



## Case Study

# Preventing the PKK's Misuse of Children by Introducing Community Policing: The Şanlıurfa Case

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**Abstract:** *The PKK's actions have resulted in a huge loss of life and property, violence, forceful migration, international crises and instability. So far, various precautions, including military intervention, have been employed to deal with these problems. Although many institutions have great responsibilities to prevent the PKK terror, the burden falls mainly on the shoulders of the police force. The prevention of juveniles joining the terrorist organization is one of the essential tasks the police undertake. Community policing principles provide important opportunities for prevention strategies because the police can identify and have access to high-risk youth at a relatively early age. The Şanlıurfa Police Department has developed a strategy to enhance its work in preventing the PKK's recruitment of children and families by improving the use of existing community resources. In this paper, the role of community policing in attaining this aim in Şanlıurfa is examined as a case study.*

**Keywords:** PKK, Terror, Juvenile Delinquency, Street Children, Community Policing.

## Introduction

A sharp rise in juvenile delinquency rates in recent years has led to growing concern and debate within Turkey.<sup>1</sup> This was closely followed by discussions on the subject of 'street children', who are assumed to be connected with the increase in juvenile delinquency. The rising numbers of street children in Turkey's major cities as well as in the eastern and southeastern regions of the country is a growing problem. The number of children living and/or working on the streets of Turkish cities has visibly increased in recent years. Many children who live at home are forced by

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<sup>1</sup> Erkan Yücesan, "Çocuk Suçluluğu", *Çağın Polisi*, Year: 4, No. 48, (December 2005), pp. 47-48.

their parents to work on the streets in order to supplement household income. Some who come from abusive families seek refuge on the streets. Unable to apply themselves to study or even to attend school, many of these children have dropped out of the educational system and grow up with little hope of gaining the appropriate training or certification for a skilled job. While on the streets, many of these children are subject to maltreatment, physical and/or sexual abuse, disease, malnutrition and substance abuse.<sup>2</sup>

Although most street children are not orphans, their family links are often the reason they are on the street, working to supplement the household income or running away – trying hard to break those links. All the same, these children are ‘orphans’ of the street in that they are estranged from the society in the midst of which they scrape a living – they are often prone to drug abuse and delinquency. Street children are seen as vagrants, illegal vendors or truants by the majority of the general public. Many people view street children as irresponsible young persons who were ‘criminals-in-the-making’. Reactions to such children thus tend to be punitive and their anti-social and delinquent behavior, stemming from poverty, should be considered in its proper social and psychological context. There is an important dimension of the street children problem that should not be ignored by the authorities. The street children are not only involved in the abovementioned ordinary criminal activities but they are also easily deceived, exploited and manipulated by gangs and terrorist organizations. In particular, the PKK terrorist organization takes advantage of this problem and recruits many young people, including children, to its illegal circle.

This negative view has translated into an increasing number of governmental and non-governmental organizations whose main activity is to help alleviate the plight of street children. “Police officers play a crucial role in the juvenile justice system, one that extends beyond enforcing the law. The police officer on the beat has first-hand knowledge of the community and its youth—knowledge that can prove a valuable asset in efforts to prevent delinquency. Not only are officers familiar with the youth in their communities, they are increasingly knowledgeable about risk and protective factors related to delinquency.”<sup>3</sup> The Şanlıurfa Police Department has been employing community policing principles which provides great opportunity to use these prevention strategies. The police can determine and access many high-risk youths at a relatively young age by employing these principles. This article discusses some of the practical measures and activities that have been employed through the use of community policing principles by the Şanlıurfa Police Department in an attempt to target juvenile delinquency and protect children from the PKK’s influence.

### **The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL)**

The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a Marxist Leninist terrorist organization, was formally established on November 27, 1978 in the village of Fis in Diyarbakir by Abdullah Öcalan and his

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<sup>2</sup> UNICEF Web Site, “Making a Difference for Children: Street Children”, <http://www.unicef.org/turkey/dn/cp8.html>, (February 22, 2007).

<sup>3</sup> Phelan A. Wyrick, “Law Enforcement Referral of At-Risk Youth: The SHIELD Program”, *Juvenile Justice Bulletin*, Washington, DC, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, November 2000, p. 1. Available at [http://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/jjbul2000\\_11\\_2/contents.html](http://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/jjbul2000_11_2/contents.html), (September 2, 2006).

friends. The PKK has its roots in the leftist movements of 1970s and the nucleus of the organization can be dated back to 1974.<sup>4</sup> It has always used ethnic Kurdish Nationalism as a rallying point with the aim of establishing an independent Kurdish state in a region that includes the southeastern part of Turkey and some northern parts of Iraq, Syria and Iran, all areas where the population is predominantly Kurdish. Bruinessen states that Öcalan's group was the only Kurdish organization whose members were drawn almost exclusively from the lowest social classes, half-educated village and small-town youths who wanted action rather than ideological sophistication.<sup>5</sup>

In the beginning, the organizational leaders especially focused on youth in order to provide ideological development and gain new members.<sup>6</sup> While the other Marxist-Leninist Kurdish groups were conducting assaults against governmental agencies or representatives, this organization targeted brutal assaults on its own political opponents, the conventional political upper class in the southeastern part of Turkey, and the Kurdish people who supported the Turkish government. They also used nationalism to motivate support of tribal people. As a result the organization became a powerful alternative to some small administrative authorities and much more powerful than other terrorist organizations in Turkey.<sup>7</sup> So, this terrorist organization became the most brutal terrorist organization and made itself heard for the first time with a series of bloody attacks in Eruh and Şemdinli in 1984. In the following years, the PKK increased its hit-and-run attacks in southeastern Turkey. The PKK also perpetrated violence in all parts of Turkey including metropolitan cities and some tourist resorts, although the majority of its operations were directed against citizens of Kurdish origin in the southeast. "Furthermore, the PKK continues to operate as a sub-contractor of the international terror network. It continues interactions with some Middle Eastern, African, European, and Latin American terrorist groups."<sup>8</sup>

After the Gulf War, the PKK increased its terrorist attacks against the security forces in Turkey, and Turkish diplomatic and commercial facilities in West European countries. In an attempt to damage Turkey's tourist industry, the PKK bombed tourist sites and hotels and kidnapped foreign tourists in the early to mid-1990s. Then the PKK moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities into urban terrorism. It attempted to gain public support in the region and to provoke the public to revolt against the Turkish state. The organization has received safe haven and modest aid from Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The PKK has developed over the years and has become one of the most comprehensive terrorist organizations in the Middle East. The PKK has been collecting money from the expatriate Turkish community living in Europe, under the name of

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<sup>4</sup> İEM (İstanbul Emniyet Müdürlüğü, Terörle Mücadele Şube Müdürlüğü) [Istanbul Police Department, Counter-Terrorism Division] (2004), PKK/KONGRA-GEL, Eğitim Serisi, No. 6/2004.

<sup>5</sup> Martin Van Bruinessen, 'Between Guerrilla War and Political Murder: the Worker's Party of Kurdistan', *Middle East Report* (July-August 1988), pp. 40-46.

<sup>6</sup> Necati Alkan, 'Gençlik ve Terörizm' (Youth and Terrorism), Publication of Anti-Terrorism Department/General Directorate of Turkish National Police (TNP), No. 9, Ankara (2002), available online at <http://www.egm.gov.tr/temuh/mucadele1.html>, (March 8, 2007).

<sup>7</sup> Ümit Özdağ and Ersel Aydın, *Winning a Low Intensity Conflict: Drawing Lessons from the Turkish Case*, Portland: Frank Cass Publishers (2003).

<sup>8</sup> Samih Teymur and Ahmet Sait Yayla, 'How did Change Help the Country of Turkey to Deal with Terrorism More Effectively?', in *Istanbul Conference on Democracy & Global Security-2005*, Ankara: Öncü Press (2006), p. 342.

membership fees and taxes, and gets income by way of organized criminal activities such as trafficking drugs, people and arms.

The Turkish authorities finally captured Abdullah Öcalan in Kenya in early 1999, a defining moment in the terrorist organization's history. He was found guilty of treason for leading an armed separatist campaign in Turkey and he was sentenced to life in prison. Although Öcalan is behind the bars, he is still the absolute leader of the PKK and the main goal of the organization has become freeing Öcalan from imprisonment. In August 1999, Öcalan announced a "peace initiative", ordering his members to refrain from violence and requesting dialogue with Ankara on Kurdish issues. This call for a collective ceasefire found support in the terrorist organization.

The PKK ended its ceasefire in August 2004 and restarted its terrorist attacks on military, civilian, police, and governmental targets. However these attacks have not reached the intensity of its offensives in the 1990s. Recently, there has been an increase in the number of terrorist attacks in southeastern Turkey, especially in the form of roadside bombings, ambush, sabotage, bomb attacks, kidnapping, assassination, suicide bombings, riots, and protests. The PKK still maintains terrorist camps in Northern Iraq, accommodating around 4,000 armed militants.<sup>9</sup>

Since 1984, the PKK's terrorist activities have claimed more than 30,000 lives, including security personnel and civilians. The struggle has cost Turkey more than a hundred billion US dollars, not to mention damage to the social fabric of the country. Women, children, and the elderly were not exempt from these PKK attacks. People were murdered in front of family members or kidnapped and summarily executed. The PKK also killed innocent Kurdish people for collaborating with the Turkish government as well as dissidents within the organization's ranks. "Because of PKK terrorist organization: 5,722 law enforcement officers have been killed including police, army personnel, and temporary village guards, 4,556 public employees have been killed including doctors, journalists, teachers, etc., 19,591 terrorists have been captured dead"<sup>10</sup> and "innocent people of the region were negatively affected by the struggle between Turkish army and terrorists and in return Turkey was criticized at home and abroad."<sup>11</sup>

### **Child Recruits in the PKK's Illegal Circle**

The PKK is known to use children within its organization. The statistics show that 54% of PKK militants fall between the ages of 14 and 25.<sup>12</sup> The PKK targets Kurdish people; with its propaganda and brainwashing techniques and recruits many young people and tries to use them as tools for its terrorist activities.

In 1998, it was reported that "the PKK had 3,000 children within its ranks, more than 10% of whom were girls. The youngest child witnessed with the PKK was 7 years old. From 1994 it

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<sup>9</sup> Ahmet Kaya, 'Turkey's Experience against Terrorism', in *Istanbul Conference on Democracy & Global Security-2005*, Ankara: Öncü Press (2006), p. 112.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 112

<sup>11</sup> İdris Bal, 'Terrorism, Liberal State and International Co-Operation', in *Istanbul Conference on Democracy & Global Security-2005*, Ankara: Öncü Press (2006), p. 568.

<sup>12</sup> Alkan, op. cit.

appears that the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) started to systematically recruit more and more children and even created children's regiments. It was claimed, for example, that a children's battalion named *Tabura Zaroken Sehat Agit* was composed of three divisions and was, in theory at least, run by a committee of five children aged between 8 and 12 years.<sup>13</sup> The PKK is known to have recruited children from outside the region to serve with armed groups as well. It has held recruitment drives in Swedish schools as well as in the Kurdish community living in France, Germany and The Netherlands.

The PKK not only restricted itself to 'taxing' narcotics traffickers and refiners, who ran through their controlled areas in southeastern Turkey, but they were also directly involved in transporting hashish and heroin themselves through the Balkans into Europe, and its supporters were marketing drugs inside Western Europe. The PKK is employing children in this drug-trafficking. "Police in Hamburg arrested a group of 11 year-old Kurdish children who had been smuggled into Germany from Turkey in order to sell drugs for the PKK. Children and teenagers who have been moving drugs for the Kurdish terrorists have been caught throughout Europe on numerous occasions in the 1990s and as recently as 2000."<sup>14</sup> Likewise, on January 11, 2007, the Turkish police caught a 13 year-old girl with 9.236 kilograms of drugs trafficked by the PKK.<sup>15</sup>

In recent years, particularly after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK started pushing children and women to the front of mass demonstrations in order to gain public sympathy and to legalize their activities as in the case of Palestinian children fighting against the Israeli army. So, the PKK deliberately uses women and children to hamper the security forces' response through having to act with less force.<sup>16</sup>

A recent study has examined the motivations of some terrorists captured from the organization. It revealed a prevalence of very low family income<sup>17</sup> and that 61% of these terrorists joined due to social and economic unfairness.<sup>18</sup> In return for joining the organization, they were offered care for their families; however, all the children reported that these offers were not fulfilled. The survey also revealed that 60% of those surveyed had an education level below than high school and 80%

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<sup>13</sup> Global March against Child Labour, <http://www.globalmarch.org/resourcecentre/world/turkey.pdf> (March 8, 2007).

<sup>14</sup> Mackenzie Institute, 'Other People's Wars: a Review of Overseas Terrorism in Canada', [http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/other\\_peoples\\_wars7.htm](http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/other_peoples_wars7.htm) (March 8, 2007).

<sup>15</sup> *Sabah* (January 13, 2007).

<sup>16</sup> Not only the PKK but Turkish Hezbollah is also trying to misuse children by recruiting them to their organizations. Hezbollah's methods of recruitment, finance, education, training, and operations are similar to those of the PKK. See Ali Çağlar, 'Terrorism and Terror Organizations in Turkey: an Overall Evaluation', in *Istanbul Conference on Democracy & Global Security-2005*, Ankara: Öncü Press (2006), p. 332.

<sup>17</sup> Uğur Eşentur, *Devlet Aleyhine Suç İşleyen Teröristlerin Sosyo-Ekonomik Özellikleri -The Socio-economical Characteristics of Terrorists who Commit Crime against State-*, (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Health Sciences Institute of University of Ankara), Ankara, 2007), p. 95.

<sup>18</sup> Eşentur, *ibid.*, p. 97.

of the children admitted they actively stopped their family members, usually younger brothers, from joining the organization.<sup>19</sup>

A police chief who has read the autobiographies of 150 young students within the illegal circle of the PKK points out the main reasons for them joining the organization: “Students were going to war not to solve a problem but to escape from their own problems that they are not able to solve alone. Economic difficulties, problems related to family and their social environment, etc. has made them hate the community they live in.”<sup>20</sup>

Those youngsters, in particular, come from Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, İstanbul, İzmir, Adana and Mersin. An increasing number of street children in those cities provides a suitable ground for the PKK from which to recruit. This will be briefly explained in the following section.

### **Main Predictors of Juvenile Delinquency and Terrorist Acts in Şanlıurfa**

The malleable factors of delinquency are arranged in five domains: individual, family, school, peer-related, and community and neighborhood factors.<sup>21</sup> There is an important factor in Şanlıurfa that should not be missed by the authorities: high number of children per family. According to a survey on PKK members, the average number of children per terrorist’s family is 6.8.<sup>22</sup> The case in Şanlıurfa displays a negative picture in this regard. First, Şanlıurfa has a high birth rate compared with other cities. During the period between 1990 and 2000, Antalya, Şanlıurfa and İstanbul were the cities with the highest birth rates in Turkey with annual population rate increases of 41.8%, 36.6% and 33.1% respectively.<sup>23</sup> Likewise, in the period between 2000 and 2005, Antalya had the highest population increase at 16.7%, followed by Şanlıurfa with a rate of 14.6%.<sup>24</sup> For instance in 2004 alone, the population of Şanlıurfa increased by 19,562 males and 17,573 females.<sup>25</sup> Thus, while the percentage of population in Turkey below 15 years old is around 30%, this percentage is around 45.8% in Şanlıurfa and Diyarbakır.<sup>26</sup> A certain number of those children are born into unworkable home situations where poverty and overcrowding, physical or mental abuse might exist.

<sup>19</sup> Esentur, *ibid.*, p. 97-102.

<sup>20</sup> Recep Güven, ‘Lessons from Combating Terrorism’, in *Istanbul Conference on Democracy & Global Security-2005*, Ankara: Öncü Press (2006), p. 339.

<sup>21</sup> J. David Hawkins, Todd Herrenkohl, David P. Farrington, Devon Brewer, Richard F. Catalano and Tracy W. Harachi, ‘Predictors of Youth Violence’, *Bulletin*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (April 2000), p. 2.

<sup>22</sup> Esentur, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

<sup>23</sup> ‘2000 Genel Nüfus Sayımının Kesin Sonuçları’ (Result of 2000 Census), T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Resmi İnternet Sitesi [http://www.die.gov.tr/nufus\\_sayimi/2000Nufus.pdf](http://www.die.gov.tr/nufus_sayimi/2000Nufus.pdf), (March 22, 2006),

<sup>24</sup> ‘Şanlıurfa’nın Nüfusu 5 Yılda 210 Bin Arttı’ (Population of Şanlıurfa Increased 210,000 in 5 Years), *Urfa İçin Hizmet* (July 22, 2005).

<sup>25</sup> T.C. Başbakanlık Nüfus ve Vatandaşlık İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü’nün Resmi İnternet Sitesi, [http://www.nvi.gov.tr/11\\_2004ana\\_Sayfa\\_Dogum\\_Ve\\_Olum\\_Istatistikleri.html](http://www.nvi.gov.tr/11_2004ana_Sayfa_Dogum_Ve_Olum_Istatistikleri.html) (September 14, 2006).

<sup>26</sup> ‘Güneydoğu’nun Yarısı Çocuk’ (Half of the Southeast is children), *Milliyet* (April 3, 2005); ‘Şanlıurfa’nın Yarısı Çocuk’ (Half of Şanlıurfa is Children), *Şanlıurfa İçin Hizmet* (July 31, 2006).

The second main factor for the rapid increase in the number of children in Şanlıurfa is migration from rural areas to the city center. In recent years, economic and security reasons initiated an influx of people to the city center. Another important factor triggering this influx is the construction of the Atatürk Dam. Those who had fields in the dam area were paid large amounts of expropriation fees by the government, which stimulated the people to migrate to the city center.<sup>27</sup> Rural migrants were also attracted by the possibilities that cities can offer, but they often settle in shanty towns and experience extreme poverty. Due to the abovementioned reasons, the number of the children per family is very much higher in Şanlıurfa than one finds in other cities.

This situation brings some challenges for social life in the city. In their efforts to adapt, many of them will add to the rapidly growing number of children living and working on the streets of the city. These children are seen to lack the primary socialization and modeling framework of the family that is thought to foster healthy growth and development. As such, they are seen to be developmentally at risk. "In our major cities where the population density is becoming more widespread and more complex especially due to increasing horizontal movement and migration, the formal social control means which substituted for informal ones – police force constitutes a significant part of these means – have eminent responsibility in fighting crime. In the ever-changing structure, not only the amount, but also the attributes of crimes are changing and new types of crimes are appearing. Being a result of various social, cultural and economical conditions, criminals create more victims of violence, robbery and purse-snatching."<sup>28</sup>

And worse than all these challenges is that overcrowded families, where parents lose control over their children, provide a 'free haven' to terrorist organizations, especially the PKK. The PKK offers these 'hopeless' juveniles large amounts of money and status, and brainwashes them with Kurdish nationalist propaganda.

The problems stemming from this negative situation are not only confined to the districts of Şanlıurfa – they can be found in other parts of Turkey. Street children, juvenile delinquents or children in mass demonstrations in big cities of Turkey, such as Istanbul<sup>29</sup> and Izmir,<sup>30</sup> predominantly come from the east and southeast of Turkey. It is also claimed that the PKK is using children for purse-snatching in order to collect money.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Zuhâl Karahan Kara, 'Şanlıurfa'da Sokak Çocuklarını Çoğaltan en Önemli Neden: Köyden Kente Göç' (The Main Reason for the Increasing Number of Street Children in Şanlıurfa: Migration from Rural to Urban Areas), *Şanlıurfa İçin Hizmet* (February 21, 2005).

<sup>28</sup> Tülin İçli, 'Policies of Controlling Judicial Crimes in Turkey with Respect to Providing Global Security: the Importance of Some Current Applications and Some Suggestions', in *Istanbul Conference on Democracy & Global Security-2005*, Ankara: Öncü Press (2006), p. 590.

<sup>29</sup> According to research done in Istanbul, 44% of such children come from eastern Turkey. See: Kültegin Ögel, Harika Yücel ve Alper Aksoy, 'İstanbul'da Sokakta Yaşayan Çocukların Özellikleri' (Characteristics of Street Children in Istanbul), *Yeniden Bilimsel Araştırma Raporları*, No. 7, Istanbul (2004), p. 9.

<sup>30</sup> Hancı et al., *ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> In May 2007, the police revealed that some gangs are using the children as hackers to swindle the people on internet.

### **An Effective Strategy to Protect the Juveniles from Terrorist Activities: Community Policing**

In recent years, law enforcement officers in Turkey have begun fighting to cope with the increasing rate of crime, in particular with juvenile delinquency. Various studies and work is being carried out with the aim of preventing crime. However, “Criminal justice scholars and administrators have come to recognize that one of the biggest mistakes in ‘modern’ policing was to place total responsibility and accountability for public safety on the shoulders of law enforcement agencies.”<sup>32</sup> Because police effort is insufficient to prevent crime<sup>33</sup> and “law enforcement alone cannot prevent school-based violence, violence directed at youth, or factors that contribute to destructive behavior by young people. Providing the safest possible environment for learning and personal development is a shared responsibility and an essential part of community policing.”<sup>34</sup> Therefore, successful crime prevention depends more on the community than on the police. “At the core of this new understanding is a deep appreciation of the importance of non-police resources in fighting the war on crime, and especially an appreciation of the role of the community as a partner of the police in fostering public safety.”<sup>35</sup>

Additionally, “research findings indicate that crime rates are heavily influenced by social forces in the community and that community-based actions must play a central role in any program to prevent crime.”<sup>36</sup> Traditional preventive patrols, rapid response to calls, and efforts to identify and apprehend offenders are not sufficient to reduce citizens’ fears because, as numerous research studies have shown, fear of crime is not simply an objective response to one’s risk of being victimized but is, rather, determined by a host of other personal, social and environmental factors.<sup>37</sup> The corrosive effects of disorder and squalor in the environment have been widely recognized. The environment sends powerful messages that regulate and release individual behavior: “If a broken window is unrepaired, all the windows will soon be broken. Broken windows are a signal that no one cares.”<sup>38</sup> Indeed, studies have suggested that sordid environments beget sordid behavior.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> William A. Geller, ‘Crime Prevention, Fear Reduction, and the Community’, in *Local Government Police Management*, Illinois: ICMA Training Institute, p. 96.

<sup>33</sup> David H. Bayley, *Police for the Future*, New York: Oxford Press (1994), pp. 3-4.

<sup>34</sup> Dylan Presman, Robert Chapman and Linda Rosen, ‘Creative Partnerships: Supporting Youth, Building Communities’, *Cops Innovations – a Closer Look*, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services p. 1, <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e03021471.pdf>, (August 30, 2006),

<sup>35</sup> William A. Geller, op. cit., p. 96; Francis J. Gladstone, ‘Coordinating Crime Prevention Efforts’, *Gladstone Report-Home Office Research Study*, No. 62, Home Office, London (1980), p. 5.

<sup>36</sup> Albert J. Reis, Jr. and Michael Tonry, ‘Why are Communities Important in Understanding Crime?’, in *Communities and Crime, Crime and Justice: an Annual Review of Research*, Vol. 8, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1986), pp. 1-34; Dennis P. Rosenbaum, ‘Community Crime Prevention: a Review and Synthesis of the Literature’, *Justice Quarterly* 5 (188), pp. 323-95.

<sup>37</sup> Mark H. Moore and Robert C. Trojanowicz, *Policing and Fear of Crime, Perspective on Policing*, No. 3, Washington DC: National Institute of Justice, 1988.

<sup>38</sup> J. Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, ‘Broken Windows: the Police and Neighborhood Safety’, *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 249, No. 3, Boston (March 1982), pp. 29-38.

<sup>39</sup> Robert J. Sampson and W. Byron Groves, ‘Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social-Disorganization Theory’, *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 94, No. 4 (January 1989), pp. 774-802.

Therefore, the movement toward community policing has gained momentum in recent years as police and community leaders search for more effective ways to promote public safety and to enhance the quality of life in their neighborhoods. Community policing is policing that actively involves the community in order to reduce, prevent, and detect crime.<sup>40</sup> Community policing promises to mobilize numerous individuals and agencies in this effort. Police are encouraged to develop working partnerships with governmental, civic and other community groups to accurately survey community needs and priorities, to use the public as a resource in problem-solving efforts and in developing and implementing interventions. "As links between the police and the community are strengthened over time, the ensuing partnership will be better able to pinpoint and mitigate the underlying causes of crime."<sup>41</sup>

Another fundamental aspect of community based policing lies in bringing policing out of being the reactive work of just replying to emergency calls, and directing it towards a proactive, preventive approach that acts before crime is committed, as well as having more cooperative and closer contact with the public.<sup>42</sup> So, principles of community policing suggest moving from a "Reactive to a pro-active approach to policing."<sup>43</sup>

The threat of terrorism provides a unique opportunity to create a partnership with other public service agencies and with the community to effectively deal with terrorism. "The community policing philosophy is an important resource for preparing for and responding to acts of terrorism and strongly encourages engaging the community in the war against terrorism. External community policing elements recognize that the police cannot solve community crime and disorder and terrorism related problems alone. The police are only one of a host of other local government agencies responsible for responding to community problems and dealing with terrorism and terrorism related issues."<sup>44</sup> "Community policing can help law enforcement prepare for and prevent terrorist acts and respond to the fear such threats create by encouraging organizational change within law enforcement agencies, supporting problem-solving efforts, and seeking external partnerships."<sup>45</sup> These programs serve as examples of partnerships that law enforcement agencies, schools, and community organizations can form to address issues of juvenile crime, victimization and terrorist activities.

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<sup>40</sup> *Community Policing Lesson Plans*, OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, Idrizovo-Skopje: Multi-Ethnic Police Academy (2001), p. 3. See also Wendy Kammer, 'Crime and Community', *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 273 (May 1994), pp. 111-120.

<sup>41</sup> 'Understanding Community Policing...', Bureau of Justice Assistance.

<sup>42</sup> Michael D. Lyman, *The Police: an Introduction*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. (2002), pp. 340-342.

<sup>43</sup> Reactive policing is about waiting for a crime to occur before responding. Pro-active policing is about taking positive steps prior to the occurrence of a crime to prevent it from happening. See OSCE, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>44</sup> Matthew C. Scheider, Robert E. Chapman and Michael F. Seelman, 'Connecting the Dots for a Proactive Approach', US Department of Justice-Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1046>, (March 12, 2007).

<sup>45</sup> Rob Chapman and Matthew C. Scheider, 'Community Policing: Now More Than Ever', US Department of Justice-Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=716>, (March 14, 2007).

### **Community Policing Projects to Prevent Juvenile Delinquency and Terrorist Activities in Şanlıurfa**

Youth who are not routinely involved in supervised activities and are away from the supervision of parents, and who lack significant connections to positive influences and role models are more likely to become perpetrators and/or victims of crime. The incidence of drug abuse, violence, involvement in terrorist acts and destructive behavior also increases without proper supervision. “Providing the safest possible environment for learning and personal development is a shared responsibility and an essential part of community policing.”<sup>46</sup>

The Şanlıurfa Police Department analyzed the terrorism problem and the human source of terror, developed appropriate responses and reflected these efforts in the mission goals and objectives of the department. Since 2002, in Şanlıurfa the Office for Child Protection has been a catalyst for innovative community policing practices, facilitating local development of community-wide partnerships that promote safe environments for youth. So, the implementation of community policing principles in Şanlıurfa demonstrates how, by developing meaningful partnerships between law enforcement, schools, and the community, youth can be set on positive paths and youth crime, victimization and terrorist acts can be addressed. These sobering facts require a vigorous response from law enforcement professionals, educators, and communities alike. All the following programs are valuable assets in preventing and responding to acts of terrorism.

“While crime control and prevention remain central priorities, community policing strategies use a wide variety of methods to address these goals.”<sup>47</sup> The following are the examples of the innovative ways that the Office for Child Protection has worked with local agencies to develop partnership-based programs for youth. These methods in Şanlıurfa can be classified under two headings:

#### ***1. Projects Concerning the Parents of PKK Terrorists***

The clashes between the security forces and terrorists have caused tremendous casualties in Turkey. Military units equipped with ‘extraordinary’ authority fought to cope with the terrorist organization. However, finding the solution to this problem it is not and should not solely be the duty of military forces. As a substantial step the state should contact families who have had their children taken by the organization. Unfortunately, certain policies aimed to gain the hearts of the families of terrorists have not been or could not be implemented for a long time. However, families whose children recruited by the PKK are in a complicated situation: On one side of the medal they see their children fighting in the circle of a terrorist organization and on the other side a huge pressure from the community and the image of being ‘a parent of a terrorist’ in the eye of law enforcement officers. This situation mostly drives them in a desperate situation as such ‘voluntary supporter of the PKK’.

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<sup>46</sup> Dylan Presman, Robert Chapman and Linda Rosen, ‘Creative Partnerships: Supporting Youth, Building Communities’, *Cops Innovations – a Closer Look*, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services p. 1, <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e03021471.pdf>, August 30, 2006).

<sup>47</sup> ‘Understanding Community Policing...’, Bureau of Justice Assistance.

However, an important point should not be disregarded by the authorities: Most of the members of the terrorist organization living in the mountains communicate with their families. So, by the use of legal regulations, employment opportunities and essential protection programs, those families should be contacted and some positive messages should be conveyed. They should be encouraged and supported. These contact meetings should be arranged in their own environments instead of police headquarters or military garrisons. With this aim, the Şanlıurfa Anti-terror department launched a project to contact those families. Families were interviewed based on the idea that they would contact their children and encourage them to leave the organization. Many families wanted to assist the police department and contacted their children to convince them to surrender to the security forces. Hence, children were given the chance to leave the organization, especially those who did not commit a crime. Between 2002 and 2006, 12 terrorist organization members surrendered to police officers following interviews with 50 families. Thus, the pressure of families put pressure on the organization.

Following surrender, the children were put on probation and assisted to reintegrate into society. Considering the benefits of the Turkish police officers' successful negotiations with families of PKK members, one can see how fruitful this project is.<sup>48</sup>

However, civilians should become involved in this project since contact by law enforcement officers is not always sufficient to convince the families. For instance, civilian groups constituted of well-educated and experienced psychologists and other experts should also establish close relationships with the families. Particularly, politicians and professional experts would display more sincere effort.

When not only the parents but also the members of the terrorist organizations were approached with good will by the security forces, tremendous positive results were obtained as well. As one police chief stated, "When sincere and close relations were demonstrated to the members of the terrorist organization, most of them cooperated by their own will, and spoke to their friends in custody in favor of the state and its representative forces. This attitude left positive impressions on other members of the terrorist organization, and some of them discontinued their relations with the organization. Our experiences showed that some terrorist organization members departed their organizations completely, and they became supporters of the state through our positive relations."<sup>49</sup>

The following sections will provide information about the activities directly related to children, community engagement, and findings from local prevention projects as well as examples of strategies that have been tried in Şanlıurfa.

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<sup>48</sup> Likewise, this project is also put into practice by other security forces, i.e. the gendarmerie. See, Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, 'Evladına Söyle Dağdan İnsin' (Tell Your Child to Surrender), *Sabah* (October 30, 2006).

<sup>49</sup> Güven, op. cit., p. 339. For more positive examples regarding this approach and the terrorists who left their organizations voluntarily, see, Serdar Bayraktutan, *İntihar Eylemcisinin Eve Dönüşü: Anne Ben Geldim*, (Homecoming of a Suicide Bomber: Mom I'm Here), Istanbul: Karakutu Publ. (2007).

## 2. Projects Concerning Juveniles

### a. Children as Tourist Guides

The Şanlıurfa Police department launched a Tourism Volunteer Project in 2002 to train street children who give tourists wrong information and disturb them by begging for money. Having obtained necessary permission from their parents, 18 children were selected and they were trained in different topics such as English, computers, politeness, hygiene, theatre, chess, and folklore. After 6 months of training, these children were given special uniforms and authorization to guide tourists within the historical site of Balıklıgöl.

Through this pioneer project<sup>50</sup> in Turkey, 55 children have been rescued from the streets. They have become good individuals and citizens who are a credit to their parents and the community they live in. In this way, in a short time, many children who had dropped out school, were living on the streets and abusing volatile substances, and disturbing tourists by begging for money, became tourism volunteers. This project has gained great support from the other NGOs and the community.

These children have been given continuing education to keep them motivated and educated for the long-term. They have also been provided with facilities within Şanlıurfa Police Department's complex to play basketball, football, volleyball and other games such as swimming and table-tennis. Some of them are guided to attend vocational training so they can gain a certificate for a trade. These children are also taken to festivals, which will be detailed later.

This project has also had an impact on the truancy rates of these children. Teams of community-based officers follow these children during school hours, approaching suspected truants, identifying them, taking them to school, and contacting school personnel and parents about their attendance and other school-related problems (e.g., fighting, drug or gang involvement, etc.). Hence, truancy reduction efforts have been enormously successful and daily unexcused absences have decreased. The decrease in truancy should, in turn, result in a reduction in criminal activity.

### b. Activities Concerning Juveniles Using Volatile Substances

Essentially, volatile substance abuse may be considered as such if it involves deliberate or intentional inhalation of gases or solvents for the sole purpose of achieving mental excitation or getting a 'buzz'.<sup>51</sup> In recent years, disorderly conduct by volatile substance-abusing juveniles has been increasing in Turkey and substance abuse has been linked to a number of psychosocial problems, associated risk behaviors and multiple crimes. The inhalant users are likely to have attempted other crimes such as stealing bags, damage to property, theft, unruly and offensive behavior, sexual assault, youth suicide and family conflict. These juveniles can easily be manipulated and snatched by organized crime gangs and terror organizations. In addition to this anti-social and criminal behavior, young people who chronically abuse these substances usually have a range of associated and inter-related risk factors including; homelessness, mental health

<sup>50</sup> 'Sokak Çocukları Rehber Olacak' (Street Children will be Tourist Guides), *Star* (February, 2005); Saygı Öztürk, 'Ateşkesten Sonra Güneydoğu' (Southeast after the Ceasefire), *Gözcü* (October 11, 2006).

<sup>51</sup> Kate Skellington Orr and David Shewan, 'Review of Evidence Relating Volatile Substance Abuse in Scotland', *Scottish Executive Substance Misuse Research Programme* (September 2006), p. 9, available online at <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/147377/0038818.pdf> (March 2, 2007).

problems, low or no income, family dysfunction, experiences of physical, mental health issues associated with physical, sexual, psychological or other forms of abuse, multi-drug use. Many young people become homeless because they choose to leave an abusive home.

The Şanlıurfa Police Department has launched a project to re-assimilate the 'sniffers' in Şanlıurfa to society by using proactive policing principles and community engagement. First, awareness among the police of appropriate responses to interactions with solvent abusers was raised. Police employed some types of treatment available to volatile solvent participants including psychotherapeutic approaches, individual or group counseling, family counseling, and temporary removal of young people from risk environments. Police respond with immediacy by discovering solvent abusers in action and by attempting to arrest them for antisocial behavior or public disorder offences, but police also participate in a developed long-term project. Hence, the pursuit of solvent sniffers by police is complemented by an awareness of harm minimization strategies, raising the profile of volatile substance abuse among professionals so that the risks are better understood, providing suitably targeted services and trained staff, restricting sales of dangerous substances, and working proactively with local communities to address issues associated with volatile substance abuse.

Young people who are abusing volatile substances are often interviewed by the police, given food and clothing, taken to health centers for medical care, and are encouraged to participate in activities and festivals. They are encouraged to join football and basketball teams to integrate and socialize with other juveniles and to gain self-confidence. Police officers approach them like friends rather than law enforcement officers and try to rescue them from their environment. The police do not use degrading or humiliating language or intimidate these children. Finally, the abusers feel free to approach police facilities, such as police stations and police guest houses<sup>52</sup>, and they can easily contact police officers. Between 2003 and 2007, 82 'sniffers' had been contacted and 71 of them had given up sniffing. The remaining 11 are being monitored closely by the police.

The police have contacted family members to educate them about how to treat their children without violence and tell them to contact the police in case of need. Although volatile substance abuse was present across all social strata, the families of the children in Şanlıurfa have low socio-economic status, such as low, irregular or no income, a low rate of literacy, crowded families with an average of 8-10 children,<sup>53</sup> and almost all mothers are housewives. Most of the 'sniffer' children are illiterate and/or truant, and are either irregular attendees at school or drop out entirely. The police in Şanlıurfa use limited powers of detention if they have reasonable belief that a young person is likely to cause harm to him- or herself or to someone else. Police make an assessment of the situation, and decide, depending on the needs of the young person, to connect that young

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<sup>52</sup> In Turkey, many organizations, including the National Police maintain small hotel-like buildings where people from the organization or their guests may stay when travelling for business. In the case of police guest houses, police officers work simultaneously as building staff, such as front desk clerks, and as officers.

<sup>53</sup> The larger the number of children per family, the greater the probability that the individual will engage in illegal and violent behavior. See, Özcan Köknel, *Kimliğini Arayan Gençliğimiz* (Our Youth Searching for Their Identity), Istanbul: Altın Kitaplar Publ, (2001), p. 356.

person to their family or appropriate carer: a hospital or health service, or if appropriate, an alcohol and drug agency. However, there are no dedicated services for working with volatile substance abusers nor are there treatment centers for young people with chronic solvent abuse problems.

*c. Kites, School Reports, Kids and Tree Planting Festivals*

Since 2002 orphan children, children of poor families, tourism volunteers, volatile substance ‘sniffers’ and children of police parents have gathered at the Police Guest House to celebrate and enjoy ‘school reports’ before their summer vacation. Another fantastic activity to gather these children is the kite festival. Every year, during spring, a kite contest is arranged and the children receive awards from the police. During summer all these children are invited to swim in the police swimming pool and are given swimming courses. Similarly, these children are guided to plant trees in different locations of the city. Thus they are given a sense of a ‘green world and nature’. Every single child has his/her own tree tagged with a name to protect. In this way, children at risk have a chance to integrate with other children, to save the environment, and gain a sense of solidarity and self-confidence.

*d. Movie Festival for Children*

The movie festival is another significant activity used to protect and educate children who are living in the suburbs and on the streets, as well as those from the poor classes of the community, and volatile substance abusing children and orphans. These children are more liable to get involved in illegal activities and the manipulation of terrorist organizations. By way of these activities, children may integrate into society and have a sense that “they are important for the community”. Police work together with the local community leaders to determine which children to invite to the cinema. The movie festival activities occur as follows. With the permission of their parents, children between the ages of 7 and 14 are picked up by police buses. Police officers start conveying positive messages even in the buses. These messages include but are not limited to the following: respecting the rights of others, raising awareness of diversity, obeying the rules, love of nature and animals, being a good individual in society, respecting elders (in particular parents), love for children, respect for property, trees and street animals. The children are not approached to educate them in a boring atmosphere but rather like a friend in cheerful manner. Once arriving at the cinema, the children are taken to the restrooms to be show hygienic practices. After washing, the girls are guided by policewomen and the boys by policemen to the hall. They sing and dance altogether there. The ones who display good behavior from the previous week are rewarded and honored before the children. Before the movie starts every single child is given a symbolic ticket and they are accompanied to their seats by police officers. During the movie they are served popcorn. In the cinema, the children watch selected popular movies that convey some positive messages. After the movie has ended, the children are dropped off again by police buses. More than 100,000 children have been invited to this kind of activity.

The aim of this activity is not merely to watch movies but to give the children messages. Interviews with children revealed that they are looking forward to joining such “children’s happy hours”. They stated in their assessment paper that “*their image of the police was totally changed,*

they will never scratch vehicles again, or break the trees, and they will observe hygienic principles, and this was the first time they had come into a cinema hall and they love the police officers very much.” Further observations revealed that these promises are actually fulfilled by the children. For instance, the number of scratch repairs undertaken at car repair services has declined by 95% since 2002. This program has also had an impact on rates of truancy in Şanlıurfa. Thus, the police and the community have become partners “in addressing problems of disorder and neglect (e.g. gang activity, abandoned cars, and broken windows) that, although perhaps not criminal, can eventually lead to serious crime.”<sup>54</sup> Since the implementation of this program, there have been significant changes in police approaches to juvenile delinquency and corresponding changes in results. The outcome may be indicated “by police officers’ greater knowledge of the experience of children and greater appreciation for the potential benefits of collaborative intervention”.<sup>55</sup> It is anticipated that these projects related to the children at risk will result in a reduction in criminal activity. This activity has gained the full support of the community and the media.<sup>56</sup>

#### *e. Local Sports Fields*

Communities on the outskirts of Şanlıurfa are mainly in diverse, low-income neighborhoods and are in need of quality recreational space. An overwhelming percentage of children in these communities live below the poverty line and most households need some form of public assistance. The Şanlıurfa Police Department implemented physical development projects to make use of open areas that have been left aside or abandoned. To date, 8 football fields and 5 basketball courts have been constructed in these neighborhoods. Future programming includes expanding the youth football program, youth football league games, tournaments and camps. Many other official institutions and NGOs are giving their full support to these activities. These areas are maintained and protected by police officers. The children using these fields are between 7 and 15 years old. They are given free sports materials and are trained regularly by police officers. In the past, police officers arranged football tournaments among these children and 12 football teams participated. Some businessmen and sports clubs provided funding and materials for the project. There is a Police Basketball Team comprised of girls from those quarters. Volatile substance sniffers and juvenile delinquents are included in these teams to separate them from a violent world and to help them adapt, adjust, and stay healthy. The children are instructed in football and basketball rules as well as the rules of fair-play.

#### *f. Activities in the Schools*

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<sup>54</sup> ‘Understanding Community Policing...’, Bureau of Justice Assistance.

<sup>55</sup> Steven Marans and Miriam Berkman, ‘Child-Development-Community Policing: Partnership in a Climate of Violence’, *Juvenile Justice Bulletin*, Washington DC: US Department of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, (March 1997), <http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/164380.pdf> (September 14, 2006).

<sup>56</sup> ‘Urfalı Çocuklara Sinema Hizmeti’ (Cinema for the Children in Şanlıurfa), *Sabah* (February 20, 2006).

As an outgrowth of police-community collaboration, the police have increased their involvement with Şanlıurfa's state schools. First, the Traffic Management Unit has been conducting traffic education seminars in the schools to teach basic traffic rules, making the pupils safer and familiarizing them with the police. Second, skilled police chiefs are giving seminars on effective communication, parent behavior and raising the awareness of illegal activities. Third, the Şanlıurfa Police Department is educating students to prevent substance abuse. The curriculum includes information on developing good communication skills, and promoting refusal skills for youth. It also includes raising awareness about community resources and general information about a variety of drugs and current trends. These courses are taught by friendly, experienced and certified police instructors. In addition to these courses, diving seminars are also given by expert police officers to the high school students. Last but not least, the Şanlıurfa Police Service coordinates the reconstruction of one school every year with the support of different sponsors.

While innovative efforts to address such issues as juvenile delinquency, street children, and child abuse by terrorist organizations have occurred through crime prevention programs, the community policing approach incorporates such prevention and intervention strategies into the mainstream of policing.

These programs are built on the philosophy of community policing and therefore require that the participating police department has implemented community policing strategies or is engaged in the process of implementation, particularly with regard to children, adolescents, and families. One of the fundamental goals of these programs is to broaden and shift the perspective of officers and community participating in the collaboration. It is believed that officers develop greater knowledge of child development and an awareness of the experience of children. Officers also gain insight into psychological contributions to human behavior and the implications for policing, and develop a capacity to reflect on and consider a broader range of options. However, preventing crimes is the most effective way to create safer environments in our neighborhoods. The value of crime prevention is also acknowledged in Şanlıurfa.

## Conclusion

The widespread terror and fear in southeastern Turkey over the last two decades has caused the greatest harm to the people of the region. The rest of the country has also suffered from the economic and political consequences of the unrest. In addition to traditional responsibilities, Turkish law enforcement agencies have provided a visible security presence around potential terrorist targets, partnered with intelligence agencies, responded to an increasing number of terrorist attacks, and investigated a large number of terrorism related leads.

As Cerrah stated "a solution which depends on a solely military response, so far, has shown that this strategy is unlikely to be successful. This is what the British government found out in Northern Ireland, and the Spanish government has had similar experience in the Basque Region."<sup>57</sup> Therefore, using violent methods to combat terrorism is not enough to overcome the problem. The main reasons leading to this conflict should be taken into consideration and they

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<sup>57</sup> İbrahim Cerrah, 'Countering Terrorism in a Democratic Society: Turkish Case', in *Istanbul Conference on Democracy & Global Security-2005*, Ankara: Öncü Press (2006), p. 658.

should be well defined for an effective response. "Strategic analysts should attempt to identify why problems exist in neighborhoods as well as identify the conditions that contribute to and perpetuate crime. This information will certainly prove useful in the planning and implementation of tactical responses and crime prevention strategies."<sup>58</sup> The causes of PKK terror can be analyzed and understood by looking at a number of contributing factors related to social, political, economic and/or historical issues. "Being a social problem which has multi dimensional causes and aspects, terrorism cannot be solved by only applying force. In that case, in fighting against terrorism in general and the PKK in particular, all factors contributing to terrorism have to be taken into consideration and addressed respectively."<sup>59</sup> In the fight against PKK terror, the support of the public should be placed at the core of the effort<sup>60</sup> and findings of scientific research into the background reasons and causes of crime should be employed. For instance, if militant recruitment cannot be prevented at the outset using suitable methods, terror and terrorism will not be eliminated.<sup>61</sup> In other words, the sympathizers of the terrorist organization should be taken into account and "it is believed to be necessary to rehabilitate the sympathizers of terror in the long run and under the umbrella of democracy rather than treating them as terrorists."<sup>62</sup> However, inhibiting potential terrorists including juveniles from joining terrorist organizations is the most important and complex of the elements of a strategic psychological program designed to counter terrorism. From childhood there is a normalization and social value attached to joining a terrorist group.<sup>63</sup>

Community policing can be an effective strategy for conducting and coordinating these and other terrorism prevention and response efforts. Law enforcement agencies should realize that community policing is more important than ever in pro-actively dealing with and responding to terrorism in their jurisdictions.

Crime prevention projects such as those in the Şanlıurfa Police Department have found that these principles are remarkably compatible with community policing as it has been implemented in the city. Indeed, the Şanlıurfa Police Department used these principles as the basis for a parallel set of statements about community policing.

Among many other positive results of community policing projects, first we can observe juvenile delinquency trends in Şanlıurfa. Figures for crimes committed by juveniles in the period

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<sup>58</sup> Timothy N. Oettmeier and H. Bieck William, *Integrating Investigative Operations Through Neighborhood-Oriented Policing: Executive Session #2*, Houston: Houston Police Department, 1988, p. 64.

<sup>59</sup> Cerrah, op. cit., p. 658.

<sup>60</sup> İhsan Bal, 'Police Operations in the Framework of the Hezbollah Example and the Proactive Fight against Terrorism', in *Istanbul Conference on Democracy & Global Security-2005*, Ankara: Öncü Press (2006), p. 120.

<sup>61</sup> Necati Alkan, *Psikolojik Harekât, Terörizm ve Polis*, (Psychological Operations, Terrorism and Police), TEMÜH Publ., No. 5, Ankara (2000), p. 12.

<sup>62</sup> Bal, 'Police Operations in the Framework of the Hezbollah Example ...', op. cit., p. 120.

<sup>63</sup> Post, Jerrold M. "Psychological Operations and Counterterrorism", *Joint Force Quarterly*, (April 1, 2005), retrieved from [http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\\_0286-13903643\\_ITM](http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-13903643_ITM), (September 18, 2008).

between 2002 and 2006 are as follows: 923 in 2002, 1288 in 2003, 777 in 2004, 401 in 2005, and 397 in 2006. Likewise crimes against juveniles were as follows: 1026 in 2002, 1385 in 2003, 601 in 2004, 345 in 2005, and 590 in 2006.

Second, the success of the abovementioned projects can clearly be seen in mass demonstrations in recent years. The burial of PKK terrorists in Diyarbakir in late March 2006 sparked bloody riots that lasted for days. During the riots, pro-PKK protesters torched public buildings and the ransacked shops. These riots led to the destruction of private and government property and a battle between Kurdish protestors hurling rocks and firebombs at Turkish police. At the time, it was primarily children and young people who were engaged in skirmishes with the police as well as in looting stores. More than a dozen people lost their lives during the unrest, which also spread to the cities of Hakkari, Van, Batman, and Mardin. Surprisingly, the PKK could not manipulate the children during the incidents in Şanlıurfa. For instance, the children in the riots in Viranşehir, Suruç and Birecik were given some gifts like candies, toys, sports clothes, and shoes by police officers. Hence, the children began applauding and cheering for the police during the demonstrations.<sup>64</sup> The community policing strategies including this strategy was praised highly by local media.<sup>65</sup>

A third achievement of the community policing projects in Şanlıurfa has been achieved through the family visits. Families of PKK members have been visited by police officers to convince their children to leave the organization. This strategy has worked and many of children have run away from the organization and surrendered to the security forces.

Last but not least, these projects facilitate communication and good relations between police officers and youth. "Many would hold that reciprocation in the attitudes of youth and the police is one of the key elements in police and community relations. Better police-community relations in the future depend heavily on today's work in police-youth interactions."<sup>66</sup>

So, the burden placed on local law enforcement is great. However, the community policing endeavors of the Şanlıurfa police department will not be sufficient alone to fight terrorist activities. Contingencies should be developed with parents, school officials, mental health professionals, probation officers, and social service workers who are already involved or may need to be involved with the youngsters and their families. With a mixture of authority, psychological sophistication, and persistence, the officers and other state officials, universities, educators and NGOs involved in terrorism prevention, efforts will be enormously successful.

<sup>64</sup> 'Hepsi de Çelik Gibi: Güneydoğu'daki Birçok Şehirde Çocuklar Polise Taş ve Molotof Kokteyli Atarken Bizim Çocuklar Polislerimizle Gülüp Eğleniyor' (All Are Like Steel: While The Children Throwing Stones at Police in Other Cities, the Children in Şanlıurfa Applause and Having Fun with the Police), *YeniGün* (April 4, 2006) ; 'Halk Bölücülerin Oyununu Bozdu' (The People Spoiled the PKK's Plan), *YeniGün* (April 5, 2006); 'PKK'nın Oyunu Birecik'te Bozuldu' (The PKK's Plan was Destroyed in Birecik), *Haber Aktif* (April 5, 2006); 'PKK'nın Oyunu Gofret İle Bozuldu' (Wafers Destroyed the Plans of PKK), *Sabah-Güney* (April 7, 2006).

<sup>65</sup> Mehmet Yalvaç, 'Başarı Budur' (Here is the Success), *YeniGün* (April 4, 2006); Ömer N. Kapaklı, 'Viranşehir-Suruç-Kutlay Çelik', *YeniGün* (April 5, 2006).

<sup>66</sup> Louis A. Radelet, *The Police and Community*, California: Glencoe Press (1973), p. 311.

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