



Countering Ideological Terrorism

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Abstract. Political Islam can be institutional and peaceful, but there are those who support it with jihadism. This is something other than the traditional Islamic jihad. The reference of this ideology to Islam complicates the issue, for there are serious Muslims who interpret criticisms of jihadism as attacks on Islam. In recognizing that this dimension hampers the development of strategies to counter terrorism, this paper focuses on the ideology of jihadism, first to understand it, and second to think how to counter it. In the section analyzing this ideology, the conflicting visions are presented as: The Kantian views on world peace based on the existing Westphalian order, being a model challenged by the call for a *Pax Islamica*, being the vision of the jihadism of political Islam. Relating this new phenomenon which intrudes into world politics in the form of non-state actors, to international studies, one is compelled to a search for new approaches. In the study of International Relations traditional wisdoms need to be questioned and subjected to a new reasoning. Among the pertinent changes to be taken into account one faces the rise of politicized religion, which is becoming one of the major issues of international affairs. Islamism revives the identity of *umma* in Islam. However, owing to the rise of the political culture of multiculturalism in the West, the censorship of “political correctness” has outlawed the reference to the cultural origins of people, and any relating of these to, or combining them with, conflict studies. The ideology of jihadism has typically been reduced to a religious fanaticism or a mere protest against hegemonic structures. The aim of Section V of this paper is to show how migration has become an area of international studies. The German logistics related to the Hamburg cell of al-Qaida are a case in point. It is often overlooked how jihadism is spreading with the assistance of madrassas and faith schools both in the world of Islam and in its diaspora in Europe.

Keywords. Terrorism, political Islam, jihadism, counter-terrorism, Islamism and International Relations, Islamic diaspora and International Relations.

Introduction

Terrorism is the most recent new pattern of warfare addressed by Martin van Creveld as “low intensity war”, by Kalvi Holsti as “war of the third kind” and by myself as an “irregular war” of non-state actors waged without honoring rules.¹ If this warfare were not based on an ideology articulated in religious-cultural terms it would have been an easy undertaking to counter it through simple strategies of policing. A closer look at the variety of this terrorism practiced by al-Qaeda reveals with clarity the reference to religion involved—even though in an ill shape. For Islam is a faith and it by no means supports any kind of action that can be identified as terrorism, it rather prohibits it. To be sure, at issue is not a proper or an ill understanding of religion, but rather the ongoing process of a religionization of politics and a politicization of religion leading to a jihadization of Islam in an invention of tradition.² The outcome is the ideology of jihadism which is something else than the classical Islamic jihad.³ This is the basis of the ideological foundation of terrorism.

To infer from the statement made that the ideology of jihadism has nothing to do with Islam would be a wrong scriptural understanding of the issue. Jihadists are people who perceive of themselves as “True Believers”⁴ and for this reason they excommunicate those fellow Muslims from the Islamic community of the *umma*, those who disagree with them in labelling non-jihadist Muslims as *kafirun*/unbelievers to be killed.

If these facts are properly understood and placed in their context while inquiring into the ideology of Islamist terrorism addressed here as jihadism, it becomes clear that mere military strategies, not to speak of policing, are utterly insufficient instruments. To deal appropriately with the issue for combating terrorism new strategies are needed. In a contribution to the Berlin-based project on countering terrorism whose findings were published in a book edited by Martin van Creveld and Katherina von Knop, I argue that the war on terror is also a war of ideas and worldviews.⁵ It follows that the reference of the jihadist ideology to Islam complicates the issue. The war of ideas enables the jihadists to defame any countering of terrorism in addressing it in terms of a war on Islam. There are serious Muslims—that is not only Islamists—who voice this bias. In recognizing that this dimension hampers a development of strategies for countering terrorism, this paper focuses on the ideology of jihadism, first to understand it, and second to think

¹ These references are Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), Kalevi J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Bassam Tibi, *Conflict and War in the Middle East. From Interstate War to New Security*, 2nd enlarged edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), herein chapter 12, and the chapter by this author included in the volume *Redefining Security in the Middle East*, fully referenced in note 29 below.

² This interpretation is unfolded in my chapter on Islam in the volume *World Cultures Yearbook*, edited by Helmut Anheier and Y. Raj Isar, to be published 2007 by Sage Press, London and New York.

³ See the references in note 25 below.

⁴ Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer. Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: Perennial Library, 2002, reprint of the original 1951).

⁵ B. Tibi, Countering Terrorism als Krieg der Weltanschauungen, in: Martin van Creveld and Katharina von Knop, eds., *Countering Modern Terrorism. History, Current Issues and Future Threats* (Bielefeld: Bertelsmann, 2005), pp. 131-172.

how to deal with it. In fighting the militants one needs to beware of raising any suspicion that may support the jihadist ideology that claims that Islam and its people are the target. To ensure a successful combating of terrorism the idea of jihadism should be targeted jointly in a Muslim-Western endeavor that makes clear: The war on terror is not a war on Islam.

I. Introduction

The point of departure is the insight that contemporary terrorism is a new kind of warfare. The term I have coined for it, i.e. “irregular war”, has to be supplemented with an analysis of “Religion and Terror”⁶ for interpreting the use of religious themes in a pursuit of a justification of the practice of terror in the name of Islam. In this context, the formula “politicization of religion and religionization of politics” (see note 2) has been phrased for identifying the ideological foundations of Islamist (not Islamic) terrorism. The ideology of Islamism is based on the politicization of Islam and it justifies “terror in the mind of God”. In this regard this distinction is highly relevant: Political Islam⁷ could be institutional and peaceful, but it also has a terrorist branch. It subscribes to violence and is addressed here as jihadism. It needs to be reiterated: this is something other than the traditional Islamic jihad (see note 3) for jihadism is based on an “invention of tradition”,⁸ not the tradition itself. The outstanding issues surrounding this doctrine were debated at a variety of events dealing in a policy oriented way with “transnational terrorism”: In Madrid, London, Rome, and in Monterey/California, the analysis of the ideological roots of religious extremism was established as one of the basic issue areas in the study of terrorism. This author was involved in these projects and contributed to the related findings which are pertinent for the reasoning continued in this paper on the ideological foundations of terrorism. It is an action pursued with a religious justification and legitimation.

Among the related facts in the study of the contemporary ideology of jihadism is that its history is rooted in the 20th century’s phenomenon of political Islam, which predates Bin-Ladenism by many decades.⁹ The ideology of jihadism can be traced back to the birth of the Society of Muslim Brothers in Cairo in the year 1928. This is the first movement of Islamic fundamentalism.¹⁰ In the past decades this “Brotherhood” has developed within the networking of transnational religion into an international movement also covering the Islam diaspora in Europe. The founder of this movement Hasan al-Banna published around 1930 his “*Risalat al-Jihad*/Essay

⁶ See the contributions by Bruce Lincoln, *Holy Terrors. Thinking about Religion after September 11* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003) and Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2000).

⁷ On political Islam see Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam, Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London: Routledge, 1991) and Graham Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (Boulder/Col.: Westview Press, 2003) and also my book referenced in note 9.

⁸ Eric Hobsbawm, ed., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, reprint 1996) introduction, pp. 1-14.

⁹ For a content-based survey see B. Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism. Political Islam and the New World Disorder* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1998, updated edition 2002).

¹⁰ Richard Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

on Jihad”,¹¹ which is used today in textbooks for the indoctrination in the jihadist ideology. This makes it clear that al-Banna’s writings are among the major sources of intellectual terrorism. The indoctrination in jihadism is based on the al-Banna essay cited as well as on several catechisms/pamphlets authored by Sayyid Qutb. The latter was the foremost thinker of political Islam and he continues to be the most influential ideological founder of Islamism.¹² Qutb was also translated—in the underground—into Turkish.¹³ The idea of neo-jihad outlined by al-Banna was upgraded by Qutb to an idea articulated in quasi Marxist terms claiming “jihad as a permanent Islamic world revolution”¹⁴ in the pursuit of establishing *hakimiyyat Allah*/God’s rule on a global basis. This is also the ideology of a new order for the world that envisions a replacement of the Western secular Westphalian system. This claim is the substance of the challenge of jihadism. In short, the ideology of jihadism is much more than a religious extremism making use of force. It is also a concept of order for the world.

The preceding introductory remarks make clear that countering of terrorism cannot be successful if it is merely restricted to the narrow security confines of policing and of military issues. In my contribution to “Countering Modern Terrorism” waged as an irregular war by jihadist terrorists, I argue that this is also a war of ideas (see note 5). The ideological jihadism at issue seems to be more successful in this regard than the West. Many Western experts seem to underestimate the ideological dimension in the war on terror. It is often overlooked how this ideology is now spreading with the assistance of madrassas and faith schools both in the world of Islam and in its diaspora in Europe. On the grounds of this religious-Islamist ideological indoctrination a policy of recruitment is pursued by the respective Islamist organizations: first teach jihadism and then recruit. If these facts are seriously taken into consideration, then it follows that a counter-terrorism strategy needs equally to engage in this war of ideas for combating the virus of jihadism, not through power, but rather through education and enlightenment to win the hearts and souls of young Muslims in order to prevent their development into jihadis. In talking about security cooperation, one may add that the war on terror can only be successful, and won, if it becomes a joint Western-Islamic effort. A part of this war of ideas is to prove in deeds and not only in pronouncements that the Islamic perception that the war on terror is a general war on Islam is wrong.

In establishing itself on cultural and religious grounds the Islamist terrorism in question interprets Islamic jihad anew as a jihadism. This is a related dimension of Islamism, also addressed in terms of political Islam. As stated, it emerges from the contemporary politicization of religion in the countries of Islamic civilization undergoing a crisis situation. To be sure, the very same phenomenon can be observed in other world religions, the result of which is a variety of

¹¹ See Hassan al-Banna, “*Risalat al-jihad*/essay on jihad” in the collected writings of al-Banna, *Majmu’at Rasail al-Banna* (Cairo: Dar al-Da’wa, 1990), pp. 271-292.

¹² On the impact of Sayyid Qutb see Roxanne E. Euben, *The Enemy in the Mirror. Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Nationalism* (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), chapter 3.

¹³ My post-graduate Turkish student at Bilkent University in Ankara Ayşegül Kececiler completed in 1995 this paper on the impact of Qutb in Turkey: *Sayyid Qutb and his Influence on Turkish-Islamic Intellectuals from the 70s to the 80s* (Ankara: Bilkent University 1995).

¹⁴ Sayyid Qutb, *al-Salam al-Alami wa al-Islam/World Peace and Islam* (Cairo: al-Shuruq, 1992), p. 172.

contemporary religious fundamentalisms, and not only in the world of Islam. In introducing nuances and distinctions, this phenomenon is divided by two major streams: institutional Islamism and jihadism. Unlike the exponents of political Islam of the first stream, who believe in achieving their goal, i.e. the Islamic shari'a state, through participation in the democratic game of political institutions, the latter one, i.e. the jihadists, subscribe to violent direct action believed to be fought as "terror in the mind of God" (see note 6). The related ideology of global jihad is based on an Islamist interpretation of Islamic doctrines for underpinning terrorist action with religious arguments.

Long before 9/11, in fact since the 1980s, Algeria, Egypt, Pakistan and many other Islamic countries were exposed to the security threat of jihadism posed by these "warriors of God". It is expressed in two ways: First, the call to topple the existing order, second the resort to terror, being a practice addressed in this article as "irregular war". Clearly, jihadist Islamism is therefore a threat to the existing state order, but it is also an issue that touches on international security. The call of Sayyid Qutb, the *rector spiritus* of Islamism, for a *Pax Islamica*, i.e. an Islamic world order, precedes by a few decades al-Qaida and its internationalism.¹⁵ However, the post-bipolar development is the framework that paved the way for the thriving of jihadist terrorism, which existed before. This pattern heralds a shift from Clausewitzian inter-state war to the new one of irregular warriors of neo-jihad. Based on this observation it is argued that jihadism is a challenge which requires the unfolding of adjusted patterns of new security. Among these is a strategy for dealing with the ideological foundations of terrorism. At issue is first how to respond to "terror in the mind of God", being the new post-bipolar irregular war, and second how to deal with the call to topple the international order of secular states known as the Westphalian order, and to replace it with a global Islamicate, i.e. a *Dar al-Islam* mapping the entire globe. In the present paper an effort is made to explain the substance and the background of the ideology of jihadism in the context of international security.

The ideology of jihadist terrorism is embedded in the time and space of post-bipolar world affairs.¹⁶ There are many new factors, one of which is the return of the sacred¹⁷ within the framework in of the cultural turn. Another factor is the ascendance of non-state actors in world politics resulting in the emergence of terrorist movements acting globally in this capacity as non-

¹⁵ On the Islamist *umma* internationalism, Peter Mandeville, *Transnational Muslim Politics. Reimagining the Umma* (London: Routledge, 2004), in particular chapter 6, pp. 178-191. On al-Qaida Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden* (New York: Free Press, 2001), herein chapter 10.

¹⁶ See the most interesting article by Daniel Philipott, The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations, in: *World Politics*, vol. 55,1 (2002), pp. 66-95. Much earlier, Mark Juergensmeyer gave his pertinent book the title: *The New Cold War?*, with the subtitle: *Religious Nationalism confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). On this subject see also B. Tibi, "Secularization and Desecularization in Modern Islam", in: *Religion, Staat, Gesellschaft*, vol. 1,1 (2000), pp. 95-117.

¹⁷ On this debate see Bassam Tibi, "Habermas and the Return of the Sacred. Is it a Religious Renaissance? Political Religion as a New Totalitarianism", in: *Religion, Staat, Gesellschaft*, vol. 3, 2 (2002), pp. 265-296.

state actors. The study of terrorism in international affairs¹⁸ is becoming in this regard a major concern of security. In this context, the terrorism branch of contemporary political Islam, i.e. jihadism, has to be placed into the new environment of international affairs in the post-bipolar development affecting recent patterns of world time. For properly dealing with this recurrent issue we need both to understand the changes occurring in international politics, in general, and political Islam itself. Jihadism as an expression of irregular war emerges in particular from this context. To be sure, the focus of this paper is on the ideology of jihadism and therefore it cannot be exhaustive; it does not claim to cover all aspects of this multifaceted complex subject matter.

In relating Islamism, and also its jihadist terrorism, as a fully new phenomenon in world politics based on the already mentioned ascendancy of non-state actors,¹⁹ to international studies, one is compelled to a search for new approaches. In the study of International Relations traditional wisdoms need to be questioned and subjected to a new reasoning. Among the pertinent changes to be taken into account one faces the rise of politicized religion, which is becoming one of the major issues of international affairs.²⁰

The matter is not only restricted to looking at concrete cases of terror legitimated as jihad in the path of God, but also to view the political discourse related to it, being the underlying ideology. This consideration leads to the insight that neo-jihad (global jihad) is not a goal in itself, but rather just a means in the pursuit of a new order in line with this discourse. The use of religion in politics underpinning the legitimation of irregular war matters to post-bipolar security not only in terms of incorporating terrorism in military studies, but also for dealing with the new phenomenon within the scope of “order”. In the tradition of Bull’s IR-work, order is viewed to be the pivotal subject of world politics.²¹ In this regard we need to take a glimpse at the discipline itself for grasping the issue and for incorporating jihadism as a new issue in the respective studies.

¹⁸ In an early contribution of 1982 to this subject, in Grant Wordlaw, *Political Terrorism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, 2nd edition 1989), we find, for instance, no reference to Islam or to jihad. In contrast, recent books like Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) deal with this issue. Among the recent contributions are: David J. Whittaker, ed., *The Terrorism Reader* (London: Routledge, 2001) and Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy* (Washington/DC: Brookings Inst., 2001).

¹⁹ In overcoming classical state-centered realism Joseph Nye, in his *Bound to Lead. The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), distinguishes between state related, and not-state challenges/challengers; he notes “private actors ... have become more powerful”, p. 182. In so arguing Nye draws our attention to new challenges and challengers related to the rise of non-state actors. Back in 1990 the jihadist private actors were there, however, not yet visible in the West, not even to Harvard scholars; Nye does not refer to them.

²⁰ On this politicization see the contributions to the special issue of *Millennium, Journal of International Affairs* (29, 3/2000) on: Religion and International Relations, including B. Tibi, Post-Bipolar Order in Crisis: The Challenge of Politicized Islam, pp. 843-859. See also Jeff Haynes, *Religion in Global Politics* (London: Longman, 1998) herein in particular chapter 7 on the Middle East.

²¹ In his seminal work, Hedley Bull strongly places the study of order at the center of International Relations; see his classic, *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), herein in particular part one. For an appreciation of Bull, see the essay “Bull and the contribution to International Relations”, by Stanley Hoffmann, in his book *World*

In continuing these introductory remarks it can be stated at first that the established discipline of International Relations is, as Stanley Hoffmann once noted, an “American discipline”. I hasten to add, a discipline “of the Cold War era”. All major schools of the discipline concurred on sharing the view of the state being the basic actor. Long before Samuel Huntington coined the term “clash of civilizations”, the French scholar Raymond Aron, who was the mentor of Stanley Hoffmann in Paris, turned our attention to the fact that bipolarity has been the “veil” concealing the real source of conflict in international politics. Aron points at “the heterogeneity of civilizations”.²² People belong, by nature and by their socialization in family and society, to cultures and civilizations, and only formally to existing states. In real states citizenship constitutes a part of the identity of the people, but in most countries of the world of Islam, states are “quasi states”, i.e. nominal states,²³ inasmuch as people’s citizenship lacks “identity”. In this context Islamism revives the identity of *umma* in Islam. Are we allowed to address this issue? Owing to the rise of the political culture of multiculturalism in the West, the censorship of “political correctness” has outlawed the reference to the cultural origins of people, and any relating of these to, or combining them with, conflict studies. The cultural worldviews are now coming back, and to the fore. Prior to September 11 it was risky to maintain that cultural differences could lead to violent conflict. This is changing slowly (see note 2). Only a few scholars dared to point to a “multiculturalism of fear”²⁴ in referring to some bloody outcome of cultural-ethnic conflicts. In this regard, this author, himself an IR scholar and a Muslim, cannot escape seeing the civilizational conflict divided between two positions: On the one hand we have those who are poised to revive the Kantian concept of world peace for establishing democratic peace in the age of post-bipolarity; on the other—and in contrast—we see those who revive Qutb’s vision of an Islamic peace²⁵ to be achieved by jihad. This option is determined by the worldview of acting in the *sabil Allah*/path of God for expanding the Abode of Islam/*Dar al-Islam* within an alleged order of the Islamicate to map the entire world. In short, the conflicting visions are: The Kantian views on world peace based on the existing

Disorders. Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 13-34.

²² Raymond Aron, *Paix et guerre entre les nations* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1962).

²³ Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). On the concept of “the nominal national state” see B. Tibi, “Old Tribes and Imposed Nation States”, in: Ph. Koury and J. Kostiner, eds., *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 127-152.

²⁴ Jacob Levy, *The Multiculturalism of Fears* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), in particular pp. 19-39 and also chapter 2.

²⁵ See B. Tibi, From Islamist Jihadism to Democratic Peace? Islam at the Crossroads in Post-Bipolar International Politics, in: *Ankara Paper 16* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2005), 41 pages, and on democratic peace Bruce Russett, *Grasping Democratic Peace* (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). The origin of the concept is Immanuel Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden*, reprinted in: *Friedensutopien*, Zwi Batscha, Richard Saage, eds., (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979), pp. 37-82. In Islam there is a different concept of peace. On this issue see: B. Tibi, “War and Peace in Islam”, in: Terry Nardin, ed., *The Ethics of War and Peace* (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996 and 1998), reprinted in: Sahal Hashmi, ed., *Islamic Political Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). The reference to this classical concept for the calling for an “Islamic World Revolution for achieving Islamic World Peace” can be found in Sayyid Qutb’s work.

Westphalian order being a model challenged by the call for a *Pax Islamica*, being the vision of the jihadism of political Islam.

Underlying this conflict in world affairs on a non-state level is the above-mentioned current politicization of religion, correlating to a religionization of politics. The ideology of religious fundamentalisms²⁶ includes in its centerpiece a concept of order for remaking the world.²⁷ As stated, the envisioned order of *hakimiyyat Allah/God's rule*²⁸ is, in the new ideology, the ultimate divine political order. In a first step it should be established in the world of Islam, and on this basis afterwards enhanced to a new world order mapping the entire globe under the rule of Islam. This order facilitates ruling according to the Islamic vision of a global *Pax Islamica*. It is noteworthy that only Islamists—one is asked to be aware of the distinction between Islam and Islamism²⁹—subscribe to the view that *Dar al-Islam* ought to comprise all humanity. It is also the orthodox-Salafist worldview of Islam³⁰ that claims universality. This worldview on which the ideology of jihadism rests becomes a world-political problem articulated in the politicization of Islam.

Based on the preceding introductory thoughts, the following analysis is pursued in three steps: *First*, to establish the subject matter itself, *second* to shed light on the politicization of religion and religionization of politics that leads to the new jihadist ideology, and *third*, to outline what I term as “irregular war”, being the instrument of jihadism for establishing the new divine order they envision. The Islamist ideology revolves around these issue areas.

It should be noted here that the ideological foundations of terrorism are not well researched. In the West one encounters a variety of authors who reduce the ideology of jihadism to a religious

²⁶ The most authoritative work on this subject completed at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences is Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, eds., *The Fundamentalism Project*, 5 volumes, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991-1995). The fact that Islamic fundamentalism and its jihadism are not an expression of a traditionalism, and that Islamists draw on modern technology, even adopting its accomplishments, is also treated in this project by B. Tibi, “The Worldview of Sunni-Arab Fundamentalists: Attitudes towards Modern Science and Technology”, in: vol. 2, *Fundamentalisms and Society* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993), pp. 73-102. For a recent work on the use of modern technology by Islamists for terrorist ends see Gary Bunt, *Islam in the Digital Age. E-Jihad, Online-Fetwas and Cyber Islamic Environments* (London: Pluto Press, 2003).

²⁷ See the respective chapters in the part “Remaking the World through Militancy”, in: volume 3 of Marty and Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalism and the State* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993).

²⁸ On this concept of divine order see the analysis and the authentic Islamist references in B. Tibi, *Fundamentalismus im Islam. Eine Gefahr für den Weltfrieden* (Darmstadt: Primus Verlag, 2000, 3rd edition 2002) chapters 2, 4 and 5. The origin of this concept is included in the—in a way—holy book of the Islamists by Sayyid Qutb, *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq/Signposts along the Road*, published in millions of copies in Arabic as well as in diverse translations to other Islamic languages. I use the 13th legal edition (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1989).

²⁹ On the basic difference between Islam and Islamism from a perspective of security studies, see B. Tibi, “Islam and Islamism: A Dialogue with Islam and a Security Approach vis-à-vis Islamism”, in: Tamy A. Jacoby and Brent Sasley, eds., *Redefining Security in the Middle East* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2002), pp. 62-82.

³⁰ See the chapter on the Islamic worldview in B. Tibi, *Islam between Culture and Politics* (London: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 53-68.

fanaticism or extremism. Others mostly belittle political Islam and its jihadism in a viewing both in a benign manner as a mere protest against hegemonic structures in world politics. Both are wrong. The present analysis claims to uncover political Islam and jihadism as a nostalgia for a return of the Islamic history of *futuhat* conquests, becoming on these grounds a mobilizatory ideology in action. This ideology is becoming a real challenge to international security.

II. The Subject-Matter and the Scope of the Analysis

It is pertinent to note at the outset that any treatment of the subject under issue is a difficult undertaking in that the analysis needed involves breaking up taboos and thus it resembles entering an area full of mines. Nevertheless, after September 11, it has become in a way easier to speak of jihadist Islamism as a security threat. However, from an enlightened point of view, it has equally become a requirement to combat, in parallel with this, the spread of Islamophobia. However, one needs to be aware that Islamists themselves are exploiting the suspicion of Islamophobia attached to constructed images of Islam for associating any reference to Islamist activities in security studies with an alleged demonization of Islam. In the aftermath of September 11 the situation has improved and worsened at the same time. September 11 made it clear that Islamists were in action, but it unfortunately also paved the way to the revival of established clichés about Islam which relate this religion without distinction to terrorism. Among the extremes we find, on the one hand, the well-known and fashionable accusation of Orientalism hitting new heights. Those scholars who do not share the view that the terrorists were simply a “crazed gang” (E. Said), with nothing to do with Islam, have been targeted. On the other hand, we face the other extreme of imputing all evils to “militant Islam”, equating it with Islam itself. The present analysis aims at enlightening both extremes while endeavoring to introduce the analysis of the ideology of jihadism of political Islam as a political-ideological foundation of terrorism into security studies. This ideology is inspired by an Islamic nostalgia aimed at reviving Islam’s glory in the past.³¹

In fact, Islamic terrorists refer to themselves as people fulfilling the religious duty to jihad as an obligation on every Muslim. A closer look at the phenomenon shows that we are dealing with a new pattern of jihad that can be described as an “invention of tradition” (Hobsbawm, see note 8), for it is not classical Islamic jihad.³² Nevertheless—and despite clarification—we need to take the Islamic self reference of these jihadists seriously. The religious image the jihadists have of themselves as “the true believers” is not an expression of cynicism, but rather sincere true belief, even though their action might contradict orthodox religious doctrines. Understanding this is pertinent, because it is basic to the effort to enable ourselves to grasp the current historical phenomenon of the religiously legitimated terrorism under issue. The religious legitimation is neither instrumental nor does it serve as a camouflage for covering otherwise criminal acts. The

³¹ On Islamic nostalgia see John Kelsay, *Islam and War* (Louisville/KY: John Knox Press, 1993), p. 25-6. Kelsay makes clear that there is no “end of history” (see Fukuyama), but rather a return of it in a new shape, accompanied by new claims. This is the substance of Islamist nostalgia, which is not a mere romanticism.

³² See note 25 above and the article “jihad” by B. Tibi in: Roger Powers and William B. Vogeles, eds., *Protest, Power and Change, An Encyclopedia of Nonviolent Action* (New York: Garland Publishers 1997), pp. 277-281.

Islamist terrorists do not perceive their actions to be *irhab*/terrorism, but rather *jihadiyya*/jihadism, i.e. a new interpretation of religious jihad being a duty/*farida*. To reiterate: In their self-proclaimed capacity as jihadists these Islamists believe that they act as the “true believers” (see note 4). I shall take pains to shed light on religious-fundamentalist terrorism in an effort to explain Islamic-fundamentalist jihadism, while firstly placing this terrorism in the debate on warfare in terms of a new pattern of irregular war. Then, secondly, we need to relate the purport of “remaking the world” (see note 27) to jihadism as a means for achieving the goal. This creates the background for a security approach to guide the policy required for coming to terms with the challenge of jihadism on two counts: First, terrorism, and second, threatening the existing order of the state as well as world order itself.

Among the methodological grounds required for the analysis of jihadism as a security concern, we answer the above-mentioned need for introducing the study of religion into the discipline of International Relations. In addition to this requirement, the study of war needs to go beyond the legalistic constraints attached to an inter-state war (e.g. declaration of war by a state) to consider actions as a war. To be sure, traditional wisdoms no longer help in grasping the recent current of irregular war of which jihadism is a case in point. In general, we are challenged to rethink the discipline of International Relations and introduce into it many innovations. There were times in the past age of bipolarity when those scholars in “the dividing discipline”³³ of International Relations were not only separated from other scholars of thought, but they were equally divided along ideological lines and boundaries. Those among them who deal with security were disparaged as “right wingers” in contrast to the left wing IR-scholars, who focused on political economy. Aside from the political differences existing between these ideologies—now phased out in the light of the end of bipolarity—there existed a methodological distinction: Students of international security focused on the state actors and on their military capacities, whereas political economists in political science—most of them had never professionally studied economics—believed only in the relevance and priority of economic macro-structures for analysis. The global system school stretched this approach to absurdity. Clearly, in the present case no one can explain jihadism with a reference to this “global system”, unless we—as some do in an absurd manner—view terrorism as a protest movement directed against economic “globalization” run by the USA. Those who subscribe to this view unwittingly justify both jihadism and anti-Americanism.

Not only in the light of post-bipolarity, but also in that of September 11, we may discern new challenges on the rise that compel us to question both the approaches mentioned of the phased out “left and right”-scheme. This would enable us to consider new perspectives for grasping changed International Relations in general, and international security in particular. Among these challenges we see the self-assertive, civilizational “Revolt against the West”³⁴ directed against secular Western values. In considering this revolt new areas are to be brought into the study of International Relations. As already mentioned, Raymond Aron addressed this subject in terms of the “heterogeneity of civilizations”. Without a reference to Aron or his work, Huntington speaks of a “clash between civilizations”. In putting the work of both scholars alongside each other, we find

³³ Kalevi Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985).

³⁴ Hedley Bull, “The Revolt against the West”, in: Hedley Bull and A. Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), pp. 217-218; on Bull see also note 21 above.

an appropriate explanation of the outstanding issue in the work of Hedley Bull, who unravels the fallacy of the so-called global village in stating that:

“It is also clear that the shrinking of the globe, while it has brought societies to a degree of mutual awareness and interaction they have not had before, does not in itself create a unity of outlook and has not in fact done so ... Humanity is becoming simultaneously more unified and more fragmented.”³⁵

Based on this observation I develop my concept of a simultaneity of structural globalization and cultural fragmentation.³⁶ The gap addressed here has been generated by the European expansion which has contributed to the structural mapping of the entire world along the lines of standards designed by the civilization of the West.³⁷ However, there was no successful overall universalization of Western values that matches with the degree of globalization reached. In short: I distinguish between the *globalization* of structures and the *universalization* of values. Thus, the globalization of structures coexists with the cultural fragmentation, i.e. with the lack of universally valid and accepted norms and values. The new challenges are related to new challengers, who are non-state actors. The revolt against Western values to which I refer (see note 16) has—more or less successfully—launched a process of de-Westernization³⁸ which starts with knowledge, values and worldviews, and only then moves to the political order itself. This makes clear the pertinence of the ideological foundations. If one stubbornly insists on the validity of the realist model in simply reducing jihadist terrorism to a problem of “rough states”³⁹ while overlooking the cultural roots of the phenomenon, then one is deprived of the ability of grasping the issue and thus of developing any proper response to it as a new security threat!

In the first place we need to understand in what way politicized religion serves in the post-bipolar time as a tool for articulating the “Revolt against the West” (norms and values). Political Islam is the frame of reference for the developing the idea of classical jihad into a new concept of terrorist jihadism against the West. This new interpretation of jihad, understood both as an ideology and as a pattern of irregular war, is related to an action that can be—in a way—addressed in the Georges Sorelian term “action directe” against the existing order. It is a terrorism which heralds the end of the classical Clausewitzian inter-state war. For neither al-Qaida nor any similar group has an army that can be combated by regular armed forces. To threaten the states that

³⁵ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (see note 21), pp. 273.

³⁶ On this simultaneity see B. Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism* (note 9 above), chapters 1 and 5 and also B. Tibi, *Islam Between Culture and Politics* (note 30), chapter 4.

³⁷ Philip Curtin, *The World and the West. The European Challenge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); see also Roger Scruton, *The West and the Rest. Globalization and the Terrorist Threat* (Wilmington/Del.: ISI-books, 2002). On the claims and on the failure as well as the future of the universalism of Western civilization, see David Gress, *From Plato to NATO. The Idea of the West and its Opponents* (New York: The Free Press, 1998), chapter 12. On the concept of de-Westernization see the reference in the next note.

³⁸ See B. Tibi, “Culture and Knowledge. The Fundamentalist Claim of de-Westernization”, in: *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol. 12,1 (1995), pp. 1-24.

³⁹ On this subject see Robert Litwak, *Rough States and US-Foreign Policy* (Washington/DC: John Hopkins University Press, 2000).

“harbor” (G. W. Bush) jihad terrorists with punishing military intervention is utterly meaningless. In particular, democratic Western states are part of the global networking of terrorism which uses migration and the related diaspora culture for providing jihadism with a “hinterland”. The German logistics related to the Hamburg cell of al-Qaida are a case in point for showing how migration becomes an area of international security studies. This insight was introduced to International Relations long before September 11, 2001 by Myron Weiner⁴⁰ and shall be integrated in section V of this paper.

In dealing with the ideology of Islamism and its political movements as an issue area of national and international security in the light of September 11, we need to take a look at Islamic civilization, out of which the jihadist groups—being inventors of tradition, and also as non-state actors—are emerging. In international politics this civilization consists of Islamic states, being members of the international community. Even though Islamic civilization is often described as the “World of Islam”, it does not constitute a world of its own in that its states are part of the international system. Only in one sense do Islamic states exist for themselves, namely as a grouping of states of a distinct civilization. These states have their own international Organization of the Islamic Conference, the OIC. Since the rise of political Islam in that part of the world, any dealing with Islamist movements has also become a policy issue in the international arena, and it is no longer merely an academic concern for the traditional students of Islam, nor of those of Middle Eastern studies. Neither those Orientalist philologists nor the cultural anthropologists in Middle Eastern studies can help in dealing with the outstanding issues. In contrast, an International Relations orientation, placing Islamism in security studies, is more promising. Underlying this view is the fact that Islamists unequivocally make clear the target of their call, i.e. the toppling of the existing order of the nation-state to be replaced by what they envisage as a *hakimiyyat Allah*/rule of God, being the substance of an Islamic state and a new world order. Again, here we do not face a simple cultural attitude, but rather the vision of an alternative political order. The issue of “*nizam Islami*/Islamic order” ranks as a top priority on the agenda of Islamism.

In contemporary history the very first Islamist movement was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. It is the movement of the Muslim Brothers (see note 10). It was al-Banna himself who reinterpreted the doctrine of *jihad*, and thus they paved the way for jihadism in the understanding of terrorism (see note 11). In this tradition, Islamists envision in the long run an international order designed by the shari’a of Islam. The outcome is the current competition between a *Pax Islamica* and the *Pax Americana* of the West. This is the substance of the challenge of Islamic fundamentalism as related to the claim of replacing the Western Westphalian order in world politics. The repeatedly mentioned “Revolt against the West” is also characterized by an effort at de-secularization. Islamism is directed against the secular character of world politics.

⁴⁰ Relating migration to security studies is an academic approach introduced by Myron Weiner, *The Global Migration Crisis* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995), chapter 6. The Hamburg cell of al-Qaida illustrates this issue. On this see Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside al-Qaida* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 129-131. Furthermore see the investigative research on this subject in Germany by Udo Ulfkotte, *Der Krieg in unseren Städten. Wie Islamisten Deutschland unterwandern* (Frankfurt: Eichborn, 2003). With the guidance of the approach of Weiner, the following study on Islamic migration (in the light of September 11) was completed. B. Tibi, *Islamische Zuwanderung. Die gescheiterte Integration* (München: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2002), in particular the introduction.

Therefore, at issue is a civilizational conflict in world politics, because secularization and de-secularization are related to rival civilizational worldviews and related to conflicting world political visions.

As already indicated, the 57 nation states of Islamic civilization are civilizationaly grouped in the “Organization of the Islamic Conference/OIC”—i.e. the sole regional organization in world politics established on the civilizational grounds of religion. Among these states we find only very few—and of course in a very limited sense—that can be qualified as democracies. It follows that in these states there mostly exists no opening for practicing a political opposition. Thus, the rise of political Islam is not and also cannot be expressed in institutional channels (Turkey is an exception). Islamist movements are however the basic political opposition in the world of Islam, but they are denied a realm for their activities in pursuit of their political goals in their own Islamic countries. For this reason, they act in the underground and in addition move their followers to the West to establish a hinterland for their activities of opposing superficially secular regimes at home.

The major target of Islamist movements is at present to topple existing regimes at home. This leads to the question: Can one exclusively locate Islamism in the world of Islam itself? In a widely-received essay by Michael Doran on “other people’s war”⁴¹ we find the argument that in September 2001 al-Qaida primarily wanted to hit its enemies in the world of Islam via the United States. Even though Doran’s essay is very intelligent, it overlooks or even confuses the two levels of order in the strategy of Islamism: *First*, the replacement of secular regimes in the world of Islam itself by the *nizam/system* of *hakimiyyat Allah/God’s rule*, and on that basis, *second*, the establishment of a global *Pax Islamica* via an Islamic “*thawra alamiyya/world revolution*” (see note 27). Qutb states that this is carried out by political Islam. Thus, on September 11, the levels were both confused and intermingled. It is only in this sense that one may speak of “somebody else’s war” when addressing the assault of September 11. Jihadist Islamism is both domestic (the world of Islam) and international (world politics), internationalism is intrinsic to Islamism. It uses the Islamic diaspora in the West to achieve both goals.

Now, it is an established fact that Islamists, despite their deep contempt for Western democracy, make full use of Western democratic rights for establishing the logistics for their movements in Western Europe itself.⁴² From this fact follows the need to enhance the study of Islamic fundamentalism as a security concern to include Europe itself in the scope of the analysis. I have already pinpointed the importance of the study of Islamic migration to Western Europe as part and parcel of the analysis needed for unfolding appropriate security policies. Among the

⁴¹ Michael Doran, “Somebody Else’s Civil War”, in: *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82,1 (2002), pp. 22-42.

⁴² For this reason the weekly *Newsweek* in its issue of November 5, 2001, asked on the front page “Why do Islamists like Europe?” The answer was given in the article on Germany already in the headline: “Tolerating the Intolerable”. One reads in that article: “Bassam Tibi ... has warned for years ... no one wanted to hear that” (p. 46). If one in this context reads Myron Weiner, *The Global Migration Crisis* (note 40), one is in a position to grasp the link between migration and security. On this issue see the chapters on Islamic fundamentalism in the book by Jean-Francois Revel, *Democracy against Itself* (New York: Free Press, 1993), chapter 12, and in Michael Teitelbaum and Jay Winter, *A Question of Numbers. High Migration, Low Fertility and the Politics of National Identity* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), pp. 221-239.

established facts is the link between radical Islamic movements in Western Europe with al-Qaida⁴³ camps established in Afghanistan under the Taliban. Among the Islamic countries we find in addition weak states (like Yemen) or almost non-states (like Somalia) which harbored those Islamists committed to jihadism as a means of an irregular war for the realization of their goals. As already mentioned, even Western states (e.g. Germany harbors al-Qaida's networking) are important. But the rough states at issue have little significance in the study of jihadism and security, therefore, the focus continues to be on non-state actors themselves being the real challengers to security. Rough states do not act, but—willingly or unwillingly—provide their territory for the jihadists. This is not a criterion, and if it were so, then Germany would be counted among the rough states.

III. The Political and Ideological Background of Jihadism: The International Ideology of a Universal Islamic *Umma* in the Context of the Politicization of Religion

In the preceding section an outline for setting the scope of the analysis was elaborated in order to make clear that the politicization of religion underpins the justification of the call for a new Islamic order to be achieved by the irregular war of jihadism. These issues are at the center of the analysis. The jihadist threat to security in world politics has been illustrated by September 11, 2001, as an act of irregular war.⁴⁴ Well, the rise of political Islam precedes the end of the Cold War, but first, in the light of these post-bipolar developments, the study of Islamism becomes an area of *new security*. To formulate the issue with Mark Juergensmeyer, we may state that a competition between religious and secular orders is at work underlying “The New Cold War”, carried out as “Terror in the Mind of God”.⁴⁵ Prior to the broadening of the scope of jihadist activities from the domestic level of the state to an international level, the Islamic revolution in Iran created a precedent for such a development of Islamic internationalism. It also gave an incentive to Islamist terrorism. In fact, terrorism served as a foreign policy instrument for exporting Iran's Islamic revolution”.⁴⁶ This revelation in Iran motivated a few scholars to venture into studying Islam as a framework for designing a foreign policy.⁴⁷

⁴³ For more details see Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside al-Qaida* (note 40), and on the Taliban themselves, Ahmed Rashid, *The Taliban. Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

⁴⁴ On the religious legitimation of September 11 see Bruce Lincoln, *Holy Terrors* (note 6), on jihad see herein chapter 3. See also B. Tibi, “Islamism, National and International Security after September 11”, in: Guenther Baechler and Andreas Wenger, eds., *Conflict and Cooperation* (Zurich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung Publ., 2002), pp. 127-152. In my earlier book on Middle Eastern Wars (see note 1) I suggested viewing the rise of Islamic fundamentalism compels a new security approach.

⁴⁵ See Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God. The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) and his earlier book *The New Cold War* (referenced in note 16).

⁴⁶ Edgar O'Balance, *Fundamentalist Terrorism 1979-95. The Iranian Connection* (New York: New York University Press, 1997). See also B. Tibi, “Extremismus und Terrorismus als Mittel des Revolutionsexports”, in: *Jahrbuch Extremismus und Demokratie*, vol. 11 (1999), pp. 79-96.

⁴⁷ Aaded Dawisha, ed., *Islam in Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), in particular chapter 1. See also more recently Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser, *A Sense of Siege, The Geopolitics of Islam and the West* (Boulder/Col.: Westview Press, 1995).

We need to remind ourselves of the fact that jihadism is not simply terrorism. It is much more than that, because the impact of politicized religion creating “the Challenge” touches on the existing order, and it is basically in this sense a radical threat to international security. In the tradition of Hedley Bull, the Harvard IR-scholar Stanley Hoffmann has addressed emerging “World Disorders” in terms of a post-Cold War era source of “troubled peace”. However, he failed to see the source of the emerging “new world disorder”⁴⁸ as being generated by the conflict between religious and secular order. Unlike Hoffman, this author, by coining the formula “new world disorder” refers to the real threat and equally to the inability of the Islamists to create the envisaged order, because they lack the necessary power. Nevertheless, jihadism does not remain without results. The outcome is international destabilization. It is true, in a way the irregular war of jihad helps Islamists to compensate the technological superiority of their enemy, but they fail to go beyond triggering destabilization. Jihadism leads to the creation of disorder and not to the envisaged new order of God’s rule. However, this evaluation of the jihadist irregular war is not to belittle its serious security challenge.

The claim of Islamism is to bring to expression a civilizational competition between two concepts of order, and for this reason it is argued that politicized religion leads to an international conflict. In addressing this conflict in terms of a *clash of civilizations*, Huntington made an effort to create a new thinking in International Relations.⁴⁹ A year before Huntington’s book, I, in my book “Krieg der Zivilisationen” of 1995, dealt with this issue in outlining civilizational competing concepts of order. I acknowledge my failure to introduce the concept of civilization successfully into the IR-discipline. That has been the accomplishment of Samuel P. Huntington. In my book on civilization-based conflicts in world politics, I—despite disagreement—acknowledge Samuel Huntington’s *Foreign Affairs*-article of 1993 and have discussed it at length while keeping faithful to my own approach. The major points of disagreement were elaborated further in my contribution to the book of the former President of Germany Roman Herzog, published under the title *Preventing the Clash of Civilizations*.⁵⁰ In these contributions, not only the seniority of Huntington in the debate but also his success are acknowledged. Nevertheless, one cannot be silent about the gaps in Huntington’s knowledge and the need to make corrections pertinent to placing Islam and its civilization in the study of International Relations. In this context, the argument is made that, in view of the topical and increasingly important role of Islam, the social scientists who

⁴⁸ This analysis is provided in my work of 1998, updated 2002 (as referenced in note 9 above). Also Stanley Hoffmann, in his book *World Disorders* (see note 21), employs the term “disorder”, however, without any reference to religion and fundamentalism, thus overlooking the basic issue on this topic, politicized religion in the major sources of disorder and threats to security, as shown in the present contribution.

⁴⁹ Samuel Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations and the Framing of World Order*, (New York: Simon & Schuster 1996). The idea was first published 1993 in an article in: *Foreign Affairs*. I find myself in disagreement with Huntington and therefore elaborate on the existing differences in the new edition of my book *Krieg der Zivilisationen. Politik und Religion zwischen Vernunft und Fundamentalismus*, first published 1995 (Munich: Heyne Verlag, expanded 1998 in a further new extended edition 2001), herein chapter 7, pp. 305-333.

⁵⁰ Roman Herzog *et al.*, *Preventing the Clash of Civilizations* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). This book includes B. Tibi, “International Morality and Cross-cultural Bridging”, pp. 107-126.

deal with these issues need to know more about Islam and the emergence of a “defensive culture”⁵¹ in world affairs.

The scholarly debate referred to touches on the present topic. I refer to it not only to dissociate myself from Huntington’s clash, but also to make clear my determination to refuse to join the club of those practically correct scholars who demonize Huntington. I believe his work has contributed to the debate and I find it sad to see how Huntington has been defamed as a “Cold Warrior” and even been accused of Islamophobia for pointing at political Islam as a security issue. It is not Huntington but Juergensmeyer who rightly sees an emerging “New Cold War” (note 16). The security threat of jihadism is a matter of fact, it is not a view, or a distortion by the media, or by scholars seeking a “substitute to the Soviet Union”. But the traditional students of Islam are reluctant to deal with this issue in their academic Islamic studies. These are basically the Orientalists who are philologists, historians or simply students of religion, and who thus have no authority to judge about international security. In their disciplines, as well as in cultural anthropological studies, scholars have succumbed to Edward Said’s unscholarly condemnation of “Orientalism”. Neither these scholars nor the late Said himself have a professional competence to deal with international affairs. Among Western orientalists we rarely find scholars with a professional social-scientific background. Nevertheless, these scholars have been called upon to review as authoritative “readers” project proposals submitted for the study of fundamentalism in Islam as an issue of international security. In most cases known to me, the orientalists in question turned these research proposals down with the pseudo-scholarly argument that the issue was not serious and did not deserve funding, or simply “fundamentalism does not exist; it is a construction”. This was belied by the events of September 11, which gave a blow to traditional Middle East studies, be it in the US or in Europe. In a case known to me in Switzerland, the philologist readers argued that “fundamentalism” is a product of the Western media and is not a reality. Certainly, it is not a transgression in this article to refer to this kind of treatment of the study of political Islam and security in established scholarship. The reference merely serves to show the grave obstacles standing in the way of the research on the subject matter under scrutiny in this paper. The curtailment of the right of free speech in research is a troubling disservice to scholarship in contemporary Western institutions and is therefore a serious concern.

Against all the odds, I find it, as a Muslim scholar living in Europe, but active as a scholar in the US, easier to address the jihadist security threat at the American academe than in Europe. In the US it was possible to carry out a great multimillion project for the study of fundamentalism which led to the publication of the seminal five volumes referenced above on this subject. Since September 11 it has become more than clear, and to what a great extent, that we need to pursue further the study of Islamism and international security. The inquiry into the linkages between religion and international politics showcased on Islamism and world politics is a case in point. Islamist terrorism in world politics begins with the “Iranian connection” and thus predates September 11. That is why a prominent Swiss institution for security studies has ventured into this

⁵¹ On this issue see B. Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam* (Salt Lake City: Utah University Press, 1988) and also B. Tibi, *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change* (Boulder/Col.: Westview Press, 1990, reprinted 1991).

domain.⁵² It is also worth mentioning that prior to September 11 a study group at the London School of Economics succeeded in creating a team of experts dealing with religion and International Relations in their publication (see note 3). To my knowledge it was unprecedented that at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association in Chicago (March 2001) some panels were allowed to be devoted to “Religion and International Relations”. In the light of the impact of September 11 it is pertinent to draw on some existing approaches to the study of politicized religion, as well as international security, and to link them to one another. The analysis of jihadism suggests that there is a need to establish new approaches in International Relations. Underlying this insight is the fact that politicized religion is among the major issues of the political crisis of order in international politics after the end of the Cold War. This is the new shape of the return of the sacred.

In considering the post-bipolar “cultural turn” in our world one can recognize a crisis of meaning growing from the crisis of modernity itself. The already mentioned lack of a universalization of Western values, along with intensifying globalization, continues to generate this crisis of meaning with world political ramifications. Globalization, but not a successful Westernization,⁵³ has been taking place worldwide. The phenomenon of the return of the sacred in a political form, being an effort at de-Westernization, is not properly understood in the West. With the formula of a “post-bipolar society”⁵⁴ Juergen Habermas provides nothing but a poor concept, without a proper knowledge of Islam, for dealing with a real phenomenon. Habermas fails to explain the resort to religion in non-Western civilizations (see note 17), because he does not understand that the competition of the secular and divine orders goes along with two worldviews opposed to one another: The ideologies of neo-absolutisms and of relativism clash with one another although they arise from the very same context.⁵⁵ We see on the one hand the politicization of religion, as showcased on Islam, assuming the shape of a neo-absolutism challenging the contemporary world order. On the other hand we see post-Christian developments emerging in Western Europe ensuing in a crisis of identity. Westernisation in the world of Islam is

⁵² Within the framework of the Geneva-based Security Studies Program the following study was completed before September 11. See Frédéric Grare, ed., *Islamism and Security. Political Islam and the Western World*, (Geneva: Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, 1999), see herein B. Tibi, “The Failed Export of the Islamic Revolution”, contribution on pp. 63-102. It is also worth mentioning that the Swiss *Zentralstelle für Gesamtverteidigung/Office Centrale de la Défense*, back in March 1997, summoned experts on political Islam, including me, and published the brochure *Islam et l’Islamisme*, Bern 1997 (my contribution pp. 9-20).

⁵³ On de-Westernization see notes 37 and 38 above, on Westernization see Theodore van der Laue, *The World Revolution of Westernization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). On globalization and culture see Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992, reprinted four times, new printing 1998). Robertson rightly criticizes those who overlook “the relative autonomy of culture”.

⁵⁴ Juergen Habermas, *Glauben und Wissen* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2001).

⁵⁵ See the proceedings of the Erasmus Foundation, Amsterdam: *The Limits of Pluralism. Neo-Absolutisms and Relativism* (Amsterdam: Praemium Erasmianum, 1994). In this Amsterdam debate political Islam is presented as a variety of neo-absolutism by B. Tibi in a paper on pp. 29-36. This volume also includes the controversy between Clifford Geertz and Ernest Gellner on culture and relativism.

receding to the benefit of a drive at de-Westernisation (see note 19) being promoted by Islamic revival. At issue are the effects of this process on a changing world order.

The contemporary neo-absolutism of political Islam claims to de-center the West and to replace its Westphalian secular order through a divine Islamic one. Jihadism is among the means for reaching this end. In this context, it is possible to understand the reference in the introductory remarks to the French social scientist Raymond Aron, who, in his *Paix et guerre entre les nations*, addresses the “heterogeneity of civilizations”. The pertinence of this issue to International Relations revolves around the existence of different world views and—along these lines—of different concepts of order. While one of them is secular, others (e.g. Islam) are based on the politicization of religion. With the exception of Western civilization, almost all other world civilizations are related to and determined by a concept of religion and the related worldview (see note 30). In the case of Islam, an Islamist concept of order is becoming a broadly accepted public choice. This concept of *din-wa-dawla*/unity of religion and state challenges the validity of the secular nation-state to the world of Islam and goes further in enhancing its claim for an Islamic order to cover world politics altogether. Again, in the intellectual tradition of the philosophical approach to International Relations presented in the work of Raymond Aron and Hedley Bull, I relate my study of religion to their study of values in international affairs. In this context, Islamism is interpreted as an expression of Islamic revival being equally political, cultural and religious. To reiterate the major findings of this inquiry: The outcome is a civilizational challenge to the world order. The Islamist claim to an alternative new order is perceived as the replacement of an alleged “Judeo-Christian conspiracy”⁵⁶ believed to be directed against Islam. Therefore it is bound to a “Revolt against the West”. In this regard I draw on Bull’s essay “Revolt against the West” (see note 16), explaining the resort to religion as a cultural-political articulation in the pursuit of de-Westernisation. In order to develop an understanding of jihadism in a world-political perspective we need to go *Beyond Left and Right*⁵⁷ and equally to overcome in the study of International Relations the burdens of the traditional boundaries of a dividing discipline. To achieve this end, in my work I operate on the following two methodological assumptions:

First, we need a serious International Relations-oriented study of religion, considering its politicization which leads to religious fundamentalism. Of course, the prevailing clichés and catchwords transmitted in the media, which convey the phenomenon at issue in terms of “fanaticism, terrorism and extremism”, ought to be contradicted, but this is not the business of the IR discipline. It is dishonest to refer to this deplorable image of Islam in the West in order to turn down the study of the jihadist threat of Islamism to world order as an expression of “Islamophobia”. Jihadism and not Islam is under issue, although this threat emerges from the politicization of Islam. The indiscriminate reference to the Saidian formula of “covering Islam” for

⁵⁶ See the allegation of “Une vaste conspiration judeo-chrétienne”, by Mohammed Y. Kassab, *L’Islam face au nouvel ordre mondial*, (Algiers: Editions Salama, 1991), pp. 75-93. Not only Islamists, also Germans (left and right) claim that September 11 was a home-made conspiracy. This is done in a dozen German anti-American bestsellers: See the special issue *Verschwörung*/conspiracy of the news magazine *Der Spiegel* 37/2003 criticising these bestsellers.

⁵⁷ Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right. The Future of Radical Politics*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).

denouncing the Western media has served as a tool for turning down any critical approach, and this is not helpful.⁵⁸ I do not defend the Western media, but the concern is the bashing of the West.

Second, the politicization addressed under point one reaches its height when it embraces Islamic universalism. The result is a concept of world order designed and articulated in divine Islamic terms. This is unique to Islam because of its universalism. For instance, the politicization of religion in Hinduism only leads to a concept of order restricted to the Hindu nation of Hindustan that is envisaged. It follows that the Hindu fundamentalist threat to security is confined to the territoriality of Hindu civilization, i.e. it is exclusively regional and pertinent to South Asia. In contrast, Islam is a universalist religion and its politicization touches on the international order. As the intellectual precursor of political Islam, Sayyid Qutb, proposed, international peace can only be based on spreading *hakimiyyat Allah*/God's rule on a global basis. The implication of this view is that there can be no world peace without the global domination of Islam. This is the articulation of an Islamist internationalism made by Qutb with a bid for a related new international order.⁵⁹ This is the ideological background of persons like Bin Laden and of globally networked movements like al-Qaida, which provide the internationalist model for all of the contemporary jihadist movements acting *fi sabil Allah*/in the path of God for establishing the Islamist order of *Pax Islamica*. It can be safely stated that the jihadist internationalism has become a security concern. To throw light on this threat surely has nothing to do with any Islamophobia.

Cultural diversity is natural and it could be enriching for humanity. However, the politicization of the heterogeneity of civilizations addressed above results in the rise of claims—as is the case in political Islam—for a political order. It does not only herewith create a challenge to the existing world order, but also leads to dividing lines that separate humanity. One should have been alerted in the 1950s, when the precursor and foremost thinker of contemporary political Islam, Sayyid Qutb, challenged the existing world order; he maintained that a deep civilizational crisis in the West was to be resolved by Islamic dominance. In his pamphleteering, in particular in his *Signposts along the Road*, and also in his *World Peace and Islam*, he proposed that only Islam is in a position to overcome this crisis and to save humanity. To be sure and to reiterate: This is the very source of the worldview of Bin Laden and of all of the al-Qaida *jihad* fighters. Clearly, this is not the view of a “crazed gang”, but rather the authoritative expression of a mainstream of jihadist Islamism in the world of Islam. Is it desirable that the Westphalian order in world politics⁶⁰ be replaced by an Islamic order? I shall come back to this question.

Hedley Bull did not know of Qutb and of his views, but he was aware of the fact that the stated civilizational “Revolt Against the West” is best “exemplified in Islamic fundamentalism”.⁶¹ In the course of the post-bipolar crisis of international order these ideas (e.g. Qutb) became more topical, enjoying a mobilization function in the world of Islam. The reference to these ideas reinforces Islam's new role as well as its appeal as a public choice as seen by the Islamists. The fact that political Islam can be traced back to the year 1928, when the Society of Muslim Brothers was

⁵⁸ Edward Said, *Covering Islam* (New York: Pantheon, 1981). There are numerous reprints.

⁵⁹ Sayyid Qutb, *al-Salam al-alami wa al-Islam* (note 14), pp. 167-199.

⁶⁰ Lynne Miller, *Global Order* (Boulder: Westview 1990), on the Westphalian system chapter 2.

⁶¹ Hedley Bull, *The Revolt Against the West* (see note 34), p. 223.

founded, provides evidence that Islamism predates the demise of the Cold War, as has already been argued. Yet, political Islam and its ideology did not acquire the assumed nature of a mobilization and their appeal before the end of bipolarity. The heterogeneity of civilizations started then to come to the fore in the shape of politicized religions. The concept of order in Islam has been given the name of *al-dawla al-Islamiyya*/the Islamic State. The reader is asked to recall that the Islamist neo-jihad in the 21st century is an effort—at times with the means of irregular war—to reach this end of realizing the new order which political Islam requires, at home and internationally as well.

In summing up the analysis accomplished in this section it can be safely stated that the foremost issue related to the pertinence of politicized religion—in Islam for International Relations, being an expression of “the revolt against the West”, is its rejection of the existing secular order and its Westphalian origins. One may ask, are we heading in a direction “Beyond Westphalia”?⁶² There is no doubt, the Westphalian order is not a sacred cow and therefore it is fully legitimate to question its existence in a changed world. However, neither the violent jihadist means of Islamism nor the ideology of *hakimiyyat Allah*/divine rule as a concept of order seem to be the appropriate alternative humanity is looking for in overcoming the crisis of the secular nation-state. For a religiously diverse humanity, no alternatives based on the political concepts of order grounded in religion can be accepted. Why? On the state level, “the *nizam Islami*/Islamic system”⁶³ is a totalitarian political pronouncement of Islamism not even acceptable to all Muslims, in particular not to those committed to freedom and democracy. Some jihadists yearn for the traditional order of the caliphate of the *Sunna*, which is not acceptable to the *Shi’a*. The exponents of political Islam believe that they in the long term perspective will prevail and be in a position to make Qutb’s vision of world peace under the banner of Islam materialize. This kind of peace is a threat to non-Muslims, who—according to the shari’a—would be discriminated against as subdued *dhimmi*s.⁶⁴ This is a violation of the human rights of non-Muslims, not—as alleged—a variety of tolerance.

To put minds at ease, of course, we are not heading towards a new political order relating to International Relations based on the politicized rules of Islamic shari’a. Clearly, on grounds of feasibility, this Islamist goal will continue to be difficult to achieve in the foreseeable future: Nevertheless, if the conclusion of this statement were that the jihadist call for an Islamic world order is practically irrelevant and meaningless, then it would be premature and wrong. On domestic and regional grounds the call for an Islamic shari’a state serves as a mobilizational device with great appeal to deprived Muslims. The result would be to destabilize and to undermine the

⁶² See the contributions in the volume *Beyond Westphalia*, ed. by Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995).

⁶³ See Salim Al-Awwa, *fi al-Nizam al-Siyasi li al-dawla al-Islamiyya* (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Masr, 1975, 6th reprinting 1983).

⁶⁴ On the discrimination against non-Muslims in the shari’a see the work of the Muslim reformist Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, *Toward an Islamic Reformation* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990), chapter 7. Islamic shari’a contradicts individual human rights. On all counts see B. Tibi, “Islamic Law/Shari’a, Human Rights, Universal Morality and International Relations”, in: *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 16,2 (1994), pp. 277-299.

legitimacy of existing order. The political terrorist “action directe” of jihad on the path of God aims at establishing a *hakimiyyat Allah*/rule of God. This is much more than the rhetoric of a romantic order because it contributes to generating real disorder.

The overall assessment of jihadism provided needs to be placed in the broader debate on the study of religion and politics in our age of the cultural turn. Therefore a reference to the inquiry into religion in social-scientific terms is a part of this summing up. Let me first mention the two approaches employed in the academic literature on political Islam. We first find the approach applied by political scientists interested in religion and politics. Some focus on country studies, others on the study of Islamist movements: these are viewed as an indication of dissent and an expression of political opposition. Some scholars operate on the assumption of an instrumental use of religion by Islamists for giving their movements a religious legitimacy. I disagree with this approach and support this disagreement with my empirical survey completed among Islamists. It leads exactly the opposite assumption: The Islamist is a political man of action, this is true, but he is also a “true believer”. Jansen addresses this fact appropriately as “the dual nature of Islamic fundamentalism”.⁶⁵

There is also another approach, which looks at civilizations in history,⁶⁶ and which has been recently introduced to International Relations. These efforts are pursued without overlooking the fact that international actions and international behaviour are related to states, not to civilizational entities. However, civilizations have their own distinct worldviews and provide substance for the understanding of notions of order, war and peace as pivotal for the study of international affairs. Along civilizational patterns not only local cultures (e.g. Indonesia and Senegal), but also states can group to form entities (e.g. OIC) in world politics. Therefore the approaches of studying world civilizations and world politics can be linked to one another. Now, which approach proves more promising for studying the rise of jihadism and of its impact on international affairs in a changed world after the demise of bipolarity? Of course, this question does overlook the focus of this inquiry, namely of the politicization of religion by Islamist movements being an issue of security. There are different levels of the analysis to which the study of political religion, understood as an element of potential conflict, can be related. It is preliminary to deal with the significance of religion, ethnicity, culture, and other sources of conflict. Earlier they were ignored by subsuming them within the East-West rivalry. Since the demise of bipolarity and the bisected world of the Cold War, hitherto suppressed conflicts related to these factors are now on the rise. Islamist movements are among the new forces related to politicized religion. In fact, emerging religious fundamentalism and ethnicity cannot be properly understood without studying religion in its links to culture and ethnicity, and of course, the mapping civilizations. In addition, neither Islamic fundamentalism nor its jihadism can be viewed as passing phenomena; it is wrong to reduce these

⁶⁵ Johannes Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism* (Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), see also notes 26 and 30 above.

⁶⁶ In the first place Arnold Toynbee, in his multi-volume opus magnum, *The Study of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), and then and more recently Will Durant, *The Story of Civilizations*, 11 volumes (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1963- 1967). Leslie Lipson, *The Ethical Crisis of Civilizations* (London: Sage, 1993). On the introduction of this approach to International Relations see note 49 and 50 above.

ideologies to topicalities of current events. Experts like Gilles Kepel doing this are mistaken.⁶⁷ Currently, all regional conflicts around the world are related to the ideologies of fundamentalism or to ethnicity. In some cases, like in the Balkans, Chechnya, and Kashmir, we even find a mixture of both, merging to a kind of ethno-fundamentalism.

In conclusion, any understanding of the background of jihadism placed in a comprehensive security analysis requires a new approach open to drawing on a variety of disciplines. In this regard, religion, ethnicity, culture and civilization are the issues to be included in the study of the ideological foundations of terrorism.

IV. The Ideology of Jihadism and its Challenge as an Irregular War to Security

Traditional security studies can no longer provide adequate perspectives for studying the new challenges of irregular war and its Islamist ideology. With regard to the necessity for a new approach there have been a few promising revisionist, although too general, approaches, like the one presented by Barry Buzan.⁶⁸ However, we are still at the beginning of the road. It was an improvement when Buzan broadened the perspective in looking at security beyond the conventional military wisdoms. Then came September 11, 2001, to remind us that security studies will have to deal with the violence of terrorism in a fully new perspective. In crossing the traditional boundaries, and stepping beyond the constraints of the organized military force of the state, the place of culture, religion and ideology is acknowledged as an issue area for strategies aimed at countering terrorism.

The ideology of jihadism underlying the irregular jihad waged by warriors as non-state actors is the ideological foundation of this new terrorism. A declaration of jihad war on Western civilization by the private actor Bin Laden and his al-Qaida is a threat to international security based on an understanding of jihad with reference to a concept of a world religion. The jihadists believe in mobilizing their fellow religionists, who make up one fifth of the world population (1.6 billion of about 6 billion people in the world population), for their world revolution. All Muslims together constitute a transnational community addressed in Islam as *umma*. In their name al-Qaida has declared jihad as war, not only on the West, but also on those Muslims who do not join in. Can political Islam succeed in the political mobilization of the Islamic *umma* to put it into the service of its Islamist and jihadist ideology?

Islamists refer to religion in the pursuit of non-religious ends, and these groups constitute only a minority in the Islamic *umma*, but they (e.g. al-Qaida) are well organized and well equipped. Therefore they cannot be either ignored or belittled. Their numbers matter little, what matters is their efficiency. These groups are very capable of destabilizing and creating disorder through their means of irregular war. In what way is the new jihad an irregular war? And how can it be contained?

⁶⁷ So Gilles Kepel, *Jihad-Expansion et le Déclin de l'Islamisme* (Paris: Gallimard, 2000). For a contrast to Kepel see my introduction to the updated edition of my book *The Challenge of Fundamentalism*, referenced in note 9 above.

⁶⁸ See Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder/Col.: Lynne Rienner Publ., 1991). See also note 64 below.

To be sure, Jihadism in the shape of terrorism is no longer the classical jihad of Islam,⁶⁹ it is the outcome of the politicization of religion in Islam. It follows that there is the need introduced earlier for a differentiation between Islam and “Islamism”. The latter includes jihadist fundamentalism, which creates a security concern. We should recall that Islam is a religion and it builds up the framework for the respective civilization⁷⁰ which, however, manifests great cultural and religious diversity in itself. The difference between Sunnite and Shi’ite Muslims⁷¹ is significant as the Shi’i-Sunni conflict in Iraq reveals. Add to this the great variety of religious and cultural denominations and numerous sects within Islam. In considering the cultural diversity one can see for instance that African Islam is entirely different from the pattern of Islam prevailing in Southeast Asia, or that of the Indian subcontinent. All of these varieties differ from one another and foremost from the original Arab pattern. The religious and cultural diversity addressed here is also reflected in Islamic fundamentalism throughout the world of Islam. Jihadism is a Sunni ideology.

After 9/11 some experts—with a reference to Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”—asserted the existence of an overall Islam collectively acting as a monolith, but they are wrong given the distinctions listed above. Even Sunni jihadist political Islamist movements are diverse. They legitimize themselves through religion for toppling existing orders, but they are not so coherent, despite their claim to an Islamic internationalism.

Despite the great diversity indicated, it can be stated that all Islamist groups adhere to similar concepts of political order based on politicized religion and shari’a-divine law. These groups are committed to an interpretation of jihad in the understanding of an irregular war. Thus, the argument for including jihadism in security studies and for developing a new security approach is based on empirically solid grounds. Some of those who refuse to include Islamism in security studies fearing an Islamophobia confuse Islam and Islamism. In our age of the “cultural turn” it is clear that cultures and civilizations play an increasingly important role in international politics in terms of identity politics. It goes beyond saying that civilizations cannot act as actors in world politics. Huntington believes that he finds a way out of this impasse in stating that each civilization can be led by a “core state”. In the case of Islam, this construct does not work for the simple reason that none of the fifty-six existing Islamic nation-states is in a position to lead the entire Islamic *umma* and its civilization. In addition, even though there are many rough states among these Islamic entities, none of them cause the real problem of jihadism. That was the greatest flaw in the planning of the Iraq war. The war there was justified by pointing at the “security threat”

⁶⁹ On the traditional origins of this concept and its current relevance see John Kelsay, *Islam and War* (Louisville/KY: John Knox Press, 1993), chapter 5 and furthermore James T. Johanson, *The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Tradition* (University Park/PN: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); see also the references in note 25 and 32 above.

⁷⁰ See Sir Hamilton A.R. Gibb, *Studies on the Civilization of Islam* (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962, reprint 1982) and also note 66.

⁷¹ On this Sunna-/Shi’a-conflict carried out by Shi’i movements in Iraq after Saddam’s fall see Faleh A. Jabar, *The Shi’ite Movements in Iraq* (London: Saqi, 2003). Earlier, Andrew and Patrick Cockburn, *Out of the Ashes. The Resurgence of Saddam Hussein* (New York: Harper and Collins Publ., 1999) analyzed the Saddam era.

posed by Saddam Hussein and it was falsely related it to the jihadist threat in a continuation of the war on terrorism. This state focus proved to be utterly wrong in terms of security because it overlooked the real issue. The threat is related to the jihadist movements which are all non-state actors, not to Iraq as a state. Therefore, the de-Saddamization of Iraq did not affect these groups at all, let alone any weakening of them. In contrast, jihadism and its ideology received a boost through the Iraq war. This is an empirical fact.

The interpretation of jihadism as an Islamist “Revolt against the West” is a notion which refers to a civilizational conflict being an international conflict. This is the issue which makes abundantly clear the extent to which worldviews of civilizations play a vital role in world politics. In Iraq for instance the US views the de-Saddamization as a liberation, while Iraqis condemn the US presence as a military occupation of crusaders. These are different worldviews. In considering this fact, and in continuing this line of reasoning, war is not understood here simply as a military conflict between states. In my earlier book *The War of Civilizations* (see note 49), I suggest that we consider the conflict of different worldviews and of particular sets of norms and values in the analysis of security. After all, the idea of order is always based on civilizational values. In the analysis presented in that book, conflict is viewed as revolving around the normatively different understanding of five issue areas: 1) the state, 2) law, 3) religion, 4) war/peace and 5) knowledge. Civilizations differ over these issue areas and therefore there are conflicting concepts of the world order needed. One may argue, value related conflicts have nothing to do with military capabilities, but they can nevertheless contribute to the emergence of real conflicts. At the beginning, the “war of civilizations” could be looked at as a war of values and worldviews that directly affects conflict on all three levels: domestic, regional, and international. On September 11 this kind of war undeniably assumed a military shape. It follows: Jihadism contributes to the militarization of conflicts between civilizations. This supports the idea that differences in world view, if they cannot be negotiated, could lead to an armed conflict. Now, the West is strong, but the irregular war of terrorism is the weapon of the weak, it cannot be defeated by conventional military force. The irregular war of the Islamist Intifada taking place in Palestine since September 2000 is a convincing case in point. Earlier, Israel was in a position to win all Arab-Israel inter-state wars in short time, but it is fully incapable of winning this irregular war or even of coming to terms with it.

In the light of the distinctions presented, the new security approach has to deal with the outstanding issue on two levels: First, conflicts of values which have political implications, but which cannot be settled by military means; and second, the irregular use of force by the fundamentalists which they believe they find in the “mind of God” (see note 45). It is extremely important to distinguish between these two levels at this stage of the analysis in order to shed light on the military dimension of the politicization of religion, while being wary of any involvement in Islamophobia. Nevertheless, the event of September 11, as well as the ensuing jihadist attacks in 2002/03 worldwide, have revealed how interrelated the aforementioned levels are. I have already maintained that the jihad-terrorists of al-Qaida militarized in New York and Washington value conflicts concerning “order” existing between Islamic and Western civilization. This was not the action of a “crazed gang”, but an act of irregular war by jihadism, which is a stream within Islamic fundamentalism. This resort to terrorism was an actualization of the conflict related to civilizational worldviews. In short, the value related fight over “what world order” assumes a military form. “Gangs” do not involve themselves in the business of international affairs.

The irregular war at issue is a militarization of the war of ideas. The combination of dissent over worldviews and an incalculable and unpredictable use of force results in terrorism. In this interpretation jihadism is the Islamic variety of contemporary terrorism, being the current form of the use of force by irregular warriors in a new pattern of war. To this pattern belongs the use of bodies by jihadists to assail persons and buildings of the “enemy” in their “action directe”. The major target is political; it is the order of the secular nation-state. The enemy should be demoralised and made uncertain about what lies ahead. The rejection of the secular state applies to fundamentalists in all religions. It is, however, unique to Islamic fundamentalists to go beyond the level of the nation-state in embracing the universalism of Islam and, in the course of the politicization of this universalism, call for an establishing of an Islamic world order. This belief leads to a contest of existing concepts of world order. It is on this basis that a conflict emerges between two competing concepts of world order, the prevailing secular Western and the Islamic one of God’s rule envisaged for the future. The jihadist terrorism of the Islamists is an irregular war to achieve this end. John Kelsay, a scholar of Islam, states, “in encounters between the West and Islam, the struggle is over who will provide the primary definition to the world order”. And then, on the same page, he asks who will lead the world in the future:

“Will it be the West, with its notions of territorial boundaries, market economies, private religiosity, and the priority of individual rights? Or will it be Islam, with its emphasis on the universal mission of a transtribal community called to build a social order founded on pure monotheism natural to humanity?”⁷²

For Islamic fundamentalists the answer to this question is clear, and it has been already provided by the quoted spiritual father of their ideology, Sayyid Qutb. In his *Signs along the Road* (see note 28) he states that only Islam is designed to lead the whole of humanity in a world order to be established in the years to come. It is clear that the questions asked and the answers given indicate a competition between Western and Islamist concepts of world order. At issue are normatively different understandings of the notions of war and peace, as well as law and justice. Again, this is the content of the values related to the scenario of a “war of civilizations” (see note 49) that can be averted. It follows that we are confronted not only with a new era for the study of security but also with new substance. At issue is the ideology of global jihad waged against the West in a “New Cold War” (Juergensmeyer) confrontation. Jihadism serves to escalate this conflict of worldviews through militarization to one related to the irregular war of terrorism. Thus, the politicization of religion is not simply a state of mind or a dispute over different approaches. If it were, one may prescribe “tolerance”. But this prescription does not work when violence in the form of terror is present. We have here a great security problem. Long before the world was confronted with the case of September 11 there were the earlier cases of Kosovo, Macedonia, Chechnya, and Kashmir and, of course, the *al-Aqsa Intifada* in the Middle East, in which jihadism is involved. The fight over Eretz Israel versus Islamic Palestine is related to religion and to conflicting civilizational worldviews, and in this exceptional case both are religions. Even the late secular Arafat responded by calling for Islamic jihad when Israeli tanks encircled his residence on January 26, 2002. At the time one could see him on BBC-World shouting five times in a row: “My

⁷² Kelsay, *Islam and War* (note 31), p. 117.

answer is *jihad*...”. This slogan of the declaration of an irregular war is equally most appealing and most difficult to cope with by conventional means.

To be sure, the irregular war is not exclusively based on terrorist acts committed by Islamic fundamentalists. It is a general phenomenon, regardless of the substance of conflict, and can be identified without referring to related cases. Not only in Kashmir, but also on the soil of India, Muslims and Hindus fight over their political beliefs under religious disguises. The well-known report of the destruction of the *Ayodhya* Mosque in India by terrorist acts back in December 1992 was followed by the revenge in terror of the jihadists. Similarly, the actions by the Jewish settlers in the occupied territories of Palestine (e.g. the Hebron massacre, February 1994) are avenged by Hamas and Jihad Islami. I am not seeking to minimize the threats posed by Islamic jihadists to international security when the terror of others is mentioned and differentiations are recognized. My intention is merely to locate the generalizable action in order to support the following three central observations related to the security oriented study of jihadism:

First: The problem of political order. Islamic fundamentalism, as a powerful variety of the politicization of religion, does not only bring existing cultural differences to expression. In this regard the revived worldviews touch on a concept of order with the implication of creating a gap between existing civilizations. Whereas religious fundamentalism is a global phenomenon which can be found in almost all world religions, all of them share, whatever their variations, a certain kind of family resemblance which allows generalization. However, Islamism is a very specific variety when it comes to the issue of international order. In terms of security jihadists mobilize on religious grounds and are most compelling and subsequently successful in this pursuit. Despite the need for military security measures needed to face their irregular war, we have to acknowledge that fundamentalists cannot be fought with armies alone if we are to undermine their appeal and their call for an Islamic order. For dealing with these issues we need a security approach which is neither fixated on the state, nor on the predominance of conventional military thinking and its traditional wisdoms.

Second: Holy terror and irregular war. Not all fundamentalists fight for their goals in institutions by political means. Among them we also find those who resort to violence within the framework of terrorism to enforce their concept of order. Jihadism is a variety of “terror in the mind of God” (see Juergensmeyer, note 45) which combines fundamentalism, and the related worldviews about order, including the politicization of a conflict of values, with terrorism, i.e. “holy terror”,⁷³ with irregular war.

Third: Is “Islamism” different from “Islamic fundamentalism”? In this contribution, the terms “political Islam”, Islamism, and Islamic fundamentalism are used interchangeably. This is not common, because some dispute the application of the fundamentalism concept to Islam with the intention of combating the spreading prejudice. However, this is utterly misleading. It is true, the term “fundamentalism” has been ill handled as a cliché, but it is—despite all odds—a scholarly and analytical concept for studying the politicization of religion. By using the term Islamism as an alternative to the one that refers to the global phenomenon of fundamentalism, the respective scholars are unwittingly contributing to the stereotyping of Islam by implicitly restricting the

⁷³ See Bruce Lincoln, *Holy Terror* (see note 6).

politicization of religion to it. In contrast, I argue that “Islamism” is only a depiction of a specific variety of the phenomenon of political religion addressed as a religious fundamentalism. This phenomenon does not only occur in Islam. However, jihadism, as the military dimension of this phenomenon, is specifically Islamic. It compels us to include the inquiry into Islamism in the field of security studies. The new reasoning in this field has to be addressed as “new frontiers of security”,⁷⁴ setting out from a demand to go beyond the traditional concept of security dominated by military thinking. In so doing one smoothes the way for broadening the scope and deepening the insights of the analysis to enable oneself to deal with the new pattern of irregular war being the challenge.

Jihadism is not only an ideology of religious extremism, but also a new concept of warfare. The issue is political, namely the Islamist aspiration for a new world order. With the end of the East-West confrontation it seems that conventional Clausewitzian wars are no longer likely to take place. Wars between states, and between organized, institutionalized armies, have almost disappeared, being replaced by wars waged by non-state actors as irregulars. It is suggested that this pattern is likely to prevail in the foreseeable future.⁷⁵ Therefore, most of the issues must be thought through anew. Security experts have been arguing for a long time that this change be taken into consideration, and have underscored the need for a new security approach. Scholars like Barry Buzan, and later Martin van Creveld and Kalevi Holsti, have ventured into ground-breaking studies of security and war going far beyond the fixation with institutionalized armies. Both the changed character of wars of the new kind and non-military aspects are to be emphasized more and more strongly, and they need to become central subjects of security studies. In this sense, and in this sense only, I propose to deal with the religious Islamist ideology, and with its jihadism within the framework of a new security approach. Jihadism is both a propaganda fight for a new order and an irregular war which on September 1, 2001, and the following events proved powerful. Organized armies are helpless against the terrorist acts of violent jihadists, in particular the suicide bombers among them. Prior to these recent developments, earlier events in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Afghanistan, as well as in Xinjiang, Kashmir, Kosovo, and Macedonia make this issue clear.

One can take it for granted that the West will not be able to cope properly with jihadism and the related challenges to international security within the framework of the old state-centered approach. In earlier conflicts with other states the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces were able to overpower their foes, for example the Serbian army, with its regular and armed forces in 1999. The same applied in an effort to oust Saddam in the Iraq war back in March/April 2003. In contrast, neither the religious-ethnic UÇK irregulars’ acts of revenge against the Christian Serbs and Macedonians or others, nor the irregular war against coalition troops in Iraq and in Afghanistan, could be curtailed. Another example is the already mentioned inability of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) to cope with Intifada “against the infidels”. This understanding is currently gaining topicality in response to the irregular war of jihadism as practiced on September 11, 2001. This jihadist threat continues. The victory over the Taliban and over Saddam cannot be repeated against the jihadists in either country, or elsewhere.

⁷⁴ Leonore Martin, ed., *New Frontiers in Middle Eastern Security* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), introduction.

⁷⁵ See the reference in note 1.

In being confronted with jihadist Islamism, both as an ideology and as an international movement, one is also exposed to the fact that some parts of the Islamic diaspora in the West are being hijacked by the Islamists. Those claim to be the true representatives of the ‘true voice of Islam’. In fact they are seeking a “hinterland” for their actions. Jihadists of the diaspora abuse basic democratic rights and demonize their critics as the “voice of Islamophobia”. At issue is a camouflaging of their activities to establish their logistics in the West. Important components of Islamic jihadism exist for instance in Germany, which is a case in point. With these facts in mind, the study of security must cover an inquiry into the networking between the region of conflict itself, in this case, the world of Islam, and its extension through global migration abroad, for which the term “gated Diaspora”,⁷⁶ i.e. Islam in the West, has been coined. The denunciation of references to the conflict between political Islam and the West as an indication of Islamophobia is used as a cover to obscure these issues and it is utterly misleading and detrimental, both for the integration of Muslims and for Western security itself. After all, this kind of political correctness serves to camouflage fundamentalism and does not contribute to protecting either Muslims or democracy. In this free spirit of inquiry, the ensuing section of this study addresses the abuse of the Islamic diaspora in Europe for camouflaging the Islamic terrorists around al-Qaida’s Hamburg cell of Mohammed Atta and for facilitating the activities of these fundamentalist warriors of God in their pursuit of irregular war as jihad for a new international order based on the Islamist notion of “*hakimiyyat Allah/God’s rule*”.

V. Global Migration, International Security and the Ideology of Jihadism on the European Battlefield

Of course, there exists an alternative to Islamism for Muslims living in the West and also for Turkey in its bid to join the EU, this alternative being Euro-Islam.⁷⁷ The debate over this issue took place in many international projects. At the University of California, Berkeley a research project addressed this issue under the apt heading “Islam and the Changing Identity of Europe”. The project was conducted by two major Berkeley centers and it led to a publication under the title “Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam?”⁷⁸ If this alternative proves to be unfeasible, the Islamist dream of a “Muslim Europe”, to be accomplished piecemeal in a politics of Islamization, comes within the reach and it is a serious security threat. Underlying this assumption is the fact that the operation of al-Qaida on September 11, 2001 was carried out in New York and Washington, but it was prepared and rooted in the German Islamic diaspora. To put it bluntly: The networking of Islamism and the related supporting systems of jihadism are based and located in the Islamic diaspora in Western Europe, making of Europe a battlefield. Clearly, at issue is a small minority among the Islamic diaspora. In the case of Germany there are about 100,000 Islamists among the

⁷⁶ I borrow the term “gated diaspora” from Nikos Papastergiadis, *The Turbulance of Migration* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).

⁷⁷ See B. Tibi, The Quest of Islamic Migrants and of Turkey to Become European, in: *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, vol. 3.1 (Spring 2004), pp. 13-28.

⁷⁸ Nezar al-Sayyad and Manuel Castells, eds., *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam?* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), this volume includes B. Tibi, “Muslim Migrants in Europe: Between Euro-Islam and Ghettoization”, pp. 31-52.

3.5 millions of the diaspora community. The figure is in average never more than 3 to 5%. However, the issue is not the number of jihadists, but their ability to launch a strike. Islamists are institutionally well organized, both vocal and powerful. Above all they dispose of resources and they are in the control of major mosques of the diaspora in Europe.⁷⁹

After September 11 and the crackdown on the fifty-five al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan the world knows precisely, despite all the conspiracy driven thoughts, that the Bin Laden–al-Qaida connection is not a “gang”, but rather a powerful organization of jihadist fundamentalism with a considerable logistical base in Western Europe, in particular Germany.

In another international project on “Religion in an Expanding Europe”⁸⁰ run at Cornell University, I have formulated the options in the formula “Europeanization of Islam or Islamization of Europe”. The standing of the jihadists in the Islamic diaspora is clear. In a propagandist war of ideas they reject the use of the notion of fundamentalism for indentifying those who seek the unity of religion and the state in Islam, the so-called *din-wa-dawla* concept (*din-u-devlet*), as fundamentalists. They nevertheless believe that only they draw on the true *usul*/fundamentals of Islam, and deny that any others are true believers or entitled to have any representation in the Islamic diaspora of Europe. And in this capacity they claim religious freedom as basic human right. It is sad to acknowledge that Osama Bin Laden does the same; he continues to be popular⁸¹ both in the world of Islam and in the diaspora. The language of political Islam is popular for declaring the *jihad*-war on the West. It is believed to be the language of *iman*/belief against *al-kufr al-alami*/international unbelief, and it is also used in the Koran schools in the Islamic diaspora in Germany. It is not the person of Bin Laden, but rather the symbolic incorporation of this jihad war that creates this popularity. In short, at issue is also to win the Islamic diaspora for the security battle against jihadism. In this sense we are dealing with a novelty, namely the fact that Islamist movements and the related conflicts in the world of Islam are now being exported to the West, thus concretely touching on Europe and on its own security. The Islamists come to Europe by joining the ever increasing number of asylum seekers and migrants. In this way, political Islam has been exported to the West and it is becoming a domestic European issue. Being myself a liberal Muslim, I have been warning for years that totalitarian-minded Islamists have been abusing both democratic freedoms and the European Islamic diaspora itself for establishing a logistical base for their activities in the West. Newsweek wrote after September 11 about me: “Bassam Tibi ... has warned for years that Westerners need to differentiate between good Muslims and the bad ... no one wanted to hear that, verging as it does on the politically incorrect.”⁸²

⁷⁹ See chapter VI “The Fundamentalist Abuse of the Islam-Diaspora: Western Europe a Safe Haven” in: B. Tibi, *Die fundamentalistische Herausforderung* (Munich: C.H. Beck, fully rewritten 4th edition, 2003), pp. 184-214.

⁸⁰ See Peter Katzenstein and Tim Byrnes, eds., *Religion in an Expanding Europe* (Cambridge/UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006) including my chapter on the Europeanization of Islam.

⁸¹ I agree with the editorial by Thomas Friedman. He wrote after a visit to a variety of Islamic countries: “Quietly, Many in the Muslim World Want Bin Laden to Get Away”, *International Herald Tribune*, January 24, 2002, p. 8. Yossef Bodansky, *Bin Laden. The Man Who Declared War on America* (Rocklin/Cal.: Forum/Prima Publ., 1999).

⁸² See “Tolerating the Intolerable”, in: *Newsweek*, November 5, 2001, p. 46.

Due to a wrong understanding of the concept of an “open society”⁸³ fundamentalist activities in Europe and generally in the West are mostly ignored. European politicians—despite the warnings of the security apparatus—are more concerned about political correctness and worry about being related to any conflict that would associate them with political an alleged Islamophobia. Of course, it is right to curb prejudices against non-Western cultures, and to combat all kinds of related racism and real, not alleged, Islamophobia. However, Islamophobia is one thing and a security-related containment of Islamic jihadism and its “new totalitarianism”⁸⁴ is another.

The success of Islamist networking in Europe’s civil society and the spread of the related ideology in the diaspora are evidence of the ability of the movement to establish an argument that equates the critique of jihadist Islamism with an ugly Islamophobia in a war of ideas. In particular in Germany, the media fell into this trap and assisted in protecting Islamic fundamentalism against any disclosure while overlooking the interrelation between migration and security.⁸⁵ Opinion leaders were less concerned about the enemies of open society and preoccupied with combating any expression of political incorrectness. Even liberal Muslims engaged in Islamic reform, like this author elaborating on a reformist Euro-Islam,⁸⁶ were victimized by this European drive which was perceived as an indication of alleged tolerance towards an Islam conceived in an indiscriminate way. It is no surprise that the Islamists have been giving a priority to Germany and Scandinavia for establishing their logistical bases. In particular Germany—due to its shameful past—has been the one with the highest standards of political correctness when it comes to non-Western cultures. The fate of the liberal German journalist, who disclosed the “Krieg in unseren Städten” is a telling story; he was silenced by lawsuits and arbitrary court decisions. In an earlier article of *The New York Times* republished in *The International Herald Tribune* we find an explanation for this German behavior. Germany is addressed as a “safe haven” for the Islamist.⁸⁷ In addition, *Newsweek* asked on its cover the question of: “Why terrorists like Europe”. For Germany this answer was given with the formula “Tolerating the Intolerable”. Three of the four neo-*jihad* terror-pilots came from Germany, where the finance and the infrastructure of the operation, the support system of jihadism, were located. Their accommodation was called “*Dar al-Ansar*/House of the Supporters”. The anti-terror laws legislated in Germany and the United Kingdom in 2001/2002 put European governments in position to prosecute fundamentalists legally and to curb their activities in Europe. Britain is doing well, in Germany there is little will for law

⁸³ Karl Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, 2 volumes (London: Routledge and Paul Kegan, 1945).

⁸⁴ B. Tibi, *Der neue Totalitarismus. Heiliger Krieg und westliche Sicherheit* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2004). On the wrong response to jihadism with the attitude of “tolerance” see my chapter in: Alice Schwarzer, ed., *Gotteskrieger und die falsche Toleranz* (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2002).

⁸⁵ See Myron Weiner, referenced in note 40 above and the related study by B. Tibi, *Islamische Zuwanderung* (referenced in that note as well).

⁸⁶ On this issue one reads in *Time Magazine*, December 24, 2001, p. 49: “Bassam Tibi ... who coined the term Euro-Islam insists on the integration of Europe’s Muslims”, p. 49.

⁸⁷ Steve Erlanger, “Extremists Found Safe Haven in Germany”, in: *International Herald Tribune*, October 6-7, 2001, p. 3 (published before in *New York Times*).

enforcement in this field. At any rate, there is a very long way to go before we achieve better security given that the threat continues to be there, it certainly has not abated, despite all measures. In my most recent book “The New Totalitarianism” (note 84), I argue that European awareness of the security threat is weak and far from the realities. Here we face the dilemma of security versus liberty. The Islamists came to Europe not because they liked it, as *Newsweek* ironically put it, but for using its democratic freedoms to facilitate their activities. A French author suggested the formula “democracy against itself” for depicting the issue.⁸⁸ But this formula can also be put the other way around: in combating Islamic fundamentalism in Europe one can undermine the foremost credentials of Western democracy. This is truly a predicament: how can we achieve security in stopping the intrusion into Europe of Islamic fundamentalism from the world of Islam without doing any damage to democratic rules and values? How can we defend the “open society” of the West against its new enemies in Islamist totalitarianism without succumbing to the rules of the jihadist Islamists themselves? How can we protect Muslim migrants against a collective accusation of being supportive of jihadism? These are tough questions and I do not answer them.

An essential part of countering terrorism and combating its ideology in the West is a successful integration of Islamic migrants in Europe within the framework of a Euro-Islam. This would provide an efficient means for combating fundamentalism within the confines of democracy. According to my view presented above, there are two areas in which Islamists have been successful in Europe. It is clear we need a security approach in a war of ideas to curb them. There are, however, two other areas. *First*, to dry out the support systems, and *second*, to get a grip over the institutional outlets for mobilizing parts of the Islamic diaspora in the name of ethno-religious solidarity. The so-called Islamic welfare organizations in the diaspora were and still are the camouflage of the support systems of jihadism disguised as religious associations. And some basic Islamic schools serve the development of ethno-religious solidarity, not integration into European societies. Only Euro-Islam can help reach the goal of making the Muslim diaspora in Europe immune and keep it away from the susceptibility to the Islamist ideology of terrorism.

VI. Conclusions

In concluding this paper on countering ideological terrorism serving as a legitimation of an irregular war presented as a *jihad* by the Islamists, it is argued that a new concept of security is needed for properly dealing with the outstanding challenges. In distinguishing between political organizations and real religious institutions of Muslim migrants we put ourselves in a position to draw a line between Islamic jihad fundamentalists and ordinary Muslim migrants. The new security approach had to be attached to a democratic strategy both against the ideology of jihadism and one of a clash of civilizations. Without the assistance and cooperation of Muslims in the pursuit of this strategy a war on terror can never be won. An essential part of this assistance needs to come from the Islamic diaspora itself. The supporting systems of jihadist internationalism are located in Western Europe. A line has to be drawn between Islam and Islamism for countering jihadist ideology.

⁸⁸ Jean-Francois Revel, *Democracy against Itself* (see note 42 above); on Islamic terrorism see herein chapter 12.

The painful disclosure that there were British, German and French migrant Muslims fighting both as volunteers on the side of the Taliban as well as acting as al-Qaida jihadists was alarming. Again, this is not an issue to be coped with adequately through policing. The geopolitical setup of jihadist activities is the triangle: The world of Islam, the West and the Muslim diasporic culture in Europe. In the latter issue area, i.e. in Europe, things have not been going well. Being a Muslim migrant myself, I believe, the worst case is Germany. The ethnic determination of what is *German* precludes Muslim migrants from becoming members of the core community and thus increases the appeal of political Islam to them. Being a Muslim descending from the nobility/*ashraf* of Damascus I have been treated in German society as a “guest worker” and discriminated against in my university career. For me it was not possible to become in substance a German citizen, beyond legally holding a German passport since 1976, and living in Germany for four decades. My education in rational philosophy and the knowledge of Islam help me to distinguish between Islam and Islamic fundamentalism, and also not to be affected by the appeal of a jihadist defensive culture, despite the experience of discrimination in Europe. In an interview with the German magazine *Focus* after the jihadist assaults of London, July 7, 2005, I stated bluntly: “Had I not been educated in European philosophy I would have become, in view of the discrimination I was subjected to, a jihadist fighting Europe.”⁸⁹

The bulk of the poorly educated Muslim migrants is not protected against their “othering” by European societies. This makes them an easy catch for jihad-Islamists. Earlier in this paper, my concept of Euro-Islam was presented for combating Islamism. The concept is underpinned by the conviction that it is possible to be both European and Muslim. Again, a Euro-Muslim would not be susceptible to the appeal of jihadism. It follows that the lack of integration boosts the feeling among migrants of being excluded. In fact, this is the domain in which Islamic fundamentalists find people like the Egyptian Mohammed Atta, and even the German born Moroccan Said Bahaji, who are willing to join their fundamentalist network for ideological reasons. A Muslim with a European civilizational identity would presumably not act in this manner, but rather as a guardian of Western values, not as a jihadist. But the “othering” of young Muslims migrants in treating them as aliens and denying them full membership in the polity is an indirect assistance to the ideology of Islamism which seeks to undermine any effort at integration. It is to be hoped that such an open and enlightened Islam that could unfold in Europe among Muslims will affect the triangle I mention in shaping the world of Islam itself. This part of countering terrorism is essential for the security approach needed to supplement the other areas of policing and military issues. The politics of integration of Muslim migrants would be the best security approach against jihadism.

Security is for me not a means for preserving the status quo, but for defending freedom and democracy. How can we prevent the enemies of the “open society” from abusing its freedom? Among the principles of civil society is its decoupling from the state. Islamists as religious fundamentalists (see note 26) have been successful in establishing themselves in Europe on the level of civil society applied to Islamic communitarism. In this regard we see some basic differences between France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Despite all flaws, the French model has proved to be more promising than the others for stopping the intrusion of jihadist Islamic fundamentalists into Europe. France expects from the Imams of the mosques expressions

⁸⁹ Interview with B. Tibi, *Focus*, issue 29 of July 18, 2005, pp. 150-51.

of loyalty to the constitution, democracy and the *laïcité*.⁹⁰ This is not the case in the United Kingdom or Germany. Back in 2001, after the November debate in the British parliament on Muslim Britons fighting in Afghanistan against Britain and the USA, the then British home secretary David Blunkett requested in an unprecedented manner loyalty from Muslim migrants, but the Labour politician was accused of using “right wing slogans” against Muslims, simply for requiring loyalty. After the assaults of July 7, 2005, the United Kingdom could no longer afford this “multicultural tolerance” facilitating within the multiculturalism of “anything goes” the actions of jihadism.

In concluding this analysis on the roots of ideological terrorism we have referred to the politicization of Islam in a context of a religionization of politics in order to explain jihadism as an ideology of an irregular war. In instrumentalizing democratic freedoms, but also in abusing the weakness of European values, the exponents of jihadist Islamism succeeded in finding safe haven in Europe and ideological safeguards. Fundamentalists, who are against the political integration of Muslim migrants as citizens of the heart, have been able to hijack parts of the Islamic diaspora. Integrated ordinary Muslims can become true European citizens, but Muslims at the fringe of society can be mobilized as ethnic-religious minorities for the political ends of religious fundamentalism, being the ideology of jihadist terrorism.

An ideology based on religion and culture in a political shape is an essential part of terrorism. For deterring the security threat of jihadist Islamism, we need a new approach for dealing with the triangle in question: The world of Islam, the West and the Islamic diaspora in Europe. Jihadist terrorism as irregular war is to be located in this triangle. The war against jihadist terrorism is also a war of ideas and it can neither be restricted to military means nor to a formal legal understanding of war. The war on terror cannot be declared, because one cannot declare war on invisible non-state actors.

The instruments needed for undermining Islamic fundamentalism as the ideological foundation of terrorism in the world of Islam and in Europe are multifaceted. In this contribution I have been at pains to analyze and shed light on the challenge posed by jihadist Islamic ideology to Western as well as to Islamic and to international security. Political Islam is primarily a challenge to Muslims themselves in their dealing with the outstanding predicaments of modernity. The solution for Europe lies in Europeanizing Islam⁹¹ for countering the efforts at an Islamization of Europe. In the world of Islam itself the option is either to accept the subjection to the new totalitarianism or to smooth the way through reforms for an Islamic embracing of secular democracy⁹² within the

⁹⁰ Paul A. Silverstein, *Algeria in France* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). See also B. Tibi, *Les conditions d'Euro-Islam*, in: Robert Bistolfi and Francois Zabbal, (eds.), *Islam d'Europe. Intégration ou insertion communautaire* (Paris: Editions de l'Aube, 1995), pp. 230-234. See also the report on Dalil Boubakir, the Imam of the Paris mosque, “Muslim and French and Proud to be Both” by Katrin Bennhold in *International Herald Tribune*, March 16, 2006, p. 2.

⁹¹ B. Tibi, “Between Communitarism and Euro-Islam. Europe, Multicultural Identities and the Challenge of Migration”, in: John Docker and Gerhard Fischer (eds.), *Adventures of Identity. European Multicultural Experiences and Perspectives* (Tübingen: Stauffenberg, 2001), pp. 45-60: see also note 80 above.

⁹² On Islam’s compatibility with democracy and modernity see William M. Watt, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity* (London: Routledge, 1988), and Rahman Fazlur, *Islam and Modernity. Transformation of*

framework of an open liberal Islam. This would open the way for Muslims to join the rest of the world governed by rules of democratic peace (see note 3). Democracy in Islam would help Muslims to come to terms with the rest of the world and to give up the illusion of a global Islamization. The jihadist-terrorist internationalism of political Islam is not a contribution to world peace. Terrorism⁹³ alienates Muslims from the rest of humanity; therefore, Muslim politicians are best advised to join the war on terror and to dissociate themselves from global jihad. The European approach of a democratization of the EU's neighborhood⁹⁴ is the best for countering ideological terrorism.

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⁹³ See Richard Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terrorism. A Portrait of Middle Eastern Terrorism 1994-1999* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002) and Paul Berman, *Terror and Liberalism* (New York: Norton & Company, 2003).

⁹⁴ See the work of the EU Think Tank CEPS edited by Michael Emerson, *Democratization in the European Neighborhood* (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 2005), herein B. Tibi, Islam, Freedom and Democracy, pp. 93-117.

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