CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE
DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM

HOMEGROWN TERRORISM
Causes and Dimensions

ANKARA / TURKEY 03-04- JUNE 2014
Activity Report

HOMEGROWN TERRORISM
Causes and Dimensions

COE-DAT WORKSHOP, ANKARA / TURKEY
03-04- JUNE 2014
ABSTRACT

The present manuscript reflects the proceeding of the Homegrown Terrorism: Causes and Dimensions Workshop organized by the NATO COE-DAT at its premises in Ankara on 03 – 04 June 2014.

Since the transnational dimension of terrorism, this workshop was conceived to benefit from the insights of academic and operational field experts’ from various countries. Therefore, each perspective provided valuable opportunity for mutual comparison among practitioners engaged in different professional and environmental contexts. Individual perspectives provided valuable opportunities to gain knowledge on the work of practitioners from other countries and professional contexts coping with homegrown terrorism threat.

The suitability of this approach was made clear during the activity through complementary academic and field-level experts’ approaches. Such combination provided added value in order to increase the understanding on homegrown terrorism enablers, which allow terrorist organizations to maintain attractiveness, as well as to provide an estimation of homegrown terrorism threats, extent and trends.

This product delivers the workshop’s outcome and goals to contribute to the wider purpose of mitigating terrorism threats. Moreover, while successful in eliciting key trends of homegrown terrorism in the countries addressed, the WS facilitated the establishment of a network for views exchange and information sharing.

This constitutes an excellent basis for the COE-DAT to build on and proactively address the issue of homegrown terrorism in accordance with the needs of the Alliance.

This activity report is a draft product of the COE-DAT. It is produced for experts in the field interested in the topic. It does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO and is designed to provide and independent research document.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Countries addressed during the WS present different characteristics in terms of trends, number and way people engage into terrorism although there are some common denominators concerning the push and pull factors towards terrorism. These can be weak identity, vulnerability to messaging and appeal of terrorism organisations, convincement of social injustice to be redressed.

Differences between South European countries (i.e. Spain and Italy) and Central-North European countries (i.e. the UK, Germany and the Netherlands) are due to different migration background as well as geopolitical reasons. While the latter countries present increasing concerns with respect to mobilization and proselytism, former two suffer from being logistical hubs for transnational terrorism actors. Although law enforcement efforts in recent years showed indoctrination and recruitment for terrorism purpose exist. In the case of Turkey, domestic terrorism matters still require seeking solutions for the stability of the country and beyond.

• The application of appropriate terminology for defining the process, when it occurs, leading to pursue terrorism purposes which is increasingly being defined as radicalisation still stirs the debate. (There is no common understanding and, therefore, agreement on the use of the term radicalisation to define the process of people exposing terrorist ideology).

Speakers stressed that being radical is not a form of crime and it was emphasized that radical views are relative to the form of the society and time in which they manifest. These can be positive drivers for democracies to build on (as the case of Martin L. King demonstrates). Nevertheless, the discussion over terminology was considered to pertain to the academic field and should not undermine neither reduce focus from actions against Homegrown terrorism.

• Battlefields are an unquestionable factor for pulling youth into violent extremism and terrorism. In the past, linguistic boundaries determined Homegrown terrorists’ choice of battlefield. This is ultimately led by most prominent conflicts going on.

• The civil war affecting Syria since 2011 and other conflicts in the Middle East are a driver for youth to become fighters. This phenomenon is not necessarily is preceded by a sophisticated indoctrination phase or a process implying particular stages before supporting or directly pursuing violence.

• Emotional factors and targeted campaigning are leverage for attracting recruits. This, in most of the cases, does not imply a defined process of radicalization but the decision to act can be immediate therefore not based on deep forms of indoctrination.

• Identity-related rather than socio-economic matters play a significant role in pushing EU countries’ individuals to become fighters for the Jihadist cause in Syria.
People undergoing a stage prior to adult maturity, during which they are relatively more vulnerable to the influence of others, are sensitive target for terrorism propaganda.

Returnees from Syria and other battlegrounds are a major concern for European Union (EU) countries security stakeholders. Such assessment is based on the risk that EU countries' sensitive targets will continue to be attacked by their own citizens.

Besides of the physical threat, Homegrown terrorism is a wider issue for communities' cohesion requiring multi stakeholder-based responses ranging from private and public local level organisations/authorities to central level security agencies.

The nature of threats borne by Homegrown terrorism is different when comparing Turkey and EU Member States. The latter countries share the concern of their citizens who fought in Syria or in other Middle East conflicts and ultimately constituting a direct threat for perpetrating attacks once they return home. On the other hand Turkey directly faces the consequences of conflicts in its neighbourhood. Foreign fighters’ movements are a huge threat to security and public order of Turkey which, moreover, faces terrorism concerns related to minorities that may try to exploit regional instability to pursue their agenda.

Some of the attendees stressed that Jihadism is frequently subject to a misconception and youth who are not aware of its tenets are under exploitation by terrorist organization.

Worship places are often exploited for enticing youth into embracing violent ideologies. Since better, not restrictive, surveillance measures were adopted for prevention, other areas including sports grounds and cafes became sensitive for recruiting.

Prison is confirmed as being an environment conducive to radicalisation and terrorism recruitment.

Past terrorism prevention strategies generated counter-productive effects by alienating the individuals whose support is actually needed to revert the trends.

Loss of significance and disillusionment are factors facilitating the separation of individuals from terrorist organization and violence perpetration in general. Conveying these into reintegration methods through structured programmes is a key for successful policies against Homegrown terrorism.

The internet was seen as a medium to be better used for developing robust and credible communication strategies against Homegrown terrorism.

In the course of the workshop, speakers called for strengthened commitment towards cooperation at the political level as a requirement for the convergence of Turkey and EU countries’ interest. This will be eventually translated in practical joint work against sources and battle grounds breeding transnational terrorism.
"Politics and Terrorism Prevention: The evolution of the UK’s "Prevent" Strategy between governments" was the title of a presentation of a representative from the Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies (BUCSIS) at the University of Buckingham whose career combines intelligence work and academia-police cooperation. The policy being implemented in the United Kingdom (UK) aims at building measures for the complex challenge to preventing youth engagement into terrorism with a particular focus on Islamist militancy. The presentation offered insights regarding the strategies applied in the United Kingdom (UK) since 2003 and explained the changes of policies through the years not only in order to respond to the varying forms of the domestic terrorism, but also for political choices related to government orientations.

CONTEST is the first post 9/11 UK strategy to attempt to address Homegrown terrorism. The strategy was launched in 2003 and saw its “Prevent” strand developed substantially following the London bombings in July 2005. The back-drop to the attacks was a growing sense that London had become a safe hub for radical Islamic proselytism. Therefore, in 2006 through the Terrorism Act (TACT) new types of provisions addressing terrorism-related offences entered into force, including: Undertaking terrorism training; Preparation of, or planning terrorist acts; Disseminating terrorist publications; and Glorification of terrorism. The expert pointed out that this new course posed serious questions regarding provisions for the freedom of speech while countering terrorism. Difficulties over the ethics of counter terrorism policy emerged during the attempted extradition of a radical preacher to a country not guaranteeing sufficient human rights standards with regard to detention measures and the use of torture in terrorist investigations.

In 2009 the strategy was updated with CONTEST 2 by widening the definition of extremism, and focusing more robustly on the significance of radical propaganda. The updated strategy focused on prevention methods and how to best alert the public concerning terrorist threats. CONTEST is split into four work streams called the four ‘P’s: Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare. The purpose of Prevent is to stop people from pursuing terrorism. Following a change of government in 2010 in which the Conservative Party headed up the governing coalition, the Prevent strategy was upgraded to emphasise 3 main objectives: 1) countering terrorist ideology and challenging those who promote it; 2) supporting individuals who are especially vulnerable to becoming radicalised; 3) working with sectors and institutions where the risk of radicalisation is assessed to be high 1. The key intent was tackling radicalisation by providing a narrative to discredit that of al-Qaeda and other extremists under its umbrella. A wide range of sectors are involved in efforts to help to prevent people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. The Government works with particular sectors including education, faith, health, criminal justice and charities. The internet is a specific sector although there are questions as to what can reasonably be done in this particular sector, at least by the government.

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1 Objective 3: Supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation: In the UK, evidence suggests that radicalisation tends to occur in places where terrorist ideologies, and those that promote them, go uncontested and are not exposed to free, open and balanced debate and challenge. Some of these places are the responsibility of Government, some are Government funded but have considerable autonomy and others are both privately owned and run (but may still be subject to Government regulation).
A core element of the ‘Prevent’ strategy is the Channel Programme: a multi-agency approach to supporting vulnerable people at risk from radicalisation. Channel uses existing collaboration between local authorities, statutory partners (such as the education and health sectors, social services, children’s and youth services and offender management services), the police and the local community to:

1. identify vulnerable individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism;
2. assess the nature and extent of that risk;
3. develop the most appropriate support plan for the individuals concerned.

Channel is embedded within already existing statutory safeguarding processes for both children and adults and operates in a pre-criminal space. As Channel processes have developed the number of referrals nationally has increased and now stands at a total figure of 2,653 referrals (between April 2007 and March 2013). Not all individuals referred will be assessed as being vulnerable to being drawn into violent extremism and therefore in need of support from Channel. Of the total figure 587 (22%) referrals were assessed by multi-agency panels to be suitable for the Channel process. Between April 2007 and the end of March 2013, Channel received a total of 930 (35%) referrals that involved individuals under 18 years of age at the time they were referred. Between April 2012 and the end of March 2013 the percentage of referrals that were recorded as being Muslim was 57%, with other religions accounting for 11% while the religion is not known accounting for 27%.

A second British speaker from the South Oxfordshire and the Vale of White Horse Local Police Area, Thames Valley Police, addressed the issues of female terrorists as well as the ‘engagement of women and their role at local community-level in Prevent strategy’. During the introduction it was stressed that overlooking radicalization processes was considered a weakness of past counter terrorism strategies in the UK with particular regard to the ‘self-starters’ phenomenon.

Some cases of Homegrown terrorists were illustrated. These included Roshanara Choudhry: a British student radicalised online who carried out the first political assassination attempt in UK by Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism. Another case regarded Samantha Lewthwaite, the widow of Germaine Lindsay who was one of the London 2005 bombers. She is sometimes referred to as the world’s most wanted female. Lewthwaite has allegedly become a member of the Somalia-based radical Islamic militant group Al-Shabaab. Looking at the capabilities of women in sustaining authorities for counter terrorism policies, the presenter described them as key actors since they are at the heart of their communities. Women are best placed to recognise early warning signs of radicalisation and therefore able to provide a bridge between local authorities and communities. This can include noticing behavioural changes in people which might be of concern, whether that be in terms of drug addiction, gang involvement, or recruitment to terrorism. However, Muslim women have been identified as traditionally having little contact or interaction with the police. ‘Women and Prevent’ is expected to become successful Prevent activity used by police forces and partner agencies from around the UK once barriers to engagement are overcome.
In the second part of the presentation the Counter Terrorism Local Profile (CTLP) was introduced. This is a product developed by the police to identify the threat and vulnerability from terrorism and extremism targeting local-level environments which can be conducive to terrorism. It aims to help both police and partners understand and prioritise threat and vulnerability with suggested recommendations to address any risk. The CTLP is a key tool for driving a two-way sharing of information.

The UK speakers explained that political drivers around Prevent have had a significant impact on its application. Until 2010 perceived failures of multiculturalism and community cohesion, a need to respond and adapt to new forms of terrorism as well as supporting communities in which radicalisation and terrorism were emerging were key drivers. The more recent change in the government leadership provided an unequivocal interpretation of the strategy’s use of the term ‘Islamist’ partly in response to perceived public disquiet about radical preachers. It also led to a decoupling of community cohesion project support from Prevent. Nevertheless a drive for measurable outcomes from the strategy’s delivery continued, providing challenges to identify clear indicators for measuring the effectiveness of the impact and concrete results.

The representative from the South Oxfordshire and the Vale of White Horse Local Police Area concluded by highlighting issues arisen as a result of the Prevent strategy as the alienation of many of the wider Muslim community which has sometimes made the strategy counter-productive. To some extents it has run the risk of inadvertently creating a ‘suspect community’; and has resulted in the counter-terrorism community sometimes overlooking the many potential non-Muslim extremists. This has also contributed to the Islamophobic conspiracy debate among youth in the UK who have started questioning the Prevent Strategy’s legitimacy in terms of its potential influence on freedom of thought and freedom of speech. These matters could be leading to a counter-productive effect that ‘Prevent’ may be alienating the individuals whose support is actually needed to revert the trends.

A senior researcher at International Center for Terrorism and Transnational Crime (UTSAM) gave a presentation on Radicalization and De-radicalization in Terrorist Groups: Lessons from the Turkish Penitents’. The process of Individual disengagement from political violence in Turkey by reconstructing the lives of 13 so-called ‘Turkish Penitents’ was illustrated as results of a research study. This benefitted from direct interviewing with concerned individuals after detention periods. Two of these were contacted through private means and the rest through snowball technique. Access to personal background information was considered helpful for relevant data collection. Key questions study sought to answer were:

- What motivational (individual/internal) and structural (environmental/external) factors did influence Turkish Penitents’ processes of disengagement from political violence?
What were the obstacles and inhibiting factors for leaving the group? How did they overcome such factors?

What were the differences and similarities between Turkish Penitents who left a leftist-revolutionary group and those who exited from a separatist organization, the PKK?

What are the Turkish Penitents’ current positions in society and the states of mind?

What can we learn from their experiences that may contribute to the facilitation of disengagement processes for others who are still involved in political violence?

A theoretically-informed methodology, process-based Rite of Passage (ROP) Model for political violence was applied. This is shaped around the stages of Separation (pre-violence), Transition (violence) and Incorporation (post-violence).

Findings related to the ‘separation’ stage: the speaker explained that, in order to account for individual paths to political violence, researchers should avoid seeking deterministic, one-dimensional and/or mono-causal explanations (e.g. ‘poverty leads to crime’). Instead, a process-based socio-psychological approach seems to provide better opportunities for making sense of one’s killing of others or suicide. He stressed that in order to better understand individual paths to political violence individuals’ experiences in various phases of their separation stage which include their lives in family and school, their political socialization, radicalization and entry into groups. The concepts of significance quest and significance loss played an important role in interviewee’s separation stage, either in their radicalization or entry phases. Specifically, those with more disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds first felt a significance loss, which prompted a significance restoration and culminated in their joining to terrorist groups. Interviewees from better socio-economic backgrounds joined their groups as a result of their quest for meaning and significance, but they too had a significance loss in their processes of radicalization, which took place after their voluntary entry to their respective groups. ‘Loss of significance’ seems to be the common factor affecting the separation stages of all of the Turkish Penitents. While significance loss in some interviewed penitents was created by problems related to Turkey’s social and political structures (e.g. the de facto differential incorporation of various ethnic, religious and economic groups into society; relative deprivation/frustration-agression because of personal or collective trauma, etc.), the notion of significance loss manifested also in the form of psychological problems springing from their tense, unloving or dysfunctional family structures and/or from their negative experiences during their political socialization in the family and/or school.

The speaker followed by presenting the findings related to the ‘transition’ stage. This demonstrates that Individual disengagement from political violence is a gradual process which is as complex as the process of joining political violence in the first place. Factors influence this process include, but are not limited to, having the first seed of doubt, disillusionment, rumination on leaving the group, groups’ threats against disengagement, reasoning, planning and exit. Some interviewees (detached) left their groups and violence while retaining their ‘revolutionary ideology’ but others (repentant) not only left their groups, violence and their ideologies but also felt remorse and went into great lengths to alleviate the
associated stress of past wrongdoings. To this end, among other things, they offered to state officials their insider knowledge not only about their own groups but also other terrorist groups and their relationships with the actors of the deep-state. This latter issue is important in the sense that such information provided by those repentant, most of whom were former members of terrorist organizations, became crucial in the processes of unmasking of the Turkish deep-state, and thereby opened a new page in the country’s efforts towards the establishment of an advanced democracy.

The study suggested that factors affecting individual disengagement from terrorist groups can be found in numerous problems and contradictions that are inherent in legitimate peripheral participation in communities of violent practices (i.e., terrorist groups). These problems and contradictions entail:

- Problems pertaining to the interpersonal relationships within terrorist groups. For instance, PKK and revolutionary groups perceived and experienced a high level ‘distrust’ and ‘unjustness’ in terms of peer-to-peer and master-novice relationships within their respective groups. Those who joined the PKK involuntarily realized such feelings from the beginning, but all others who joined their groups for ideological reasons started to realize the effects of such feelings more strongly when the influence of their ideologies were lifted. Some of the interviewees were moved by these feelings to abandon ideology.

- Problems related to access and sequestration with regard to participation in the production process in a community of violent practices. It appears that in the PKK, even novices do not have any problem in waging violence. Novices are sent to violent clashes with the Turkish military without proper training and equipment which creates a feeling of ‘worthlessness’ not only in those novices but also some of the old-timers who realize that the group has taken the political out of ‘political violence’. These practices of the PKK are called by the group members as the ‘policies of blood and death’. Interviewees revealed that some murky figures in their groups were actually cooperating with the deep-state. This created in them serious discontent, feeling of unjustness and disillusionment leading to their psychological degeneration.

- PKK failure in achieving proclaimed objectives in its almost 40-year history surely had an impact on some of its members, making them feel that the group’s goals are no longer attainable and leading to their ‘disillusionment’ and eventual desire to ‘disengage’ from the group. Moreover, the speaker highlighted suspected connection between the PKK and the Turkish deep-state started to be articulated more frequently in society and especially by influential Kurdish intellectuals as Kemal Burkay and İbrahim Güçlü. This could increase the number of disillusioned members in the PKK, which may even lead to their disengagement in the near future.

The representative of the UTSAM then highlighted that since the life of a member of a terrorist group is defined by learning in situ and in practice in a community through ‘thought reform’ techniques. However, these techniques backfired in that they led overtime to the disillusionment of many group members including the interviewees and contributed to their desire to disengage from their respective groups. Interviewee’s personality orientations played a significance role
in terms of disengagement sources. The speaker pointed out that the personality orientations of the people he interviewed were judged in respect to their disengagement from political violence. Turkish Penitents are predominantly ‘reward-oriented’ and ‘inner-directed,’ and also they have ‘internal locus of control.’ Therefore, in contrast to conventional thinking suggesting that personality orientations are stable over the life-course, this study found that their personality orientations changed when there was an important change in the social situation (e.g., transition from being ordinary citizen to being a member of a terrorist movement). When their styles of coping were examined, this study found that all 13 subjects of this study used ‘altruism,’ ‘anticipation,’ and ‘rationalization,’ while ‘idealization’ made a crucial impact on the disengagement of one subject. Furthermore, decisiveness of my informants was a key to their disengagement, but the importance of “repentance laws” cannot be neglected in terms of understanding their disengagement more fully.

With regard to the ‘incorporation’ stage, findings suggest that the reincorporation of the Turkish Penitents into society is extremely difficult, in particular because of conditions compelling them to lead an ‘invisible’ life in society. These conditions comprise the threats they receive from the groups they left on the one hand and the society’s scarce preparedness to accept them. The latter problem manifests itself in two ways: the Turkish Penitents are accused of being ‘traitors’ by their own people, Secondly, society’s unwillingness to give them a new chance complicates the Turkish Penitents’ incorporation into society even further in that such unwillingness lead to their dire economic conditions upon return from political violence. The feeling of abandonment appears to be dominating the lives of the Turkish Penitents after their disengagement from political violence. This is often associated with feelings of boredom, melancholy, hopelessness, deprivation and loneliness.

Trying to give policy recommendations, the speaker first referred to the paradigm of undemocratic governance in the 1990s to more-democratic governance characterizing Turkey developments especially during the last decade which has implications for country’s counter-terrorism policies. He indicated that shifting from tense and murky exchange relationship between the state/deep-state and potential beneficiaries of repentance laws to a more lax and transparent exchange relationship since the enactment of the Effective Repentance Law (Art. 221) created favourable conditions for law beneficiaries while increasing the credibility of Turkish government’s counter-terrorism strategy. Policy problems concerning individual disengagement from political violence are of theoretical and technical nature he added, specifying that the former category is related to the concept of ‘liminality’ which dominated the political discourse on terrorism and political violence in Turkey for long time. Moreover, the research study implemented by the speaker revealed a lack of institutionalization regarding repentant‘ reintegation of society while it would be crucial institutionalizing these efforts by developing clear-cut policies and programs to facilitate repentants’ reintegration. These should be promoted and advertised to make sure that potential beneficiaries of repentance laws will have a clear idea about disengagement positive outcome. This would contribute to the State capability to invalidate the disinformation campaigns of terrorist groups through which they try to dissuade their disillusioned members’ from disengagement. The speaker emphasized that implementation of repentance laws with clarity and sincerity and
in institutionalization of reintegration efforts under clearly defined and advertised programs are extremely important in terms of the state’s counter-terrorism policies, given that such policies will not only facilitate the reintegration of repentants into society, it, will also provide a good example to incentivize disillusioned members of terrorist organizations to disengage.

In order to generate achievable policy strategies and targets with regard to individual disengagement from political violence, the speaker concluded that more case studies to allow further assessment of the subject from both the local and international dimensions are required. Research goals should be at international level by applying the RoP for terrorist groups in two or more countries (e.g., Turkey, Israel and Iraq). In addition, more case studies are needed to assess the effects of repentance laws on individual disengagement from political violence both at local and international level.

A representative from the Turkish National Police Academy focused his presentation on the ‘conflict in Syria, the issue of foreign fighters and the experiences of Turkey’. Experts, open information and findings of academic research were sources for collecting data to respond to main features of this phenomenon as profiles, routes used, modalities, choice of combating front and quantity of persons involved.

The presenter explained that there are citizens from more than 70 countries which can roughly be categorized in 3 groups: fighters without previous conflict experience (mostly young men and occasionally young women); fighters with previous experiences in battlegrounds (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Russia etc.); fighters from Lebanese Hezbollah and foreign military experts. Although it is well known that the numbers of foreign fighters in Syria are increasing substantially, there is not any sound figure so far. Those who are fighting against the regime since early 2011 are estimated to be between 8,000 and 11,000. According to open and intelligence sources, Europeans are more than 1,000. The USA Today reported that 5,000 Hezbollah fighters while Meir Amit, Turkish Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (MAITIC), estimates that almost 8,000 Shi’ite foreign fighters supported and coordinated by Iran are backing the regime in place.

According to the same source those coming from Europe can be grouped into 3 categories:

1. Countries with high participation: the number of foreign fighters may reach several hundred. They include Britain, Belgium, France, Holland, Germany, and the Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia). The largest number comes from Britain and Belgium (around & more than 300).

2. Countries with medium participation: between several dozen and 100 fighters. They include Ireland, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Austria.

3. Countries with low participation: ten or fewer fighters. They include Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary, Romania and Switzerland.

Fighting against the Assad Regime or to help the Assad Regime were two main initial drivers for foreign fighters to go to Syria. After, Al-Qaeda affiliated groups and PKK/PYD
recruits joined the battleground to establish territorial control: respectively to declare Islamic Caliphate and Kurdish autonomy or independence. A further factor was the desire for adventure. The speaker stressed that the conflict in Syria constitutes a huge direct threat for Turkey’s security and radicalization trends will continue to increase in Syria unless the regime will be toppled. Otherwise the conflict in Syria will remain as a magnet of foreign fighters globally.

In the second part of the presentation, measures taken to prevent foreign fighters travel through Turkey were illustrated. These include preventing entry in Turkey from source countries as well as denying access to Syria. Concerns as military trained and ideologically indoctrinated returnees, the scarce or ineffective counter radicalization efforts in source countries (who selfishly blame Turkey without fulfilling their responsibilities to prevent potential foreign fighters to depart) were highlighted by the representative from the Turkish National Police Academy. Importantly, the speaker also raised some suggestions for better international cooperation as follows:

• Source countries should share comprehensive information on suspected foreign fighters;
• Source countries must act timely to notify about suspect individuals;
• Source countries must provide Turkish authorities with detailed information about potential foreign fighters (i.e. their identity, travel routes, possible companions, photos, travel documents) and evidence that they would go to Syria to fight;
• Turkey cooperates with all allies and partners to eliminate possible risks stemming from foreign fighters flow to Syria;
• All countries, mainly European, have to do their best and exhibit sincere efforts to stop the war in Syria instead of just dealing with their citizens.

The representative from the Turkish National Police Academy concluded his intervention stating that Syria is the new hub for foreign fighters who are gaining battlefield experience. A subset of these fighters falls within the jihadist-terrorist camp. These individuals may return to their home country and target it, using their newfound skills and their native knowledge. To address this threat a multi-dimensional and transnational response is needed.

A Researcher from the International Institute for Criminal Sciences (ISISC) and the Milan-based Catholic University presented on ‘Human security as response against Homegrown terrorism’.

The speaker introduced the growing policy relevance of human dimension concept when referring to security measures. Following the end of a so-called cold war, Rule of law and Human Rights issues from being a field of exclusive competence of national authorities, within their own domain, increasingly become subject to International Community’s interest and responsibility. This led to multilevel security responsibilities (i.e. United Nations agencies dislocated at country level, Regional-level international organisations, National Human Rights bodies, civil society organisations, local authorities, communities). This multilevel and multilateral response is due to the necessity to adapt citizens’ security policies to the risks of globalization. The increasing transnational dimension of terrorism and organized crime is a
key example of these threats to security. Legal and policy trends in the 21st century and post 9/11-agedemonstrated that preventive measures are increasingly being designed to address social and political motivation of terrorism including Homegrown type. The researcher remarked that EU and NATO Member countries share the advantage of pursuing values and principles leading to security policies shaped around human security underpinned by civil rights and fundamental freedoms. Therefore, achieving results in counter terrorism policies in compliance with the international legal instruments is nowadays a key challenge to endorse human dimension for security goals.

The Italian presenter followed stressing that the understanding of terrorist behaviours and motivations is critical for deterring Homegrown terrorism. Since 2004 the term radicalisation has become central to terrorism studies and counter-terrorism policy. Addressing radicalisation (which per se is not a crime, e.g. Luther King was considered a radical) and violent extremism leading to terrorism has become a priority for counter terrorism policies. Contemporary political factors, including perceived injustices as repressions and scarce governance are key drivers. Some EU local-level territories are unlawfully governed. These are instrumental for exacerbating asymmetric conflicts that are incrementing transnational terrorism. The need to seek life objectives can easily lead to the attractive identification in vengeful motivations and terrorist purposes.

Jihad is a powerful term in the Muslim psyche. It evokes the legitimate self-defence struggle in the glorious days of the early Islam. This is very attractive toward the masses of Muslims suffering social injustices while being exposed to radicalising messaging. The frequency of the use of the term jihad should be studied in connection to the echo of legitimate jihad and how this translated into the political purposes. Jihad will remain an extremely powerful slogan to rally Muslim communities against whom they see as oppressors. Violent extremists have long realized that sense of alienation and frustration can be capitalised upon in order to attract recruits. Extremist movements succeed in offering potential recruits identities empowering them through the construction of their sense of self-confidence. However, the Italian researcher stressed that with regard to many EU countries - due to immigration tradition- this mutated into an autonomous phenomenon consisting of groups ‘home-grown’ Muslims who have adopted the language of Al-Qaeda and who act according to a largely independent decisional framework. In this view, contemporary Islamist militancy in Europe is an extreme, violent form of popular culture, which has to be eradicated not by focusing on eliminating the ‘leadership’ of the movement but through societal and human factors, therefore human security is central.

Quoting Dr. A. Schmid, the presenter identified three levels of analysis of radicalisation:

- **Micro-level**: the individual level, involving e.g. identity problems, feelings of alienation, marginalisation, discrimination, humiliation, stigmatisation and rejection, often combined with moral outrage and feelings of (vicarious) revenge;

- **Meso-level**: the wider radical milieu - the supportive or even complicit social surround - which serves as a rallying point and is the “missing link” with the terrorists’ broader constituency or reference group that is aggrieved and suffering injustices which, in turn, can radicalise parts of a youth cohort and lead to the formation of terrorist organisations;
• **Macro-level:** role of government and society at home and abroad, the radicalisation of public opinion and party politics, majority–minority relationships, especially when it comes to foreign diasporas, and the role of lacking socio-economic opportunities for whole sectors of society which leads to mobilisation and radicalisation that might take the form of terrorism.

The speaker then referred to a variety of academic and intelligence agencies’ different definitions of radicalisation and violent extremism showing that there is no common/unified view about this concept problem mainly due to the difference among single/national perspectives over the matter. Practitioners argue that discussing about terminology rightfulness pertains to a merely academic debate. Nonetheless, trying to re-conceptualize and re-define violent extremism and radicalisation leading to terrorism, it should be addressed as occurring on both sides of a conflict dyad, it can be a collective or individual process rising in war or peace times. This regards situation of political polarisation characterized by the abandon of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between actors bearing diverging interests in favour of engaging in confrontation. This can lead to terrorism or acts of violent extremism. A series of tools for de-Radicalisation/disengagement from terrorism were mentioned as influence from family or peer group, ideological tools as counter-fatwas, dialogue with well-known imams and muftis as well as repentant terrorists’ reintegration measures to facilitate their active collaboration for preventing new jihadist recruits. Key aspects are rejection of ideology of violence, community support, disillusionment with terrorist leadership/organization and understanding that violence is a failing strategy. Any programme can be effective only through personal commitment the disengaging individual. Trust in the staff involved is also vital. Therefore, involving former extremists in de-radicalisation/disengagement was warmly suggested by the speaker since these have deeply understood the challenges facing the individual and may enjoy more credibility. Programmes should be delivered to facilitating the perception they are independent from the State. In this sense partnership between public authorities and community-level actors as civil society organisations, schools and welfare structures is an added value. The objective of supporting Human Rights through developing policies oriented at citizens’ security to enshrine human security values may invest on civil society, which could play a primary role. Civil society can be a precious actor that already exists at the grassroots level offering authorities an opportunity for local engagement. Empowered civil society organisations can fulfil the sensitive task of being a source of frontline evidence-based knowledge regarding risks posed by radical trends.

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‘Terrorist organizations profit over the vulnerability of individuals who seeks values.’

Hence, civil society is a natural channel through which is a possible enhancing countering Homegrown terrorism practice. It may help to develop creative skills and critical thinking to reduce attraction toward violent extremism. It requires capabilities to careful assess of what are legal attitudes and social behaviours which may develop in illicit practices as terrorist organisations, overcoming interreligious and social peaceful relations, is profiting of the vulnerability of individuals who seeks values.
The presenter then explained that reintegration measures can be beneficial for the entire social fabric as they would strengthen the risk of being recruited by illicit actors as criminal organizations. Organized crime role – especially when historically rooted is decisive for controlling events related to illicit and licit activities including the life of individuals who are at risk of undertaking violent paths including radicalisation-led terrorist activities. Defacto governance power exerted by criminal organisations is crucial for not allowing democratic mechanisms having their natural course and expected impact. As a consequence, strengthening counter-radicalisation efforts is instrumental for fighting against organized crime and to the wider scope of furthering security. Societies present weaknesses that are beneficial for powerful and undemocratic actors’ goals pursuance. Addressing rooted and outstanding illegal forces is in some cases a necessary step for pursuing counter-radicalisation actions and democratic policies. The speaker added a reference about home terrorism in Italy mentioning few cases of jihadist cells dismantled in the south of the country in recent years. These were discovered to be very active for logistical support provision to facilitate Jihadists movements throughout Europe as well as for jihadist propaganda production. According to investigations, in order to perpetrate these activities connivance with local Italian organized crime was essential for inter alia forged/counterfeited travel documents provision.

The presenter then stressed that sensitive places for recruiting potential violent radicals are the prisons. Although phenomena are different as well as methods are, criminal organizations and jihadism proliferation have such common characteristic of exploiting the chances offered by the place where individuals are kept under secure control. Prisons are – by definition – confined spaces in which access and movement are tightly restricted. Yet, as the growing body of literature on Islam in European prisons suggests, prisons are also a highly conducive environment for radicalisation and recruitment. Prisons are environments in which individuals are confronted with existential questions in particularly intensive ways. Prisons across Europe have seen the formation of radical Islamic groups, which adhere to the rhetoric and strict behavioural codes of the Islamist militant movement. Arguably, these groups are successful because they manage to exploit the unsettling conditions imposed by the prison environment. Joining an Islamic group satisfies individuals’ urgent need for a social network in a situation in which – at least initially - they are completely on their own: it allows them to avoid isolation, and it prevents them from being picked on by other groups. Moreover, and more importantly perhaps, the Islamic identity of these groups provides members with a unique sense of strength and superiority. Prison-based rehabilitation programmes are, therefore, considered by the researcher as key to reduce terrorism and must be cleared by the risk of becoming incubator for violence.

Focusing on the EU context, the speaker highlighted that during last forty years, Europe has undergone significant demographic changes which have generated rapid changes in culture in certain countries. They struggle with integration problems, Muslim communities are considerable part of these minorities affected by radicalisation and violent extremism leading to terrorism. Muslim migrants present heterogeneous characteristics across EU countries implying the existence of diverse radicalization-related risks. It was stressed that, in the pursuance of EU shared counter radicalisation goals need keep envisaging as fundamental principles the effective implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the international
Homegrown Terrorism: Causes and Dimensions

legal standards encompassing the field of migration and the international refugee law. These references are supportive to address threats posed by violent interpretation of religious tenets facilitating modern jihadi conflictual objectives. Having Europe attracted huge numbers of Muslims immigrants in recent history, these are often part of societies where gaps among communities are widening and create profound questions about identity. These individuals are naturally in search for belonging or a cause. Some accept an ideology of violence. Joining the jihad is more of a bottom-up than a top-down activity, with individuals actively seeking out opportunities to be recruited. Importantly, it should not be underestimated that the path of radicalization is attractive also for well educated young people. Although integration is often expressed as the fundamental problematic, it is in fact globalization’s key features causing integration problems in the EU. Classical understandings of integration foresee migrants’ adoption of the host country’s language, values and political framework. Thus, when Muslim migrants, for example, advocate the ‘implementation of the Sharia’ they are seen as advocates of an alien political framework or ideology, one that is foreign in its very origins to the host country. Therefore, addressing the problem of integration involves a reframing of the paradigm because communication technologies (satellite broadcasts and the Internet) make maintaining multiple languages and cultures inevitable.

The researcher summed up claiming that the cultural power of the distorted and insane messages grounding on violent extremism and radicalization represents a strategic modus operandi for the proliferation of terrorism. The development of policies/actions tailored for countering the misleading drift of religious tenets towards terrorism has to rely on an updated debate and open discussion among practitioners, academicians, policy-makers and law-enforcement actors. The proliferation of violent extremism overcoming inter-religious peaceful relations is profiting of the vulnerability to the insane misinterpretation of Muslim belief characterizing huge portions of young Muslim populations residing in the EU area. Some key reasons endorsing this phenomenon are rooted in identity/lack of values that youth Muslim EU community experience. Such vacuum is exploited by transnational terrorist organizations for expanding international level outreach in an effort to exacerbate modern asymmetric conflicts. Finding concrete objectives of life can easily lead to the attractive identification in vengeful motivations and terrorist purposes. The proliferation of Homegrown terrorism which rejects democratic values requires accurate preparedness at several strategic levels for neutralizing key radicalization sources and stimulus (i.e. activist leaders) while ensuring the best social ground for countering recruitment possibilities and facilitating EU social cohesion.

A Major of the Italian Carabinieri illustrated the issues concerning ‘Homegrown Terrorism in Italy’. The presentation unfolded through a set of key assumptions:

- Homegrown Terrorism phenomenology experienced a paradigm shift in the radicalization process since it is no longer confined to training camps in Afghanistan or other impervious locations far from our lands, but it is developing at domestic level;
- Domestic radicalization and Homegrown terrorism are ideologically inspired by a violent interpretation of Islam;
- The Internet is massively being used to enlist followers, increase support and possibly prepare terrorist attacks;
- Jihadi-salafi ideological inspiration, along with well established military strategies and tactics, are being employed as main drivers that motivate young men and women, born or living in the West, to carry out ‘autonomous/autochthonous’ jihad via acts of terrorism against host countries;

- A generational change in the violent extremism stream took place: from wide networked structures committed to supporting large jihadi campaign (Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan) towards close cliques or clusters or even Homegrown ‘lone-wolf-type’ of attackers who performed limited but effective violent actions.

The Italian Carabinieri’s representative continued his presentation by describing Homegrown terrorism as terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within a country or abroad by citizens of that country (both original - the so called converts - and the so called 2nd and 3rd generations of migrants), legal permanent residents (those raised in a country, although originally coming from another, absorbing the local culture, values and social perception: these individuals can be labelled a “sociological citizen”), or visitors radicalized largely within the country.

The speaker provided an historical overview of Jihadist networks active in Italy since the late 1980s. The northern city of Milan has always been the undisputed hub of jihadist activity in Italy. The city’s Islamic Cultural Institute (ICI), a former garage turned mosque, was controlled by members of Egyptian Jama’a al-Islamiyya after its foundation in 1988. Not only was the ICI’s imam, Anwar Shabaan, the commander of foreign mujahidin in Bosnia, but the network in Milan was logistically strategic for the supply of documents, money and other forms of support to volunteers worldwide seeking to reach Balkans battlefield. Throughout the 1990s, the ICI remained, according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, “the main al Qaeda station house in Europe.” Radical preachers of global stature regularly visited the ICI. Forged documents, funds and recruits from Milan went to support jihadist groups in Algeria and Afghanistan. Particularly noteworthy was the contribution of Milanese jihadists in Iraq, where several individuals recruited within the ICI scene who carried out suicide operations. Their demographics mirrored migration patterns, as the vast majority of individuals were first generation immigrants from Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Many of them were in the country illegally living in socio-economic disenfranchisement conditions. At the beginning of the 2000s, a generational shift was being developed among militants in Italy. Several aggressive security investigations led to the dismantling of dozens of cells and the voluntary departure from Italy of many hardened jihadists. These actions caused a significant decrease in jihadist activity in the country. With regard to the generational shift, in July 2002, authorities arrested Domenico Quaranta, who had converted to Islam in prison, for detonating four explosive devices in the vicinity of various targets in the Sicilian city of Agrigento and in a Milan metro station in the span of seven months. Quaranta left at the scene messages threatening to continue his actions until “you will submit to worshipping the one God.” Two similar incidents took place in Modena (2003) and Brescia (2004). In both cases explosive materials was placed in a car to attack a synagogue (a Palestinian, Muhannad al-Khatib, was the author) and a McDonalds (a Moroccan, Moustafa Chaouki, was responsible). Both men died in the ensuing blast and no other injuries occured. These three episodes were characterized by the rudimentary nature of the explosive devices and no perpetrators’ affiliation with any known
militant circle. The psychological conditions of mental instability and deep depression of the perpetrators cannot be ignored and are possibly the main reasons for their actions. Some years later, in October 2009, a Libyan National and long-time Milan resident Mohammed Game attempted to enter a military base in Lombardy. When confronted by a guard, he detonated an explosive device, severely injuring himself and lightly wounding the guard. Investigation led to two Milan-based North African men (an Egyptian and another Libyan) who had helped Game with his plot. A large quantity of explosive materials and ad-hoc devices was seized in an apartment at his disposal. Game, who had recently begun attending the ICI, operated mostly independently and his radicalization process had occurred largely online (788 files of jihadi content with 185 files on Abu Musaab al-Suri were recovered). However, Italian authorities considered the attack on the barracks in Lombardy a watershed event. The 2009 annual report sent by Italian intelligence to parliament clearly stated that “in the proximity of structured groupings active in logistics and propaganda can operate isolated individuals or micro-clusters ready to act in complete independence.” It also raised concerns about the arrival of the phenomenon of internet-driven Homegrown radicalization in Italy—in this case, mirroring a dynamic seen in Europe years before. By the second half of the 2000s, Italian authorities had begun monitoring an online-based network of jihadist sympathizers. The cluster was led by a handful of Italian converts based in various Italian cities and in London. In 2012 authorities charged some of the network’s most active members under article 270 quinquies of the penal code. The article criminalizes the provision of terrorist training and has been used with increasing frequency to prosecute cases involving operational materials online exchange. Online texts ranging from jihadist philosophy to manuals on weapons and explosives were translated into Italian and disseminated. The investigation led authorities to Mohamed Jarmoune, a young Moroccan-born man living in the province of Brescia. Jarmoune spent up to 15 hours a day online, disseminating jihadist materials and connecting with like-minded individuals around the world. Together with the London-based wife of a known Algerian militant, he administered a private Facebook group and openly discussed his jihadist sympathies. In an essay, Jarmoune summarized his life as follows:

“I am 20, I have lived in Italy since I was 6 and I started following Islam when I was 16 and initially found only books and files in Italian, written by modern, phony and moderate Muslims...I read them in depth and later I found the truth thanks to God and so I began translating books and files for Italian Muslims but later these Italian brothers abandoned me and I don’t know why. Maybe they are afraid...and so I stopped speaking to Italian Muslims...and I began helping Muslims and the nation all over the world. And later I worked with important jhd [jihad] as video producer and other important projects. Now I am the moderator of the jhd forum of God, a great challenge for me and I am very happy about this.”

After months of monitoring, authorities arrested Jarmoune after he conducted online surveillance of Jewish targets in Milan. In May 2013, Jarmoune was sentenced to five years and four months in prison for disseminating terrorist propaganda. Another young Moroccan descent case regards Anas El Abboubi who lived with his well-integrated family near Brescia. He deserved attention of Italian authorities since he idolized Jarmoune, and had allegedly embraced jihadist ideology online. Without ever leaving Italy, El Abboubi had managed to build
contacts with the leaders of various extremist groups, from Germany-based Millatu Ibrahim to Sharia4Belgium. El Abboubi had apparently taken it upon himself to establish the Italian branch of the franchise, starting the blog Sharia4Italy and involving a handful of local friends. Authorities decided to arrest El Abboubi after becoming concerned by the increased militancy of his online activities and by the fact that he had allegedly used the internet to research various iconic sites in Brescia. He was later released, as the court did not deem his behaviour a violation of article 270 quinquies. There are indications that, upon release, El Abboubi fled to Syria, where he reportedly remains. A further case the speakers reported concerned the Italian online jihadist scene which gained the spotlight in 2013. Born in Genoa in 1989, Giuliano Delnevo converted to Islam in 2008. He had been active in the local Islamic scene, but as his views radicalized he could not find like-minded individuals in Genoa. He sought them online and in European countries with a more developed Salafi-jihadi scene. By 2011, Delnevo was actively seeking to join jihadist groups and in December 2012 he managed to enter Syria. He reportedly died in June 2013 in Syria while fighting alongside a Chechen-led brigade of foreign fighters.

The presenter then focused on behavioural patterns. He argued that roots of radicalisation should be sought in an individual’s psychological profile and search for a personal identity in accordance to the analysis of the few cases of Italian home-grown jihadists. Neither Jarmoune nor El Abboubi can be considered to be poorly integrated from a socio-economic perspective. Both lived with their families in more than decent dwellings in small towns in the province of Brescia. Jarmoune worked for a company that installed electrical systems and had a permanent contract, a luxury lacked by many of his Italian peers. El Abboubi studied at a local school. The families of both individuals are described by most as well integrated. This argument can be applied to Delnevo’s case with an even greater significance. Born in a middle-class Italian Catholic family, Delnevo had none of the integration problems attributed by some to European Muslims who become radicalised. It is obvious that in the Delnevo’s case – but no differently from Jarmoune and El Abboubi – the roots of his radicalization are in his personal traits and his unwillingness, rather than his inability, to fit into Italian society. All three young men struggled to find an identity and flirted with various alternative ideologies before embracing jihadism. But this trajectory seems to be clearly dictated by an intellectual development determined by personal choices and not by any kind of socio-economic disenfranchisement. Since an early age, Delnevo was fascinated with fascism and some of his closest friends upon converting were former right-wing activists who had converted. Jarmoune collected Nazi memorabilia. El Abboubi was a rapper in his teens under the pseudonym McKhalif. Under that name he operated a YouTube channel that, after radicalizing, he used to post religious lectures instead of rap videos characterized by an uncompromising interpretation of Islam and attitudes of intolerance towards Western customs'.
Trying to identify some operational features that are common to this new scenario, the Italian speakers pointed out that: a) ‘new jihadist’ are disconnected from Italian mosques, either because they consider them not to be in tune with their interpretation of Islam or because they fear surveillance by the authorities; b) no connection with the ‘traditional’ jihadists and their mosques since the linguistic barrier (older militants are largely North Africans whose native language is Arabic not fluent in Italian) and, importantly, diffidence the traditional structures feel about latest home-grown generation. The latter seems due to secretive and risk-averse traditional structures which are unreceptive to the newcomers (home-grown activists may be considered spies). Italian home-grown activists have created their own operational space, which is mostly Internet-based. It is, in fact, on various blogs, Facebook and other online social media that this tiny community comes together. A handful of individuals are the key connectors, being very active online and beyond. Unlike most of the militants of the older generation, who were only online propaganda passive consumers, this new generation of home-grown activists are also often active producers of their own jihadist material, as the El Abboudi’s case has shown with the attempt to franchise the Sharia4 brand in Italy, an official recognition by formal outfits is a worrying signal.

According to the representative of Carabinieri, counter-measures against Homegrown terrorism imply a bi-dimensional challenge: the first regards organizations and it means how to effectively face the threat through personnel, resources and structures; the second applies on a cultural level and it means adapting the investigative approach to the operational problem. The latter imposes developing and educating the tradecraft while facing a generational shift and evolution of the threat requiring risk assessment updated capacities. Speaking about specific measures the speaker listed few (not claiming their exhaustiveness) suggestions:

- emphasizing Human Intelligence HUMINT to gather and process information and developing actionable intelligence;
- executing interviews of detainees to: a) obtain statements that are useful for related judicial case, b) to expand operational environment picture regarding the prison system for prevention purposes;
- employing technical surveillance: phone eaves dropping, ground or air surveillance to glean evidence of terrorists’ activities. With regard to phone assets, data other than conversations are also considered essential instruments (e.g. metadata as geo-location);
- Internet and social networking digital monitoring;
- Implementing of site exploitation. Once the scene of the investigation has been fixed biometrics, DOMEX (documents and media exploitation), CELLEX (mobile phone exploitation via device ripping), computer forensics, are all essential actions for countering Homegrown terrorism.
- employing analysts, using tools and setting procedures to execute all-source fusion of data, information, clues and evidence that have been gathered through several disciplines (HUMINT, interviews, biometrics, forensics).
- finally, establishing liaisons and partnerships with other anti-terrorism units:
The representative from Italian Carabinieri concluded by highlighting that ‘traditional networks’ still constitute a threat in Italy. By speaking, lone operators and small clusters of ‘sociologically Italians’ who radicalize on their own, operate independently from mosques and traditional groups, and are prolific online and active in Italy. They still represent a smaller threat compared with other EU countries. Authorities have so far successfully contained this developing threat. Nevertheless, he clarified that past recent cases indicate a larger phenomenon is underground whereas jihadist ideology to an often online activity aimed at publishing and disseminating material that ranges from the purely theological to the operational is being disseminated. A common thread is the initial self-radicalization towards violent jihad via the Internet. Yet, as the cases of Jarmoune, El Abboubi and Delnevo show, some members of this country-wide informal scene occasionally make – or attempt to make – the leap from the keyboard to the real world, trying to reach structured violent networks abroad.

A senior fellow at the Berlin-based German Institute for International and Security Affairs ‘Stiftung Wissenschaftr und Politik SWP’ provided an analytical overview regarding ‘Civil War in Syria and Homegrown Terrorism in Germany’.

The presenter opened the presentation arguing that Homegrown terrorism threat in Germany has connections with its Turk minority and Turkey’s issues with particular regard to the drawing factor of the war in Syria. Currently, increasing concerns are related to emergence of German Jihadist indigenous structures which combined with returnees are posing significant threats to German society. As of 31 March 2014, around 320 fighters joined Syria from Germany. Some were jailed; others either are in Turkish territory or died in Syria.

The case of Mohamed Atta (one of the 9/11 attackers) was mentioned to clarify that, although he was living in Hamburg is not considered by the speaker as a case of Homegrown terrorism as his indoctrination did not take place in Germany. Only from 2006, also thanks to US intelligence advice, a distinct autochthonous jihad-inspired terrorism trend of movement was noted to be sociologically growing in Germany. This was certainly facilitated by conflicts attracting jihadist fighters from Europe including Turk minority from Germany. The epicentre was the Turk minority intensely-populated province of Saarland in Westphalia.

Courts proceedings revealed that many who wanted but to reach the battlegrounds in Chechnya and Waziristan faced difficulties due to linguistic and (partly) logistic barriers. The intention of being engaged into jihadist military groups was overcome by joining a group formerly a cell of the IMU in Uzbekistan - where Turkic common languages facilitated interaction. This marked a significant point for German jihadism growth which during following years managed to establish elements in Pakistan. Latter also founded the German Taliban Mujahidin in FATA areas which existed for few months but demonstrated the existence of an exclusively German jihadist movement. There was a dynamic of increasing number of German citizens in Pakistan in the years from 2006 to 2011. This contributed to what the speaker referred as ‘Europlot’: a series of attacks Al-Qaeda planned through returnees in EU countries. Many perpetrators were arrested before executing these but others, as in the case of the...
French citizen Mohammed Merah in 2012, were able to carry out an attack. As a matter of fact, the presenter stressed that a German movement managed to sediment into Al-Qaeda in those years. Two German elements (with background of re-settlers from former Soviet Union countries) were arrested and evidence was gathered of such European terroristic strategy. German citizens were a primary basin for jihadist recruitment up to 2010-2011, but recent trends showed that, according to population dimensions, Belgium (in particular the region of Flanders) became key country for recruiting.

With regard to the German jihadist trends, the speaker stressed that since 2009 north of Germany witnessed an internationalization process of terrorist cells affiliates. A huge variety of national backgrounds were united by ideologies and revenge feeling against western military interventions. However, after 2011 there was a decrease of German members of Al-Qaeda as this stopped recruiting from EU countries maybe because of Bin Laden death. The war in Syria revitalized jihadism in Europe.

In Germany a group emerged: Millat Ibrahim whose founder is considered to be the father of German language-internet jihadism. He facilitated the recruitment of Homegrown terrorists to be directed to Syria.

Looking back to past decades phenomena before the eruption of Syrian civil war, the representative of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs stressed that the conflict in Chechnya was a very important driver for jihadists living in Germany. The components of the so-called Hamburg cell of Al Qaeda (who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks) were trained in Afghanistan in order to join the jihad in Chechnya as they were prevented being recruited when they tried to do so by going directly to the Northern Caucasus. Until mid 2000s Chechnya was a goal for German jihadist groups because of the influence of Turk immigrants for whom Chechnya had a strong meaning. From 2006 Afghanistan (and partly Somalia) become hotspots. This is proportionally to the escalation extent of these conflicts. However, focusing on the Syrian events, the presenter explained that the easiness to be recruited to fight against Assad’s regime if key to explain the massive flows of fighters from Germany. The speaker mentioned that on Turkish soil facilitation mechanisms for jihadists willing to go to Syria persist and referred also to a German detainee in a Turkish jail is able to communicate externally for propaganda and logistical purposes. Many of the recruits join Chechen groups active in Syrian war (at least four groups were identified) as evidence gathered through returnees once back to Germany revealed. However, most of the volunteers prefer joining the ISIS as this does not collaborate with non Muslims and are committed in implementing the Sharia. In other words, the presenter stressed this is the most militant jihadist organization active in Syria.

The presenter warned that besides numbers, the transnational capacity of German jihadist movements is impressive. Once in Germany, returnees not only will face public authorities’ prosecution but also growing popular extremist right-wing parties’ rise. The speaker added that German authorities are concerned about Turkish authorities’ underestimation of the issue about movement and recruitment of jihadists to/from Syria along its borders. Chechen jihadists are a major threat for German security services as there is lack of capability to interpret North Caucasus languages, the speaker concluded.
A researcher from the Madrid-based Elcano Royal Institute gave a presentation of an empirical study concerning "Jihadist terrorism in Spain: a foreign phenomenon with Homegrown radicalization." From 1996 to 2012 a total of 77 individuals were convicted. In addition, suicide bombers in Leganés on 3rd April 2004 were considered. This brings the total of 84 jihadists who were convicted or died in Spain in the period under study. Key data source are proceedings initiated at Spain’s Audiencia Nacional and interviews with experts in international terrorism both from the Policía Nacional and the Guardia Civil, as well as the Centro Nacional de Coordinación antiterrorista.

The presenter provided figures highlighting that 100% of cases regarded men whose age ranged (at the time of arrest or self-immolation) from 22 to 64, the age cohort most frequent was between 25 and 29 (34.5 of the individuals) - just over a half of them (53.5%) were aged between 25 and 34. 74.9% were aged between 25 and 39. The mean age of all the individuals under study, is 32.5 year-old. Jihadists come from a group that primarily comprises a first generation of immigrants. 67.7% of the individuals under research were married at the time of arrest or suicide. Moreover, the majority of these had children. Eight out of ten individuals (83.4%) were foreigners out of which 75% were living legally in the country. 20% were Spanish, mostly naturalised citizens. The percentage of foreigners among the individuals under study has increased over time. Only the 16.5% of the individual studied had Spanish nationality. This figure provides a marked contrast to the UK, where the same type of individuals with British nationality between 1999 and 2009 reached 77.5%. However, the Muslim populations in both countries must be taken into account to understand this contrast. In the Spanish case, individuals of Algerian and Moroccan nationalities are those who record the highest percentages of the total, 29.8% and 27.4% respectively. Only 4.8% of the individuals studied were born in Spain. This figure enables a better understanding of the limited percentage of individuals with Spanish nationality. The expert compared these data with the one of the UK where, contrarily, almost eight out of ten had British nationality, although only were native. In Spain, the individuals under study are mainly from Morocco (29.8%) and Algeria (28.5%) as well as Pakistan (19.0%) and Syria (14.3%).

Among those convicted for jihadist terrorism activities or who have committed suicide in bombing attacks in Spain, seven out of ten had only been educated to secondary school level, but a half of individuals had only completed primary education. Two out of ten lacked of formal education. However, to complete the diversity of education levels among the individuals under study, we must say that 24.1% had university studies. One out of four convicted or dead terrorists’ occupation was unknown. This category usually corresponds to individuals who devote most of their time to jihadist activities and obtain economic resources from fellow religious believers, common crime or sporadic work. Noteworthy are the percentages of entrepreneurs or self-employed workers, which combine to reach 27.1%. 22.2% of the total had a previous criminal record for non-terrorism related crimes. This suggests not only the existence of links of one kind or another between common crime and jihadist terrorism, but

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2 The speaker specified that those born in Morocco come mainly from the Tangier peninsula; those born in Algeria, mainly from the provinces situated on the north-western shore; those born in Pakistan, mainly from the province of Punjab; those born in Syria, mainly from the districts of Aleppo and Damascus.
also that prison facilities are an environment conducive to radicalisation.

The researcher from Istituto Elcano followed by focusing the theme of the presentation on three main questions:

1) When do individual processes of jihadist radicalisation tend to develop among Muslims living in Spain?

2) Where is their exposure to and possible adoption of jihadist Salafism most common?

3) How does the process in which these individuals embrace the attitudes and beliefs inherent to this particular ideology of violence work?

1) 51.5% of the individuals under consideration began their process of radicalization between 16 and 25 years old. The proportion rises up to 84.8% if the age bracket is extended from 16 to 30. In fact, the demographic group whose percentage is highest (33.3%) corresponds to those between 26 and 30. The age at which the process of jihadist radicalisation begins dropped significantly over time. Therefore, jihadist radicalization begins during youth when individuals are considered to be undergoing a stage prior to adult maturity during which they are relatively more vulnerable to the influence of others. This coincides with the occurrence or aftermath of some event meaningful for the Islamic world in general and for propagators of Salafist jihadist ideology in particular. A total of 6% of the people convicted of or died in acts of jihadist terrorism in Spain between 1996 and 2012 began their process of radicalization in the 1980s, coinciding with the war in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion (1979-92) and the call to a defensive jihad in that country, and, also, with the repression of members and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood by the regime of Hafez el Assad in Syria (starting in 1982). Another 51.5% of those included in the study began their radicalization process in the 1990s, coinciding with the civil war in Algeria (starting in 1991), the war in Bosnia (1992-95) and the first war in Chechnya (1994-96). The speaker noted that it was the decade during al-Qaeda consolidated as the founding nucleus of today’s global terrorism. The remaining 42.5% began their radicalization between 2000 and 2004. That five-year period was mainly marked by the September 11, the subsequent military invasion of Afghanistan and also the invasion and occupation of Iraq. These events were crucial for the radicalization of some individuals involved in the 11th March 2004 attacks in Madrid.

2) The process of jihadist radicalization took place totally or partially on Spanish soil for 71.6% of the individuals. In nearly half of the cases – 46.9% – the process took place entirely in Spain. Over the course of the period under study jihadist radicalization in Spain was a Homegrown phenomenon. The distribution of those individuals who were radicalized totally or partially in Spain is not homogeneous. Nearly half of them (46.4%) underwent radicalization in jihadist Salafism in Madrid, while other parts of Spain that are also to a large extent home to the diaspora of their native countries registered a significant proportion, including Catalonia (17.8%) and Valencia (13.4%). Two other regions (Andalusia and Castilla León) and one autonomous city, Ceuta, on the coast of North Africa have smaller but significant percentages. Within their regional and provincial context, the cities that stand out as local staging grounds for jihadist radicalization include some of the main metropolitan areas of Spain (Madrid, Barcelona and Valencia). This distribution is due to the fact that in these areas many immigrants live from
countries where majority of the population is Muslim. Based on the empirical evidence available in the Spanish case, private homes were the site of radicalization for 73% of the individuals featured in the study while places of worship served that purpose for 46.1% of the individuals. Both places were the most common areas for the launch and development of processes of radicalization for jihadists active in Spain from the 1990s practically up today. Commercial outlets were also used in 34.6% of cases. Outdoor areas were used in 32.7% of cases and the workplace accounted for another 19.2%. Prisons were the site of radicalization for at least 17.3% of the people covered in the study. In the evolution of the phenomenon, prisons took on a special high profile role as fertile ground for this sort of indoctrination in Spain. It is important to note that these different venues for jihadist radicalization are compatible and generally complementary, but not mutually exclusive.

3) Among the people considered in the study, none became radical autonomously. In all cases, the process was carried out in the company of others and by someone who acted as agent of radicalization. A total of 60% became radical totally or partially while living in Spain. The most important and popular of them was Imad Barakat Yarkas, a Syrian established in Spain in the 1980’s who was the leader of Al Qaeda’s cell dismantled in Madrid in 2001. In 17.2% of the cases, the agent of radicalization was someone recognized as a religious leader. Agent of radicalization was someone considered a friend, prior to the start of the process of radicalization. Less prominent but still significant roles were relatives and workmates. Both were the main agent in 5.7% of the cases. Altogether, friends, relatives and workplace colleagues – the components of a person’s social network – would account for 22.8% if we redefined them as a single category among the agents of radicalization. Coherent with this data, in Spain around 70% of the cases showed that predominant method of recruitment inside the country has been top-down, while in 11.4% of the cases the approach was bottom-up. For the remaining 18.2% the recruitment was horizontal. A common series of tools were used repeatedly to spread violent Salafist ideology similar to those employed in other EU countries. They include printed material: books, brochures and internal publications of terrorist organisations, or communiqués (82%). Audio tapes heard by 75.5%. The Internet was used in 62.2% of the cases. Videos, DVDs and other audiovisual media were employed in 57.8% of the cases. Furthermore, correspondence between imprisoned radicalized individuals who wrote to communicate with their released leader or with other recruited people in prisons elsewhere in Spain were used in almost 9% of the cases. Over time there are changes in the frequency of usage of the different tools of radicalization. Amid these variations, only audio recording remained steady. This trend could be attributed to the rise in use of the Internet as a tool of radicalization.

Cases vary greatly from one to another. But our evidence points out that complete the individual’s jihadist radicalization process takes an average of four to five years. Moreover, the speaker stressed that in 2012 (final year included in the presented study) stands out as a turning point. In fact, the result of the last police counter-terrorist operations against jihadist terrorism in Spain point out to some significant modifications related to the very essence of the phenomenon itself. Detainees since 2013 are still men of a similar age as the convicted or
suicide during the period we have already studied (1996-2012), however, there is now a more than significant proportion of Spanish-born citizens among them, mostly native from Ceuta and Melilla or residents in these autonomous cities. That means that a substantial Homegrown component of Jihadist terrorism has recently appeared in Spain. This is the reason why Spain, the speaker concluded, needs to approve and implement a public strategy against violent radicalisation urgently.

A representative from the Spanish Ministry of Interior gave an overview about the evolution of terrorism affecting Spain since the ‘60s. The developments of the armed Basque nationalist and separatist organization ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) were illustrated. This was founded in 1959 and has since evolved from a group promoting traditional Basque culture to a paramilitary group with the goal of gaining independence for the Greater Basque Country which includes also 3 French provinces.

Since 1968, the presenter explained, ETA has been held responsible for killing 829 people, injuring thousands and undertaking dozens of kidnappings. On 20 October 2011, the group announced a cessation of armed activity via video clip displayed by media. Historical trends show that the intensity of the terrorist action heightened during the periods the Spanish governments was committed in political reforms. From 1978 to 1980, when the constitution and the regional charter were approved, the first Basque regional elections were held and the Basque country local government took office the ETA killed 247 people. ETA’s targets have expanded from the former military/police-related personnel and their families, to a wider array. Until 1975, marking the death of former Spanish authoritarian regime president Francisco Franco the ETA killed 44 people. From 1976 until the adoption of a democratic constitution in 1978, the murder rate rose to 96. Throughout its history the ETA committed 858 murders only 5.5% of which happened during Franco’s era. The various branches of the group have committed nearly 3,000 attacks that besides the casualties have left a balance of over 2,000 people injured.

Currently the ETA seems to maintain the position of not executing terrorist attacks but it is engaged in political activism and pressure over the population which require Police continued counter terrorist work. The 11th March 2004 Madrid-bombing which caused the death of 191 people and injured over 1,400 others was erroneously initially attributed by Spanish authorities to the ETA.

The representative from the Spanish Ministry of Interior then provided some statistics regarding jihadists arrested in Spain:

- Between June and September 2013: 9 arrests too place in Ceuta in relation to recruiting fighters to join the war in Syria;
- In January 2014: at Malaga airport first returnee, coming from Istanbul, was arrested;
- In March 2014: 3 persons were arrested in Melilla, 1 in Malaga and 3 in Morocco as they fought in Syria;
- In April 2014: in Almeria a returnee from Syria was arrested based on France authorities’ information;
- In May 2014: 6 people were arrested in Melilla for facilitating foreign fighters returned from Mali.

The speaker added that Spain is both target and logistical hub for terrorism and concluded that in the EU, Maghreb and the Mediterranean region terrorist activities are linked with organized crime activities (e.g. smuggling of people, counterfeiting of passport, drug trafficking).

Director of the Centre of Terrorism and Counterterrorism at Leiden University addressed the issue of "Foreign fighters" a major terrorism-related threat currently in the Netherlands. The presentation was started by enlisting key question to be answered regarding such foreign fighters matter: ‘who are they, why do they go, what are they doing over there, do they pose a threat when returning and, how to deal with this phenomenon?’

The speaker gave a rough estimation of 100-150 Dutch Muslims who seemed to have travelled to Syria in 2013 with the intention of taking part in jihadist activities. About 30 battle-hardened jihadists have since returned to the Netherlands, posing a significant threat to national security. The threat is not only physical but it constitutes a wider issue for society and inter-group relations. Among key motivation for joining the Syrian battle-ground is the strong appeal this jihadist cause exercise toward youth. This is shaped around emotional factors and targeted campaigning which is leverage for attracting recruits. This in most of the cases does not imply a defined process of radicalization but the decision to act can be immediate therefore not requiring forms of deep indoctrination.

The first nucleus of Homegrown Salafi radical elements, (dating back from the 2003-2005 period) were young people who previously were engaged in political activism before embracing violence. In 2012, Development showed worsening trends and indicators pointed to the emergence of more clearly defined jihadi-inspired violent movements. The speaker stressed that battle-grounds as Syria are surely drivers for latter trend. These include few cases of converts as well as Moroccan descent (most of the cases, whose highest Muslim minority in the Netherlands although some have Bosnian, Somali and Turkish background). Many of the Dutch jihadists are second-generation immigrants who were born in the Netherlands and are concentrated in the cities of Delft, Rotterdam, Zeist and The Hague. The vast majority of Dutch jihadists in Syria have joined one of two rebel groups, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant or Jabhat al-Nusra. At least ten individuals from the Netherlands were killed in 2013, including two Dutch jihadists who blew themselves up in suicide attacks (one in Syria and one in Iraq).

The speaker from Leiden University passed onto categorizing ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors leading to jihad-inspired violence. The former include: responsibility to protect, doing something good for Syrians, motivation of religious beliefs, will to fight for the cause of Islam, adventure. The latter are related to personal problems. Identity-related rather than socio-economic matters play a significant role in pushing Dutch individuals to become fighters for the Jihadist cause in Syria. However, the presenter stressed that radical trends, as history demonstrates, can drive for positive changes of the societies. Therefore they not only deserve respect but, especially, State authorities have to ensure the capability to listen people who are seen as radicals compared to mainstream ideas of society. He added that in some cases returnees claimed
having travelled so Syrian for providing humanitarian assistance. He added Post Traumatic status of returnees’ calls for welfare policies to deal with disorder of individuals who may be prone to use violence. In this view, the AIVD (Dutch secret and intelligence service) growing concerns seem justified although the risk of terrorist attacks is still a theoretical one. The fact that the agenda of ISIL goes beyond the war in Syria is a concern as it raises questions regarding the future trends once this conflict will end. Relevant stakeholders have to pay particular attention with regard to returnees from the Syrian battlefields that have joined this particular group or other jihadist militants.

Moreover, the speaker emphasized the important role that civil society organizations can play. Especially at a local level, civil society is the key to facilitate integration policies to be applied.

Finally, the presenter highlighted that symbolic measures are very important to counter Homegrown terrorism. These have to address the whole society and to consider the key role that families play for preventing youth to join the jihad. He also pointed out that, frequently, (counter) narratives are not based on consistent and solid (foreign) policies, which renders them ineffective. Governments need to develop a wide approach to deal with jihadi fighters and should not shy away from using not only the carrots, but also the stick. It should be made clear to the (wannabe) foreign fighters, the jihadi-salafi groups and the general public that joining the jihad in Syria is totally unacceptable.

A tactical operational specialist from The Hague Police Force working as Liaison Officer between the Police and The Hague municipality gave a presentation titled ‘Tackling recruitment for the Jihad, views from a community policing perspective’.

The presenter emphasized that in the Dutch context Amsterdam, Arnhem and The Hague are keys for violent jihadism in the country. There is no clear profile of Homegrown terrorists characterized by overlapping social network of like-minded. These have influence in public space, around educational institutions, as well as private setting.

Various internet fora are key medium for expanding influence as well. All fighter departing from The Netherlands to join jihad in Syria were all part of jihadist circles these radicalized but Salafi Mosques, which initially in the past, spreading ultra fundamentalist words, do not constitute a problem nowadays. In Syria the Islamic State in Iraq the Levant (ISIS) is the main attractor of Dutch Salafi-jihad Takfiri youth (and a few go to Jabat al Nusra). The representative of The Hague police stressed that, therefore, at first, knowledge of religious motivation (ideology) is necessary for addressing this matter (Salafi-jihad Takfiri).

Sources of inspiration the speaker identified are international leading Jihadist figures (e.g. Bin Laden, Anwar al-Awlaki, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Muhammed al-Baghdadi) as well as figures from local, national and global scene (Abdul-Jabbar Van der Ven, Abou Moussa).

Internet radicalization tools include Dewarereliege.nl (true religion) and Shaamall Ghareeba, on-line libraries, open and closed fora, blogs, YouTube, Facebook, WhatsApp, ask.fm, Skype
used by Dutch youth operating in the Syrian context. The Dutch Jihadi propaganda uses (inter alia), in their perception, the following pinpoints to convince new recruits:

- violated treaties (‘the Western countries’ violated that treaty);
- ‘Your Government’ is waging war against Islam;
- people responsible for public (because they have chosen their government);
- population and their possessions are targets (so-called ghanima) (hence burglary, armed robbery, drug trafficking etc. are licit means in that war);
- Jihadists are mainly focused on ‘occupied’ land and ‘own’ leaders.

This led the presenter to the logical step that jihadists ignore the obvious ‘constraints’ at war within the Islamic legal tradition and call for anarchic violence.

The Dutch specialist explained that the police set up an internal integrated system to early warning in order to convert to operational execution. Both preventive and repressive measures with HUMINT as basis. This will be relying on the proactive contribution of several stakeholders. This envisages collaboration with schools, local government structures and also self-help organizations and residents and families. The police, its representatives highlighted, it is in the process of investing meaningful efforts to engage local level institutions, schools and civil society. This is to be built upon trust to guarantee targeted interventions. In this sense, informal networks are proving to be effective tools to prevent Homegrown terrorism as in the case of key community leading figures. This networking is the key for community policing, showing commitment, professionalism and knowledge about neighbourhood dynamics. Not only know your neighbourhood but understanding local level and applying an empathy-based approach when talking with people is bringing important results.

Prevention is a key task of the local government. This community-level approach is shaped around Network Development (to ensure outreach to relevant figures and organizations); Promoting Expertise (through briefing and training activities); Interventions, projects, advice focusing on countering Jihad Travel to Syria; Re-socialization of returnees from war zones with efforts based on health and psychological assistance.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

• Homegrown terrorism is a phenomenon subject to variable developments since it depends on human and political factors, it is suggested not to set rigid patterns when designing and planning response policy models.

• Responses against Homegrown terrorism should be prioritized preventing terrorism acts and any supportive actions avoiding categorizing and profiling citizens’ practices that may be counter-productive.

• Debate about terminology of the processes leading to terrorism should not undermine, neither reduce, the focus from actions for tackling Homegrown terrorism.

• State authorities have to ensure being capable to listen to people and movements who are considered radicals compared to mainstream ideas of society.

• Rather than counter-narrative, strategic communication-related policies should be based on consistent and open narrative measures to be supportive of a proactive attitude in disengaging youth subject to terrorism and political violence appeal.

• Prevention and reintegration work has to rely on contribution of a variety of stakeholders. Facilitating terrorists return to society is key task and responsibility of policy makers.

• Public-private partnership provides a range of solutions to address Homegrown terrorism through civic engagement. In order to better target youth, co-operation with civil society organisations is seen as best practice. While public authorities need to maintain policy-making decisions leadership, not appearing at the forefront when implementing actions in co-operation with civil society is instrumental for pursuing effective programmes.

• Stakeholders from intelligence services to social workers and local police officers should be included to deal with Homegrown terrorism. In addition, closer cooperation at local, national and international level has to be constantly pursued and updated.

• Strategies including community engagement and community-oriented policing are key to build trust and partnering with local communities. The continued development of information-driven community-based solutions, with the active involvement of family members and a variety of local-level public stakeholders and civil society is a tool helping to achieve concrete results in the fight against Homegrown terrorism in particular in the UK and in the Netherlands. Such programmes need to avoid the risk to split communities.

• Apart from the estimation of recruited terrorists, the development of mechanisms for identifying indicators to measure effectiveness of impact and concrete results has to be considered.

• The internet and the wide range of tools it offers (which are very popular among youth) provide an opportunity to realize communication strategies based on creative and open minded solutions for drawing the attention of youth. In order to strong ideological appeal surrounding conflicts, core emotional factors through credible messaging needs to be targeted.

• The combination of academia and practitioners experts’ efforts is beneficial for improving stakeholders’ capacity and sustaining policy-makers efforts against Homegrown terrorism.

• Human rights should be preserved when pursuing any counter terrorism policy. Flexible legal approaches should guarantee fundamental freedoms respect. The mere membership to any movement cannot be prosecuted if this does not materialize in active support for terrorism including propaganda for violence.

• Political will is required to facilitate convergence of Turkey and EU countries’ interest concerning conflicts affecting the Middle East. This will improve cooperation to assess terrorism threats and eventually achieve effective results in the fight against transnational terrorism.