CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE
DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM

COE-DAT
NEWSLETTER
Volume 1 / Issue 3 / September 2007

Contents

3 **General Overview of the Terrorist Activities**
by Ömer YILMAZ
Inspector, TUR Police

7 **Education and Training in Terrorist Organizations**
by Arif EKMEN
Colonel (TUR Gend)

13 **What Strategies are Most Effective When Fighting Against Terrorists**
by Engin KILIÇ
Captain (TUR N)

21 **"Motivation for Suicide Bombers" Workshop**
by Halil SARICA
Colonel (Ret.)

26 **A New Way of War**
by Evan THOMAS
and John BARRY

30 **COE-DAT Activities**

COE-DAT;

Your gate to get information.

Editorial

Newsletter's third issue has three main sections. First of all, we share the information and the analysis of the data related to terrorist incidents took place in the previous three months. We also have articles on terrorism related issues. Lastly, brief information about the training activities of our centre is provided in the bulletin.

COL Arif EKMEN, in his article on *Education and Training in Terrorist Organizations* underlines the importance of having knowledge of and understanding the terrorist recruitment and training processes in order to create proper countermeasures.

CAPT.(N) Engin KILIÇ introduces the effective strategies which can be used for defeating terrorists by touching upon the strategies employed by terrorists and arguing the best metrics of the success in the fight against terrorism.

COL(Ret.) Halil SARICA tries to point out the general concept of the papers presented in the workshop on *Motivation for Suicide Bombers* conducted by COE-DAT on 24-25 May 2007 in Ankara/TURKEY.

Lastly, regarding the importance of countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs), an article on *"New Way of War"* from Newsweek (August 20, 2007) written by Evan Thomas and John Barry is placed in this issue.

The opinions and comments in the "*COE-DAT Newsletter*" represent the personal views of the authors. They do not represent the official views of Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism nor NATO.
All the rights of the articles and pictures included in this book are reserved.

General Overview of the Terrorist Activities (June-August 2007)

Ömer YILMAZ
TUR Police, Inspector, Analyst

During the last three months of the year 2007, comprising June, July and August, the global terrorism menace continued with hundreds of attacks causing huge grievances. Among these three months July was the most volatile one with 1051* attacks, killing 2834 and wounding 3837, along with 176 abducted in 25 separate countries while in June and August almost a same level of activity was recorded with 938 and 940 attacks, respectively. In June, 2235 people were killed, 3162 people were wounded and 291 others were abducted in 28 countries while the attacks in August killed 2344 people and wounded 3122 people in 29 countries. A further 388 were also abducted in these attacks. In sum, 2929 attacks of the three months claimed 7413 lives and 10121 injuries in 42 separate countries.

Iraq was far and away the most unstable country in the world as for the locations hit by terrorist attacks. Some 1191 attacks in the country claimed 4840 lives and 5691 injuries in the relevant three-month long period. As many as two hundreds people were also abducted in these attacks. The death squad killings was the most immediate and devastating tactic of the assailants as 1770 of those killed lost their lives in the hands of these squads, showing the sectarian nature of the ongoing violence in the country. In addition, the suicide attacks were the other destructive tactic used and at least 1001 people were killed and 1821 others were wounded in 71 attacks. As another large-scaled attack type, vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) strikes became third in the damages sustained with 90 attacks, killing 670 people and wounding 1762 more. Indeed, the VBIED-strike which killed 87 people and wounded 214 more in Baghdad was the single deadliest attack of June 2007 while the deadliest attack of July was recorded in Tuz Khurmato on July 7 when a similar attack killed at least 150 people and wounded 250 more. However, the massacre-like suicide attack spate on August 14 in Mosul's Sinjar area was the deadliest attack of the three-month period with 344 killed and 396 wounded. Although a decrease in the number of attacks was sustained in the last three months of the year, when compared with March to May period, the unpredictable nature of violence in Iraq, mainly due to provoking attacks targeting the values or symbols of different communities, do not seem to change unless a comprehensive reconciliation is achieved.

In **Afghanistan**, another country attracting the attention of international community most after Iraq, the level of Taliban insurgency escalated by June and reached its peak in July with 155 separate attacks and didn't show a meaningful change in August. In total, some 395 attacks claimed 673 lives and 782 injuries in this three-month period. The abductions of 87 people were the other security concerns of the country. As for the tactics the insurgents used, the abduction of the foreign civilians was the most prominent one, especially after the abductions of 23 Koreans on July 19. It was one of the most effective tactics of the Taliban to weaken the unity of international community in the ongoing stabilization efforts, *inter alia*, as the Government of South Korea accepted the demands of Taliban to withdraw its troops in order to secure her citizens.Separately, targeting the Coalition forces and Afghan National Army with several kinds of improvised explosive devices remained to be another primary insurgent tactic while the relatively easy target, the poorly equipped and trained national police organization, was hit most with close quarter armed assaults along with the roadside IED-strikes.

** All figures mentioned in the report are totally procured from the open sources and any dispute in figures used in similar works is a matter of capability to reach the same source. Neither NATO nor COE-DAT is responsible for the disputes but the analyst.*

Country	Event Count	KIA	WIA	AIA
Iraq	1191	4840	5691	200
Afghanistan	395	673	782	87
India	356	389	801	76
Pakistan	266	530	1188	186
Somalia	174	249	446	2
Sri Lanka	129	215	280	0
Thailand	124	90	271	2
Turkey	76	57	131	8
Nepal	46	21	41	13
Lebanon	44	101	88	0
Nigeria	20	2	4	94
Russia	18	31	85	0
Philippines	17	75	82	1
Niger	11	38	49	93
Colombia	10	24	33	2
Bangladesh	7	2	21	0
Israel	5	3	6	0
Congo	4	7	5	0
Algeria	3	10	37	0
Mali	3	12	0	38
Guatemala	2	1	0	0
Indonesia	2	2	6	0
Iran	2	0	0	30
Mexico	2	0	0	0
Myanmar	2	27	11	0
Spain	2	0	2	0
USA	2	0	0	0
Central African Republic	1	1	0	0
Chile	1	0	0	0
Eritrea	1	0	0	23
Ethiopia	1	1	8	0
FYROM	1	0	0	0
Georgia	1	0	1	0
Guinea	1	0	1	0
Honduras	1	1	0	0
Ivory Coast	1	0	4	0
Kenya	1	1	37	0
Morocco	1	0	0	0
Sudan	1	1	4	0
Tajikistan	1	0	0	0
UK	1	0	0	0
Yemen	1	9	6	0
Grand Total	**2929**	**7413**	**10121**	**855**

***Table 1** - Incidents per country in June-August*

The mostly-ineffective indirect fire attacks were also used to hit the foreign bases but just caused civilian casualties. The execution of Afghan civilians on spying charges and the arson attacks targeting the support elements of the foreign troops were the other tactics the insurgents used. In terms of locations the southern Helmand province was the most volatile place with 52 attacks, killing 73 people and wounding 79 others. Kandahar and Ghazni were also hit for 41 times in this three-month period according to the information provided by open sources. However, the level of the casualties were higher in Kandahar than in Ghazni as 111 people lost their lives in Kandahar while 42 others were killed in Ghazni.

Despite the holy Ramadan, which will be experienced between 13 September and 12 October, an increase in violence is expected before the weather conditions deteriorate in the country during next quarter.

Apart from Afghanistan and Iraq and in a regional context, **Asia** was the most troubled region in the world with 950 attacks, killing 1351 people and wounding 2701 more in ten countries. Besides, some deep-rooted terrorist campaigns in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Nepal and Thailand, some attacks were also reported from relatively peaceful Bangladesh, Indonesia, Myanmar and Tajikistan. And among the Asian countries hit by terrorist attacks, **India** was the most hit country with 356 attacks, killing 389 people and wounding 801 more. The revolutionist Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) and the nationalist United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) were again the most active terrorist groups operating in the country. In some 99 attacks of CPI-Maoist, 104 people lost their lives and 75 more sustained injuries while 30 ULFA attacks claimed 21 lives and 190 injuries. Apart from these two groups, the attacks of twenty others groups were also recorded during the relevant time period.

In **Pakistan**, the second most hit country in Asia, although the year's least level of terrorist activity was seen in June, the violence, triggered by the Lal Masjid operation of the security forces, surged in July and saw its peak in August. The North West Frontier Province, Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Baluchistan were the leading provinces those saw a high level of terrorist activity. The rise in the number of suicide attacks was also significant as 25 such attacks were conducted in the relevant period while the number for the previous five months was nine.

In **Sri Lanka**, the terrorist campaign of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, despite a decrease for a three-month period, had again caused heavy casualties in the continent with 49 attacks, killing 98 people and wounding 66 more in June and a fourth month was added to the consecutive three-month long decrease in the violence in July 2007 with 33 separate attacks which claimed 76 lives and 119 injuries. The achievements of the security forces over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam terrorist organization during the month were undoubtedly the most important reasons of this low level activity of LTTE. But in August, a slight decrease in violence was seen and total 47 attacks of LTTE claimed 41 lives and 95 injuries. The primary tactic of the terrorists in August was the close quarter armed attacks with 31 repetition and indirect fire attacks with eight occasions. However, several IED-strikes were also conducted.

The ongoing terror campaign in the southern tip of **Thailand**, the clashes between the extremists of the rival political groups in **Nepal**, the bloody clashes between the security forces and the separatist militants in Philippines and discrete attacks in Bangladesh, Myanmar and Tajikistan were the remaining terrorism related developments in the continent.

The region following Asia in terms of the number of attacks conducted in the relevant time period was **Africa** with 223 separate attacks, killing 322 people and wounding 595 people. The assailants also abducted 250 people, mostly in Nigeria, Niger, Mali and Eritrea. Among some 14 countries hit by several terrorist attacks in Africa, **Somalia** was the most-hit one. The security agenda of the country was mainly shaped by the violence campaign of Islamic Courts Militia (ICM) in the capital Mogadishu city and even national reconciliation efforts marked July and August, no concrete results have been achieved yet. Although the grenade attacks were regarded as the primary tactic of the militants, 60 such attacks were conducted in the last three months; the close quarter armed attacks and IED-strikes were the other tactics used most, with 45 and 36 repetitions respectively. Separately in the continent, the attacks targeting the foreign firms and their workers in **Nigeria** and **Niger**; the al-Qaeda inspired terrorist activities in Algeria and the old ethnic and religious disputes in some several countries such as Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo were the other items of the security agenda of the continent.

During the relevant three-month period, **Europe** witnessed a PKK/KONGRA-GEL-dominated terrorism agenda along with attacks against the security forces and the local officials in Russia's several troubled regions. In **Turkey**, the PKK/KONGRA-GEL terror campaign reached its year peak in June with 32 attacks, killing 30 people and wounding 61 others and declined in the following months with 21 and 23 attacks, respectively. The landmine attacks and the roadside IED-strikes were the key tactics of the terrorists while some casualties were also given to security forces in the clashes erupted during the security operations. In the other most-hit country, **Russia**, although just a sole incident had been reported in June, the level of activity rose in the following months and Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia witnessed several armed attacks and clashes between the security forces and the insurgents. The derailment of a train traveling between Moscow and Petersburg on August 13 due to an IED explosion was the other important incident took place out of the aforementioned regions and the motive behind the attack could not be cleared yet.

Separately, several other terrorist incidents were also reported from FYROM*, Georgia and United Kingdom and the VBIED-strike of ETA, dated August 24, was the first attack giving casualties in the year 2007 in Spain.

** Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.*

In the Middle East; Lebanon, Israel and Yemen were the countries from which several terrorist activities were reported. Several indirect fire attacks, in which rockets were used, targeting Israeli lands and a clash between the militants and the Israeli security forces were the incidents reported from the country while a suspected al-Qaeda VBIED-strike in July was the sole attack in Yemen. In this attack nine people were killed, including seven Spanish tourists, and six others were also wounded. However, the clashes between the Lebanese Army and the Fatah-al Islam group and several bombings, including an explosion targeting United Nations' Peacekeeping Mission in the country placed Lebanon at the top of the most-hit list of the region.

Lastly in the Americas, eighteen incidents were reported from six countries and Colombia heads the list with ten attacks. In addition, several incidents were reported from Guatemala, Mexico, Chile, Honduras and USA.

World	Event Count	KIA	WIA	AIA
Abduction	131	23	3	667
Armed Attack	984	3182	871	89
Arson	37	1	1	0
Assassination	83	76	34	0
Clash	321	683	1200	0
Hijacking	3	0	0	0
Hoax	7	0	0	0
Hostage Kill	64	123	0	0
Hostage Taking	1	0	0	0
IDF	335	351	1281	0
IED	567	755	2048	0
Infrastructure Attack	51	0	6	0
Raid	9	29	50	72
Suicide Attack	137	1369	2630	0
VBIED	103	713	1829	0
VOIED	96	108	168	0
Grand Total	**2929**	**7413**	**10121**	**855**

Table 2 *- Tactics used in June-August 2007*

Education and Training in Terrorist Organizations

Arif EKMEN
Colonel (TUR Gend)
Course Director, COE-DAT

Introduction

In her book *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, Cindy C. Combs describes the difference between a terrorist act and a similar crime or war activity. According to Combs, terrorist acts are perpetrated deliberately upon innocent third parties in an effort to coerce the opposing party or persons into some desired political course of action. Terrorists acts, in other words, are constructed deliberately to 'make war' on innocent persons not involved in combat situations. This is the very reason why education and training on terrorist tactics is so important in combating and prevention of terrorism.

These bring in the discussions of different types of terrorism, terrorist profiles, recruitment and membership process, training, networking and security measures vital to gain a better understanding of terrorists, their tactics and how to counter terrorism(1).

All Education and Training related with terrorism starts with understanding terrorists and the reasons why they engage in terrorism. Combs explains that terrorism; (a) is an act of violence, (b) has political motive or goal, (c) is perpetrated against innocent persons, and, (d) is staged to be played before an audience whose reaction of fear and terror is the desired result. This definition eliminates football players, lunatics on a killing spree, and the assassin who tries to kill a bad ruler, from the label of terrorist(2).

Today we are faced with a new kind of terrorism that does not emanate from one country, one religion or even one group, but from the networks that span the globe from East to West and North to South, irrespective national boundaries and frontiers. The attacks so far have left victims from over 80 countries, and suspects have been arrested in 60 different states. Since this new terrorism is dynamic and amorphous by its nature, efforts to combat terrorism today must be flexible, comprehensive and coordinated(3).

Dr. Bruce Hoffman, one of the leading terrorism experts, has also stated terrorism as having a dynamic character and our thinking and responses to terrorism should also be dynamic. He has promoted the notion that terrorists have become progressively more lethal, and deadly, more willing to kill people in great numbers and less discriminate in their targeting than past terrorists.

For examining the psychology of a terrorist, one needs to know their ages, sexes, marital status, rural or urban origins, social and economic backgrounds, education or occupations, method and places of recruitments and political philosophy. Based on research, Russell and Miller reached a conclusion that the usual age for an urban terrorist cadre is between 22-25. In adittion, they asserted that 80 percent of the terrorists are male, and most of terrorists cadres and leaders studied, are unmarried. Also terrorists perforce must be familiar with the area in which they operate, hence urban fighters tend to be urban-bred. In accordance with their urban origin, terrorists tend to be upper middle class. Very often their parents are professionals and liberal in outlook. On the other hand, the terrorists that come from rural areas are mostly undereducated because of their poor social origin.

When discussing the psychology of a terrorist, one also needs to understand the different types of terrorism as listed below(4):

1) Mass Terror- It is terror by a state, where the regime coerces the opposition in the population, whether organized or unorganized, sometimes in an institutionalized manner.
2) Dynastic assassination- It is an attack upon a head of state or ruling elite, precisely the kind of terrorism that the international community tired to criminalize in the mid-nineteenth century.
3) Random Terror- It involves the placing of explosives where people gather to destroy whoever happens to be there.
4) Focused random terror- Itrestricts the placing of explosives, for example, to where significant agents of oppression are likely to gather
5) Tactical Terror- It is directed solely against the ruling government as part of a "broad revolutionary strategic plan".

For an effective counter-terrorism effort, the terrorist means to carry out an attack have to be denied. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan once mentioned that this denial should include denying terrorist financial support, denying access to deadly weapons, denying access to travel and desired targets and deterring states from supporting terrorists. "Denying terrorist

means to carry out an attack" is easier said than done. There are many factors that make it difficult. One of those factors are the financial support that terrorist receive from different organizations around the world. This allows them to recruit, buy arms, and promote their cause. What needs to be done especially by states is to freeze assets of individuals and groups that have been verified as contributors to terrorist organizations. Currently, there have been many states that have practiced this act of freezing assets but there is still a considerable lack of participation to these efforts around the world.

Recruitment

Trends in recruitment and membership in modern terrorist affiliations offer clues as to who is currently becoming a terrorist. Let us look at the terrorist profile and trends in 1997. Fredrick Hacker puts forward three categories of persons who commit terrorism(5):

1) Criminal – perform terrorist acts for more easily understood reasons to include personal gain/profit, usually in return for profit and or safe passage with a strong expectation of survival.
2) Crusader – seek not personal gain, but prestige and power for a collective cause, they commit terrorist acts in the belief that they are serving a higher cause, seldom willing to negotiate because it could be seen as a betrayal of the cause and expectation of survival is minimal with reward in afterlife.
3) Crazy – emotionally disturbed individuals who are driven to commit terrorism by reasons of their own that often do not make sense to anybody else, but are willing to negotiate when negotiator can understand motive and offer hope/alternatives, expectation of survival is strong but not based on reality.

Throughout the time, there has been an accumulation of information on who are currently becoming terrorists. Below are the profiles as mentioned by Combs(6):

a) Age – Terrorism is not only a pursuit of the young but also very young especially after 1980s. The majority of active terrorists have been in their twenties but currently the age has decreased to 14 or 15. These children are recruited by the philosophy learned at the universities and the secondary schools. However, children growing up in cultures that violence is a way of life could easily become part of terrorist activities.
b) Sex – Terrorism of the twentieth century is an equal opportunity employer. Woman may be by numbers assigned to less life-threatening roles but have proven to be tougher, more fanatical, more loyal, and possessors of a greater capacity for suffering and remain members longer than men on the average.
c) Education – Generally over the years individuals involved with terrorism were well educated with almost two-thirds of people identified as persons with some university training, graduates, or postgraduate students. But today the level of education of the average terrorist is declining partly because of the trend in recruitment age of the last two decades of the twentieth century that is already noted.
d) Economic Status – During the time when the majority of terrorist groups came from upper middle class educated families, they were rejecting the comparative wealth of their surroundings to fight for justice for those less fortunate, but today's terrorist tend to be drawn more from the less fortunate than from the comfortable middle-class homes. In the terrorist group, these individuals find a collective wealth and ability to improve one's financial situation that is enormously appealing to the impoverished.

According to Necati ALKAN, the author of *Youth and Terrorism: The Recruitment Methods of the Terrorist Organizations to Influence the Youth*, terrorist organizations takes advantage of the youth period, stating that this is the period when courage is superior to hesitation, adventure feelings to comfort and sentiments to logic. These procedures by terrorist organizations have been confirmed by the increased use of youths in suicide bombings, burning themselves, hunger strikes and armed/unarmed attacks in the recent years(7).

Terrorist organizations gain the youth through social and psychological methods in line with the face-to-face propaganda. In this context, a young is dragged into a group dynamic in which its players and décor has been determined earlier through the friendship, kinship, social and cultural activities and by being

exploited his/her economic, social and psychological needs. It is very important that youths be aware of these tactics and educated on prevention.

Jessica Stern of the Harvard JFK School of Government states that, although women represent a fraction of terrorists worldwide, it is naive to assume they're not recruited to violent extremists groups. Women are responsible for one third of the suicide attacks perpetrated by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, two-thirds of those by PKK in Turkey. Women have founded and led terrorist groups, hijacked planes, served on all-female tank units, blown up buildings and assassinated national leaders(8).

Rita Katz, the director of the Search for International Terrorist Entities (SITE) Institute, an organization that seeks out and reports on terrorist organizations throughout the world, believes these "Female Jihadist" or holy warriors, are more radical than their male counterparts and are a growing component of the terrorist world. And now Al Qaeda is actively recruiting women in its ranks, something that was not part of the norm for the terror organization. Katz explained that by recruiting women, Al Qaeda, is showing that it understands women are very important in the sense that they can infiltrate the enemy better than the men, especially when they (coalition forces) are not looking for women(9).

Jessica Stern(10), also the author of *Terror in the Name of God* agrees that the dress code for devout Muslim women and norms regarding body searches could make it easier for women to hide weapons and that they still arouse less suspicion when it comes to physical violence than men thus receive less attention.

Training Terrorist

John Holms, the author of *Terrorism/Today's Biggest Threat to Freedom* discusses fundamental concepts of terrorist training. The following is a list of those concepts:

1) Make full use of any and all available weapons.
2) Attack aggressively, if possible by surprise, using maximum strength against your enemy's weakest points.
3) Maintain your balance at all times and destroy your enemies.
4) Maneuver your enemy in such a way as to use his momentum to your advantage.
5) Learn each phase of the training before trying to attain speed. Precision is the key to success.

Recruits from all around the world arrive to these terror camps as students or tourist or under assumed names supplied with money and materials already committed, dedicated and angry. Upon the completion of their training they are sent back to the world either to take action or to wait under deep cover in a target country until they are called upon to serve.

In *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*(11), is about the passage of Al Qaeda operatives starting with graduation from a training camp. In these camps, terrorist learn how to blow up infrastructure of a country, including airports, railroads, and large corporations. They are also taught how to wage urban warfare by blocking roads, storming buildings, and assassinating individuals. In most of the camps, terrorist undergo a rigorous program of activities to gain proficiency in a variety of skills including;

- Arson and Bombs: 50 percent of all terrorist incidents involve bombings and as a rule terrorists are taught how to make and use two types of bombs, explosives and incendiary. Explosive bombs are generally of either fragmentation of blast type. Incendiary bombs are fire bombs generating extensive fire damage. Plastic explosives are the newest editions to explosive weapons used by terrorist after being trained at terrorist camps.
-Assassination and Ambush Techniques: Terrorist are usually taught how to penetrate personal security systems in order to kill at close hand. Methods of clandestine approach, disguise and escape are generally incorporated into this part of every terrorist training.
-Extortion, Bank and Armoured Car Robberies: Contemporary training for terrorist often include information on how to raise money for indigent terrorists groups. Among the instruction offered in this curriculum is information on how to extort money from wealthy sources, usually the families or employers of kidnap victims.

- Recruitment: Most terrorist are trained in the techniques of recruitment, seeking to draw in new members but constantly being aware of counterintelligence penetration. Most terrorists today make use of the internet as their primary recruitment tool, targeting youth.
-Communication: Terrorist are trained in sophisticated methods of communication, using today's technology for their benefit. Leaders of terrorist organizations are having larger numbers of their recruits trained in the advanced technology of communication, attempting to stay step forward in their war against humanity.
- Intelligence collection and counter-intelligence methods: Intelligence collection involves teaching terrorists how to infiltrate target areas, gather relevant data, and return that information to headquarters. Counter-intelligence including how to disseminate misinformation designed to confuse their enemies.
- Weapons: Terrorists are being trained on various weapons available through different training camps to include; small firearms, automatic and semiautomatic weapons, and light tank anti-rocket launchers.

Major David Smith, USMC states that terrorists require training in a wide variety of subjects in order to operate effectively and achieve their objectives. He professes, since the majority of terrorist incidents involve bombs, explosives training is paramount. Substantial instruction is required to construct anything more complicated than the most fundamental explosive weapon. Use of components such as mercury tilt fuses (common to car bombs), remotely controlled, and electromagnetic firing devices must be taught by experts to students already well versed in, and confident working with, explosives. Additionally, the complexity of the latest types of vehicle bombs is extraordinary. The bomb employed against the Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon consisted of l2,OOO to l8,OOO pounds of explosives arrayed in a gas enhanced configuration.(12)

Firearms training is also important to terrorist training objectives and is more easily obtained than explosives training. Major Smith explains that students need range time and instruction in weapons maintenance in order to become proficient with small arms. This instruction is often combined with small unit tactics and techniques of guerrilla warfare in what is essentially paramilitary training. Additional skills include; a proficiency in covert communications, document falsification, methods of surveillance, Martial arts, employment of disguise, and procedures for jamming communications. Some terrorists also seek expertise in evaluating security systems, as well as in assessing the vulnerability of various targets. These capabilities are essential for successful mission planning. Languages are also a valuable skill, and media manipulation is additional recurring theme of terrorist training.

Major Smith lastly states that, in addition to general skills that are germane to virtually all terrorist movements, groups pursue skills in areas directly applicable to their anticipated operations. Organizations intending to kidnap or assassinate people while they are in motor vehicles may study defensive driving and evasion methods to reduce the likelihood of their victim's escape. Similarly, organizations contemplating aircraft hijacking will attempt to learn the techniques that hostage rescue teams might employ in order to thwart them.

There are characteristics we consider to be of a successful terrorist, one being high intelligence. But due to the recruiting style of the terrorist in the recruitment of younger personnel as discussed earlier, this characteristic has become less attainable by the terrorist, but they still are able to meet other guidelines to include(13):

- Dedicated – Man of sacrifice, with absolute obedience to the leader of the political movement, full time mercenary.
- Personal Bravery – Facing the possibility of death, injury, imprisonment or torture if captured as a part of the job.
- Without Human Emotions of Pity or Remorse – Capable of killing innocent men, women, and children in cold blood.

These are not only deadly characteristics, but also easily attained through younger people by brain washing and belief of a cause greater than their own.

Terrorist networking is also another issue

of great concern. Cooperation between terrorist groups with, if not a common cause, at least a shared hatred, has occurred with alarming frequency for two decades. Linkage appears in the form of shared members, training camps, weaponry, and tactics. It is obvious in the propaganda being disseminated by the groups; perhaps the most obvious linkage/funding became evident after the September 11 attacks. Study of contemporary terrorist groups suggests that terrorist in the latter part of the twentieth century shared intelligence, weapons, supplies, training facilities and instructors, sponsors and membership(14).

The cooperation in terms of strategic planning that has been authenticated to date between terrorist groups has been focused on the planning of just one particular operation between groups whose other contacts remain fragmentary and or bombastic, consisting primarily in the issuing of declarations by congresses or transient alliances between groups briefly united against a perceived common target.

James Dunnigan, the author of *Where Terrorist Camps Thrive,* states that while Afghanistan is no longer available for terrorist training camps, this has not stopped the training programs of organizations like al Qaeda. Even before Afghanistan became a center for terrorist training, such activities were openly carried on in Iran, Pakistan, Lebanon and Syria. Less open training programs were conducted in Palestinian controlled Gaza, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Clandestine training was conducted in many other nations, but it was the more open camps where the most effective training was carried out(15).

The training camps are an integral part of the terrorist organization(16). All 19 of the 9/11 hijackers, as well as the operatives in the *Cole* attacks and the African bombing attended Afghan training camps sponsored by Al Qaeda. The reciprocal relationship between Al Qaeda and the camps was essential for the preservation of the organization: the camps provided the manpower for the terrorist activities, and the successfully executed attacks increased camp recruitment and enrollment numbers.

The training received at Al Qaeda camps was geared towards a number of possible scenarios. Although most recruits received conventional warfare training, Al Qaeda needed foot soldiers, heavy machinery operators, and individuals who could bomb embassies or hijack planes. Specific terrorist training was given only to the top recruits that Osama Bin Ladin personally evaluated.

The atmosphere of the camps encouraged recruits to develop creative ways to create mass murder. Martyrdom was the most highly achieved state which encouraged many recruits to volunteer to go on suicide missions.

According to the Commission on Terrorist Attacks, as many as 20,000 individuals trained at Bin-Ladin supported camps throughout Afghanistan from May 1996 to September 11, 2001. However, out of this large number, only a select few went on to receive specialized terrorist training.

Conclusion

In sum, education and training concerning terrorism is key to our ability to combat terrorism and keep the world safe. It is imperative that we understand the terrorist recruitment and training process in order to create proper countermeasures. In this changing world, the face of terrorism has shifted to include; advances in technical training of terrorist, use of women for attacks, and recruitment of much younger individuals.

Terrorism threatens all states, their allies, interests, and the world community. Defeating requires sound policies, and international cooperation. This cooperation includes forging partnerships with non-state actors, multilateral organizations, and foreign governments to advance the counterterrorism objectives of states.

One of the keys to defeating terrorism is a worldwide effort to combat terrorism using all the instruments available to the state to include intelligence, law enforcement, and military with the goal of achieving the following:

*Defeat terrorists and their organizations;
*Deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists;

*Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit;
*Defend humanity against senseless attacks.

There(17) also should be an emphasis on the prevention of attacks by the terrorist networks before they occur, the denying of , denying of radical groups the support and sanctuary of states and denying of militants control of any nation that they would use as a home base and a launching pad for terror. These are currently tactics used by the United StatesDepartment of State, Office of Counterterrorism and other partner countries.

Once terrorist tendencies could be recognized, cooperation among more states is achieved, terrorist recruitment networking, and training are stopped, with the combination of the global implementation of security measures, humanity will be affectively protected against these inhuman cruel attacks.

References

(1) Combs, C. (2006) Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century
(2) Combs, C. (2006) Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century
(3) Brochure on Border Security and Transborder Crimes, COE-DAT
(4) Combs, C. (2006) Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century
(5)Hacker, F. (1997) Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in Our Time
(6) Combs, C. (2006) Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century
(7) Alkan, N. (2002) Youth and Terrorism: The Recruitment Methods Terrorist Organizations to Influence the Youth
(8) Stern J. (2003) Washington Post
(9) Katz, R., Search for International Terrorist Entities Ist.
(10) Stern J. (2004) Terror in the Name of God
(11) Howard, R. & Sawyer, R. (2004) Terrorism and Counterterrorism
(12) Smith, D. (1995) Terrorist Training Objectives
(13) Howard, R. & Sawyer, R. (2004) Terrorism and Counterterrorism
(14) Adams, J. (1989) The Financing of Terror
(15) Dunnigan, J. (2005) Where Terrorist Camps Thrive
(16) Department of Defense NEWS SERVICE, USA
(17) U. S. Department of State

What Strategies are Most Effective When Fighting Against Terrorists?

Engin KILIÇ
Capt (TUR N)
Chief, Education and Training Department, COE-DAT

Introduction

Terrorism is a phenomenon which aims to reach different goals by always using practically the same destructive methods to reach its goal, which can have international dimensions and threatens all countries to the same degree without making any distinction between developed and developing ones. Terrorism has an objective to destroy the traditional feeling of trust and protection between the state and the people by applying a systematic and undiscriminating strategy of violence against governments and innocent civilians, by means of increasing political instability and internal tension in a country and by instilling the belief that the government could not cope with terrorism without resorting to oppressive methods.
In the twenty-first century, it is being witnessed that terrorism, in the world in general, has reached a destructive potential heretofore unseen in any period of history, both in technological resources and from the aspects of the area targeted.

The developments have shown that no country is immune to terrorism. It is now accepted that even if violent acts are initiated within the borders of a specific nation or state, every terrorist organization is dependent on elements outside the borders of the state in which the actions are carried out, on matters such as finding personnel, providing logistic support, training of the organization members, providing financing for terrorist activities and finding a place for shelter.

The answer to the question of what strategies are most effective in defeating terrorists lies in an unsatisfactory history. That frustrating history has shown us only one historical absolute when analyzing terrorism–the most effective response to terrorists is unique to the case at hand. On the other hand, history has taught us that there are common aspects, which warrant analysis, to these strategies. Here are some examples that demonstrate three critical components of all strategies to counter terrorists(1);
-The provision of assurance (security and quality of life) for the local populace;
-The elimination of the terrorists – militarily and politically;
-The prevention of external opinion that was sympathetic to the terrorist cause.

One must clearly define terrorism in order to properly discuss counterterrorist efforts. Just as strategies to counter terrorism vary with every situation, the definition of terrorism varies as a result of perspective, political influences, opinions of instruments and techniques used by belligerents, rationality of the belligerents, and a host of other reasons.

Ironically, throughout history, the details of counterterrorism strategies were often a mirror image of the activities of terrorists. Terrorism reflects deeper and wider structural changes. In this sense, defeating terrorists cannot be a simple war of armed forces but must be a sociopolitical process. Rather than a "war on terror," what is needed is to transform security itself, to make it less like war and more like what the social theorist Michel Foucault wrote in the tradition of eighteenth-century social philosophy. Foucault focused on "Police"-not merely policing in the sense of politics and society, stressing social development, welfare, and good governance(2).

Sun Tzu's Theories Of War Which Can Be Used When Fighting Terrorists

Sun Tzu's theory of war provides direct relevance on the war against terrorists. Since terrorism is unique in that it can occur during times of peace and war, it correlates well with Sun Tzu's broad concept of war that "peace and war are difficult to distinguish from each other and are part of the same ongoing conflict."(3) Sun Tzu's theory of war for the understanding of the outcomes of

terrorist campaigns has direct applicability and is a resource to help develop counterterrorism strategies and policies against future war on terrorism. His *Art of War* codifies from a broad perspective that includes; the threat of military action combined with non-military methods such as diplomatic, political, economic, and psychological and intelligence means which could be used to attack a terrorist's strategy which would lead to the greatest achievement of winning without fighting.

Sun Tzu states that "what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy".(4) Sun Tzu's strategy of war articulates the principles related to the use of intelligence which has direct applicability to combating terrorism. Sun Tzu stated "know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."(5) Intelligence enables the counterterrorism forces to combat terrorists "when the enemy is at ease . . . to weary him; when well fed, to starve him; when at rest, to make him move." (6) In addition, intelligence gives the ability to prepare either military or non-military resources to "move swiftly where he does not expect you and to be certain . . . to attack a place the enemy does not protect."(7)

The terrorist campaigns are mostly secretive, surprising, segregated and decentralized making terrorists extremely difficult to find, fix, penetrate, capture, or kill. In these types of circumstances, the line between war and peace is blurred due to the difficulty of achieving conclusive military victories against terrorists because their organizational structure, tactics, techniques and procedures cannot be defeated decisively. Only through the use of intelligence preparation of the battlespace, with indications and warning, targeting and predictive analysis, may the counterterrorism operators better understand the terrorist mindset, concentrate on the mind of the enemy and thereby gain information superiority. One of the major theories advocated by Sun Tzu is the importance of human intelligence. The *Art of War* emphasizes the use of spies and agents and that "secret operations are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move. An army without secret agents is exactly like a man without eyes and ears."(8) In any terrorist campaign, the captured terrorists can be of great importance in obtaining valuable intelligence that helps dismantle terrorist networks.

Sun Tzu recognizes that war is always constant and does not necessarily need to be represented by force on force military actions, but includes non military actions of political and diplomatic nature. In alignment with Sun Tzu's strategy, politics and military instruments of war are working towards being more interoperable and seamless. Sun Tzu's theory of war provides a conceptual framework for the study of policy and strategy that has direct relevance on the War on Terrorism. The *Art of War* has direct applicability and is a resource to guide not only military leaders but also political leaders for better understanding the outcomes of terrorist campaigns.

The Structure Of Terror

Despite their diversity in motive, sophistication, and strength, terrorist organizations share a basic structure (Leadership-Organization-States-International Environment-Underlying Conditions)(9). At the base, underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, and ethnic strife create opportunities for terrorists to exploit. Some of these conditions are real and some manufactured. Terrorists use these conditions to justify their actions and expand their support.

The international environment defines the boundaries within which terrorists' strategies take shape. As a result of freer, more open borders, this environment unwittingly provides access to havens, capabilities, and other support to terrorists. Terrorists must have a physical base from which to operate. Once entrenched in a safe

operating environment, the organization can begin to solidify and expand. The terrorist organization's structure, membership, resources, and security determine its capabilities and reach.

At the top of the structure, the terrorist leadership provides the overall direction and strategy that links all these factors and thereby breathes life into a terror campaign. The leadership becomes the catalyst for terrorist action. The loss of the leadership can cause many organizations to collapse. Some groups, however, are more resilient and can promote new leadership should the original fall or fail.

The Level Of Operations For Terrorist Organisations

The terrorist threat is a flexible, transnational network structure, enabled by modern technology and characterized by loose interconnectivity both within and between groups. In this environment, terrorists work together in funding, sharing intelligence, training, logistics, planning, and executing attacks. Terrorist groups with objectives in one country or region can draw strength and support from groups in other countries or regions. The terrorist threat today is both resilient and diffuse because of this mutually reinforcing, dynamic network structure.

Terrorist organizations in the world operate on three levels, State-Regional-Global(10). At the first level are those terrorist organizations that operate primarily within a single country. Their reach is limited, but in this global environment their actions can have international consequences. Such state-level groups may expand geographically if their ambitions and capabilities are allowed to grow unchecked. At the next level are terrorist organizations that operate regionally. These regional operations transcend at least one international boundary. Terrorist organizations with global reach comprise the third category. Their operations span several regions and their ambitions can be transnational and even global. These three types of organizations are linked together in two ways. The first way is through cooperation by directly sharing intelligence, personnel, expertise, resources, and safe havens. Second, they can support each other in less direct ways, such as by promoting the same ideological agenda and reinforcing each other's efforts to cultivate a favorable international image for their cause.

Best Metrics Of Success When Fighting Terrorism

Today, there is no specific definition of the best metrics of success when fighting terrorists. We lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the war on terror. Are we capturing, killing, deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the terrorists are recruiting, training and deploying against us? What are metrics? "Metrics" is a fancy word for "measurements" that matter to management. A metric can be something like the number of customers who enter a retail store on a given day. In the terrorism context, it can be some other indicator, such as the number of terrorist members in custody.

The world today is faced with the dilemma of formulating the best metrics of success when fighting terrorists. However, these metrics will differ from case to case. If the wrong metrics are selected, execution will be invariably orient on those metrics and produce unintended results. In addition to developing different metrics for different time frames, metrics should also be both quantitative and qualitative in nature. This is not to dismiss the importance of metrics such as the rate of attacks around the world, the number of terrorist leaders killed or captured, and the value of assets frozen. Rather, the point is that we should also seek to define other measures that provide another angle of insight into our progress.

Some examples of metrics or measures of success that need to be identified, improved, evaluated, and applied, are the:(11)

- Capturing or killing the leadership of the terrorist organization;
- Disconnecting the leader of the terrorist organization and his supporters from power;

- Tracking number of battle and non-battle casualties;
- Tracking number of supporters of the terrorist organization;
- Tracking number of terrorists attacks on the country's persons or interests at home and abroad per week-month-year etc.
- Tracking total amount spent on fighting terrorists;
- Gaining large majority of the community's trust in which the local authorities are maintaining law and order, and working for the common good (Gaining the trust and cooperation of the population in the country);(12)
- Destroying terrorist networks, the infrastructure of the terrorist movement;
- Cutting-off the terrorist financial lifeline;
- Using all elements of national power to deny terrorist recruiting.

In the end, the only thing that matters is that we never see another attack on the country again. That's how we ought to measure success.
A combination of tactical, strategic, quantitative, and qualitative metrics is probably the best way to measure progress. Devising these various metrics is worth some effort to develop. The closer we get that measurement to zero, the closer we get to victory. At best, one can make an attenuated argument that winning hearts and minds of people will help to reduce the recruitment pool for terrorists, but that's a really big stretch.

Strategies Employed by Terrorists
"One man's terrorist is another man's freedom-fighter."(13) But what if the society is not civilized enough? What if the authorities are hated and feared rather than trusted? Then the terrorist can always find support and hiding places among sympathizers who are not willing to become terrorists themselves, but are not willing to support the authorities either.

The terrorists' best strategy is to drive a wedge between the people and the authorities. Average people, or at least some of them, protect and support those whom they see as fighting for freedom, religious faith, patriotism, or some other deep value, against overwhelming odds. The biggest danger to the terrorist is the people's trust in authorities. As that trust is weakened or destroyed, the terrorists gain strength and freedom of action. Their prime goal must be to eliminate the trust between the people and the authorities.
How can terrorists act most effectively to eliminate that trust? Here is where the meaning of terrorist violence is often misunderstood. The classic terrorist act is to blow up some innocent victims. But the actual destruction is not the goal, in a military sense. There is a symbolic goal of showing that the more powerful enemy can be touched and deeply harmed, but even that is not the real goal. The real goal is to provoke massive retaliation. The tiny group of terrorists who actually committed the act may escape entirely, may take casualties, or may even be entirely destroyed, but the larger terrorist movement feeds on the retaliation. From the terrorists' perspective, the important thing is for the massive retaliation to harm many people in the general population, even among their own supporters.
The point is to incite the authorities to act in a way that erodes the people's trust in their government. When people lose trust, the terrorists are seen as freedom-fighters, and they gain support, shelter, strength, and freedom of action. However, from the terrorists' perspective, the more horrible, and better the strike, it will provoke a more drastic retaliation. Since it will destroy the people's trust in the authorities and strengthen the terrorists' position, the more horrible, the better retaliation. From the terrorists' perspective, the actual damage to the people, even their supporters, is a benefit, not a cost of terrorist action.

Terrorism is likely to be a reasonably informed choice among available alternatives that have been tried unsuccessfully. Terrorists also learned from the experiences of others, usually communicated to them via the news media.(14)

Effective Strategies Which Can Be Used For Defeating Terrorists
It is a well-established fact that there are many terrorist groups operating in the world. Every group has several characteristics, and every terrorist group

has different aims and uses different linkages and tactics to achieve those aims. The biggest concern is the growing linkages between them. Terrorist groups with global reach are increasing their ties with regional and local groups. Furthermore, terrorist groups are also forming linkages with some insurgencies such as a communist party or a religious party of a country.

Due to the very nature of terrorism, it can only be defeated by employing both military and non-military strategies. In spite of the fact that strategies which can be used against terrorists will differ from case to case, it must be understood how terrorists are kept away in the best case, how terrorists can fight against a country, and what works and what doesn't work to foil those aims, before terrorist attacks can be eliminated.

Here are some strategies when fighting the terrorists:

1. Avoid Massive Repression

Aside from the obvious personal motivation to stay alive, the strategic reason to prevent terrorist attacks is to foil their attempt to provoke massive retaliation. Impotence is the worst-case outcome for a terrorist, not death. Intelligence is needed, good enough to detect and prevent terrorist acts, but this cannot take absolute priority since it would ultimately infringe on our free and trustworthy society. Therefore, some attacks will occur, and there will be casualties. It is important for both the terrorists and the general population to understand clearly that terrorist acts cannot defeat military forces. The hardest part about defeating terrorists comes when a terrorist attack succeeds. The whole point of the terrorist attack is to do something horrific to provoke massive retaliation. The right response must be deliberate and appropriate.

2. Gain Trust and Cooperation

A deliberate and appropriate response gains the trust and the cooperation of the people. To do this, the state authority must be trustworthy. It also means that the training of troops for this kind of war must be very different from conventional wars. Soldiers must be more than conventional warriors in order to serve as community police, or even as social workers and political advisors.

Some of the specific methods for building trust and cooperation from the people are as follows:
- Refute the terrorists' lies; demonstrate the truth and be open to criticism;
- Create, publicize, enforce, and obey "A Bill of Human Rights";
- Demonstrate even-handedness in local disputes;
- Demonstrate justice, even when treated unjustly;
- Visibly work for economic justice for the oppressed.

3. Don't Merely Concentrate on the Terrorists

Terrorism is a tactic used by insurgencies and not an entity by itself. Thus, the strategy should not just be concentrated on defeating terrorists, but focus harder on countering factors that contribute to groups exercising these tactics. These factors include their ideological appeal, fund-raising, recruiting, and the operational space they use to inspire and train future generations of terrorists.

4. Establishing cohesive intelligence to prevent terrorist attacks:

Defeating terrorists requires the use of intelligence which has direct applicability. The terrorist campaigns are mostly secretive, surprising, segregated and decentralized making it extremely difficult to find, fix, penetrate, or capture. Only through the use of intelligence preparation of indications and warning, targeting, and predictive analysis, may the counterterrorism operators better understand the terrorist mindset and concentrate on the mind of the terrorists, in order to gain information superiority. In any terrorist's campaign, the captured terrorists can be of great importance to obtain valuable intelligence that helps dismantle terrorist networks.

5. Devise Long-Term Investments for Domestic Reform

The lack of effective domestic institutions in many cases creates the

requirement of long-term investments. To achieve the reform, every country needs a greater understanding of the domestic realities. Such an understanding requires a dramatic increase in political and military person-to-person contacts in the country. Obviously, implementing this strategy is far from simple.

6. Use 4D strategy-Defeat, Deny, Diminish and Defend(15)

a. Defeat Terrorists and Their Organizations.

The first tenet of the 4D strategy calls for defeating terrorist organizations through the direct or indirect use of diplomatic, economic, information, law enforcement, military, financial, intelligence, and other instruments of power. The evolution of terrorist organizations into loose, flexible networks with small, informal groups compounds the challenges of combating them.

An analysis of the history of combating terrorism confirms that the best way to defeat terrorism is to isolate and localize its activities and then destroy it through intensive, sustained action. However, due to the broad expanse and sophistication of some of terrorist organizations, we must first act to reduce their scope and capability. This effort requires us to identify the terrorists, locate their sanctuaries, and destroy their ability to plan and operate. This can reduce the terrorist's operational capabilities and drive down its morale. It can also facilitate the surrender of militants who would otherwise hesitate to turn themselves out of fear of retribution by the terrorist's leadership.

b. Deny Sponsorship, Support, and Sanctuary to Terrorists.

The second tenet of the 4D strategy stresses denying terrorists the sponsorship, support, and sanctuary that enable them to exist, gain strength, train, plan, and execute their attacks. The strategy to deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary is three-fold. First, it focuses on the responsibilities of all states to fulfill their obligations to combat terrorism both within their borders and internationally. Second, it helps target the country assistance to those states that are willing to combat terrorism, but may not have the means. Third, when states prove reluctant or unwilling to meet their international obligations to deny support and sanctuary to terrorists, the country, in cooperation with their friends and allies, or if necessary, acting independently, will take appropriate steps to convince them to change their policies.

The goal of this front is to cut off the lifeline of terrorist groups—their access to territory, funds, equipment, training, technology, and unimpeded transit. This approach will therefore weaken terrorist organizations and their ability to conduct operations. Nongovernmental organizations are important in combating terrorism and should be worked with to prevent terrorists from taking advantage of their services.

c. Diminish the Underlying Conditions that Terrorists Seek to Exploit.

The third component of the 4D strategy is made up of the collective efforts to diminish conditions that terrorists can exploit. While it is recognized that there are many countries and people living with poverty, deprivation, social disenfranchisement and unresolved political and regional disputes, those conditions do not justify the use of terror. However, many terrorist organizations that have little in common with the poor and destitute masses exploit these conditions to their advantage. September 11 terrorists, for instance, came predominantly from the ranks of the educated and middle-class and served in an organization led by a millionaire murderer.

d. Defend the countries' sovereignty, territory, and its national interests, at home and abroad.

The fourth tenet of the 4D strategy encompasses nation's collective efforts to defend a countries' sovereignty, territory, and its national interests, at home and abroad. This tenet includes the physical and cyber protection of the country, its populace, property, and

interests, as well as the protection of its democratic principles.

Empowered by modern technology and emboldened by success, terrorists seek to dictate the timing of their actions while avoiding countries' strengths and exploiting countries' vulnerabilities. In an increasingly interconnected and technologically sophisticated world, where time and distance provide less and less protection, we must be prepared to defend our interests, as a nation and as citizens. Embodied in this strategy is the old adage that the best defense is a good offense.

With the possibility of striking anywhere and anytime, terrorists are difficult to detect, deter, and predict(16). By improving and coordinating our indications and threat warnings, one will be able to detect terrorist plans before they mature. Through continuous law enforcement, intelligence community, and military pursuit of terrorist organizations, one will disrupt their ability to execute attacks both at home and abroad, and by expanding our physical and cyber protection and awareness, one can be reduced the vulnerability of a countries' personnel, critical infrastructure, and interest.

There are surely many other effective methods to be identified, improved, evaluated, and applied, such as:
- Destroying terrorist networks, the infrastructure of the terrorist movement;
- Cutting-off the terrorist financial lifeline; this can play an important role in defeating the terrorists. This can cause a substantial decline in the terrorist's credibility.
- Having a clear political objective towards which its military and political work is directed and, to some extent, promoting amnesty for the organization's foot soldiers.

Conclusion

Time usually favors the terrorists. Governments are not able to use force as effectively as in a conventional war. The terrorists usually want a protracted war(17). They have much lower costs in military equipment and supplies than a government must expend in crushing an uprising. As the costs mount, governments must change their strategy or be willing to stop fighting once the value of the object exceeds the costs of fighting. The only way to effectively fight terrorists is to provide the security and welfare of the local population and to provide them the chance to aid the government in fighting and eliminating the enemy piece by piece.

Developing a strategy to defeat terrorists is no easy task. If it is understood which weapons actually work against terrorists and how the terrorists try to destroy the weapons, it can be seen what action is required. Effective strategies for defeating terrorists require deep knowledge, cleverness, and wisdom in order to put them into action. Asking the question of what strategies best defeat terrorists will often create frustration, variance, and disparity. But at least there are common components upon which strategy should be built, namely:
- Providing the affected populace with security and a vision of an improving life,
- Implementing a decisive combination of military and political tactics,
- Gaining the sympathy of an external constituency

When terrorists are viewed with suspicion by the vast majority of the general public and are reported to the authorities when they turn violent, then the war on terrorism can be won. It's tempting to think that a war against terrorism can be won by killing all the terrorists. In the real world, this naive plan doesn't work. A serious attempt to find and kill all the terrorist sweeps up many average people, and some of them and their relatives become new terrorists, creating more terrorists than what was defeated. The harder the authorities pursue this strategy, the more effectively they can recruit new terrorists.

The "weapon" needed to defeat the terrorists is the trust and cooperation of the population of the country. As seen, terrorists realize this fact and can use fiendishly clever strategies for

eroding this trust and fomenting resentment and hatred. The goal of counter actions must be clear and concise for those who are responsible for planning and execution.

Defeating terrorists requires discipline, sacrifice, restraint and carefully planned actions. This war is unlike the major wars of the past. If a country tries to fight like the past wars, it will lose, and won't understand how or why. It needs to learn how to fight with the terrorists.

Defeating terrorists should be vital not only for some nations which suffer from terrorism, but also for all nations in the world which may suffer from it in the future. It's obvious that terrorism isn't targeted against a specific color, religion or nation, but its global issue that affects all humanity. As Martin Luther King stated, "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere."(18) From the terrorism perspective; "Terrorist attack anywhere and are a threat to peace everywhere." That is why all countries should combine their power and engage terrorism and all terrorist organizations.

References

(1) William R. Daly. "What Strategies are Most Effective in Defeating Terrorists"?, Essay in S&P, (NWC, 2004)
(2) Philip G. Cerny, "Terrorism and the New Security Dilemma," Naval War College Review, (Winter 2005), 14.
(3)Sun Tzu, The Art of War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.
(4) Ibid.,77
(5) Ibid.,84
(6) Ibid.,68
(7) Ibid.,104
(8) Ibid.,149
(9) George W. Bush, "The Nature of the Terrorist Threat Today: National Strategy For Combating Terrorism," (February 2003), 6.
(10) Ibid.,8
(11) Engin Kilic, "What are the Best Metrics of Success When Fighting Insurgents and/or Terrorists?" Final Examination, (NWC, 2004), 6.
(12) Grant R. Highland, "The Global Insurgencey within Islam and the Nature of the War on Terror," Chairman of the Chief of Staff Strategy Essay Competition, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2003), 30.
(13) David Horowitz, accesed on 15 Feb 05.
(14) Manus I. Midlarsky, Marta Crenshaw, and Fumihiko Yoshida, "Why Violence Spread," International Quarterly 24, (1980), 262-298.
(15) George, W. Bush, "Goals and Objectives: National Strategy For Combating Terrorism," (February 2003), 15.
(16) Audrey J. Cronin, "Globalization and International Terrorism," International security 27, no.3 (Winter 2003), 45-54.
(17) Steve Prescott, "Under what Circumstances do the Strategies that Incorporate Terrorism Have the Greatest Chances of Success?", Essay in S&P, (NWC, 2004), 7.
(18) Clayborne Carson, The Autobiography of Martin Luther king, Jr., (January 2001), 343.

"Motivation for Suicide Bombers" Workshop

Halil SARICA
Colonel (Ret.)

Introduction

Do we know how our enemy thinks? The topic of suicide terrorism takes us right to the heart of the dilemmas of the 21st century, in all their complexity. Suicide bombing is the most clearly motivation-based and motivational form of terrorism. The study of motivation takes us back, beyond the operational stages, to the collective mentality of the terrorist organizations and their cultural background, and to the mind of the terrorist. Motivation is controversial, but important. If one looks at motivation for suicide bombers from a counter-terrorism point of view, it is clear that preventing terrorism at the motivation stage is essential. Comprehensive solutions to past conflicts involving terrorism have not been able to avoid this aspect.

In the burgeoning world of terrorism studies, which has seen a deluge of publications and new institutes like the CSTP in St Andrew's and the ICT think tank in Herzliya, the emphasis is on the practical skills related to terrorism and counter terrorism: security procedures, threat and intelligence analysis techniques, and national and international security and defence policymaking. Given the urgent need to respond to terrorism, this emphasis on the practical is understandable.

"Motivation for Suicide Bombers" Workshop

COE–DAT organized an Advanced Research Workshop in Ankara/Turkey on 24–25 May 2007. While the participants had the challenging title of "Motivation for Suicide Bombers", the papers presented by the speakers were wide-ranging. Some took the issue of motivation as their starting point, before heading in another direction. Others were about different aspects of suicide terrorism and terrorism.

The aims of the workshop were understanding the background, motivation, and rationale of suicide bombing. The workshop also sought to identify patterns in the phenomenon, to combine multilateral efforts in countering suicide bombings, and to develop a concept which will ensure pre-emptive action to eliminate or significantly reduce the effects of suicide bombings to countries at greatest risk.

The topics were arranged in a framework of five sessions. The first session considered what is new about today's terrorism and the phenomenon of suicide attacks, while the second session, 'Defining the Threat', analyzed specific aspects of this kind of terrorism. The third session looked at terrorism's impact on modern society (here the speakers interpreted their brief quite broadly and creatively). The fourth and fifth sessions addressed 'Countering Suicide Terrorism' and 'Organizing to Fight Suicide Terrorism'. The two papers in this last session were about terrorism financing.

Papers Presented at the Workshop

The scene was set by a historical review of suicide attacks by the first speaker, Brigadier General Stanciu. His briefing on 'Factors Involved in Terrorist Attacks' provided a wide-ranging analysis, dividing the phenomenon into three main headings: individual and psychological

factors, the organization and its contribution, and the environments (political, social, cultural/religious, etc) in which the terror is nurtured.

"Suicide bombing is the most clearly motivation-based and motivational form of terrorism."

The suicide attack is the weapon of choice of 'globalized terror', a term explored by Laila Bokhari in her paper 'Jihad in a Globalised World'. She highlighted the interplay between the local and the global contexts of al-Qaeda's associates, with an emphasis on extremism within Europe's immigrant communities.

While beginning with the topic of what is new about modern terrorism, Cpt (N) Altunbulak and Lt. Col. Sarıca's consideration of 'Religious Motivations and Suicide Bombings' concentrated on the error of glibly associating al-Qaeda-type terror with Islam, and they identified this error in some of the security policies of the United States (US) and Britain. On a more positive note, this contribution suggested how Turkey's history can provide material for an informed and constructive dialogue between western governments and their Muslim citizens.

Chief Superintendent Ahmet Eren is an expert on the wide spectrum of terrorism in Turkey. His presentation concentrated on the mindset of the members of the PKK terror organization, showing how they are dominated by an autocratic leadership style which values only obedience. In contrast, Mr. Eren noted that the Iraqi suicide volunteer Mervan Ebu Ubeyde came from a privileged background, but had chosen to sacrifice himself, expressing his motives in the broadest of terms. Mr. Eren spoke of the danger of creating a vicious circle if security forces react randomly to terror. He also warned the audience about misconceptions about Islam.

The methods used by terrorist organizations to recruit and train suicide bombers was the subject of the presentation of Superintendent Suleyman Özeren. His presentation also provided a useful survey of relevant literature, with references to discussions from a psychological viewpoint of what makes a terrorist.

"Motivation for Suicide Bombers" Workshop cunducted on 24-25 May 2007 at Merkez Officer's Club in Ankara, Turkey.

Another aspect of terrorism considered at the workshop was the fact that women suicide bombers have a high profile in some terror organizations. Laila Bokhari's second paper suggested that women's past role as victim or supporter may be changing, and she evaluated the significance of this development. In

the last five years, since Wafa Idris blew herself up in Jerusalem, Radical Islamists have accepted female volunteers for suicide attacks. Laila Bokhari quoted from the web magazine 'al-Khansaa' which is aimed at women in pro-al-Qaeda families. The magazine generally sees its readership in traditional supportive roles, although some sections provide information on active training for combat and administering first aid.

Brian Fishman brought a wealth of information about the area which is now the undisputed focus of suicide attacks, Iraq. Here we learned, for example, that in the overwhelming majority of suicide attacks in Iraq no responsibility is claimed. In another part of his presentation, he introduced us the main arguments used by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi to justify suicide attacks according to one view of Islamic Law. Fishman also looked at the impact of suicide attacks on US public opinion, and argued that they are not shaping public opinion to any great extent.

William Gawthrop required a certain stretch of the imagination if the participants were to accept one assumption in his paper, namely that people interrogated in investigations of al-Qaeda-style terror base their responses on a detailed grasp of Islamic Law and what it says on such subjects as informing, picking apart a brother's words, and giving a misleading impression. The presentation took as its one authority on Islamic Law the 'Umdat as-Salik of Ahmad ibn Naqib'. It was not surprising that in the long discussion after the paper of Gawthrop, it was claimed that he was offending Muslims.

Anthony Richards analyzed the 7 July 2005 London Bombings and evaluated the 'Emergency Response, Intelligence and Causes'. In his survey of the reports and reactions of the UK government, he pointed out that the attack had not been unexpected, and already many important steps had been taken like the creation of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre. In terms of the British government's response, Anthony Richards noted that the 'Countering International Terrorism' document (2006) had emphasized the need to tackle inequalities in British society, a need which has been recognised and acted on for years. There was, however, "very little acknowledgement of the foreign policy sphere a being a major source of the problem".

In his paper 'The Role of Intelligence in Combating Suicide Terrorism; Sharing Intelligence amongst States', Ely Karmon demonstrated the international character of suicide attacks, and reviewed the performance of existing international cooperation frameworks. He also presented some of the criticisms made of the current structures, not least Turkey's dissatisfaction with European efforts against the PKK.

In the most practical of all the papers, Rolf Tophoven answered the question of how the police and/or private security personnel can provide on-site security against suicide terrorism, especially in situations where rings of defence can be established around a possible target area.

'The Law and Rules of Engagement against Suicide Attacks' was a paper presented by a lawyer, Jonathan Edwards. Edwards reviewed the laws relating to orders issued to the military personnel on the use of force in situations where there is a threat of suicide attacks. Attacks on land, sea and from the air were considered in his presentation. While the emphasis was on the difficulties faced by US troops in Iraq, Mr. Edwards compared the laws of different countries. Incidents in which the orders have

been tested were presented, for example the London Metropolitan Police's shooting of an innocent Brazilian man mistaken for a suicide bomber. There was also a detailed account of the case concerning the shooting of the Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena and two intelligence officers in Baghdad in 2005.

Nick Ridley's contribution looked at many aspects of terrorism before touching on some financial aspects of various suicide attacks. He pointed out that "the financial outlay to a terrorist organisation ... is comparatively small compared to other forms of terrorist attack," and "these financial advantages are enhanced by the mobility and adaptability of the suicide terrorist."

Besides, his presentation which took us deep into the world of donors, charities and the 'hawala', the simple bank transfer widely used by extremist groups in financing terrorism, was that of Katharina von Knop. She reviewed the elements involved in terrorism finance, and analyzed the Safa Group, in which businessmen and others, including the infamous professor Sami al-Arian, had a complex network of connections and a strong interest in funding various extremist organizations.
At any conference on terrorism feelings are likely to run high. This was particularly the case as, only two days before the COE–DAT Workshop, Ankara had been shaken by a fatal suicide attack near Ulus Square. In response to these attacks, Professor Mustafa Kibaroğlu kindly agreed to give some closing remarks in order to reflect on some of the issues, thereby providing a resolution to the two days of debate. He underlined the way Islam has been presented in the West and the need for objective research.

The knowledge of the way terrorist organizations think and act is of crucial importance in combatting terrorism.

The content of the papers presented during the workshop was of such a certain quality that it was able to provide a framework who wants to learn about the 'Motivation for Suicide Bombers'. Due to time constraints, it was not possible to cover all the issues concerning suicide bombings. However, concerning the workshop, the emphasis was mainly on practical measures and policymaking.

Motivation for Terrorism as a Branch of Research

The challenge is still out there to pioneer research into the issue of motivation. This subject would require teamwork, as knowledge of varied disciplines would be called for.

Regarding the question of how well we know our enemy's thoughts, an example of how unaware senior intelligence officers can be, was provided by a British expert specializing in al-Qaeda who was addressing other terrorism experts

and puzzling aloud over the fact that this group's suicide bombers wear layers of tight clothing when they launch an attack. However, if he could learn to think like an al-Qaeda member, the reason is obvious: in sacred history the 'first generation' of fighters were careful to go into battle wearing well-fitting clothing. Knowledge of the al-Qaeda sub-culture also explains the group's strange interest in medical techniques like cupping, and why they choose names like Qatada, Abu Hafs, and Hamza.

The knowledge of the way terrorist organizations think and act is of crucial importance in combating terrorism. In this respect, psychology turns out to be one of the disciplines concerning the study of motivation for suicide attacks. Other required skills would refer to sociology, politics, international relations and history.

A New Way of War*

Evan THOMAS
John BARRY

With reporting by Babak Dehghanpisheh in Baghdad, Melinda Liu in Beijing, Joe Cochrane and Danfung Dennis at Forward Operating Base Speicher, Christopher Dickey in Paris, Ron Moreau and Sami Yousafzai in Kabul, Kevin Peraino in Jerusalem, Zahid Hussain in Islamabad, and Jeffrey Bartholet and Abby Dalton in Washington, D.C.

It's bad enough when the insurgents hide the IEDs (improvised explosive devices) in animal carcasses or, more ghoulishly, human cadavers. Worse is when they leave the bombs sitting in plain sight. "It makes the hair on the back of our necks tingle," says Command Master Chief Pat McLean, the senior enlisted man in an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Mobile Unit 2 battalion in northern Iraq, the specialists who disarm bombs--and who lost three men to exploding IEDs in July. Insurgents sometimes want the Americans to find the IEDs--so they can draw them into an ambush.

The Iraqis are getting cleverer as the Americans try to shield U.S. troops with more and more armor. In a recent incident, insurgents used a small IED to blow out the tires of one vehicle. When the passengers scrambled out to transfer to another vehicle, a larger IED detonated, killing two. "Sadly, it seems that we're the ones lagging behind. They're getting better and better at it," says Robert Lamburne, the director of forensic services at the British Embassy in Baghdad. The Brits and the Americans now have fancy forensic facilities, like the CSI labs on TV, to trace bombmakers. But Lamburne, who has inspected hundreds of devices, notes that the insurgents don't try all that hard to cover their tracks. About one in five leaves behind fingerprints. "It's not ignorance," he says. "They just don't care. They may believe they're going to die fighting anyway."

How do you defeat a foe who can destroy million-dollar machines with devices that can be built off the Internet for about the cost of a pizza, especially if that foe doesn't particularly worry about dying? When the insurgency began, there were about five "master bombmakers" in Baghdad, each with a recognizable style. Their model was the roadside bombs that were used in Lebanon almost 20 years earlier by the Iranian-backed group Hizbullah. Primitive versions used rudimentary triggers--sometimes just a car battery and a long wire. Today's IED makers have inexpensive gadgets like garage-door openers and disposable phones to detonate their bombs.



** This article is extracted from the US Edition of the Newsweek, New York: Aug 20, 2007 pg. 28.*

The insurgents in Iraq have perfected a new way of war. America is still the world's greatest superpower, and the U.S. military's capacity to take out a moving vehicle using a drone piloted from half the world away should still provoke a little shock and awe. But the IED--cheap, easy to make and adapt, and deadly--has in its own way proved equally powerful. The bombs have bled the U.S. military in Iraq. And thanks to the ubiquitous videos of IED attacks shot by insurgents and put up on YouTube, they will be credited with driving us out of the country whenever we do leave. Guerrillas, even armies, elsewhere are watching: most of the world's conventional militaries would be vulnerable to similar tactics. Already, locally made devices have begun appearing on battlefields from Somalia to Thailand to Pakistan.

"IEDs are easy to make and bombmakers don't have to look very hard for ingredients."

The U.S. military hasn't told the public exactly how many soldiers and Marines are killed and injured by IEDs every month in Iraq. Such disclosures would aid the enemy, or so goes the official explanation, though it might also embarrass Pentagon officials who say they have spent at least $6 billion so far trying to defeat IEDs, with limited success. The best estimate is that about one in three soldiers lost in 2004 was killed by an IED. Now it's more like four out of five. About 50 soldiers a month are killed or injured by IEDs, up from about 30 a year ago. Success, such as it is, is measured this way: the insurgents are setting off more and more IEDs every month--perhaps twice as many as last year. The American death toll is not rising as fast. Officials claim that about eight out of nine IED casualties are injured, not killed, which is a consolation of sorts, though not much of one to the maimed and brain-damaged.

The Americans are caught on the wrong end of what military experts call the "offense-defense spiral." In the race to kill better, offense usually stays a step ahead of defense. IEDs are easy to make, and bombmakers don't have to look very hard for ingredients. The highly militarized regime of Saddam Hussein stashed weaponry all across the country. When Saddam fell and the American invaders failed to secure his arsenals, insurgents could and did avail themselves of about 500 million tons of bombs, artillery shells and ammo, basically left lying around. When the Marines finally seized control of Fallujah in 2004, they discovered that munitions were stockpiled everywhere. The insurgents were transporting IEDs around town in an ice-cream truck. The supply of IEDs and the men to deliver them has become so plentiful that there has been a decline of what is known in the narcotics trade as "street value." In 2005, the teams emplacing IEDs were being paid $100 for each successful blast. Now in central Iraq the payoff is sometimes as low as $40.

About two years ago, Americans, especially the ones fighting against Shiite insurgents, began seeing the deadly effects of a new, improved IED, a charge that could blast right through an armored vehicle, even a tank. These explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) are shot out of crude cannons shaped roughly like coffee cans. Making an EFP requires expertise and machine tools, and earlier this year the Americans claimed the devices originated in Iran. According to the military, EFPs accounted for a third of American combat deaths in July.

The U.S. military responded to the IED threat slowly and defensively. More than a year into the insurgency, the unit set up to figure out how to counter IEDs was operating out of what one veteran of the early days called a "converted closet" in the Pentagon. Now the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), formed in 2006, has a staff of 400 and a budget this year of $4.5 billion. For the first several years, the defensive effort focused largely on building better

jammers. None works very well. It is difficult to sort out a single tiny signal in the electronic clutter of an urban environment. For a time, American soldiers were turning off their jammers because they jammed their own communications.

The other defense is more and better armor. For several years, a dispiriting squabble spluttered in Washington over the failure of the military to provide its troops with enough armored vehicles. The Army brass seemed to forlornly hope that the Iraq War was an unfortunate mistake that would never be repeated (shades of Vietnam), so they saw no point in wasting scarce resources on buying vast armored fleets that would never again be deployed. The Army's foot-dragging finally stopped after a briefing for Defense Secretary Robert Gates on May 1. Unlike the Army, the Marines had ordered a disproportionate number of odd-looking vehicles called MRAPs (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected), which have a V-shaped chassis to deflect explosions. According to a source who was present but would not be identified discussing a top-level meeting, Gates turned to one Army commander and inquired: "Tell me, general, what is the difference between a Marine's blood and a soldier's?"

The U.S. military will now be re-equipped with armored vehicles at the cost of billions. The armored-vehicle shortfall has attracted a great deal of attention in the press and in Congress, but it misses the larger point, says JIEDDO chief Gen. Montgomery Meigs, who was brought out of retirement to be the overall commander in the war against roadside bombs. As Meigs acknowledged to NEWSWEEK, defense is not really the answer because, again, the insurgents can always build bigger IEDs. The better approach, says Meigs--and he does not pretend that it is a sure or perfect answer--is to go on offense.

One step is to get soldiers out of the vehicles that have too often become their fiery coffins. "What does barreling down a highway at 45mph, peering through a dust-covered windshield, actually accomplish?" asked a retired general who declined to be quoted by

name criticizing his former military colleagues. A veteran of the Balkans, this general recalled that his troops had a term for routine, pointless patrols. "Dabbing," they called it, from the caustic acronym for "driving around Bosnia." " 'Dabbing' now means 'driving around Baghdad'," says the general. Before he became head of Coalition forces in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus wrote the Army's new manual on counterinsurgency. For his forces in Iraq, he boiled it down to a series of instructions. Instruction No. 4: "Get out and walk."

"In the dry jargon of military thinkers, guerilla fighting is called "asymmetrical warfare." The asymmetries are not just physical or technological, but moral."

Everyone--from the Americans to the British to the Israelis, with their long experience in Lebanon--seems to agree that better intelligence is essential to reducing the IED problem to a mere "nuisance" (Meigs's goal). But good intelligence is hard to come by. Instead, the Americans have resorted to operations like sending out convoys as bait--while drone aircraft loiter overhead to track the bombers, and signals-intelligence teams listen for their communications--followed by a larger force to spring a trap on the attackers. If that tactic sounds a little desperate, a senior military official, speaking

anonymously about a sensitive subject, assured NEWSWEEK that such convoys use volunteer crews and very-well-armored vehicles.

The success of the insurgent tactics employed in Iraq seems to guarantee we will see them again elsewhere. In the dry jargon of military thinkers, guerrilla fighting is called "asymmetrical warfare." The asymmetries are not just physical or technological, but moral. Martin Van Creveld, a well-respected historian at Hebrew University, puts the proposition starkly: because occupying powers are automatically cast as the bully, they have to show restraint in the battle for world opinion. "You cannot be both strong and morally right at the same time," says Van Creveld. "But if you are small and weak, then you can do what-ever you want. Necessity does not have any moral bounds."

COE-DAT Activities (June- July 2007)

A delegation from Azerbaijan visited COE-DAT on 20 June 2007.

A delegation from Kazakhstan, headed by Brigadier General Edibar ALİYEV, visited COE-DAT on 21 June 2007.

NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) visited COE-DAT on 28 June 2007.

COE-DAT Activities (September-November 2007)

Legal Aspects of Combating Terrorism Course

1 COE-DAT will conduct a course on "Legal Aspects of Combating Terrorism" on 17-21 September 2007 in its facilities in Ankara/Turkey. The course aims to provide the participants with necessary direction and guidance in order to promote standard training and basic skills of NATO forces to maximize the NATO military mission in defeating the terrorism threat. The course also intends to inform the participants to recognize principles for the use of force, examine the law of armed conflict and terrorism, improve the efficiency of Legal Response in combating terrorism and notice the impact of treaties and institutes in Legal Aspect. In this respect, the course is open to all NATO, Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) nations for participation.

Responses to Cyber Terrorism Workshop

2 A workshop on "Responses to Cyber Terrorism" will be held by COE-DAT on 4-5 October 2007 in Ankara/Turkey. By evaluating the threat of cyber terrorism, it is intended to identify measures to counter cyber terrorism and increase the consciousness towards the necessity to establish international cooperation in countering cyber terrorism. The workshop is open to all NATO, Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) nations for participation.

Organisational and Psychological Profile of Terrorism ATC

3 COE-DAT will conduct an Advanced Training Course (ATC) on "Organisational and Psychological Profile of Terrorism" on 22-26 October 2007 in Macedonia. By elaborating the aims and strategies of terrorist organisations, their recruitment methods, action methods and financial sources, the ATC aims to provide information about the structuring of terrorist organisations.

Concept Development and Experimentation Conference

4 2007 Concept Development and Experimentation Conference will be held between 5-8 November 2007 in Istanbul/Turkey. The conference is sponsored by SACT, USJFCOM and Turkish General Staff. COE-DAT is conducting host nation support activities on the behalf of Turkish General Staff. COE-DAT will also conduct a panel during the conference named "Deterrence of Terrorism-Prerequisites for Success."

Defence Against Suicide Bombing Course

5 COE-DAT will carry out the "Defence against Suicide Bombing Course" on 19-23 November 2007 at COE-DAT facilities in Ankara/Turkey. This course is conducted twice a year since the year 2005. The aim of this course is first to analyze the issue of suicide terrorism in different dimensions including the psychological, social, legal, financial, intelligence aspects and then to discuss how to defend against suicide attacks. The course is open to all NATO, Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) nations for participation.

COE-DAT

Centre of Excellence
Defence Against Terrorism

PK.57, 06582 Bakanlıklar
Ankara / TURKEY

Tel: 00-90-312-4258215
Fax: 00-90-312-4256489
E-mail: tmmm@tsk.mil.tr

www.coedat.nato.int

© **COE-DAT 2007** All Rights Reserved