
VBIED	9	19	118	0
Hoax	8	0	0	0
Raid	3	68	7	0
Suicide Attack	3	0	2	0
Execution	1	4	0	0
Cyber Attack	1	0	0	0
Total	254	260	456	41

Table 8 - Types of Terrorist Attacks in Europe during the third quarter of 2011

The attack types in Europe in the period are shown above in the table. IED attacks, clashes and armed attacks consist of 73% of the total attacks in Europe in the period. According to attack types, IED attacks was the most prevalent methodology during the period.

“July 22 raid in Norway was the most significant attack both in Europe and in the world. Meanwhile, the second deadliest attack in the third quarter of 2011 in Europe was 14 July clash in Turkey. The clash occurred in Silvan District in the city of Diyarbakır with PKK-KONGRA GEL and soldiers as a result of incident 13 security forces were killed and seven others were wounded.”



Map - 3: Europe

ASIA

Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Thailand, Philippines, Nepal, Bangladesh, Indonesia, China, Myanmar, Kazakhstan, Japan, South Korea and Sri Lanka suffered from terrorist attacks in the third quarter of 2011. Total 1734 incidents were

reported in the region during the period. The incidents were decreased roughly 1% in Asia compared to previous period. The number of incidents in Asia consists of 53% of the total number of incidents in the world in the period.

Country	Number of attacks	K	W	A
Afghanistan	610	948	1075	66
Pakistan	605	1014	1228	89
India	296	217	439	50
Thailand	78	75	241	16
Philippines	66	60	143	17
Nepal	56	13	13	6
Bangladesh	8	5	45	0
Indonesia	5	24	21	0
China	4	14	28	0
Myanmar	3	7	1	0
Kazakhstan	1	1	3	0
Japan	1	0	0	0
South Korea	1	0	0	0
Sri Lanka	1	0	0	0
Total	1734	2378	2337	228

Table 9 - Incidents per Country in Asia during third quarter of 2011.


Attack type	Number of Instances	K	W	A
IED	496	606	1295	0
Armed Attack	425	709	416	0
Clash	334	343	441	1
IDF	91	104	281	0
Execution	144	262	0	0
Hoax	6	0	0	0
VBIED	11	29	56	0
Suicide attack	60	285	714	0
Raid	49	38	30	15
Arson	60	2	4	1
Abduction	56	0	0	211
Cyber attack	2	0	0	0
Total	1734	2378	2337	228

Table 10 - Types of Terrorist Attacks in Asia during the third quarter of 2011

Afghanistan was the most hit country in Asia with 610 incidents. 35% of the incidents in Asia occurred in Afghanistan. But, Pakistan was in the first place by the total number of casualties in Asia in the period 2011.

The attack types in Asia during the third quarter of the year are shown above in the table. IED attacks, armed attacks and clashes consist of 72% of the total attacks in Asia in the period. According to attack types, IED attack was the most prevalent methodology during the period.

“The deadliest attack in the period in Asia was August 19 suicide attack in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) province, killing 56 people and wounding 123 others.”



Map - 4: Asia

THE AMERICAS

Mexico, Colombia, USA, Peru, Guatemala, Brazil, Nicaragua, Chile and Belize suffered from terrorist attacks in the third quarter of 2011. Total 203 incidents were reported in the region during the period. The incidents were increased roughly 27% in America compared to previous period. The number of incidents in America consists of 6% of the total number of incidents in the world in the period. Mexico was the most hit country in America with 92 incidents and 45% of the incidents in America occurred in Mexico. Also, Mexico was in the first place by the total number of casualties in America in the period.

Country	Number of attacks	K	W	A
Mexico	92	297	83	32
Colombia	94	123	207	61
USA	4	3	3	0
Peru	3	4	3	0
Guatemala	2	1	4	0
Brazil	5	7	1	0
Nicaragua	1	1	0	0
Chile	1	0	0	0
Belize	1	0	0	0
Total	203	436	301	93

Table 11 - Incidents per Country in Americas during the third quarter of 2011

Attack type	Number of Instances	K	W	A
Armed Attack	67	242	81	0
IED	34	32	39	0
Clash	33	28	50	0
IDF	13	12	46	0
Execution	26	113	3	0
VBIED	4	6	77	0
Raid	3	3	5	13
Abduction	14	0	0	80
Cyber Attack	5	0	0	0
Hoax	4	0	0	0
Total	203	436	301	93

Table 11 - Types of Terrorist Attacks in America during the third quarter of 2011

The attack types in America in the third quarter of 2011 are shown above in the table. Armed attacks, IED attacks and clashes consist of 66% of the total attacks in America in the period. According to attack types, armed attack was the most prevalent methodology during the month.

“The deadliest incident in the third quarter of the year in America was an armed attack in which 53 people were killed at a casino on August 26 in Monterrey, Mexico.”



Map - 4: Americas

A General Overview of the Concept of Terrorism

Col. Özden Çelik*

ABSTRACT

This article discusses the historical evaluation and causes of the terrorism as a form of political violence by looking at the changing profile over its ideology, organization and structure, as well as motives and roots. First, the article examines the historical evolution of the terrorism, together with its goals and motivation. Second, it brings up the difficulties in defining terrorism by emphasizing historical and current challenges. In this part, the main pillars of the common definitions are also presented. Third, the last part of the article is dedicated to explain the main causes of the terrorism, with special attention to contextual, convictional, motivational and facilitating causes.

Key words: Terror, terrorism, history, definition, causes, extremism, ideology, perpetrator, political, violence, fear.

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism deems all methods legitimate in order to reach its aims and it is a concept which is as old as the history of humanity. Parallel to the developments in technology, communication, transportation and socio-economic fields beginning with the 1960s, terrorism has developed over time as well and has become one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in our time. It has gained an intercontinental dimension by going beyond regional borders, thanks to its large financial resources, and became the dominant element in international relations. In our time, both in terms of its qualities and its dimensions, terrorism has become an issue that cannot be prevented and overcome by any single state without international collaboration.

Terrorism emerges as a concept that is hard to explain and define because of its changing nature, appearance and purposes; it does not have a clear, easy and objective definition like other concepts. Although it is widely used in contemporary times, unfortunately there is no commonly accepted definition for it. Despite the different definitions, there is no

single and comprehensive definition even among the United Nations (UN) or in other international multiparty agreements. Such a definition of terrorism could not be reached even under the favourable climate that was created after the 9/11 attacks.

Nowadays the concept has become so extensive and so obscure that various actions that have no ulterior motives could be labelled terrorism without making any differentiation. Although the act might be the same, the fact that on the one side an individual is being seen as a liberation fighter and a hero while on the other side he/she is seen as a terrorist who has committed the most unforgivable of crimes, constitutes the biggest obstacle to the elimination of terrorism. That there are different approaches to the existence of terrorism poses the problem of what can be considered to be terrorism and when, and in whose hands and when it would not be counted as terrorism.

2. History of Terrorism

The word “terror” originates from the word “terrere” which means “an extreme fear, anxiety and horror in the face of an unknown or unforeseen danger” in the Latin language. It was translated into French as “terreur”

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and into English as “terror.” The concept of terror meant “being shocked by fear” or “causing somebody to be horrified because of fear” and we first encounter the term for the first time in one of the appendixes of *Dictionnaire de l’Académie Française*, which was published in 1789. In the French Petit Robert dictionary, it was described as “the common fear created by a group in order to break the resistance of the people in a society” and in the *Dictionary of Political Terms and Organizations* as “violent acts that spread fear and intimidation and that was committed in order to destroy the public authority and the social structure.”

In its current meaning, the concept of terror was employed for the first time in France after the French Revolution when it was used to describe the policy of systematic violence used by the Jacobins, who advocated all kinds of oppression and violence for the sake of establishing democracy and equality during the rule of Maximilien de Robespierre (March 1793-July 1794). In this way, for the first time a political element was introduced into the concept of ‘terror’ which indicates the oppression against the people in order to protect a certain political order. During the same period, in the form of “terreur panique,” the concept was also used to reflect the condition of the entire society or just a section in the face of a danger. The concept was employed until the fall of Robespierre. The concept of ‘terrorism’ started to be used to express the continuity of the political acts of force and violence after July 27, 1794.

As a result of the political developments throughout the 19th

century, terrorism gained a meaning that not only describes the violence inflicted upon the citizens by the state, but also the violence used by individuals and political groups against the state.

3. The Need to Define the Concept of Terrorism

In order to solve an international problem, first of all, the problematic issue and the other concepts related with it should be clearly explained. It is impossible to solve an issue while there is no common understanding and agreement about its existence, definition, dimensions and causes. In such an environment of uncertainty, states look for solutions that are in line with their national interests and this situation has caused some contradicting approaches to emerge.

International law doctrine has dealt with the issue of whether it is a necessary condition to define terrorism in order to stop the disagreements over this extremely broad and indefinite concept. There are two opinions regarding that point. According to the first opinion which has been advocated by the majority, it is certainly necessary to define terrorism. It is claimed that the absence of a generally-accepted definition of terrorism constitutes the biggest obstacle in the fight against terrorism and that the definition of terrorism is exactly necessary in order to determine the proper method of fighting against terrorism so as to transform this fight into practice. For instance, stating that the most important issue in the international fight against terrorism is the issue of definition, Başeren emphasized that once this problem is dealt with, the issue of fighting against terrorism

would be solved.¹ Bagdasarian indicates that disagreements over the definition of terrorism have created difficulties in terms of identifying terrorist acts, preventing such acts and controlling these acts. He also points out that the international collaboration that would have to be developed in order to overcome international terrorism could only be possible if an agreement is reached on the definition of terrorism.² On the other hand, it has been stated that the definition of terrorism is necessary in order to be able to differentiate between acts of terrorists and acts of national liberation organizations. The voices that consider a definition to be unnecessary argue that such a definition is practically impossible and that there is no need for such a definition in any case. For example, Konstantinov states that it is not necessary to have a generally-accepted definition of international terrorism.³ Arguing that to make an effort to define international terrorism is a waste of time, Zaid stresses that a solution is possible if we focus on the crime rather than attempting to focus on the definition.⁴

It can be observed that this diversity of opinions over this doctrine is reflected in the states. Although the UN General Assembly has stated that a generally-accepted definition of international terrorism would make the fight against terrorism more effective,⁵ the Ad-Hoc Committee, established by the General Assembly,⁶ has hosted intense discussions on the definition of terrorism. Two different

opinions were voiced during the studies of the commission. According to the first opinion, it is impossible to make a normative arrangement before reaching an agreement on the definition of terrorism. Therefore it is obligatory to have a definition of terrorism. The other opinion, pointing out that the efforts to define terrorism remained ineffective so far, claimed that it would be more rational to define terrorism by taking the already agreed points as a basis for the future regulation.⁷

If we consider these opinions that we have tried to summarize, it can be seen that a clear definition of terrorism would guide the international society on this subject. Both at the level of states and in the international arena, it is necessary to clearly define terrorism in order to be able to determine antiterrorism policies. If this step is done, the biggest problem faced by international society in the fight against terrorism, namely the issue of collaboration, could be resolved and it would be easier to implement the peaceful methods of solution. Otherwise, everybody might bring his/her own interpretations regarding the concept of terrorism, which would make it difficult to determine and implement any anti-terrorism measures. Such an agreement is necessary to know which actions are illegal according to international law. At least, a clarification is necessary regarding what makes an action a terrorist action.

Considering that the fight against terrorism consists of a legal front on

1 Sertaç H. BAŞEREN, "Uluslararası Hukuk Açısından Terörizm," *Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Terör*, Ed. Ali Tarhan, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası, 1st ed, Ankara, 2002, p. 184.

2 Sabrina R. DER BAGDASARIAN, "The Need for International Cooperation to Suppress Terrorism: the United States and Germany as an Example," *N. Y. L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L.*, Vol. 19, 1999, pp. 265-266.

3 Emil KONSTANTINOV, "International Terrorism and International Law," *G. Y. I. L.*, Vol. 31, 1988, p. 297.

4 Mark S. ZAID, "Combating International Terrorism in the 21st Century," *ILSAJ. Int'l & Comp. L.*, Vol. 2, 1996, p. 665.

5 G.A. Res. 46/51, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/51 (1991).

6 A. Res. 3034, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3034 (1973).

7 U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 37 A/34/37, (1979). Due to these disagreements, the Committee did not attempt to define the terrorism in its report presented to the General Assembly.

the one hand and of a political and diplomatic front on the other, the disagreement over the concept of terrorism weakens the legal front. As long as there is no clear definition of terrorism, the perpetrators of violent acts could continue to raise the defence that they are not included within the definition of terrorism.⁸

4. The Difficulty in the Definition of Terrorism

The fact that the international community has failed to reach a generally-accepted definition of terrorism does not mean that the concept of terrorism is indefinable.⁹ This failure is not because terrorism is an unknown or indefinite concept, but because the concepts of terror and terrorism have a complex, subjective and constantly changing structure that has political, legal, social, philosophical and international dimensions. There are two main causes behind the difficulties in defining terrorism: political causes and international law causes.

a. Political Causes

The first problem that we encounter in trying to define the concept of terrorism results from the fact that the states, because of differences in their political systems, may have a different approach towards the concept. Since each state uses its legal and political authority in line with its internal and external relationships, the definitions have a certain difference according to these differing political and ideological approaches as well as their political priorities. Even it can be seen that the same state brings different definitions of terrorism, depending

on their changing political interests in different periods of time.¹⁰

The states do not want to rely upon a set definition and they do not want to limit themselves by a set one as well. In that sense, they make positive evaluations about the actions and the members of groups (for example, of the illegal organizations active in another country) with whom they share the same political views. Therefore, they aim to legitimize these organizations internationally by not including them within the scope of the term 'terrorism.' For individuals, groups and states with whom they disagree, they use the term 'terrorist' and for their actions they use the term 'terrorism.'¹¹ The states' classifications of violent acts differ according to their political interests as well as their ideological approaches. Thus, the states aim to increase their power in the regional and international arena and to form supporter regimes in the developing countries.

Geopolitical discrepancies and ideological conflicts can function as a catalyst for terrorism. For example, during the Cold War era both the US and the USSR accepted the narrow geopolitical definition of terrorism. The US accepted the actions of those groups that struggled against the pro-Soviet regimes to be legitimate by calling them 'freedom fighters' and described the struggles against pro-American regimes to be 'terrorism.'¹² The Soviet Union, on the other hand, claimed that the US described the legitimate movements that struggle on the basis of 'self-determination' or human rights as 'terrorist' because it wanted to discredit these movements.¹³

⁸ Antonio CASSESE, "The International 'Legal' Reponse to Terrorism," in *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol 38, 1989, p. 605.

⁹ Oscar SCHLACHTER, "The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases," *Hous. J. Int'l L.*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1989, p. 309.

¹⁰ BAŞEREN, "Terörizm.", p. 184.

¹¹ Ali KHLAN, "A Legal Theory of International Terrorism," *Conn. L. Rev.*, Vol. 19, 1987, p. 947.

¹² Beth STEPHENS, "Responding to Rogue Regimes; From Smart Bombs to Smart Sanctions; Accountability Without Hypocrisy: Consistent Standards, Honest History," *New Eng. L. Rev.*, Vol. 36, 2002, pp. 920-922.

The US and the USSR used to see the acts of violence that were directed against the states which were close to each of them as illegitimate acts and this is a clear example of how the definition of terrorism was politicized. With the end of the Cold War, the differences regarding the definition of terrorism between the Eastern- and Western-block countries were mostly eliminated.

The existence of different approaches towards terrorism both due to ideological differences and political concerns causes a struggle to be seen as a legitimate act of resistance by one side and as a terrorist action by the other. As clearly expressed with the phrase 'One man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter,' a person can be accepted as a 'freedom fighter' in one country and a 'criminal' in another because of the nature of the action that he/she committed.

On the other hand, terror or terrorism gains a specific dimension in each country. Terrorist actions in one country do not overlap with the terrorist actions in another country because they have different structural features. In other words, planned frightening, suppression and intimidation against a society by using force and violence against individuals, or the threat of such force and violence, and doing these in a systematic () manner differ from country to country. Similarly, if there was an agreed definition that objectively covered all the elements of terrorism, and if this definition could be included in the international agreements and regulations signed within the scope of fighting against terrorism, concerned countries might not accept the asylum requests of those individuals who committed

a crime and would directly and unhesitatingly apply the options of arrest and extradition.

The treaties on antiterrorism focus on certain actions and targets, including 'antiterrorist' measures but do not define what terrorism is. The regional or bilateral treaties on the extradition of the offenders generally exclude the terrorist criminals under the concept of "political crime" (which brings the liability of extradition or trying him/her), but they avoid defining terrorism.¹⁴

b. The Causes that Result from International Law

(1) The claim that terrorism was and is being used as a method within the scope of the struggles against occupation and colonialism is among the most frequently encountered questions.

(2) Especially nowadays some states and some dominant groups choose to manipulate the masses in line with their demands by explaining all the events or the individuals through their connection with 'terrorism.' The purpose of this is to shape the understanding, reactions and the attitudes of the masses in line with their own purposes.

(3) Due to the time- and location-dependent nature of terrorism, it can sometimes easily be confused with different types of the political power struggles like war, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, revolution, anarchism and political murders, which include force and violence.

(4) Besides, because of the fact that the types of terrorism vary and that individuals make different evaluations based on their own moral and political perspectives, the phrase of 'one man's terrorist is another's

¹³ Louis Rene BERES, "The Meaning of Terrorism-Jurisprudential and Definitional Clarifications," *Vand. J. Transnat'l L.*, Vol. 28, 1995, (b), pp. 248-249.

¹⁴ John R. MURPHY, "Defining International Terrorism: A Way Out of the Quagmire," in *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights*, Vol 19, 1989, p. 21.

freedom fighter,¹⁵ which means the rejection of the rule of law, is being frequently repeated in the studies of terrorism. These intermingled concepts stand as one of the main elements that make it harder to bring a definition. Similarly, different types of social and political actions could also be evaluated as terror activities.

5. Existing Definitions

The definitions are not the end but are instead the means to support the process of thinking. Definition makes it possible for the studies and reviews on a certain subject to be systematically carried out. In the previous sections, it has been already said that no generally-accepted and universal definition of terrorism has been developed in international law, although the international fight against terrorism has a long history. Some writers who have studied this subject point out the difficulty of agreeing on such a definition and they avoid offering any definitions; however, other writers, although they point out this difficulty as well, choose to attempt a definition from their own perspective.

The definitions of terrorism made by different individuals, organizations, institutions and states help to introduce the complexity of this task by providing information about the 'main elements of terrorism,' although they are incapable of covering all types of terrorism.

Before we proceed with the detailed definitions, it is useful to stress that the concepts of 'terror,' 'terrorism' and 'anarchy' are different from each other.

Terror is a technique of creating fear and horror. Its fundamental feature is to frighten and intimidate. This

technique is being used by individuals, groups and even by the states for ideological, religious and ethnical reasons and by means of different methods.

As a strategy that adopts the use of methods of terror in an organized, systematic and constant manner for a political purpose, the concept of terrorism is different from the concept of terror. While the concept of terror indicates the horror and fear, terrorism brings a continuity and a political content to the concept. From this perspective, it can be seen that there is a misconception about terrorism nowadays and that all kinds of actions are being labelled "terrorism." For example, the phrases like "terror of the football hooligans" and 'pickpocket terrorism' are wrong, because such actions do not have the aforementioned three elements (ideological purpose, violence and being systematic) at the same time.

Anarchy is a political and social doctrine which was derived from a French word 'anarchie.' It is based on self-propagating development without the supervision of the state. Anarchism advocates the non-existence of an organized authority. Anarchists want a free collective existence of individuals without the presence of armed forces, courts, prisons and written laws. They see the administration, namely the government or the state, as the source of all evil in society.

The Dutch political scientist Alex Schmid, in a study carried out in 1983, identified 109 different definitions of terrorism made between 1936 and 1981.¹⁶ There have been many definitions since 1981 as well. All the definitions agree that terrorism

15 Sulbi DÖNMEZER,, "Tedbişçilik Üzerine", *Devir*, 6, p. 20; Dönmezer, "Her Yönüyle Tedbiş", 11 Oct.1997.

16 Richard J. ERICKSON, *Legitimate Use of Military Force Against State-Sponsored International Terrorism*, Air University Press, 1989, pp. 24-25.

implies the use of violence or the threat of such violence; they all accept that it is a method of struggle and that its purpose is to create an environment of fear in the target mass. Schmid extracted 22 main elements and 20 purposes from the definitions regarding the function and the purpose of terrorism. The most frequently observed elements were violence, political purpose, fear, menace and creation of a psychological effect on the third parties. The most frequently observed purposes were to terrorize the society, to force the authorities to take harsh countermeasures, to mobilize terrorist forces, to neutralize the government forces, to positively or negatively influence the public and to change the political regime.¹⁷

According to the personal definition of Alex Schmid, terrorism is the repeated acts of violence by individual, group or state actors in order to create fear and anxiety for individual, criminal or political reasons. With the exception of assassination cases, the direct targets of these actions are not the actual victims. The human victims of violence are chosen among the target mass as the random or predetermined representatives or symbolic targets and as the generators of a certain message depending on the suitability of the opportunity. The purpose is to create a process of direct communication between the terrorist, the victim and the target mass, a communication process that is based on menace and violence. This process of communication that is based on menace and violence aims to influence the actual target, namely the general society. Depending on the purpose of the intimidation, force or propaganda that would be reached, the target mass is brought to the

focus on the terror, the demands or the attention.

Yonah Alexander defined the terrorism as the following: "Terrorism is defined as the calculated employment or the threat of violence by individuals, sub national groups, and state actors to attain political, social, and economic objectives in the violation of law, intended to create an overwhelming fear in a target area greater than the victims attacked or threatened."¹⁸

According to Bozdemir, "Terror is the act of forcing or threatening the population by means of intimidating and suppressing them in order to impose them some ideas and behaviours."¹⁹

Professor in Ordinary Dr. Sulhi DÖNMEZER offers the following definition: Terrorism "... is the use of violation in a planned and illegal manner with the purpose of creating social, national, racial, religious agitation or alike and in order to incite a conflict and a war between the social classes."²⁰ It is also stressed that one of the elements which characterize the terror is that 'violence' is being used as a 'means.' Again for the same writer, "terror is not a doctrine but a style of action. It is a kind of strategy, a means for reaching an end." But terrorism is neither a type of conventional warfare, nor a random madness that was exploited by the mass communication tools. The most distinguishing feature of terrorism is the unique strategy it uses to achieve certain political aims.

Although the studies of the United Nations General Assembly on terrorism go back to 1972, it is not possible to say that important progress had been made in this area up until the middle of the 1990s.

17 AREND & BECK, p. 161; ERICKSON, p. 24-25.

18 ALEXANDER, Yonah: "Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Threats and Responses", *DePaul Bus. L. J.*, Vol. 12, 1999, s. 65.

19 BOZDEMİR, Melül, *Terör (mî) ve Terörizm (mî)? SBF Basın Yayın Yüksek Okulu Yıllığı*, Ankara, 1981, s.523 v.d.

20 DÖNMEZER, Sulhi, "Her Yönüyle Tedbiş," *Son Havadis*, 10 Nov. 1997.

Right from the beginning, the definition of terrorism has been the most important problem. The UN General Secretary proposed to place a study entitled “Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism” on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1972. Many disagreements resulted from the definition and finally the subject could be placed on the agenda only with a much extended title. The General Assembly formed a special committee for international terrorism with 35 members and began its studies in this field. It can be observed that in the General Assembly decisions about terrorism that were issued during the 1970s and up until the middle of the 1980s, made references to the right to self-determination. According to some writers, this implies that the General Assembly accepted that terrorism can be employed to achieve the right to self-determination.²¹ It was only after the Achille Lauro ship raid in 1985 that the General Assembly started to condemn all kinds of terror actions without exception, regardless the actors and the location involved in. Decisions of the General Assembly condemn all kinds of terror now, although it still accepts the right to self-determination.

The active efforts of the General Assembly regarding antiterrorism started with the Declaration annexed to General Assembly Decision 49/60.²² With this declaration, a call was made for the UN member countries to urgently review the international law provisions on the prevention of terrorism and elimination of its causes with the purpose of creating

a comprehensive legal framework that covers all the aspects of the issue. According to this declaration, the states were invited “to review the scope of existing international legal provisions to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, with the aim of ensuring a comprehensive legal framework for the prevention and elimination of terrorism.”²³

It has already been stated that terrorism, in its widest sense, is a means to reach a political end. This statement overlaps with the Declaration annexed to the 1994 UN General Assembly Decision 49/60. According to this declaration, “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.”²⁴ Another result that can be derived from this definition is that acts had the purpose of creating fear.

Terrorism, according to NATO, is described as “the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objective.”²⁵

According to the European Union, terrorism is defined as the offences that “may seriously damage a country or an international organization where committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population,

21 HALBERSTAM M., “The Evolution of the United Nations Position on Terrorism: From Exempting National Liberation Movements to Criminalizing Terrorism Wherever and by Whomever Committed”, *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, Cilt 41, Sayı 3, 2003, ss.575-580.

22 A/RES/49/60, 17 February 1995, available at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/768/19/PDF/N9576819.pdf?OpenElement>, (last visited 12.Spe. 2011).

23 *Id.*, para 7.

24 “Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism”. s.128.

25 NATO Terörle Mücadele Askerî Konsepti, (MC 472).

or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.” These offences can be defined as:

- attacks upon a person’s life which may cause death;
- attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
- kidnapping or hostage taking;
- extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;
- seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;
- manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of biological and chemical weapons;
- release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life;
- interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life;
- threatening to commit any of the acts listed above.

The Commonwealth of Independent States defined terrorism in its “Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism,” which was concluded in Minsk on June 4, 1999 and written in Russian, as “an illegal act punishable under criminal law committed for the purpose of undermining public safety, influencing decision-making by the authorities or terrorizing the population, and taking the form of:

- Violence or the threat of violence against natural or juridical persons;
- Destroying (damaging) or threatening to destroy (damage) property and other material objects so as to endanger people’s lives;
- Causing substantial harm to property or the occurrence of other consequences dangerous to society;
- Threatening the life of a statesman or public figure for the purpose of putting an end to his State or other public activity or in revenge for such activity;
- Attacking a representative of a foreign State or an internationally protected staff member of an international organization, as well as the business premises or vehicles of internationally protected persons;
- Other acts classified as terrorist under the national legislation of the Parties or under universally recognized international legal instruments aimed at combating terrorism.²⁶

The United States of America changed its definition of terrorism

after September 11. Formerly terrorism was considered to be a crime but now it is considered to be an act of war and the legal tools that were used to fight crime were replaced with the proactive tools and techniques to prevent terrorism. In this context, many units like the US Department of Homeland Security, FBI, CIA, Department of Justice, and Department of State participate in antiterrorism activities and they employ the definitions of terrorism which reflect their approaches.²⁷

The United States Department of Defence defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or threat of unlawful force or use of violence by revolutionary organizations against the individuals or the property of the individuals for political and ideological purposes and with the intention of suppressing or keeping them under oppression.”

The Department of State defines terrorism as “...premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents.”

The Department of Justice definition is “violent acts that intend to intimidate or coerce a civilian population and to influence the policy of a government by intimidation, suppression, kidnapping or assassination.”

On the other hand FBI uses a definition of “... the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”²⁸

Established with the purpose of developing strategies for anti-terrorism, the Bush Committee, so-named because it worked under Bush, then the vice president, the Interim Committee defined terrorism by combining existing definitions. The result was a definition that terrorism is the “unlawful use of violence or threat of unlawful violence against the individuals or the property in line with political and social targets. The intended purpose is generally to intimidate, coerce or to change the behaviours or the policies of the government, individuals or groups.”²⁹ Besides, due to the federal system, every state has its own definition of terror in their criminal law.

With the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the US defined international terrorism as: “Use of unlawful violence against the citizens of United States or of other nations outside the borders of United States in order to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the state policy or the operation of the state in line with political and social purposes.”

England defined terrorism as: “The use of violence or the threat of such violence against the individuals or property for the purpose of reaching political, religious or ideological cause or in order to influence the government (including the international governmental organisations) or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and thus endangering the health or safety of the public or a section of the public.”³⁰

27 Yonah ALEXANDER, and Edgar H. BRENNER, “Terrorism and the Law”, New York: Transnational Publishers, 2001, p. 4.

28 BERES, 1995, (b), p. 239.

29 LAQUEUR, p. 99. For an evaluation of USA's definitions of terrorism, see Aaron J. NOTEBOOM, “Terrorism: I Know It When I See It,” *Or. L. Rev.*, Vol. 81, 2002, pp. 567-573.

30 *Terrorism Act 2000, Part I, Introductory*, <http://www.legislation.gov.uk>.

31 *Law No. 3713*.

Turkey defined terror and terror crimes in the first article of Antiterrorism Law.³¹ According to this statute, “terrorism is any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat.”³²

After all these definitions, it would be beneficial to say that all these definitions of terrorism are inadequate. The existing definitions are either limited to certain aspects of terrorism or they have been accepted by just a couple of states. Therefore, it is not possible to say that all these given definitions could fully express what terrorism is.

As can be seen from the definitions, all the terrorist actions involve violent practices and threats of violence to create an environment of fear and anxiety for the attackers to achieve their purposes. There is general agreement that actions like the taking of hostages, plane hijackings, sabotage, assassinations and bombings are terrorist actions. But not all actions that fall into these categories are terrorist actions, because terrorism cannot be defined by merely focusing on the action; the distinguishing feature that make the violence political and that

differentiates it from common crime must be emphasized.

6. The Elements of Terrorism

When the definitions of terrorism are analyzed, some common features that are involved in almost all definitions attract our attention. These can be seen as the factors that should come altogether in order to talk about the existence of terrorism. These elements have legal importance as well since they are important in the definition of the concept of a terrorist organization. Briefly, a terrorist act involves such distinguishing features as:

- a. There is a political purpose and ideology that aims to overthrow the existing order of political power and to form a new order of power.
- b. There is the constant, widespread and systematic use of political violence or the threat of such violence as the method of changing and transforming the political power.
- c. A fear, anxiety, weariness and intimidation created in order to psychologically influence the entire society.
- d. The targeted mass is innocent and unaware.
- e. Generally there is a hidden organization. This disciplined organizational structure is formed by individuals and cadres who were convinced and conditioned for a purpose; inside it there is the obligation of unconditionally carrying out the orders and tasks. The behaviours that are inimical to the obligations are punished with sanctions only inside the organization.
- f. A certain domestic social support

is a pre-condition. The support of the external forces that want to weaken the target state plays a role in the determination of the dimensions of the event.

7. The Purposes of Terrorism

The ultimate aim of terrorist organizations is to establish a new order in line with their own demands and ideologies by overthrowing the existing authority. To this end, the short-term purposes of terrorism could be summarized as the following:

- a. To weaken the authority of the state in the eyes of the people by corroding the regime and the political power and to spread the belief that the state cannot help when needed. (After creating a crisis of authority and exposing the incapability of the administrators, they would push the masses to revolt against the existing political power, shock the central administration and succeed in intimidating the public.)
- b. To increase existing social tensions and disputes.
- c. To publicize the causes in the domestic and foreign public, to attract the attention over the cause the terrorists advance.
- d. To force the government to use repressive methods in order to create a reaction among the public.
- e. To eliminate the negative approaches and to force the masses into submission by breaking the resisting strength of the society through the terror they create.
- f. To ensure the participation of their followers and the support of the masses in the society where they gained a partial power and authority.

8. The Classification of Terrorist Groups

One or more states also play a role in determining the targets and tactics of the terrorist groups as well. In former years, the security forces classified the terrorist groups as national and international terrorist groups according to their styles of operation. However today terrorist organizations are being classified as independent, state-supported and state-directed.

- a. Non-state-supported organizations (independently operating ones), operate autonomously, receiving no significant support from any state.
- b. State-supported organizations generally operate independently but receive support from one or more states.
- c. State-directed organizations operate as an agent of a state and receive intelligence, operational or logistic support from one or more states.

9. The Targets, Weapons and Financial Resources of Terrorism

a. The targets of terrorism

There is no set target for the terrorists; you are either with them or against them. This approach indicates how broad the target base is or could be. In other words, the target is everything that serves their ends – actual and possible enemies (the state and the regime that they are in, the systems and the people of other countries, international organizations and institutions), individuals, thoughts and beliefs. The important thing for the terrorists is not the physical effect of the action on the target but the

psychological effect on the public and the lingering impact of this effect. Terrorism does not target the real victims but the audience.

b. The weapons of terrorism

Terrorism has two main weapons: material and spiritual weapons. The psychological methods and the propaganda form the spiritual dimension. The fear created in society in general and the deep psychological trauma resulting from anxiety is the most effective weapon to this end. All kinds of physical tools, equipment, materials and ammunition form the spiritual arsenal of the material terrorism.

c. Financial resources of terrorism

Depending on the developing technology and the conditions, terrorist organizations are able to create legal and illegal financial resources and use these in line with their aims. The main resources are as the following:

- (1) Drugs and arms smuggling,
- (2) Human trafficking,
- (3) Subscription fees and donations,
- (4) The money that was forcibly collected under the guise of 'taxation,'
- (5) Stealing, burglary and robbery,
- (6) Commercial activities through front organizations,
- (7) Foreign aid received from other countries,
- (8) Incomes earned from entertainment, weddings and meetings,
- (9) Work force brokerage,
- (10) Income earned from

blackmailing and threats,

- (11) Uncontrolled funds and aid,
- (12) Organ harvesting and trafficking, and
- (13) Income earned from the press.

10. The causes of terrorism

As was the case for the definition of terrorism, the discussions on the causes of terrorism are still going on. A common cause or a series of causes that would cover all types of terrorism has not been brought forward yet. As there are a lot of types of terrorism, there are many and diverse causes that drag the individuals into terrorism as well.

A study by the United Nations that was entitled the "Root Causes of Terrorism and International Terrorism," stated that "poverty, misery, troubles, sorrow and hopelessness leads to terrorism. Terrorists are affected by international and national political, economic and social developments and there might be individual causes. But it is impossible to establish scientifically the concrete causes that direct the terrorist towards concrete actions." In some studies it has been concluded that the weakening commitment for common values, the replacement of justice by materialism and the effect of psychological reasons on individuals determines a person's involvement in terrorism.

Studies show that terrorism can emerge in less developed, developed or developing countries; in low, middle and high income countries; in countries that have or have not felt the repression of colonial mentality; and in democratic or anti-democratic countries without any discrimination.

The studies that have been carried out on the individuals who have taken part in acts of terror show that terrorists could be among the well-educated as well as the uneducated individuals, psychologically handicapped individuals as well as the psychologically healthy individuals. Another conclusion of such studies is that the individuals who were involved in terrorism could be male or female. It is possible to extend this list. Besides demonstrating how hard it is to make a generalization regarding the causes of terrorism, this situation and the results make it difficult to foresee the future dimensions of terrorism.

Based on these results, analysis of the causes of terrorism should depend on the general mind sets; social, cultural and economic conditions; the living environments; family structures and psychological structures of the individuals who form the terrorist groups. It should be borne in mind that the data derived as a result of such studies would vary depending on the scope and timing of the research and on its definition of terrorism. But from a general perspective, the causes of terrorism can be addressed under four main categories: structural, facilitating, motivational and motivating causes.

a. Structural Causes

These are the causes that directly affect the lives of the individuals. The individuals may be or may not be aware of these causes.

(1) Globalization

It is extremely clear that globalization and the accompanying innovations have increased the awareness of inequality between individuals in groups and between groups in society; globalization has not brought

the same benefits to an entire society. Causing the rich to become richer and poor to become poorer, globalization has increased the inequality in income distribution and has brought about the unequal sharing of the total benefit. This growing inequality causes economic problems and gaps in the income of the population in many countries. And, as a basis of international terrorism, this gives rise to domestic unrest and acts of terrorism against the countries that were considered to be the source of these problems.

The difficult economic conditions affect the population in physical terms, psychological terms and morale terms. Another concept created by the income inequality is poverty. Combined with lack of education and ignorance, poverty becomes a ticking bomb because these individuals are open for exploitation and can easily be directed by the foci of terror. The great demoralization that occurs after war, natural disasters and heavy economic downturns could be exploited by terrorist organizations and transformed into radical actions that affect society.

Another effect of globalization is the differences and breaks it creates in the individuals' understanding of nationalism. Together with the elimination of the borders in the new world order, global living spaces and the new understanding of culture resulting from these spaces, the concept of nationalism has come under more discussion and pushed some individuals towards a search for a new identity. Those individuals who cannot find an answer in this search or who fail in harmonizing themselves with the system are being dragged towards some extremist currents

and even getting involved with some violent acts, either consciously or unconsciously.

(2) Rapid Change

Some analyses claim that rapid change and modernization created by globalization and technology have had negative effects on society and caused some troubles like the use of violent methods, disorder and even terrorism because the entire society cannot keep up with the rapid change that disturbs the balance in society. The differentiation and even the break in the ties that connect the common values create discontinuity in society.

However, according to the liberal viewpoint, this rapid change brings about a social order of wealth and happiness, creates conditions that are suitable for political development and a free trade economy supports the existing economic order by reinforcing the economy, therefore the conditions that give birth to terrorism are eliminated.

(3) Relative deprivation and/or dissatisfaction

The dissatisfaction created by the social, cultural, economic and political life of an individual inside a society or the complete isolation of the individual from these factors are among the primary factors that push an individual towards violence and terrorism. When a serious gap between such expectations and the encountered reality emerges, it is very clear that it would have some negative reflections.

(a) Poverty

The results of studies show that there is no direct correlation between poverty and terror/terrorism. The studies that have been carried out in the last 20 years have shown that

individuals who were involved in acts of terrorism were more educated and in a higher income group when compared to the other members of society. But it should be borne in mind that the poverty that would be combined with lack of education and ignorance is open to the exploitation or terrorist organizations and can easily be directed towards violence and terrorism as a result.

(b) The search for democratic rights and freedom

It is clear that democratic values are important in terms of the rights and freedoms they provide for society and the individuals in it. So important that, there is a very low possibility that the dissatisfactions and problems about this issue would direct people to the actions that could threaten the existing order and the regime. The democratic system provides many alternatives for the individual to express the problems and dissatisfactions that he/she experienced and to find solutions for it. That is why the probability of resorting to violence and using acts of terrorism is lower in democratic societies. In other words, such kind of actions would diminish as the level of democracy increases.

But on the other hand, it is an undisputable truth that the existing environment of peace enters into a complex and difficult interaction with democracy. The understanding of freedom and the free environment in democratic societies allow political problems and violence to move and to gain dimension easily. The advantages of human rights and individual freedom prepare the grounds for the uncontrollable behaviours and activities of the masses even without the intention of doing so. Moreover, those who come to power with the

support of the democratic majority could become the slaves of this power and tend to form a dictatorship against the other minorities.

As a conclusion, these two different situations that were presented from the perspective of democracy should never be forgotten. Nobody could guarantee that terrorism would not emerge in democratic societies, because the cause that pushes the people towards terrorism is not only dissatisfaction but, as is the case with the owners of the political power, over satisfaction as well.

b. Facilitating Causes

Although the causes that are investigated under this category are not the main causes, they make terrorism attractive, enable it and facilitate its dissemination. The developments in the field of technology, transportation, communication and media, together with decrease in costs, make it easier and attractive to act against weak and powerless countries that have rich raw materials, underground minerals and energy sources.

(1) Developments in communication and transportation

Thanks to developments in this field, the interaction and cooperation between countries, different groups and societies on the earth have increased. This is valid for terrorist groups and organizations as well. These developments have allowed some secret groups to easily resort to violence and thus to attract the reaction of the world. Especially the widespread use of the Internet has facilitated and enforced the communication between these groups and thus allowed their actions to be disseminated to wider masses. The same advantages have allowed them

to quickly transfer their huge financial resources from one country to another. In a nutshell, the globalized international system has allowed terrorism to become globalized as well.

(2) Media

Influencing the public is an extremely vital issue for terrorist groups and individuals who aim to influence the national and international political process. From the perspective of terrorist organizations, the best tool to achieve this is the media that collaborates with them, consciously or unconsciously, from time to time. Terrorism absolutely needs a target mass to express its existing ideology. This target mass is the national or international public because terrorism would continue its cause here; it would be able to recruit new people, to gain some privileges and be nourished by spreading fear through illegal actions.

On the other hand, the existence of a symbolic relation between the media and terrorism is still being discussed. Terrorism and the media are soul mates – the reflection of which cannot be separated from each other, because they perpetually feed each other.

(3) State support

From the 1960s onwards, state support has been considered to be one of the most prominent causes of international terrorism. Especially, discussions about the new terrorism claim that state-supported terrorism vanished after the collapse of the classical understanding of terrorism and after the emergence of global terrorism. This is a total misconception. In our times, there are states that actively and/or passively support terrorism.

(4) Weak States

This is a concept that describes the states which cannot not exercise any central sovereignty or which exercise only weak central sovereignty on the lands that they own. States like these provide, consciously or unconsciously, secure areas for terrorist groups and they are appropriate areas to find human resources, to manufacture drugs and to traffic drugs.

c. Motivational causes

These are the causes that result from individual and societal problems and troubles that motivate individuals towards a certain behaviour.

(1) Psychological causes

(a) Individual causes

Claims that terrorists all have the same psychology and mindset have not been proved yet. Although many researchers have tried to reach some conclusions in light of the collected data, there are no concrete results due to the permanent changes in the structure of the terrorist actions. But to put it generally, it can be stated that each and every single terrorist operates with different ideological motivations, they do not have psychological disorders and did not experience any serious childhood traumas.

(b) Causes related with the group

Since it is not possible for an individual to live a life isolated from society, the influences of the society and the environment that the individual has been living in should be taken into consideration. Therefore, from a social and political viewpoint, it can be said that political violence is a familiar and known concept for some individuals. When this situation is combined with the individual's thought of being committed to a

group, individuals would define their status in society the way the group recognized it. This leads to the conclusion that individuals are getting involved with terrorist acts as a result of the psychological factors formed inside the social structure that they have been in.

(2) Ideological causes

Right after the individual enters into a group, she/he faces the dynamics of the group and starts to think like the group. The purpose of the group thought is to enforce the unity and togetherness among the group and to create a concept which has a high priority among the members of the group. When the issue is terrorism, this group thought, or in other words the ideology, becomes the most important link between the members of the group. This ideology is also a concept that shows that the rightful cause of the terrorist is justified. All throughout history, terrorism has come out under many different ideological covers like religious fanaticism, anarchism, fascism, neofascism, secessionism, nationalism and racism.

(3) Feeling of revenge

The feeling of revenge is among the most important motivational causes of terrorism. The existing unsolved problems between societies or between groups of the same society form the primary factors that feed the feelings of grudge, hate and revenge which are deeply rooted in history, then transferred and conserved from generation to generation. In our times, it is possible to find many examples of this phenomenon.

d. Impelling causes

Suddenly emerging situations and events are also among the causes that

drag individuals or groups to terrorism. Normally, such kind of situations and events do not lead to terrorism only if there is no already existing tensions or enmities. However, if there is a historically inherited and sensitive balance between the parties, the resulting actions could take the form of terrorism.

11. Conclusion

Terrorism provides hope for the discontent, targeted mass that wants to seek a change. This hope forms the ideology that gathers the individuals together. The people who gather around this ideology form a system according to their abilities and talents. They form the basis of terrorism by creating organizations inside this system.

Due to its frequently and quickly changing subjective structure, it is foreseen that a general definition of terrorism will not be possible in the near future. Even if such a definition is reached in the international field, it is doubtful that the states could completely put this into practice in their domestic order, because the states would choose to take a position depending on their interests during that period; they would want to reserve manoeuvring space for themselves considering the future developments.

However, despite all these failures, all the studies on the definition of terrorism will contribute to the development of the international law and will bring a momentum to the legal fight against terrorism.

NATO Russia Council Critical Infrastructure Protection Conference

Maj Matthew EDWARDS*

Lt Col Oktay URBAY**

INTRODUCTION

The NATO Centre of Excellence – Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) hosted the NATO Russia Council (NRC) Conference on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) on behalf of the NRC Counter-Terrorism Working Group (CT WG) over the period 20-21 June 2011 at the Turkish Military Officers' Club Cultural Centre in Ankara. The aim of the conference was to cement cooperation between NATO and Russia in the area of CIP. The conference was broken down into 7 sessions – Defence Against Terrorism and CIP; the State of Play, Mapping out the Threat Landscape in Energy Security, Cyber Security, Transportation and CIP, Technology in Defence Against Terrorism and CIP, Managing the Consequences of an Attack on CI and Practical Cooperation in the field of CIP. Each session was 1 hour and 15 minutes in duration and allowed time for several speakers to present their material followed by a central question and answer (Q&A) session at the end of the period.

OPENING REMARKS

Keynote Speech

The conference was opened by the Assistant Secretary General of the NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division, Ambassador Gabor IKLODY, in his role as the chair of the NRC CT WG. The ambassador noted that Turkey was the right place to host a conference on CIP as she supports a significant amount of national and international

CI, especially in the energy sector. He stated that the increasingly strong cooperation between NATO and Russia is being fed by the DAT program of work which is high on the list of priorities. This conference was the main event in the NRC April 2011 action plan against terrorism.

The ambassador went on to talk about the importance of the New Strategic Concept and the various work strands that appear before the NRC, highlighting cyberdefence, non-proliferation, energy security and terrorism. He stressed that NATO could only be successful if it works in international partnership with the military, civilian, public and private sectors. He stated that it was important for NATO to analyze its own and others' capabilities. Due to the evolving threat environment, the focus must move away from 'defending and deterring' towards 'prevention and resilience' when combating these non-traditional threats. The ambassador concluded his remarks with the hope that the conference would achieve a sharing of lessons learned and best practice, an understanding of strategies, an understanding of vulnerabilities and provide opportunities to network.

SESSION 1 - DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM AND CIP; THE STATE OF PLAY

**Doctrine, Concepts
and Standards in CIP**
**Lt Col Bernward Grosse
SANDERMANN¹ (ACO)**

Colonel SANDERMANN opened the session by giving an overview of

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¹ (DEU AF)

the subject from an Allied Command Operations (ACO) point of view. CIP is one of the 10 work strands within the ESCD DAT Programme of Work (PoW) and NATO brings military know how and lessons learned on operations into the civilian arena to help with the protection of strategic sites such as harbours, airports, nuclear power stations and communications networks. This know-how is at the cutting edge of new technology and solutions proven on operations often have utility for fixed civilian CI.

In the first part of the presentation, he went on to talk about CIP in general and then specifically Military CI, stating that it is now all operationally focused. Risk assessments are conducted against environmental and enemy threats with risk determined as a function of likelihood versus impact. The key take away is that while force protection (FP) is a formal NATO essential operational capability, it is not possible to protect everything. There must therefore be prioritization based upon various considerations (political, strategic, operational or tactical) coupled with the actual threat(s). The NATO approach is one of defence in depth using layered and mutual support backed up by continuous assessment. It uses active and passive measures and the residual risk is managed through resilience measures.

In the second half of his presentation, Col SANDERMAN addressed the subject of concepts and doctrine by providing a detailed overview of the layered documents that support CIP and FP with NATO. At the highest level is the Military Committee's Policy for Force Protection published in draft form by SHAPE in January

2011 which outlines the essential operating capability. Below this level, AJP 3.14 is the coordinating document for a host of joint doctrine publications that have relevance in the CIP arena.

The Spanish Perspective Mr Tomas MartinINURRIETA (National Centre for CIP)²

Mr. INURRIETA gave an in-depth description of how Spain addresses the issue of CIP and contrasted his country's approach with that of other NATO countries. He noted what he called 'CIP Dependence' where numerous government agencies have a stake in CIP activities. In Spain the lead organization is the Interior Ministry; this is not the case elsewhere – in the USA it is the Department for Homeland Security and in the UK it is the domestic security service. Spain defines 12 CI sectors but again this is not uniform throughout NATO; the USA has 18 sectors.

Whatever the lead agency, and however CI is defined, the need for a holistic approach that includes government, law enforcement and the private sector (in most cases as the majority owner), underpinned by international cooperation, is common. International cooperation is important in the modern networked world given the complex double dimension of physical infrastructure security and cybersecurity. Spanish policy is therefore based on an international legal framework supported by EU directives.

A significant problem that Spain has had to address is the classification and handling of CI information. Mr. INURRIETA stated that due to handling and releasability rules, the country has a classified CI

catalogue and uses two information management systems under the HERMES project. ARGOS deals with classified information while H3 deals with information marked as sensitive. All of this information feeds into the EU critical infrastructure list highlighting the interdependence across Europe.

**Critical Infrastructure
Protection Overview
Lt Col Marc BONNET³
(MILENG COE)**

The final lecture of the first session tied into the lecture by Col SANDERMANN and provided an overview of military engineering support to FP and CIP. This is described in the already mentioned AJP 3.14; how it is then implemented is contained in two further documents – ACO Directive AD80-25 and STANAG 2280. The key theme for military engineering support in this area is the need to prioritize and be flexible. The majority of casualties within military infrastructure come from glass laceration and structural collapse. Whilst the threat environment includes environmental, occupational and enemy action, the one area of particular interest is that of ‘weapon effects on structures.’ The minimum military requirement is laid out in Annex I to AD 80-25.

Session 1 Summary

CIP is one of the 10 work strands in the NATO DAT PoW. NATO brings its military know how and lessons learned from operations into play to support the civilian CI arena. Risk is made up of threat, vulnerability and consequences; there are never enough resources to provide total protection so the key question is where to concentrate? The threat is often fast

moving and therefore difficult to address. While it cannot be ignored there is an argument to concentrate resources on the other two elements, vulnerability can be reduced through hardening and technology. Consequences can be addressed through risk mitigation, redundancy and resilience. The bottom line is that it is a balancing act and the emphasis may be constantly changing over time. What is crucial is that CIP requires a holistic multiagency approach not only within NATO or any given member state but more broadly internationally.

**SESSION 2 – MAPPING OUT
THE THREAT LANDSCAPE
IN ENERGY SECURITY**

**Critical Infrastructure and its
Impact on Energy Security
Assoc Prof Mitat ÇELİKPALA⁴
(Kadir Has University, Turkey)**

To understand why CIP is important, Professor ÇELİKPALA started by looking at a number of definitions of CI and pulling out the common threads of ‘physical or virtual,’ ‘vital to the state’ and ‘debilitating effect if disrupted or destroyed.’ He then moved on to look at the elusive term of ‘Energy Security.’ The common theme in definitions of Energy Security is availability, accessibility and affordability but the emphasis on what is important often depends on where the actor is in the value chain – producer, energy company, transit country, consumer country – and is often encompassed by geopolitical issues. There are a number of challenges and associated risks but with an increasingly complex and integrated global infrastructure, protection of critical energy infrastructure (CEI) is an issue for all actors.

³ (FRA A)

⁴ (TUR CII)

The main energy infrastructure targets include production and storage facilities, transportation facilities and routes, and consumption facilities but there are often wider consequences outside the direct target. There were over 400 terrorist attacks on oil and gas infrastructure between 1990 and 2010 but this only equates to about 1% of the total attacks in that period. Even with this relatively low number of attacks, there can be significant consequences. The bottom line is that the energy sector is a complex network of systems that is not easy to protect.

**Incorporating New
Threats to Energy into
the Threat Assessment
Julijus GRUBLIAUKAS⁵
(Energy Section ESCD)**

Mr. GRUBLIAUKAS concentrated his presentation on new trends in risks to CEI. He started by picking some key deductions out of the NATO Strategic Concept; “.....energy supplies will be increasingly exposed to disruption;NATO will develop the capacity to contribute to energy security including the protection of CEI, transit areas and lines.” With the world increase in energy consumption (oil being the leading fuel), the pressure on CI will increase. The result is likely to be massive investment in the sector between now and 2030, a large portion of which will be in CI. The challenge is that as reliance on, and vulnerability of CEI increase, and given ever increasing complexity and interdependence, the ways of defining the criticality of infrastructure across the whole energy supply chain will need to be developed.

The threats to the energy sector are diverse. They include natural phenomena and events such as the

impact of the Japanese earthquake and subsequent tsunami on the nuclear industry; technical failures such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico; political instability and conflict such as that affecting Iraqi oil production in 1990/91 and again from 2003; and of course human factors that include terrorism and cyberattacks. The concerns within this area of human factors are many; terrorists can adapt to CEI protection systems, pirates can change tactics and the vulnerabilities to cyberrisks can generally lie undiscovered. As in other areas, traditional solutions may not provide the answer. Traditional defence may not be possible and direct deterrence is often difficult. Cooperation is a key activity to prevent such acts through information and intelligence sharing, analysis of the threat, and scientific research as well as resilience through such things as redundancy, separation of assets and robust recovery plans.

The way forward for NATO consists of a number of conferences and exercises in 2011. In Georgia in July there will be a conference on Cyber Risks to Energy Security followed by a number of events in November – the Energy Efficiency in the Military Sphere conference, the NATO Security and Peace through Science (SPS) program sponsored CIP Advanced Research Workshop at COE-DAT and a table top exercise on ‘Energy Security and Terrorism’

**The Security Systems of
Critical Infrastructure
Facilities in Russia
Emzar DZNELADZE⁶
(EMERCOM)**

Mr DZNELADZE started his briefing by stating that the Russian economy is underpinned by mining,

⁵ (EST Civ)

⁶ (RUS Civ)

heavy industry, transportation and the energy sector; in a country the size of Russia, there is a vast array of CI spread across many sectors. The Russian approach to protecting CI stems from legislation. The National Policy to Protect the People of the Russian Federation was signed by the president in 2006. This policy champions a unified approach to CIP. All entities are consolidated into a list of what is critical and there is a management body in place that uses the concept of cross-service interoperability to manage CI in any type of emergency.

Session 2 Summary

Energy Security depends on availability, accessibility and affordability. Even though different actors in the value chain have differing perspectives, today's interdependence means that every actor has a stake in CEIP. The threats to the energy sector are diverse. For example, with the increased use of technology in the energy sector, there is the potential for increased vulnerability. In the cyberdomain there has been a rise in attacks on SCADA controllers that are used across the energy sector. Traditional defence and deterrence may no longer be the most appropriate protection measures. International cooperation underpinned by comprehensive legislation and resilience across the sector are now seen as crucial.

SESSION 3 – CYBER SECURITY

Assessing the Risks of Technological and Intellectual Terrorist Attacks on Critical Infrastructure
Dmitri REZNIKOV⁷ (Russian Academia of Science)

Dr REZNIKOV started with a walk through of scenario construction and the theoretical model of risk. Risk is made up of 3 factors – threat, vulnerability and consequence – each of which is of interest to different communities. Law enforcement and the intelligence services concern themselves with threat, the engineering community with addressing vulnerabilities while agencies such as FEMA and EMERCOM deal with consequences.

Risk can be broken down into two areas. Firstly, 'Safety Risk' which looks at what may happen and how it may happen. This can be modelled with fault trees, event trees and Bayesian nets. It is linear with the threat acting on vulnerabilities to provide consequences. Secondly, 'Security Risk' asks 'What should be done to make this happen?' and 'If I were a terrorist what I should do to make this happen?' This is modelled with attack trees, decision trees and influence diagrams and is significantly more complicated to model due to the feedback loops from vulnerabilities and consequences to threat. This adds much uncertainty and variability. Dynamic game theory often provides a useful modelling tool.

Dr REZNIKOV then went on to define different types of terrorist action. 'Ordinary Terrorism' is the traditional type of attack where a target is attacked and destroyed. 'Technological Terrorism' is concerned with breaking through safety barriers to initiating secondary catastrophic processes using hazardous substances, energy, and/or information stored or processed at the attacked CI. Only 1-10% of the

losses may be caused by the attack itself with 90-99% occurring as a result of these secondary processes. The modelling of technological terrorism requires the use of a hybrid scenario tree where multiple attack trees feed into the start of the event tree. 'Intellectual Terrorism (IT)' is a purposeful unauthorized interference with the process of designing, building and/or operating the CI and is aimed at increasing its existing vulnerabilities and creating new ones. These vulnerabilities, insider's knowledge about the CI and access to its elements are used to trigger the most disastrous scenarios during a terrorist attack. As a rule, IT requires that a member of a terrorist group penetrate into the staff of the organization that designs, constructs and operates the CI. Acts of intellectual terrorism can be carried out at any stage of the CI's lifecycle. Less than 1% of losses are likely to occur from the initial attack, a further 1-10% from secondary process and the majority from subsequent cascading effects. Intelligent terrorism adds further complexity to the modelling process with multiple attack trees effecting different stages of the event tree.

The lecture finished using the story of 'the elephant and the blind wise men' although where terrorism is concerned maybe it should be the 'Tyrannosaurus Rex and the blind wise men'. The moral of this story is that only through a joined up multidisciplinary approach – law enforcement, emergency services, intelligence services, engineers, social scientists, politicians and response organizations – can CIP be properly conducted.

Lisbon Summit Taskings and Development of the New NATO Policy on Cyberdefence Col Carlos TORRALBA⁸ (Cyberdefence Section ESCD)

Colonel TORRALBA discussed the roadmap to the new NATO cyberdefence policy from the NATO 2020 report in August 2010 to the action plan of June 2011. This policy outlines how to use NATO assets in cyberdefence. It stresses that cyberdefence is a NATO core task and should concentrate on resilience and prevention. There should be centralized protection of NATO's networks and the minimum requirements also include the protection of national networks that are critical in supporting NATO's core tasks. The policy also outlines the minimal level of cyberdefence across all CI and engagement with partners, international organizations and the private sector. The policy is underpinned by a robust system of governance, implemented through a regularly updated action plan which advocates sharing of best practices and information, coupled with the conduct of training and exercises between nations. Cyberdefence within NATO is therefore a shared responsibility.

Session 3 Summary

NATO's new cyberdefence policy outlines the alliance assets that will be used in cyberdefence. Terrorism is just one of many cyberthreats. The debate continues within both academic and security circles as to the exact nature of 'cyberterrorism.' Using narrow definitions, it can be argued that there has never been a

cyberterrorist attack as the known attacks in cyberspace to date do not meet the traditional definition of terrorism. On the other hand, using wider definitions it can be argued that every terrorist use of cyberspace is 'cyberterrorism' and it is happening constantly. Current thinking is moving away from the phrase 'cyberterrorism' to 'terrorist use of cyberspace/the Internet.' Using this terminology, the terrorist is therefore just one group of individuals that will conduct cyberattacks that need to be defended against.

SESSION 4- TRANSPORTATION AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Transportation and Critical Infrastructure Protection: Risk of Air Transportation and Security in Air Hubs against Terrorist Attacks Dr Franco FIORE⁹ (NC3A)

Dr FIORE covered both this topic and his later lecture on 'Capability Needs in the Protection of Military Infrastructure on Operations and the Relevance for Civilian Use' in this one presentation. He opened the session by giving the practical details of his organization's support to current NATO operations by the use of explosive detection systems, jammers, stand off explosive detection, novel route clearance techniques, remote biometrics, psychological profiling, persistent ISR at KAIA, KAF comprehensive force protection, Defence Against Mortar Attack (DAMA) and C-IED support.

Moving onto the subject of aviation security, he stated that there is no silver bullet for the protection of transport CI but that several operational projects had utility to support airport security. Air transportation security

provides a multitude of challenges, made all the more difficult by having to balance the need for security with what a paying public and the industry will accept. Checkpoints are the resulting bottlenecks and that technology is often not up to date to handle potential threats. Every nation has different procedures and levels of security but the amount of screening possible is driven by business and limited by time.

If asked the question; are we safe? Dr FIORE would answer: not completely. For example, you have to ask yourself just what could be hidden from standard x-rays. There is a need to use a suite of better technology, such as backscatter devices, for better screening. One of the areas being looked at is the multisensor approach where different sensors are positioned in the waiting line and security channel to conduct additional screening during this otherwise wasted time. NC3A is actively proposing new technology for use in the air transportation sector. One such technology is millimetre wave passive screening sensors. NC3A has identified this technology in a Research Technology Organisation (RTO) task group; done some simulation and R&D; tested it a national test range with real explosives; performed a NATO trial; tested the technology in an operational environment (ISAF); and put on paper the pros and cons of the technology for future acquisitions by NATO and NATO nations.

Throughout the conference, the concepts of resilience and prevention surfaced numerous times. NATO can bring lessons from operations into the CIP arena. For example, the IED fight is not an isolated task. It is part of an overall COIN approach and has synergy with

other activities such as the antidrug fight (poppies), human trafficking, weapons smuggling, targeting HME production and therefore ammonium nitrate transportation/factories, and training forces. Traditionally, technology in support of the C-IED fight has been mainly concentrated on defeating the device once it is emplaced (protection). The goal of today's C-IED fight is now to attack the network(s) (prevention) and therefore more and more technological effort is being made in this area. All the efforts lead towards stopping the threat being activated. We avoid a rocket being built and launched, a dirty bomb being built and activated, and weapons are not bought, smuggled, delivered to the enemy for use.

In summary it was Dr FIORE's assessment that airports and air hubs are not secure enough. It is a trade-off between screening times per person vs. time vs. cost vs. limitations. Some enhancement could be made in the areas of technology, TTPs, uniformity of approaches and security levels but perception is also a key area and can act as a strong deterrent. NC3A's work takes operationally tested concepts and technologies and proposes their possible utility in civilian CI security.

**Measures to Ensure
Air Transport Security
Andrey ANDREEV¹⁰ (Interior
Ministry of the Russian
Federation)**

Terrorism is one of the major threats to air transportation. Transport networks in Russia are vulnerable due to their scale and spread. Russia has worked hard to continually improve protective measures and introduce

comprehensive legislation. The legislation identifies influencing factors and requires unified actions from a multitude of organizations – Ministry of the Interior, Border Service, Federal Security Service, Federal Protection Service, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Transport and Foreign Intelligence Service – across all areas.

Russia approaches airport security as a layered system and has already instigated lessons identified from the Moscow Airport bombing. The system consists of five layers between an individual approaching an airport and getting on to an aircraft. The first layer is control over the airport approach roads and area in front of terminal buildings; this includes vehicle examination, patrolling, video monitoring, detection of suspicious items, use of service dogs, explosive object containment, protection of the airport complex perimeter zone and operational search measures. The second layer is control of entry to the air terminal complex which includes profiling (detection) and joint examination of suspicious passengers carried out by the aviation security services and internal security organizations. The third layer is the passenger registration zone where profiling of potentially dangerous passengers occurs. The fourth layer is passport, border, immigration and customs control in the passenger screening zone that is used to detect wanted persons and counterfeit documents using a comprehensive database. The final layer is pre-flight screening of passengers which includes screening of hand luggage, baggage, tactile screening in order to detect and seize prohibited items and substances.

**Ensuring Security
against Terrorism in the
Transport Infrastructure
of the Russian Federation
Maksim LUKYANCHIKOV
(Federal Security Service)**

Mr. LUKYANCHIKOV posed the following question to the audience: what has the Federal Security Service done in the field of transport infrastructure security? The service is part of the multiagency National Transportation Security Committee. Some of the measures that have been endorsed since the Moscow Airport bombings are the mandatory certification of protective equipment and security systems, stricter responsibility for the organization and carrying out of screening procedures, governmental supervisory control of the transportation security provisions, introduction of ‘pilot areas’ for the testing of top-notch protective equipment and security systems. This has included the senior executive government authorities at the regional level. In total over 1,700 inspections were conducted resulting in approximately 500 notifications of security lapses being made to relevant stakeholders. These notifications eventually resulted in specific recommendations for the improvement of transportation security systems being implemented

The primary objectives of the Federal Security Services’ work are to form an adequate legal framework in support of transportation security, develop an appropriate level of professional skills for transportation security staffers, and introduce mandatory certification of legal entities dealing with transportation security matters. One of the avenues within which this is done is through information exchange

with NATO via the Protection of Transportation Working Group.

Session 4 Summary

There is no silver bullet when it comes to transportation security. In the aviation, maritime, rail and road sectors, the scale of CI is vast. There is again this recurring requirement for a multiagency and multisensor, layered approach that features physical protection offset by preventative and resilience measures. In the aviation sector, NATO has used technology proven in operations to support enhanced screening at civilian airports and continues to develop processes and equipment that may be of benefit. Especially when dealing with sectors that rely on the flow of goods and people, total security must be offset to a degree by business necessity. This makes prevention and resilience even more important.

**SESSION 5 – TECHNOLOGY
IN DEFENCE AGAINST
TERRORISM AND CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION**

**The Human Dimension
in the Protection of
Technological Infrastructure
Prof Mustafa KİBAROĞLU¹¹
(Bilkent University, Turkey)**

Professor KİBAROĞLU delivered a lecture on the human dimensions of protecting technological infrastructure, particularly those structures that involve WMD being used in terrorist events. He discussed the international treaties and national technical means that are in place to prevent scientific and technological infrastructure from falling into terrorist hands. Events using WMD have a low likelihood of occurrence but high consequences if successful

and that is why the protection of CBRN technology, materiel and knowledge is important. The key activity is to deny access, which requires physical protection of storage facilities and transportation routes but also guarding of intellectual materiel and persons with knowledge.

There are number of existing treaties – the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), the Biological Weapons Convention (1972) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) – which have had new elements added as the vulnerability of CBRN technology, materiel and knowledge has changed. International organizations, such as the IAEA with its illicit trafficking database, have a key role to play and collaboration between scientists and security practitioners is paramount to success.

SESSION 6 – MANAGING THE CONSEQUENCES OF A TERRORIST ATTACK ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Emergency Planning, Crisis Management, Disaster Preparedness and Response Procedures – Peter SANDERS¹² (UK Department for Business Innovation and Skills)

Mr. SANDERS opened with the phrase ‘failing to prepare is preparing to fail.’ If you fail to prepare then the consequences are often much worse. Often someone else’s problem quickly becomes yours. This is the start point for consequence management. It is important to first understand what a crisis might look like. It may include loss of life, loss/disruption of service or supply; a breakdown of normal systems and processes; a sudden lurch from normality to abnormality but also has other impacts such as

a loss of reputation with voters, shareholders and the media; financial loss; introduction of measures that may be necessary but unacceptable; require tough choices to be made; involve lawsuits and claims; give a perception that government has lost control or is not doing enough or was not prepared; result in a public inquiry or review, emergency powers and further regulation. The aim of crisis management is to provide stability and control.

The UK government follows seven principles of best practice when considering crisis management.

- Preparedness of both individuals and organizations using flexible, rehearsed plans.
- Continuity using existing structures but adapted to new circumstances.
- Direction from the top that gives clarity of purpose but devolves decision making down to the appropriate level.
- Integration of all stakeholders into the plan at an early stage.
- Communication that provide regular situation reports to all stakeholders and is two-way through constantly open channels.
- Cooperation that is proactive between all stakeholders.
- Anticipation_of risks, vulnerabilities, interdependencies, direct and indirect consequences, and technological developments.

A key strand in UK consequence management is engagement with industry. The majority of critical national infrastructure (CNI) is

owned by the private sector and it is the owners that are responsible for security and resilience.

As part of the cooperation strand, the UK also operates within NATO structures. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) is staffed 24/7 by NATO and partner countries. It has the ability to move Rapid Reaction Teams to a crisis within 24 hours. These teams can evaluate civil needs and capabilities to support a NATO operation or emergency and are comprised of civilian experts taken from the Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Committee. They are able to conduct assessments of civil requirements such as transport, communications and energy. Although they are non-deployable in a crisis situation, nations can also call upon Advisory Support Teams to support the planning and preparedness process. Finally, there is the Industrial Resources and Communications Services Group (IRCSG) that sits within the CEP framework. It is an ad hoc group on energy that conducts seminars addressing protective security in the electricity, gas and oil sectors. This has led to the appointment of energy security experts to a wider pool of civil experts that are available to advise both IRCSG and NATO as a whole.

**Risk Management,
Training, National and
International Coordination
Marybeth KELLIHER¹³ (US
Department for Homeland
Security)**

Ms KELLIHER provided an in-depth look at how the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) approaches CIP. Homeland Security

Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD 7): Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection (2003) established a national policy for federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize critical infrastructure and to protect them from terrorist attacks. It established the original 17, now 18, critical infrastructure and key resources sectors. The DHS has the lead in 11 of the 18 sectors but has a role under other lead departments in the other seven. Each of the 18 sectors has a coordination body that operates under the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC). This is made up of Government Coordinating Councils (GCCs) and the Federal Senior Leadership Council; Sector Coordinating Councils (SCCs) and Partnership for Critical Infrastructure; State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial GCC (SLTTGCC) and Regional Consortium Coordinating Council (RCCC) and underpinned by an Integrated Risk Management Framework. It must be noted that although the government can take punitive measures in some areas it is largely a voluntary activity that relies on the engagement of private sector and emergency responder community.

The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), the latest version of which was published in 2009, provides the unifying structure for the integration of efforts for the enhanced protection and resilience of the Nation's critical infrastructure and contributes to both steady-state risk management and incident management. The National Response Framework (NRF) guides how the Nation conducts all-hazards response. It documents the key response principles, roles and structures that organize national response and allows

first responders, decision makers, and supporting entities to provide a unified national response. The bridge between steady-state critical infrastructure protection and incident management, effectively the NIPP and NRF, is provided by the Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource (CIKR) Support Annex.

The US sees a mix of threats to its CIKR – biological, nuclear, chemical or terrorist attacks; accidents and disease outbreaks, and natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes. In addressing CIP, the government sets a number of national priorities. It must prevent catastrophic loss of life, manage cascading impacts on U.S. and global economies, and identify gaps, overlaps and shortfalls in protection. Its Critical Infrastructure Protection Framework provides for collaboration between federal departments, coordination with state and local governments, and information sharing with CI owners and operators who are responsible for the majority of the CI. In 2011 the National Protection and Programs Directorate initiated the Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Enhancement Initiative (CIRME) to enable the NIPP Partnership to strengthen the feedback loop among risk assessments, mitigation efforts, and outcomes; develop metrics that quantify the outcomes of risk mitigation efforts; demonstrate how activities are making critical infrastructure more secure; and address opportunities to improve critical infrastructure protection and resilience.

Crucial in making the partnership work are the 93 Protective Security Advisors (PSAs) and Regional Directors, including 87 field deployed

personnel, which serve as critical infrastructure security specialists. They provide state, local, tribal, and territorial links to DHS infrastructure protection resources and coordinate vulnerability assessments, IP product and services, and training. They also support resource, recovery, and reconstitution efforts of states affected by a disaster, provide a vital link for information sharing and assist facility owners and operators with obtaining security credentials. During contingency events, PSA's support the response, recovery and reconstitution efforts of the state(s) by serving as pre-designated Infrastructure Liaison Officers (ILOs) at the Joint Field Office (JFO). They have developed over 50,000 individual working relationships with federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial CI partners. All of this work is supported by the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) and Homeland Security Information Network – Critical Sectors (HSIN-CS) programs. The PCII Program is an important tool to encourage industry to share their sensitive critical infrastructure information. It provides the private sector with legal protections and 'peace of mind.' The HSIN-CS is DHS's primary technology tool for trusted information sharing. It enables direct communication between DHS, Federal, State and local government, and infrastructure owners and operators.

Summary Session 6

Critical Infrastructure Protection must be planned at the highest level. Governments need to have robust policies backed up by tried and tested procedures across all response agencies. Before 9/11, the United States had robust crisis management

procedures that were safety-related and focused on occupational and natural hazards. Post 9/11, these existing relationships were leveraged to work on the new policies and integrate the security issues. The terrorist only need to be lucky once and therefore preparation and planning are crucial activities. Nations must have comprehensive consequence management systems in place, threat and other sensitive information must be shared, and all departments must work and train together so they understand each other's capabilities and procedures.

SESSION 7 – PRACTICAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS)

**Best Practice, Lessons Learned, Experience Exchange and Potential for Cooperation
Capt (US Navy) Randy STROUD¹⁴ (COE-DAT)**

Capt STROUD set the scene for the summary of proceedings by putting the monthly human toll of terrorism into context. The figures for May 11 were 1589 killed, 2611 wounded and 100 abducted in 1135 attacks across 34 different countries.¹⁵ These figures are typical for most months. Terrorism is not new; it is an ancient phenomenon with a new lease on life. The media age has increased the impact of terrorist events. Before television, internet, video phones, etc., terrorism was perhaps reported globally but experienced locally. In today's 'information age' terrorism is

now reported globally immediately and also experienced globally. In 500 BC Sun Tzu wrote 'kill one – frighten a thousand'; in 2011 we have seen an exponential increase in the impact of event – 'Kill One – Frighten MILLIONS!'

Terrorism usually employs tactical actions to achieve strategic outcomes. Future challenges may see this goal being pursued via increased targeting of Critical Infrastructure; increased exploitation of cyber vulnerabilities; increased efforts with respect to WMD terrorism and the targeting of key maritime nodes/capabilities, especially in the energy sector.

Throughout the conference, the recurring best practices that have been featured time and again have been the need to continually assess threats, vulnerabilities and likely consequences as they are dynamic; conduct of risk management and risk assessment; focus on prevention and create resilience; be proactive vice reactive and, for example, attack networks; the need for legal and regulatory frameworks; plan and then plan some more; and train for all eventualities through computer simulations, exercises, etc so as to be ready and aware. Finally the overarching lessons learned were the existence of multiple and shared concerns with respect to Critical Infrastructure - cyber threats, transportation security, energy security, threats to population centres, traditional and non-traditional terrorists threats...and more; and shared perceptions – we are all on same planet. A threat to Russian Critical Infrastructure is also a threat to NATO and vice versa.

¹⁴ (USA N) Deputy Director COE-DAT

¹⁵ (Figures compiled monthly by COE-DAT Information Collection and Management Centre.)

¹⁶ (TUR Civ)


**Closing Remarks
Mr Sabri ERGEN¹⁶ (Head
of Counter Terrorist Section
ESCD)**

Following Capt Stroud's summary of the main outcomes of the conference, Mr ERGEN closed the proceedings. He was pleased by the level of open and frank discussion that had been generated both inside and out of the lecture theatre. He stressed that the conference had

been a key event in work for the joint NATO/Russia action plan on terrorism and that interdependence of cyberspace and wider CI was the 'game changer' now that so much is computer-controlled. The final take away was that experience, lessons and technology from an operational military environment have increased utility in the civilian CI realm.

Book Review “The New Age of TERRORISM and the International Political System”

Maj. Arno Jansen*



The New Age of **TERRORISM** and the **International Political System**, Adrian Guelke. published by I.B. Tauris, 2009, 238 pp, ISBN: 978-1-84511-803-7.

The author, Adrian GUELKE, is Professor of Comparative Politics at the Centre for the Study of Ethnic Conflict, Queens University, Belfast.

He is the author of *South Africa in Transition* and *Terrorism and Global Disorder*.

Did the 9/11 attacks on the US usher in a new age of mass-casualty terrorism and war on “terrorist groups of a global reach”? Adrian Guelke questions whether terrorism has evolved into a new form of political violence or whether it remains essentially unchanged, with violent acts by small groups pursuing their struggles against ‘imperialism’ and the West. He explores the varying perceptions of, and reactions to, violent acts in the developed and developing worlds both within and across national boundaries in order to examine how ‘terrorist’ groups join the peace process and take their place in state, society and “legitimate” government.

This stimulating and strongly-argued interpretation of terrorism uncovers its theoretical and practical mainsprings and shows that 9/11, the subsequent attacks in London, Madrid, Bali, and even the concept of a global war on terrorism, may have changed perceptions and increased the fear of mass casualties, but have not altered its basic nature. The study is now even more vital for students,

policymakers, those involved in politics and conflict resolution and, especially, general readers.

- An Air France plane was hijacked at Algiers airport.
- The presidential candidate of Sri Lanka’s United National Party, Gamini Dissanayake was assassinated.
- A British tourist was shot dead during a trip to the ancient temple of Luxor in Egypt.
- Three Westerners were taken hostage and then murdered in Cambodia.
- A bomb destroyed a commuter plane in Panama, killing 21 passengers. This incident was linked to an attack the previous day on a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires, Argentina, which killed 96 people.

These examples, all taken from the second half of 1994, suggest that it would be extremely foolhardy to suggest that an end to the age of terrorism was in prospect.

Yet other events of 1994 suggested a world that had moved on. Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as president of a democratic, non-racial South Africa, with scarcely a murmur from white supremacists. Yasser Arafat received the Nobel Peace Prize. There were ceasefires by Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. Carlos the Jackal was arrested in Sudan and then extradited to France. At the same time, the genocide in Rwanda, the civil war in Angola, and the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union were not the mark of a world at peace. However, by and large, the term ‘terrorism’ was not applied to these horrors.

* (Royal NLD Marechaussee), COE-DAT Policy Officer.

The notion that we live in an age of terrorism which began in the late 1960s became prevalent during the 1970s. This book examines the basis of that perception. It also contends that the notion of an age of terrorism is fading, partly because of changing meanings and applications of the term 'terrorism' and partly because of changes of policy by governments in their handling of clandestine violence by small groups. The starting point of the book is an analysis of the concept of terrorism itself. One reason why so much of the literature on terrorism is held in such contempt is precisely that it takes the issue for granted, despite the fact that it is evident, on very little reflection, just how slippery the concept is. Where a definition of the term is given, it all too frequently bears little relationship to the nature of the violence discussed. In particular, a literal definition, that the purpose of terrorism is to induce fear, is often used and then applied to the clandestine violence of small groups, a form of violence plainly less terrifying than overt violence on a mass scale.

- Chapter 1 - Barriers to Understanding Terrorism – examines difficulties in the way of understanding the concept of terrorism in the light of the emotive force of the term.
- Chapter 2 - Distinguishing Terrorism from Other Forms of Violence – analyses attempts by academics to distinguish terrorism from other forms of violence.
- Chapter 3 - The Poverty of General Explanations – examines critically the generalizations

that have been made about the subject.

- Chapter 4 - Varieties of Terrorism – explores the different strands of political violence in the late 1960s and early 1970s that gave rise to the modern usage of the term.
- Chapter 5 - The Legitimization of Terrorism – analyses the background to the legitimization of violence by small groups at the onset of the age of terrorism.
- Chapter 6 - On the Fringe: Political Violence in Stable Democracies – examines the case of terrorism in West Germany.
- Chapter 7 - Bomb Culture: The Case of Northern Ireland – tackles the very different case of Northern Ireland.
- Chapter 8 - Violence, Inequality, and the Third World – considers the application of the concept of terrorism to conflicts in the Third World.
- Chapter 9 - The International Dimensions of Terrorism – looks at why an international dimension is so central to terrorism.
- Chapter 10 - Stopping Terrorism – examines the issue of stopping of terrorism, discussing the evolution of international law and employing case studies to analyze factors that have influenced the ends of campaigns of violence.
- Chapter 11 - The End of Terrorism? – explores the relationship between the age of terrorism and the nature of the international political system.

The future of terrorism

Epilogue of the writer

Current public alarm over terrorism is driven primarily by the fear of future attacks as lethal as, or more lethal than, the 9/11 attacks or the other mass-casualty attacks that have taken place in recent years. Since whether and how many attacks of this type will take place may depend on political developments that have not yet happened, it would be extremely foolish for any analyst to rule out such possibilities. Thus, the claim that another 9/11, let alone an attack on a lesser scale than the July 2005 bombs in London, could not happen, might be proven false before any readers had even picked up the book in which the statement was made. By contrast, the assertion that a dirty bomb attack on a major city that might affect hundreds of thousands of people is inevitable is impossible to disprove in the absence of an explicit time limit on the prediction. As in other fields of human activity, predicting the worst, insofar as that resonates with people's fears, is much more credible than making the opposite assumption.

However, before considering further the problem of how to assess the prospects of future terrorism, it is worth considering what has so far happened in the years since 9/11 and the anthrax attacks that followed in its wake. The absence of terrorism on any scale in the United States in the five years from the beginning of January 2002 to the end of December 2006 is striking. There were two major attacks during that period on countries belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and part of the 'Coalition of the Willing in Iraq': the attack on Madrid killing 191 people and the London bombings in which

a total of 56 people died, including the four perpetrators. Admittedly, in the same period, there were a number of near misses in which bombs that had been placed failed to detonate. Several plots were also uncovered; although it is open to question how many of these were ever likely to have come to fruition, failing their discovery, since in a number of these cases, the intentions of the would-be perpetrators do not appear to have been matched by the technical proficiency to achieve their plans.

From the perspective of 2007, 9/11 now looks like the culmination of al-Qaeda's efforts to attack the American mainland rather than the opening shot in a campaign of violence directed against the United States, as it seemed at the time. Further, the subsequent attacks on Madrid and London appear to have been a response to the conduct of the global war on terror, especially what the author called the 'misconceived invasion of Iraq,' rather than an extension of al-Qaeda's strategy of attacking the 'far enemy.' Of course, this is not an especially reassuring conclusion insofar as it suggests that there may be more attacks as a reaction to the global war on terror, particularly if there are further large losses of civilian life in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. To the cases of Madrid and London, one should add the considerable number of attacks on tourists that have taken place since 9/11. The most lethal of these was the truck bomb attacks on nightclubs in Bali that killed over 200 people in October 2002. Almost all of these attacks have taken place in countries in which the majority of the population is Muslim. Consequently, there is some ambiguity as to whether they should be seen as intended

to complement al-Qaeda's global strategy or as the independent actions of jihadist groups pursuing nationally-based strategies. The adoption of the tactic of mass casualty terrorism is very disturbing in either event. So too is the widespread use of the tactic in the context of the ongoing conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel/Palestine, and parts of India and Russia. The obvious danger is that if the tactic is perceived as having successfully contributed to a desired political outcome, it will prompt imitators.

In this context, it is worth emphasizing that the analysis of human behaviour is entirely different from the study, say, of hurricanes and earthquakes. In the case of natural events, historical regularities provide an obvious starting point for assumptions about their future occurrence. At the same time, there is virtually nothing that the authorities or anyone else can do to affect the incidence of hurricanes and earthquakes. By contrast, previous experience and the calculations derived from it profoundly influence human behaviour. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify some common characteristics in the responses of government when confronted with new forms of violence. Typically, at the onset of a campaign of violence, the authorities seek to eliminate the new threat directly through acting against those responsible. The effort to uproot al-Qaeda in 2001 through military action to derive the organization of its safe haven in Afghanistan fits this pattern. Measures of suppression, including the authorization of harsh interrogation techniques and extended detention of suspects without recourse to ordinary courts, form another characteristic

response to the emergence of a new threat. Thus, the approach of the Bush Administration to 9/11 or, for that matter, that of the British government in the wake of the London attacks in July 2005 is far from being unprecedented. The justification of extreme measures as necessary to reassure public opinion has also been a recurring theme in many such situations.

What is very commonly lacking is recognition on the part of governments facing a new threat of how their own responses may influence the behaviour of their adversaries or affect the capacity of their enemies to secure support for their actions. This is particularly pertinent in the case of mass-casualty terrorism, since intrinsically such action is very difficult to legitimize. For example, throughout its campaign of violence in Northern Ireland, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) maintained that it only attacked what it described as legitimate targets. Its notion of what constituted a legitimate target was quite elastic and even so its actions from time to time breached its own guidelines of what constituted justifiable violence. Nevertheless, it was part of the mode of operation of the Provisional IRA that warnings were given of bomb attacks to minimize civilian casualties. In practice, bungled or inadequate warnings meant that there were many civilian casualties of bomb attacks in the course of the Provisional IRA's long war. However, unlike al-Qaeda, the Provisional IRA did not generally seek to maximize civilian casualties. While it might be argued at a stretch that the passengers on board the jets hijacked on 9/11 were incidental to an attack on targets chosen for their

symbolic significance, the Madrid and London bombings in their direct targeting of ordinary commuters accurately epitomize the totally indiscriminate character of the mass casualty terrorism practiced by al-Qaeda and the network of global jihadists.

Al-Qaeda has sought to justify such deaths by repeated references to the high civilian death toll as a result of wars affecting the Muslim world, including currently the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The theme of avenging deaths in these wars can be also found in many of the statements of those who have volunteered for suicide missions. While such statements should not necessarily be taken at face value, evidence from acquaintances of bombers has tended to confirm the importance of this as a factor in the recruitment of volunteers to the global jihad. An important implication is that in the absence of ongoing wars causing high civilian casualties and involving foreign forces, it would be much more difficult, and perhaps impossible, for mass casualty terrorism to be legitimized outside arenas of violent conflict. Oblique recognition of this point is to be found in the emphasis that leading Western governments have placed on their role as defenders of Muslim communities in the Balkans, as a way of countering al-Qaeda's propaganda that the West is engaged in a new crusade against Muslims.

Admittedly, how al-Qaeda seeks to legitimize mass casualty terrorism does not explain why the organization adopted the strategy of attacking the 'far enemy.' It is possible that the calculation by bin Laden was

that America's aversion to casualties would prompt a U.S. withdrawal from conflicts in the Muslim world. If so, it was a huge miscalculation. But another possibility is that bin Laden intended to provoke a strong reaction from the United States on the assumption that this would reinvigorate the Islamist cause, as well as undermine the position of pro-Western regimes in the Muslim world in the process. And even if this was not his original intention, it may now form a rationale for continuance of the strategy. Hitherto, the question of strategy has been a neglected subject in the analysis of the phenomenon of mass casualty terrorism. Since terrorism is not, in general, a pathological phenomenon but involves purposive political behaviour, it cannot be sustained by any group without some notion of how it might advance the group's political cause. To justify their violence to themselves requires that the terrorists believe it ultimately to be an effective means to a legitimate end. Of course, in reaching that conclusion they may operate under what most other people would regard as a highly-skewed view of reality. Commonly, that will lead to miscalculations of the consequences of terrorism, but that has the obvious implication that to justify continuing a campaign the group may have to adjust its strategy; continuing failure to make headway in achieving the group's objectives may lead to further adjustments. But in the long run, it may prove simply impossible to sustain belief in the effectiveness of the campaign. No politically motivated group would be likely to persist in killing people without such a belief.

Assertions by Western governments warning the public to expect the jihadist campaign of mass casualty

terrorism to last a generation or longer do not appear to be based on any profound understanding of what the leaders of al-Qaeda or other jihadists might hope to achieve through seeking to sustain such a campaign over such a long period. Rather, such predictions seem to be made simply in order to justify the open-ended nature of the restrictions on civil liberties which have been introduced in the name of combating terrorism. In fact, so far very little attention seems to have been paid to the strategic thinking underlying mass casualty terrorism. Indeed, if it had, it would hardly be possible to make sense of the Bush Administration's conduct of the global war on terror. Thus, the use made by the Bush Administration of 9/11 to forward the pre-existing foreign policy agenda of the neoconservatives and their project for a new American century by invading Iraq not merely lent verisimilitude throughout the Arab and Muslim world to bin Laden's lurid picture of Western intentions, but ultimately also undermined the efforts to uproot al-Qaeda from Afghanistan and Pakistan in the wake of the fall of the Taliban regime.

Almost as damaging as the intervention in Iraq has been the violence resulting from the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the outset of his presidency, George W. Bush appeared indifferent to the breakdown of the peace process that had occurred in 2000 and his government did nothing to try to revive negotiations between the parties. Wiser counsel had just started to prevail when 9/11 abruptly undercut plans for a fresh initiative to relaunch the peace process. After that, the priority given by the Bush Administration to domestic political

opinion, as well as the influence of neoconservatives hostile to the very concept of a Middle East peace process under existing circumstances, ensured that no constructive effort was made by the Administration to address the problem. The issue has been further complicated by internal Palestinian divisions, underlined by the victory of the Islamist party, Hamas, in elections in the Palestinian Authority in 2006. At the same time, the Israeli government has been weakened by the failure of its 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Such circumstances hardly seem propitious for a comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

A further factor that has led Western governments to respond counterproductively to the threat posed by mass casualty terrorism has been the influence of political considerations, with the pursuit of partisan advantage and the perceived need to assuage an outraged public being given much greater weight than objective assessment of the likely effectiveness of the measures proposed. The inhuman treatment of individuals who have not been convicted of any crime has been deeply damaging to the reputations of both the British and American governments, while adding grist to the mill of al-Qaeda propagandists. Because public opinion is deeply hostile both to the methods of the "global jihadists" and to their religious beliefs, governments have too easily fallen into the mistake of conflating extremist views with a readiness to perpetrate acts of mass casualty terrorism. Glossing over the distinction is to the benefit of al-Qaeda, as it adds credibility to their narrative of the persecution

of Muslims for seeking to put their religious principles into practice. Another mistake that governments have made is to confuse the tiny numbers of global jihadists that threaten Western societies with the Islamist protagonists in internal conflicts who do not pursue their objectives by solely violent means. One consequence may well be to enhance the popularity of Islamist political parties in Muslim countries as a reaction to Western attitudes.

The above discussion has highlighted the importance of political factors in accounting for the rise and fall of terrorist campaigns. While the methods associated with terrorism can be adopted by any group or even by disaffected individuals, for the most part, it is a political phenomenon. In this context, the distinction between religious and secular terrorists is less important than it appears, since both generally employ violence instrumentally for the achievement of results in this world. An implication of this analysis is that politics will also determine the future of terrorism. As few forms of human activity are as unpredictable as politics, this explains why it is so difficult to forecast the future course of terrorism. But what should also be rejected is the fatalistic attitude that politics is incapable of bringing an end to terrorist campaigns.

Conclusion

This book analyses what perhaps might now be called the first age of terrorism that got under way in the late 1960s and appeared to be abating in the 1990s with the era of peace processes that followed the end of the Cold War. There is some good news to report. South Africa has remained politically stable since its transitions to democracy in 1994. In Northern

Ireland, a political settlement to underwrite the paramilitary ceasefires of 1994 was achieved in 1998, though in this case it took another nine years for the settlement to take root. Unfortunately, the most important of these processes with the greatest influence on the use of political violence by non-state actors, the attempt to secure a permanent settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, ended in failure. But if the reader is required to take into account the repercussions of that failure when considering the book's conclusions, the rest of the analysis retains its contemporary significance. This includes the need to consider the different meanings and connotations that the word terrorism has acquired over the years. It is also vitally important that the immense normative power of the term is understood – in particular, the virtually invariable implication that the violence in question is absolutely illegitimate. Much of the discussion of these issues in the book has become more rather than less relevant as a result of events in the first decade of the new millennium. This is also true of the analysis of how terrorist campaigns end and the different approaches that can be adopted to combat terrorism. It remains the case that compounding the anger and disgust that terrorism arouses is not merely the intrinsic nature of the acts themselves but the distance between the means being used by the perpetrators and the ends for which they are being used, so that the suffering caused by terrorist acts is made worse by the fact that they seem utterly incapable of yielding any positive results, from any political perspective. The violence of global jihadists directed indiscriminately at the citizens of

large Western metropolises virtually represents the total embodiment of this futility. Indeed, the violence of self-described national liberation movements that limited their violence to particular territories seems rational and calibrated by comparison. However, the requirement to understand the mindsets of the perpetrators is the same in either case, so that the purpose for which violence is employed, as well as how it is legitimized, is better understood. Without that understanding, mistakes will continue to be made in how terrorism is countered that are likely to exacerbate rather than ameliorate the treat.

Bruce Hoffman, Intelligence and National Security:


“Worth reading for the fresh perspective it brings to a poorly understood phenomenon. Guelke brings uncommon rigour and insight to this work ... challenges many long-held assumptions and forces the readers to consider the concept of terrorism in a new and more critical light.”

Financial Times:

“In lucid and rational arguments ... Guelke asks whether the very term ‘terrorism’ can still have a clear meaning and whether it is rendered less effective as a political weapon by the rehabilitation of former terrorists as modern-day statesmen.”

COE-DAT PUBLICATIONS “DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM”

Edited by COE-DAT
Published by IOS Press
NATO Science for Peace
and Security Series
(E: Human and Societal
Dynamics-Vol.84)



This book “Defence Against Terrorism” contains the lectures presented at the Advanced Training Course (ATC) which was conducted in Amman, Jordan, on 03-07 January 2010. This ATC was organized by the Ankara-based Centre of Excellence–Defence against Terrorism (COE–DAT), which was inaugurated in 2005 with the purpose of supporting NATO on defence issues related to terrorism.

Turkey is the Framework Nation and currently seven other nations also contribute staff and funds: Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Romania, the United Kingdom and the United States. Each year, COE–DAT organizes several ATCs, workshops and courses to bring academicians and terrorism experts to interested parties in NATO countries, Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries, and Mediterranean Dialogue Countries, ICI Countries, and others.

This book comprises 8 chapters containing the lectures during the ATC. The presenters are both academics and practitioners, selected for their expertise in matters related to terrorism.

The papers cover the main areas taking into account the various dimensions, theoretical, historical and practical aspects, and the defence against it.

The first chapter by Ms. Zeynep SÜTALAN aims to provide a general framework for understanding the history and causes of terrorism rather than proposing methods to cope with them. It is hard to identify one specific cause or a few specific causes that can

completely account for all terrorism. Different types of terrorism in different cases can derive from different causes. Despite the difficulty in identifying causes of terrorism, a comprehensive approach towards the political, social and economic environment where terrorism is likely to flourish may result in fruitful outcomes for combating terrorism.

The second chapter by Major Julian CHARVAT is written from several NATO briefing documents regarding the Alliance’s fight against terrorism that have been published on the NATO website or other NATO briefing documents. A brief overview of Alliance anti-terrorism operations and their objectives is given in addition to details of organization policy and guidance. The need to constantly evaluate NATO strategies to deal with the problem of terrorism is emphasized.

The third chapter by Major Barbaros Hayrettin ŞENERDEM emphasizes the importance of providing a platform to present details of the relationship consisting of three parties (government, public and media) in order to deeply understand the expectations of each party so that appropriate measures in defence against terrorism through the media can be described. Throughout history, terrorism has made use of communications with an increasing trend of advancing technology in order to have a catalyst effect for terrorist acts. Unfortunately, since the means of communication serve the commercial interests of players in the media, a by-product of the catalyst effect seems to be a symbiotic relationship formed between each party. At the point of breaking the relationship, governments enter

the scene and intervene in it. While doing that, governments actually have experience to avoid the vulnerabilities of democracies that serve the freedom of expression for the media. Therefore, it is necessary to open the media's eyes to make them choose a balanced way to defend against terrorism.

The fourth chapter again by Major Julian CHARVAT takes a look at the "Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Terrorism" and discusses the possible intentions of terrorist groups to use WMDs and the possibilities they may have for obtaining them. A WMD attack on a city target would potentially be one of the most devastating types of terrorist attack possible. Not only would the potential physical damage be significant but the psychological effects of a WMD or suspected WMD would be far greater than that of a conventional attack. It will also discuss NATO's response to a WMD threat and the capabilities it has to prevent and deal with any such action.

The fifth chapter by Prof. Nicholas RIDLEY starts by providing an overview of initial international reactions to the problem of combating terrorist financing in the post-9/11 environment. It then examines more recent obstacles to solving the problem including finding agreement on the definitions of terrorism and identifying terrorist activities among other criminal financial dealings, the latter issue being the main focus of this presentation.

The sixth chapter by Dr. Vesna MARKOVIC describes a growing trend in the establishment of relationships between organized crime groups and terrorist organizations. Various types of criminal activities that

terror organizations have been found to have been involved with are detailed in a series of case studies. These case studies describe involvement in various smuggling activities including cigarettes, drugs, arms, counterfeit products, and people. A call is made for greater attention to this problem and international action to prevent it.

The seventh chapter by Major A. Aykut ÖNCÜ examines the role and place of strategic communications in combating terrorism. The chapter outlines what strategic communications are and argues that strategic communications must be regarded as a fundamental element for all efforts in combating terrorism. Mutual understanding and listening will help us to understand the real causes of problems and show us the way to solve them.

The last chapter again by Ms. Zeynep SÜTALAN discusses future trends in terrorism by looking at the changing profile of terrorism with regards to ideology, organization and structure as well as the means and methods used in terrorism. Ms. Sütalan points out how the ideologies used by terrorist organizations, together with their goals and motivations, have changed. She elaborates how the organizational structure of terrorist organizations has changed with reference to the network and hierarchical structures of terrorist organizations. Ms. Sütalan looks at the means and methods of terrorist organizations with special attention to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bombing. Other features of terrorism like cyber terrorism, the growing interconnectedness and interdependency between organized crime and terrorism and the nexus

between piracy and terrorism is also addressed. As the final part, Ms. Sütalan touches upon NATO's study on Multiple Futures, which is about the future threats that the Alliance will be facing in the 21st century. In this context, she argues that there is both change and continuity in terrorism since it is a historical phenomenon and intends to contribute to the discussions on the future of terrorism.

By the collection of these articles in a book, it is intended to cover many different perspectives on terrorism and create an awareness of this growing problem. The sharing and dissemination of knowledge, experience and perspectives on different parts of terrorism allows for further consideration and improvement in our systems of defence against terrorism, and creating and improving the authorities' and systems responsible for responding to related risks. We hope that the content of this volume will be useful and informative for a much greater time and to a greater audience.

COE-DAT ACTIVITIES

1

The Head of Operations of Mauritania General Staff; Col. Brahim Vall Ould CHEIBANY and a delegation with him visited COE-DAT on 05 July 2011.

**2**

MG. Shahid Ahmad HASHMAT from Pakistan General Staff and a delegation with him visited COE-DAT on 05 July 2011.



3

COE-DAT conducted an Advanced Training Course on “Defence against Terrorism” on 26-30 September 2011 in Montenegro. The course covered the following topic areas: Terrorism overview; history, definition and root causes, terrorist’s motivation, dynamics of ideology and target selection, legal aspects of combating terrorism, role of intelligence in DAT, terrorism and media, public relations and information management, terrorism and crisis management, NATO’s counter-terrorism policy, crisis management, combating the financing of terrorism (legal responses), cyber terrorism, WMD terrorism, suicide bombing, energy security, border/transport security and critical infrastructure protection in DAT and future trends in terrorism. There were 33 participants from four countries and 11 lecturers from five countries.

Future ACTIVITIES

- 1** COE-DAT is going to conduct a **Course** on “Terrorism and Media” on 10-14 October 2011 in Ankara / Turkey. The course intends to understand the perspectives of terrorists, the media and government for terrorism; enable effective support through understanding ways that terrorist organizations use the established media to increase awareness of their ideological goals; develop effective measures in combating terrorism through the media; find a balance between security and freedom of the media.
 - 2** COE-DAT is organizing an **Advanced Training Course** on ”Defense Against Terrorism” on 24-28 October 2011 in Algeria. The course intends to discuss and understand the current terrorism threats; examine strategies in different fields to combat terrorism; study the existing institutional and conceptual gaps in combating terrorism.
 - 3** COE-DAT is going to carry out an **Advanced Research Workshop** on “Dimensions of Technology in Defence against Terrorism” on 2-3 November 2011 in Ankara / Turkey. The purpose of the workshop is to equip the student on the dimensions of technology in DAT which has never been seen and underline the technological reasons that cause the current situation; to categorize the contributions of technological improvements on terrorism and counter maneuver.
 - 4** COE-DAT is going to conduct a **Course** on “Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism” on 21-25 November 2011 in Ankara / Turkey. The course intends to examine NBC weapons and missile proliferation in historical context; be aware of the regional implications of WMD; work on terrorism and WMD: How credible is the threat; study agreements against WMD and missile proliferation and NATO Policy.examine the best possible ways to combating terrorism.
 - 5** COE-DAT is going to carry out an **Advanced Research Workshop** on “Intelligence Sharing and Terrorism” on 7-8 December 2011 in Ankara / Turkey. The workshop intends to analyze the current intelligence sharing in NATO on Defense against Terrorism: Intelligence collection, analysis, and sharing; discuss sharing intelligence between governmental agencies; overview on counterintelligence measures.
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