CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE
DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM

COE-DAT
Newsletter

Volume 3 / Issue 17 / October-December 2010

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Editorial

The seventeenth issue of COE-DAT Newsletter begins with an overview of the terrorist incidents that took place throughout the world over the last quarter of 2010. This is followed by an article on NATO's role in Dense Against Terrorism, a review of the successful "Trends and Developments in Contemporary Terrorism" workshop held here at COE-DAT, and a review of the book *Countering the Financing of Terrorism* by Thomas J.BIERSTEKER & Sue E.ECKERT. Last, the newsletter provides a brief summary of recently completed and future activities of the Centre.

The article, NATO's Role in Defence Against Terrorism, is written by the capabilities department of COE-DAT. The article covers the historical development of NATO's role in defence against terrorism, the NATO concept studies on terrorism which drive NATO actions and force structure, and whether or not new strategic concept will create radical changes in NATO's struggle against terrorism. The article focuses primarily on the 1999 and the 2010 Strategic Concept Studies, and NATO's efforts in capacity building and close cooperation.

In October 2010, COE-DAT held the NATO Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) "Trends and Developments in Contemporary Terrorism 2010". The paneled workshop was directed by COL Dan-Radu VOICA and LTC Adil DUYAN with the aim of focusing on the current developments of recent terrorism, both actual and potential, in order to look at how current policies and practices in Defense Against Terrorism could be adjusted or improved to meet and defeat these developments. Prof Dr. Yonah ALEXANDER, the Director of Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, led off the two day workshop with his keynote address on the current threat posed by terrorist organizations and their future activity. The article provides a short summary of the event and the conclusions of the panels. The complete findings of the workshop will be published as a book in the 2011.

LTC.Ergün ERÜN reviews *Countering the Financing of Terrorism* (Routledge Press, 2008). A book which begins with the social organization of terrorism and its backgrounds, moves to an analysis of the financial organization of terrorists, and concludes with articles on the current responses to fighting the financial dimension of terrorism.

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General Overview of Terrorist Activities (Oct.– Dec. 2010)

LTC Ergün Erün *

Cvl Aslıhan Sevim **

In the last quarter of 2010, terrorist incidents increased roughly 2%, totaling 2,924[1] versus 2, 869 from the third quarter of 2010. In this last quarter of 2010, 63 countries were afflicted by terrorist attacks versus 58 in the third quarter of 2010. These 2,924 terrorist attacks resulted in 3,790 lives lost and 6,502 people injured. Also, 755 people were abducted by unknown assailants during the period. The deadliest attack for the period was a suicide attack in Pakistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, on November 5. More than 90 people lost their lives and 72 others were wounded in the attack. The blast took place at a time when 300 people were offering Friday prayers in the Darra Adam Khel district.[2]

On November 5, suicide attack claimed 95 lives and 72 injuries in Darra Adam Khel district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan.

Another deadly attack for the quarter was an **improvised explosive device** (IED) attack in Iraq, in the capital city of Baghdad, on November 2. 64 persons were killed and 360 were wounded in 15 explosions in separate parts of Baghdad. In that attack, twelve car bombs, two explosive charges and a sticky bomb went off in different parts of Baghdad, including the Khadhimiya, Zuhour, Ur, Sadr City, Bayaa, Shula, Ghazaliyah, Jihad and Yarmouk districts.[3]

IED attacks in Baghdad claimed 64 lives and 360 injuries on November 2.

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1 *All figures mentioned in the report are obtained from open sources and any dispute in figures used in similar works is a matter of reader capability to obtain the same data. Neither NATO nor COE-DAT is responsible for any disputes but acknowledges responsibility for the resulting analysis.*

2 *Pakistan map, (accessed November 5, 2010; available from http://images.google.com.tr/imgurl=http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk*

3 *Iraq Map, (accessed October 25, 2005); available from http://images.google.com.tr/imgurl=http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk.*

Furthermore, another deadly attack occurred in Iraq on October 31.[4] The attack was a clash, in capital city Baghdad, where security forces backed by coalition forces conducted a hostage release operation after gunmen attacked and abducted approximately 120 civilians in a Christian church. During the hostage release operation, 58 people lost their lives and 75 others were wounded.

On October 31, hostage release operation claimed 58 lives and 75 injuries including policemen in Baghdad.

As usual, **Iraq** suffered by far the most with 762 separate attacks claiming 683 lives and injuring 3,173 others, along with 14 others abducted, during the last quarter of 2010. The level of violence in Iraq decreased roughly 9% compared to the previous quarter and accounted for 26% of total attacks, 18% of the total fatalities, and 33% of the total casualties in worldwide terrorist incidents. The capital city, Baghdad, saw the most attacks with 343 separate terrorist incidents, claiming 289 lives and wounding 1,242 people, included five abducted. The second most hit city in Iraq for the period was Mosul with 163 separate terrorist attacks. In Mosul, the attacks caused 109 dead and 229 wounded, included one abducted.

The deadliest attack in Iraq was a 2 November suicide attack in the capital city Baghdad. At least 60 people were killed and 360 wounded when coordinated IED attacks were triggered, while a 31 October clash erupted after a hostage release operation and claimed 58 lives and 75 injured. In addition, 25 people lost their lives and 70 others wounded in a suicide bombing attack in southwestern Diala province on October 29. The bomber, wearing an explosive belt, blew himself up inside a popular coffee shop in the town of Balad Ruz, east of Baquba.[5]

Suicide attack in Balad Ruz inside a cafè, east of Baquba claimed 25 lives and 70 injuries on October 29.

4 *Iraq map, (accessed October 12, 2005); available from http://images.google.com.tr/imgress?imgurl=http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk.*
5 *Iraq Map, (accessed January 22, 2007); available from http://images.google.com.tr/imgress?imgurl=http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk*



	Country	Number of Attacks	K	W	A
1	Iraq	762	683	2,173	14
2	Afghanistan	571	690	763	92
3	Pakistan	448	758	1,138	79
4	India	313	212	238	74
5	Somalia	96	482	719	281
6	Philippines	86	86	95	30
7	Russia	81	50	83	0
8	Mexico	78	243	132	4
9	Thailand	72	61	88	0
10	Colombia	66	97	144	38

Table 1 - **The Most Hit Countries Worldwide during Last quarter of 2010.**

In the last quarter of 2010 violence decreased roughly 21% in Afghanistan. There, 571 attacks were recorded during the quarter versus 731 in the third quarter of 2010. These 571 attacks claimed 690 lives and injured 763, along with 92 people being abducted, during the period.

The deadliest attack for Afghanistan in the last quarter of 2010 was an IED attack in Helmand province in southern Afghanistan on December 11, that claimed 15 lives and four injured.[6] A roadside bomb struck a mini-bus that the victims were riding in, when it triggered a landmine and caused the casualties.



6 *Afghanistan Map (accessed November 15, 2010) http://www.google.com.tr/imgurl=http://bp.blogspot.com/qhnI/helmand_map*

In addition, a bomb blast tore through a minibus in western Afghanistan, killing 14 members of the same family and injuring four others. The incident took place in Kushki Kuhna district, north of Herat province, close to Afghanistan's border with Turkmenistan.[7]

IED attack in Herat province left 14 dead and four wounded on December 16.

Another deadly attack was a 20 October IED attack in Nimroz province. Fourteen members of a wedding party were killed when the van they were traveling in struck a roadside bomb in Dilaram district of the southwestern Nimroz province. The blast took place on the Herat-Zaranj Highway. The toll was 10 civilians injured in the blast.[8]

IED attack in Nimroz province claimed 14 lives and 10 injuries on October 20

Moreover, suicide attacks in Paktika province resulted in 12 deaths and 16 wounded on November 27. Two suicide bombers wearing police uniforms blew themselves up at an Afghan police headquarters in the eastern Paktika province, a deadly border region. The Taliban claimed responsibility for these attacks. Both men wore police uniforms and made it through three security gates before reaching the main building in

7 *Kabul map, available from http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/45040000/gif/_45040017_afghan_Kandahar _2209.gif*
8 *Nimroz Map, available from http://www.google.com.tr/imgres?imgurl=http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/48512000*

the police compound. One attacker detonated his explosives inside the police headquarters building, while the other blew himself up near the entrance. The blasts went off within 20 minutes of each other.[9]

Suicide attacks in Paktika province left 12 dead and 16 injuries on November 27.

In **Pakistan,** violence increased 12% compared to the previous quarter, where 448 terrorist incidents were recorded during the last quarter of 2010 versus 391 in the third quarter of 2010. These attacks claimed 758 lives and caused 1,138 casualties, along with 79 others abducted.

Suicide attacks decreased roughly 20% in Pakistan where 14 suicide attacks were recorded during the quarter versus 18 in the third quarter of 2010. Of these, 269 people were killed and 582 were wounded in these 14 suicide attacks.

The deadliest attack in Pakistan for the last quarter of 2010 was a suicide attack in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province on November 5, mentioned in the first page. Also, December 6 suicide attacks in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) caused 50 dead and 120 wounded. The target was the jirga (Tribal council) being held outside the office of the assistant political agent, Mohmand Agency, at Ghalanai, the headquarters of Mohmand Agency, in FATA. Among the dead were 12 Government officials and two television journalists. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for the attack.[10]

Suicide attack in FATA, Mohmand Agency caused 50 dead and 120 wounded on December 6 in Pakistan.

9 *Paktika Map, available from http://www.google.com.tr/imgres?imgurl=http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/48512000*
10 *FATA Map, available from http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/41932000/gif/41932036/Pakistan/203.gif*

Another suicide attack happened in Bajaur Agency on December 25. A female suicide bomber ripped though a gathering of conflict-affected people waiting to receive food in Bajaur Agency, killing at least 42 people, including women and children, and injuring more than 70 others. The suicide attack took place at a food distribution center being run by the World Food Organization (WFO) in Khar district. Around 300 people from the Salarzai tribe were gathered to receive food when the bomber struck. The attack took place where people were being screened at a security checkpoint near their center.

The bomber was a woman, appearing in full veil, who blew herself up while being searched at the center. The bomber threw hand grenades at tribesmen before detonating the bomb. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for the attack and attack was retaliation for the Salarzai tribe's activities against the Taliban.[11]

Second significant suicide attack in FATA, Bajaur Agency left 42 dead and 70 wounded on December 25.

In addition, in an attack on November 11, a **suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device** (SVBIED) attack caused 30 people to be killed and 150 to be wounded. This was a suspected Taliban suicide car bomb attack at a security compound in Pakistan's largest city Karachi. The attack took place at the compound of the police Crime Investigation Department, only meters from the provincial chief minister's house in a central district known as the "red zone" because of its high security status. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), claimed responsibility for the attack.[12]

SVBIED attack in Sindh province killed 30 people and wounded 150 others on February 5.

11 *Pakistan Map, http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/45060000/gif/_45060447_pak_fata_nwf_226.gif*
12 *Sindh map (accessed 14 March 2010) available from ws.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7979022.stm*

A total of 313 terrorist incidents during the last quarter of 2010 put **India** in the fourth place in the world according to number of attacks. These attacks claimed 212 lives and 238 injured in total, along with 74 abducted by unknown assailants.

The deadliest attack in India for the quarter was an armed attack on November 8. At least 18 persons, including 13 Hindi-speaking people, were killed and several others injured when militants of the anti-talks faction of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), led by Ranjan Daimary, went on a killing spree in four places in Northern-Assam.[13]

Armed attack in Assam province caused 18 people dead on November 8.

Also, another deadly attack was a 17 December raid in West Bengal province. The cadres of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) killed seven Forward Bloc party workers at Baghbinda village of Jhalda in Purulia District.[14]

CPI-Maoist killed seven civilians in West Bengal province on December 17.

With 96 terrorist attacks, **Somalia** was the fifth most-hit country in the world during the last quarter of 2010. These 96 attacks claimed 482 lives and 719 injured, with 281 others abducted. The deadliest attack was a December 2 clash in the capital city Mogadishu that claimed 35 lives and 17 injured.[15]

Clash in Mogadishu claimed 35 lives and 17 injuries on December 2.

13 *Assam Map, available from http://www.google.com.tr/imgres?imgurl=http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk//images/39513000/gif_assam*
14 *West Bengal Map, available from http://www.google.com.tr/http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk//images/39963000*
15 *Mogadishu map, available from http://1.bp.blogspot.com/s320/somalia+mogadishu+map.bmp*

Seven different tactics were used by terrorists in Somalia during the period, but the most used one was 'clash' with 52 repetitions, killing 433 people and wounding 655 others, while piracy was the second most used methodology with 22 repetitions, claiming one life and 278 abducted. Armed attack was the third most used methodology with nine attacks, resulting in 20 deaths and eight wounded, and included one abduction. Also, four IED attacks caused 14 dead and 21 wounded, while four indirect fire (IDF) attacks left six dead and 25 wounded. In addition, two raids claimed five lives and 10 injuries, while three people were executed in two separate incidents. Lastly, two aid workers were abducted in Somalia on October 14.

Terror incidents increased roughly 65% in **Philippines** and some 86 attacks claimed 86 lives and wounded 95 people along with 30 people abducted during the last quarter of 2010. The deadliest attack was a December 14 clash in the northern province of Samar. Ten government soldiers and a nine-year-old boy were killed and two other soldiers were wounded in an ambush by suspected leftist rebels in the central Philippines. The incident happened in a village of Catubig town.[16]

Clash in Samar province claimed 11 lives and two injuries on December 14.

In terms of methodology, armed attacks were conducted 37 times resulting in 42 deaths and 32 wounded, while clash occurred 22 times and caused 23 dead and 21 wounded in Philippines. In addition, eight IED attacks, including one

16 *Philippines Map, available from http://www.google.com.tr/imgurl=http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/gif*

vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) attack, claimed 10 lives and 25 injuries, while two people were wounded and 30 abducted in two separate abductions. Also, five raids resulted in nine deaths and seven wounded. In addition, four IDF attacks left two dead and eight wounded. Lastly, two hoaxes were reported from Philippines during the quarter.

Violence in **Russia** continued in the last quarter of 2010 but decreased roughly 23%. There were 81 separate terrorist incidents, versus 105 compared to the previous quarter, resulting in 50 dead and 83 wounded.

The most significant attack in **Russia** was a November 11 clash[17] where seven policemen were killed in shootouts in Russia's Dagestan region in the North Caucasus. Three policemen and three passersby were also injured in the attack.

Clash in Dagestan province claimed seven lives and six injuries on November 11.



IED Attack, including five VBIED attacks, was the most used tactic during the quarter with 30 occurrences, while armed attack was the second most used tactic with 22 occurrences in Russia. Also, 19 clashes, four IDF attacks, two suicide attacks, four hoaxes, one arson and one raid were recorded in Russia during the quarter. Of these, 30 IED attacks claimed three lives and 37 injuries, while two suicide attacks caused four dead and 27 wounded.

17 *Russia Map, available from http://www.google.com.tr/imgres?imgurl=http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/images/gif*

Narco-terrorism related incidents in **Mexico** made this country the eighth most hit country in the world, and the most hit country in the Americas. The deadliest attack in Mexico in the last quarter of 2010 was an armed attack in Ciudad Juarez on November 6, causing 18 civilian deaths.[18]

Armed attack in Ciudad Juarez province claimed 18 lives on November 6.

Thailand was the ninth most hit country in the last quarter of 2010. A total of 72 terrorist attacks caused 61 people to die and 88 others to be wounded. Three troubled southern provinces – Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat – were the most volatile locations in terms of the number of attacks during the quarter. Pattani suffered 25 attacks that resulted in 22 people killed and 11 wounded, while in Yala 20 people were killed and 24 were wounded in 22 separate attacks. The province of Narathiwat also suffered a significant number of attacks, 14, which claimed 13 lives and wounded 23. The deadliest attack was a November 24 armed attack in Narathiwat province.[19] Three men were killed in a drive-by shooting in Rueso district. The victims were in a pickup truck going home from a meeting in Rueso district, when two gunmen in another pickup truck sprayed bullets at them.

Armed attack in Narathiwat province caused three dead on November 24.

18 *Ciudad Juarez map (accessed 20 June 2010) available from ws.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7979022.stm*
19 *Thailand Map, available from http://www.google.com.tr/imgres?imgurl=http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/gif/_40838849*

Colombia was the tenth most hit country in the world during the last quarter of 2010, where 66 separate terrorist attacks claimed 97 lives and 144 injuries, including 37 abducted. The most deadly attack was a December 17 IED attack in Caqueta province.[20] Five soldiers were killed and two others wounded when they entered a FARC minefield in a rural area near Puerto Rico, a town in southern Colombia in Caqueta department.

Eight different methodologies were used during this period and the most used one was IED attack, including three VBIED attacks with 20 repetitions resulting in 28 deaths and 49 woundings, while raid was the most-used second tactic with 13 attacks causing 18 dead and 33 wounded. Also, 12 clashes resulted in 21 deaths and nine wounded. In addition, eight armed attacks left 19 dead and six wounded, while seven IDF attacks claimed 11 lives and 47 injuries, and included five abducted. Lastly, 32 people were abducted in four separate abductions, while an arson attack caused no casualties in Colombia during the period.

IED attack in Caqueta province claimed five lives and two injuries on December 17.



In **Europe** 13 countries were hit by terrorists during the quarter. The most hit country was Russia with 81 separate attacks, while Turkey was the second one with 22 separate attacks. Also, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Kosovo, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom (UK) and Ukraine were the other countries that suffered from terrorism during the period. During the period, anarchist activities in Greece and Italy particularly make their mark, with 14 attacks in Greece and 10 attacks in Italy claiming four

20 *Caqueta map (accessed 2 February 2009) available from ws.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7979022.stm*

injuries in the last quarter of 2010. Fire Cell Conspiracy anarchist group in Greece and Federation of Anarchy (FAI) have claimed responsibility for attacks during the period. Lastly, in Turkey, the most significant attack occurred in Istanbul on October 31. A PKK/KONGRA-GEL suicide bomber attacked a police checkpoint in Taksim Square, wounding 32 people, including policemen.

Terrorists worldwide used 14 different tactics in the last quarter of 2010. **IED** attacks were the most used tactic during the quarter with some 947 attacks claiming 820 lives and 2,480 wounded, while traditional **armed attacks** were the second most used tactic with some 716 repetitions, resulting in 1,178 deaths and 516 wounded along with one abducted. Iraq was the most targeted with IEDs, suffering 382 separate attacks. Afghanistan was the second country most suffering from IED attacks with 191 incidents while Pakistan was the third most targeted country with 133 incidents. In addition, 59 IED attacks were reported in India, while 25 IED attacks were reported in Russia. Lastly, 16 IED attacks were reported in Thailand. The deadliest IED attack was a 2 November IED attack in capital city of Iraq, Baghdad; at least 64 people were killed and 360 others wounded in the incident.

Extrajudicial killings posed an important security challenge for Afghanistan, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, and Thailand and especially for Iraq where 110 people lost their lives in captivity in 41 separate incidents during the last quarter of 2010.

Clashes between security forces and terrorists caused considerable damage. 501 incidents claimed 760 lives and 1,135 injuries along with four abducted. Clashes posed an important security challenge for Afghanistan with 150 incidents, while India was the second most hit country with 83 clashes.

A wide usage of **Indirect Fire** (IDF) attacks was also noted during the quarter, killing 110 and wounding 434, and included five abducted in 181 attacks.

Another deadly IED tactic, the **VBIED** attack, was the fifth most used tactic. There were 125 separate attacks claiming 162 lives and injuring 527 during the quarter. Iraq was the most afflicted with 85 separate VBIED attacks that killed 87 people and wounded 375 others. Other countries with attacks using this tactic during the quarter were Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Sweden, Thailand, UK, USA and Yemen during the last quarter of 2010.

	Event Type	Event Count	KIA	WIA	AIA
1	IED	947	820	2,480	0
2	Armed Attack	716	1,178	516	1
3	Clash	501	760	1,135	4
4	IDF	181	110	434	5
5	VBIED	125	162	527	0
6	Abduction	92	2	4	322
7	Raid	87	142	187	9
8	Execution	82	136	2	1
9	Suicide Attack	79	474	1,211	0
10	Arson	61	3	2	2
11	Piracy	31	1	2	411
12	Hoax	17	0	0	0
13	Cyber Attack	3	0	0	0
14	VOIED	2	2	2	0

Table 2 - **The Most Used Tactics in the World during the Last Quarter of 2010.**

Abductions were another tactic used during the period. 92 separate abduction incidents claimed two lives and four injuries, and included 322 abducted.

Raid was the most used seventh tactic during the period with some 87 separate attacks, claiming 142 lives and 187 wounded along with nine abducted. Pakistan was the most hit country with 16 separate attacks, while Afghanistan was the second most hit country with 15 attacks. In addition, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Colombia, Denmark, India, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Russia and Somalia were the other countries afflicted raid during the quarter.

Execution was the eighth most used tactic during the quarter with some 82 attacks, claiming 136 lives and two injuries, and included one abducted. Iraq was the most volatile country related to execution with 22 incidents, while 21 incidents were recorded in Pakistan. In Iraq, 22 executions caused 39 deaths, while 21 executions in Pakistan resulted in 33 deaths. Also, Afghanistan, Burundi, India, Mexico, Nepal, Somalia, South Africa and Thailand were other countries where execution occurred during the period.



Suicide Bombing was the deadliest form of IED attack again with 79 incidents, killing 474 people and wounding 1,211 others during period. Afghanistan was the most volatile country according to data available about suicide attacks with 39 separate attacks, while Iraq was the second most suffered country from suicide attack with 16 of these attacks. Pakistan was the third hardest hit by this tactic, suffering 14 such attacks. Other countries targeted were Bangladesh with one, Egypt with one, Iran with one, Russia with two, Sweden with two, Turkey with one and Yemen with three attacks during the quarter.

During the quarter, 61 **arson** attacks caused three dead and two wounded, and included two abducted. India was the leading country with 26 arson attacks. Also, Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Sudan and Turkey were the other countries suffering arson attacks.

Piracy was another method used during the period, 31 piracy related attacks claimed one life and two injuries, and included 210 abducted, while 17 hoaxes were reported during the last quarter of 2010.

Three **cyberattacks** were reported. Germany, USA and Sweden were the countries suffering most from cyberattacks during the quarter.

Lastly, the **victim - operated improvised explosive device** (VOIED) attack was the fourteenth most used tactic for the period with two attacks, claiming two lives and two injuries. Afghanistan and Pakistan were the countries afflicted VOIED attack during the last quarter of 2010.

NATO's Role in Defence Against Terrorism

By Capabilities Department of COE-DAT

INTRODUCTION

NATO still counters terrorism in different fields by using various methods and tools. This work will cover the historical development of NATO's defence against terrorism by including first its struggle in the field. Later on, NATO's studies in order to keep on its struggle against terrorism in the field will be put forward. Lastly, whether the new strategic concept creates radical changes in NATO's struggle against terrorism and its way of handling it or not will be examined.

The historical development of NATO's defence against terrorism can be summarized as follows:

a. The strategic concept of 1999 defines terrorism as one of the risks that affects the security of NATO.

b. After the 9/11 attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 in 24 hours. All member countries as well as Russia and Ukraine decided to take all necessary precautions in the struggle against terrorism within 48 hours.

c. NATO made the below listed decisions on 02 October 2001 in order to support USA and its allies:

- ✓ Intelligence sharing,
- ✓ Providing support in defence against terrorism at all level of possibilities,
- ✓ Taking precautions for the protection of facilities,
- ✓ Providing support for control and safety of airspace,
- ✓ Giving right of access to airports and harbors,
- ✓ Being ready to send sufficient naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean,
- ✓ Being ready to forward-deploy AWACS.

d. NATO carried out its first defence against terrorism operation, Eagle Assist, between October 2001 and May 2002. In the context of that operation, seven AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft were sent to control USA airspace. This was the first force deployment of NATO in the context of Article 5. After that, NATO provided support according to the demands of member nations in the field of security by using its warning and control systems together with multinational CBRN Defence Teams, especially in important international organizations that are tempting for terrorist elements. (For instance: Athens Olympic Games)

e. NATO executed its second defence against terrorism operation on 26 October 2001 when Active Endeavour started in the East Mediterranean. That operation, which was open to the participation of non-NATO countries, aimed to provide transportation security in the Mediterranean and destroy terrorist elements in the context of Article 5. It was second counter-terrorism operation of NATO and it still goes on. On 10 March 2003, "Active Endeavour" was expanded to include escorting civilion shipping through the strait of Gibraltar.

f. Since August 2003, NATO has led the operation in Afghanistan (ISAF; International Security Assistance Force). Although NATO's presence in Afghanistan is not directly related to counterterrorism, ISAF shows NATO's determination to help Afghan people to establish a democratic, stable and secure country far away from the terrorism threat.

g. Stability to struggle against all kinds of threats including terrorism was announced at the Prague Summit on 21-22 November 2002. Terrorism-related titles of that summit are:

- ✓ Acceptance of Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism,
- ✓ Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism,
- ✓ CBRN Defence Initiatives,
- ✓ Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan
- ✓ Missile Defence,
- ✓ Cyber Defence,
- ✓ Cooperation with International Organizations,
- ✓ Improved Intelligence Sharing.

h. At Riga Summit in November 2006, terrorism, together with WMD, was described as the most serious threat that NATO will face during the coming 10-15 years.

i. The Strategic Concept that was accepted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010 again defines terrorism as one of the primary threats and addresses the determination and solidarity of NATO on DAT.

COMPARISON OF THE LAST TWO STRATEGIC CONCEPTS IN TERMS OF DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM

In the context of counter-terrorism, in addition to the operational aspects, NATO leads studies in different fields:

Concept studies that form the basis for operations and force structures:

a. 1999 NATO Strategic Concept:

It was put into practice at the Washington Summit on 24 April 1999. This concept is different from other NATO Strategic Concepts in terms of defining terrorism as one of the risk factors that threatens the security of allies rather than being a classical threat. In the document, it is explained that the security of allies can be affected by terrorism, sabotage, and organized crime to cut the flow of important natural resources, except from classical threats, and the protection of critical infrastructure and allied forces against terrorist activities is also stated.

b. NATO's Defence Against Terrorism Concept:

The basis of NATO's Defence Against Terrorism strategy is the Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism (MC 472) that was prepared according to 1999 NATO Strategic Concept and approved in 2002. MC 472 concept constitutes legal and military basis of NATO's defence against terrorism. According to that concept, activities and operations of the Alliance in terms of defence against terrorism should be proper to international law, UN Resolutions and respectful to human rights.

The concept sets four courses of action for NATO. These are:

1) Anti-Terrorism Actions: Precautions taken to eliminate weaknesses of people, forces, and properties against terrorism.

- Nations are responsible for protecting their people and infrastructures, but they can request help from NATO in defence against terrorism.

- Timely and accurate intelligence, standard warning systems, improved air and sea defence are

important points for deterring and protecting against terrorist attacks.

2) Counter-Terrorism Actions: The North Atlantic Council decides the implementation of precautions. Counterterrorism operations are generally executed collectively. MC 472 sets two roles for NATO in counter-terrorism. One of them concerns the start and execution of counter-terrorism operations by (NATO in Lead). The other is related to the support for the operation that is executed by one country or coalition of countries.(NATO in Support)

3) Consequence Management: Precautions taken to ease the destructive effects of terrorism in case terrorist attacks are carried out.

4) Military Cooperation: NATO needs the cooperation of other countries and international organizations in order to increase the effectiveness of counterterrorism. NATO's partnership programs with Partnership for Peace countries, Mediterranean Dialogue countries, as well as the NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine Councils so as to improve cooperation and coordination outside of the Alliance can be considered in this context.

c. In order to determine the operational execution of MC 472, a CONOPS has been developed for NATO counterterrorism. That concept was approved by the North Atlantic Council in 2003 and has been evaluated since 2007 that the concept does not meet the necessities. Thereupon, the Military Committee has started a new project. The first draft of the work that was executed under the leadership of ACT has been prepared by COE-DAT. The Bi-SC Strategic Military Concept for the Military Contribution to NATO's Defence Against Terrorism has not been approved yet although it was in the process of approval after taking the views of member countries in 2008.

d. In 2009, the Strategic Commands were charged to develop the concept of Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats (MCCHT). That concept puts forward the parameters of hybrid threats that NATO is facing. It also aims to define different fields that will enable improvement of new capabilities in the future. The concept that has been evaluated to be the main concept in the concept hierarchy that defines terrorism as an element of hybrid threats. That concept does not change NATO's strategy and vision in defence against terrorism that is put forward in MC 472. That concept is also noticeable in explaining the relationship of terrorism with other disordered threats. Moreover, comprehensive approach comes into prominance in all studies carried out in defence against terrorism and civil-military cooperation is important in every activity in terms of terrorism.

e. 2010 NATO Strategic Concept:

That concept has been approved and was put into practice at the NATO Heads of States Summit that was conducted in Lisbon, Portugal on 19-20 November 2010. There are terrorism-related explanations in the document:

1) Terrorism is a direct threat for the security of people of NATO member countries, international stability and world peace. Extremist

groups keep on spreading primarily in the areas of strategic importance to the alliance. Technological advances cause the increase in the terrorism threat. In this context, terrorists obtaining CBRN weapons become critical in terms of terrorist activities and their potential effects.

- Cyber attacks have the potential to create great harm to the administration, economy, transportation and critical infrastructure of nations. These attacks can cause damage in security and stability of nations and allies. Intelligence services, organized crime members, terrorists and radical organizations can carry out such kind of attacks.

- Conflicts and instabilities beyond the borders of NATO can directly threaten alliance's security by fostering extremism, terrorism and trans-national illegal activities.

- To defend against terrorism effectively, improve military capabilities which include training of local forces, increase dialogue with partner countries, and analyng terrorism threat precisely are needed.

In the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, it is emphasized that cooperation and political consultation with Russia should be developed in terms of shared interests including counter-terrorism.

In the context of threat evaluation in the new strategic concept, cyber defence, proliferation of WMD and energy security have been emphasized. Similarly, by taking into consideration the complexity of threats, it is accepted that the manifestation of terrorism is probable in these three areas although it is not directly attributable. Then New strategic concept has expressed the necessity of cooperation with partner countries, UN and international organizations in order to counter all threats. Consequently, it is evaluated that international cooperation will be one of the most significant elements of counter-terrorism.While the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept mentions the terrorism threat as a possibility, the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept accepts the reality of a terrorism threat and its direct effects on the Alliance's security. Besides, it has put forward an approach in terms of defence against terrorism. Comparison between 1999 NATO Strategic Concept and 2010 NATO Strategic Concept can be seen at Table 1.

COMPARING 1999 NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT WITH 2010 NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT IN TERMS OF DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM

1999 NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT	2010 NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT
1. The security of allies can be affected by terrorism, sabotage, organized crime, cutting the flow of important natural resources rather than classical threats.	1. Terrorism is a direct threat to the security of people of NATO member countries, international stability and world peace. Extremist groups keep on spreading primarily in areas of strategic importance to NATO. Technological advances cause the increase of terrorism threat. In this context, terrorists' obtaining CBRN weapons become critical in terms of terrorist activities and their potential effects.
2. Allied forces and critical infrastructures should be protected against terrorist activities.	2. Conflicts and instabilities beyond the borders of NATO can directly threaten alliance's security by fostering extremism, terrorism and trans-national illegal activities.
3. -	3. To defend against terrorism effectively; a. Improve military capabilities which include training of local forces, b. More dialogue with partner countries, c. Analyze the terrorism threat precisely as needed.

Table 1

Other working areas:

Use of technology and efforts in capacity building are other working areas of NATO in the defence against terrorism. These studies are explained below:

a. Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work has been developed by the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD). It mainly focuses on the usage of technology in the prevention of terrorist attacks and decreasing its effects.

b. CBRN defence studies, forming a CBRN Defence Battalion and Joint Assessment Team together with the foundation of a CBRN Center of Excellence and Center of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism are the main advances of NATO in terms of improving defence capability against CBRN terrorism.

c. In the context of precautions for cyber-terrorism, there are some efforts to establish a presidency/ unit and Cyber Defence Center of Excellence in Estonia.

d. Improved Intelligence Sharing stands as the primary subject of the negotiations between countries in the Defence against terrorism. At the end of 2003, the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit was established under the NATO Security Office. At the İstanbul Summit in 2004, it was decided that intelligence structures in NATO HQs should be evaluated. In this regard, an Intelligence Liaison Unit has been established in SHAPE so as to provide intelligence sharing with NATO countries and partner nations.

e. In the area of Economic and Financial Aspect of Combating Terrorism, the Economic Commitee holds meetings in which these subjects are discussed with allies. Besides, situational awareness of partners is increased by conducting workshops and meetings in order to prevent international financial sources of terrorism.

f. The NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme contributes to NATO's target of strategic partnership by providing support to academic studies since 2004. Defence Against Terrorism is the primary subject of this program. The NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme executes activities like seminars, symposiums, workshops and working groups which gather academics, military personnel, and bureaucrats together to discuss problematic areas and put forward NATO methods for solution. COE-DAT has obtained a total of 896.000 Euros from this fund and executed 10 ATCs and 12 NATO Workshops in return. The number of participants in COE-DAT Advanced Training Courses (ATC) and NATO Workshops that were executed with support of NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme can be seen at Table 2 and 3 respectively.

Close Cooperation with Partners:

a. The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism puts forward the roles of the partners in defence against terrorism and their capabilities in this field. Making use of airspace, intelligence and information sharing and taking joint measures against the terrorism threat are sample areas of cooperation. Energy Infrastructure Security, Border Security, and Fighting the Financial Aspects of Terrorism working groups have been added to the action plan that was started at the 2002 Prague Summit.

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS IN COE-DAT NATO WORKSHOPS EXECUTED WITH SUPPORT OF NATO SCIENCE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY PROGRAMME

NO.	NAME, PLACE AND DATE OF THE ACTIVITY	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS		
		PARTICIPANT	LECTURER	TOTAL
1	"INTEGRATION OF PEOPLE EXPERIENCE TRAUMA AFTER TERRORIST ATTACKS INTO MODERN SOCIETY" WORKSHOP (27-28 April 2006)	38	17	55
2	"THE MEDIA: VITAL GROUND FOR TERRORIST OPERATIONS" WORKSHOP (07-08 June 2006)	25	18	43
3	"TRAIN THE TRAINERS OF THE AMPUTEE PLAYERS" WORKSHOP (07-11 May 2007)	32	22	54
4	"MOTIVATION FOR SUICIDE BOMBERS" WORKSHOP (24-25 May 2007)	36	18	54
5	"RESPONSES TO CYBER TERRORISM" WORKSHOP (04-05 October 2007)	40	15	55
6	"DEFENCE AGAINST WMD TERRORISM" WORKSHOP (10-11 April 2008)	69	15	84
7	"TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AGAINST TERRORISM" WORKSHOP (05-06 May 2008)	60	21	81
8	"BIOTERRORISM" WORKSHOP (13-14 November 2008)	37	14	51
9	"HOMELAND SECURITY ORGANIZATION IN DAT" WORKSHOP (19-20 November 2009)	40	13	53
10	"RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM" WORKSHOP (14-15 January 2010)	44	12	56
11	"TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM 2010" WORKSHOP (11-12 October 2010)	31	18	49
12	"MARITIME SECURITY AND DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM" NATO WORKSHOP (08-09 November 2010)	30	15	45

*Totally 680 participants (198 Lecturers, 482 Participants) in 12 NATO Workshops

Table 2

b. In the framework of new relationships and partnerships, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative was launched at the 2004 Istanbul Summit in order to reach Middle East countries. Moreover, NATO has tried to create a broader area of cooperation in defence against terrorism by connecting to Contact Countries. In this sense, COE-DAT has acted as both a point of combination and a catalyst. Until now, it has explained the determination of NATO in defence against terrorism to the representatives of almost 100 countries and transferred the views of experts in these countries.

c. In terms of developing cooperation with other international organizations, NATO still goes on working with EU, UN and OSCE in fight against terrorism.

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS IN COE-DAT ADVANCED TRAINING COURSES (ATC) EXECUTED WITH SUPPORT OF NATO SCIENCE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY PROGRAMME

NO.	NAME, PLACE AND DATE OF THE ACTIVITY	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS		
		PARTICIPANT	LECTURER	TOTAL
1	ADVANCED TRAINING COURSE "BORDER SECURITY AND TRANSBORDER CRIMES" (GEORGIA) (26 February-02 March2007)	47	11	58
2	ADVANCED TRAINING COURSE "ORGANIZATIONAL & PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE OF TERRORISM" (MACEDONIA) (22-26 October 2007)	33	11	44
3	ADVANCED TRAINING COURSE "LEGAL ASPECTS OF COMBATING TERRORISM" (BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA) (04-08 February 2008)	44	12	56
4	ADVANCED TRAINING COURSE "USE OF FORCE IN COUNTERING TERRORISM" (KYRGYZSTAN) (08-12 September 2008)	37	10	47
5	ADVANCED TRAINING COURSE "ANALYSIS AND STRATEGIES TO COUNTER THE TERRORISM THREAT" (ALBANIA) (20-24 April 2009)	42	10	52
6	ATC; "CYBER TERRORISM; A 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGE TO STATE SECURITY" (MOLDOVA) (12-16 October 2009)	47	9	56
7	ATC; "DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM" (JORDAN) (03-07 January 2010)	39	8	47
8	ATC; "DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM" (AFGHANISTAN) (23-27 May 2010)	39	9	48
9	ATC; "ENHANCING COOPERATION in DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM" (KAZAKHSTAN) (27 September-01 October 2010)	34	11	45
10	ATC; "DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM : CONCEPTUAL APPROACH IN COMBATING TERRORISM" (SERBIA) (22-26 November 2010)	37	8	45

*Totally 498 participants (99 Lecturers, 399 Participants) in 10 Advanced Training Courses (ATC)

Table 3

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Bi-SC Strategic Military Concept for the Military Contribution to NATO's Defence Against Terrorism, which has been prepared for the operational practice of MC 472, has not been approved and that causes problems. It is foreseen that this concept will be approved after the approval process of Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats Concept (MCCHT).

2. A Counter-Terrorism Unit has been established under the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) on 01 August 2010. Establishment of that unit can be described as a positive step in terms of NATO's institutionalizing its efforts in defence against terrorism.

3. Consequently, it is expected that NATO's new strategic concept will not bring new and extensive changes to the MC 472 counter-terrorism strategy that is based on the 1999 Strategic Concept. However, it is foreseen that a widening of NATO's area of interest will bring up outer area operations on countering terrorism frequently and countering IED and intelligence sharing efforts will become more important.

NATO ARW "Trends and Developments in Contemporary Terrorism 2010"

Col Dan- Radu Voica[1]

LTC Adil Duyan[2]

On 11-12 October 2010, COE-DAT in Ankara conducted a NATO Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) entitled "Trends and Developments in Contemporary Terrorism 2010." The aim of the ARW was to take stock of the developments across the spectrum of terrorist activity, both actual and potential, and look at how current policy and practice in Defence Against Terrorism could be adjusted or improved to meet and defeat these changes. This paper summarizes the content of the various lectures and the conclusion drawn from those lecturers. The full workshop papers will be published in book format in first part of 2011.

The workshop was attended by 31 participants (18 from NATO, 7 from PfP and 6 from MD countries), 18 experts on terrorism, and keynote speaker Prof. Dr. Yonah Alexander.

The ARW itself broke the subject into 5 panels:

- Terrorism as an Entity in 2010,
- Current terrorist threats,
- Countering terrorist threat,
- Emerging trends in terrorism,
- Communication strategy - winning the minds.

There were 17 subject areas, aimed to look at relevant areas of New Terrorism and the response to this threat, and raise discussion/debates among the selected audience. Each speaker was allotted 30 minutes to introduce his or her subject with 30 minutes at the end of each session for questions and answers.

The panels were built on a central theme assessing the threats posed by the New Terrorism; the means to respond to these threats at the international, regional and national level; and the way forward.

Significant reactions and comments based directly on the concrete experiences of those parts of the world enabled the creation of an environment for dialogue and mutual confidence. In this respect, the Center seeked to reach a common understanding of the future threats posed by terrorist organizations in the 21st century, and to determine common themes that may form the guide for future policy developments in respect to that subject.

1. SUMMARIES OF THE PRESENTATIONS

a. Keynote speech

Prof Dr. Yonah Alexander, Director of Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, USA, gave the keynote speech, providing a very good general overview of the threat posed by terrorist organizations and the foreseeable future of their activities.

At the beginning, he stated that terrorism – as a tool, method, process, and projection of psychological and physical violence in violation of law – is not new. Although the tactics and strategies of terrorism as employed by both non-state and government agencies in the name of 'higher' ideological, theological, or nationalistic principles to attain political, social, or economic objectives date from time immemorial, it is the twentieth century and even the early twenty-first century that are unique for the extraordinary scale of the globalization and brutalization of this mode of waging war by other means.

1 ROU A, Instructor and Course Director, COE-DAT
2 TUR A, Course Director, COE-DAT

More specifically, no community, country, or region is immune from conventional and unconventional threats of terrorism. The Middle East is the most terrorist-active region and this has serious implications for international security. Turkey is a classic case study.

The global and regional outlook is however more bleak. Experience indicates that terrorist groups thrive on collaboration across national boundaries. Shared ideologies and commitments to radical strategies (such as professed struggles against Capitalism, Imperialism, Racism, Zionism, and Democracies) motivate groups to work together on a global scale. Informal and formal relationships among various terrorist groups and state sponsors have resulted in a national, regional, and international terror framework. The international character of many terrorist efforts often compounds the difficulty of identifying the initiator or sponsor of a given terrorist act.

Clearly, Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda is the most elaborate international terrorist network operating around the world, with dire consequences for the security interests of the United States and its friends and allies, such as Turkey. That is, al-Qaeda (the Base), also known as the International Front for the Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, the Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites, and the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places, operates in over 90 countries. Al-Qaeda seeks to unite all Muslims and establish a government which follows the rule of the Caliphs, according to bin Laden's strategic plan.

Indeed, in the post 9/11 environment, tomorrow's al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorists will continue to utilize a broad range of conventional weapons, including explosives and missiles, as illustrated by suicide bombings worldwide. The arsenals of future operations will most likely consist of the instruments of mass destruction, such as biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear, and cyber terrorism. In the face of such devastating dangers, the question is not if the worst is yet to come, but when "super terrorism" will occur and along with what consequences for national, regional, and global security concerns.

What is also challenging to the global security system in the twenty-first century is the expansion of violence in the maritime environment. The proliferation of piracy, insurgency, and terrorism is a stark case in point. More specifically, the tactics utilized by these actors include hijacking, arms smuggling, human trafficking, drug trafficking, assaulting land-based maritime facilities, shelling tankers, firing rockets at port energy infrastructures, launching seaborne raids against civilian targets on land, attacking offshore oil rigs, and bombing vessels in port.

In view of the foregoing dangers, it is important to underscore several security problems. For example, globally, there are some 15 million shipping containers in circulation and approximately 120,000 merchant ships that require some sort of security protection. There is also concern about tracking difficulties such as re-naming, re-painting and re-registering ships. Additionally, fictional corporations are formed by owners of these vessels to disguise them.

Finally, the important role of Turkey in combating terrorism in the maritime environment and elsewhere should be commentated on. For instance, representatives from EU member states and ten Mediterranean partners, including Turkey, met in Barcelona, Spain, in November 1995 to begin the Mediterranean Dialogue. Though the ultimate goal of the dialogue was to secure improved political, economic, and cultural relations in the Mediterranean region, it did focus on maritime security cooperation. This initiative was confirmed by NATO's North Atlantic Council the following year. Also, on June 29, 2004, at the Istanbul Summit, NATO members decided to elevate the Mediterranean Dialogue to a full partnership with associate countries. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) aims at promoting military-to-military cooperation, fighting terrorism through information sharing and maritime cooperation, and fighting illegal trafficking on a bilateral level with Turkey, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.

Moreover, from January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2010, Turkey served as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, whose primary responsibility is to maintain international peace and security. The selection of Turkey for this important Council seat was testimony of the world body's confidence in Ankara's capability to carry out this task.

b. Panel 1-Terrorism as an Entity in 2010

TERRORISM TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE - Assoc. Prof Mustafa Kibaroğlu, assistant academic advisor at COEDAT.

First he made a short overview of the terrorist organizations today. After that, he referred to proliferation of WMD weapons in the world, and the wish of certain states to have nuclear capabilities as a means to gain political and economical benefits. Also he addressed the danger posed by the dissolution of Soviet Union in terms of thefts of nuclear and radiological materials, and the new terrorist threats posed by Al Qaeda and methods used to reach its goals.

In the second part of his speech he addressed the effort to stem the threats of nuclear terrorism and proliferation. On this issue, he stressed that actions taken must be multilateral to be effective, and nothing of consequence could be accomplished without international cooperation. Nonetheless, U.S. programs may be a useful framework for discussing the overall effort. The United States invests over $2 billion annually to detect, secure, and dispose of dangerous nuclear material, to stem the threats of nuclear terrorism and to hinder proliferation. Nineteen different programmatic activities are conducted with over 100 partner countries by the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defence. Moreover, seven countries have contributed $45 million of their own money directly to fund these U.S. programs, not to mention significant other 'in kind' or independent expenditures.

NATO TRANSFORMATION AND DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM - Col. Mitko Stoykov, Chief of COEDAT Transformation Department.

The brief started with a basic definition: Transformation is a process

that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit a nation's advantages and protect against asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain countries' strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world. After that the three NATO military transformation initiatives that are essential to improving NATO defence capabilities were discussed: the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) along with the streamlining of the military command structure, and also the Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism.

Under the PCC, member countries made firm political commitments to improve capabilities in more than 400 specific areas, covering the following eight fields:

- Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence;
- Intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition;
- Air-to-ground surveillance;
- Deployable and secure command, control and communications;
- Combat effectiveness, including precision-guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defences;
- Strategic air and sea lift;
- Air-to-air refueling;
- Deployable combat support and combat service support units.

Following that, reference was made to the NATO Response Force (NRF) which is a highly ready and technologically advanced force made up of land, air, sea and special forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly wherever needed. It numbers up to 25,000 troops and starts to deploy after five days' notice and can sustain itself for operations lasting up to 30 days, or can operate for longer if resupplied. At the end, the future of NATO transformation and defence against terrorism processes were discussed, as well as the draft new NATO Strategic Concept, addressing both the reason for it and scenarios for the future: Dark Side of Exclusivity, Deceptive Stability, Clash of Modernity, and New Power Politics.

Finally, the brief concluded that NATO transformation is a continuous process and actions of 2010 will be some of the most important steps regarding the next decades; NATO defence against terrorism is achieving new levels as a significant part of new capstone concept of countering present day, complicated, hybrid threats.

c. Panel 2 - Current terrorist threats

LTTE A NATIONAL SEPARATIST TERROR CAMPAIGN - Mr. Ranga Kalansooriya, a journalist from the Sri Lanka Press Institute.

In this presentation, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), as one of the most ruthless terrorist organizations in the world, and the world's only terrorist group that has ground, sea and air combat capabilities, was described in detail.

Next the evolution of this organization since the early 1970's and their motivation for the fight was discussed.

Then the leadership structure of the organization and its financing was presented followed by information on their landmark attacks, and the Black Tigers – the brigade of suicide cadres which is considered a trendsetter for terrorist organizations. Then the Anuradhapura Attack, which is possibly the first combined Air and Land guerrilla attack,was presented as a case study. After presenting the splinter groups, the last developments in the area and the official end of civil war in May 2009 were mentioned. As a result, approximately 250,000 IDPs are now being resettled. Following this, the actual situation and the concerns to the international community were elaborated on.

As keys to the success in battling this terrorism, following were considered to be crucial: well coordinated ground-air-sea combat force supported by unified and strengthened intelligence, attacks from multiple fronts with a reinforced army, the Splinter Group effect, the need for international support (India, Pakistan, China), and unshaken political will.

A RELIGIO - POLITICAL TERROR CAMPAIGN PAKISTAN'S MILITANT CHALLENGE Dr. Moeed Yusuf, Boston University, USA.

The paper looks at Pakistan's security conundrum. It focuses on the nature and severity of the threat the country faces from the various militant groups operating from its soil. Rather than presenting a generic picture as much of the popular discourse on Pakistan has done to date, the argument presents a rather nuanced understanding of the different kinds of challenges various militant groups present and the rationale for Pakistan's case-specific approach to these challenges. The capacity constraints, as well as the regional context, which are seen to be the two underlying factors dictating Pakistan's strategy, are dealt with in detail. The paper concludes with a rather worrying prognosis: the Pakistani state is in a race against time to tame militancy; while it can keep the level of violence manageable, it will remain unable to rid itself of the menace completely unless the regional context – namely instability in Afghanistan and continued tensions with India – are addressed in an amicable manner.

Structurally, the paper laid out what the problem of militancy means for Pakistan and the region at large. It then explained past policy choices, both by Pakistan and its allies like the U.S., which have allowed the militant enclave to gain the kind of strength it has today. The post-9/11 analysis proceeds in two phases: 2002-2007 when the militancy turned inward and the Pakistani state remained largely complacent and timid; and 2007 onwards when the militant activity expanded greatly and the military responded with all its might within a larger COIN framework. In both phases, the nature of the threat and the state's response were evaluated. The lessons drawn from this discussion, the prognosis for the future and the policy options were then highlighted.

d. Panel 3-Countering terrorist threat

DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW - Maj. Kenneth Hobbs, NATO School.

The agenda was as follows: International Law, Eliminating Financing for Terrorism, Criminal

Prosecutions, Terrorism and the Law of Armed Conflict (Targeting and Detention), Cyberterrorism and Lawfare.

First he spoke on the definition of terrorism on which the international community has not reached consensus yet. Than he referred to the challenges posed to disrupt the financing of terrorist organizations like: implementing legislation, legal/judicial/prosecutorial resources, informal banking systems and cash couriers. At the end he referred to terrorism and Law of Armed Conflict in terms of detention and targeting.

POLICING AGAINST TERRORISM - TACTICS AND INVESTIGATIONS - Dr. Robyn Mace, Michigan State University, USA.

The agenda that she followed was: threats and risks for terrorism, institutional framework, counterterrorism options, strategic considerations, tactical dimensions, costs and benefits, and future research/policy implications.

Referring to terrorism threats and risks she talked about state-sponsored dissidents, as well as religious, ideological and criminal dissidents.

In an answer to these threats, the state has the following responses: counterterrorism and use of force (war), suppression (punish/destroy), repressive options (non war), disrupt operations and interdict supporters, conciliatory options (DIME), anticipate/mitigate immediate and future crisis, Rule of Law (legalistic) and prosecution, conviction, incarceration

Moreover she referred to strategic issues like changing international norms; ambiguity in language, intent, and law; preemption prevention or anticipatory self-defence; the gap between legitimacy and legality; NATO in Kosovo (no UNSC resolution); alignment/integration of enforcement/coercive tactics with diplomatic and economic efforts; complexity of rights (life, liberty, property, privacy, and free speech); security and social allocation of the same; depersonalization via technology (LE/M and targeted citizens); domestic political power; minority concerns and blowback; and blame.

In conclusion she presented the Developing Action Research Framework, meaning awareness of dominance-bias (the right approach), managing consensus and not hierarchical pressure, active (voluntary) involvement of CT agencies, informing the political process (Carpe Diem), commitment to research by agencies and cooperation with the academy, NGO's, and think tanks.

TRACKING TERRORIST FINANCING - Dr. Nicholas Ridley, London Metropolitan University, UK.

In terms of co-ordination and commitment, international governmental, law enforcement and regulatory efforts against terrorist financing were moribund and of lesser priority until the turn of the century. Even the 1999 UN Convention against Terrorist Financing, finally enacted and passed, came into force only after the events of 9/11. Since the events of 9/11, the decade of anti-terrorist financing efforts at international level has been pursued with commitment and resources and motivations beyond

reproach. However, efforts have been hampered by strategic oversights. It has been suggested that these strategic oversights are four in number, each one covering an overlapping time period within the overall decade 2001 to 2010. Significantly the fourth oversight is still ongoing and, equally significantly, the vulnerability was partially identified by law enforcement and financial regulatory agencies (particularly in the USA) since 2007. Yet as late as 2010, there are little or no countermeasures in place, and as such remains a strategic oversight (one of four) hampering international efforts against financing of terrorism.

INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERING THE TERRORIST EXPLOITATION OF UNGOVERNED SPACES - Mr. Simon Bergman, Information Option Limited, UK.

First the speech presented some facts about the concept of intelligence - intent & capability, what are the ungoverned spaces, and the need for full integration of efforts with traditional approaches. Then the elements of intelligence were discussed: what are the requirements, what assets are required, and if the Alliance is configured for this challenge. Next the speeach addressed understanding an environment in terms of the human element: an ability to understand, an ability to predict, and an ability to develop intelligence requirements in relation to specific risks and threats. Tools currently being used include: social network analysis, remote profiling, behavioral analysis, psychologists and anthropologists, cultural experts, and key leader engagement. In conclusion, a model for an approach to intelligent understanding of ungoverned spaces. This includes identification of key factors or mapping, empathies with the human dimension, communications within the environment, the effective use of targeted information gathering tools, and analysis of relevant information related to risk and threats

e. Panel 4-Emerging trends in terrorism

CYBER TERRORISM AND THE USE OF THE WEB - Dr. Marco Gerke, Cybercrime Research Institute, Germany.

The presentation dealt with the systematic aspects of a legal response to terrorist use of the Internet. As result of the available network technology and the multitude of internet-based services, anti-terrorism strategies face difficulties that range from preventing the availability of instructions on how to commit terrorist attacks on various websites to monitoring the use of encryption technology in communication, thus preventing and prosecuting terrorist use of the Internet presents a unique challenge. The challenge is related to both the development of adequate legislation as well as capable technical solutions. Various countries have in the last years introduced legislation dealing with the criminal abuse of information and communication technology as well as anti-terrorism legislation. Not only do the formulation of criminal legislation and procedural instruments vary, but so too do the systematic approaches. It is possible to identify three key trends:

- countries are applying existing cybercrime legislation, developed

to cover non-terrorist related acts, to terrorist use of the Internet;

- countries are applying existing legislation, developed to cover non-Internet related terrorist acts, to Internet-related acts as well;
- countries have enacted specific legislation on terrorist use of the Internet.

The presentation provided an overview of the different approaches and discussed the advantages and disadvantages of each approach.

NANOTHREATS AND NANOTOXICOLOGICAL PECULIARITIES OF NANOOBJECTS AS ONE OF THE FUTURE TRENDS OF TERRORIST THREATS - Prof. Dr. Oleksii Kharlamov, Institute for Problems of Materials Science of the National Academy of Science, Ukraine.

The end of the last century was characterized by epoch-making changes in two directions: in science and in economy. The new state of a matter (solid molecules, nanoparticles and nanostructures) was open and new principles of creation (nanotechnology) were engineered. Nanoobjects are extremely aggressive and harmful to live organisms but their properties have not been investigated practically. Besides, there was a destruction of the two-polar world (ending of Cold War, disintegration of USSR and Yugoslavia) and formation of the unipolar world with extremely fast democratic development of large scale, densely-populated territories.

Every significant historical epoch of civilization development has the terms – brands – which describe it fully (e.g. steam locomotive, revolution, radio-activity, and cosmos). Today's brands are democracy, «nano» (nanoparticles and nanostructures), terrorism and narcotism. Probably, between these words and phenomena, a casual interrelation is present: the more we hear about the progress of democracy and the achievements of «nano», the higher scale of terrorism and narcotism we observe. Therefore it is important to establish a logical interrelation between these concepts (phenomena), to understand the basic reasons for the appearance and scale distribution of young drug addiction and modern terrorism. In the present report, basic attention was given to the analysis of the reasons for the appearance of new threats connected to development of «nano».

The main nanotoxicological threat is connected to the extremely high ability of highly active nanoparticles to penetrate into the human organism. Nanoobjects are capable of penetrating into a human organism by all possible routes: by way of breathing and digestion, as well as breaks in the skin. Nanoparticles are easily capable of overcoming biological barriers to enter a human organism, to change physiological and biochemical mechanisms and to cause various pathologies. The evolution has not yet created any natural mechanisms of protection from these essentially new carriers of properties, which have already been reproduced already in huge amount. To detect such nanoobjects is very difficult at the present time.

Nanotechnological threats will be connected to the creation of a revealed nanoweapon. Nanosystems created for replacement of live organs

(kidney, liver, blood, lungs) and the transformation of Homo sapiens in nanopeople basically can be quite uncontrollable.

Nanoprogress progresses, as a rule, in democratic countries, therefore uncontrollable use personal nanosensors of a residence, of intelligence and feelings will be the main threats to civil rights and liberty in the coming nanodemocracy epoch.

WMD THREATS FROM TERRORISM - Mr. Adrian Baciu, director of the Professional Private Security Association, Romania.

Proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons has concerned the international community of nations for nearly a century now since the first use of chemical weapons in the battlefields during World War One. There have also been countless instances of the deliberate use of microbes and poisons since early ages to kill as well as to incapacitate large populations and their armies. Nuclear weapons have been used for the first, and hopefully the last, time, by the United States against Imperial Japan, an event that many scholars believe brought World War Two to an end. The enormous destructive potential of all sorts of weapons of mass destruction make it an imperative to halt their spread and to reverse the course of their proliferation, if possible, by way of achieving disarmament on a large scale. There are, however, serious obstacles on the way to achieving such a noble goal. In addition to some technical and technological problems concerning the safe and secure storage of dismantled weapons, if and when disarmament is achieved, there are political and psychological problems that stand in the way. Among the many reasons why states want to acquire weapons of mass destruction, first and foremost are the need for security and the need to gain prestige. Hence, it is necessary to improve peace, stability and the security situation in the world so that states would not have to rely on possessing or deploying such weapons. The presence of weapons of mass destruction is accepted by many as posing the greatest challenge to international security. This being true, one should also not forget that an even bigger challenge stems from the possibility of these weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organizations who possibly will not hesitate to use them againt innocent populations.

WATER RELATED TERRORISM - Prof. Georgios Gallios, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece.

In the presentation, the possible vulnerabilities of the total water supply system and proposed measures to eliminate these vulnerabilities were shown.

Water is the most important natural resource and the well-being and development of humanity is directly related to the availability of appropriate quantities of 'good quality' water. Even though our planet is 70% covered by water, most of this is not of 'good quality' because it is salt water. Only 3% of the total water is fresh water and from this around 2% is not readily available as it is permanently bonded in ice and glaciers. Only 1% of the total water reserves is fresh water available to the world population. Today more than 1.5 billion people do not have access

to good quality water and this number will increase significantly if care is not taken now.

The usual route of water supply to urban areas involves taking water from water reservoirs, treating it in suitable water treatment facilities and the distributing the clean water to habitants and industries through a complicated network of pipelines and pump stations. Several times the wastewater collection pipes and the fresh water supplies are in such close proximity to each other. The potential for degradation of water quality by mixing with harmful substances, either by accident (unintentionally) or intentionally, is quite high.

MARITIME TERRORISM - Mr. Valerio de DEVITIIS, International Organization for Migration, Italy.

Maritime terrorism has emerged as a formidable threat in the world, targeting both civilian and naval vessels. The threat is compounded by the use of maritime vessels and shipping lanes by criminals who are often in league with terrorists. With the possibility that weapons of mass destruction could be used as a terrorist weapon, efforts to pre-empt such attacks which could cause mass civilian casualties has become a top NATO priority, making it necessary for the alliance to expand its maritime frontier. As the stakes are raised, the international community must innovate in order to counter the new maritime threats.

Memories of the hijacking of the Italian-flagged cruise ship P/V Achille Lauro in 1985 off Port Said, Egypt, were revived this year when the mastermind of the hijacking, Muhammad Abbas, died in Iraq. Members of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) held the ship, with 180 passengers and 331 crewmembers on board, hostage, to demand the release of 50 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. They killed an invalid Jewish American passenger before negotiating the release of the rest of the hostages against their safe passage. Europe did not witness acts of such maritime terrorism for the next ten years, but today illegal acts directed against ships, their passengers, cargo or crew, or against sea ports with the intent of directly or indirectly influencing a government or group of individuals, are a formidable threat.

The similarities between the methods used in attacking the USS Cole, a navy destroyer, and the M/V Limburg, a French supertanker, both "rammed" while in Yemeni waters, illustrate that the terrorists do not discriminate between military and civilian maritime targets. The poorly protected, relatively slow and massive ocean-going vessels such as the Limburg present much softer targets to terrorists than better-protected U.S. Navy ships. In 2008, 22 percent of the vessels attacked worldwide were tankers. In addition to being terrorist targets themselves, civilian vessels face another threat. Also, the September 11 attacks have demonstrated that commercial aircraft, usually targeted for hijacking or bombing attacks, can also be successfully used as devastating weapons. Oil, natural gas and other hazardous cargo–laden, ocean-going vessels could also be used as such weapons by terrorists against port facilities.

f. Panel 5 - Communication strategy-winning the minds

COUNTER RADICALIZATION AND TERRORISM RECRUITMENT - Ms. Jolene Anne Jerard, International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Singapore.

This presentation refuted the linkage of Muslim education in Indonesia with radicalization, and that it addresses the commonly held, if incorrect, perception that theological conservatism has a causal relationship with violent extremism. Rather than a causal agent for extremism, Muslim education in Indonesia tends to operate as a protective mechanism against radicalization, as does participation in vibrant religious and cultural celebrations. Students attending secular universities are most susceptible to extremist discourse, through the process of re-Islamization and the development of a stark and detached rational understanding of Islam.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN A BATTLE AGAINST TERRORISM - Mr. Viorel Mihaila, University of Bucharest, Romania.

Strategic Communication is a rapidly evolving concept intended to foster a deeper understanding of communications interactions nowadays. In fighting terrorism, the importance of communicating the right message to the right people is paramount. Moreover, it is not about only communicating the right message, but it is also equally important to engage your audience.

We are witnessing now a big change in the communication philosophy of the strategic planning in this field. However, there seems also to be a change in the expectations of the target audience in relation to the communicators and to the informational content of their activities. The defence and security 'product,' at least in peacetime, is less tangible, more difficult to communicate in a way that is relevant to our audiences. This 'product' is best understood when is consumed, when the 'consumers' experienced the relationship with it. The PR philosophy to repeat/remind seems to need some added value in today's interconnected information environment. We have rejuvenated the conceptual apparatus of public diplomacy, and a vigorous growing network of professionals, working toward a better understanding of the process of communicating strategic or/and influencing at the strategic level. Ideology is more and more individualistically defined and the post-modern citizen would select itself from a broad range of causes, ideas and ideals and build up its own perspective. The inherent set of values included in the fight against terrorism seems to me not to be yet fully incorporated into the public diplomacy national strategies, nor for the international organizations acting on this field. How to better and more effective penetrate the social fabric of the society is still a huge debate. In the defence and security arena, this new reality is trying to be organized and shaped by employing a variety of instruments, mainly now under the Strategic Communication umbrella. At the national level, communicating defence and security issues could be the context to effectively employ Strategic Communication to support the fight against terrorism, to get the support and to counter radicalization and extremist ideologies.

REPORTING TERRORISM, TV AND NEW MEDIA - Dr. Peter Busch, King's College London, UK.

In general, the public derives its perception of reality beyond direct personal experience through the media. When the major media-players say and present the same thing, the public generally assumes it is being honestly informed. Of course, the Internet, Twitter and other means of communication often challenge the major media, but not everyone has the time or interest to become well-informed on the many issues and sort things out, especially when the alternative media also present conflicting views of reality. The major media usually show and present stories to suit their agenda. They rile up the public over certain issues or hide vital information. When the media riles up the public, governments can feel pressured to act in one direction or the other. All this, conflicts with honest reporting. On the other hand, terrorists, governments, and the media see the function, roles and responsibilities of the media when covering terrorist events from differing and often competing perspectives. Such perspectives drive behavior during terrorist incidents – often resulting in both tactical and strategic gains to the terrorist operation and the overall terrorist cause. The challenge to both the governmental and press communities is to understand the dynamics of terrorist enterprise and to develop policy options designed to serve the interests of government, the media, and the society.

STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESSFUL RISK REDUCTION PROGRAMS FOR VIOLENT EXTREMISTS - Ms. Lee Hoon Susan Sim, International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Singapore.

The presentation began with the following assumption: if terrorist rehabilitation programs are the "new weapon" in the counter-terrorism tool kit, how do we assess their effectiveness in facilitating de-radicalization or disengagement from violence? Next come the challenges: at least 16 countries have some form of terrorist rehabilitation/ disengagement programs but are prepared to release only limited data, do not welcome external evaluations, are not always transparent about the goals of the programs and thus the criteria for success, and last the context is specific. Three strategies are currently being used for this process: religious rehabilitation in Singapore (provides alternative ideological reading to allow an extremist to change his mind; most successful with those on periphery), intelligence-driven in Indonesia (targeting senior leaders with influence to assist in interrogation; encourage collaborators but with a high recidivism rate) and counter-insurgency in Afghanistan (the battlefield inside the wire) – separating the wheat from the chaff.

The following lessons have been learned: two key breaks are required to trigger disengagement and decrease recidivism (break ideological mindset and break group bonds), know the detainee (understand the level of radicalisation and pathway) and match his personality to the case officer (easier to engage, create trust and dependency).

In conclusion, structured risk reduction programs are resource-

intensive; countries must be prepared to take a long term perspective and for this, there is a need for unity of political will.

2. CONCLUSIONS

In the 21st century, understanding the changes in the nature of terrorism and the possible responses to terrorist acts is crucial. Terrorism continues to increase in diversity in terms of geography, demographics, and method – terrorists acts can occur now in almost every country, involve a widening range of ethnic communities, and employ an expanded arsenal of weapons. The redefinition of terrorism at local, national and international level has made data collection and tracking of the trends of this phenomenon more difficult, contributing to disagreements over 'who we engage against' and 'what rules apply' in this increasingly violent conflict.

Suicide bombing has become a much more common tactic of terrorists from many groups. Also, terrorism is increasingly carried out by women. In Iraq, the number of female suicide bombers increased from 5 in 2007 to 33 in 2008.

Terrorism today is almost completely transnational. In the past, terrorist attacks were planned and carried out within one state; today, acts are more likely to have international planning, performance elements, and victims. Globalization and the increased capabilities in mass transit and communications make this linkage formidable.

Terrorist groups today are more loosely structured. The cell structure of terrorists is much more difficult to infiltrate than those of earlier decades. The all-channel network structures of terrorist cells make bribes, sting operations, and the capture of one of the members to gain entry to the group are much less effective than similar counterterrorist actions against the earlier chained networks.

Twenty-first century terrorists are, as a whole, much better trained and equipped than those of earlier decades. They have not only organized training camps, but also training manuals, and assembled a growing arsenal of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, simple bombs and other explosives are still popular, as the growth of IED use makes clear.

Terrorists today are more adept at using the Internet and other forms of modern mass media communication, reaching worldwide audiences and targeting different types of audiences effectively with their messages. The Internet 'showcases' terrorists' work very effectively, as hostage videos from Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated. Terrorists are not longer dependant on getting local newspapers to carry their messages. These new skills are also highlighting the increases vulnerability of computer networks to cyberattacks, making the critical infrastructure of many nations of risk from cyberterror.

Terrorists today can sponsor states, rather than being dependent upon a state for sponsorship, whereas terrorist groups of the late twentieth century had sponsored states. Modern terrorists have resources that make such sponsorship unnecessary. This means that the limits on state actions and the vulnerability of state actors to reprisals or punishment for open sponsorship can no longer be assumed to limit the actions of

the terrorist groups. Failed or failing states can give terrorists a safe haven without ties or responsibilities for adherence to international law, as the increasing piracy around the coast of Somalia makes it clear.

These few attributes of the terrorism emerging in this new millennium do not offer a complete, or even a final picture of terrorism. That is why, in order to cope effectively with the modern terrorism, law enforcement and security agencies, not only have to be aware of these changes but also have to develop counterterror means and methods to cope with effectively. Counterterror policy makers have to not only "catch up" on with the terrorists but they also have to learn faster than terrorist.

Book Review

LTC. Ergün Erün*

The book consists of three parts, and each part has some articles regarding ways to counter terrorism financing. In Part I, the authors discuss "the social organization of terrorism." Four articles were published in Part I; these are: "Producing Terror: Organizational Dynamics of Survival" from Jessica Stern and Amit Modi, "The Evolution of Al Qaeda" from Rohan Gunaratha, and "The Social Organization of Terror in Southeast Asia: The Case of Jemaah Islamiyah". "The Financial Organization of Terrorism: The Raising and Movement of Funds" from Zachary Abuza was discussed last in Part I.



Part Two includes five articles in which "Terrorism, Charities and Diasporas: Contrasting the Fundraising Practices of Hamas and al Qaeda among Muslims in Europe" was the first article from Jeroen Gunning, followed by Phil Williams discussing "Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime: Nexus, Appropriation, or Transformation." The third article was titled "Trade Diversion as a Fund Raising and Money Laundering Technique of Terrorist Organizations" from Donald E. Dekieffer, while Nikos Passas and Samuel Munzele Maimbo highlighted "The Design, Development, and Implementation of Regulatory and Supervisory Frameworks for Informal Funds Transfer Systems." Lastly, Dauglas Farah was evaluating "Al Qaeda and the Gemstone Trade" in Part II. In Part III, four articles were published related to responses to the terrorist financing challenge. The first article in Part III was "The US Regulatory Approach to Terrorist Financing" from Sue E. Eckert, while Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert and Peter Romaniuk highlighted "International Initiatives to Combat the Financing of Terrorism." The third article in Part III was "Lessons for Countering Terrorist Financing from the War on Serious and Organized Crime" from Michael Levi. The last article in Part Three was "Conclusion: Taking Stock of Efforts to Counter the Financing of Terrorism and Recommendations for the Way Forward" from Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert.

About the Authors

Thomas J. Biersteker, PhD, has been a faculty member of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology since 2007 and was named the first Gasteyner Chairholder in the same year. He previously served as the director of the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. He has also taught at Yale University and the University of Southern California. He is the author/editor of nine books, including State Sovereignty as Social Construct (1996), The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (2002), and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (2007). His research focuses primarily on international relations theory and economic aspects of contemporary global security issues. His recent activities include work with the United Nation (UN)'s Secretariat and the governments of Switzerland, Sweden and Germany on the design of targeted sanctions.

* *(TUR AF), Chief of Information Collection and Management Center, COE-DAT.*

Sue E. Eckert, is a senior fellow at the Watson Institute, after having served as assistant secretary of export administration in the Clinton administration. Her current research focuses on issues at the intersection of international security and political economy, such as terrorist financing, targeted sanctions, cybersecurity, and critical infrastructure protection. She works extensively with United Nations bodies to enhance the instrument of targeted sanctions, having co-authored Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manual for Design and Implementation, having participated in series of multilateral initiatives (the Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin, and Stockholm Processes), and organizing workshops and simulations for the UN Security Council.

Highlights of the Book

Part I (The Social Organization of Terrorism):

Part I consists of three articles. All of them relate to the social organization of terrorism and their backgrounds.

The first article is "Producing Terror" and the authors are Jessica Stern and Amit Modi. This article has shown that terrorists produce a definable product and that consumers "purchase" this product with their donations to a terrorist organization; these donations are made to support a perceived public good that the recipient terrorist group purports to promote. Also, this article suggests that a mature terrorist group will be both resilient at the network level and effective at the level of the node.

The second article in Part I, "Evolution of al Qaeda", highlighted al-Qaeda's historical backgrounds. The author, Rohan Gunaratha, claimed that al Qaeda has evolved from a core group of radicals determined to execute and facilitate acts of terrorism to an ideological vanguard inspiring a global jihadi movement. The author investigates the al Qaeda terrorist organization in five phases – Phase one: In Pakistan, al Qaeda existed as Maktab-il Khidamat (MAK – Afghan Services Bureau) for four years between 1984-1989. MAK was established by Palestinian – Jordanian scholar Abdullah Azzam and his protégé Osama bin Laden. MAK received substantial financial support from Muslims living worldwide against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. In 1989, bin Laden and Azzam split over disagreements regarding al Qaeda's priorities, so most followers joined bin Laden. Later, in 1989, an Egyptian Islamic Jihad member killed Azzam in Pakistan. So MAK withered and bin Laden became the backbone and principal driving force of al Qaeda. Phase two: In Sudan, following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia. After falling out of favor with the Saudi government, bin Laden fled to Sudan, the headquarters of al Qaeda between April 1991 and 1996. Phase three: In Afghanistan, the relocation to Afghanistan in 1996 created the opportunity for bin Laden to build a truly global jihad network, consolidating old relationships and building new relationships with jihad groups in Africa and the Middle East. Phase four: As the global jihadi movement, al Qaeda disseminates its ideological agenda of global jihad to its followers. Through communications from bin Laden, al Zawahiri, al Zarqawi and others via the Internet, al Qaeda provided indirect but critical ideological and strategic direction in

this phase. Last Phase: In Iraq, the Iraq conflict has provided al Qaeda with an infusion of new human and tactical resources. For the foreseeable, Iraq and a lesser extent Afghanistan will remain the primary fronts of the global jihadi movement.

The last article in Part I was "The Social Organization of Terror in Southeast Asia: The Case of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)" from Zachary Abuza. In this article, the author discusses the relationship between al Qaeda an JI, JI's organizational structure (the shuras, regional advisory council and mantiqi, regional commands), JI's organizational flexibility and decision-making mechanism, informal ties and recruitment and JI's funding mechanism. Also, the author highlighted JI's future direction; it is important to keep in mind that JI has a very long-term strategic view.

Part II (The financial organization of terrorism):

In Part II, the authors analyse the financial organization of terrorism (the raising and movement of funds). Five articles appear in Part II.

The first article in Part II was "Terrorism, Charities and Diasporas" from Jeroen Gunning. The author investigates links between "Islamic charities" in the West and organizations categorized as "terrorist" in Middle East since 11 September. Some terrorist organizations, such as The Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas, Hezbollah and Tamil Tigers are involved in political violence but use charities in Western countries, especially in Europe. Also, the author highlighted some UN resolutions to fight against terrorism financing and the organizational difference between al Qaeda and Hamas, (for example, Hamas is categorized as "jihadist" only vis-à-vis Israel, while al Qaeda is categorized as "jihadist vis-à-vis world). In addition, the author looks at the impact of organizational differences on the use of charities, especially Hamas and al Qaeda in the article. Lastly, the author debates "al Qaeda's future in Europe and policy implications" in his article.

The second article in Part II, from Phil Williams, is about "Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime." The author describes the relationship between terrorist organizations and organized crime groups with examples in this article. The author discussed organized criminal activities, criminal enterprises, terrorist entities, terrorist activities and hybrid entities in his article.

The third article in Part II explains "Trade Diversion as a Fund Raising and Money Laundering Technique of Terrorist Organizations." The author of this article is Donald E. deKieffer. The author investigates "how trade diversion works", "what is money laundering", "diversion in the United States of America Market", the "relationship between smuggling and diversion" and "product counterfeiting and diversion" with examples. Also, the author gives example case studies about the "possibility of terrorist financing via stolen goods", "Hezbollah and the tri–border region of South America" and "terrorist finance via cigarette diversion" in his article.

"The Design, Development, and Implementation of Regulatory and Supervisory Frameworks for the Informal Fund Transfer System" is

discussed in the fourth article in Part II. The authors, Nikos Passas and Samuel Munzele Maimbo, investigate the informal fund transfer system (IFTS), especially hawala in their article. Also, the authors look at the al-Barakat case in the article.

The last article in Part II is related with the gemstone trade and the title of the article is "Al Qaeda and the Gemstone Trade." The author, Douglas Farah, highlights that gold, diamonds, and tanzanite have played an important role in terrorist financing. The author discusses gemstone and al Qaeda, African connections, al Qaeda and Liberia findings of the 9/11 Commission in his article.

Part III (Responses to the Terrorist Financing Challenge):

Part III includes three articles and a conclusion from the authors.

First article in Part III was "The US Regulatory Approach to Terrorist Financing" from Sue E. Eckert. The author firstly defined the regulatory environment before 11 September 2001, explaining the BSA (Bank Secrecy Act). Also, the author explained the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and its recommendations, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and its functions, the US response to 11 September (freezing assets, USA patriot act, etc), anti-money laundering (AML) efforts and the unity of financial intelligence.

Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert and Peter Romaniuk highlight "International Initiatives to Combat the Financing of Terrorism" in the second article in Part III. The authors explain the international effort to counter terrorist financing in this article. Also, the authors discuss "post 11-September UN countering financing terrorism (CFT)", "FATF and other AML/CFT efforts", and "international CFT standards." Lastly, the authors evaluate the effectiveness of international initiatives to counter financing terrorism.

In the third article of Part III, Michael Levi presents "countering terrorist financing from the war on serious and organized crime." The author probes the "unintended consequences and the importance of broader measures", "evaluating what has been learned from AML efforts", "the need for impact analysis" and "applying lessons from AML to countering terrorist financing" in his article.

COE-DAT ACTIVITIES

1 The Defence Attaché of New Zealand, COL John McLead, visited COE-DAT on 08 October, 2010.

2 COE-DAT carried out the workshop "Trends and Developments in Contemporary Terrorism 2010" from 11-12 October, 2010, in Ankara, Turkey. As terrorism is continually evolving, it is important for NATO members to remain current, therefore, the workshop analyzed the current terrorist threats, countering terrorist threats, and emerging trends in terrorism. 31 participants (18 from NATO, 7 from PfP and 6 from MD countries) and 18 speakers attended the workshop. The keynote speaker was Prof. Dr. Yonah ALEXANDER.

3

The NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) Commander LIEUTENANT GENERAL Micheal BARBERO visited COE-DAT on 12 October, 2010.

4

A delegation from the Turkey – U.S. – Iraq tripartite sub-committee meeting, led by MAJOR GENERAL Tarıq Albeldavi, visited COE-DAT on 20 October, 2010.

5

A delegation from the Naples Detachment of ACCI visited COE-DAT on 01 November, 2010

6 COE-DAT hosted a **course** on "Terrorism and Media" from 01-05 November, 2010, in Ankara, Turkey. 10 lecturers from 4 countries and 24 participants from13 countries attended the course.

7 COE-DAT carried out an **Advanced Research Workshop** on "Maritime Security and Defence Against Terrorism" from 08-09 November, 2010, in Ankara, Turkey. The threats and implications of terrorism in the Maritime Environment; the vulnerables and sensitives of Maritime Security; combating threats to Maritime Security and Maritime Terrorism; the contribution of Turkey to Global Maritime Security; and the need for international and interagency cooperation were analyzed throughout the workshop. 15 lecturers from 8 countries and 30 participants from 12 countries attended the workshop.

8

A delegation from Bangladesh visited COE-DAT on 11 November, 2010.

9 COE-DAT organized an **Advanced Training Course** (ATC) on "Defence Against Terrorism: Conceptual Approach in Combating Terrorism" from 22-26 November, 2010, in Belgrade, Serbia. 46 participants from 6 countries and 8 lecturers from 3 countries attended the ATC.

10

A delegation from China visited COE-DAT on 26 November, 2010.

11

A delegation from the collective working group between Turkey and Romania, led by COL Mihai Buta, visited COE-DAT on 7 December, 2010.

12

The secretary general of the Kyrgyzstan Security Counsil, Major General Murat IMANKULOV, visited COE-DAT on 23 December, 2010.

Future Activities

1 COE-DAT is conducting a **Workshop** on "Energy Security" in January, 2011.

2 The "Legal Aspects of Combating Terrorism" **Course** will be held at COE-DAT from 18-22 January, 2011. The aim of the course is to familarize participants with international ragulations and institutions dealing with combating terrorism; to inform participants of the general framework of legal responses to terrorism, to examine the legal basis for using military force against terrorism and to identify gaps and develop effective measures in legal response to terrorism.

3 COE-DAT will conduct a "Defence against Suicide Bombing" **Course** on 21-25 February, 2011. The aim of this course is to understand the history, mechanisms, motivations, and related issues and concepts of suicide terrorism. This course will focus at the staff and planning level and will not be a tactical level course. This course will assist staff officers in the development of policies and dealing with DAT issues.

4 COE-DAT will conduct a "Cyber Terrorism" **Course** from 14-18 March, 2011. The course aims at examining the increasing threat of attacks to cyber systems, considers how terrorists can exploit the Internet in their campaigns, and examines possible strategies in defence against cyber terrorism.

COE-DAT

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