



CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM



COE-DAT

NEWSLETTER

Volume 1 / Issue 2 / June 2007

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information.

Editorial

Newsletter's second issue has four main parts. The first part contains the information and the analysis of the data related to terrorist incidents took place in the previous two months. The second part is composed of articles on terrorism related issues. The third part is designated to the brief information about the training activities of our centre are provided in the bulletin. The last part addresses the past and future prospects of the Centre.

In their article, *Cooperation Failure in the Fight Against Global Terrorism*, Assoc. Prof. Mustafa KİBAROĞLU & Research Assistant Baris Caglar, argues adjustment and coordination problems among states, terrorism's mainly being a political phenomenon, Reasons of Fail-

ure in Cooperation Against Terrorism, Levels of Analysis, Response Strategies Employed by States.

Major Ümit GÜLERYÜZ introduces different approaches to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and its effects on terrorism in his article. He explains, the threat of weapons of mass destruction, definition problems, different strategies for countering this threat and NATO policy against WMD proliferation.

Lastly, Colonel Arif EKMEK points out the general concept of the essays presented in the advance training course of *Border Security And Transborder Crimes* which was conducted by COE-DAT on 26-28 February 2007 in Georgia.





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A BREAKING POINT WITH EUROPE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM?

Turkey's permanent representative to the Council of Europe, Ambassador Daryal Batbay forwarded the protest of Ankara to the Secretary General Terry Davis for allowing the PKK terrorist to enter the premises of the Council to conduct an interview with him.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon for Europe and many of the member States of the Council of Europe, including England, France, Germany, Spain, Italy and Turkey, have been involved in various struggles against revolutionist, ethnic or religious terrorism for decades. Aware of the growing concern caused by the increase in the terrorist acts in Europe, especially, since the middle of the 1970s, the Council has adopted a series of regulations such as the "European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism" (ETS 90), dated 27.01.1977. The Convention was the first and the most comprehensive legal document ever prepared in this context. Further, in parallel with the changing nature and capabilities of the terrorism and terrorist organizations, all Council bodies, mainly the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly, have adopted new texts such as many other conventions, resolutions, declarations or recommendations in order to enhance the capability of the member States in the fight against all kinds of terrorism.

The Council of Europe's response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States was regarded firm and immediate. Meanwhile, in order to take steps rapidly to increase the effectiveness of the existing international instruments within its body in the fight against terrorism, the Council of Europe established a "Multidisciplinary Group on International Action Against Terrorism" that was responsible to review the implementation and to examine the possibility of updating the existing international instruments of the Council of Europe relating to the fight against terrorism, with particular emphasis on the ETS 90. As a result of this working group's efforts, on June 1, 2007, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Terry Davis, announced that the new Convention on the Prevention of Ter-

rorism has entered into force, saying; "This new weapon provides a robust and effective response to the threat of terrorism. It allows our governments to act early and effectively to stop terrorists before they can carry out their attacks". Council of Europe, "A new weapon in the fight against terrorism", (Accessed on June 8, 2007).¹

Although the new Convention was announced as a "new weapon in the fight against terrorism" by the Secretary General Davis of the Council of Europe, his meeting with the members of the terrorist organization PKK / KONGRA-GEL on May 23, 2007 who are wanted by the INTERPOL has caused deep resentment in Turkey's capital on the grounds that this was an irresponsible act that highly contradicted with the objectives of the Convention.

It was a well-known reality that no other terrorist organization had any capability and immunity to organize, fund and manage its terrorist aims in Europe as the PKK/KONGRA-GEL; but the last meeting of the Council's Secretary General that was held only a day after the suicide attack in Ankara, killing eight innocent civilians and wounding as many as 90, was regarded as a break point in Turkey's cooperation efforts with Europe.

It is believed that the article below, translated from its original, titled "Strasbourg'a PKK Protestosu" (Protest to Strasbourg over the PKK) by Kayhan Karaca, NTV's representative to Strasbourg, which was published in a Turkish weekly paper namely Dünya Gündemi (World Agenda) on its June 3-10, 2007 edition, would be enough to explain the seriousness of the situation.

"Ankara protested the Council of Europe, of which she is a member, for the interview of Secretary General Terry Davis with the members of PKK who are searched by the INTERPOL with a red bulletin.

Turkey's permanent representative to the Council of Europe Ambassador Daryal Batbay forwarded the protest of Ankara to Terry Davis. According to the information acquired by NTV, Batbay told Davis that those three people who interviewed with him

on May 23, 2007 with the title of “Kurdish representatives”, were indeed the members of PKK and that one of them, namely Ahmet Gulabi Dere was searched by the INTERPOL’s red bulletin for “crime of terrorism”. Batıbay also emphasised that Remzi Kartal, a lawyer of the former Democratic Emek (Democratic Labour) Party (DEP) who went on a hunger strike in recent weeks in Strasbourg in order to have the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) send a delegation to Imrali, was also searched by the INTERPOL’s red bulletin. Remzi Kartal had sent a letter to Terry Davis about the condemnation of the suicide attack, which occurred in Ankara on May 22, 2007. It was learned that Batıbay had given Davis the copies of the INTERPOL bulletins about Ahmet Gulabi Dere and Remzi Kartal.

Amb. Batıbay also said that the PKK militants namely, Hacer Altınsoy codenamed “Dr. Nujin”, and Abdullah Öcalan codenamed “Xebat Halfeti” were present at the meeting. Batıbay strongly criticized the Council of Europe’s Secretary General about the acceptance of these people for an interview. He accused Davis of “being an instrument

of propaganda of the PKK” and “giving the impression of CPT’s visit to Imrali that it was for the sake of the PKK’s efforts”.

Batıbay has also given a letter to Davis in which he exemplified the efforts of the Council of Europe against terrorism and stated that the Turkish authorities were expecting from the Secretary General the protection of the norms and the values of the Council of Europe. Batıbay also stated that allowing the terrorists (to enter the premises of the Council of Europe) was an act of making mockery of these norms and values.

The supporters of the PKK in Europe had started a campaign at the beginning of this year claiming that Abdullah Öcalan was poisoned and they put pressure on the Council of Europe for sending a delegation to Imrali.

The visit of the delegation was interpreted as an act of “sham fight with the activists”. Davis had requested a condemnation announcement from the activists about the suicide attack that had taken place in Ankara-Ulus on May 22, 2007. After this request, the activists had given him a short declaration on the condemnation of the attack.”

References

- ¹ Council of Europe, “A new weapon in the fight against terrorism”, <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1143501&BackColorInternet=F5CA75&BackColorIntranet=F5CA75&BackColorLogged=A9BACE> (Accessed on June 8, 2007).

General Overview of April 2007

Ömer YILMAZ

TU Police, Inspector, Analyst

The constant rise in the number of events took place in the world continued in the fourth month of the year 2007 and in total **1009* incidents**, reported from **30 countries**, **3247 people lost their lives** and **4102 sustained several injuries**. No meaningful divergence was observed in the figures related to the report, except for the number of countries from which terrorist activities were reported: In April, 30 separate countries were hit while the number for March was 35. Among these countries, **Iraq** again came first in all aspects and in as many as 578 incidents, 2059 people were killed, 2830 more were wounded and 188 others were abducted. **Afghanistan** was in the second place in the most-hit countries list as it was in the previous month with 100 incidents; those killed 194 people and wounded 168 more.

The terrorist incidents took place in **India** increased in April and made the country third most-troubled country in the world with 79 incidents. Although there was a decrease in the number of attacks that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam conducted in **Sri Lanka**, the consequences of those attacks were still one of the highest recorded worldwide; in 66 separate terrorist attacks 148 people lost their lives.

Similarly, in **Pakistan** that neighbors two of the most volatile countries in the world, namely Afghanistan and India, at least 47 separate incidents, killed 289 people and 177 more were wounded.

The other volatile Asian country was **Thailand** due to the separatist campaign in the southern tip of the country, bordering Malaysia. In violent 44 incidents, those are believed to be conducted by some shadowy groups in the country, those haven't officially proclaimed their goals and demands, 39 people lost their lives and 96 more were injured. Along with the incidents reported from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal and Philippines; Asia became the most hit continent in the world with 254 incidents, killing 600 and wounding 728.

In addition, **the terrorist acts of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL**, which is one

of the most active terrorist organizations in the world, made **Turkey** the most-troubled country of Europe. As a result of 28 terrorist attacks carried out in accordance with the terrorist group's so called "legitimate defense strategy", 24 people were killed and 18 more wounded. Separately the insurgency in the Russia's Chechnya region claimed 23 lives and six casualties while only one each incident was recorded in Armenia, France and Serbia in Europe during the month.

In Africa, the re-sparked long-lasting conflicts and the attacks against the foreign premises and workers of the firms running the natural sources of the hosting countries marked the month. The **civil war-like security situation in Somalia** claimed hundreds of lives and forced thousands flee their inhabitation according to the reports issued by international organizations from the country and only the evident incidents those have terror features are recorded in this report. The turmoil in Sudan, its first circle affects on Chad and the re-triggered disputes in Democratic Republic of Congo were the other reasons of the worsening situation in the continent. Meanwhile, although the attacks against foreign investors were common in Nigeria and Niger, the attack against an oil company in **Ethiopia** was noted to be the largest one with a same cause. The suicide attack conducted by the **al-Qaeda Organization in Islamic Maghreb** against the Algerian Prime Minister and two suicide attacks in Morocco were the prominent attacks in the North Africa. In sum, at least 337 people were killed and 293 more wounded in Africa in 35 terrorist attacks while the other local disputes or clashes claimed much more casualties.

The proclamation of the military wing of HAMAS to end the five-month long ceasefire in **Israel** raised the tension both in the country and in the Middle East. Separately, the level of people to feel themselves secure in **Lebanon** was still not very high due to several well-known reasons and this situation caused constant hoaxes in the country at the very beginning of the year. Another occasion was again recorded in a uni-

** All figures mentioned in the report are totally procured from the open sources and any dispute in figures used in similar works is a matter of capability to reach the same source. Neither NATO nor CoE-DaT is responsible for the disputes but the analyst.*

versity in April. Lastly in **Yemen**, the sectarian clashes in Saada region of the country claimed more than twenty-five lives and much more casualties during the month.

The traditional tactic of the terrorists, **the close quarter armed attack**, was again the far and away first choice of the terrorists. In 370 separate occasions targeting both civilians and security forces, 1331 people were killed and 280 sustained several injuries. The fates of the 42 other abducted people are still unknown. 94 of these CQA attacks were the unattended killings possibly subsequent to the abductions of the victims and 722 people lost their lives in such conditions. As an organized act that gives various messages to several target groups, this kind of attacks poses a real threat to the security level of the countries. Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Philippines and Sri Lanka were the countries where such attacks were reported. In similar 102 **clashes**, those mainly erupted during the operations of the security forces or due to the pre-planned ambushes or attacks of the rebels, 457 people, mainly the members of the security forces, were killed and 380 more were wounded.

Having destructive consequences, the usage of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is the most dangerous immediate threat in the world. Although some questions the efforts against the weapons of mass destruction, mentioning not giving required importance on this immediate threat or other kinds of terrorist acts as a part of their anti-war campaigns or political beliefs, it is a fact that one of the main concerns of the security forces all over the world is the struggle against this kind of explosive usage. Some new techniques, technologies or tactics are being constantly searched. However, it is really difficult to avoid such attacks once the perpetrator is committed to conduct the attack. So, in order to win the superiority of initiative, the criminal and preventive intelligence comes first as the fundamental strength of the security forces.

In April 2007, total 266 **IED-strikes** killed 727 people and wounded 1756 more. 49 of these attacks were vehicle

borne IEDs those have the most destructive results among the IED types and 435 people lost their lives and 1043 more sustained several injuries. In separate 42 incidents, those were mainly the landmine explosions, named as the victim operated IEDs, 51 people were killed and 112 more wounded. In the remaining 175 attacks in which several IEDs used without a classification due to lack of adequate information, 241 people were killed and 601 more were wounded. The targets of such attacks were mainly the well-armed and equipped security forces, but the targeting of the civilians or the other governmental officials cannot be overlooked. The **VBIED-attacks** were reported from Colombia, India, Iraq, Somalia and Thailand while the **VOIEDs** were mainly used in Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Turkey. The general use of IEDs was also reported from Armenia, Indonesia and Philippines apart from the countries mentioned above.

As another deadly attack type, the **suicide attacks** are still one of the main tactics the terrorists rely on most. Although a little decline was observed in April when compared with March's 59 occasions, 53 suicide attacks claimed 447 lives and 1190 injuries in the fourth month of the year. The countries hit by such attacks were recorded as Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Morocco, Pakistan, Somalia and Turkey. Especially the attacks against the top government officials in Algeria and Pakistan as well as large-scaled attacks in Iraq's Karbala and Ramadi were the most significant examples.

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT IN APRIL 2007

TAMIL TIGERS CONDUCTED THEIR THIRD AIR RAID

Sri Lankan Tamil Tiger rebel planes bombed two oil facilities near the capital on April 29, causing minor damage and tripping air defenses that plunged the city into darkness. Colombo residents heard explosions and gunfire as the military responded to the air raid around 1:50 a.m. (2020 GMT). Six people were admitted for injuries after the attacks, and two were in intensive care. The

early morning attack was the third air strike ever by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE, who are fighting for an independent homeland for ethnic minority Tamils in the north and east of the Indian Ocean Island. "They dropped four bombs ... there was no human damage." Two bombs landed in an area called Muthurajawela, north of the city, one damaging a water pipeline at a crude oil pumping station and the other striking a fire hut at a Shell gas facility. There was an explosion and a fire. There has been some damage, power failure ... (But) there has been no damage to our storage tanks or pipeline" said a Sri Lankan officer. The fire was brought under control in about 45 minutes. Two other rebel bombs landed near the Kolonnawa oil refining facility 5 km (3 miles) north of Colombo. Two aircraft carried out the raids, hitting both targets before returning safely to base.

The rebels' first air strike was on the air force base next to Colombo airport at the end of March, and it took the military by surprise. Cathay suspended its daily flights after that attack for the better part of a month, resuming just a week ago. Analysts believe the Tamil Tigers' air force consists of just two to five light propeller planes assembled from pieces smuggled into rebel-held territory over time.

The Tigers said this would not be the last aerial attack. It is not only preemptive; it is a measure to protect Tamil civilians from the genocidal aerial bombardments by Sri Lankan armed forces.



- Pilots are shown wearing pale blue Tiger striped uniforms, in one shot grouped around the terrorist leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran.

More attacks of the same nature will follow. The air raid comes as the Tigers were seen to be facing setbacks on the ground. In recent months they have been driven from many towns and villages along the coast in the Eastern province.

The government has long suspected that the rebels were trying to get aircraft, smuggling them in pieces to be assembled in their northern stronghold. It's not a new dimension. They were constructing a runway about two or three years back. During the ceasefire agreement they have brought all these things.

There is no shot showing the entire aircraft, but the Sri Lankan Government believes it to be a Czech-designed Zlin-143. One picture shows four bombs mounted underneath the fuselage. It's a very basic system they seem to have put on their aircraft, very hit and miss. It's interesting though, a bold effort. To fly down at night and get back is quite a message to send. The government says its air defense system was a success because the fighter jets housed in hangars at the air base were not damaged. And there was nothing like the scale of damage caused in 2001, when a Tiger attack on the airport complex left half the national airline fleet in flames. (Source: Reuters)

TAMIL TIGERS' BOMBER AIRCRAFT



Sources: Janes, Morovan Aeroplanes, Tamil.net

General Overview of May 2007

The uptrend in the number of violent attacks on which some different terrorist motives were attributed reached a **new record** in May 2007 with **1111** separate incidents in **28** different countries. In these indiscriminate attacks, **3001 people lost their lives** and **4012 more sustained several injuries** while 303 people were abducted. The main reason of the increase in the number of incidents took place in the world was the rising violence in the Middle East, South Asia and the African Horn while the number of incidents conducted in Iraq was counted 30 less than the previous month and the number of countries hit was recorded as the lowest of the year. **Iraq** was again the most-affected country by terrorism. The on-going violence claimed 2122 lives and 2621 injuries in separate 548 incidents.

The year highest 114 separate incidents in **India** made this country the second-most hit one in the world. The activities of more than fifteen different terrorist organizations in the country, mainly the revolutionist CPI-Maoist and the nationalist United Liberation of Assam, claimed 119 lives and 214 more were also wounded in the attacks.

The relatively high level of violence in **Afghanistan**, by the third month of the year, was again sustained by the assailants in the country. However, May 2007 was the deadliest one among the last three months with 219 fatalities and 239 injuries in 93 different incidents. Despite their ineffectiveness, the common usage of the newly adopted tactics had the main role in this devastating result.

Pakistan, where the terrorist campaign of the anti-governmental elements against the decision of supporting US in the fight against Taliban, the somewhat nationalist and separatist motives in Baluchistan and the sectarian violence had considerable role in shaping the security conditions of the country, was hit for 69 times and 92 people lost their lives and 120 more were wounded in these attacks. In the other troubled south Asian country, **Thailand**, the number of the terrorist attacks in May 2007 was the year's highest score with

58 separate attacks, killing 91 and wounding 153 more.

The indirect fire attacks of HAMAS inside Israel and the clashes between the Lebanon Army and Fatah-al Islam group were the main causes of the increasing violence in the **Middle East** as well as the on-going sectarian disputes in Yemen. Besides, the separatist movement of Turkey and northern-Iraq based PKK/KONGRA-GEL terrorist organization in Iran was one of the other terrorist causes. In general, total 35 terrorist attacks in the region claimed 57 lives and 137 injuries.

Russia, Spain and Turkey were the countries hit by terrorist attacks in May 2007 in Europe. The sole incident in Spain, where municipal elections were held on May 27, was an IED-strike targeting an opposition party in Valencia without causing any damage. However, the explosion in a café in Russia's Orsk town killed ten people on May 13 while **the terrorist campaign of PKK / KONGRA-GEL** in Turkey was marked with the **suicide attack** that killed eight and wounded 89 in the capital city Ankara. Having officially ended its so-called unilateral ceasefire in the last month, the PKK / KONGRA-GEL terrorists conducted 22 attacks in Turkey, killing 30 people and wounding 138 more.

In Africa, nine countries were victimized by various types of terrorism. Somalia was the most hit country with 36 separate attacks those claimed 50 lives and 93 injuries while in the oil-rich Nigeria, two people lost their lives and 41 more were abducted. Separately some terrorist activities were reported from Algeria, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Sudan and Uganda.

Apart from the countries mentioned above, **in Southeast Asia**; Bangladesh, Indonesia, Philippines, Nepal and Myanmar were hit by terrorist attacks in May 2007. The clashes between the opposite groups and the abductions of the members of the rival groups in Nepal were the main problems experienced in the country after the Maoists entered the parliament in beginning of

the year. Meanwhile in Philippines, the religious and revolutionist terror claimed as many as thirty lives and more than forty casualties.

As for the tactics the terrorists used, **the close quarter armed attacks** came first in repetition. **1485 people**, including both civilians and security forces, **lost their lives** and **389 more sustained several injuries in separate 385 such attacks**. The huge threat of unattended killings after possible abductions in the countries where deep-rooted disputes challenge the stability of the country, continued in May with 87 separate incidents in which 921 people lost their lives. Without doubt, Iraq was the leading country affected by this threat while India, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Thailand were the other affected countries. Meanwhile in **126 similar clashes**, in which the security forces and the assailants exchange fire after an encounter, 126 people, mainly soldiers and police officers, were killed and 488 more were wounded. As it can easily be observed from the difference

between the number of those wounded in the close quarter armed attacks and in the clashes, the superiority of action is on the assailants' side in the first tactic while it's on the security forces in the latter.

The usage of improvise explosive devices (IED) by the terrorists pose another threat for the security stability of the countries. In May 2007, total 301 IED-strikes killed 718 people and wounded 1822 more. In more than half of the countries hit by terrorist activities in the month such attacks were conducted. A detailed examination reveals that among the general IED usage, **the vehicle borne IED-strikes were the most destructive ones** as 226 people lost their lives and 732 more sustained various injuries in just 40 attacks. Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia and Thailand were the countries from where such attacks were reported. Separately, **the usage of landmines as victim operated IEDs**, were more common than the previous type of IED classification and in 38 separate attacks, 61 people were killed and 129 more were wounded in Afghanistan, India, Sri Lanka and Turkey in addition to the countries where VBIED-strikes were also experienced. The **PKK/KONGRA-GEL** with eight attacks; **Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)** with seven attacks and **CPI-Maoist** with six attacks were the terrorist organizations used this tactic most. In addition, the **Taliban** targeted mainly the national police organization in nine such attacks and in the **Baluchistan** region of Pakistan, similar relatively ineffective four attacks were reported.

Chart 1
Some countries hit by terrorist attacks in April and May 2007





Chart 2 - Some tactics used by the terrorists in April and May 2007

As one of the deadliest and most difficult tactic to be dealt with, **the suicide attacks** claimed 356 innocent lives and 801 injuries in different 51 occasions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Turkey. The largest attacks were conducted once again in Iraq, especially in **Erbil and Baghdad**, killing more than thirty and wounding as many as eighty. Separately, the sole suicide attack in **Ankara**, Turkey was one of the largest ones as 91 people were wounded in addition to six fatalities.



The indirect fire attacks were also commonly used by the assailants in May 2007. The usage of mortars against civilians in Iraq; the ineffective rocket attacks inside Israel targeting mainly civilians; the mortar and grenade attacks of LTTE in Sri Lanka and some similar harassment attacks in the regions of

Pakistan, neighboring Afghanistan were the primary types of this tactic which killed 126 people and wounded 509 in 126 occasions.

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT IN MAY 2007

SUICIDE BOMBING IN TURKISH CAPITAL KILLS EIGHT, INJURES 89

A powerful bomb, triggered by a suicide bomber, outside a crowded shopping mall in Turkey's capital Ankara killed eight people and injured 89 others on May 22. It was believed to be the worst in at least a decade to strike near Turkey's power centre, which houses the presidency, the government and armed forces. "We have seen a vicious, ruthless terror attack at Ankara's busiest time," Prime Tayyip Erdogan told reporters at the scene of the blast in the city's historic Ulus district. There was no immediate claim of responsibility



Name : Güven AKKUŞ
Place of Birth : İstanbul
Hometown : Sivas / Zara
Year of Birth : 1979

COUNTRY	EVENT COUNT		KILLED		WOUNDED		ABDUCTED	
	APRIL	MAY	APRIL	MAY	APRIL	MAY	APRIL	MAY
AFGHANISTAN	100	93	194	219	168	239	12	19
ALGERIA	5	2	57	4	222	2	0	0
ARMENIA	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BANGLADESH	1	4	1	0	0	3	0	0
BURMA	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0
CAR ²	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
CHAD	1	0	65	0	0	0	0	0
COLOMBIA	1	4	1	19	34	0	0	5
CONGO ³	1	3	3	19	0	20	15	6
ECUADOR	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EGYPT	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ETHIOPIA	1	2	74	16	0	0	7	0
FRANCE	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
INDIA	79	114	71	119	128	214	5	10
INDONESIA	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
IRAN	0	1	0	7	0	0	0	0
IRAQ	578	548	2059	2122	2820	2621	188	151
ISRAEL	2	21	0	10	0	14	0	1
LEBANON	1	10	0	33	0	110	0	0
MALI	0	1	0	1	0	5	0	0
MOROCCO	2	0	1	0	20	0	0	0
NEPAL	6	23	0	12	66	113	1	13
NIGER	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
NIGERIA	8	16	31	2	2	0	4	41
PAKISTAN	47	69	289	92	177	120	0	24
PHILIPPINES	8	7	36	29	13	48	0	0
RUSSIA	4	1	23	10	6	0	0	0
SERBIA	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
SOMALIA	12	36	38	50	26	93	0	8
SPAIN	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
SRI LANKA	66	64	148	101	209	103	14	12
SUDAN	5	3	67	0	23	0	0	9
THAILAND	44	58	39	91	96	153	0	0
TURKEY	28	22	24	30	18	138	0	2
UGANDA	0	2	0	8	0	0	0	0
YEMEN	2	3	25	7	73	13	0	0
TOTAL	1009	1111	3247	3001	4102	4012	246	303

but a security source said all eyes were on PKK KONGRA/GEL terrorists and Turkey's military chief said he feared similar blasts could hit other large cities. Analysts said the blast was certain to raise tension ahead of July general elections.

State-run news agency Anatolian said eight people had died in hospital and that six Pakistanis were also among the wounded. A security sources told that the bombing bore the hallmarks of the PKK KONGRA/GEL terrorists. Parts of the mall's entrance collapsed, shop windows were blown out, debris was strewn across the street and police cordoned off the area as rescue workers carried injured people, many covered in blood, to ambulances. Mehmet Yilmaz, a shop owner in the area of the blast, told Turkish television he saw someone on fire and tried to put out the flames by covering him with rugs and water. Harun Kiraz, a 42-year-old taxi driver, also said that "People were running away... I saw a few wounded people ... they were in shock and could not speak. I brought one of them to hospital." (Source: Reuters)

*Table 1
Incidents in April and
May 2007 throughout
the World*

WORLD	EVENT COUNT		KILLED		WOUNDED		ABDUCTED	
	APRIL	MAY	APRIL	MAY	APRIL	MAY	APRIL	MAY
ABDUCTION	32	64	3	0	0	0	180	287
ARMED ATTACK	370	385	1331	1485	280	389	49	3
ARSON	13	8	0	0	33	0	15	0
ASSASSINATION	34	34	23	29	11	2	0	0
BOMB ATTACK	100	126	104	126	406	509	0	0
CLASH	102	102	457	243	420	488	2	13
HOAX	3	6	0	0	0	0	0	0
HOSTAGE KILL	18	10	72	33	0	0	0	0
HIJACKING	0	1	0	11	0	0	0	0
IED	175	223	241	431	601	961	0	0
INF. ATTACK	11	23	0	0	1	1	0	0
RAID	7	0	83	0	5	0	0	0
SUICIDE ATTACK	53	51	447	356	1190	801	0	0
VBIED	49	40	435	226	1043	732	0	0
VOIED	42	38	51	61	112	129	0	0
TOTAL	1009	1111	3247	3001	4102	4012	246	303

*Table 2
Types of terrorist attacks used
in April and May 2007*

Cooperation Failure in the Fight Against Global Terrorism

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Introduction

In the present dusk of the international system established in the aftermath of the Second World War, a relatively uncertain period is experienced during which authority and legitimacy as a power resource are being contested again, and breakdown of power is not constrained to states alone. Alongside the states, institutional tools of authority allocation such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), The World Bank, World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the NATO are challenged by non-state entities such as transnational corporations (market authority), transnational criminal and terrorist organizations (illicit authority), and various types of non-governmental organizations (moral authority). An additional factor that complicates this break down of power even further is the adjustment and coordination problems among states. Different threat perceptions or different response policies employed against the threats can cause friction. However, international institutions possibly provide suitable arenas to lessen such friction through dialogue, one of the principal medium of establishing consensus. One the one hand, in institutionalized settings in which open discussions can be held as in NATO, a checks-and-balances system appears to be a latent mechanism of managing power to a certain extent. On the other hand, this latent mechanism is not always operationalized to realize cooperation both within alliances and with other international organizations.

Terrorism is a Political Phenomenon

Within this above panorama of politics, states play important roles due to their resilience. Clashing interests and different political postures of states lead to a cacophony of terrorism-related river of opinions that do not flow together well. There is a confusion of the way people think about terrorism. The writings on terrorism are purportedly influenced by propaganda of different states and non-state actors of dissimilar authorities and influence. Popular beliefs are bereft of any consistent academic or expert analysis.

Many people from different fields embark upon an adventure of understanding terrorism without possible analytical dangers unattached. Even experts from realms such as teleology and religious studies take the issue up and devise policy recommendations without essential basics researched. The essential basics assessing the phenomenon comprise the historical evolution of terrorism, due theories, clear conceptualizations and the political nature of terrorism. An approach and policy different from those based on, or in collaboration with, teleological lines of thinking must be maintained: Terrorism is mainly a political phenomenon, not a transcendental one.

This is not to say that terrorism cannot be studied by pursuing different approaches, but only that it has generally not been dealt with a rationally sound and educated approach. As a consequence of that, many definitions of 'terrorism', or many terrorisms, abound. A definition can always be made easily, and there are hundreds of definitions of terrorism with no consensus established. Then, it is worth underlining that the lack of a standard, or generally acceptable, consensual definition of international terrorism demonstrates how much the problem of terrorism is politicized in world politics. Again, the very fact that terrorism is politicized demonstrates essentially its political nature, not its religious aspect. Above all, religious extremism -though related to religion- is mainly political.

Weighed according to its consequences, terrorism is yet again political: It causes states and international organizations to change policy. Since any violence is about survival and politics, terrorism is also political. Putatively authoritative opinions such as 'terrorists are irrational' are arguable at best, and do not diminish the political nature of terrorism. Terrorism, whether religious or not, is a hard fact not only of the era of 'international relations' as politics among nation-states starting from the Westphalian era, but actually it dates back to many centuries before. Indeed, it has been around almost as long as humanity itself. Throughout this long continuum of history, it has been a

political problem.

Following Edward H. Carr, the history of world politics and mankind can be viewed as a struggle between satisfied and unsatisfied units of different sorts. These units consist of people both in state and in non-state formations. The struggle between units does not seem to be coming to an end, but only continues in different forms. The profile of people using violence, and the technology involved may change. However, as long as the use of violence on a systematic basis to achieve political objectives continues, terrorism as an unconventional form of political violence is likely to remain intransigent.

Reasons of Failure in Cooperation Against Terrorism

While terrorism proved adamant, cooperation among states to cripple it did not prove to be so. That is why the intensity of attempts and endeavors taken by states at the international level to respond to terrorism at various issue-areas are on their own worth considering as the criterion for successful cooperation. Alternatively, such criterion can also be seen as decline in the number of terrorist attacks or casualties. To date, the international community has responded to the growth of modern terrorism. Yet, some states still regard terrorism privately, if not publicly, as a minor irritant and have been content to deal with it through quiet diplomacy and various forms of appeasement. This is due to the differences in interests and political cultures. This can only serve to encourage more emphasis on this 'high value, low risk' strategy. Given that, any cooperation attempt or any work by states under the rubric of international cooperation deserves considerable attention.

To what extent states can end the period of regarding terrorism as having a nuisance value, or seeing it as a minor irritant? This is still an open question and the reasons of cooperation failure may vanish in the future. How can we know that when it vanishes? How can we know that cooperation against terrorism is successful? Successful cooperation emerges when the conditions

that make cooperation work becomes ever more available.

To understand cooperation failure, it is crucial to ask: What makes cooperation work? The endeavors to harmonize the interests of states, to adjust policies on a quid pro quo basis and to fine-tune other interests of states with the interest of lessening the political weight of terrorism, to prioritize fighting terrorism among other national goals, and following a common response-strategy are among the factors that make cooperation work.

More specifically, the yardsticks to assess the degree of cooperation among states in responding global terrorism are: the new cooperative institutions established or the transformation/adjustment of prevalent institutions such as NATO and the UN; the frequency of the international public debate on counter-terrorism and making terrorism the number one priority for most of the states both in words and deeds, counter-propaganda coordination and adjustment, the extent that national and international diplomacy channels are used; the amount of intelligence exchange taking place between governments; the degree of adjustment and coordination of financial and economic response-policies; the use of and cooperation among international institutions such as INTERPOL, EUROPOL, EUROJUST and other states' counterparts and agencies alongside the UN and NATO; the new institutions established on a national basis and the ability of these new institutions of different states to adjust their policies; intergovernmental and interagency feedback and coordination states. Cooperation failure is the failure to effectively meet most of these factors.

As already pointed out above, terrorism is political. Moreover, states and non-state actors politicize the definition of terrorism dramatically. High politicization of the term deprives it from any consensual meaning. Lack of consensus impedes joint-planning, adjustment of policies and as a corollary joint-operation. Disagreement on conceptualizing terrorism and the politicization

thereof take place because of the diverging interests of the actors involved. This is where the reason for cooperation failure lies. In other words, the definition is politicized because each actor in world politics has its own interest in defining terrorism idiosyncratically. Different definitions of terrorism inheres in different interests that lead to different response-policies and strategies to counter the terrorist threat. States have either clashing interests or shared interests with disparate strategies. This is basically the root-cause of cooperation failure.

Levels of Analysis

Put into a traditional international security perspective, two levels at which to analyze the issue come forth: the local level and the global level. There are mainly two kinds of terrorist groups/agendas, those that operate at the national level and those that operate at the global level. Local terrorist groups have relatively local agendas operating rather locally/nationally when compared to 'more' transnational or global groups. To illustrate, we might bear in mind the differences between the activities of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which later tried to gain an allegedly more political basis (and formed the Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan - KADEK), and those of Al-Qaeda .

The difference between local and global terrorist mode of operations originates in the degrees of transnationality. Both have transnational links, however, with remarkably different degrees. The following questions might illuminate the differentiation between local and global scales of terrorist operations. Did the PKK bomb institutions, buildings, public places for instance in America, in Europe or elsewhere in the world? Where did Al-Qaeda series of atrocities take place? The answers to these questions show the differences between local and global agendas of different kinds of terrorist groups operating on separate levels. Al-Qaeda operates almost all around the world (such as Bali, Istanbul, New York, Washington DC, Madrid and London), whereas the PKK attacks (though having some transna-

tional connections) take place mainly in Turkey.

The degree of transnationality of terrorist operations conducted by local and global groups is not the same. Put another way, terrorists with global reach have a markedly higher transnational mode of operation in comparison to those of local terrorists. The working conceptualization here is that the level at which terrorists are perceived to be operating determines the scale of the terrorist threat. The more the threat is perceived global, the more the number of states whose interests are at stake.

Hence, questions such as why the American administrations would act in total concert with Turkey to erase PKK's terrorist activities, or whether states perceive to have any vital interest in cooperating against terrorist groups whose attacks focus only on a particular state are yet to be answered. ETA, IRA and PKK are among those, which must be studied on a relatively local level. Al-Qaeda type globally active terrorist groups create global problems affecting many states. This global terrorism highlights the inevitability of international cooperation even more, because local grievances resonate locally, while global ones do globally.

Response Strategies Employed by States

In addition to this analytical categorization of the levels at which terrorists operate, it is necessary to study the way states respond to terrorism at these two different levels. The method employed by states can be traced through examination of how states perceive and approach the issue in terms of both how they define terrorism and how they conceptualize terrorism in the way they respond to the problem. This must be approached because how they respond gives important indications about the possibilities of cooperation.

For understanding the issue of how states perceive terrorism, there are two simple questions: 1-Which groups or entities do the states see as terrorist threat? 2- How do they conceptualize and devise their responses to the ter-

rorist threat perceived?

The answer to the former question can mainly be grouped under the above-mentioned criterion of levels at which terrorists operate. As for the latter question, how they conceptualize their response to terrorism tells us the different tendencies of fighting it, the will-generating power of an alignment, and the motivation to contribute to an international effort. The nature of the answer to the second question, whether states see their response as a military or a criminal issue requires to determine which states use what response strategy, and more importantly why they use them. Why does the United States see it more of a military issue despite the fact that some of the EU member states perceive it as more of a law-enforcement issue? To the extent they approach terrorism at a particular (local or global) level differently, states use separate institutions or a blend of institutions. Even when they agree on the level at which terrorists operate and agree on pin-pointing which terrorist groups to confront, they may still use different approaches.

Therefore, other important questions are: Is terrorism an issue of low politics or high politics according to different states? Alternatively, are there states that deny such a distinction? How do states instrumentalize and operationalize the terrorism phenomenon in their foreign policies? These are all issues which portray how and why states diverge or converge on the issue of cooperation against terrorism. Joint-policy implementation entails adjustment of policies. However, above-mentioned factors curtail such adjustment.

The elaboration of cooperation dynamics among states may roughly come along the following paths: In the first path, states may be simply in disagreement with each other with respect to the existence of a common threat and they may declare it as such. A state may declare a violent non-state entity as terrorist while other states may not see it as terrorist. No joint-action comes forth.

In the second path, unlike the first path

of alignment dynamic mentioned above, there is a common threat perception among states. Yet, either the threat may not be seen high or vital enough for putting interests at stake or the perceived levels of threat may be different. This may be the case when an unattacked country's threat assessment becomes different from that of an attacked one: Although the same source of threat is recognized as the common security issue, the threat may not be seen as vital enough to counter by one of the states. It may be intentionally or unintentionally regarded as a threat to be appeased. This usually occurs when the terrorist group under question does not conduct bloody terrorist operations in the country that decides to appease it.

This may also occur when the levels (global or local) at which terrorists operate differ. One may be willing to fight only against a terrorist group acting locally, and another may deal with a global group. Alternatively, some states (although perceiving an upcoming common threat) may behave grudgingly to align with other states in order not to attract or 'invite' threats. Without open denial to cooperate, they may only seem to be rhetorically supporting the international cause with no concrete forthcoming contributions. To put it in the 'alliance-politics' jargon, they may free-ride and pass the buck to other states. This also frees them from the collective action problems, while exacerbating the task of the alignment of states determined to fight terrorism. Regarding these two paths, the two main factors that affect states-decision to enter into an in/formal alliance or an alignment are the states' perception whether a threat against them exists, and the anxiety to attract terrorist attacks. The shadow of future argument sheds light on the latter: A state may not be hit, thus may not be willing to align so as not to become a new target. Even if it already suffered a damage and therefore perceive a common threat, the anxiety to experience consecutive attacks in the future inhibits its effective involvement in cooperation against terrorism. In this case, there is hardly any intention to cooperate.

Thirdly, by and large due to the fact that all suffered from terrorist attacks, states may try to make common cause, align with each other and participate in a coalition. However, owing to their disagreement on the response-strategy to be employed, no effective joint-policy implementation takes place except paying lip service. Different political cultures of states may fail them to reach a common response-strategy. The more different approaches to deal with terrorism exist, the more multi-headed strategies occur. In such cases, there is intention to cooperate, but states fail to conclude a common decision-making procedure to press on. This hinders joint planning of a common response-strategy and due policy-adjustments. What are the domains that require mutual efforts of states? On which fields do states need common response-strategy and joint-planning to successfully carry out the fight against terrorism?

The fight against terrorism has several dimensions: the economics and financial dimension, law-enforcement/police operations dimension, the counter-terrorism dimension that includes special forces of armies and other special counter-terrorist teams of states, the dimension of mass-public information control through counter-propaganda or persuasion, the intelligence gathering and exchange dimension via secret-services and technological and human intelligence means, last but not least, political and diplomatic dimension that

aim to establish due norms and law-making against terrorism. All of these dimensions of the fight against terrorism suffer from burden-sharing problems even if states agree to cooperate.

Fourth, states may climb the ladder of pursuing a common response-strategy, but this time another shortcoming may emerge as the obstacle against effective or successful cooperation, namely free-riding problem or the 'you pay and work for it all problem'. Free-riding is related to burden-sharing, which originate either from lack of intention or lack of commensurate capability of a state.

Conclusion

States have divergent capabilities regarding each dimension of the struggle against terrorism. Capabilities gap among states in intelligence-gathering and sharing, financial disruption of blood-money, law-enforcement or in using of force is one of the grave problems of cooperation against terrorism even when states are fully committed to the counter-terrorism cause. Thus, different capabilities of states create both burden-sharing and interoperability problems. Overcoming burden-sharing and interoperability problems entail the convergence of states' response-strategies on the table, and of willingness and capacities to implement those strategies on the ground with regard to the mentioned-dimensions of the fight against terrorism.

Border Security and Transborder Crimes*

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1. Introduction

Border security plays an essential role in ensuring the effective protection of a state's boundaries, thereby contributing to the preservation of its citizen's sense of safety and to the strengthening of a state's legitimacy and integrity. Despite the challenges to the autonomy of individual states due to the increasing levels of globalisation and integration, border security has retained its political and functional importance. All states should therefore have a pre-eminent interest in providing for an effective border security.

Recent changes in the perception and understanding of security have made effective and efficient border security systems a basic requirement for all states and over the last few years' border security has raised to the top of the international agenda.

There are three critical principles that underpin border security as listed below:

(1) There is No Single Programmatic Fix:

Border security is a long term challenge and will be achieved through a network of mutually reinforcing, and to some extent redundant, layers of defence.

(2) Border Protection Begins Far From Our Shores, Airports, and Crossing Points:

Border security is more effective when we have programs that reach toward the points of origin, rather than simply relying on defending the fixed points of the border. A wide variety of programs fall into this category and should be considered part of the border security effort, including intelligence.

(3) Reducing the volume of work and magnitude of the task through more effective use of information and technology:

In some circumstances, we can use information and technology to help "profile out" and allow trusted passengers and cargo to circumvent routine inspection.

These principles have made border control more manageable, though they have by no means resolved certain broader issues of security.

2. The Nature of the Current Global Terrorism and Its Future Reflections in the Region

Today we are faced with a new kind of terrorism that does not emanate from one country, one religion or even one group, but from the networks that span the globe from East to West and North to South, irrespective national boundaries and frontiers. The attacks so far have left victims from over 80 countries, and suspects have been arrested in some 60 states. Because this new terrorism is by its nature dynamic and amorphous, efforts to combat terrorism today must be flexible, comprehensive and coordinated. September 11 demonstrated the new forms of terrorism being transnational, or trans-regional having a global reach, therefore the focus upon international cooperation is valuable in countering this new terrorism.

Dr. Bruce Hoffman is one of the leading terrorism experts. Dr. Hoffman has stated terrorism as having a dynamic character and our thinking and responses to terrorism should also be dynamic. He has promoted the notion that terrorist have become progressively more lethal, and deadly, more willing to kill people in great numbers and less discriminate in their targeting than past terrorists.

For examining and investigating the psychology of a terrorist we need to know their ages, sexes, marital status, rural or urban origins, social and economic backgrounds, education or occupations, method and places of recruitments and political philosophy. Russell and Miller reached a conclusion that the usual age for an urban terrorist cadre is between 22-25. 80 percent of the terrorists were male, and most terrorists cadres and leaders studied, were unmarried.

Terrorists must be familiar with the area in which they operate hence urban fighters tend to be urban-bred. In accordance with their urban origin, terrorists tend to be upper middle class. Very often their parents are professionals and liberal in outlook. The terrorists that come from rural areas are mostly undereducated because of their poor social origin. The leader tends to be rigid, motivated

* This article has been approved and put together from different papers given during NATO Security Through Science Programme Advanced Training Course "Border Security and Transborder Crimes" between 26 February-02 March 2007 in Tbilisi/Georgia and summarized from the original format by Colonel (TU Gend) Arif EKMEN, Senior Course Director, COE-DAT.

and prone to suspect the loyalty of others. The leader verges on paranoid personality. His political radicalism usually predates strictly criminal behavior. Like leaders in other situations, the terrorist leader is able to read the others well, and recognize their fantasies, and to construct roles which will allow them to enact those fantasies.

Throughout the course of its history, NATO has served both political and military purposes. It has combined the strengths of both a military alliance and a collective security system. The Alliance developed forces which could be rapidly deployed to engage in a variety of operations.

At the dawn of the millennium, in the wake of the terrorist attacks, NATO was again called upon to address a different security threat of terrorism. NATO has formulated and implemented an immediate response and has devised long-term strategies to counter future terrorism activities such as cyber and nano terrorism which we might face in the foreseeing future. The nature of the campaign against terrorism itself facilitates a strong NATO role, in that it puts a priority upon international cooperation in the realm of defense and security.

3. Global Terrorism and Threats to International Borders

The end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization have contributed to the growth of new transnational crime groups. Increased access to international markets, increased international transportation and communications and their considerably low costs provided invaluable opportunities for the smaller groups for mobility. In addition to providing opportunities, even for the small globalization concurrently marginalized and impoverished many communities. This created more propensities for many communities in the developing world to engage in illicit activities to survive or convenience for the terrorist recruitments.

Defining transnational organized crime and terrorism, is what Stanislawski calls “two global bads”, and is of vital importance; first for the analysis of these

threats both by the policymakers and the academicians and second, for developing countering strategies.

Within this framework, a crime is considered transnational if:

- a) It is committed in more than one state,
- b) It is committed in one state, but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another state,
- c) It is committed in one State, but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one state or,
- d) It is committed in one State, but has substantial effects in another state. (UN 2000, Art. 3, pt. 2)

In 1994, the United Nations Secretariat included into the category of “transnational organized crime” criminal offenses “whose inception, prevention and/or direct or indirect effects involved more than one country”. This list of offenses include; money laundering, terrorist activities, illicit traffic in arms, aircraft hijacking, sea piracy, computer crime, environmental crime, trafficking in persons and illicit drug trafficking to name a few.

In this context, it is important to note that terrorism is considered as a form of transnational organized crime. Terrorism involves illegal activities that weaken the social fabric and spread distrust of the ability of state institutions to protect the nation. Despite its links with transnational organized crime, some scholars think that terrorism is a type of transnational organized crime and should be combated as such.

Borders are one of the first lines of defense against terrorism. At various occasions, a number of NATO nations and Partners noted the need for further efforts to implement the PAP-T with special emphasis on relevant aspects of border management and security. Although border security is a national issue, due to the increasing dual participation among the states, deriving from globalization in any realm, border security turned out to be an issue which needs international cooperation. As a

first step, border security necessitates a genuine intention of a nation-state to secure its borders and then collaborate with other nations to pursue policies for securing the borders of the every country in the world.

4. Tasks, Capabilities, Responsibilities of the Border Units

Border units maintain their duties by a 24 hour principle and their main tasks are;

- to protect the border and provide security in their area of responsibility,
- to prevent the incoming-outgoing smuggling in the customs line,
- to inspect and catch the criminal activities within the First Military Forbidden Zone established along the land borders,
- to hand over the captives and the crime evidences to Government Authorities,
- to apply the relevant law sentences to foreign combat army members with the aim of crossing the border for refugeement and apply the rules on procedures to refugees and illegal refugees.

Border units execute their missions in coordination and cooperation with other public units and customs service. Joining in the preparation of Border Protocols as military experts, preservation of border signs, reporting of border incidents, application of procedures for illegal border crossers, execution of exercises, border intelligence missions, establishment of Physical Security System, rotation between border units, and logistical support are the other duties to be performed by border units.

Members of the border units, have the same rights and licenses as other security forces including the license to use weapons. The border troops have the necessary weapons and equipment to ensure an effective control over the border areas. They are mostly equipped with Thermal Cameras, Radars, Night Vision Devices and other devices needed for border security. In addition to this equipment, border units have various wire obstacles in order to establish the physical obstacle.

Customs plays a vital role in protecting borders from the entry of illegal and harmful goods and unauthorized people.

Counter terrorism and improved quarantine intervention remain top priorities as well as intercepting illicit drugs and other things potentially harmful to the community. The procedures applied in sea customs are executed by Sea Custom Units. The Sea Custom Units are responsible for checking the ships, cargo, passengers and crew. Custom specialist officers do these check-in procedures. All commercial vessels arriving in ports are risk-assessed.

The sea borders are protected by Coast Guard Commandant. They operate with a fleet of vessels of various types and sizes. Coast Guard Commandant is responsible for planning, tasking and deployment of the vessels, connected to Marine Forces. Tasks include:

- Information and intelligence gathering,
- Intercepting vessels suspected of carrying illegal entrants, drugs and other prohibited or restricted goods or suspected illegal fishing ,
- Assisting with search and rescue,
- Checking on environmental pollution assisting with park management of offshore nature reserves.

Border units implement this mission at three stages; firstly, know the difference between smuggling and trafficking in human beings; secondly, catch the smugglers/traffickers with their equipment and vehicles; thirdly, hand over them to the judicial authorities. Here are some sanctions to be applied against Human Smuggling;

- Intensive controls at borders,
- Examining the forged travel documents,
- Intelligence efforts,
- Operations on organized crimes,
- Bilateral cooperation agreements,
- Information exchange,
- EU Harmonization Study.

Fundamental principles; “Humanity, impartiality, neutrality” provide peaceful standard for border units. Border unit’s purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being according to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977.

5. Coastline Control in Maritime

Ships are the primary mode of transportation for world trade and carry more than 90 percent of countries' trade. That means maritime transportation is vital to world economy. There is concern however, by government leaders, economists, and security experts that the maritime transportation system could be a target and damaged by terrorist or other threat groups.

The Maritime Transportation System can be used by terrorists to smuggle personnel, weapons of mass destruction, and other humanity threatening tools into the country. Ports are one of the most vulnerable parts of the Maritime Transportation System. While in port, large commercial cargo ships and cruise ships can be targeted for terrorist attacks. This is largely due to their size, proximity to the city, amount of cargo handled, and the accessibility by land and water.

This is the main reason why the Maritime Transportation System all around the world needs to implement security measures to protect against such attacks. These security measures should be balanced into the commercial industries plan, so that those measures do not prevent or delay commercial activities. The government organizations involved in the securing of Maritime Transportation Systems are the Navy, Coast Guard, and Customs, shippers, port security and police forces.

In order to manage these security measures in daily Maritime Transportation operations, the mentioned related organizations and authorities need to rely upon two tools, their own "Domestic Law" and International Law.

The Navy is an important instrument of a maritime policy. The maritime policy of a country involves not only its military strategy but its total response to the oceans around it. It involves economic, social, political and diplomatic aspects as well. This implies that a Navy as an instrument of maritime policy has a very important and definite role in peacetime also.

The Blacksea's longest distance from

west to east (from Poti-to Burgaz) is 635 NM, the shortest distance from north to south (from south of Kırım-to the cape of Kerempe) is 143 NM. The Blacksea is very important to the coastal countries because of economical reasons. The Blacksea is a very impressive example for the whole world because of the peace, maritime security and mutual co-operation between the coastal states.

BLACKSEAFOR agreement was signed in Istanbul on 2 April 2001. The ratification process of this agreement was completed on 5 June 2003. Tasks of BLACKSEAFOR are;

- Search and rescue operations
- Humanitarian assistance operations
- Mine counter measures operations
- Environmental protection
- Goodwill visits
- Any other tasks agreed by all parties
- BLACKSEAFOR may also be available for the UN and OSCE mandated missions.

Operation Blacksea Harmony is a surveillance, reconnaissance and patrolling in the Blacksea for following and watching the suspected vessels that are assessed to have relations with terrorism and illegal activities by Turkey.

6. WMD-Terrorism and Border Security

Nuclear weapons possess a unique destructive force and still, sixteen years after the end of the Cold War, they are perceived to be a sign of prestige and a political leverage. Their mere acquisition provides for states and non-state actors alike the ability to capture the attention of a wide audience around the world even without their actual use. As from states' perspective, nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are more reliable than conventional deterrence. As for the terrorists' perspective, it is a powerful tool for creating identity, attracting attention, gaining recognition, widening the base of followers and for compelling the states to obey their wishes.

This relation of WMD to border-security presents two challenges: First challenge is the theft of nuclear materials from various nuclear stockpiles around

the world. Against this challenge, authorities of several countries try hard to maintain security of numerous nuclear stockpiles through agreements signed among them. Security of stockpiles is the first layer of defense against nuclear terrorism. The Second challenge in preventing nuclear terrorism is interdicting nuclear materials, which are illicitly transported across borders.

Because nuclear weapons and their ingredients do not occur in nature, and since it is hard for terrorists to produce them on their own, the best way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to keep nuclear materials out of terrorist hands. An important reason for getting serious about nuclear terrorism is that terrorists equipped with nuclear devices and materials can explode them not only in major states, but also in one of the Eurasian countries as well.

There are three fundamental ways to stop nuclear smuggling: First, securing all civilian and military nuclear stockpiles and associated facilities is essential. Secondly, interdicting nuclear smuggling/border detection is urgently needed and last but not least is law enforcement and intelligence cooperation.

When you have common borders with various countries which have different rules and implementations on border security, you often have border security problems. There aren't efficient agreements between neighbor countries about terrorist activities or uncontrolled migrations. Some solutions include;

- Increasing punishments with sanctions to whom violating military forbidden zones, not letting immigrants pass without proper documents,
- Disarm, give border troops proper equipment, establish effective ambushes and mobile surveillance forces to prevent violation in avenue of approaches
- Install physical security system along border including underground sensors, wire obstacles, illumination systems, cape wires, rock fields, patrol routes and electronic observation system.
- Satisfy economically in salary of charged personnel in border not to gain money or take bribe from smugglers.
- Establish effective liaison among

border units with wireless, telephone, network etc.

7. Illegal Migration, Trafficking and People Smuggling In/Into/Via Turkey

The worldwide increase in illegal migration has prompted the origin, transit and destination countries to take counter measures. As a form of criminal activity, migrant smuggling has long ceased to be a problem of individual countries. The experience gained during these years made it clear that the full understanding of illegal migration process can only be achieved by examining the complex, multifaceted and global nature of the illegal migratory flows. Socio-economic imbalances, political instability and human rights violations are among the main causes leading people to search for better living standards. Therefore, these problems should not be treated as national issues, neither for origin and transit nor for destination countries. Countervailing measures need to be developed in a cooperative manner. The solution depends in large measure on finding effective responses at international level within a burden sharing approach.

Turkey, at the crossroads of Asia, Middle East and Europe, bordering eight countries and lapped by 5,000 miles of coastline, has seriously been confronted with various forms of this transnational crime, which without doubt, pose a threat to its social order, human and democratic values. As a consequence of various developments taking place at the regional and global level, Turkey, due to its geographical situation, needed to tend an ever-growing illegal migratory pressure from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and other Asian countries who are mainly entering to the country illegally, especially from our mountainous, rough green borders in the eastern region of our country, trying to go to EU countries. People from Balkan States and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) often choose Turkey as a target country to work and stay.

However, by the efficient efforts of Turkish law enforcement authorities to combat illegal migration and people smuggling, some specific routes used

by illegal migrants and smugglers has been turned towards south route (Iraq-Syria-Lebanon) and north route (Iran-Caucasian-Ukraine). In addition, preventive measures taken by the Turkish Coast Guard have impeded the illegal departure of boats and vessels from Turkish coasts to the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. As a key phenomenon in the illegal migration issue, people smugglers organizing illegal migrant flows to obtain profit are playing very important role. With this regard, the main issue while fighting against the illegal migration is identifying smuggler's network including national and international level and sending its members to the court.

Trafficking in persons can be depicted as the modern day slavery against which legal, social and economic measures are taken. In order to combat this scourge, countries, International and non-governmental organizations should closely co-operate on every level, focusing on prevention, victim assistance-protection and law enforcement aspects. A multi-disciplinary and integrated approach is recommendable with the involvement of State agencies and the civil society. The primary concern is to combat the exploitation of human beings under forced labor or slavery like conditions.

8. NATO Border Security Policy-Problems and Solutions

We will now view border security through the filter of a NATO perspective, lessons learned and level of ambition. So, why is Border Security crucial? Transnational terrorists and organized crime permitted to easily cross international borders, create ideal conditions for drug smuggling, small-arms trafficking, human trafficking, and create ideal conditions for terrorism, political subversion and violence.

It is clear that border security requires international cooperation and coordination. There are always two nations on either side of a border – and efforts by one must be matched by the other if they are to have a lasting positive effect. Moreover, since international coordination is required, it also makes sense to involve international organizations –

particularly those with experience in the conceptual and practical issues related to border security. These organizations have an interest in sharing their experience because it will help their day-to-day work, making possible further and faster progress in the region, and bringing closer the day when the international community's presence is no longer required.

The unique strength of the NATO Common Platform lies in the continuing strong engagement in this whole effort by four influential and resourceful international organizations – the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Stability Pact, and the NATO Alliance. The Platform underlines that we stand ready to assist you, and to review with you the progress you are making, so that we all get the most out of our joint effort.

In order to promote local and regional ownership, the four Partner Organizations (NATO, the EU, the OSCE and the Stability Pact) agreed upon common political goals, objectives, principles and instruments to which they proposed that the Western Balkan countries subscribe to at the Ohrid Conference. The present Common Platform contains the guidelines for the commitment of the four Partner Organizations and the countries of the region.

The professional policing of borders should be based on the principles of democratic control, efficiency and proper implementation. Democratic control is critical. Any military involvement in border management must be ensured through legislation. Whether it be in the Ohrid process or in a different framework, more focus must be given to the four following points, as they are directly linked with the future interoperability of countries in and outside Europe.

- 1) Human resources and training,
- 2) Information systems (incl. communication, processing and analysis),
- 3) Cooperation between border police services and criminal police,
- 4) Cross border operational cooperation among relevant services all over the region.

Finally, keeping in mind all the tasks remaining, the international organizations must use every opportunity to reiterate their support to the whole process. They will sometimes need to join their forces, each in the area where it can have “added value”, hereby speaking with one single voice and financially contributing to the implementation of the programs.

9. Conclusion

Border security is vital in counter terrorism for the following reasons:

- Detection – Ahmed Ressay the Millennium bomber. US border guard thought he was suspicious by his behaviour. Had a look in the boot of his car and a terrorist attack is detected.
- Disruption – sometimes it is not apparent that a terrorist has been disrupted. Senior 9/11 planner and would be suicide pilot Ramzi Bin Al Shibh made three unsuccessful attempts to get a US visa.
- Deterrence – we know that terrorists feel vulnerable at border controls and an effective security regime will deter them from using it.
- Intelligence – whatever the counter measures they have employed, a terrorist held at a border is vulnerable. It is perhaps the only opportunity short of arrest where you are able to question a person, search them and carry out some

kind of investigation into them. The aim of the Border Security Advanced Training Course is to have practical information on border management based on International laws and regulations, and to take the necessary measures for establishing an effective system.

The information provided should enable you to accomplish many important tasks to include;

- Have basic information concerning Global Terrorism and Its Future Reflections in the Region,
- Learn the threats to International Borders,
- Have information about Missions and Responsibilities of Border Units,
- Learn Coast line Control in Maritime,
- Study WMD and Its Relations with Border Security,
- Learn how to work with Border Security Problems,
- Review and study Map Exercises on Border Security,
- Learn NATO's Border Security Policy,
- Have basic information concerning Physical Border Security Systems.

With a combined effort we should be able to effectively combat Global Terrorism and incorporate proper Border Security around the world.

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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Its Effects to Terrorism

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I. Introduction:

The possibility that terrorists might acquire and use nuclear weapons is an urgent and potentially catastrophic challenge to global security. Nuclear weapons, the most powerful weapons of mass destruction (WMD), use the energy produced by reactions within and between atomic nuclei to generate tremendous explosive force, heat, radiation, and other harmful effects. This tutorial provides an overview of the threat of terrorism using nuclear, biological, chemical weapons and options for preventing that occurrence.¹

From the late 1940s until the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the world lived with the constant threat of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War offered hope that the nuclear arsenals built by the United States, Russia, China, and other countries would never be used and might eventually be completely dismantled. But a new nuclear threat quickly arose. In the final years of the 20th century and in the early years of the 21st, international terrorist organizations have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to kill large number of innocent civilians to achieve their objectives. They have also made efforts to gain access to WMD, including nuclear weapons, by contacting nuclear weapon scientists and casing nuclear facilities.²

The motivations that inspire terrorists to acquire and use chemical, biological and radiological weapons are the potential of these weapons. While the large-scale biological attack could cause more fatalities or as many fatalities as nuclear detonation, indeed some powerful nuclear weapons are able to destroy the core of a major city. On the other hand, Chemical weapons expert Gert G. Hagiel considers only nuclear weapons true weapons of mass destruction, because “only nuclear weapons are completely indiscriminate by their explosive power, heat radiation and radioactivity, and only they should therefore be called weapons of mass destruction”.³ He prefers to call chemical and biological weapons “weapons of terror” when aimed against civilians and “weapons of intimidation” for soldiers.

Nuclear weapons cannot be manufactured directly from the key raw material found in nature, uranium. Natural uranium must be enriched before it becomes nuclear-weapons usable, an extremely complex and costly task that only nations or large-scale commercial enterprises have resources to undertake. For this reason a terrorist organization can acquire a nuclear explosive only by obtaining an intact nuclear weapon from a national stockpile or by obtaining fissile material from stocks that were produced in highly advanced industrial facilities and then making the fissile material in to nuclear explosive.⁴

The most important and effective steps for reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism are therefore to secure, consolidate, reduce, and, where possible, eliminate nuclear weapons and fissile material. Programs to implement such measures are under way in many countries but are far from reaching their goals.⁵

Ensuring that every nuclear warhead and every kilogram of material worldwide is secure and accounted for is the most important step in preventing nuclear weapons terrorism and a key element in the global struggle to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

II. What Are The Threat Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction?

Such weapons include biological, chemical, nuclear and radiological devices, and range from the silent threat of a poison gas attack to a cataclysmic nuclear explosion. Those who would launch such attacks know thousands could die, of course, but their fundamental motive would be to strike fear and panic in tens of millions more.⁶

(1) Nuclear Warfare:

The United Nation's International Atomic Energy Agency oversees 900 of the world's nuclear facilities. Pakistan and India have both exploded nuclear devices in test blasts. Israel and North Korea are two countries believed to possess nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons produce devastating and long-term effects on human and animal life, as well as the environments in which they live. These are the hardest of all types

of weapons to make because the critical nuclear elements — plutonium and/or highly enriched uranium — are hard to come by, and are very expensive. These weapons are most likely to be delivered in the form of ballistic missiles or bombs dropped by fly-over bombers. Terrorists could also cause accidents involving nuclear power plants, nuclear medicine machines in hospitals and vehicles used in the transportation of nuclear waste. The size of an actual nuclear weapon can be quite small, however, and could easily fit into a large car or truck. That has sparked a fear among many experts that a nuclear warhead could simply be driven into a large city by terrorists and detonated by either a suicide bomber or by remote control.⁷ These weapons are Atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, “loose nukes” and “suitcase” bombs.

How could terrorists acquire or build nuclear weapons?

Plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons, are beyond the capabilities of terrorists to produce, but with enough of these materials in hand, nearly any state, and some particularly well-organized terrorist groups, could have the potential to make at least a crude nuclear bomb.⁸ Keeping these weapons and materials from being stolen in the first place is the key to keeping these items out of the hands of terrorists and hostile states.

Theft and smuggling of weapons-usable nuclear material is not a hypothetical concern, but an ongoing reality: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented 18 cases, confirmed by the states involved, of seizures of stolen plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) over the past decade.⁹

It is sometimes said that the easiest way to bring nuclear material in to any country would be to hide it in a package of cocaine or bale of marijuana. Every nation's border is vulnerable to various types of illicit movement, be it drugs, terrorists, or the material needed to unleash nuclear terror. And national borders are becoming ever more porous.

(2) Biological Warfare:

Biological Warfare (BW) agents are micro-organisms such as viruses and bacteria that infect humans, livestock, or crops and cause an incapacitating or fatal disease. Symptoms of illness do not appear immediately but only after a delay, or “incubation period”, that may last for days to weeks, and even, in some cases years.

Terrorism involving biological weapons — referred to along with chemical weapons as “the poor man's nuclear weapon” — can range from putting deadly substances in the nation's food supply to the aerosolized release of a contagious virus over a city the size of New York or Istanbul. Biological weapons can be aerosolized, meaning they can be easily spread into the air and inhaled by humans. These weapons can also be put into food or water supplies, where they would be ingested. Many will also cause harm if they contact human skin. Biological weapons often take weeks or months to take their toll. Public health systems often can't pinpoint bioterrorism right away, because symptoms often mirror ones exhibited by a person with the common cold or the flu. Russia is known to have stockpiles of various biological weapons. The United States studies some substances, such as anthrax, in laboratories. Iraq, North Korea and Syria are a few nations thought to still possess biological weapons.¹⁰

(3) Radiological Warfare:

Radiological weapons are thought by many to be the likely choices for terrorists. Unlike nuclear weapons, they spread radioactive material, which contaminates equipment, facilities, land and acts as a toxic chemical, which can be harmful, and in some cases fatal. A “dirty bomb” is the likely choice for terrorists and can kill or injure people by exposing them to radioactive materials, such as cesium-137, iridium-192 or cobalt-60. Atomic experts say that the explosion of a dirty bomb containing one kilogram of plutonium in the center of Munich, Germany, could ultimately lead to 120 cancer cases attributable to the blast.¹¹

Methods of detonating a dirty bomb include devices — such as bombs or

artillery shells — used to disperse harmful radioactive material. This weapon can be used to contaminate livestock, fish and food crops. Most radioactive material isn't soluble in water, so that virtually rules it out as a way for terrorists to contaminate reservoirs or other water supplies.¹²

Terrorists could launch a systemic attack on a nuclear power plant by venting or overloading a reactor so it acts as a radiological weapon.

(4) Chemical Warfare:

This is a warfare (and associated military operations) using the toxic properties of chemical substances to kill, injure or incapacitate an enemy. Chemical warfare is different from the use of conventional or nuclear weapons because the destructive effects of chemical weapons are not primarily due to any explosive force. The offensive use of living organisms (such as anthrax) is considered to be biological warfare rather than chemical warfare; the use of nonliving toxic products produced by living organisms (e.g., toxins such as botulinum toxin, ricin, or saxitoxin) is considered chemical warfare under the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Under this Convention, any toxic chemical, regardless of its origin, is considered as a chemical weapon unless it is used for purposes that are not prohibited.

About 70 different chemicals have been used or stockpiled as Chemical Weapons (CW) agents during the 20th century. Chemical weapons are classified as weapons of mass destruction by the United Nations, and their production and stockpiling was outlawed by the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993.¹³

Why would terrorists want to employ CBW?

- If used effectively, CBW are potentially capable of inflicting a large number of casualties.
- CBW can have a greater psychological impact than conventional explosives, as suggested by the year 2001 anthrax letter attacks, which killed five people but frightened millions of people.
- Although CBW agents are not near-

ly as destructive as nuclear weapons, but they are much easier and cheaper to acquire.

The first successful use of chemical agents by terrorists against a general civilian population was on March 20, 1995. Aum Shinrikyo, an apocalyptic group based in Japan, released sarin into the Tokyo subway system killing 12 and injuring 5,500. In 2001, after carrying out the 9/11 attacks in New York City, the Al Qaeda terrorist organization announced that they were attempting to acquire radiological, biological and chemical weapons. This threat was lent a great deal of credibility when a large archive of videotapes was obtained by the cable television network CNN in August of 2002 showing the killing of three dogs by an apparent nerve agent.¹⁴

As a conclusion, we may say that terrorists may seek to obtain greater status by demonstrating that they have the technological capabilities to develop, produce and deliver CBW agents. The ideology or psychology of a particular terrorist group may lead to fascination with poisons and disease.

III. Combating Wmd With Lawfull Means:

In security and foreign policy analyses, “weapons of mass destruction” is a term that generally encompasses nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, with radiological weapons occasionally included. Contemporary international legal analysis generally follows this conventional definition of WMD, even though neither treaty law nor customary law contains an authoritative definition of WMD. The reason such a definition does not exist is that states have historically used international law to address each category of weapons within the WMD rubric.

The international community has long been concerned by the proliferation, threat and use of WMD weapons. In response, States have pursued various multilateral measures.

- **Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;**
The Treaty represents the only binding commitment by the nuclear-weapon

States at the multilateral level to the goal of nuclear disarmament. Opened for signature on 1 July 1968, the Treaty entered into force on 5 March 1970. A total of 190 States have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty's significance.¹⁵

- **Comprehensive Nuclear -Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT);**

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear explosions, for military or civil purposes. After three years of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the CTBT was adopted on 10 September 1996 by the United Nations General Assembly and opened for signature on 24 September 1996.¹⁶ The CTBT would have entered into force 180 days after it had been ratified by the 44 States that were identified in Annex II to the Treaty and that possessed nuclear power or research reactors.

- **Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention);** The CWC opened for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993 and entered into force on 29 April 1997. The CWC is the first disarmament agreement negotiated within a multilateral framework that provides for the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under universally applied international control. Under the Convention, chemicals that are toxic enough to be used as chemical weapons, or may be used to manufacture such chemicals are divided into three groups according to their purpose and treatment:¹⁷

More than 140 nations signed the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, which bans the development, production and possession of chemical weapons. Nonetheless, a number of nations are believed to have the weapons.¹⁸

- **Schedule 1**

Have few, if any, legitimate uses. These may only be produced or used for research, medical, pharmaceutical or pro-

TECTIVE purposes (i.e. testing of chemical weapons sensors and protective clothing). Examples include nerve agents, ricin, lewisite and mustard gas. Any production over 100 g must be notified to the OPCW and a country can have a stockpile of no more than one tonne of these chemicals.¹⁹

- **Schedule 2**

Have no large-scale industrial uses, but may have legitimate small-scale uses. Examples include dimethyl methylphosphonate, a precursor to sarin but which is also used as a flame retardant and Thiodiglycol which is a precursor chemical used in the manufacture of mustard gas but is also widely used as a solvent in inks.²⁰

- **Schedule 3**

Have legitimate large-scale industrial uses. Examples include phosgene and chloropicrin. Both have been used as chemical weapons but phosgene is an important precursor in the manufacture of plastics and chloropicrin is used as a fumigant. Any plant producing more than 30 tonnes per year must be notified to, and can be inspected by, the OPCW.²¹

- **Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention);**

As a result of prolonged efforts by the international community to establish a new instrument that would supplement the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning the production and use of an entire category of weapons, was opened for signature on 10 April 1972. The BWC entered into force on 26 March 1975. However, the absence of any formal verification regime to monitor compliance has limited the effectiveness of the Convention.²²

- **Missiles;**

By its resolution 55/33 A of 20 November 2000, entitled "Missiles", the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a Panel of Governmental Experts, to prepare a report for the consideration

of the General Assembly at its 57th session on the issue of missiles in all its aspects. The Panel, after holding three sessions in 2001 and 2002, adopted a report by consensus and submitted it to the General Assembly at its 57th session.²³

V. Nato Policy Against Wmd Proliferation

NATO's reduced reliance on nuclear forces has been manifested in major reductions in the forces themselves. In 1991, NATO decided to reduce the number of weapons which had maintained for its sub-strategic²⁴ forces in Europe by over 85 per cent compared to cold war levels. None of these weapons are targeted against any country.

NATO countries have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy, and they do not foresee future need to do so. The threat to international security represented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction resulted in decision by NATO leaders in 1994 to intensify and expand the Alliance's efforts in his field. The Alliance policy framework on proliferation weapons of mass destruction (WMD) published in 1994 states that the principal goal of the Alliance and its member states is to prevent from occurring or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means.

A far-reaching WMD initiative was launched at the April 1999 Washington Summit and a WMD center was established at NATO HQ in May 2000. The center works to strengthen dialogue and common understanding of WMD issues among member countries, to strengthen consultations on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues, to assess risks, and to support defence efforts that serve to improve the Alliance's preparedness to respond to the risks of WMD and their means of delivery.²⁵ The Center includes personnel drawn from NATO's International Staff as well as national experts.

IV. How Should The World Respond To The Threat Of Wmd Terrorism?

In the new WMD environment, states

and international organizations are diversifying the role international law plays in connection with the WMD threat. The traditional arms control approach no longer monopolizes the international legal strategy against WMD. This development suggests that the need for international law in connection with the WMD threat may be higher now than in previous historical periods.

The threat of a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon attack by terrorists or hostile regimes requires a layered, global defence strategy. Today's world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active non-proliferation, counter-proliferation and defenses.²⁶ A major milestone was the passage in April 2004 of UNSCR resolution 1540. UNSCR 1540 requires states to take and enforce effective controls on funds and services related to export and transshipment that would contribute WMD programs.

The nations must expand and deepen their efforts in an effective multinational way to prevent terrorist acquisition and use of WMD.²⁷ To succeed in their effort to combat WMD proliferation, they must apply all elements of their national and international power-diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement and military. Thus, they will work to harness all relevant collective resources to establish more coordinated and effective capabilities to prevent, protect against, and respond to the global threat of terrorism.

In addition to this, the contribution to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency's ability should be increased in due course to detect nuclear proliferation and uncover clandestine nuclear programs. It is clear that some states will cynically manipulate the provisions of Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty to acquire sensitive technologies to enable them to pursue nuclear weapon capabilities. To close this loophole, the uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capabilities, the two primary paths to acquiring fissile material for nuclear weapons, must be limited to those states that already operate full scale, fully functioning facilities.²⁸

The most important issue that I would mention is the need to prevent terrorist

acquisition and use of WMD, and especially of biological and nuclear weapons. If terrorists acquire these weapons, they are likely to employ them. The biggest hurdle that a well-organized terrorist group with appropriate technical expertise would have to overcome to make a crude nuclear device is to gain access to sufficient quantities of fissile material. The interdiction of WMD from falling into the hands of terrorists requires many tools relevant against WMD terrorism. A few examples are: reducing the global stocks of fissile material and securing those which remain, improved nuclear and biological detection capa-

bility, and the interdiction of trafficking in nuclear weapons and biological components.²⁹ All the world cannot rest as long as enough material for even one nuclear weapons remained unsecured.

This Article is prepared by Maj. Ümit GÜLERYÜZ, course director in COE-DAT at March 27, 2007

Note: The opinions and comments in this article represent the personal views of the authors. They do not represent the official views of the COE-DAT.

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COE-DAT Activities (May 2007)



1 COE-DAT conducted a course on “Media and Terrorism” on 30 April - 4 May 2007. During the five days’ course, terrorism, government, media, the role of state media in reporting terrorism, legal aspects of reporting terrorism, NATO policy on media and

terrorism, expectations of a journalist, INFO OPS related to terrorism, TV and the war on terrorism, EUFOR PSYOPS and reporting PKK as case study and the future of terrorism and media were discussed. 34 participants from 13 different countries have attended the course.



2 Mr. Sergei CAREV, Acting Executive Director of UN Security Council Counter Terrorism Committee, and his delegation visited COE-DAT on 5 May 2007.

3 COE-DAT carried out a NATO Advanced Research Workshop on “Train the Trainers of Amputee Players” on 7-11 May 2007 at Turkish Armed Forces Rehabilitation Center, Ankara/TURKEY. The workshop which was organized by COE-DAT, was sponsored by NATO Security Through Science Program. 34 participants from 17 different countries and 20 instructors and trainers from Britain, Portugal, Brazil and Turkey have participated in the activity. The first two days were composed of theoretical sem-

inars whereas the last three days consisted of applied training of the amputee players’ trainers. By discussing and defining the methods and practices regarding the disabled sports, this very first initiative in NATO intended to provide a platform to draw attention to the integration of the terror victims, who were suffering from several impairments, into society. The lectures given in the workshop and the proceedings of the workshop will be published as a NATO Science Series book and will be delivered to the NATO countries.





4 COE-DAT organized a conference on “Counter Ideological Support of Terrorism” in cooperation with George C. Marshall Center and NATO-Russia Council, on 14-18 May 2007 at Swiss Hotel, Ankara/TURKEY. During the five days’ conference, the phenomenon of ideological support for terrorism was elaborated in terms of critical dimensions such as democratization and economic opportunity, family values and ethics, education, religion and policy. The Conference also tried to provide policy suggestions for “the way ahead” in each core dimension of countering ideological support of terrorism via the discussions of working groups where there were people from different cultures with professional backgrounds.

5 COE-DAT conducted another NATO Advanced Research Workshop on “Motivation for Suicide Bombers” on 24-25 May 2007 at Merkez Officers’ Club Ankara / TURKEY. The workshop which was organized by COE-DAT, was also sponsored by NATO Security Through Science Program. There were 28 participants from 24 different countries and 20 lecturers from 8 different countries. Throughout the conference, ‘localized’ and ‘globalized’ suicide attacks, mindset of suicide bombers, recruit-

ment and training method of suicide bombers, female participation in suicide terrorism, methods of attacks and selection of targets, intelligence role in combating suicide terrorism, sharing intelligence amongst states, security measures in countering suicide attacks, the law and rules of engagement against suicide attacks and financial issues of suicide terrorism were discussed. After the workshop, a NATO Science Series book which is composed of the papers of the lecturers will be published.





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