

**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF
ANKARA**



**PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM
ON
" GLOBAL TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION "**

(ANKARA, MARCH 23-24, 2006)



**The Turkish General Staff Centre of Excellence Defence Against
Terrorism Publications**

**ANKARA
THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF PRINTING HOUSE
2006**

CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM



COE-DAT

**“GLOBAL TERRORISM &
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION”**

ANKARA, 23-24 MARCH 2006

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ISBN :

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
Page Design

Air Major Ergün ERÜN
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GENERAL STAFF PRINTING HOUSE

PUBLICATION NUMBER : 2006/



"Mankind is a single body and each of us is a part of that body. We must never say, 'What does it matter to me if some part of the world is going?' If there is such an illness, we must concern ourselves with it as though we were having that illness."

M. Kemal ATATÜRK



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PREFACE



Mr. President,
President of the Afghanistan Islamic Republic Hamid KARZAI,
and Distinguished Guests,

The international symposium hosted by the Turkish General Staff (TGS) and organized under the auspices of the Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism within its annual programme will be carried out today and tomorrow in your presence.

It is of high importance for us that a symposium named “Global Terrorism and International Cooperation” with such an extensive participation is hosted and organized by Turkey.

Turkey, as a nation ready to share its experience on “Defence Against Terrorism” both inside Turkey and at the international arena with other nations, is determined to continue its attitude towards this issue.

During the symposium, the issue of fight against terrorism will be examined within the framework of international law, different perspectives and inter-cultural approaches and solutions to sustain a

realist and effective international cooperation on this issue will be sought.

Participants of different ranks from 82 countries, among whom there will be high level representatives from NATO, PfP and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, have attended.

22 academicians, statesmen, officers, experts, administrators and speakers from Turkey and 11 other countries are participating to the symposium, which is composed of four sessions. Furthermore, one special paper is to be presented in each session.

Symposium will start with the opening address of the Chief of Turkish General Staff, General Hilmi ÖZKÖK immediately after the short introductory film of COE-DAT.

Subsequently, a special paper by Hamid KARZAI, the President of the Afghanistan Islamic Republic and the honor guest of the symposium, will be presented.

“The Impact of Globalization on Terrorism” will be investigated in the first session, which will last till noon under the chairmanship of Miss Michelle Van CLEAVE and Prof. Dr. Ali DOĞRAMACI. Five papers are to be presented in this session.

The afternoon programme will start with the special paper presented by Lieutenant General Kale EIKENBERRY, the Commander of the Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan. Afterwards under the chairmanship of Ambassador Shunji YANAI and Retired General Edip BAŞER, the second session dealing with “Urban Counter Terrorism” will be conducted.

The second day of the symposium will begin with the special paper presented by General Peter PACE, the Chief of US General Staff. Following, under the chairmanship of Prof. Dr. Rob de WIJK and Prof. Dr. Ersin ONULDURAN, the third session about “Cooperation Opportunities in Counter Terrorism” will be held. Five papers are to be presented in the third session.

Just after the paper presented by Mr. Ercan ÇİTLİOĞLU, the President of Strategic Research Center of Bahçeşehir University, the fourth and the last session will be conducted. In this session, the chairmen of the first, second and third sessions will present the summaries of the evaluations about the sessions they are responsible for.

Under the chairmanship of the chairmen of the third and fourth sessions, there is going to be an “open forum” on “Contemporary Terrorism and Its Impacts”. Following the open forum, rapporteurs will provide and present the results of the symposium.

The symposium will be over by the closing remarks and the presentation of symposium souvenirs and participation certificates by the Chief of Turkish General Staff, General Hilmi ÖZKÖK.

Thank you all.

Bekir KALYONCU
Lieutenant General (TUA)
Chief Operation of TGS

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OPENING REMARKS OF GENERAL HİLMİ ÖZKÖK, CHIEF OF TURKISH GENERAL STAFF



Mr. President,
President of the Afghanistan Islamic Republic
Hamid KARZAI,
and Distinguished Guests,

Welcome to the international symposium hosted by the Turkish General Staff and organized by the Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism within its annual curriculum.

To begin with, I would like to draw your attention to the importance of Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism. Founded and hosted by Turkey, this Center aims to support NATO activities on the development of concepts and doctrines against terrorism. It also aims to provide operative and strategic level training on struggle against terrorism to NATO and other nations. The Center currently conducts its activities with the support and participation of the Bulgaria, Romania, United Kingdom and the United States. We expect that the activities of this Center will be transformed into a concerted effort involving all NATO nations. It is our hope that this Center will also contribute to the development of an atmosphere of cooperation and common understanding among nations on the issue of struggle against terrorism.

Along with the developments in the fields of science, technology, art and philosophy, the humanity experienced two bitter world wars in the 20th century. The second half of this century was marked by the Cold War, an unprecedented power struggle, which is said to have finished today.

Throughout the Cold War, the prevention of hot conflicts by the possibility of a thermo-nuclear doomsday resulted the continuity of the dominance struggle between two blocks through an arms race and a power struggle in the socio-economic field. This also has led to the emergence of limited or low-intensity conflict regions with the aim of establishing dominance over various parts of the world.

After 1960's, this state of affairs in international relations paved the way for various nations to support terrorism as a means of exercising influence. The distinguished guests here undoubtedly have profound insights as to what terrorism is and what should be perceived as terrorism. We also believe this issue will be discussed in detail throughout the symposium. Therefore I will not dwell on the definition of terrorism. Nonetheless, I would like to underline the fact that terrorism is "the gravest social illness of our century and an ideology of conflict stemming from this illness".

Today terrorism exploits ethnic and religion-based conflicts, the ideological differences between the left and the right wing and economic crises. It also makes use of the same pretexts as a means to legitimize its actions. "TERRORISM IS A CALCULATED AND POLITICALLY MOTIVATED KIND OF VIOLENCE". Its aim is to affect the masses with its activities. From a terrorist's perspective, murder is not an end but a means to an end. What is worse, an activity for a terrorist is a nasty message disseminated from the area where it is committed, to a broader region, and from that region to the whole world. It is incumbent upon us to analyze the sources of this

nasty message, to give the required response and to stop the dissemination of the messages given by the terrorists. This is an issue of utmost importance in struggling against terrorism.

It is necessary to give a common response to this nasty message of terrorism by all nations. However, the person hailed as a freedom fighter in one country can be seen as a traitor committing unforgivable crimes in another country. This is, I think, the most important obstacle in eradicating terrorism. There is a common understanding among nations regarding the enormity of the terrorist threat. Nonetheless, the real disagreement concerns the question as to which acts of violence and usage of threat are to be perceived as terrorism. The difference in perceiving a terrorist as a “murderer targeting humanity” and as a “freedom fighter” is nourishing terrorism. Unless a common understanding is achieved on this issue, there can be no common solution to this problem. And the state of uncertainty emanating from a lack of required cooperation will naturally result in a suitable environment for terrorism to mushroom.

In a research conducted on terrorism, it is stated that more than one hundred (109) different definitions of terrorism were made only between the years 1936 and 1981. Since we have difficulty in describing terrorism within a single common definition, we should all together determine the parameters of common understanding in combating terrorism, because common parameters will eventually bring us to a common understanding.

One of these parameters—and from my point of view the most important one—is that “each nation should respect the political, economic, cultural and religious sensitivities in another country especially the border security and territorial integrity of all other countries. Once this respect is displayed, the real cooperation based on mutual trust can be established between nations.” I hope this symposium will contribute to this process.

Distinguished Guests,

Advances in transportation and communication, the improvements in the technology of explosives and WMDs have enabled the regional or international terrorist groups to organize activities beyond their capabilities more easily. Since terrorist groups have more and easier access to technology and raw materials and they can obtain biological and chemical WMDs much more easily today, there is a much higher probability that horrible attacks with devastating results may occur. After the nerve gas attack by an extremist religious group in a metro station in Tokyo in 1995, it is very well understood that similar attacks with a greater magnitude may be conducted.

The tragic 9/11 attacks have portrayed once again the transnational character of terrorism unlimited by the borders of any nation. No nation can ensure keeping terrorism outside of its borders. The improvements that make political borders more and more translucent, do not allow any country to be completely immune to the social, economic and political unrest and disturbances in other parts of the world. Just like environmental problems, terrorism is no longer a problem confined to a specific country or a region and has gained a global dimension.

This threat is now targeting every culture, civilization, society and nation, all the way from New York to Istanbul, from Cairo to Bali, from London to Moscow.

As we express in all occasions where security issues are discussed, we have been following our eternal leader Mustafa Kemal ATATÜRK's motto "Peace at home, peace in the world". In this regard, within the global conditions of today, the principle of "Peace and security is either everywhere or nowhere" should be the common understanding and perception of the struggle against terrorism in the international arena. We are a nation who has suffered from terrorism and a nation with thousands of martyrs because of terrorism. It is this sensitivity that causes us to have empathy with those other nations suffering from terrorism. Furthermore, I think that, this vests responsibility on the nations, which do not want to suffer from terrorism to have empathy with the ones who have suffered from terrorism. Doing this, these nations should also strive for meeting any necessity that this empathy requires.

Distinguished Guests,

A "sine qua non" of the struggle against terrorism is to establish a consummate cooperation mechanism at the global level. This cooperation can only be possible by recognizing and evaluating every kind of terrorist organization as a common target without making any discrimination among them. Putting aside the misguided perception of "your terrorist versus my terrorist", we must admit that there exists a single type of 'terrorist' threatening our lives, our values and the stability all around the world.

Supporting terrorism or maintaining an indifferent attitude towards terrorist activities targeting other countries must no longer be a part of any national interest in order to eradicate the global threat of terrorism whose target is not a single society, culture or civilization but the whole "humanity and civilization". In the new era of communication, the walls and doors are so transparent that no behind-the-doors contact with terrorists can remain secret.

No country should rely on its own border security, self-defense rights or its share in the global economy. Besides that, no nation should think that it could defeat terrorism single-handedly. National defense and reaction capabilities are very important for fighting against terrorism, but not enough. In short, none of the nations or cultures can achieve in fighting against terrorism by ignoring terrorist threats targeting other countries or cultures.

I believe that global organizations like United Nations and the regional institutions like NATO and the EU have important missions and responsibilities with regard to the cooperation on combating terrorism.

Within this framework, it is an indispensable requirement to establish new structures ensuring information and intelligence sharing in the international fora and to ensure a high level contact among those structures.

Today terrorism has almost become a new field of employment. The terrorists have become the employees who join terrorist organizations because of monetary reasons instead of their ideals and have become workers whose wages and social rights are provided by the terrorist organizations. This transformation process leading to the institutionalization of terrorism is risky. Terrorist organizations experience no difficulty in finding new recruits in the areas suffering from high rate of unemployment and profound economic problems. What is more, it is a highly motivating factor for the terrorist to have perceived that he has acquired an identity by this way.

Distinguished Guests,

As long as the agony of the masses that suffer from poverty and desperation lasts and accusation of the prosperous societies by the poor ones continues, it is highly difficult to completely drain the sources of terrorism. Likewise, we cannot prevent the escalation of terrorist activities unless we fully identify whether it is the culture, the beliefs or the geography where the people who suffer from the pains and agonies of the past live that cause terrorism. Within this context, it is necessary to find concrete remedies to solve the gradually deepening structural problems between wealthy and poor countries.

It is also very important to develop common projects that could drain the financial resources of the terrorist groups. Terrorist organizations, as seen in PKK/KONGRA-GEL case, procure their revenues not only through illegal means such as drug and human trafficking, extortion, fraudulence and racketeering but also through legally disguised ways such as commerce and donations via dummy

corporations, unions and foundations. Indeed, these activities are taking place in developed countries with strict control mechanisms, rather than countries with loose and insufficient mechanisms, which prove that a common attitude and determination in struggle against terrorism has not been established yet.

Distinguished Guests,

The struggle against terrorism cannot be carried out solely by the state bodies. Media and all the broad layers of society should be well-informed and involved in this campaign.

In order to achieve success in this struggle, it is a must to avert the radicalization of the masses targeted by the terrorists for propaganda, to prevent the suffering of the innocent people and more importantly, to convince the society of the state's power and good faith.

In this regard, the media has a vitally important task to avoid the panic and horror that the terrorists are trying to create and also to prevent untimely publication of intelligence data.

It is crystal clear that the improvement of these efforts and their effective implementation depend highly on the goodwill and cooperation at the international level. Another imperative for success is to prevent the exploitation of "the struggle against terrorism" as a new means of establishing influence in various parts of the world. In addition to that, neither the "support for terrorism", nor the "struggle against terrorism" should be used as a method of pursuing egoistic foreign policy goals (without taking the side-effects into consideration). One should always bear in mind that if "terror" were used as a foreign policy tool, sooner or later the boomerang effect of it would come into being.

Identifying some cultural codes in the world as more prone to terrorism and making some false diagnosis in that respect will not only make it difficult to understand the real causes of terrorism, but also serve the radicalization of the masses, which have nothing to do with terrorism. I would like to reiterate that terrorism is a universal threat and we need to make genuine analysis on the political and socio-economic reasons that causes terrorism to flourish in any part of the world.

At the point reached so far, the most frightening development should be a clash of civilizations. Such a clash looks unlikely for the time being; nonetheless provocations and accusations that may harm the harmony between civilizations must be avoided. Shouldn't the mankind who managed to split atom, be able to overcome the prejudices of people against each other? Turkey's neighboring region, the Middle East has been going through periods of crises, stemming

from the problems inherited from the previous century. The lingering political, economic and social problems taking place in this region, which was once the cradle of magnificent civilizations, may result in the radicalization of masses. Putting an end to the exploitation of this situation by the terrorists requires the proper identification of these crises and finding the right solutions.

Distinguished Guests,

For the past 35 years, Turkey has become the target of terrorism fueled by ideological, ethnic and religious hatred. Consequently, dozens of our diplomats have been killed by the ASALA terrorists and more than 30 thousand Turkish citizens have been the victims of the bloody terrorist organization of PKK/KONGRA-GEL. Being one of the countries that suffered a lot from terrorism, Turkey quite well understands the pains and the agony felt by the nations targeted by terrorism, and supports all kinds of efforts in the struggle against terrorism today as well as she did in the past. The terror we have been subject to gave us the feeling to sympathize with those suffering from terrorism in any part of the world. This sentiment, which we feel on behalf of the global public opinion, vests us the responsibility to deal with terrorism more effectively and sensitively than any other nation. For the future of mankind and civilization, every single person and statesman in the world should approach terrorism with the same feeling of responsibility. Every single individual and statesman on earth is at an equal distance to the risk of being the target of a terrorist attack. What urges us, the nations of the world, to develop a common understanding and cooperation against terrorism is this equal distance from where we cannot predict the place, time and magnitude of the next terrorist attack. One of the underlying reasons for the spread of this feeling of insecurity is our equal distance to the uncertain nature of the terrorist threat.

I would like to remind you, therefore, that any nation or individual supporting terrorism may harm other nations or individuals and they may think that this will make them stronger. However, history witnesses the creation of Frankenstein monster frequently and terrorism, in that respect, is not an exception to the rule. Nobody shall forget that in the end, the ungrateful monster that is created buries his master. This has always been the case and those who think otherwise are certainly making a fatal mistake.

Distinguished Guests,

After each terrorist attack, if we do not feel the pain that the victims felt, then this means that terrorism has won the victory it seeks for.

However, the ones who support terrorism and those who pose an indifferent attitude towards it, sooner or later would be drown in the blood of the terrorism victims.

The solution is clear in the sense that all of us should display a strong solidarity without making any discrimination among any terrorists and any kind of terror, by feeling as if each bomb exploded anywhere in the world destroyed our own houses and injured our families.

In this regard, it is my hope that this symposium will be a milestone in creating a culture of collectivity and improving mutual cooperation against international terrorism. Maybe in this way we will be able to bring up an answer to the question that Albert EINSTEIN asked “if there is a way to save the humanity from the fate shaped by wars” by putting forward alliances, a culture of collectivity and a genuine cooperation among nations as a solution.

Distinguished Guests,

I would like to express my gratitude to everyone participating in this symposium organized with the purpose of setting up a common rhythm and establishing a common platform in international struggle against terrorism and specifying proper methods of our joint struggle. My special thanks first go to our President and the President of Afghanistan Hamid KARZAI, then to the distinguished participants from NATO, PfP and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, to the academicians, scientists and experts who are to present a paper and to all other distinguished guests.

I want to conclude my words with the statement of our leader ATATÜRK, the founder of modern Turkey who emphasized the importance of international cooperation by saying: “We should consider humanity as a single body and a nation as one of its organs. Pain on the tip of a finger is felt by all other organs.” Therefore, we should see all nations as a part of a single body and then take the necessary precautions.

Thank you.

General Hilmi ÖZKÖK
Chief of Turkish General Staff

FIRST SESSION

IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON TERRORISM

Co-Chair of the Session	Prof. Dr. Michelle Van CLEAVE	USA
Co-Chair of the Session	Prof. Dr. Ali DOĞRAMACI	TURKEY
Rapporteur	Assoc. Prof. Türel YILMAZ	TURKEY



SPEAKERS	
H. E. Pres. Hamid KARZAI	AFGHANISTAN
Prof. Dr. Sertaç BAŞEREN	TURKEY
Dr. Boaz GANOR	ISRAEL
Mr. Michael SMITH	UNITED KINGDOM
Dr. Kimberley THACHUK	USA
Prof. Dr. Ali KARAOSMANOĞLU	TURKEY

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HONORED KEYNOTE SPEAKER “LESSONS LEARNED IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN”, HIS EXCELLENCY, HAMID KARZAI (AFG)¹



¹ Hamid Karzai was born in Kandahar in 1957. Following the Soviet invasion in 1979, Karzai along with his family moved to Pakistan and joined the National Liberation Front for Afghanistan (NLFA), a Mujahiddeen group under the leadership of Prof. Sibghetullah Mujaddidi. After the Soviet withdrawal, Karzai was assigned as the Deputy Foreign Minister by Prof. Mujaddidi who assumed power temporarily as the first President of Afghanistan. He remained in this post till 1994. In 1997, Karzai led the efforts to gather international support for the reconvening of the Loya Jirga, which he considered vital for the salvation of Afghanistan. On the overthrow of the Taliban Regime by the US led forces following the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, Karzai was elected as the Chairman of the Interim Administration under the Bonn Agreement signed in 2001. He has been elected as the President of Afghanistan on 9th October 2004. Beside his native language Pushtu, he speaks English, Dari and Urdu. He is married to Zinat Karzai. They have no children.

Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, General ÖZKÖK, Generals, ladies and gentlemen:

It's a tremendous honour for me to be invited to this distinguished conference today and to be having the honour of addressing this distinguished gathering. I am very grateful to our brothers and sisters in Turkey for being kind to me by bestowing this honour on me. As we all know, Turkey is a very old friend and brother of Afghanistan, and Turkey has taken an active participation in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and in the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan, and in bringing stability and peace to the Afghan people. Turkey has twice led the ISAF force in Afghanistan -which is the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan - for which we, the Afghan people, are immensely grateful.

Ladies and gentlemen:

We live in a changed time where technology has brought immense facilities and wealth to mankind, where technology has brought to all of us speed of movement. It has made us wealthier, it has made us more comfortable; but we also have in today's world still affecting us disease, poverty, crime and - worst of all – terrorism; and as we all know, terrorism is in today's world the most menacing of mankind's enemies. It is a challenge that we all have to address together. It is a challenge that we can not address if we are not together. The case in view is that of Afghanistan, because terrorism is not predicated on morality or on objective: it is predicated upon hatred, harm and enmity with all. As my job today is to speak about Afghanistan's experience, and the way international assistance has helped Afghanistan, and also in a manner that neglect - forgetting Afghanistan - promoted terrorism in Afghanistan. Indeed is a very important subject for us today.

Ladies and gentlemen:

Speaking on Afghanistan, the experience of my country shows that extremism or radicalism resulting in terrorism did not grow in Afghanistan. It did not come from the Afghan people. Events in the past 30 years caused it for us, with consequences to the rest of the world. We all know the invasion by the former Soviet Union through which the former Soviet Union tried to impose communism on Afghanistan, on a deeply believing Muslim nation, on a nation with deep values in history; and for the Afghan people - in order to free themselves from Communism and from foreign rule, which was trialled by the Soviet Union - we began a war of liberation. In this war of liberation, a lot of our people were forced to migrate outside of Afghanistan and wage a war from there as well. So from the one

hand, on the one side was the Soviet effort to try to impose communism on Afghanistan. On the other hand the Afghan resistance to the Soviet Union was helped by the international community, by the free world, by the countries around us, by the Islamic world; and in support to the Afghan resistance against the former Soviet Union, almost all of those countries that helped us, radicalism, religious radicalism, was chosen and supported fully as an instrument of fighting communism. While the Afghan people waged a resistance to free the country, these two competing forces were exerting pressure on Afghanistan, each against the other. Both were directed to Afghanistan from outside, as both were spending money in Afghanistan, as both were trying to find support in Afghanistan while the Afghan people were trying to free themselves; and when the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, the Soviet Union collapsed. The rest of the world -particularly the west, having ended the Cold War - forgot Afghanistan, neglected Afghanistan, and the result of that neglect was that other entities in the region could intervene in Afghanistan and bring extremism to Afghanistan. Extremism was used as an instrument of foreign policy. Support to extremism was used as instrument of foreign policy which affected our country, and the consequence of that having now on Afghanistan that was extremely weakened, with institutions destroyed, with the nation in a very miserable state of existence.

The extremist forces that arrived in the form of the Al-Qaeda and the Taleban began to rule Afghanistan with immense misery to the Afghan people, with immense destruction to the Afghan people, but we had always a desire on Afghanistan to have Afghanistan freed. This desire could not materialize freedom by the Afghan people because of our incapacitation as a consequence of years of war and interference and invasions and immense support to extremism from outside.

September 11 (9/11) changed that. The attack on the twin towers, on Pentagon and on other civilian targets around the world brought the liberation of Afghanistan, as it awakened the world to the dangers that were emanating from the existence of terrorism in Afghanistan. So the combination, in the aftermath of 9/11, of the arrival of the international community in Afghanistan and the desire of the Afghan people put together, brought about the liberation of Afghanistan; and the reason that it was so easy that Afghanistan was freed within a month and a half was exactly because the Afghan people wanted liberation but did not have the means, so the combination of the two brought the means and desire into movement. This brought Afghanistan what we experienced in the past four years: liberation of

the country, building of the country, reconstruction of the country, institution building of the country, the return of education to Afghan children - where we had five years ago schools closed all over the country. Today we have five million or more than that of our children going to school, both girls and boys. Institutions are built, and the Afghan people participate freely in determining the future of their country.

This cooperation from the international community and the Afghan people has brought to us what we can today easily call "the cooperation of civilizations", not only in building a country from the abyss of misery and destruction, but also a cooperation of civilizations in trying to build a better future for all of us.

As terrorism is a universal threat, so cooperation should be a universal activity. That has been proven in Afghanistan in two stark ways. One, that when Afghanistan a member of the international community was afflicted by terrorism and neglected by the rest of the world, the consequences of that reached thousands and thousands of mile away to America and to the rest of the world; and as the rest of the world came to help Afghanistan the consequences of that also reached the whole of mankind. Sadi, the great Persian poet, has put this fact of life in the best possible words. He says "this children of Adam are limbs of one another, all member with each other; and if one part of this limb or this body is afflicted by pain, the other parts of the body will not remain in rest;" and indeed, Afghanistan provided that example.

So, in a negative way, Afghanistan is an example to learn from, that when you neglect a fellow human being and when you interfere with the life of a fellow human being in a negative way by exporting extremism to it, by trying to undermine its culture and values, and by trying to impose a regime in the form of the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda who are alien to the to the history and traditions of a country, you have the most menacing examples of terrorist activity as it emerge from Afghanistan; and in a positive way, Afghanistan provides the best example of when nations, countries, societies, governments come together and cooperate with each other. They not only free a nation, but have the consequences of that freedom and peace reach the rest of the world. This unprecedented cooperation in Afghanistan is a model on how we can continue to fight terrorism in the future.

Now, terrorism has no religion, terrorism has no tradition, terrorism has no value system. We heard now it is in the press, in the media, references to the Islamic Extremism or Islamic terrorism. I am strongly against this: Islam is a religion of peace. In Islam killing an innocent man, killing an innocent person is equated with killing of the

whole humanity. Therefore, the first thing that we should do as people in this world is to commit ourselves to recognizing that no religion is for extremism or terrorism, that no religion wants to hurt and specially Islam – as I am a Muslim and I would like to speak for it - will not allow religion to be used for that purpose. There are elements - no doubt in all religions, and Muslims as well - who use the name of Islam to promote their agendas; and these very elements, who are now called Islamic terrorists, first perpetrated terrorism on the Muslim people. The Afghans were the most devoted among the Muslims or among the most devoted of the Muslims and near the poorest; but the Al-Qaeda and the Taleban were perpetrating terrorism on them for many years before they decided to go and reach the west. Therefore, it is not an Islamic terrorist against another culture, another religion, and another value. No, terrorism is universal: it kills all of us. It belongs to no religion and here, equally, I should say that the recent cartoons depicting our prophet Muhammed in an unpleasant manner must also not be tolerated. One of the basic elements - one of the very important elements of cooperation in civilizations, in traditions, in different part of the world - is to learn to respect each other, to respect other religions, to respect other traditions, to respect other value systems. While we condemn the publication of cartoons in the name of the freedom of the press, we also equally condemn those who, to protect religion, reek havoc in the streets, in market places around the world, be in the Islamic world or in the rest of the world because, ladies and gentlemen, in Islam other religions are highly respected. Jesus and Moses are treated as prophets in the Quran, and if a Muslim denies the prophethood of Jesus or Moses he or she ceases to be a Muslim. It is a heresy. Therefore, it is an extremely important aspect of the success of our fight against extremism, to begin to respect to each other's religions and values and not allow anything that would justify an infringement upon these values or violation of these values. We must also, among ourselves, as another measure of our fight against terrorism not allow preachers of hatred, preachers of division, preachers of clash to succeed or to have their way around the rest of us. It is for us, all religions, all traditions, to promote an understanding cooperation, dialogue, alliances among various value systems and the toleration of each other. Speaking of this, in today's world we have, ladies and gentlemen, a deeper value system that can put us together in the fight against terror and for a more peaceful, a more tranquil world. That is the need of all of us for understanding, for progress and for what our human desire asks of us. In this regard and for us to be able to effectively fight against terrorism, international cooperation is one effective method: the United Nations, other

international organizations, together with the governments and personalities who have proposed various methods of cooperation among different religions and different cultures. We have the example of the alliance of civilizations put forward by His Excellency, Prime Minister Erdoğan and Prime Minister Zapatero of Spain. We have the concept of the dialogue of civilizations, put forward a few years ago by my friend and brother the former president of Iran, President Hatemi. We have the example of Afghanistan, where cooperation of civilization is actively taking place, where today you have a highway from Kabul to Kandahar to Herat - almost 1100 kilometers - being built by the United States, by Saudi Arabia and by Japan. One is a western country, the other is a Buddhist country, the other is a Muslim country. Now, countries from America to Saudi Arabia to Japan are cooperating in a country like Afghanistan. A two-way cooperation: cooperation between these various cultures and religions and civilizations and cooperation also with the Afghan people. Afghanistan provides - perhaps in today's world as we speak - the best example of cooperation of civilizations. We also have the idea of enlightened moderation as put forward by His Excellency, the President of Pakistan President Musharraf. Now, if we take this example and enhancing through international organizations and work on the proposals, perhaps we can move forward towards a more peaceful, a more cooperative world.



Ladies and gentlemen:

As I mentioned earlier, Turkey is a great friend of Afghanistan. While being a great friend of Afghanistan, Turkey is also a bridge between continents, a bridge between religions and a bridge between civilizations. Speaking in Turkey, which is able - which is already functioning - in many ways as a bridge between cultures and

civilizations, I propose that our brothers in Turkey take more measures in enhancing cooperation, alliance, dialogue between civilizations and values and cultures; and I am sure there are millions and millions of human beings around the world who will take this at heart and who will help us promote this concept.

After all, we are all human beings and we have all suffered from terrorism and we all want to be free from it. Thank you very much.

Hamid KARZAI
President of Afghanistan Islamic Republic

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CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF TERRORISM: A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS

TERRORISM WITH ITS DIFFERING ASPECTS

Prof. Dr. Sertaç BAŞEREN (TURKEY)¹



Introduction

The aim of this study is to assess the concept of terrorism within its period of change, to diagnose today's situation through exposing the different aspects it has acquired and therefore to help to solve problems.

If we attempt to search the roots of terror from an historical perspective, it is possible to take this to Habil's killing his brother Kabil. Within this framework, what Hasan SABBAAH did in Alamut Castle can be talked about, too. History is full of rather impressive terror incidents. One of the most impressive incidents is the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to Austrian-Hungarian Empire, in Bosnia. Terror had very significant effects on Islamic history as well. The murder of Caliph Ali caused Islam to divide into sects. Together with this, terrorism with its features that we are interested in can be examined within the framework of the changes it has experienced over the last four decades. In other words; taking account of its effects in respect of contemporary political system, the subject can be evaluated over the last four decades². The word "terror" came from a Latin word "terrere" in respect of its etymological roots.³ It means frighten, terrorize, and intimidate.⁴ An Arabic origin word "tedhis" is used in Turkish with the same meaning.


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² When we evaluate this period of four decades in respect of Turkey, we encounter four big terror waves. The first is Armenian terror, the second is the terrorism arising from right-left conflicts and dating back to 1970s, the third is PKK terror and terror of division and the last wave is reactionary terrorism. See Kongar, E., (opcit.), pp.86, 90,92.

³ Wilkinson, P., Political Terrorism, London 1974, p.9

⁴ Turkish Dictionary, Ankara 1983, V II, pp. 1159, 1177

Terror⁵ can emerge out of an individual action as well as it can occur in a random mass violent action. In this regard, terror is generally out of control and it is neither organized nor systematic.⁶ For this reason, neither an individual action nor series of incidents emerging by chance are terrorism.⁷ To talk about terrorism, it is necessary to have series of terror incidents, which are interconnected and turn to a certain political target. "Terrorism is a strategic analysis which, for political purposes, identifies itself with a method including the usage of organized, systematic, and continuous terror."⁸



⁵ Even though there are other terror and terrorism types, political terrorism is focused on in this study.

⁶ Wilkinson, P., (opcit.) p.17

⁷ Ibid. idem; Crenshaw, M.H., "The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism", The Journal Conflict Resolution, September 1972, p.384;

⁸ Bozdemir, M., "Is terror and terrorism?", School of Political Sciences Press and Publication College, 1981, V.VI.

1. The Determining Issues of Actions in Form of Terrorism

In order to expose the changing features of terrorism, in a simple way it will be suitable to find out the determining issues of actions in form of terrorism and then to make a definition valid in this study. For finding out the determining issues of terrorism, it is possible to benefit from reason, intention, and purpose, which take place within the notion of intention in penal law.

As it is seen in figure I, in political terrorism, perpetrator moves with a political reason. The content of the reason that is; the political view of the perpetrator is not important. The reason can reflect any political view on condition that it has political content. This evaluation touches on the preference, which the author of these lines agrees with, and unfortunately, it does not represent an issue, which has been agreed upon. The terrorist who commits the most unforgivable crime in one side of the border can be seen as a national liberation fighter when he crosses the border. The most typical understandings of these analyses which create these different evaluations have appeared in United Nations General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism. According to Algeria, Democratic Yemen, Guinea, India, Congo, Mountania, Niger, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia which have a common view about the definition of terrorism, the definition of terrorism should not harm⁹ national liberation struggles. For these countries, if the political reason of the perpetrator is to use the right to determine his own future, to struggle for freedom or to realize national and to realize their national liberation movement, then there is no use to talk about terrorism. The actions of violence and other assimilating actions, which colonist regimes commit, are terrorism in every way.

The perpetrator who takes action with a political reason acts in violence. Here, violence is a tool for arriving at the conclusion in order to realize the aim.¹⁰ This action including violence creates an advantage in favor of the terrorist and turns it into a target, which is impossible to determine before, and mostly is not related with the current political struggle but important in the eye of public. For example, the action gives birth to a conclusion such as murder of diplomats. The perpetrator wants to obtain a benefit beyond the

⁹ See United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, Official Records: 28th Session, Supplement No.28 (A/9028). New York 1973, p.21.

¹⁰ Dönmezer, S., Kriminoloji (Criminology), Istanbul 1981, B.6 p.220; Bayraktar, K., Siyasal Suç (Political Crime) Istanbul 1982, p.163; Alpaslan, S., Kriminoloji ve Hukuk açısından Tedhişçilik (Terrorization In Respect of Criminology and Law), Istanbul 1983, p.9, for "convenient tool" in penal code see Dönmezer, S., Erman, S., Nazari ve Tatbiki Ceza Hukuku (Theoretical and Practical Penal Code) (General Section) C. I, B. 9, Istanbul 1985, p.409.

conclusion; the aim is to affect masses. In other words; violence is used and propaganda is made for affecting.¹¹ The most significant issue underscoring terrorism appears at this point. When the result exemplified with the murder of diplomats arising from action of violence is compared with the one coming out in respect of affecting masses it becomes so small, but the result is extraordinarily large. That is to say, the effect created in proportion with the action is extremely large.

Terrorism is, by means of killing one person, to frighten millions and to influence their political preferences. Therefore, it is essential to say that terrorism is a symbolic action. A direct action is not important in respect of its conclusions, it is very important for its effects being created beyond the conclusions. In this way, the action is not instrumental, but symbolic. At this point, it is useful to remember the terror definition introduced in 1960s: "Terror is a symbolic action shaped for influencing political behavior by using violence or by unusual ways including threat of violence".¹² The definition of terrorism has gained sufficient clarity. Together with this, in course of time, by being used in different dimensions terrorism has been diversified and has gained new features.


2. Terrorism in Varying Political Relations

It is possible to show in which relations the terrorism is used through drawing a macro model covering both national and international political relations.

The actors of the model are states, international organizations, and terrorist organizations (the terrorist organizations are at the same time foreign policy tools). O1 and O2 represent country 1 and country 2, U.C. represents international organizations. The relations between them are classical international political relations. Besides, apart from these international relations, the internal policy of the countries takes place in the model as well. The societies of O1 and O2 are T1 and T2. The relation between O1 and T1 and the relation between O2 and T2 are internal politics. Additionally, there are relations in which O1 and O2 direct to the societies of each other or there are relations which emerge within individual societies. These are "transnational" relations.

¹¹ İsen, G. B., "Terörizm: Değişik Boyutlarda Çağdaş Bir Sorun" ("Terrorism: A Contemporary Problem with its Different Dimensions"), the Journal of Dicle University School of Law, 1983, C. I, p.1, p.197.

¹² Thornton, T. P., "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitations", Internal War, (ed. By) Eckstein, H., London 1964, p.73.



Now, going into detail we will find out the features which the terrorism has gained in respect to the relations emerging within this model.

a. Terrorism in Internal Politics

Terrorism in internal politics appears in O1 T1 circle in figure i. Here, the political struggle using violence that is terrorism has two dimensions. On the one hand, it is possible for states to utilize terrorism both as an internal and external political tool to continue their current state regime, and on the other hand, it is possible for those who want to destroy the established order and to seize the power to use terrorism in their struggle against the order. Applying terror for continuing power by those in power is called state terrorism or terrorism from above. We will touch on the issue of states applying terrorism as an external political tool under the title of "State Supported Terrorism" in the paragraphs below.

Applying terrorism to sustain the continuity of a regime at home has been institutionalized in totalitarian regimes such as Nazis Germany, the former USSR and East Bloc countries. Cambodia can be given as


another example. Saloth Sar, who was the Prime Minister in 1975 – 1978, leader of Khmer Rouge and known as Pol Pot, caused the death of more than one million Cambodians in order to govern Cambodia in accordance with his own communist vision. Besides, that the mentioned regimes went into the depths of history did not ensure assimilating terrorism to vanish. Today, it is possible to say that various dictatorships do not hesitate to apply terrorism in order to control homeland. Considerable amount of torture and inhumane treatment are the typical evidences of the situation. We call terrorism, which is applied by those in their struggle against the order for destroying the established order and seizing power, terrorism from above. State terror may instigate terror of revolt or the terror of revolt may instigate the state terror. If the states entrapped, have ethnic problems and if these are used in the mentioned struggle, the possibility to experience civil war is inevitable.

(1) Ideological Terrorism

Terrorism serves ideologies, too. The great part of terror organizations emerging in 1970s had Marxist background and they identified themselves as the part of revolutionist anti-imperialist movement. Red Army Fraction (RAF), which emerged in 1968 and existed until 1998, Brigade Rosse (BR), which emerged in 1969 and existed until 1982, and Revolutionary Organization (DHKPC) 17 November against Turkey, which emerged in 1975 and existed till now, are the most important examples. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which was established in Colombia in 1966 and Ejericto de Libracion Army (ELN) which was established in 1965, Sendero Kuminoso (SL) established in Peru in 1969, might be listed among these.

In Europe organizations with extreme left ideologies left the arena in 1980s and their place was taken by organizations with extreme right ideologies. It is known that in Germany many extreme rightist organizations some of which are neo-Nazi have appeared. These organizations, which use violence, consider Turks as prioritized targets. Killing of five Turks in Solingen by setting their houses on fire is an example of terrorist violence, which cannot be forgotten easily.

TERRORISM IN CIVIL WAR



(2) Ethnic terrorism

Spreading of western values to the world, which we call globalization, results in political crumble in means of former structures. This political crumble brings ethnic struggles and the ethnic terrorism, which is used, in these struggles. Ethnic terrorism can be used as a tool for separatist movements as well as it can turn into terrorism in ethnic civil wars.

In this framework changes in political regime and integrity that are against the constitution of a state, although it does not always reach to this level, it might be beneficial to evaluate it on a process in which political violence styles, which might lead to civil war, exists.

As seen in Figure III, in this process, which begins with use of violence in excess of the normal political violence¹³ in the society, terrorism might be encountered at every stage. As the process evolves, due to suppressive and revolting terrorism which mutually rise, political violence increasingly grows and at the highest level by looking to its growth, it starts a steeper decline and finishes when it reaches a tolerable or a valid level of violence in the new order. Although it is not always absolutely necessary, there exists terrorism, guerilla warfare, and war in this political struggle. Theoretically the process may start and end only with one of; terrorism, guerilla warfare or war. Still political aggression methods do not appear as alternatives to each other; practically most of the time they coexist in a complementary manner.

During ethnic civil wars, often genocide or ethnic cleansing policies are followed thus forcing ethnic groups which form a part of the nation to leave their homes. For the means Terrorism is being resorted and mass killing, raping follows incessantly. These wars result in a lot of refugees and casualties in great amounts that is not comparable to other means of terrorist activity. This struggle within the state has two important dimensions with respect to International Law; State of emergency (problems which exist before the state of emergency are left outside the scope of the study) and armed conflicts which do not have an international dimension. In this respect, the relation of the subject to International Law appears at the human rights dimension. The subject we are studying is both studied in relevance to state of emergency and (from viewpoint of humanitarian law) armed conflicts, which are not international. Humanitarian Law which we can define law for armed conflicts prohibits terrorism. At this point it will be beneficial to state that with respect to non-international armed conflicts, Geneva Conventions are in line with human rights to a great extend and additional protocols prohibit terrorism. Not every ethnic violence act transforms into ethnic civil wars and mass terrorism. Some separatist terrorist groups, which lack a base, although, are unable to initiate ethnic struggles, preserve their existence. The way to avoid such movements is to satisfy demands within the democracy. For this to happen it is required that the demands should be democratic as much as there should be enough democracy in the country. Openness of the political spectrum to representation of separatist thoughts and dissolving of unitary state is not imperative.

¹³ The term "abnormal violence" refers to violence which is unacceptable with respect to legal, political and social rules of the society in which the crimes which have a terrorist nature are comitted. In this framwork it is not the terrorism which the established regime uses in line with legal rules in order to protect itself.

b. Terrorism in International Politics

Up to this point in order to keep the expression simple and plain, international relations were not included in the discussion. But the subject is almost never this confined. In real world terrorism with one of its dimensions (support from other nations, citizenship of perpetrator or injured, the place where the crime is committed etc.) is beyond the national borders. Now it is time to go back to our macro model in Figure W and add this new element. Another state may be involved in the armed conflicts that are not international. In this new dimension D/ may intervene to T2 or D2 to T1 and support terrorism there or even cause it to happen from nowhere.

(1) State Sponsored Terrorism

It is possible for some states to use terrorism as a tool in external politics as they use it in internal politics. Many examples of this have been observed in the recent past. Former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc Countries provided support to terrorist organizations. After the cold war era although the amount of support to terrorist organizations from these countries have declined, it hasn't completely been ceased. The support, which countries lend to terrorist countries as a tool for their external politics, can range from simple help, up to sponsorship. Today this situation the most happens in the Middle East. State sponsored terrorism, in other words terrorism under the control of states, is very important due to their characteristics. As states provide weapons with great firepower, money, intelligence and training possibilities, this type of terrorism is extremely dangerous and destructive. By the help of sponsorship from state, terrorism is no longer a symbolic action and has also become destructive by the means of outcomes it produces. Again as the state sponsorship of states to terrorists, provide safe hideouts for terrorist in which they can escape from judicial power it becomes even harder to fight against terrorism with this kind of support. Sponsoring of terrorism by states is also dangerous as this also incite conflicts among states. Turkey was only able to end the support that Syria gives to PKK by showing its determination for using its self-defense rights.

Democratic states may also support terrorism for various reasons. The support by these countries usually does not reach to level of sponsorship. Democratic states sometimes tolerate terrorist activity for their commercial benefits; sometimes use state terrorism as a means for fight against terrorism; and sometimes support the governments which continue their rule by using terrorist strategies. Groups, which try to topple governments, are also striking governments which support their governments which may result in globalizing local wars. Even though they do not support it, for a state

to overlook terrorist activities within their borders, which harm other states, do not go along well with the duty of the states to prevent activities, which harm other states. Conditions in Iraq, which is occupied by USA, are known, still accepting or overlooking the presence of PKK in this country is not possible.

(2) Global Terrorism and Terrorism that is being tried to Religiously Legitimized

Throughout the history, religious fanaticism have applied terrorism and tried to legitimize this with its preachings. Neither religious fanaticism nor application of terrorism by this fanaticism can be confined to a religion. Although all major religions in the world are against terrorism, it is possible to find examples for acts conducted by believers of each religion for which they try to legitimize by the preachings of religion. One of the most horrifying examples of this kind of terrorism has been the Inquisition Courts which were established to find and punish those who defied Catholic beliefs. President of Israel, Isaac Robin, was murdered by a Jewish Fanatic who claimed to fulfill the order of god. Today, it is terrorism which is being justified by Islamic sayings that is tried to be placed on the top of agendas. However, obe should never let this to result a fear of Islam. In America media has blamed Islamic Groups for bombing of Oklahoma Alfred Murray Federal Bureau without any evidence and it was later revealed that the truth was different. Connecting religious legitimization of terror to Islam is very wrong and the results will harm everyone. Still, denying existence of such organizations and the serious nature of the position is not possible. There is no state, which sponsors or controls these groups. These organizations present the characteristics of sub state actors, which act freely at the international arena (Hitting of D1 by terrorist organization in Figure III). The ties, which form the organization, are very loose. Even more in some events organic organizational structures are inexistent. It has been seen that fanatics who are influenced by the news that are reflected from media and who have no former organization connections have joined the action and committed crimes under the name of organization. As seen in September 11 attacks the outcome of the action is big enough to cause serious security problems. Although religion is being used to legitimize the act a political agent is also existent. Al-Qaeda is trying to force USA to withdraw from Saudi Arabia and entire gulf region. They want to destroy the regimes, which they see as cooperative and betraying to real Islam, and want to gather all Muslims around a pan-Islamic caliphate which rules in line with real Islam rules. This new terrorism is being used to fight against the globalization, which means domination of western values in the world. September 11, 2003 is a very typical example of this.

Usume Bin Laden was a warrior created by United States of America against the Soviet Union, which invaded Afghanistan during cold war era. In this framework September 11 terrorism is not only due to its results but also due to its source has appeared due to globalization namely cold war, which created it¹⁴. Symbolic targets of the September 11 attacks are also striking. Pentagon symbolizes military power of United States of America and twin towers of the World Trade Center at New York symbolize the economic dominance of the international capital¹⁵. That is even though the September 11 terror seemed to strike America, in fact it is an attack against globalization process. United States of America has been attacked as they are the leader of this process¹⁶. In order to end global terrorism which has become a serious nuisance, eliminating reasons; and for this aim presenting an example of political stability, peace and prosperity might be useful. Presenting Turkey as a moderate Islam state does not go along with its secular structure. It is unacceptable to expect a kind of softening in that respect when the continuity and improvement of democracy in Turkey is taken into consideration.

Conclusions

Terrorism which is in essence an effect based political struggle, is used both in internal and external politics. Different circumstances which terrorism is used makes terrorism diversify and acquire different characteristics. Creation of new types, which possess different characteristics in new dimensions, does not end uses in previous dimensions and does not eliminate old uses. Terrorism is used in different dimensions and terrorism with different characteristics is observed coherently.

Although totalitarian regimes which constitute the most important source for state terrorism, widespread torture events shows that different types dictatorships continue to use state terrorism in order to continue their existence. Especially these countries use terrorism in external politics as much as they use it in their internal politics. Although their number has declined there are still states which sponsor terrorism. Terrorism with this kind of support is more destructive and harder to prevent.

Resistance based on violence against globalization creates global terrorism. In this framework organizations which resort to terrorism are not under the control of any state. In this regard, they present an identity of an organization and actor. The ties, which form the organization, are extremely loose. They try to legitimize their extremely destructive actions with religious preachings. Terrorism is

¹⁴ Kongar, E., Küresel Terör ve Türkiye, Kürselleşme, Huntington, 11 Eylül, İstanbul 2002, p. 81.

¹⁵ Ibid. idem.

¹⁶ Ibid. idem

no more a marginal problem. Every kind of terrorism has become less differentiating and more destructive. Still ethnic mass terrorism, which comes to life with ethnic civil wars, is still incomparably the most destructive terrorism type.

TERRORISM IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Dr. Boaz GANOR (ISRAEL)¹



On September 11, 2001, the face of international terrorism changed. From that point forward the world faced a new brand of threat, of a scope and severity that was heretofore unknown. To understand the significance of the threat posed by international terrorism, we need to go back to the Afghanistan War (in the late 1970s and early 1980s), when the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan to support the pro-Communist regime against the threat of the Muslim *mujahideen*. The *mujahideen* called upon their allies from all over the Muslim world to come to their aid in the battle against the world's second greatest superpower. Volunteers came *en masse* and joined in the fighting throughout Afghanistan. After ten years, the *mujahideen* and Islamic fundamentalist mercenaries who had come from all over the world scored a stunning victory, and forced the Communist power to retreat unconditionally from Afghanistan. The fundamentalist warriors, flush with victory, needed no other proof that "God was with them," as if only the hand of God could have changed the balance of power so profoundly and led them to victory.

The Threat of International Terrorism

The Islamic radical mercenaries who had completed their mission now divided into three groups: one group remained in Afghanistan

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Dr. Ganor received his Ph.D. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, on the subject of "Israel's Counter-terrorism Strategy - efficiency versus liberal-democratic values ". He earned his B.A. in Political Science from the Hebrew University and his M.A. in Political Studies from Tel-Aviv University (thesis: "Terrorism and Public Opinion in Israel").

Dr Ganor is an author of numerous articles on counter-terrorism. His latest books - "The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle", and "Post Modern Terrorism" (Editor), were published in 2005.

and its members were united by Osama Bin Laden to form the “al-Qaeda” organization. Members of the second group returned to their native countries and joined local Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organizations that were already active in those countries (some had been members of these organizations even before volunteering to fight in Afghanistan). Members of the third group also wanted to return home, but they were refused entry by their native governments, who feared their negative and dangerous influence. Armed with this official refusal, they appealed to Western nations for political asylum – which was granted. That is how radical activists spread throughout the Western world, in countries like the United States, Great Britain, Europe, etc. These “Afghan veterans” settled in the West, and in many cases, served as dormant terrorist cells, recruiters and spiritual leaders who enlisted locals and other Muslim immigrants into the ranks of radical Islam.

It is this network of Islamist radicals that threatens the Western world, as well as the moderate Muslim regimes of the Arab world. This network of Islamic radical activists headed by bin Laden has an ultimate goal they wish to achieve – spread their version of Islam all over the world. Put simply, bin Laden wants to conquer the world—to spread his version of radical Islam to every region of the globe, so that there will be no place not ruled by Islamic religious law.

It should be noted that the Islamic religion is not necessarily more or less violent than any other religion, whether it is Judaism or Christianity. In fact, the Islamists view moderate Muslims as their enemies no less than the Jews and the Christians. Perhaps even more, since the moderate Muslims are seen as heretics.

It seems that bin Laden has adopted a three-stage strategy toward the ultimate goal of spreading Islamic radicalism all over the world. The first stage is to spread his version of Islam to Muslim countries in central Asia and the Middle East. Why these countries specifically? Because they are already home to Islamic radical organizations, some of which have large numbers of supporters. Among the countries with Islamic movements which could serve as the nucleus of radicalism are Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Saudi-Arabia, Jordan etc. Once this first stage is achieved, these “Islamized” countries can serve as the staging ground for the second stage—the spread of radical Islam to non-Arab Islamic countries or countries which has a large Muslim minorities: Turkey, the former Islamic republics of the USSR, Xinjiang area in west China, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and others. Looking at the major terrorist attacks since 9/11, most of them have occurred in Muslim countries: Turkey, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan,

Pakistan, Indonesia and so on. These acts are aimed at shaking the stability of Muslim countries whose economies rely largely on tourism. Only upon the completion of these stages, will Islamic radicalism be ready for the final stage—the ultimate battle to spread their rule to the rest of Western society.

Bin Laden recognized, or at least believed, that in order to achieve the first stage he must keep the Americans from interfering with his plans for the moderate Muslim regimes, forcing them to withdraw their military forces and their influence from Arab soil—from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and so on. In effect, the spread of radical Islam to these moderate states cannot be accomplished unless the United States can be forced into isolationism.

Bin Ladin had a plan to accomplish this—a campaign of terrorism against American interests, combined with a propaganda blitz designed to reinforce his message. The terrorist campaign was exemplified by the horrific attacks in New York and Washington, in September 2001. The 9/11 attacks was not meant therefore to destroy the United States or destroy the American economy; it was intended to create anxiety that would pressure the government to shift its policy. But these attacks in themselves would not be sufficient to make the Americans isolationists; it must be accompanied by the appropriate propaganda. Thus, bin Ladin launched a campaign to sell his message to the American audience, via videotapes and speeches aimed to reinforce the message. But the Americans were not terrorized by the horrific attacks. They were afraid, but their reaction was a wave of patriotism—the very opposite of what Bin Laden wanted to achieve.

In explaining their terrorist attacks the Islamists and their supporters argues that they are fighting a defensive war, against American Militarism and American colonialism. But the Islamists are not fighting against American troops as they are in combat against Coca-Cola, McDonalds, the Internet, and Microsoft. They feel threatened by The western way of life, by modernism, by the American culture. This implies that American isolationism will solve nothing

The problem of international radical Islamic terrorism is not the problem of one individual – Osama Bin Ladin, or a single organization – al-Qaeda – but rather, is that of a vast, international terrorist network with global reach, which includes activists from different backgrounds living and working in Arab and Muslim nations, as well as Western states and Third World countries.

The existence of this international terrorist network is not a new phenomenon, nor is it unique to modern history. The world has

already witnessed various terrorist networks in the past, headed by the network of Communist and anarchist organizations that operated during the late 1960s and through the 1970s under the direction of the Soviet Union. But the international radical Islamic terrorist base poses an unprecedented threat to the enlightened world, if for no other reason than the dangerous combination of several characteristics that are unique to this group:

The fundamentalist belief in the divine command instructing the network's members to disseminate their radical Islamic world view across the globe, through the use of extreme violence and terrorism. The belief in violent *jihad* (holy war) makes these activists particularly dangerous because if this is the will of God, then neither argument nor compromise is acceptable. What is needed is all-out war. There are those who erroneously believe that the reason for the outbreak of militant Islamic fundamentalism is rooted in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the roots of radical Islamic terrorism are steeped in religious sources, rather than being based on any particular national conflict. The Palestinian conflict serves merely as lip service for Bin Laden and his associates; in fact, they are not really interested in the fate of the Palestinian people but are cynically exploiting the conflict as a unifying Islamic cause, based on incitement and religious indoctrination. In this regard, Israel is not the cause for the eruption of radical Islamic – on the contrary. Israel is the victim, by virtue of its being identified with the West, and as being a defensive shield that is preventing radical Islam from realizing its objectives and spreading into Europe and the West.

In contrast with members of other terrorist networks in the past – frustrated, middle-class students who decided to be momentary revolutionaries – members of the radical Islamic networks are not novices. Rather, in many cases, they are battle-seasoned warriors who gained their combat experience during the Afghan campaign.

Members of this network do not hesitate to use the modern terrorist method that has been proven more effective than any other – suicide terrorism. As a result of their extreme religious beliefs, they are even happy to undertake this type of attack, out of their conviction that with such action they will not die at all, and they are certainly not committing suicide (which is forbidden by Islamic religious law), rather, they are carrying out a sacrifice for the sake of martyrdom (*istishad*), guaranteeing them eternal life in Paradise. A suicide attack is an “operational method in which the very act of the attack is dependent upon the death of the perpetrator.” The terrorist is fully aware that if he does not kill himself, the planned attack will not be implemented. The attack is carried out by activating explosives worn

or carried by the terrorist in the form of a portable explosive charge, or planted in a vehicle he is driving.

It is important to correctly define a suicide attack, for there are different types of attacks, which may be mistakenly considered as belonging to this special category:

On many occasions, the perpetrator of an attack sets out with the knowledge that there is a good chance of being killed in the course of an attack (for example in trying to force a bus over a cliff). In spite of the imminent danger to the terrorist's life, as long as there is a possibility of the attack being carried out without him being forced to kill himself during the course of it, this *should* not be considered to be "a suicide attack." In a true suicide attack, the terrorist knows full well that the attack will not be executed if he is not killed in the process. Suicide attack is the most effective method of modern terrorism. The use of suicide tactics guarantees that the attack will be carried out at the most appropriate time and place with regard to the circumstances at the target location. This guarantees the maximum number of casualties (in contrast to the use of technical means such as a time bomb or even a remote controlled explosive charge). In Israel, the number of suicide attacks, as a portion of all terrorist acts between 2001-2004 is less than 0.5 percent. Yet over 50 percent of casualties resulting from terrorist attacks come from suicide bombings.

In this regard the suicide bomber is like a "smart bomb" —a carrier that brings the explosive device to the right location and detonates it at the right time. But this is not the only "advantage" that the terrorist organization have by committing a suicide attack. As an outcome of the precise attack Since suicide attacks result in many casualties and cause extensive damage, these kind of attacks attract wide media coverage. A suicide attack is a newsworthy event for the media as it indicates a display of great determination and inclination for self-sacrifice on the part of the terrorists. In a suicide attack, as soon as the terrorist has set off on his mission his success is virtually guaranteed. It is extremely difficult to counter suicide attacks once the terrorist is on his way to the target; even if the security forces do succeed in stopping him before he reaches the intended target, he can still activate the charge and cause damage. Suicide attacks require no escape plan. And since the perpetrator is killed during the course of the suicide attack, there is no fear of him being caught afterwards, being interrogated by the security forces and passing on information liable to endanger other activists. This explains why all suicide attacks (under the above definition) are "organized attacks", Being initiated, prepared and organized by a terrorist organization and not an out come of "Personal initiative". The method of this

modern effective tactic of terrorism is therefore an outcome of a rational decision making both at the level of the organization and the of the perpetrator himself. The Islamic radical Suicide attacker believes that a shahid and his families with substantial rewards: improves his social status after their death as well as that of his families, The family of the shahid is showered with honor and praise, and receives financial rewards for the attack

In addition to these “benefit”, the shahid also receives some personal benefits (according to his belief), including: Eternal life in paradise, the privilege to promise a life in heaven to 70 of his relatives, and the loving kindness of 72 young virgins who will serve him in heaven.

Statements made by leaders of the international radical Islamic terrorist network, and the successful prevention of attacks by others belonging to this system, indicate that the global radical Islamic terrorists have no qualms about using non-conventional means if necessary – chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons – in order to achieve their goals. In order to determine what is the probability of a non-conventional attack it would be helpful to classify the types of possible non-conventional attacks.

Post-Modern Terrorism

While it is customary to differentiate between attacks according to which substance is used—chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological—one can also classify attacks by the intended result. Thus, attacks using non-conventional means can be “limited” or “unlimited” in nature. A “limited” non-conventional attack differs from the usual terrorist bombing only in the means used. As in the case of a conventional attack, the limited non-conventional attack aims to cause multiple casualties at the site of the attack or in its immediate vicinity. And like a conventional terror attack, this type of terror attack attempts to draw media and public attention to the messages and demands of the terror organization by inflicting extensive casualties and spreading public anxiety—the ultimate goal being to influence political goal processes of the target population. This is an indirect modus-operandi to change the reality. A limited non-conventional terror attack could be carried out by dispersing a chemical substance in an enclosed space, by contaminating food and water sources, or by using explosives to disperse a radiological agent at a selected location.

Figure 1: Chemical attacks are mostly “limited” in scope, while biological attacks are mostly “unlimited” with a few exceptions such as Anthrax and other non-contagious agents. Nuclear attacks are

always “unlimited” due to their scope and severe ecological impact, while radiological attacks are “limited” in scope.

In contrast to “limited” attacks, “unlimited” attacks are not meant to merely incur damage and carnage in a specific and focused public area or just to create anxiety. Rather, they are designated to destroy and contaminate large areas (a town, village, city, a specific geographical area, etc.). The conceptual basis for these two categories of attacks differs: While tactical, or limited, non-conventional terror is designated to serve as leverage to alter a political reality through the use of intimidation, unlimited non-conventional terror strives to change the political reality itself de facto by annihilating large populations, contaminating extensive geographical regions, etc. This type of attack may also have severe psychological impact on public morale—an impact that may completely undermine the population’s confidence in government institutions and their values. Yet even without this effect, the unlimited non-conventional attack causes grave and prolonged damage to the area under attack, thus immediately affecting reality. “Limited” non-conventional terrorist attack therefore should be regarded as the extreme end of modern terrorism, and “Unlimited” non-conventional terrorism is in essence the post-modern terrorism phenomenon.

For unlimited non-conventional terror attacks, terror organizations will primarily prefer nuclear or biological weapons, followed by some types of chemical weapons; radiological substances are generally unsuited to this type of attack. One of the main questions is what are the indicators that may point to the possibility that a terror organization will indeed perpetrate non-conventional terror? Only when an organization has both the operational capability and the motivation to perpetrate a particular type of attack will the attack come to pass. With regard to key predictors that indicate the terror organization’s motivation and operational ability to perpetrate non-conventional attacks, based on the post-9/11 trends of international terrorism, one can conclude that the likelihood of the occurrence of limited non-conventional attacks is much greater than that of unlimited attacks. But radical Islamic terrorist organizations might have the motivation to perpetrate also unlimited non-conventional attacks and they might materialize this motivation once they acquire the operational capability.

The counter-terrorism equation

The terrorism equation is, a combination of the motivation to perpetrate terrorist acts and the ability to act on that motivation. These two essential conditions determine the scope and nature of

past, present and future terrorism. From the terrorism equation, we can extrapolate a counter-terrorism equation. When combating terrorism, one must carry out various types of activities aimed at reducing or eliminating the terrorist organizations' ability to perpetrate attacks, and activities aimed at reducing or eliminating the terrorists' motivation to carry out attacks. Naturally, the hope is to diminish both of these variables, but the principal dilemma in fighting terrorism is the fact that the more successful one is in carrying out actions that damage the terrorist organizations' ability to perpetrate attacks, the more we can assume that their motivation will only increase. Figure 2 illustrates this dilemma and presents the necessary counter-terrorism combination between the means to reduce operational capability and to reduce motivation to commit terrorist acts.

The "level of terrorism" line in the illustration represents the line above which it is possible that terrorist attacks will take place, and below which terrorist acts cannot be carried out. The red line represents the level of motivation of a particular organization to carry out attacks at any given point in time, while the blue line represents the organization's ability to carry out an attack at that particular time.

The illustration starts out with the motivation of a group of people to achieve a particular political aim (A). At first their level of motivation is lower than the threshold needed in order to decide to perpetrate terrorist attacks, but quickly, for one reason or another, that group of people decides to employ violent means against civilians, that is, terrorism, in order to achieve its aims. This is when motivation rises above the minimum threshold for perpetrating terrorist attacks (B). At this point, the group of people who have banded together into an organization begins to attempt to gain capabilities that will enable it to act on its motivation to perpetrate terrorist attacks (C). When these capabilities exceed the minimum required for committing terrorist acts (when they cross the "terror" line), the organization is liable to perpetrate attacks. At this point, the nation coping with terrorism takes effective offensive activity against the terrorist organization (D). Such activity reduces the organization's operational capability and the more focused and successful this action may be, the more likely it is to reduce the organization's capability below the terror line – to the minimum capability needed to commit terrorist acts. But the influence of the offensive activity, no matter how effective it is, is usually short-term and after a certain period of time (E) the organization works to repair the damage it suffered and compensate for the damage to its operational capability. Then the capability line begins to go up once again, until it crosses the terrorism threshold. At the same time, as stated, the offensive activity raises the organization's motivation to

continue perpetrating, and perhaps even to escalate, terrorist activity in retaliation and in response to the country's actions. The rise in motivation stabilizes after some time at a level that is higher than it was prior to the nation's offensive activity.

When the country carries out non-effective offensive activity against the terrorist organization (F), the organization's operational capability is not damaged at all, and its motivation to carry out revenge attacks only increases.

Planning and carrying out effective offensive counter-terrorism activity is a complex task and difficult to achieve, but this difficulty is negligible compared with that of carrying out activity to counter an organization's motivation for terrorism. It would appear that the ultimate counter-motivation measure would be to accede to the political demands of the terrorist organizations. But giving in to terrorism, even without getting into the substance of the organization's demands, cannot and must not be a relevant alternative to coping with terrorism, if only because such compromise could whet the organization's appetite to increase its demands from the nation and encourage other organizations looking to achieve their own political aims to use violence and terrorism in order to achieve those aims. In spite of all this, taking steps to reduce the motivation for terrorism is essential when formulating a sound and effective counter-terrorism policy. Such steps might include: humanitarian actions aimed at the organization's supporting population; social welfare activities; education and publicity within this sector; negotiating with public representatives of the organization's supporting population – those who oppose terrorist activity or who, at least, are not involved in committing attacks and are not secretly in contact with those who are, etc. All these activities are aimed at mitigating the conflict, attempting to bring about a solution or an interim agreement through non-violent means, to win people over, to demonstrate that there is a way out. The more the possible influence of effective offensive counter-terrorist activity is immediate and tangible, the greater the chance that counter-motivation measures will be long term; the more effective these are, the more possible it will be to identify their consequences in years to come, not to mention future generations. Then the level of motivation to perpetrate terrorist acts drops (G). This drop in motivation doesn't necessarily represent the feeling of the terrorists themselves, but primarily, the feeling of the organization's supporting population. Steps taken to counter motivation must be directed, first and foremost, towards this population in order to prevent their support for terrorism, to isolate the terrorists and make it easier to undertake offensive measures against

the organization's hard core. In essence, the goal of counter-motivation measures is to distance the terrorists from their supporting population. The more effective the counter-motivation measures, as stated, the more we can expect a decline in the level of motivation to perpetrate terrorist attacks over time, until the level dips below the terror threshold (H). However, a decline in motivation does not impinge on the level of capability to commit terrorist attacks. This may be compared with someone sitting on a barrel of explosives, where the lack of attacks is the result of limited motivation but the ability to perpetrate attacks is higher than the threshold needed to carry them out. In this case, any factor that causes a temporary rise in motivation – offensive activity by the nation, interorganizational or intraorganizational relationships, external pressures, etc. – without restricting the operational capability, will lead to a terrorist attack or a series of attacks. Therefore, the combination needed in an effective counter-terrorism campaign is counter-motivation activity to distance terrorists from their supporting population, together with repeated offensive activity against the terrorist organization's hard core, its leaders, perpetrators, and its physical and financial infrastructure in such a way that the organization will not be able to recover and improve its operational capability between one blow and the next (I).

Terrorism = Motivation + operational capability




Figure 1 – Types of Non-Conventional Terrorism

It is imminent that the scope and nature of terrorism at the dawn of the third millennium constitutes a tangible threat to the peace of modern Western civilization, and poses a serious challenge to the enlightened world. As such, there is a primary need to approach a new level of international cooperation in the effort to confront radical Islamic terrorism. It is no longer enough to improve and enhance international cooperation on the basis of the familiar formula; rather, there is a need to develop a joint international counter-terrorism campaign. *The transition from international cooperation to a joint counter-terrorism campaign* is not merely a semantic change, but rather, it entails a new understanding regarding the essence of the struggle and the means needed for coping on an international scale. Naturally, the transition to a joint international campaign does not contradict the need to enhance cooperation as was described above, but at the same time, it demands that we establish joint frameworks of action for a more effective international effort, which relate to almost all spheres and elements of counter-terrorism:

Establishing a "League of Nations Fighting Terrorism" – To promote effective action against terrorist organizations and the states that support them, a permanent, international anti-terrorism institution must be given the authority to identify nations and organizations considered to be involved in terrorism, and determine sanctions and actions to be taken against them. This institution would operate on the basis of a clear and approved mandate. It would include experts from different countries who would study global terrorism and on the basis of their findings, would publish an annual list of nations supporting terrorism. International sanctions could then be adopted against countries included on that list, in accordance with the scope of their support, so as to force them to stop or limit their involvement.

This is a particularly challenging task and would require a broad international consensus regarding a definition of terrorism, and a classification of the different levels of involvement. Most likely any international effort in this direction would be doomed to fail, although perhaps some of the goals can be achieved through the establishment of a "League of Nations Fighting Terrorism" by a few countries, with others joining later on.

The United Nations should fulfill this role, but past experience shows that it cannot be expected to lead an effective campaign against international terrorism, and certainly not against specific sponsors of terrorism.

Legislative and judicial action – An international court for terrorist crimes should be instituted. The idea is to fill the lacuna that presently exists since the establishment of the International Court of Justice in the Hague, regarding which it had already been stipulated that the court would be authorized to try any person – leader and common citizen alike – but only for criminal acts or war crimes, without any mention of terrorist activity. Instead, an international court for terrorism would focus on trials for terrorists, and would be based on an accepted definition of terrorism and international charters ratified accordingly. This court could also recommend that international institutions develop new international charters, if necessary.

Intelligence – This international entity should employ its own independent intelligence sources against terrorist agents throughout the world. The international intelligence body will make available to the league of nations committed to the uncompromising struggle against international terrorism, real-time warning data, as well as information concerning the movements, intentions, capabilities and characteristics of terrorist operations.

Academic activity – Terrorism is an interdisciplinary issue more than any other phenomenon. Almost every academic discipline is relevant to one aspect of terrorism or other – political science, international relations, Middle Eastern studies, sociology, psychology, economics, computer science, law, biology, chemistry, physics, and many more. For this reason, the issue of coping with terrorism demands a perspective and analytical ability as broad as possible. The academic system must be prepared by making available all relevant knowledge and information. As part of this effort, an international academic research network should be set up with the finest academic minds, directing them towards research questions that are particularly relevant for prevention agencies, providing them with the necessary financial resources, forging links between different researchers from around the world and conducting working meetings, and helping to build joint academic databases.

Educational and informational activity – To enlist international public opinion in the vital struggle, informational and educational activities must be dovetailed in nations coping with terrorism, and other nations as well. An international framework of experts should be established to formulate joint public relations and educational policies, and to work with education systems in the different nations. It is especially important that this framework offer assistance to education

and information systems in Muslim countries as part of the effort to counter radical Islamic indoctrination.

The experience garnered by various nations with regard to counter-terrorism could be used to help other nations that lack relevant experience in this sphere, making their struggle more effective. Information about these issues can be transmitted via joint training activities – shared counter-terrorism courses, exchange programs for officers and fighters, tactical drills, strategic education, etc.

Another form of cooperation has to do with sharing technological knowledge. There should be a united effort to develop a variety of technological means: to identify and neutralize terrorists from a distance; intelligence equipment for wiretapping, surveillance, command and control; means for locating and neutralizing explosives, as well as chemical and biological agents; methods for supervising crowds and restoring order. A joint, international technological effort in all of these areas can help improve the final outcome, reduce development costs, and shorten time frames. Joint technological teams can more easily overcome typical technical problems and obstacles on the road to product development, while basing their efforts on technological experience gained in various countries.

The system of international charters must include provisions that will require nations to act against infrastructures of foreign terrorist organizations located on their territory, and against communities that aid terrorist organizations operating on their soil; charters that obligate nations to fight terrorist financing – raising funds aimed at terrorist activity, money-laundering and camouflaging funds under the guise of philanthropic social welfare activities; charters that compel banks to divulge information to security forces regarding terrorist organizations or those suspected of involvement in terrorist activity; treaties for extraditing terrorists and their associates; treaties that prohibit membership in terrorist organizations and perpetrating various types of terrorist acts – suicide bombings, extortion attacks, killing and sabotage; treaties that establish a nation's right to carry out counter-terrorist activity against terrorist organizations on the territory of another nation under certain circumstances; and so on. That requires first of all formulating a normative common denominator in the form of an international accepted objective definition for the term "terrorism." This definition must be as narrow and limited as possible so that it represents the broadest possible basis for shared agreement. A definition that may fit to these guidelines is: "Terrorism is the deliberate use of violence aimed against civilians in order to achieve political ends". This definition makes a distinction between the goals of terrorists and their modes of operation, stating the

regardless how just and legitimate the goal of the perpetrators of the attacks, there is one kind of measure that should be always forbidden – the deliberate use violence aimed against civilians – meaning – Terrorism.

Without acknowledging the severe threat that international “global jihad” terrorism posing to the safety of the world, without changing the particular interest of every civilized state and referring to counter-terrorism as the most important task of the state, and without adopting an international accepted definition of the term “terrorism”, the international community will not be able to create the necessary international institutions, and to adopt the international strategies that are needed for combating effectively the danger of modern and post-modern terrorism.

¹THE NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM AND DIMENSIONS THAT TERRORISM REACHED

Mr. Michael SMITH (UK)¹



Paper by Michael Smith presented to the International Symposium on Global Terrorism and International Cooperation organised by Nato's Centre of Excellence - Defence Against Terrorism in Ankara 23rd-24th March 2006

It was the 19th century Italian republican Carlo Pisacane who first articulated the belief of "propaganda by deed" on which modern-day terrorism is based, arguing that violence was the only reliable catalyst to changing popular perception, initially by drawing their attention to a new way forward and ultimately rallying them behind it.² Pisacane died in 1857 attempting to put his ideas into practice against the Bourbons but they were soon taken up by

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He left school at 15 to join the British Army and after service with the Royal Artillery became a member of the army's Intelligence Corps monitoring terrorist and Soviet Bloc communications. Smith studied Arabic at the army's own specialised training unit, before working for three years in the Middle-East collecting intelligence on terrorists operating in Syria, Iraq and the Lebanon.

He left the army in 1982 to join the BBC Monitoring Service, the British equivalent of the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Smith left the BBC in 1990 to become a newspaper journalist. He wrote on eastern Europe for the *Financial Times* and the *Sunday Times* before joining the *Daily Telegraph*, where he was Defence Correspondent and covered a number of wars and international conflicts

He reported on the 1991 Gulf War and various conflicts in the Balkans - twice going into Kosovo under fire to meet up with the Kosovo Liberation Army during the 1999 war. More recently, he has reported the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

² Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Gollancz, London, 1998

terrorists in the British Isles, where the Fenians sought home rule for Ireland. When an attempted rebellion against British rule was thwarted in March 1867, the Fenians took their campaign to the mainland, killing thirteen people, including a police officer. Fearing the start of a widespread bombing campaign, the British Home Office set up its own fully fledged "Secret Service Department" under a young Anglo-Irish lawyer called Robert Anderson. By pure chance, Anderson was able to recruit a Briton who had close contacts with the Fenians in America to infiltrate their ranks. Thomas Billis Beach adopted the alias of Henri le Caron and set up a Fenian camp in Lockhart, Illinois, with himself as camp commandant. He was rapidly promoted, first to Military Organiser of the Irish Republican Army and later to Inspector General, feeding Anderson with every detail of the IRA's operations.³

In the early 1880s, the Fenians began a new bombing campaign on the mainland, killing a seven-year-old boy and leading the Metropolitan Police Criminal Investigation Department to set up a Fenian Office. The rebel campaign escalated in 1882 with the assassination of Lord Frederick Cavendish, Chief Secretary for Ireland, and Thomas Burke, his permanent under-secretary, as they were walking through Phoenix Park in Dublin. It reached its peak in the Dynamite War of 1883, when some ten bombs exploded in London alone. Sir William Vernon Harcourt, the Home Secretary, called for the creation of what was eventually to become the Special Branch. "This is not a temporary emergency requiring a momentary remedy," he wrote. "Fenianism is a permanent conspiracy against English rule, which will last far beyond the term of my life and must be met by a permanent organisation to detect and to control it." In March 1883, the Metropolitan Police set up an Irish Bureau with a network of agents and informers run by Major Nicholas Gosselin, whose main qualification for the job was that "he understands these Irish scoundrels and can talk to them". It did not have an auspicious start. Just over a year after its creation, in direct response to a series of mainland bomb attacks by Fenian Dynamitards, a bomb in the public lavatory below its Scotland Yard offices destroyed a large section of the building and caused considerable injury. But the bureau survived, and four years later it became the Special Branch, which remains central to British police counter-terrorist efforts to this day.⁴

³ J. A. Cole, *Prince of Spies: Henri le Caron*, Faber, London, 1984; Henri le Caron, *Twenty-Five Years in the Secret Service*, William Heinemann, London 1892; Bernard Porter, *Plots and Paranoia: A History of Political Espionage in Britain 1790-1988*, Unwin Hyman, London, 1998.

⁴ Porter, *op cit*; Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, William Heinemann, London, 1985

Pisacane's beliefs were also taken up in 1878 by Russian revolutionaries, *Narodnaya Volya* (The People's Will). But their timid approach to terrorism suggests a complete failure to understand Pisacane's point about the use of violence to change the accepted views of the population. *Narodnaya Volya* set about attempting to assassinate members of the royal family and senior civil servants identified as key members of the Tsar's establishment. Its members adhered emphatically to the view that "not one drop of superfluous blood" should be spilt. The impossible constraints they imposed upon themselves by this belief so hampered their operations that they mounted eight unsuccessful attempts to assassinate Tsar Alexander II before finally succeeding in March 1881. Their success rested on the use of four different bombers, one of whom detonated his own bomb, killing both himself and the Tsar. The group's members were subsequently rounded up and hanged but a new generation had learned nothing from the failure and a terrorist assassin sent to kill the Grand Duke Serge Alexandrovich in 1905 pulled out of the mission when he saw that the grand duke was accompanied by his children.⁵

Terrorist attacks continued and were refined during the first half of the 20th century, the most notable being the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Bosnian Serb revolutionary Gavrilo Princip and the successful campaign by Sinn Fein from 1919 to 1921 to set up the Irish Free State. But it was not until the end of the Second World War and the widespread attempts by European colonies to obtain independence, that terrorism burgeoned into a worldwide process. The Jewish Irgun terrorist group had begun attacking Palestinian Arabs in 1937, in retaliation for the Arab revolt against the arrival of large numbers of Jews fleeing Nazi Germany. At the start of the Second World War, Irgun declared a truce in their fight against the British, who administered Palestine under mandate from the League of Nations. But in early 1944, with allied victory now seen as inevitable, they resumed terrorist attacks. Led by Menachim Begin, a Polish Jew who had found his way to Israel after being arrested by the Russians, ironically on charges of being "an agent of British imperialism", they began carrying out attacks on British troops and Arab villages in a campaign that aimed to wear away resistance to the creation of a Jewish state rather than persuade opponents of Zionism that this was a good idea.

The key factor underpinning the campaign by Irgun and its fellow Jewish terrorist groups – and one that has been at the heart of all subsequent successful insurgency campaigns - was recognition that

⁵ Hoffman, op cit

they could not win a battle to the death, since their opponents were far more capable militarily. But they had a capability in the use of terror, that their opponents could only use themselves at the risk of international opprobrium. Even if their opponents did choose to use terror against terror, it would only generate more support for the actions of the Jewish groups. Eventually support for their own cause would become so great and the prospect of further terrorist attacks so repulsive that it would tip the balance in their favour and the British would decide that it was preferable to give in.

Irgun took terror to previously unfathomed depths with the bombing, in July 1946, of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in which 91 people died. Notwithstanding the spate of bombings at the end of the 20th century and the start of the current century, it remains one of the most lethal terrorist attacks of all time, and it was arguably both the first attack to take account of the full logic of Pisacane's views and in more than one way the progenitor of modern terrorism. Despite its excessive lethality, the attack on the King David's hotel did its job, drawing the attention of the world to the Zionist cause and starting a process that led directly to the creation of a Jewish state and indirectly to the creation of a multitude of Palestinian and Islamist terrorist organisations.⁶

The approach adopted by Irgun was repeated with similar success against the British in Cyprus, where there were also similarly controversial results, and against the French in Algeria, where French troops attempted to use terror against terror, completely alienating the Algerian population, and world opinion, and making the situation markedly worse than it would otherwise have been.⁷ The result of these successes was that terrorism acquired a new respectability. Terrorist leaders became national leaders feted at the UN and terrorism was shown to have worked.

The defeats at the hands of the terrorists in Palestine and Cyprus and growing aspirations for independence in a number of their colonies forced the British to investigate more effective ways of dealing with terrorism. They found them during the Malayan Emergency of 1948-60. Living off the land and on the run, the insurgents needed the support of elements within the local population whose willingness to support the insurgency rested as much on the belief that it would improve their living conditions as a wish for an independent state and government. The British general Sir Henry Briggs devised a policy, known initially as "political pacification", which was designed to wrest that support away from the communist

⁶ Menachim Begin, *The Revolt: Story of the Irgun*, Steimatzky, Jerusalem, 1977

⁷ Hoffman, op cit

terrorists led by Chin Peng and ensure that an independent Malaya had a pro-western government.

That policy, which would become known by its more informal ambitions of winning “hearts and minds”, was to be an integral part of the overall military plan. The policy was articulated and put into action by General Gerald Templer, formerly Britain’s post-war Director of Military Intelligence. Templer was dispatched to the colony in early 1952, following the assassination by Chin Peng’s Communist insurgents of Sir Henry Gurney, the British High Commissioner. He laid out the plan to win the “hearts and minds” of the population from the very start. “Any idea that the business of normal civil government and the business of the Emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and all,” he said shortly after arriving in the colony. “The shooting side of this business is only 25 per cent of the trouble and the other 75 per cent is getting the people of this country behind us.”

Templer brought with him MI5 officers intended to revitalise the inefficient Malayan Security Service and set up an intensive intelligence and military reconnaissance campaign, closely integrating military intelligence (both the Intelligence Corps and the Special Air Service) with MI5, the Malayan Security Service (a local equivalent of MI5) and the Malay Police Special Branch. The SAS set about denying local support to the Communist guerrillas, identifying and eliminating causes for discontent with the British to win over the “hearts and minds” of the local population. In a carefully staggered operation, more than 400 villages were moved to specially constructed *kampongs*, or new villages, away from the insurgents, as area after area was declared “white” - clean of Communist influence – and emergency restrictions were lifted. This provided further incentive for other areas to co-operate and become “white”.⁸

“Intelligence was the key to the Templer method,” one former British intelligence officer said. “Intelligence Corps involvement expanded into more conventional army intelligence activities and secondment to the Special Branch of the police. The political pacification role the SAS played, directed by this police/army intelligence unit, had much to do with wrenching the initiative from the rebels and putting it firmly in the hands of the post-independence government. What was lacking was information about the terrorist organisation and order of battle and their supplies. Our main task was to track them down by means of every kind of intelligence - informers from the towns and villages where supplies were obtained, captured

⁸ Ian F W Beckett, *Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare*, ABC/CLIO, Oxford, 1999; Michael Smith, *New Cloak Old Dagger*, Gollancz, London 1996

documents from camps overrun by our patrols, prisoners and aerial photographs. At the start of the year, we knew where Chin Peng had been four months before and when I left we knew where he had been six weeks before. Eventually, some time later, they got so close on his tail that he fled over the border into Thailand.”⁹

The combination of extensive highly integrated intelligence and a minimum-force “hearts and minds” operation was used intermittently, and to differing extents, throughout the retreat from empire and was probably used to best effect in Oman where between 1970 and 1976, the SAS honed the policy to perfection. Under the guise of a British Army Training Team (BATT), based in the Dhofari capital Salalah, they fought a guerrilla war against communist rebel tribesmen from the so-called People’s Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) sent in by the Marxist government in the neighbouring People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. Meanwhile, Sultan Qaboos, who replaced his unpopular father in a bloodless coup at the start of the campaign, put in place a large number of reforms. Assisted by the SAS, he provided water, electricity, medical facilities and communications, including television to improve the lot of the local population on the Dhofari *Jebel* and to undermine any support for the rebels. The main fighting force was the *Firqat*, small teams of former rebels, turned by the SAS to fight against their former colleagues under SAS leadership. The SAS received support from a number of other British forces, including an armoured reconnaissance squadron, a field engineer squadron, military intelligence units, and RAF pilots who flew the Omani Air Force Jaguar ground attack aircraft, as well as from Omani and troops from the Shah’s Iran.¹⁰

The late 1960s and early 1970s saw a proliferation of terrorist groups across Europe and the Middle-East. The creation of the state of Israel and three Arab-Israeli wars, in 1948, 1956 and 1967, led to the exodus of around a million Palestinians who were housed largely in extremely poor conditions in refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt. The humiliation of the combined, Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian forces in the 1967 Seven-Day War led to a new approach by the Palestinians who began a spate of aircraft hijackings that yet again proved Pisacane’s theory. Even though the PLO was undoubtedly the aggressor in every terrorist attack and their victims were almost uniformly civilians, the campaign transformed popular perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict, drawing attention to the large numbers of disenfranchised Palestinian Arabs. Zerzi Labib Terzi, the PLO’s chief observer at the UN, said: “The first several hijackings

⁹ Anthony M Perry, *The Malayan Effect, The Rose and the Laurel*, December 1990

¹⁰ Smith, *op cit*

aroused the consciousness of the world and awakened the media and world opinion much more – and more effectively – than 20 years of pleading at the United Nations.” That undisputable truth led to a large number of attacks by the PLO and splinter groups supported to by Syria and Iraq in particular but to varying degrees by other Arab states not normally seen as so complicit in the violence and by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries.¹¹

Terrorism also became a growth industry in Europe where it attracted groups aiming to achieve separate states or independence for former colonies in the UK, Spain, France and the Netherlands, as well as left-wing groups opposed to capitalism and the activities of their own governments in West Germany and Italy. France and the UK had in addition to deal with Middle-Eastern terrorists using London and Paris as bases from which to mount terrorist acts. The European-based groups were led by the Provisional IRA in northern Ireland, where its activities fuelled the creation of so-called Loyalist terrorist groups determined to prevent the province’s incorporation in a united Ireland. But they also included the Basque separatist organisation ETA, the National Liberation Front of Corsica and its various splinter groups, and the more political Red Army Brigades in Italy and Red Army Faction, aka Baader-Meinhof group, in West Germany. The emergence of such groups inside western Europe and the use of the courts to prosecute them led to a sharpening of terrorist operational security and as a direct result the intelligence methods used to capture them.

One of the biggest problems facing counter-terrorist organisations as they sought to capture terrorists and bring them to trial was the disclosure rules that exist to protect defendants and under which the prosecuting authorities are effectively obliged to disclose the methods used to obtain any evidence they use in the trial. During the early 1990s, it was estimated that the reluctance of the police, or the security and intelligence services, to disclose evidence that would reveal intelligence sources was leading to an average of one court case a week being aborted. Disclosing the identity of an informer or a secret intelligence collection technique must be avoided at all costs, and numerous prosecutions had to be aborted because the judge backed up demands from the defence for the informer or method of intelligence collection to be identified. Even the act of aborting a case to protect an informant is risky, one police officer said. “It tips off the defendants that they had an informer in their midst and they will try to

¹¹ Hoffman op cit; Richard Holmes, *The Oxford Companion to Military History*, OUP, Oxford, 2001; Alex P Schmid and Janny de Graaf, *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media*, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1982

find him by a process of elimination. That could well cost him his life.”¹² But it is not only informers that need to be protected. Methods of detection can be just as vulnerable. “The constant see-saw is the counter-intelligence from their side,” said John Grieve, a former Scotland Yard Director of Intelligence. “They are constantly trying to find out how we did it.”¹³

Even where a case proceeds and the defendant is convicted, other members of the gang frequently learn enough about police methods from disclosure of evidence to allow them to develop their own counter-measures and render sources useless. The German urban terrorist group the Red Army Faction developed into a highly professional organisation, always ensuring that no fingerprints were left behind in safe houses. But the *Bundeskriminalamt* (BKA), the German federal police, discovered the terrorists were neglecting to check the underneath of toilet seats. When fingerprints were produced as evidence in open court, the terrorists’ defence lawyers insisted on being told exactly where in a safe house the fingerprints were discovered. Although that prosecution was successful, the BKA never found fingerprints under a toilet seat again. For security reasons, the Red Army Faction would pay the rent and power bills for its safe houses in cash. But since Germany has become a relatively cashless society BKA investigators were able to search through the power company’s computers for customers who moved out of addresses close to where attacks took place at roughly the same time and who paid their bills in cash. After the Red Army Faction’s lawyers forced disclosure of this technique in open court, the terrorists stopped paying in cash.¹⁴

Defence lawyers constantly mounted “fishing expeditions” to find out what they could about police intelligence techniques, Grieve said. “The big issue for us is how to do these things without showing all our secret toys,” he said. “Intelligence is anathema to the lawyers. They want their hands on absolutely everything. They are not just content with the product. They want the process as well, including some of our tricks of generating live sources of information. ‘Where was the microphone? What was the frequency? Where was it positioned in the room?’ All those kind of issues. ‘Where were the surveillance teams? What technical kit did you use? What colour vehicle were you in? Tell us everything about everything. Or drop the case.’ If we get a weak judge, we get ordered to disclose all kinds of things, and no

¹² Police Abandon 70 Major Trials, *Daily Telegraph*, 23 March 1994; Save This Threatened Species: Police Informers Make a Vital Contribution to Crime Detection, *Daily Telegraph*, 23 March 1994

¹³ Grieve interview with author 25 April 1995

¹⁴ Hoffman, op cit

lawyer in this day and age will say, 'I won't tell my client.' So a massive amount of material gets released. It's a big issue for us - a really big issue."¹⁵

Nor was the problem just one that affects the police, according to Stella Rimington, the former MI5 Director-General. "There is an inherent uncertainty in judging in advance how the courts may view individual operations and methods which we regard as sensitive. Many such sensitive techniques have to be protected at all costs, because they cannot be replaced. This sometimes means that we are unable to use the most effective investigative methods in cases that may result in prosecution. In some cases, rulings by the judge may cause the prosecution to be discontinued because the material information is so sensitive that it is not possible to disclose it in any form." There are no operations that MI5 now mounts in which a lawyer is not overseeing the process, making sure that at every point not just that all the evidence that needs to be used is collected using methods that can be revealed in court.¹⁶

But there was another problem emerging during the 1980s that was to prove to have a dramatic impact on the face of terrorism. Encouraged and trained by Syria and Iran, the Shi'ite Lebanese groups Hezbollah (Party of God) and Islamic Jihad made a name for themselves with a number of high-profile kidnappings of westerners in Beirut. But arguably far more important to the face of modern terrorism were a series of attacks they carried out in 1983. The first attack, on the US embassy in Beirut in April, killed 69 people, the second and third attacks, on the same day in October 1983, killed 241 US Marines and 59 French troops, the third on an Israeli military government building in Sidon a month later killed 67 people. Mass terrorism had arrived on the scene and while Israel and France retaliated, to little effect, the US appeared impotent in its response. This sent out a clear message that America was vulnerable, encouraging Islamist groups to attack the US in an attempt to wear down its support for Israel.¹⁷

Although it was to be another ten years before Islamist terrorists resumed mass murder, the 1983 attacks undoubtedly signalled the emergence of a new type of terrorist. The threat from these new terrorists was far less easy to quantify than the relatively straightforward behaviour of, for instance, the Provisional IRA or the Palestinian hijackers of the 1970s. While few in the West agreed with

¹⁵ Grieve interview

¹⁶ Stella Rimington, James Smart Lecture, City of London Police Headquarters, 3 November 1994

¹⁷ Michael Smith, *Killer Elite*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 2006

their violent methods, the use by the 1970s terrorists of “spectaculars”, attacks specifically designed to lead to television and newspaper coverage that drew attention to their aspirations was easy to understand and even to identify with. These terrorists were unhappy with specific aspects of the society in which they lived and were using violence to force the changes they required. The aim was not to kill per se, but to extract the maximum publicity, to publicise the cause, and to wear down resistance to their demands. Excessive violence was regarded as counter-productive. When it occurred - often because the cellular structure adopted by such groups had led to a temporary loss of control over maverick individuals - it tended to alienate their supporters and even many within the groups themselves. But the new types of terrorists do not operate under the same set of assumptions. They do not see themselves as part of society as it currently exists, and they have no regard for anyone other than members of their own sect. Anyone who is not a believer is seen as expendable, making mass indiscriminate violence not only morally acceptable but in fact compulsory - a divine duty incumbent on any true believer. A further problem for western counter-terrorist agencies is the lack of any identification with western society and aspirations which makes Islamic fundamentalist terrorism far less easy to understand and predict.¹⁸

The 1994 hijacking by Algerian fundamentalists of an Air France A300 Airbus provided a good example of this phenomenon. The initial assumption was that this was an attempt by the terrorists to draw attention to the civil war taking place in their homeland - much in the manner of the spate of Palestinian hijackings of the late 1960s and early 1970s. By this reasoning, the main value of the attack would come from the worldwide publicity achieved during long-drawn-out negotiations for the release of the hostages. In fact, the terrorists planned to fly the aircraft into the Eiffel Tower and to kill as many people as possible. They would have done so had the French authorities not discovered the plan and carried out a successful assault on the aircraft as it stood on the ground at Marseilles airport. Then in 1995, Philippines police broke up a network of terrorists who were planning to plant bombs on a dozen US airliners and blow them up simultaneously over the Pacific.

Abdul Hakim Murad, one of the co-conspirators, was linked to the failed 1993 attempt to blow up the World Trade Centre in New York and information gathered in the raids led to the conviction of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef. The mastermind behind the attack, Yousef had spent

¹⁸ This section on the emergence of al-Qaeda comes entirely from Michael Smith, *The Spying Game*, Politicos, London, 2003

some time staying in a Pakistani guest house belonging to a Saudi called Osama bin Laden, who appeared to be using an organisation he had set up called al-Qaeda (the Base) to channel money from his fortune into a holy war against the West. Murad, a Pakistani national, described how he had attended flight schools in New York, Texas, California and North Carolina, gaining a commercial pilot's licence "in preparation for a suicide mission". He had intended to seize a small plane, fill it with explosives and fly it into the CIA's Langley headquarters with the intention of killing several thousand people. The Philippines interrogation report sent to the FBI stated: "It is a suicidal mission that he is very much willing to execute."

Like Yousef, Murad was linked to al-Qaeda, the organisation set up by bin Laden in the mid-1980s. Bin Laden was the son of a Yemeni builder who had become head of a large construction firm linked to the Saudi royal family. He studied at Jeddah University where he came under the influence of a prominent Palestinian Dr Abdullah Azzam, a man regarded as the inspiration behind the fundamentalist Palestinian terror group Hamas. Bin Laden's family money helped to set up a Mujahideen organisation to fight against the Russians in Afghanistan. The Afghan Bureau had links to the Saudi and Egyptian governments, and the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). But in 1988, bin Laden fell out with Azzam over the latter's support for Ahmad Shah Masood - the western-backed Mujahideen leader, who led the Northern Alliance until he was assassinated by al-Qaeda terrorists two days before the September 11th attacks. It was then that he set up al-Qaeda.

During the 1990s, al-Qaeda set out to help any Muslims who were fighting against regimes they felt were not following fundamentalist Islamic teachings. These Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia, which had failed to honour its promise to force foreign troops to leave once Iraq was expelled from Kuwait. It also sent former Mujahideen to assist Muslim forces fighting in the Bosnia; Kosovo; Kashmir; Dagestan; Chechnya; China's Xinjiang province; the Philippines; and Indonesia. But at the same time it plotted attacks against America and US interests around the world. Its planning continued to be based on the premise that America was a paper tiger, a view reinforced by the Clinton administration's premature withdrawal of a Delta/US Rangers special operations task force from Somalia following the death of 18 US servicemen in the 1993 Black Hawk Down incident.

A subsequent captured al-Qaeda document, which claims al-Qaeda involvement in the "great victory in Somalia", articulates the belief that despite its military might America is easy to wear down due to the politicians' perceived reluctance to see body bags returning

from war zones. "The Somali experience confirmed the spurious nature of American power and that it has not recovered from the Vietnam complex. It fears getting bogged down in a real war that reveal its psychological collapse at the level of personnel and leadership. Since Vietnam, America has been seeking easy battles that are completely guaranteed. It entered into a shameful series of adventures on the island of Grenada, then Panama, then bombing Libya, and then the Gulf War farce, which was the greatest military, political and ideological swindle in history."¹⁹

By 1995, bin Laden had lost his Saudi citizenship and was based in Sudan where, on top of a personal fortune put at around £200million, he had a number of businesses providing funds for al-Qaeda. Then in 1996, a man claiming to be a leading al-Qaeda member, Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, turned up at a US embassy in Africa offering information on al-Qaeda. "I have information about people," he said. "They want to do something against your government. Maybe they will try to do something in the United States and they may try to fight the United States Army outside, and also they may try to make a bomb against some embassy."

The CIA set up a special operation, codenamed Alex, within its counter-terrorism centre to track bin Laden and al-Qaeda activities and in May 1996, under pressure from America, Sudan expelled bin Laden, confiscating some of his personal fortune. He moved al-Qaeda and its training camps to Afghanistan where the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban was just beginning to take control of the country. A month later, a lorry bomb exploded at a military barracks in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 US servicemen. An example of the second of al-Fadl's predicted attacks had taken place. Protected by US intelligence, al-Fadl provided a detailed account of how al-Qaeda operated, which could now be checked against information obtained from a new, extraordinarily valuable source that had just come on line. The London representative of al-Qaeda had bought an Inmarsat satellite telephone for bin Laden in New York. He was under surveillance by MI5 and the number of the telephone was automatically passed to GCHQ, the British signals intelligence and cryptanalysis centre. The intercepts had shown that the Khobar Towers attack and a previous attack in November 1995 on a Saudi National Guard base in Riyadh in which five US trainers were killed were the first in a series of attacks against US interests. A Top Secret report issued by the CIA's Counterterrorism Center said that bin Laden had received a call to his satellite telephone confirming that the

¹⁹ See Harmony documents at <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/AFGP-2002-600053-Trans.pdf>

Khobar Towers attack had taken place, that he had been called by Aywan al-Zawahiri, the leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who congratulated him on the attack, and that the al-Qaeda leader had told several other terrorists that the Riyadh bombing was the first attack, Dhahran was the second and that "more is coming".

Information from conversations on that telephone and others linked to it, married to al-Fadl's information, allowed western intelligence services to build up a highly detailed picture of al-Qaeda's organisation. Bin Laden was intent on waging a holy war against America and the West. He totally controlled al-Qaeda. He was advised by a consultative council, the *Shura Majlis*. This ruling group controlled four separate committees, the Political Committee; the Information Committee; the Administrative and Financial Committee and the military committee, which was the most important. It had five sections: the section led by the committee president, who was bin Laden's effective number two, Mohammed Atif, and was in charge of all military operations; a combat training section; a combat operations section; a nuclear weapons section; and a Library and Research Section. The military committee ran the training camps and planned and prepared the operations. The operations used a classic cellular structure with no-one knowing more than he - there were no women in the organisation - needed to know.²⁰

Al-Qaeda had begun to spread its influence among other Islamic fundamentalist groups, financing their operations, albeit only after every detail of the plan had been confirmed by bin Laden and Atif, and acting as an umbrella organisation for a wide range of radical terrorist organisations, an anti-American terrorist front. In return for the financing and crucially training, the groups carried out their terrorist attacks in al-Qaeda's name as well as their own in what amounted to the establishment of a series of al-Qaeda franchises. The training function, carried out in its own camps, allowed al-Qaeda to influence the active members of each of the groups, effectively infiltrating them and spreading its influence still further. These included the two main Egyptian fundamentalist groups, the Islamic Group of Egypt and Egyptian Islamic Jihad from whom many of al-Qaeda's members were drawn. But they also spanned the world to include: the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF); the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines; *Jemaah Islamiah* and the *Laskar Jundullah* militia in Indonesia; two Algerian groups - the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) - and a number of Kashmiri groups, including

²⁰ See Harmony documents at <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/AFGP-2002-000078-Trans.pdf>

Harakat-ul Jihad, Harakat-ul Mujahideen and Hizbi-al-Islami. There were also close links to Hamas and Hezbollah. Al-Qaeda also spread its influence among Muslim groups in Europe and even America itself.

It was clear that al-Qaeda was rapidly becoming the single most dangerous terrorist threat to America and the West in general. By June 1998, intelligence from a number of sources indicated that bin Laden was considering attacks on the United States mainland, on New York and Washington. The biggest terrorist threat to Britain remained dissident Irish Republican groups. But among foreign terrorist groups al-Qaeda was far and away the most important target and dominated the counter-terrorist agendas of both MI6 and GCHQ. Then on August 7th 1998, it struck again, this time driving lorry bombs up to the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 people of whom only 12 were US citizens. The third of the al-Fadl warnings had come true. President Clinton ordered cruise missile strikes against a pharmaceuticals factory in Sudan thought to belong to al-Qaeda and one of the Afghan training camps where bin Laden and key associates were due to hold a meeting. It was to be an intelligence disaster. Not only did the owner of the pharmaceuticals factory come forward to claim he was nothing to do with bin Laden, but the terrorist leader had left the Afghan training camp six hours before the missile struck. If he was not already wondering about the remarkable coincidence that the camp should be attacked on the same day he and his key advisors were holding a meeting there, he soon learned that it was no coincidence.

One or more US officials leaked the ability to tap bin Laden's satellite telephone to the US media, detailing the telephone calls that followed the Khobar Towers attacks.²¹ "We never again heard from that satellite phone," a senior US administration official said. But if the satellite telephone bought in London was no longer in use, GCHQ had built up a directory of contact numbers for other telephones. Some of these would have been discarded by the terrorists as insecure, but enough would have remained to start building up a picture of the fresh network of telephones. GCHQ had also monitored faxes being sent al-Qaeda's London representative, including one in the wake of the Nairobi bombing that with the assistance of MI6 led back to one of the bombers, Mohamed Rashid Daoud al-Owhali, a

²¹ There was a spate of claims in US newspapers in December 2005 that this was in fact not true and that the article in the *Washington Times* referred only in general terms to the US ability to intercept telephone calls. But the article spoke specifically about telephone calls made to and from bin Laden's satellite telephone. The details of the intercepts were subsequently also published in *US News and World Report* which published similar material on 31st August 1998 and *Newsweek*, which used it in an article published 19th October 1998. See: Bin Laden's several links to terrorist units known, *Washington Times*, 23 August 1998

Saudi citizen who was extradited to America and, along with three accomplices, jailed for life for his part in the bombing.

It was already clear by late 1998 not only that bin Laden was exploring the use of every kind of weapon, including if possible nuclear weapons, but that he was determined to take his attacks to the United States mainland. In September of that year, there was a report that al-Qaeda terrorists planned to fly an aircraft filled with explosives into a US airport. Over the next few months, intelligence showed that al-Qaeda was trying to set up an operations cell inside the United States with the intention of attacking targets in New York and Washington and that bin Laden was offering a bounty for the assassination of four senior intelligence officials. One intelligence assessment stated that bin Laden was "actively planning against US targets" and that a number of reports showed he was "keenly interested in striking the US on its own soil". Tenet told his deputies that despite their successes against al-Qaeda "we all acknowledge that retaliation is inevitable and that its scope may be far larger than we have previously experienced. We are at war. I want no resources or people spared in this effort either inside CIA or the community." There were continuing reports throughout 1999 from the intelligence and security services of a number of countries that al-Qaeda was planning attacks on the United States.

By now a large network of intelligence and security agencies around the world were cooperating on terrorist issues. Based on a largely US and European network set up before the Gulf War, the network had been extended to include a number of friendly Arab countries, Russia and other member states of the former Soviet Union, and countries in the Far East, including the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore. This ensured that a number of attempts to mount attacks around the millennium were foiled and the suspects arrested. One of the most prominent of these foiled attacks was a plan to take the battle to the United States itself, bombing Los Angeles International Airport, thwarted when the main suspect was arrested as he attempted to enter America from Canada. A second attack was to be aimed at American and Israeli tourists visiting Christian holy sites in Jordan in order to celebrate the Millennium. Palestinian militants intended to use 16 tons of TNT to flatten the 400-room Radisson Hotel in central Amman, which was fully booked, largely by Americans, Israelis and Europeans who intended to visit Jordan to celebrate the dawn of the millennium. Other targets included two Christian holy sites and two border crossings into Israel. The plot had been more than three years in the making but had been

given added impetus when the terrorists obtained the backing of al-Qaeda.

They needed funding to carry out the attacks and through an intermediary, made contact with Abu Zubaydah, a key member of the al-Qaeda leadership, who was responsible for setting up links to other Islamic militant groups around the world. He screened members of the group at his guesthouse in Peshawar, Pakistan, before sending them to one of the al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. Abu Zubaydah laid down very strict ground rules designed to keep the possibility of interception of messages between himself and the group to the minimum. One member of the group should be allocated to maintain the communications link with al-Qaeda. No other members of the group were to contact him. The allocated representative had to vouch for everyone involved, who must all be enthusiastic volunteers. No one was to be coerced into taking part in the operation. All the group's targets and the timing of the attacks must be approved by al-Qaeda.

Raed Hijazi, one of the leaders of the group told his interrogators how, after completing his training in the use of explosives, he was taken to one side by Abu Zubaydah. He was given a piece of paper on which were written the words: "In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate. I promise to ally myself to Osama bin Laden for the sake of God." After reading it out aloud, he was told he was now authorised to act in bin Laden's name "anywhere in jihad territories". This appears to be standard practice with large numbers of specially selected al-Qaeda "members" attending training camps or guesthouses in Pakistan's Tribal Areas before being sent home or to target countries sometimes to plan and carry out attacks immediately, but more often to merge into the population until the time comes to carry out attacks.

But despite the operational security measures imposed on Abu Zubaydah, the Jordanian police were tracking the plot and were listening in when, at the end of November 1999, Abu Zubaydah gave the go-ahead for the attacks to take place on what he described "*al-yowm al-fiya*", the day of the millennium. In the early hours of December 5th, 1999, the Jordanian police raided the Amman house in which the terrorists were planning their attack and arrested a dozen men. Nine months later, a military court convicted 22 terrorists of involvement in the planned attacks. Six of them were sentenced to death, including Raed Hijazi and Abu Zubaydah, both of whom were sentenced in absentia.

A month later, a group of al-Qaeda terrorists met in Malaysia. Those attending included Khalid al-Midhar, who was a known al-

Qaeda player plus another as yet unknown man Nawaq al-Hamzi. The Malaysian authorities told the CIA that they were at the meeting but although the FBI was told of this informally, neither man was put on a US State Department watch list, which would have prevented their being allowed to enter the United States. With a major international operation against al-Qaeda now in force, the arrests continued throughout 2000, foiling an attempted attack on tourists visiting the Frankfurt Christmas Market, and into 2001. In a direct spin-off from the success of the Jordanian arrests, MI5 mounted Operation Auden, a three-month surveillance operation in London on suspected GIA terrorists linked to al-Qaeda. On February 13th, 2001, six Arabs were arrested in dawn raids by Special Branch. Subsequent searches of six houses and an Islamic library uncovered more computer disks leading to further raids in Manchester and Birmingham. Among those arrested was Abu Qatada, also known as Omar Abu Omar, a Palestinian cleric regarded as the spiritual head of al-Qaeda's European network, who had been sentenced to 15 years imprisonment in absentia by the Jordanian courts for his part in the foiled Millennium attacks. Despite the fact that Abu Qatada was on income support, police found £180,000 in sterling, US dollars, Spanish pesetas and German marks in his west London house. The British and German arrests were followed by a series in Italy, Germany, Spain and India, where an al-Qaeda group had been planning a bomb attack on the US embassy in New Delhi.

The al-Qaeda network in Britain and a number of other countries across Europe operates at several different levels. There is a first tier of people who are simply supporters of the cause, attracted by the evangelical approach adopted by militant clerics like Abu Qatada in a number of mosques in towns with large concentrations of Muslims. They represent the vast majority who would live normal law-abiding lives and never do anything other than visit the mosque, attend demonstrations and make the odd provocative statement. A second tier is made up of the much smaller number of people who were persuaded to attend one of the training camps in Afghanistan. Many of those who attended the camps would go on to fight alongside the Taliban but would balk at the idea of taking part in terrorist activities. The third tier was made up of the very few who were selected from among those attending the camps as being suitable for the terrorist operations that al-Qaeda mounted itself. These came under the direction of Mohammed Atif, the head of the military committee, who was in charge of planning all operations until he was killed during the allied attacks on Afghanistan. Atif was subsequently replaced in this

role by Aywan al-Zawahiri, head of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and bin Laden's closest confidant.

As the Bush administration took over in early 2001, officials attempted to press upon it the importance of dealing with al-Qaeda, a conviction that had been reinforced by the killing of 17 US sailors in the attack on the USS Cole off Yemen in October 2000. Richard Clarke, head of the White House Counter-Terrorism Group, outlined a series of proposals aimed at breaking up al-Qaeda. In a presentation entitled: "Response to al-Qaeda: Roll back", Clarke advocating freezing al-Qaeda funds around the world, cutting off funding from bogus charities and giving aid and assistance to countries where al-Qaeda was funding terrorist insurgencies like the Philippines; Uzbekistan; Yemen. But the key to the plan was large scale use of special operations missions inside Afghanistan to bring down aerial strikes on the al-Qaeda camps and massively increased funding for the Northern Alliance to destroy the Taliban. But amid arguments and discussions over the administration's defensive priorities, which were obsessively centred around missile defence, none of this would be done until after the so-called 9/11 attacks when al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four airliners, deliberately flying three into the World Trade Centre's Twin Towers and the Pentagon and crashing the fourth, killing more than 3,000 people.

They have been described as a greater intelligence failure than the US inability to predict the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and with some justification. Certainly, the FBI appears to have been about as inept as it could possibly have been. The CIA was criticised for its failure to place the names of al-Midhar and al-Hamzi on the State Department watch list until shortly before the attacks and for its inability to infiltrate al-Qaeda. In the wake of the attacks, one former officer claimed that his ex-colleagues did not go anywhere where they might get diarrhoea, an allegation rejected by Jim Pavitt. The CIA did however have major problems dealing with al-Qaeda and other terrorist organisations. This was partly because of the ban on recruiting anyone with an "unsavoury" background, a distinct handicap when attempting to infiltrate a terrorist organisation. But the biggest problem by far was the agency's relationship with Pakistan's ISI secret service. For reasons that remain inexplicable, even in the context of their genesis during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the CIA had an agreement with the ISI that it would not conduct unilateral operations inside Afghanistan. Given that the ISI was one of the chief sponsors of the Taliban, it is hardly surprising that this agreement seriously hampered CIA operations against al-Qaeda. Fortunately, the intelligence relationship with Britain is so strong that

this did not matter as much as it might otherwise have done. As had happened before when the US agencies were barred from doing something, the British stepped in to help. Unlike the CIA, MI6 was traditionally strong in Afghanistan and had a number of agents there, apparently including some inside al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Jim Pavitt, the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations expressed irritation at suggestions that the agency had ignored Afghanistan during the 1990s. "If you hear somebody say, and I have, the CIA abandoned Afghanistan after the Soviets left and that we never paid any attention to that place until September 11th," Pavitt said. "I would implore you to ask those people how we knew who to approach on the ground, which operations, which warlord to support, what information to collect. Quite simply we were there well before September 11th."

The biggest problem was the tightly run cellular structure of al-Qaeda. This meant that not even having well-placed agents inside the organisation would necessarily translate into knowing what form its next operation would take. Some members of the al-Qaeda hit squads who carried out the September 11th attacks were unaware other aircraft were to be hijacked and may even have had no idea of what was to happen to the aircraft they were on, Pavitt said. "The terror cells that we're coming up against are typically small and all terrorist personnel participating in those cells, perpetrating the acts of terror, all those personnel were carefully screened. The number of personnel who know vital information, targets, timing, and the exact methods to be used had to be smaller still. Against that degree of control, that kind of compartmentation, that depth of discipline and fanaticism, I personally doubt, and I draw upon my 30 years of experience in this business, that anything short of one of the knowledgeable inner circle personnel or hijackers turning himself in to us would have given us sufficient foreknowledge to have prevented the horrendous slaughter that took place on the 11th."

The British inquiry, carried out by the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee, largely absolved MI5, MI6 and GCHQ of any blame. But its main conclusion, that "the scale of the threat and the vulnerability of Western states to terrorists with this degree of sophistication and a total disregard for their own lives was not understood", raised a lot of eye-brows among the intelligence and security agencies. That the committee could conclude this is scarcely credible. For a number of years, anyone who knew anything about terrorism was aware that: a) there were a number of modern groups, particularly but not exclusively fundamentalist Islamist groups, who did not care what the general public thought of them and were very happy to kill as many people as possible, and b) that al-Qaeda

represented the biggest threat of all. More importantly it is impossible to reconcile the committee's conclusion with the first paragraph on the same page of its report, which quotes John Scarlett, then the JIC Chairman and Britain's Coordinator of Intelligence, as saying that there was an "acute awareness in the period before September 11th that Osama bin Laden and his associates represented a very serious threat" and were planning a terrorist "spectacular" inside America that summer with the intention of causing "massive casualties".

The intelligence on the attack had begun in March 2001 when one source claimed a group of al-Qaeda terrorists, one of whom was living in America, were planning an attack on America the following month. As such it was similar to operations reported during the late 1990s and never carried out. But in April it was backed up by evidence from other sources. Although no attack materialised, the intelligence "chatter" about an impending attack continued and between May and July 2001, GCHQ and its US equivalent the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted more than 30 telephone calls and emails appearing to indicate that a terrorist attack was imminent. But none gave any hint as to when and where the attack might take place. By June, suspects linked to al-Qaeda were being tracked on the move to Britain, Canada, and America, and a number of al-Qaeda terrorists were said to be preparing for "martyrdom". Scarlett told the Intelligence and Security Committee that at one high-level meeting in June "considerable anxieties were expressed at the lack of specific intelligence. Attacks, probably against US interests, were imminent but their nature and target were unknown." One agent who had recently been in Afghanistan reported that "everyone is talking about an impending attack." A US intelligence briefing for senior administration officials in July, predicted that bin Laden would "launch a significant terrorist attack against US and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks. The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against US facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning."

If the FBI had been doing its job properly, it is arguable that the attacks would not have succeeded. Despite all the above warnings, and its own internal knowledge that suspected terrorists were taking flying lessons in which they had shown no interest in learning how to land an aircraft, it had told the Federal Aviation Authority that there was no threat that required security surrounding domestic flights to be improved. After the attacks, it exacerbated those errors by participating in a series of leaks designed to try to spread the blame

for the failure to predict the attacks. That created a climate where the leakage of top secret intelligence appeared inconsequential.

The ability of the NSA and GCHQ to intercept al-Qaeda's communications had been seriously hampered, albeit fortunately not eliminated, by the 1998 leaking of details of bin Laden's satellite telephone. Now there was a further leak of signals intelligence source material from the congressional committee investigating the attacks. The NSA had allegedly intercepted two telephone calls referring to the attacks but had failed to transcribe them until the day after the attacks. The motivation behind the leak was apparently the NSA's reluctance to declassify the two messages. The leak was specifically designed to force declassification by placing them in the public domain. But the leaking of the exact text of the two conversations almost certainly ensured not only that the telephones concerned would never be used again but that other telephones which had been commonly used for communication with those two telephones would also be considered compromised and would also not be used again. The leak had only served to hamper efforts to keep track of al-Qaeda. To make matters worse, the messages were in fact intercepted and transcribed by GCHQ and not the NSA, so the leak risked damaging the transatlantic intelligence exchange which, given Britain's greater expertise at dealing with Arabic-language intercepts, was then vital to US efforts to track al-Qaeda terrorists. The person who leaked the information no doubt thought the American people needed to know that the two messages had been intercepted. But the revelation did not show any error. Given the millions of telephone calls and email conversations intercepted every day by NSA and GCHQ, the speed with which these two conversations were transcribed was extremely good, indicating that they were given a high priority, although not the highest priority. This was because the telephones were previously listed as "possibly al-Qaeda related" but their specific ownership was unclear. What is clear is that the stupid and irresponsible leak from the US inquiry did nothing to make the American people, or indeed anyone else, any safer from al-Qaeda terrorists.

But nor did the reaction of a US administration that used the attacks as an excuse to take revenge on an old enemy, squandering the widespread international sympathy for the American people which existed, even among many Arab countries, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. The initial strikes in the US war on terror enjoyed substantial international support and capturing and killing bin Laden was a real possibility. But the chance was thrown away in the rush to invade Iraq. Whether or not, it was sensible, legal, or even morally justified to invade Iraq, is frankly irrelevant. The timing of the invasion let bin

Laden and al-Qaeda off the hook when they were at their most vulnerable while the methods used created a terrorist training ground far more effective and more dangerous than that which existed in Afghanistan.

Many of the approaches adopted by the United States and its allies in the wake of the 9/11 attacks seemed designed to drive Muslims into the arms of al-Qaeda but none more so than the invasion of Iraq. The difficulty of controlling a post-war Iraq was predicted beforehand with British officials warning presciently that the allies would need to impose a new government on the Iraqis “but this would involve nation-building over many years”. Sir David Manning, then Tony Blair’s foreign policy adviser, said there was “a real risk that the Administration underestimates the difficulties. They may agree that failure isn’t an option, but this does not mean that they will avoid it.”²²

The lack of a sensible plan for post-war Iraq allowed foreign fighters to join the insurgency, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian with a past record of ultra-violent Islamist terrorism. A series of grisly videos in which western hostages were decapitated with knives gave al-Qaeda fresh impetus at a time when bin Laden and al-Zawahiri were forced to restrict movement to within Pakistan’s Tribal Areas and severely curtail electronic communications. In late 2004, al-Zarqawi formally renamed his Tawhid and Jihad insurgent group, Al-Qaeda in Iraq. But the relationship between al-Zarqawi and bin Laden remains tense. While al-Qaeda is a Sunni Muslim organization, its leadership has expressed concern that the Jordanian’s determination to regard Iraq’s Shi-ite population as the main enemy, ahead of the Americans, might undermine support for al-Qaeda among its main audience in the Arab world.²³

Al-Qaeda had continued to mount attacks in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, with a truck bomb carrying natural gas explodes outside a Tunisian synagogue in April 2002, killing 19 people; the October 2002 Bali bombing in which 202 people died; a suicide bomb attack on an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, in which 16 people died, including the three bombers and three Israelis. The invasion of Iraq was followed by a number of bombings, some of them aimed at America’s allies and now designed to wear down support both inside the US and its coalition allies for the continued allied presence in Iraq. They began with a series of five coordinated suicide bombings in Casablanca in May 2003 in which 45 people, including 12 bombers,

²² ‘Failure is not an option, but it doesn’t mean they will avoid it’, *Daily Telegraph*, 18 September 2004

²³ BBC Profile of Abu Musa al-Zarqawi at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3483089.stm

died and were followed six months later by two pairs of bombings in Istanbul which hit two synagogues; the British consulate; and a British-owned bank, killing 58 people. With the world now used to terrorist attacks on a much greater scale, these appeared relatively low-key. But in March 2004, ten bombs explode within minutes of each other on four crowded commuter trains in the centre of Madrid, killing 190 people and wounding more than 1,400. The attack was a notable success, bringing large numbers of people out onto the streets of the Spanish capital and forcing the Spanish government to withdraw its troops from Iraq. The suicide bombings came to London on July 7, 2005, killing 56 people in a series of coordinated attacks on rush-hour underground trains and a London bus. Two weeks later there was what appeared to be a copy-cat attack by a less well organized group and the detonators failed to go off. Al-Qaeda later released a videotape of one of the July 7th suicide bombers saying the attack was carried out on behalf of al-Qaeda, criticising British involvement in the Iraq War and praising al-Zarqawi. This suggests that potential attackers are routinely videoed after training in Pakistan. There continues to be debate at the time of writing over alleged failings by the British intelligence and security services, although the actual position will not become clear until the publication of a report by the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee later this year.

There remains understandable concern that Islamist terrorist have become the enemy within, with politicians searching for knee-jerk responses such as removing clerics who preach violence from the streets rather than keeping them under observation to detect those terrorists returning from training in al-Qaeda camps in Pakistan's Tribal Areas who visit them to pay homage. Not every terrorist can be tracked in this way but it is an easy method of keeping many under surveillance. Removing such people from the streets is an attractive proposition to politicians wanting to show they are doing something but is normally completely counter-productive. The politicians have also caused concern within the intelligence and security services with demands that information obtained in sophisticated intercept techniques should be used in court cases and with demands for new laws which add little to our ability to prevent terrorist attacks.

There have been some, particularly in the US, who have argued that since the current generation of Islamist terrorists are different from their predecessors in the scale of the murder and mayhem they are prepared to perpetrate, traditional counter-terrorist measures are redundant. This is a dangerous fallacy. The most effective means of dealing with terrorists remains removing the conditions which provide

them with a support base. Fortunately, this appears to be a view shared by an increasing number of influential commanders within the US Army. Despite the recent upsurge in violence that followed the destruction of a Shi-ite Muslim shrine in Samaria. There are grounds for cautious hope in Iraq. If the Sunni insurgents can be persuaded, like much-better established terrorist organizations before them, that their future is best served in government, then the population in the Sunni triangle is likely to turn against foreign insurgents like al-Zarqawi. The withdrawal of allied troops from Iraq will focus al-Qaeda on the apostate states which it sees as its main enemy, forcing these states to act more forcibly against the movement than they currently do and the tensions around al-Zarqawi and his psychopathic willingness to attack other Muslims are also likely to undermine the al-Qaeda support base. Al-Qaeda is in fact far more fragile and vulnerable than the politicians and the media would sometimes have us believe. It can certainly be beaten but it will take a concerted effort to win over the "hearts and minds" of those in the Muslim world who currently see violence as the only effective way to wear down western resolve over the situation in the Middle East. The new attitude within the US military to fighting the Long War against terrorism is a good start.

COUNTERING SOURCES SUPPORTING TERRORISM

Dr. Kimberley Thachuk (USA)¹



When confronted with the dilemma of how to counter terrorist support structures, a wide range of potential and real factors should be considered. In recent years an unfortunate but perhaps inevitable underbelly of globalization has emerged to reveal increasingly adaptive individuals and groups with malevolent associations and agendas.² While long the scourge of international society, states the world over are being assaulted by a fresh crop of non-state actors such as terrorists, organized crime, pirates, and valueless international entrepreneurs in the arms and slave trade. Terrorists along with these other powerful groups are armed with the new and improved technological advances and opportunities peculiar to this age. As a result, a conundrum has arisen for international civilized society: how to counteract such largely non-state enemies while at the same time remain cohesive and cooperative in the interests of international order. At the heart of the problem is that these menaces are increasingly weakening the cooperative spirit between states while simultaneously strengthening their stranglehold on their host

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² Kimberley Thachuk "Globalization's Sinister Underbelly" in *The Global Century* Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2002.

nations; while states squabble for the why and heretofore of counterterrorism measures, terrorists are acting like an opportunistic and deadly virus, slowly and methodically killing their hosts. Borne of this realization, states must intensify their multilateral and bilateral areas of cooperation and become a unified force in the battle against international thugs and thieves.

Roles and relations on the international stage are becoming increasingly blurred and confused. States may harbor terrorists, mafia bosses may govern states, terrorists may be voted into office, criminal enterprise may be funding terrorists, and terror tactics may be used by criminals. With such an atmosphere of near global anarchy, it hardly comes as a surprise that along with every other non-state actor, terrorists have resorted to a myriad of schemes to survive and thrive. Not only have they generated a variety of money-making schemes including running legitimate businesses and exploiting charities, they have also delved into criminal conspiracies previously considered the sole enterprise of organized crime groups. Further, the lack of official sponsorship has meant they have sought political and popular support for their activities. In this regard they have stumbled on a windfall. By employing the dual strategies of exploiting weak and corruption-riddled states while at the same time appealing to disaffected and marginalized citizens for sympathy and support, a number of terrorist groups have been able to efficiently and effectively carve out safe havens from which to conduct international operations with relative impunity. Because this problem has become so pervasive, it is now one that the global community must tackle head on. Indeed, counterterrorism strategies at the state level will have little success if not undertaken with significant international support and cooperation. It is not so much a question of tactics either. Each state can likely kill a requisite number of terrorists efficiently. The true test will be for a long-term strategy that has far-reaching consequences at both the state level and for international society. Thus rather than prioritize counterterrorism measures or adopt short-term quick-fix tactics, a holistic, long-term strategy must be developed to comprehensively address the resilient infestation of terrorism.

The Main Pillars of Terrorist Support

It may be argued that there are three main critical pillars of support upon which terrorists rely for their operations and existence: finances; impunity; and, citizen support/passive acceptance for their activities. While these groups are likely bolstered by other factors, these three pillars arguably represent a three-legged stool upon

which is balanced the success of their terrorist conspiracies and the survival of their members. In terms of finances, understanding the sources of the funds as well as the methods by which the money is moved and manipulated is critical in stemming its flow. In a globalized economy, terrorist groups would find international operations next to impossible to conduct without the ability to raise and move money. The second pillar, impunity is most often a result of corrupt and weak governments being exploited by terrorists and their allies. Ostensibly the easiest path to plot terrorist conspiracies free from the scrutiny or interference by state authorities is to buy the silence, if not the allegiance, of those willing to rent their public offices. In this regard terrorists have used methods long employed by organized crime to gain access to weak states and then manipulate their sovereign status and governments into serving as fronts for their international criminal schemes.

Once firmly entrenched and armed with the funding, citizen backing, or at least tacit public acceptance becomes the final pillar of support. Acceptance and or compliance by the citizenry is often comprised of a complex and overlapping number of psychological and sociological conditions that may differ not only between countries, but even amongst regions or cities within countries. Factors such as political culture, historical legacy, religious prominence, the role of the media, the economy, the political leadership, and so forth all play a vital role in the extent to which terrorists are enabled. Further, these particular conditions are important in terms of whether or how terrorists recruit and train new members from amongst the host population.

Moreover, these factors are most often interrelated and strategies that address them in a stove-pipe fashion will likely fail. For example, to only tackle issues of terror finance negates the fact that many terrorist money-generating schemes rely on public support and the oft-paid for willingness of corrupt officials to look the other way. Or, what cannot be overlooked is the fact that public support is often garnered by terrorist groups who provide services and quasi-government functions to gain sympathetic allies where weak governments are unable or unwilling to do so. Understanding and integrating strategies for combating terrorism requires a careful survey of the factors that underlie and sustain it. Attention to the details will ensure that the three main pillars of terrorist support are addressed simultaneously. In so doing the careful balance upon which terrorists rely is more apt to become unstable and unreliable rather than simply shaky.

1. Terror Finances

With state sponsorship for terrorism at an all time low, many terrorist groups have turned to criminal schemes to fund their day-to-day operating expenses, purchases of equipment and information, and for training, communications and travel. Like many organized criminal schemes, terrorists' crimes have a quick turn-around and can raise significant cash. In a number of cases, it might be difficult to discern exactly who constitute the terrorist groups and who constitute the organized crime groups, their criminal activities are so similar. Indeed, there is speculation that there are *ad hoc* connections between the two communities for the purposes of raising capital. While some terrorists' money sources still include contributions and donations, sale of publications (both legal and illegal), and funds derived from legitimate business enterprises, terrorists have increasingly turned to criminal transactions for quick cash.

There are at least four main criminal activities traditionally thought of as being the domain of organized crime and now a money-generating activity of terrorist groups. In addition, these include any number of lesser crimes such as extortion, kidnapping, gambling, trade in counterfeit goods, shake-downs, document forgery, bank robbery, identity theft, credit card fraud and so forth.³ The main activities include the smuggling of *narcotics, arms, people, and nuclear materials*, and *money laundering*. These linkages are transitory and informal, and should be seen as tactically pragmatic rather than strategically or purposefully perpetrated.

Narcotic Trafficking

Arms Trafficking

Human Smuggling and Trafficking

Smuggling of WMD

The profits from criminal activity are indeed immense. While impossible to quantify accurately, it is estimated that between two and five percent of the world's gross domestic product or approximately \$600 billion to \$1.8 trillion annually is involved in illicit financial transactions. Drug trafficking alone nets between \$300 and \$500 billion, with trafficking in humans amounting to approximately \$7 billion, counterfeiting between \$150 and \$470 billion, computer crimes

³Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2001":19.

\$100 billion and trafficking in small arms comprising between \$1 and \$4 billion of the “gross criminal profit”.⁴

Many of the deals demonstrate sinister terrorist motives. For example, in November 2002 the FBI helped to halt two major drugs for arms deals. In the first case, an American and two Pakistanis were attempting to trade five metric tons of hashish and 600 kilograms of heroin for four Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, which they were planning to send to al Qaeda operatives. In the second case, four members of the paramilitary organization, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia were planning to trade \$25 million in cash and cocaine for five containers of Warsaw Pact weapons. The weapons cache included 9,000 assault rifles, 300 pistols, 53 million rounds of ammunition, 300,000 grenades and some rocket-propelled grenade launchers.⁵

According to the U.S. State Department at least a dozen of the world’s 25 largest terrorist groups have ties to drug traffickers around the world.⁶ Some of these terrorist groups include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Shining Path, The Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizbollah, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and Abu Sayyaf.

Besides drug trafficking, to raise capital, terrorist groups engage in a variety of intricate, at times almost convoluted, schemes involving numerous countries. The perpetrators are as complex to follow as their machinations. For instance, in June 2003, Italian financial police targeted some forty sites in and around Milan arresting five Tunisians and a Moroccan. The suspects, an imam among them, were accused of providing financial and logistical support to the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). The charges against them ranged from false accounting, engaging in illegal immigration, receiving counterfeit documents, abetting and financing a terrorist organization and trafficking in stolen cars. They are also believed to have been running legitimate businesses as fronts to raise money for terrorist purposes.

⁴ Bossard Andre “The Basic Principles of Money Laundering” in *Crime and Justice International* Vol. 15, No. 26, March 1999:1; Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State “Remarks at International Conference on Pathbreaking Strategies in the Global Fight Against Sex Trafficking, February 25, 2003.

⁵ “Feds Break up Drug Smuggling Linked to Terrorist Groups” *New York Times* November 6, 2002.

⁶ For recent trends, see for example, United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention *World Drug Report 2005*.

In an almost surreal twist, along with other counterfeit criminal operations that pirate everyday goods such as condoms, repackaged medicines such as Viagra with expired shelf lives, toiletries such as Armani and Chanel perfumes, Head and Shoulders shampoo and Olay cream, chocolates and other food products, spare car parts, and compact discs, al Qaeda has been linked to a scheme in which counterfeit Vaseline is moved from Dubai to Britain.⁷ According to the OECD, counterfeiting accounts for approximately 7% of world commerce.

Indeed, the counterfeiting and smuggling trade has tended to be perceived as a 'victimless crime'. Yet, the U.K.'s Organized Crime Task Force reports that in 2000 alone, state revenue losses from fuel smuggling and counterfeit tobacco products between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic by the paramilitary groups of Northern Ireland led to \$568 million. One of the benefits for criminals of smuggling counterfeit goods has been that to date the penalties for those caught are less serious than for drug trafficking. Hence, while the paramilitaries have been known to bring shipments of heroin from suppliers in Southern Spain, counterfeit tobacco products from Eastern Europe have netted similar profits but with less risk. In the case of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), it is estimated that between \$ 1 million and \$15 million is needed to sustain terrorist campaigns. The PIRA's estimated fundraising capacity from smuggling counterfeit goods and contraband is believed to be between \$7.7 and \$12.3 million.⁸

The overarching goal is of course to stop terrorist attacks before they occur. Significant treasure and human resources have been dedicated to attempting to hunt down terrorists and prove their conspiracies in courts of law. However, this is much more difficult than it sounds. In general international cooperation against organized crime has had several generations to be tested by the world community whereas counterterrorism efforts are often highly political and therefore emotionally charged.

Policy Recommendation Number One: *work closely with international partners to cooperate on the law enforcement side to apprehend and incarcerate terrorists for criminal activity and thereby interdict terrorist plots while they are still in the planning stages.*

Further, while there is a substantial and often impossible evidentiary burden for proving a terrorist conspiracy, not so criminal activity. While this does not hold the same political weight as trying someone for terrorism, the result ostensibly will be that one less act of

⁷ "Massive Haul of Counterfeit Goods" BBC News July 26, 2002.

⁸ "UK Threat Assessment 2002" National Criminal Intelligence Service (UK), July 2, 2003.

terrorism will occur. Investigating and apprehending terrorists for committing or plotting terrorist acts may take years and consume untold resources and political capital; courts require high standards of evidence for terrorist conspiracies that are often difficult to meet. To circumvent that, the fact that terrorists are engaging in criminal activity serves as an opportunity for authorities to apprehend and detain them even if the connections to terrorist plots are not immediately apparent. While many counterterrorism experts argue that terrorists must be brought to justice for conspiracies and acts of terrorism, the fact is that apprehending them for criminal activity will take them off the streets and thereby impede future terrorist conspiracies. Al Capone was not caught for engaging in organized criminal activity, rather, he was indicted for tax evasion and failure to file tax returns. The eleven-year sentence that he received effectively terminated his criminal career.⁹

Money Movements

While engaging in both licit and illicit transactions, terrorists must be able to obscure the movements of cash especially as they pertain to the funding of on-going illegal operations. This is important regardless of whether the money is being laundered to disguise its origins or clandestinely distributed to interlocking cells of globally-dispersed terrorist operatives. If conducted through legitimate channels, the greatest obstacle terrorists face is banking reporting requirements.¹⁰ Particularly since September 11, due to highly successful law enforcement efforts and stricter controls on monetary transactions, terrorists have been driven underground. This has paradoxically created a more pronounced problem for tracking terrorist money movements. There is now a greater reliance than ever before on those informal money laundering and manipulation networks that currently lie beyond the scope of most money laundering agreements.

The role of informal financial transfer systems, which go by a variety of names but are usually grouped under the term “Hawala” systems, are widely used in the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, the regions of greatest concern for terrorism. The Hawala system evolved precisely as an attempt to evade strict exchange and capital controls and as a method for avoiding taxes and usurious bank charges. The system has served as an efficient

⁹ “Al Capone” History Files <http://www.chicagohs.org/history/capone.html>.

¹⁰ Currently for movements of \$10,000 or more that appear to be ‘suspicious’ a suspicious activity report (SAR) is filed in the 101 countries of the Edgmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units that have implemented national collection centers to gather information on suspicious or unusual financial activity.

and relatively safe and cost-effective free-market transaction instrument for decades, if not centuries, in some states. From a law enforcement and counterterrorism perspective, the problem with the Hawala system is precisely the lack of a “paper trail” recording the transaction between payer and payee.¹¹

While law enforcement and counterterrorism focus on the two ends of the Hawala transaction, the key to understanding Hawala is the network of hawaladars that stand between the payer and payee and the mechanisms they employ to settle outstanding balances between them. The typical hawala transaction in which a resident of one country makes a payment to a local hawaladar, who then arranges payment by a correspondent hawaladar in the destination country, leaves an unsettled balance between the two hawaladars. The ways in which the balances are settled among hawaladars is central to the operation of the system. Typically, at least one of the countries involved in the hawala transaction maintains exchange or capital controls, or punitive taxation. Thus, a simple funds transfer of net balances between the two participating hawaladars is seldom possible. In fact, this is really what differentiates hawala from banks.

The settlement of balances among hawaladars typically involves complex financial and sometimes trade transactions (often with over or under-invoicing) among multiple hawaladars, and often involving transactions in third countries. This is the reason that attempts to impose regulations on hawala are almost certainly doomed to failure. Hawala exists to evade regulation, and, over the centuries, hawaladars have become very good at it.

Individuals and small businesses must have a way to effect cross-border financial transactions. If states and the international community wish to track movements of money, they must provide honest citizens with an efficient, legal, and economical way to conduct transactions. To promote the use of legitimate channels of commerce via a combination of the elimination of exchange and capital controls (at a minimum, controls on outgoing transfers), together with a promotion of formal financial market services—including banks, but also savings cooperatives—to small transactions should be undertaken.¹²

Policy Recommendation Number Two: *Assist with the diversion of legitimate transactions to formal channels thereby greatly reducing the volume of transactions passing through Hawalas, among which*

¹¹ In a Hawala transaction, the person making the transfer makes a payment to a local hawaladar who then contacts a hawaladar in the destination country. This correspondent hawaladar makes the payment to the payee.

¹² I am deeply indebted to Dr. Varun Sani for this valuable insight.

criminal and terrorist transfers are currently hidden. Over time, the reduction in volume should mean the only groups left using the Hawala system will be those who need to hide the purposes of their transactions.

2. Corruption: Purchasing Impunity

Understanding the relationship between money laundering, manipulation and corruption is a significant and often overlooked ingredient in combating terrorist activity. Corruption serves as the second main pillar of support for terrorist groups. As such it is a critical enabler which guarantees impunity for terrorist groups who must be able to safeguard the immunity from detection and prosecution of their members and maintain their operations free from interference by the authorities. Not only does corruption minimize the opportunities for state control over the activities of terrorists, it inevitably prevents real sovereignty from being exercised. At a minimum, to operate fluidly across the frontiers of several states simultaneously, secret networks must have a guarantee of impunity from detection and apprehension. The subornation of public officials and political leaders through the use of bribery, graft, collusion and/or extortion is the vehicle by which to secure that exemption. Allowing dishonest officials to launder corruptly acquired money serves to complicate attempts to apprehend and deter terrorists. In essence, laundering money derived from a bribe enables terrorists to deftly place a second buffer between themselves and detection; this stratum is more difficult to penetrate as it lies behind the cloak of official state power. Unfortunately, it is not a matter of simply rooting out one or two corrupt officials either. Successful crackdowns and tighter controls and oversight will likely herald an increase in the attempted, and successful, subornation of officials especially in states that are already susceptible to money manipulation and laundering.

As with the successful interdiction of illegal monetary transactions that drive terrorists underground, arresting one or two compliant officials will mean only that terrorist groups will then be required to locate still more compliant officials. Although this time, as was seen in countries such as Colombia in the 1980s and early 1990s, the stakes may then become higher. During this era in Colombia when simple bribery stopped working, officials were given the choice between a bullet or a bribe (the so-called "lead or silver" option) by the drug cartels. In so doing, these mafias managed to at once safeguard their illegal business activities, maintain their impunity from arrest and prosecution and contribute to the almost complete erosion of the legitimacy of Colombian institutions through the corruption and

extortion of public officials to the point that the state was unable to guarantee even the most basic order for its citizens. Indeed, this is the razor's edge of corruption; what often begins as the greasing of a few palms often ends as a violent and bloody hijacking of sovereign power.

For their part, terrorist groups enjoy an even greater advantage over other non-state actors such as organized crime in terms of their ability to use corruption to hijack governments. They have the added invaluable dimension of religious or ideological popular appeal. Hence, their subornation of officials may not constitute a significant expenditure relative to other expenses. If exposed, from the vantage point of public opinion, such corruption may not be viewed as particularly deleterious to society. This is so because terrorists are often seen as having important, overarching and long-term social goals that outweigh any negative effects their corruption might have.

At the heart of the issue is whether the government is able to command the loyalty of the citizens or if some other group now holds sway. If the government is not itself limited by its own laws, or its members are perceived as being corrupt and above the law, or if the government is unable to compel compliance with the laws by powerful groups, the belief in the "rightness" or legitimacy of the government, will be seriously lacking. In this case the death struggle may already be lost and terrorists or other power brokers may have firmly established roots in the community.

Indeed, such a setting is a magnet for private power brokers. It is much easier to operate illegal businesses, plot conspiracies, train terrorists, and bypass a system in which order is lacking and public institutions are rife with patronage and graft. When the instruments of coercion then land in the hands of groups other than the government, communities become subject to still more arbitrary and personally-motivated interests. In some regions an extreme quasi-government can emerge in which groups, including insurgents, drug mafias, and terrorist groups such as Hizbollah in Lebanon, the Wa in Burma, and the Tijuana Cartel in Mexico, provide such "public services" as housing, education and even justice to the people virtually replacing the state as the governing authority in certain sectors of their countries. However magnanimous these deeds may appear to the recipients, these self-appointed leaders were not democratically chosen by the people, and act from corrupt motives. They insinuate themselves using large amounts of money coupled with some ideology and appeals to the disaffected to breach vulnerable jurisdictions and then mold them into "states of convenience" for themselves. Such situations only serve as a breeding ground for

those who are liable to take advantage of feelings of alienation and despair as was demonstrated in Afghanistan and Somalia.

Additionally, the coercive power of some sub-state groups already rivals state law enforcement agencies in a number of states; often these criminals are better equipped and outfitted than are justice officials or security forces. Some terrorist groups frequently have extensive intelligence networks that inform them of the activities of the police and military, many of whom they ultimately co-opt into their fraternity. Police are paid to provide information on planned raids, and on when arrests will occur and how investigations will proceed. Prosecutors are further bribed not to prosecute, judges not to convict and penal officials to release terrorists that do end up in jail. Such impunity translates to great power and leaves communities vulnerable to capricious rule. As a result, the citizens in these regions are often subject to as much arbitrary rule as exists in any authoritarian state. The lack of liberty and personal safety that are characteristic of both authoritarian government and corrupt states amount to the same thing, but in the latter case the coercion is simply employed by groups other than the government.

At the end of the day, citizens are subject to systems of almost unchecked power in which there is a pervasive and often precarious reliance on persons rather than institutions. While people in such regions may be subject to well-written and just constitutions on the formal level, at the informal level they are subject to as much arbitrary rule as exists in any other authoritarian state. Indeed, in order to prevent new extremist groups from gaining power, not only is there a requirement for a lasting and functioning government but also it must be able to take power back from local leaders and present a more visible and trust-worthy authority in the lives of citizens. It is largely through this hijacking of strategic pieces of sovereignty, that groups who commit conspiracies on a global scale have been able to threaten international stability and security with relative impunity

Governments have little hope of attacking terrorist groups operating within the borders of their countries unless they first address the problem of corruption. Shortly after 9/11, Ronald Noble, the Director of INTERPOL noted that, "[t]he most sophisticated security systems, the best structures, or trained and dedicated security personnel are useless, [in combating terrorists] if they are undermined from the inside by a single act of corruption".¹³ Corruption is no longer simply the greasing of the wheels of commerce but is an insidious enabler of terrorist groups.

¹³ Ronald K. Noble. Chief, Interpol Interpol Press Release, October 8, 2001.

Policy Recommendation Number Three: *Countries must make a concerted effort to eradicate corruption in both their public and private sectors. Leaving terrorist groups with no place to plan conspiracies and conduct criminal enterprise will impede both their current and future operations. Closing the avenue of corruption will be integral to lessening the likelihood that they will be able to either penetrate or remain in any state for very long. Corruption is an international problem which knows no boundaries and one that must be addressed if the fight against international terrorism and organized crime is to be won.*

Countries must make a public display in the media of those officials who engage in acts of corruption by name and contrast them with those who do not. The role of the media can be critical in this regard. It is often an essential element for advertising the government's positive work in addressing and uncovering corrupt activities. A free press should make it easier to fight corruption.¹⁴ The media can help to build public support to attack corruption. Part of the fight against corruption is to show the public that something is being done to eradicate it. This means that the fight against corruption is made visible. Because the people know that something is being done and that corrupt behavior is being punished from the very large abuser to the small one, the public will change its cynicism. It must become apparent to the citizens of the country that the rule of law is observed no matter the circumstance or person involved. Once this begins to take hold in the imaginations of the people as a truth, their acceptance for even the most minor offenses will lessen. In this manner the political culture of corruption will be removed as a support structure for terrorist groups to manipulate at will.

3. Citizen Support

Indeed it is the concept of political culture -- the fundamental norms and beliefs of society -- that is central to an explanation of stability and change for support of terrorist groups in any given society. Generally passed on to succeeding generations through various forms of socialization and providing a unifying societal bond, political culture refers to the general attitudes and values that individuals and societies hold toward such political institutions as the government, political parties, the judiciary and even terrorist groups and their causes. This concept lends itself to a brief discussion of why people can be recruited to become terrorists and why even the backing of a small percentage of citizens is a critical third pillar of terrorist support.

¹⁴ Philip Heymann, "Democracy and Corruption", 20 Fordham International Journal 1996, pp. 323, 328.

The question as to why people become terrorists and why so many of their fellow citizens do not condemn, but often condone, and even support, acts of terrorism is highly complex. One of the more prevalent arguments has been that poverty, ignorance and deprivation have sparked the tendency to use terrorist methods to resolve grievances. Yet this argument rings somewhat hollow. To argue that people become terrorists because they are poor and uneducated is doing a great disservice to poor people who are generally hard-working citizens struggling to provide a better future for themselves and their children.

Indeed, most terrorist master-minds of the 21st Century are well-educated and come from the middle and even upper classes of their societies. What is a more plausible and perhaps more understandable stimulus is what unites the members of groups such as al Qaeda, Peru's Sendero Luminoso, the IRA, and even the now executed Timothy McVeigh. This is a sense of profound dissatisfaction with the political, economic, and/or social opportunities available in their own societies, combined with the presence of an alternative ideology (Political Islam, Marxism-Leninism, Irish Nationalism, and the militia movement, respectively) which gives them a vision of an alternative society, however improbable, around which to organize. In any society, feelings of humiliation, loss of dignity, loss of status, or disenfranchisement, can aggravate cultural and ethnic tensions and contribute to violent social and political movements.

After September 11 one of the larger looming questions for Americans was "Why do they hate us?" In attempting to answer that question, more valuable clues for countering the support that some citizens lend to terrorists may be revealed. Opinion leaders were polled by the Pew Research Center along with the International Herald Tribune in late 2001 and some telling sentiments were brought to light.¹⁵ People in the countries polled almost overwhelmingly felt that "it is good that Americans now know what it is like to be vulnerable". It is difficult to know whether such sentiments represent an unattractive, but, perhaps, understandable *schadenfreude* on the part of the world's poor, weak, and vulnerable, or a more fundamental hostility to American values. They further expressed the belief that U.S. policies contribute to the widening gap between rich and poor states. This coupled with numerous perceived and/or real historical political grievances in which the U.S. has somehow been involved

¹⁵ "Little Support for Expanding War on Terrorism: A multinational Survey conducted with International Herald Tribune" The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (Washington, D.C. Pew Research Center, December 19, 2001): 1.

has shaped much of the pathology of al Qaeda at the very least. In the Middle East, for example, colonialism, the inability of Arabs to prevent the formation and survival of Israel and a double standard on the part of the U.S. in supporting Israel over the Palestinians along with a record of endorsing, both past and present, regimes such as those in Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, despite some shaky human rights records, and a variety of other American policies have led to very deep resentments, if not outrage and bitterness, among many sectors of local populations. Hence, while only a few may resort to fanatical terrorist acts, for others while they may not condone such outrageous violence, nor do they condemn them.

In other words, what is now being confronted after September 11 is not merely a more deadly, more effective manifestation of the familiar terrorism of the 1980s and 1990s but rather a qualitatively different and more menacing phenomenon. The elemental nature of the struggle and the religious aura that surrounds it generate not only resentment against the modern world but for a disturbingly large number of people, the determination to destroy it. Meanwhile, the availability of advanced tools and methods gives those who are so inclined the capability to inflict catastrophic damage against anyone, anywhere.

Indeed modern terrorists are driven more by hostility to trends they perceive being inflicted upon them and over which they are (indeed really anyone is) powerless to halt — modernization, globalization, secularization, Westernization, and democratization — than to any specific policies being pursued that may directly affect them. That in itself poses a significantly complicating factor in determining how to gut the support terrorists enjoy in their surrounding communities. By stereotyping the West (and most often the United States) as the source of all the problems faced by the Arab and Islamic worlds, terrorists and their supporting propagandists greatly expand the potential base of sympathizers, supporters and potential recruits to include virtually anyone who is unhappy with his lot in life.

Their point of view is not completely without merit if one pauses and momentarily considers the printing of cartoon pictures of the Prophet Mohammed in Danish and other European newspapers in late 2005 which led to riots and bombings all over the Muslim world.¹⁶

¹⁶ The scandal began on 30 Sept 2005 when a Danish paper published the cartoons. The problems unfolded as follows: 20 Oct 2005: Muslim ambassadors complain to Danish PM; 10 Jan 2006: Norwegian publication reprints cartoons; 26 Jan 2006 : Saudi Arabia recalls its ambassador; 31 Jan 2006 : Danish paper apologises; 1 Feb 2006 : Papers in France, Germany, Italy and Spain reprint cartoons; 4-5 Feb 2006 : Danish embassies in Damascus and Beirut attacked; 6-7 Feb 2006 : At least eight killed in Afghanistan as security forces try to suppress protests; 9 Feb 2006 : Hundreds of thousands protest in Beirut.

That this is hurtful and humiliating to Muslims seems to have completely escaped those in the West who loudly bray that they have the right to a free press. It must be noted that while the exercise of a free press is a liberty that a great many countries enjoy, publishing derisive cartoons hardly constitutes serious reporting but is rather, a thinly veiled attempt to belittle and stereotype Muslims. Such a message only plays into the hands of terrorists who, with their already dubious and amorphous causes, are happy to stumble on new ways to appeal to citizens. In February 2006, Prime Minister Abdullah of Malaysia observed, “[t]he demonisation of Islam and the vilification of Muslims, there is no denying, is widespread, within Western mainstream society”.¹⁷ What is more, via modern communications, incidents such as these are capable of generating almost instant and incendiary emotional appeals to violence throughout the Islamic world.

Why do prosperous, educated people become terrorists? First and perhaps foremost, it is likely that they feel they do not have the ability to realize their aspirations. In many (but certainly not all) societies, there has been a crisis of unmet political, economic, and social expectations such that citizens look upon the works of government and their society more generally with disapproval. They see a lack of credible and accountable governments, factional loyalties that tend to splinter already fractured societies, an epidemic of public offices afflicted with graft, waste and serious misallocation of public money. They also see impunity for criminals who find safe havens if they are wealthy and powerful enough pay the tithe, and whose growing criminality, amorality, and lawlessness has caused society to become ill and further aggravate conditions of unemployment and environmental decay.

Despite the near-global trend toward democratization, aspects of arbitrary government remain in states as diverse as Brazil, Peru, Argentina, Indonesia, and Nigeria where universal justice is often absent and the rule of law is applied unequally. The people feel an increasing sense of outrage at, and alienation from, those who are meant to be serving their interests. They find they are no better off than they were yesterday or last year or even a decade ago, but rather, see only an ever widening gap between themselves and those that have reaped the rewards of globalization. It is not so much that they aspire to a violent terrorist society or that they support terrorism, but they are cynical, malignant and resigned when confronted with their governments’ inability or unwillingness to act as the vehicle for

¹⁷ “Islam-West Divide Grows Deeper” BBC News February 10, 2006

change. Such frustration increases public tolerance for alternative messages, no matter how ridiculous they may be. The terrorists' propaganda need not be complicated because if the public is outraged and demoralized with good reason, the path has already been paved; the terrorists need only add some rhetoric and back it with some zeal. Many revolutions have begun with less.

The key to a better future is the hope that it is actually possible. The more that the political culture transforms and invests in its own successful future, the less likely violence will be an option for resolving social and economic dissatisfaction. The likelihood is high that private power brokers, leaders with a cause célèbre, corrupt government, and recruiters for terrorist groups will have an exponentially lower chance of securing a foothold in a society that has invested in peace, order, and prosperity for its children. This can only occur if people see that their investment will pay off and that the government will not steal it from them. Hence, fulfilling the hope for a better future and rectifying the crisis of legitimacy will also require government investment in a stronger state; strengthening the state does not mean strengthening merely the coercive power of the state either.

Although, to guarantee that social and economic stability may transpire, governments must at a minimum maintain order. In carrying out that task, security forces and police or military units should be closely monitored to ensure that they operate within the framework of the law to whose defense they are committed. Indeed, oppressive governments become oppressive precisely because they are otherwise weak and unable to carry out their essential functions efficiently and effectively. Given unlimited power many are corrupted; possessing the greatest share of the state's coercive strength unto themselves may be too tempting especially when it is felt that democratic processes are not resolving the problem quickly enough. A strong state needs an effective judiciary, effective delivery of essential services, a healthy and vibrant economy, as well as defense and law enforcement. Moreover, the use of extra-legal force by government, no matter how tempting, ultimately undermines the legitimacy of government itself.

Policy Recommendation Number Four: Foremost consideration must be given to the rule of law in tracking, apprehending, detaining, prosecuting, and carrying out the sentences of terrorists. This commitment carries with it a plethora of consequences. The first is that violations of the law must be punished, but within the law. That is, anti-terrorist policies of liberal democracies should not involve reprisals against segments of the population thought to be

sympathetic to the terrorists. Thus, if democratic governments react to violence by using indiscriminate force against certain segments of the population, they will not only be resorting to the same practice as the terrorists, but build rather than weaken whatever support the outlaw group may enjoy among members of the population.

Above all, the greatest care must be taken to avoid humiliating people. If this occurs the deep hatred that ensues for the loss of dignity cannot be restored or rectified with any amount of money or property. Declarations of martial law and emergency measures, therefore, do not tend to strengthen the fight against violence, but rather, serve to buttress the terrorists' cause. Careful attention must also be paid to how the government treats terrorists and how this is viewed by a public supportive or potentially sympathetic to the terrorists. To slowly and carefully diminish the amount of support given to terrorists by the public, the government must appear to be doing everything for the greatest good of the society and its future. It must be a change that involves the political culture such that people decide as a whole to no longer tolerate terrorism, criminality or corruption. To slip in this regard is a loss in the favor of the terrorists; in a state infested by terrorists, government mistakes are exponentially more costly. Indeed, it might be best viewed as a zero sum game in locations where terrorists have the support of even small numbers of the public.

Government can be the guarantor of expectations such that human endeavors are possible. When a government is working well, the political process unobtrusively and continuously resolves conflict. However, when a government loses legitimacy, the citizens fluctuate between being largely indifferent and skeptical that the situation will improve, to being outraged that the government is incapable of upholding fundamental justice and they begin to seek alternatives to resolve daily problems. As institutions increasingly lack credibility, and more crucially legitimacy, the public's enthusiasm to finance their operations wanes and private justice and alternative messages often becomes the favored dispute resolution mechanism.¹⁸ Public support is thus perhaps the most serious ingredient for terrorists' survival yet the most difficult challenge for governments to address. It is a social scorecard of sorts that at once reflects both how poorly governments are doing and what headway terrorists are making. Terrorists are, or pretend to be, the voice of social outrage and alienation, so it is the job of governments to reverse that image.

¹⁸One example of such private justice, are militia groups in U.S. that argue that since the courts are not legitimate, they have no jurisdiction over militia membership.

Conclusion

Confronting terrorism will require an understanding of the three main critical pillars of support upon which terrorists rely for their continued survival. Terrorists are highly adaptive and have successfully manipulated the weaknesses of the global system and of states to their advantage. In recent years many groups have become astute criminal operators out of necessity. They have further found the cracks in cultures that have allowed them to garner support from sympathetic populations who are disgusted with corrupt and ineffective governments. While only a small number of disaffected people turn to terrorism, the message has spread. These non-state actors with state-like capabilities have taken advantage of the fruits of globalization: rapid communications and travel, and the ease of carrying out cross-border financial transactions. They have zeroed in on the aspects of disaffection that can be focused on globalization, western secular culture, and free market systems, all of which are perceived to be driven by a West that is painted as perverse, decayed and scornful of Muslims.

Indeed, terrorist groups have manipulated the underbelly of globalization and its discontents to their great advantage. They have not only drawn followers from alienated populations but money and material support from angry citizens. They have corrupted and usurped weak governments and perverted political cultures all for their own rather amorphous but no less violent purposes. To counter this will require a concerted effort on the part of the international community to develop strategies that simultaneously tackle these problems in a holistic and comprehensive fashion. The balance upon which terrorists' survival rests must be toppled; it is not enough to simply cause the structure to wobble and give terrorist groups time to adjust and regain their equilibrium. The three main pillars of terrorist support must be damaged simultaneously and irrevocably leaving these groups no alternative reinforcements with which to rebuild their structures.

EXPERIENCE IN COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE RELEVANCE OF THE CLASSICAL STRATEGIC THOUGHT

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Defining the word “terrorism” (and “counter terrorism”) is problematic. Although various international organizations such as the League of Arab States and the United Nations have defined the term in various ways, non of these definitions has been commonly agreed upon by the international community. Even those states which accepted these definitions have often overlooked them in practice. “Terrorism” is a confusing and value-laden concept. Confusing, because it is used and understood in many different ways. Value-laden, because it usually has an ethically negative connotation. Whereas what we need in political and strategic analysis is a value-free and neutral definition.² This,

however, does not imply that studies on terrorism and counter-terrorism should be completely devoid of moral considerations. It

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² James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, *Global Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2004): 9-10.

simply suggests that moral concerns should not obscure political reason and strategic outlook.

The purpose of this paper is not to deal with the problems of definition or to make an attempt to define (or redefine) terrorism. It is to draw lessons (or, perhaps, to confirm what we already know) from our experiences in ethnic separatist terrorism and religious terrorism, with special references to the PKK (which identifies itself as “the Kurdish Workers’ Party”) and the al-Qaeda-related terrorism. I will particularly focus on the following issues: the relevance of the state in terrorism and counter-terrorism; the relevance and limitations of military force in counter-terrorism; and the relevance of political objective in terrorism and counter-terrorism. The proponents of the critical international relations theory argue that the Clausewitzian paradigm is inapt for the study of terrorism. Clausewitz’s *On War* was the product of a state-centric political culture whereas, in the contemporary international system, non-state entities such as terrorist organizations, having a radically different “rationality” and objectives, constitute a major security problem. I think this argument is based on an oversimplification and misinterpretation of Clausewitz’s work.

The two types of terrorisms, one ethnic-separatist and the other religious-Islamic, are in the first view very different from each other. Nevertheless, they present a number of shared characteristics. Both pursue political objectives. Both are organized as non-state entities. They have international links. They are supported and sponsored by certain states and non-state entities. They deliberately use violence against civilians and/or military and other security personnel and facilities in order to achieve their political goals. Moreover, in both cases, the major actors fighting against terrorism are states. Beyond the similarities, the most striking difference is probably one of degree. Al-Qaeda killed 3800 people in a few minutes. Whereas the PKK claimed 30.000 lives in a period of twenty years. In Manhattan, the scale of carnage was so great and the destructive use of airliners was so terrifying that the catastrophe of 9/11 has overshadowed all the previous experiences of terrorism. Adam Roberts pertinently argues that “this indeed appears to have happened in much contemporary analysis. It is a huge mistake”.³

States, Non-State Entities, and Political Objectives

My major contention in this paper is that terrorism (and counter-terrorism) is a political act. One of its key elements is that the violence is exercised in order to achieve a political end. This key aspect of

³ Adam Roberts, “The War on Terror in Historical Perspective”, *Survival*, vol. 47, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 106.

terrorism, however, is often overlooked or obscured by different contemporary approaches to the problem. First, there is a tendency of depicting terrorism as an “extreme manifestation of human evil”.⁴ Neo-conservatives in the United States regard “efforts to understand the root causes [of terrorism] as illusory or contradictory and as the first steps away from moral clarity”.⁵ Such a moralistic (or religiously inspired) treatment of terrorism carries the risk of leading to a denial of the political aspect of the problem and to inappropriate strategic responses. Moreover, it would limit intellectual capacity of policy makers to develop alternative strategic options. Mary Kaldor points out that, for the neo-conservatives in the United States, “who had been educated in the Cold War school, it was perhaps inevitable that the chosen response was a kind of reconstruction of World War II, and that 9/11 was compared to Pearl Harbor. The war on terror, like the Cold War, is viewed as a powerful crusade-freedom against totalitarianism”.⁶

The critical school of thought has adopted a completely different perspective but, in criticizing the neo-conservative war on terror, they have ended up in removing terrorism and counter-terrorism from their political and strategic meaning. The protagonists of this school argue that the Clausewitzian state-centric paradigm has become irrelevant for the study of warfare. Thus, “reason of state” has ceased to be the prime driver of armed conflicts. This argument has strikingly been put forward by Martin van Creveld and adopted by liberal scholars such as Mary Kaldor, Ken Booth, and T.V. Paul.⁷

Mary Kaldor distinguishes “new wars” from the “old wars” in which the aim, “to quote Clausewitz, was “to compel an opponent to fulfill our will”. She defines a category of new wars as “network warfare”. These wars are fought by “armed networks of non-state and state actors”. Non-State actors are such entities as “paramilitary groups organized around a charismatic leader, warlords who control particular areas, terrorist cells...”⁸ The starting point of her arguments

⁴ William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “National Interest and Global Responsibility”, in Irwin Stelzer, ed. Neo-Conservatism (London: Atlantic Books): 64.

⁵ Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge University Press): 275.

⁶ Mary Kaldor, “Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror”, International Politics, vol. 42, no. 4 (December 2005): 496.

⁷ Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991); Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (Cambridge: Polity, 2003): 119; Ken Booth, “Two Terrors, One Problem”, in Ersel Aydinli and James N. Rosenau, eds., Globalization, Security, and Nation State: Paradigms in Transition (New York: SUNY, 2005): 45-46; and T.V. Paul, “The National Security State and Global Terrorism”, in E. Aydinli and J.N. Rosenau: 51.

⁸ Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: 119-120.

is that “new wars” are fundamentally different from the “Clausewitzian wars”.

Ken Booth criticizes the “dualism of ends/means” which, he asserts, is “deeply embedded in Western political theory, including the tradition of Machiavelli and Clausewitz”.⁹ He points out that the use of military force against terrorism is the result of this dualistic thinking. “The dualistic response to terrorism prioritizes the military means to bring about the end of al-Qaeda. The nondualistic response accepts that there are no end-points, when all will be well, only ethical and law-governed processes that are consonant with constructing the ethical and law-governed world one seeks.”¹⁰ In terms of this critical argument, a nondualistic approach would lead to a purely defensive counter-terrorism depending on protection of civilians and use of violent means only “when unavoidable”. He argues that this approach would refine the meaning of victory and that counter-terrorism “would become a political process more than a military end”.¹¹

T.V. Paul, like Booth and Kaldor, starts by underlining the irrelevance of the Clausewitzian framework and emphasizing that the contemporary international system is not any longer state-centric. Despite radical systemic changes, “the Clausewitzian conception of war as a means to serve state interests continues to form the intellectual” foundation of state action.¹² The foundations of military strategy “assume that the opponent is a rational actor who would make cost/benefit calculations and would not engage in war if the costs of attacking are higher than the payoffs”.¹³ This poses, according to Paul, fundamental problems for state actors fighting against terrorism because “the terrorist adversary does not hold the same Clausewitzian rationality assumptions”.¹⁴ Consequently, operationalization of certain basic strategic concepts such as offense, defense, deterrence, and compellence would present enormous difficulties in the struggle against terrorism. Nevertheless, in the same article, T.V. Paul moderates his argument by saying: “one can argue that a form of instrumental rationality is inherent in the calculations of terrorists”.¹⁵

Although it is impossible not to share some of their conclusions, Kaldor, Booth and Paul’s views have three fundamental

⁹ Ken Booth: 45.

¹⁰ Ken Booth: 46.

¹¹ Ken Booth: 46.

¹² T.V. Paul: 52.

¹³ T.V. Paul: 53.

¹⁴ T.V. Paul: 55.

¹⁵ T.V. Paul: 55.

shortcomings. First, they unduly minimize the role of the state and military force in fighting against terrorism. It is true that, until recently, the nation-state (or simply the state) has been the principal subject-matter of security studies. Consequently, national security has been the key issue. As an outcome of globalization, however, intensification of interaction between states and civil societies has brought “individual security” and “societal security” to the forefront. This development has also brought about “a relativization of the importance of the states” in world politics.¹⁶ It is also true that the most ominous threats in the contemporary world such as terrorism and proliferation of WMDs have a transnational and non-territorial character at least in the first view.

The point, however, is that, despite this transformation, the state is far from being discarded from world politics and international security policies. On the contrary, territorial integrity and independence of the state continue to be a major security concern. The new concepts of security are being integrated into the preexisting notion of national security and make it an increasingly transnational issue. The contemporary state is facing more ominous risks than the possibility of cross-border armed attacks. In most cases, the state can best be protected through policies giving credit to international and transnational cooperation. – as it should be the case in counter-terrorism - rather than purely national measures. There is not other institution which would be better equipped than the state to insure the safety and protection of the civil society and the individual and to manage risks arising from globalization.¹⁷

Christopher Coker states: “...we should see globalization as a process that transforms without eradicating the institutions and features of the political landscape in which it is at work. It does not entail the end of territorial geography or territoriality or supra-territoriality: these still coexist in complex relationships. It may be changing the nature of social structure, such as the state and the nation, but neither the state nor the nation has been replaced.”¹⁸

Second, the means/ends dichotomy of the Clausewitzian paradigm does not preclude any strategy purely defensive or any political process without the annihilation of the enemy. War is waged by

¹⁶ Laurent Goetschel, “Globalization and Security: The Challenge of Collective Action in a Politically Fragmented World”, *Global Society*, vol. 14, no. 2 (2000): 276.

¹⁷ This paragraph is largely borrowed from my article, Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, “Globalization and its Impact on Turkey’s Security”, A.L. Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan, eds., *The Europeanization of Turkey’s Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls* (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2003): 14-15.

¹⁸ Christopher Coker, *Globalization and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk*, Adelphi Paper 345 (London: IISS, 2002): 20.

political collectivities (state or non-state) pursuing political goals. The interaction itself is political. Politics is always involved in armed conflicts. In the Clausewitzian conceptual framework, military victory is both a means and an end at the same time. Physical force is necessary to achieve military victory. In other words, it is “the means of war; to impose our will on the enemy is its object”. The true aim of the warfare is to fulfill the political purpose. “That aim takes the place of the object, discarding it as something not actually part of war itself”.¹⁹ Thus, contrary what Ken Booth argues, in the Clausewitzian paradigm, means and ends are not separated from each other. Both are integrated with the political objective and they constitute an “ensemble”. At the same time, they constitute a dynamic political process which does not exclude the use of violence or threat of violence.

Third, Clausewitz did not assume that it was always states with armed forces which engaged in armed conflicts. “He would have been the first to recognize that this was not the case in his own teaching on the guerrilla and on the people’s uprising”.²⁰ It would be a mistake to associate the work of Clausewitz with a particular international system. The political-strategic view of war is neither the outcome nor the peculiarity of the modern state system.²¹ On the one hand, every war is different from other wars. Their characteristics vary according to historical periods, technological developments and many other factors. Struggle against terrorism is undoubtedly different from the wars of the 18th and 19th centuries. On the other hand, every war is similar to other wars because they are always waged by politically organized entities – state or non state – having the capacity to use violence in order to achieve political aims. This implies that certain fundamental concepts, elaborated by Clausewitz, such as defense, offense, limited war, compellence (submission to our will), friction transcend every historical period and every international system. The primacy of moral factors and the human dimension of warfare are “the greatest of continuities”,²² as persistently emphasized by Clausewitz.

Al-Qaeda

Many people consider al-Qaeda as an organization of religious nihilists having no political objective and no long-term strategy. It is

¹⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976): 75.

²⁰ Beatrice Heuser, *Reading Clausewitz* (London: Pimlico, 2002): 191. See *On War*, Book six, chapter 26 on “The People in Arms”: 479-483.

²¹ Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005): 217.

²² C.S. Gray: 176.

argued that they have a holy cause for which extermination of the enemy would be a victory in itself. They believe that they carry out their destructive actions on behalf of God. "The jihadists do not calculate losses, victories, and defeats as their foes do... losses are not a main factor in their assessment". According to al-Qaeda militants, defeat does not signify the victory of the adversary. It may even be an indication of the enemy's weakness, who compensates for his weakening morale by using high technology.²³

This reasoning shows that the jihadists of al-Qaeda are motivated by their religious faith-which generates from a marginal interpretation of Islamic teachings. It may also underline that those terrorists have sufficient high morale to continue their actions. But it does not imply that al-Qaeda, as an organization, has no political objective.

Osama Bin Laden's worldview has been shaped by the Salafi Jihadist movement which arguably pursues three goals. First, liberation of all Muslim lands from non-Muslim powers (tahrir); second, unification of all Muslim lands by dismantling the existing nation-states such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and others (Tawheed); third, once the land is liberated and unified by the elimination of nation-states, the ultimate goal is to reestablish the caliphate (Khilafa).²⁴

The Salafi interpretation of Islam, though unacceptable to an overwhelming majority of Muslims, has distorted mainstream Islamic teachings for the above-mentioned political goals. As Bernard Lewis pertinently remarks, Salafis teaching Islam is like Ku Klux Klan teaching Christianity.²⁵ It is to be noted that although the Salafi movement regard the traditional mainstream Islam as an enemy, it has come to be viewed by the Western public opinions as the genuine Islam.²⁶

Nevertheless, al-Qaeda seems to give priority to the goal of liberation of the Muslim lands. This implies a return to a certain degree of pragmatism. A study by Professor Robert A. Pape shows that "suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic, one specifically designed to coerce modern liberal democracies to make significant territorial concessions".²⁷ The empirical research of Robert Pape confirms that territorial gain – to put on end to the presence of foreign

²³ Walid Phares, Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against America (London: Palgrave, 2005): 200.

²⁴ W. Phares: 59-61.

²⁵ Bernard Lewis is quoted by Zeyno Baran, "Combating al-Qaeda and the Militant Jihadist Threat", Hearing at the US House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities (February 16, 2005): 3.

²⁶ Zeyno Baran: 3.

²⁷ Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism", American Political Science Review, vol. 97, no. 3 (August 2003): 1.

forces on the territory that the terrorists view as their homeland – is the principal political objective of the terrorists. Pape also argues that “not every foreign occupation has produced suicide terrorism... Here is where religion matters, but not in the way most people think. In virtually every instance where an occupation has produced a suicide terrorist campaign, there has been a religious difference between the occupier and the occupied community... Religious difference... enables terrorist leaders to demonize the occupier in especially vicious ways”.²⁸ In other words, religion serves as a source of motivation and an instrument of morale boosting.

Olivier Roy, a French scholar on Islamism, looks at the issue of foreign occupation from a different perspective. He argues that the terrorists’ “strategy is to oblige the United States to invade Muslim countries in the hope that it will become overstretched and bogged down there. Terrorists know that they cannot stir up the religious feelings of the Muslim masse in the absence of a direct occupation”.²⁹

Before the defeat of the Taliban by American conventional military power al-Qaeda had a state-base where it was able to plan operations, train its ‘soldiers’ and communicated instructions worldwide. When al-Qaeda and Taliban fled Tora Bora in Afghanistan, they began to seek a new safe haven. This became their primary objective. The chaotic situations in Iraq provided them with new opportunities.

Al-Qaeda is organized on two tracks and its operations are to be considered at two interacting levels: local and global. Al-Qaeda is not a strictly structured network. The local jihadi forces have their own local command and organizations. They fight in their own battlefields in Iraq, Chechnya, Kashmir, Philippines and Indonesia.³⁰ Terrorist acts that occurred in Istanbul, London or Madrid may not have a very close organizational links with al-Qaeda. But they certainly had a very close ideological and sentimental link with it. At the same time, however, the jihadist discourse of al-Qaeda has acquired a global character. Moreover, the international network has a key role in the recruitment and training of new terrorists.

The war on terror has made clear that although al-Qaeda is a non-state entity the states and their armed forces are heavily involved in the confrontation. Al-Qaeda was territorially based in Afghanistan until the defeat of Taliban. It was supported and sponsored by a number of states such as Sudan. The war on terror was waged by a coalition of

²⁸ “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism”, an interview with Professor Robert Pape by Scott McConnell, *The American Conservative*, July 18, 2005.

²⁹ Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (London: Hurst and Company, 2002): 340.

³⁰ W. Phares: 128.

states led by the United States. The military force using high-technology weapons proved to be effective and useful to dismantle the Taliban and the terrorist cells in Afghanistan. Its successful use, however, had limits. The coalition forces were unable to find all the terrorist leaders. For example, Osama bin Laden still is free and active. The counter-terrorist intelligence is far from being perfect. Strategic mistakes in Iraq greatly obscured the potential utility of the military force in the struggle against terrorism in general. First of all, the rationale of the invasion of Iraq remained questionable. Second, coalition forces in Iraq were successful occupying the country. But they failed in the postwar stabilization task. Third, the American strategy could not separate the Saddam regime from the state of Iraq.³¹ Destruction of the regime resulted in the collapse of the state and society creating an internal complex warfare situation in which a multiple of entities began to use violence against each other to pursue their particular interests. Fourth, promoting democratization as a means of preventing terrorism is also highly questionable in the context of the Middle East.

The PKK

The ultimate aim of the PKK has always been political. In the 1970s, it was created as a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist organization. Its followers condemned the “repressive exploitation of the Kurds”. Their aim was to set up a “democratic and united Kürdistan” in southeastern Turkey “to be governed along Marxist-Leninist lines”.³² During the first decade of PKK’s development, the Turkish state had difficulty to correctly diagnose the nature and capacities of that terrorist organization. Turkish governments had the habit of calling it as a “handful of bandits”.³³ This lack of understanding slowed down the preparation of the security forces and it took Turkish Armed Forces almost a decade to develop an effective strategy to deal with the PKK.

In the meantime, the PKK became a typical transnational terrorist organization with many connections in the Middle East and Europe. It was actively supported by some of the regional and European governments and non-governmental organizations. Its financial base was in Western Europe. Moreover, the PKK had recruitment and

³¹ Peter Faber and Carlo Masala, “Iraq-Lessons to be Learned”, Internationale Politik-Transatlantic Edition, vol. 6 (Summer 2/2005): 74-77.

³² Soner Çağaptay and Düden Yeğenoğlu, “Left-Wing Monster: Abdullah Öcalan”, Front Page Magazine.com (January 6, 2006): 1; and Nihat Ali Özcan, PKK (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi): Tarihi, İdeolojisi ve Yöntemi (Ankara: ASAM, 1999): 55-68.

³³ Ümit Özdağ and Ersel Aydınlı, “Winning a Low Intensity Conflict: Drawing Lessons from the Turkish Case”, The Review of International Affairs, vol. 2, no. 3 (Spring 2003): 108.

propaganda centers in most European countries. Syria provided its militants protection and training facilities. In the second half of the 1980s, the PKK gradually became more active and mobile. Its objectives were defined as destroying military units and acquiring land. They attacked on security patrols, gendarmerie stations. They also carried out operations against civilian targets such as factories, villages, schools and transportation facilities, killing civil and military people.³⁴

In the early 1990s, the strategy of the Turkish Armed Forces began to shift from a defensive to an offensive one. The General Staff adopted a new strategy based on “a battlefield domination concept” in their fight against the PKK. Reestablishing area control by benefiting from numerical and firepower superiority was the essence of the new strategy.³⁵

In the aftermath of the first Gulf War the demise of the Iraqi government north of the thirty-sixth parallel complicated Turkey’s security considerations. The region became a sanctuary for the PKK terrorists, who began to operate from northern Iraq. Between the two Gulf Wars, Turkish Armed Forces had to operate in the Iraqi territory nearly seventy times to hit the PKK camps and disrupt their logistic lines. The frequency of Turkey’s cross-border operations resulted in the formation of a de facto security zone with a certain Turkish military presence in northern Iraq. This strategy contributed to the containment of PKK’s military threat.

Another dimension of the strategy was the military pressure on Syria. The Syrian support was a major factor that contributed to the strengthening of the PKK and its infiltrations into Turkish territory. Ankara’s diplomatic efforts to persuade Damascus to cut off its support to the PKK and expel Öcalan from Syria failed. In October 1998, the Turkish government sent an ultimatum to Damascus and Turkish armored divisions deployed to the Syrian border. The military compellence worked and the Syrian regime put an end to its support for the PKK and ousted the PKK leadership from the country.

Turkey was eventually successful to prevent and deter the PKK activities in the country. However, there are today more than three thousand armed PKK elements who control a number of enclaves in northern Iraq. Ankara’s major concern is that the PKK, taking advantage of the post-war instability in Iraq, may resume its incursions into Turkey. It is impossible, however, to say that the PKK terrorism has stopped completely. Despite Turkey’s military victory, the PKK continues to exercise a certain amount of political influence

³⁴ Ü. Özdağ and E. Aydınli: 110.

³⁵ Ü. Özdağ and E. Aydınli: 111.

in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq. Its elements also continue to undertake, albeit very occasionally and insignificantly, some terrorist actions.

After the military defeat, the PKK took steps to convey the separatist movement to the political arena. The PKK set up a political organization and called it the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and shifted its political aim from “a Marxist-Leninist independent state” to “a democratic Turkey”. This new goal consisted of drafting a new constitution of the Turkish Republic which would be founded on “two constituent nations”, Turks and Kurds. These steps, however, did not change the fact that KADEK was not different from the PKK and that what was changing was only the façade. In May 2003, the State Department included KADEK to its Foreign Terrorist Organization list. The organization again adopted a new name: Kurdistan Society Congress (Kongra-Gel) and in the Summer of 2004 it resumed violent actions. Meanwhile, a group of former members of the Kurdish “Peoples Democracy Party” (HADEP), initiated the “Democratic Society Movement”. Although this was accepted as a legal Kurdish political movement, its members did not refrain from establishing close contact with the Kongra-Gel and Abdullah Öcalan. These developments underscore an increasing politization of the former PKK movement through political organizations such as the Democratic Society movement. On the other hand, it is clearly much too early to be sure that the PKK (or the Kongra-Gel) is giving up violence and terrorist tactics.³⁶

Another aspect of the changing political context is that Turkey is passing through a radical transformation. It has initiated an extensive program of liberalization and restructuring reforms in law, politics and economy. These measures have been motivated by a desire for further democratization and to meet the criteria of the EU. The reform packages included inter alia measures broadening cultural rights, freedoms of expression and association. The extraordinary security measures which had been applied in the southeastern regions of the country were lifted. Although there are still problems concerning implementation of the reforms, the process of alignment with the EU norms is going on. For an effective and orderly continuation of the reform process, Turkey needs a peaceful environment and secure borders. A possible dismemberment of Iraq might dangerously upset the existing balances in the region and have a delaying effect on democratization process. Such an eventuality might provide the PKK for an opportunity to redeploy its armed elements from Iraq to Turkey.

³⁶ S. Çağaptay and D. Yeğenoğlu: 5-6.

Conclusion

The main contention of this paper was that our experience has confirmed the relevance of the Clausewitzian paradigm in our struggle against terrorism. The classical strategic thought should not be blamed for moralistic and a strategic approaches or inappropriate strategies adopted in fighting against terrorism. The Clausewitzian theoretical framework help us to see more clearly what changes, and what does not, what the continuities and discontinuities are. Our brief examination of al-Qaeda and the PKK suggests significant continuities.

The risk of violence and armed conflicts between political collectivities is a permanent feature of international relations. If we put aside legal definitions, fight against terrorism, in its political and strategic sense, is a war. A different type of war, but a war. One of the conflicting parties being a non-state entity does not change its nature of being a war in strategic terms.

Moralistic approaches to terrorism such as identifying terrorists as “evil” people or as “a bunch of bandits”, hold the risk of leading to astrategic actions.

Terrorists have a political objective. They use force to achieve their political objective. Their means/ends calculations may not fit the “rationality models” that are developed in the West. The fact that they have a different “rationality” does not affect the political and strategic nature of their objectives and actions. In fact, no political action can be totally “rational”, but it can be reasonable.

Military force is useful and under certain circumstances necessary, for an effective fight against terrorism. The offensive use of military force was significantly effective against Taliban and the PKK. Furthermore, The Turkish experience showed that the use of military threat can be successful to compel and deter states sponsoring terrorism.

It is extremely difficult, indeed impossible to eliminate terrorism by using military force only. Any strategy of counter-terrorism should take into consideration the political nature of terrorism and of war termination. Accordingly, the implementation of non-military measures (political, social, economic) would be required to terminate terrorism. To call on the Clausewitzian paradigm again, “Military victory alone is only a necessary but never a sufficient condition for a lasting termination of war, which, after all, can only be achieved through political means...”³⁷

³⁷ Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, Third edition (London: Routledge, 1996): 198.

SECOND SESSION

URBAN COUNTER TERRORISM

Co-Chair of the Session	B. E. Shunji YANAI	JAPAN
Co-Chair of the Session	Gen. Edip BAŞER	TURKEY
Rapporteur	Assoc. Prof. Çınar ÖZEN	TURKEY



SPEAKERS	
Lt. Gen. Karl EIKENBERRY	USA
Mr. Celalettin CERRAH	TURKEY
Thomas W. O'CONNELL	USA
Brig. Gen. Bekto SUPRAPTO	INDONESIA
Mr. John Mc DOWALL	UNITED KINGDOM
Prof. Dr. Deniz Ülke ARİBOĞAN	TURKEY

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SPECIAL PAPER

“THE PROS AND CONS AS A COALITION OF THE ARMED FORCES ON THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM”

Lt. Gen. Karl EIKENBERRY (USA)¹



Thank you very much...I'll just stand out here

First I would like to thank the center and the invitation to be here today. It is an honor to speak at the newly established center. And it has tremendous potential as seen by the gathering here today. Also I would like to take a moment to recognize the international military personnel that have been fighting terrorism. Recognize the comrades

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in arms who are fighting this battle. Also like to thank the Turkish Armed forces and have had the distinct pleasure of servicing two tours in Afghanistan and serving side by side with the Turkish armed forces and the contribution that the armed forces have been making. More notably the significant contributions the government of Turkey has made have been extraordinary. They have really played a key role from a leadership perspective.

The first thing that I'd like to do is relay a story. This is a story of two people that were in a hot air balloon some where over the United States. The pilot and the navigator got mixed up and found themselves lost with cloud cover blocking their view. The navigator comes up with a plan and states to the pilot that we they should descend through the cloud cover and find out where they are at. The pilot agrees. So as they descend through the cloud cover and they look below them and see this huge massive building surrounded by a huge parking lot. So the navigator looks below and sees someone walking to one of the cars and the navigator shouts to the man, "Where are we"?. The man looks up and responds to the navigator, "your in a balloon". So they rise back up through the cloud cover and continue to drift. About 5 minutes later the navigator says to the pilot I know where we are. We are above the Pentagon, Washington DC. The pilot says how can you possibly make that determination from the information that the man gave you 5 minutes earlier. Just think about it? That answer was brief, it was accurate and was of no help what so ever. So I will adhere to those words of wisdom and be brief, accurate and try and offer some insight that will be helpful. What I would like to do is approach this speech from a perspective of a practitioner. There has been some tremendous presentations here earlier this morning and from a academic and theoretical side and the great thing about a conference like this is the ability of this eclectic audience to pull all of this together. So my presentation will be more of a practitioner perspective. There are three things I would like to cover.

First, I would like to give you an assessment of how we are doing on the campaign in Afghanistan. I'd like to emphasize up front that whether we debate on what kind of campaign it is--- Whether it be stability operations, counter insurgency, counter terrorist campaign clearly there are dimensions of counter terrorism that exist in Afghanistan. So it is within that frame work that I will be giving my remarks today without offering a definition of terrorism upfront.

Second, I'd like to talk about the four biggest transitions that we will see in Afghanistan.

Third, more related to the theme of this conference I would like to talk about in a coalition sense what are some of the opportunities and Challenges that we all face together as coalitions expeditionary coming together on the fight against terror.

Let me start by giving you a frame of reference from where I sit and some of the challenges that we face in Afghanistan.

First, it is my second tour of duty in Afghanistan. My first tour was from 2002 to 2003. My assignment at that time was the Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation. The function of this office was really to stand up and build the Afghan National Army. I might emphasize that the Turkish Army made the first initial step by getting the Afghan Army moving forward. I also had the duty of coordinating Security Sector Reform (SSR). That was 2002-2003. In 2004 I returned and I am currently serving as the Coalition Commander. I Command a force of about 20,000 soldiers consisting of airmen, soldiers and Marines from 22 countries. My boss is General Abizade who I believe many of you know who is the Central Command Commander. I also am a partner with the State Department working closely with the diplomatic Corps to coordinate efforts as they relate to the ongoing campaign. And I would say that I have a close partnership as well with NATO ISAF commander General Moore Develcio and under the political lead of minister Cheten. I will talk more about the NATO ISAF role in a moment. So that is the context that I operate in. I have two wings under my command. We have an operational Wing commanded by a 2 star general up in Bagram Airforce base. He has the maneuver forces and operational forces. He also has command of the provincial reconstruction teams. The other wing is commanded by another 2 star General has the oversight of rebuilding the Afghan National Army and with the Germany contribution and department of State in building of a police force.

First I'd like to get on these three topics. First, snap shot of how are we doing? Snap shot is a pretty good metaphor to use here. What I tell the members of my command when we talk about Afghanistan is don't concentrate on the Snap shot concentrate on the movie of Afghanistan. . If you look at the snap shot at any given point and time it is daunting. At times it can be terrible daunting as you look at any given day of the challenges that exist. You have to look at the movie called Afghanistan. Why do I say that?? We are 4.5 years into this campaign. Where were we 4.5 years ago? Terrorist, the Taliban controlled 90 percent of Afghanistan. No was no National credible security forces! There was a broken economy. Where are we today some 4.5 years later. Politically where are we? If you talk about progress when I left in the fall in 2003 and you asked me where would

we be today, I would have said that we should have a constitution, which they do. I would say that there would have been free and fair elections, which they have completed. I would have probably told you parliamentary elections were years off. Parliamentary elections took place in September 2005. Where are we with Afgan Security Forces? Essentially, we have gone from nothing, actually less than nothing, 45 years of a country that didn't have a credible security force and 35 years of a country that didn't know what a credible police force was like. And we have moved to a stage where we got an army that has about 30,000, it has a functioning Minister of Defense, a General staff which is all ethnic. They conduct business not from a factional perspective but from that of a logistician, operator etc... what is important in the progress that is being made is not how many battalions are fielded but has to do with the resilience of the force. Does the Afgan National Army believe in itself, are they connected to the top politically, they are under the control of President Karzai so I think we can expect further success in the Afgan National Army. The Afgan National Police: The organization started in 2002 under the lead nation of Germany. As time went on our State Department got more involved and more international assistance was acquired. However, it has only been over the last six months that a more intense and aggressive backing of the police force by the international community has taken place. The effort has been in more aggressive approach in equipping, training, infrastructure development, reform of the pay and rank of the officers and Reform in the ministry of the Interior with the police wing. It is very much like that of the Afgan army program but has just recently begun an aggressive approach to the reform efforts. I believe we will start to see the results of this comprehensive approach to the force in this coming year. And then finally, in terms of reconstruction we have gone from a country which 4 years ago had very few kids in schools to a situation right now to where we have 6 Million kids in school of which 2 Million are women. We are starting to have road networks that are connecting the country together, and reconstruction of infrastructure and social services. Now haven't said this, there are enormous challenges that remain.

The US Ambassador, Ron Newman has characterized the fight in Afghanistan as follows: "we are winning the war but the war is not yet won". Now let me talk about the transitions that are underway in Afghanistan. This is my own view and isn't a framework that exist for the country of Afghanistan but believe that most would agree with what I will talk about with respect to transition. First, for the international military forces that is in Afghanistan. From a predominantly coalition lead to a NATO ISAF lead. Let me explain

this. NATO has been in Afghanistan since 2003. They assumed the international Security Assistance Mission Afghanistan in 2003. At that time they assumed responsibility of the greater Kabul area. Then in 2004 NATO Expanded to the North then in May 2004 they expanded to the West. NATO has about 15,000 forces in Afghanistan. They have the greater Kabul area, the North and the West. What will occur this summer or late summer, early fall? NATO will expand its forces to include the south of Afghanistan. We call that regional Command South. And we they assume command it will become the southern sector of NATO. We expect, although there are political decisions that have to be made, it is possible that later this year NATO could have the responsibility of all of Afghanistan. What changes are taking place on the ground right now? Already a lot of the changes will emerge as we go into NATO Expansion. NATO is already expanding. For example the Canadians have taken over the Brigade Command down in the south as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. They have an infantry Battle Group in Kandahar. In May the British will move into the harmarn province. The Romanians this summer will move into Zolble province and they will have a US infantry Company with them. These changes are all under the umbrella of OEF but this summer all the assets will be transferred and placed under NATO Command. In the east there will be no changes made however. We currently have a US infantry Brigade operating there. Essentially at the US Brigade locations the only change that will take place is that these locations will be raising a NATO flag. So I went thru this in some detail to emphasize there is a seamless transition taking place. I remain, as the Coalition Commander, extremely optimistic about the success of this mission. What do I tell the Afghans that have some concerns of this transfer? What I tell them is that NATO has 26 great nations in it. We stand optimistic about the success of NATO in Afghanistan. As Transition takes place in the south there will be more international presence with more capability than is currently the case. The second Transition will be between a military Centric campaign to a non-military centric campaign. This gets to some of the themes that were talked about this morning. We are reaching a point where we as a military outside of the training mission (training of the afgan national army) there is a point of diminishing return and that there is less the military can do. There are needs of international governments moving in to assist the Afghan governmental agencies reform, rebuild by putting in justice systems, economic systems. Essentially, putting in place good governance. What I say most often is that it isn't that the enemy is strong in Afghanistan but that the institutions in Afghanistan are

Weak. Concerning the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. We see these teams shifting away from a military flavor to a non-military composition.

For instance, one of our reconstruction teams about 75 Kilometers N/NE of Kabul was set up there late last fall and the head of that team is not a Army LtCol but rather a department of State Foreign Service Officer. So that is the direction that we are moving in. The third Transition is what I talked about before and is moving from international lead to Afghan lead. 4.5 years into the campaign we must shift the focus from our presence to that of Afghanistan presence. Their governmental institutions, their judicial institutions, internal security, social services need to stand up and take accountability. One important provision is with the Afghan Security Forces. And this is our major effort in cooperation with NATO ISAF. We are increasingly working on developing capabilities of the Afghan National Army and the Police Forces so that they are in the lead. It is very interesting that Afghanistan is different than other campaign in that on day one of the campaign, with the fall of the former regime, is that Sovereignty existed. So the work has to be on strengthening that sovereignty. I will tell you one more time with regard to the building of the Afghan Security Forces that it is critical when we talk about the building of security forces we think more broadly than terms of just building operational battalions, brigades etc... you have to think more holistically about the institution and to sustain these security forces you need to have sustainable institutions. You need personal systems, logistics systems and that in term needs to be tied to a Ministry of Defense and a General Staff which has the primary role of serving to the state and civil authorities. And in that regard I think we have a fairly comprehensive program in Afghanistan but in the coming year you will see the push with NATO and the coalition to have the Afghanistan Forces more self reliant and competent. The forth point I'd like to make about transition is how we look at the campaign in Afghanistan and how we look at the counter terrorism and the insurgency. We need to look at the transition from fighting a war specifically from within Afghanistan and the conflict as it applies regionally. I believe we need to look at it based on regional perspective. The areas of greatest concern in that region are problems that go across national boundries. So collaborative approaches to dealing with the problem are absolutely essential if we are going to succeed. In that area there has been some pretty good progress.

I will give you one example of this collaboration. We have established a military appartiedship Commission which has been in

existence for several years now that has membership of Afghanistan, Pakistan and US led coalition personal and it was to try and increase the competence between the Afghanistan, Pakistan and Coalition Armed Forces. There have been some good substantive exchanges that have taken place as well as the military Cooperation in terms of just communication between the three entities. Given the history of the region, the mistrust of the regional players throughout history there is a long ways to go.

I'll now go to my third topic and answer some specifics on the topic that I was given to address today. And that is the Challenges and Opportunities that exist when talking about counter terrorism in an expeditionary sense----coalitions. Lets first talk about the opportunities and I'll go through these fairly quickly. First are the staying power that a coalition can bring and the persistence that they can bring in to a campaign. Not just one nation but a group of nations with a common commitment. And that is important. I talked about what has happened in the last 4.5 years and the progress but there is a long ways to go. It is going to require steady commitment and patience on all our parts to succeed in Afghanistan. Secondly the coalition brings risk mitigation. If you have one nation that is salient by itself in a fight like this it is quite easy for an enemy with its own effective forms of communication, information, and operation to turn against that one presence. A coalition brings a kind of credibility not only to the coalition force but also to the host nation. They can then turn and say that this is an international endeavor. The third is just the diversity that a coalition can bring into the fight---- The diversity in the sense of Tactics and Procedures. This fight that we are fighting requires adaptivity, requires creativity and requires to continually be innovative ensuring best business practices are implemented. And I would say from my first hand experience in Afghanistan, I see for instance, I see some of my Turkish army and airforce colleagues from previous tours that are here. I'll give you one example. The Turkish army and their ability to conduct stability operations were outstanding.

The tactics and procedures that they use out patrolling and partnering with the police were superb. These are the types of procedures that everyone wants to take a look at. Where I see Col Richard Smith from the British Army here and the training that the British have done with the Afghan National Army with the development of a Officer Candidate School. Once again, this is just another example of the outstanding contributions to the National Army. The forth topic is that concerning networks. To be able to defend the enemies network you must first be able to build your own network. You need to attack a network with a network. That is what

a coalition partnered with a host nation can bring to the campaign. Now what about the challenges we face. First, I believe it was Winston Churchill who said the only thing that's fighting with a coalition is fighting without a coalition. And fighting with Coalitions there are transaction costs involved. So what are some of those transactions cost? The first thing we all must think hard about in terms of when we commit to a coalition endeavour---regardless if it is NATO, ISAF. When you come into a coalition you have to make sure the political constraints put on are not so great that they constrain the ability to execute on the ground. Many times prior to going in a coalition environment there are great debates about what we will not do! Nations talking about what we will not do. As opposed to talking about the leading question of what we will do to ensure the success of that government who we will be serving with and with who's success becomes our success. That becomes important. And the second point I would say about the political questions. This is a very difficult one, as military commanders we wrestle with all the time, and that is the expression in this kind of environment, in a counter terrorist environment, a counter insurgency environment, the balance of protecting the force and protecting the mission. What do I mean by that? Protecting the force means building security around your self. Protecting the mission means being able to connect at some level with the people on the ground to be able to reach through. The more that you protect the force and build barriers you deter from being able to execute the mission. So what is the balance?. It is a challenge for all of us. Secondly, intelligence sharing doing work with the coalition. I'm very impressed the way NATO ISAF is approaching the intelligence sharing but it will always remain a challenge. The third is in terms of talking about a coalition expeditionary and the rationale approach to coalition logistics and national logistics. The Rationale approach to lets say, enablers. What does a military Commander refer to as enablers? What do I mean by enablers? Enablers can be army helicopters to move forces and logistics in theatre, or it could be close air support. As we look forward to these Coalition campaigns the need for us from a military sense we must ensure that commitments we make of these Critical Enablers are ones that we are putting into a common pool for common use. The transaction cost and inefficiencies to do it any other way are just too great. In terms of challenges as well let me talk about two more then I'll stop.

The first is in each one of these campaigns that may be fought there is going to be particular aspects of them that might not fit into what we might say is a common template. Here is an example of

what I'm talking about and it has to do with the Afghanistan counter narcotics business. General Jones, SACEUR, said some months ago that long term narco trafficking represents the greatest threat. And I would agree with that assessment. And there is going to be aspects in any one country that we will be working together collectively that will stand out as something unique to that particular campaign. We have to be able to task organize ourselves. Governments Task Organize, Militaries Task Organize to address these very specific problems.

The final challenge I would say, and based very much on my experience here in Afghanistan is the need for all of us, not just the military uniforms but all government, academia who are working hard to develop the proper analytical constructs to help us move forward to meet the needs in these highly complex campaigns. But we need for all of us to think in comprehensive ways to address the challenges that we all face. I all ready noted earlier on that we are at a point in Afghanistan that we are transitioning from a military to a non-military nature. As we look at how we apportion forces for a particular campaign we need to be very clear for a need of a very holistic approach. Not just military but broader security. The reconstruction effort and government and justice reform. We should not just be thinking militarily of putting just forces on the ground but forces that are dictated by where you are at in a campaign that can make much more of a decisive difference. For instance, at this stage in Afghanistan the need for military capability is more like road construction engineers that can help with reconstruction, can help with governance can help with the security and putting those kind of capabilities on the ground instead of just thinking about infantry units. As well, when we talk about putting forces on the ground we also have to be clear amongst ourselves to what end. I will give you one more example as I finish up here. And I think this one really makes the point. I took a trip to a particular province and visited with one of my provincial reconstruction team commanders and I was with a maneuver battalion commander they were giving me a briefing. They had a slide of what they show which I remember now. The slide was " My most powerful weapon system is projects". It is not machine guns, mortars, etc.. it is projects. It is roads, it is schools. Now we say that it isn't a military job but security situation is tilting for the better but it is still very difficult to get NGO's in there. So how are we going to apportion our military and to what end and with what kind of capability. But that is something the military shouldn't be deciding on its own. This is a collective endeavor, which brings in our governments along with all our assets of national power. So I will

close with that. I'm sorry I went over my time limit. But I would like to thank everyone for the honor to speak here today. And I want to assure everyone here today that we are all winning...WE are all winning in Afghanistan. And the real winner is the government of Afghanistan. The government is winning. But it is going to require more time, more patience, and more commitment and everyone in this audience plays a very important role in terms of education so that the leaders of our countries are clear on what is needed to, as we say, get the American football over the goal line.

Thank you very much.

“SUSTAINABLE SECURITY MEASURES AGAINST TERRORISM IN METROPOLISES”

General Evaluation of Global Terrorism

Istanbul Police Chief, Celalettin CERRAH (TURKEY)¹



The power of terrorism is increasing day by day, utilizing new capacities and capabilities it has gained through the developing technology. Individuals and small-scale groups, who are more powerful and more creative than ever, have achieved an ability to pose big threats in this global era. New object of terrorism is to hit, or the new terror has aimed at, economical and civilian targets. The 9/11 attacks without doubt is the most remarkable example of this.

Humanity is witnessing the age of space on the one hand, and there appear masses of people died of starvation on the other hand. This imbalance places the people who have nothing to loose against the wealthy nations.

Today, it's getting easier increasingly to access all kinds of information especially through the internet. People can as easily access to instructions of how to make a bomb as they access a

¹ He was born in Konya/Akşehir in 1953. He graduated from the Police Academy in 1974 and served in different departments of the Turkish Police Organization such as Anti-Terrorism Division, Public Order Division, Beşiktaş and Kadıköy Police Directorates of Istanbul Province. He was appointed to Mardin as the Chief of Police in 1989. Later on, he was appointed to Batman, Siirt, Kütahya and Sivas respectively as the Chief of Police between 1990-2000. In 2000, he was assigned as the Deputy Director General of the Customs. He was appointed again to Sivas province between 2001-2003. Since March 2003 he has been the Istanbul Chief of Police. Cerrah is married and has two children.

recipe for making a cake. Terrorist organizations could also receive and evaluate information, acting like an intelligence service.

The terrorist activities performed in different locations all over the world aftermath of the 9/11 shows us the terrorism threat will continue with, increasing density.

The terrorist operations which were performed on November 15-20 in İstanbul and organized by the individuals trained in the Al-Qaida camps abroad are the most critical activities through which terrorism aimed directly at our country.

Totally 57 innocent people including Roger SHORT, British Consul General, and 3 security officers killed and about 800 citizens were injured in these attacks.

The Police in İstanbul identified the perpetrators and gave them over to the judicial authority in short notice.

Definition of Terrorism

The biggest obstacle before the international cooperation in fighting against global terrorism is that there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism. However, we could define terrorism, among many definitions suggested so far, as “activities of violence which target current political power and regime and which performed by more than one individual organized around an ideology”.

Terror is defined in the Counter-terrorism Act no. 3713 as follows: “any kind of criminal activity which is committed by means of pressure, threatening, intimidating or humiliation through using violence by one or more person who are members of an organization in order to change the characteristics of the Republic stated in the Constitution and to change political, judicial, social, secular and economical order; to break up the unitary structure of the state with its country and nation; to endanger the existence of the Turkish state and republic; to weaken, to destroy or to capture the authority of the state; to destruct basic rights and freedoms; and to disturb the internal and external security of the state, public order or public health.”

There exist common understandings and definitions thereby allowing cooperation in fighting against drug trafficking, human trafficking and organized crime which have increased up to an across-boundaries level with ease due to globalization. Nevertheless, there is no such common ground against terrorism yet. And this makes it harder to cooperate against terrorism.

It's known that terrorist groups have been seeking financial resource and thus they cooperate with organized crime formations, especially in drug trafficking; because some sources feeding terrorism

were cut off as a result of efforts made for this. For this reason, to ignore terrorism just on the grounds that there is no common definition of terrorism means at the same time to support drug trafficking and organized crimes.

It's also a well-known fact that the cyber-terrorism is being supported and hackers have accessed certain information ranging from defence plans of nations to military software codes being used and top secret knowledge of weapon technology. Terrorist organizations have internet in their hands as an incredible means to access these information. Thus, a total strategy must be put forth in order to counter international terrorism and an international standard must be set against cyber-terrorism.

Evaluation of the Incidents of Terrorism in Turkey

Our country has witnessed a fight against political-, ethnic- or religion-based terrorist organizations during the last 30 years. This has allowed our fighting units to gain much experience in their subject fields. The final argument agreed as a result of this experience is that terrorism has no religion, race or ideology. Terrorism, under whichever cover, is a crime against humanity and should not be tolerated at all.

It's determined that there are about 35 terrorist organizations holding leftist ideology in our country. Among these, DHKP/C (Revolutionist Public Salvation Party/Front), MLKP (Marxist- Leninist Communist Party), TKP/ML-CONFERENCE and MKP (Maoist Communist Party) are currently active. It's a well-known fact that Fehriye ERDAL, member of the terrorist organization DHKP/C, is one of the perpetrators involved in killing 3 people including a famous businessman in our country, and that she is still in one of the EU countries and has not been returned yet. Tangible examples like this point out the importance of the international cooperation and test the sincerity of the countries regarding this issue.

PKK/KONGRA-GEL, which has been continuing its activities as an ethnic-based terrorist organization in our country, terminated its so-called unilateral cease-fire on June 01, 2004 which it had commenced on September 01, 1998, in order to get over its internal and external problems deteriorating increasingly and to facilitate its politicization process. However, it's known that even during this so-called cease-fire period, the terrorist organization provided training in the subjects such as "bomb making, sabotage, intelligence, assassination, raid, ambush, intruder mission, kidnapping and taking hostage" to the act groups founded under the name so-called "PKK KONGRA-GEL Special Forces" in the camps in Northern Iraq. We have found out

that the members of this organization have been sent to metropolises namely İstanbul, Antalya, Mersin, İzmir and Adana to carry out some activities within the framework of so-called Legal Defence Strategy; and that they have planned to create fear and anxiety in the public by performing sensational acts to affect the country's tourism and industry, as well as assassinating the members of the security forces and the judiciary with the help of their terrorist organization's members and sympathizers in those metropolises.

We all know the terrorist organization PKK/KONGRA-GEL's legal/illegal structuring efforts abroad. Although the linkage between legal establishments and the terrorist organization is clear, our attempts to make a cooperation about this issue have proved futile, as is the case with ROJ TV.

Our country is at the crossroads connecting the western and eastern cultures. Democratic and secular Turkey, with its population being Muslim, constitutes an example for other Muslim countries on the one hand, and it has become a target of radical fundamentalist groups on the other hand. However, our country remains to be a peaceful and safe island in the middle of the world's one of the hottest spots, thanks to our effective struggle against political-, ethnic- and religion-based terrorist activities.

The lessons we have learned from this struggle emphasize that the following issues should be realized for an effective counter-terrorism effort:

- Strong intelligence,
- Effective crisis management,
- Information-sharing at national level,
- Crime-scene investigation and securing and protecting the proofs,
- Effective control of entry into/exit from the country, and
- International cooperation.

Sustainable Security Measures Against Terrorism

It's not always necessary to restrict basic rights and freedoms in order to fight effectively against terrorism and to be successful in this effort. On the contrary, atmospheres lacking basic rights and freedoms, and existence of anti-democratic structures, pave the way for terrorism. However, in democratic societies, basic rights and freedoms could be restricted to some extent for the sake of social utility.

For the purposes of security of state and public utility, restricting some rights of the people who have directly participated in terrorist

activities or who have linkages with terrorist organizations is not contrary to the universal norms of law and our constitution.

I think some provisions of the renewed Turkish Criminal Law and Code of Procedure must definitely be improved in order to maintain an effective fight against terrorism. The laws and regulations on counter-terrorism should be considered and arranged as a different, new and separate concept from the Turkish Criminal Law. These arrangements must have nothing to do with the citizens who have absolutely no ties, relations with terrorism. It should be the members of a terrorist organization whom the counter-terrorism act deals with.

It should not be forgotten that one cannot be succeed in fighting against terrorist organizations with the methods of dealing with simple offenses. In this context, I would like to express the following suggestions regarding legal and administrative arrangements.

Legal Arrangements

The period for keeping under surveillance should be applied as 4 days with the public prosecutor's knowledge and additional time for surveillance or preliminary inquiry up to 15 or more days could be provided in accordance with the decision of the court to which the subject individual has been sent at the end of the 4-day period.

The concept "circumstances which pose danger in case of delay in judicial action" means that circumstances under which there is the possibility of committing a crime or disappearance of the offenders and proofs if a required judicial action is not made immediately. In case of such circumstances exist; the authority to issue a written order for search should be given to the chiefs of the police.

According to the Code of Procedure, when a suspect is apprehended, it's mandatory to inform immediately the suspect's close relatives or an individual determined by that suspect. However, when the criminals who have committed together a terror crime are arrested, they inform a member of the organization about the situation and hence the proofs of the offense are destroyed and other suspects run away. Therefore, in the case of terror crimes, the right to inform close relatives and see his/her attorney at law should be delayed up to 1-4 days.

According to the Article 127 of the Code of Procedure, for all kinds of seizure process, it's mandatory to get the judge's decision allowing this, and written order of the public prosecutor in case of the circumstances mentioned above (in the second paragraph). This procedure, which makes it harder to collect proofs and closes the way leading from the proof to the offender, should not be implemented in

case of terror crimes and the police could be able to commence a legal action in the form of seizure.

According to the Article 122 of the code of Procedure, the papers and documents found during a search performed by the police could only be examined by the Judge or Public Prosecutor. However, examining such documents immediately could prevent destruction or disappearance of the proofs as well as making it possible to take necessary measures if those documents mention an order or instruction for a terrorist activity targeting people's life or property. The police should be authorized for taking necessary steps also in this case.

We do not have any info-banks which keeping the photographs, finger prints, physical characteristics and genetics (DNA) information of the individuals. The data bank which once included the fingerprints of the criminals apprehended by the police has been terminated in accordance with the Articles 75-82 of the new Code of Procedure. Therefore, information which used for identification purposes such as everyone's fingerprints and DNA samples should be provided and necessary arrangements should be made to be able to employ such information in throwing light on terror crimes.

It's not necessary to establish a new court under a different name; however, one of the high criminal courts should be assigned only to hear the cases of terror crimes.

For the lawsuits regarding terror crimes in the phase of inquiry, it's decided not to prosecute, and it may be well observed that the trial process is manipulated by the lawyer of the defendant. Hence, such trial system in which there is no room for the judge and prosecutors to maneuver should be abandoned; and it should be possible to collect new information, documents and proofs from the operational units during the trial process.

During the execution of a sentence, terrorism criminals may not take advantage of the applications such as laws of pardon or amnesty, good conduct or release on probation.

Administrative Arrangements

In order to fight against global terrorism, decisions taken by UN and International Organizations and agreements signed among nations should be implemented at functional level. Nations when trying to prevent terrorism by means of their national legal rules and laws, they, at the same time, must support or approve the international efforts being carried out in this field.

Nations, in accordance with an agreement, arrangement or other mechanism regarding mutual legal assistance and information

exchange, should provide maximum assistance in lawsuits, administrative searches and investigations and penal applications related with terrorism and financing terrorist activities and terrorist organizations. They should also have the procedures in force which dictates returning the individuals who committed crime to their countries.

It's necessary to commence the fight against global terrorist organizations from beyond the national borders. It should be possible to prevent certain individuals, who could pose a potential threat, from entering our country, during their visa and entrance procedures performed at our embassies and consulates.

It should be possible to keep the records of entries into and exits from the country regularly at the checkpoints on the borders and to record photographs and fingerprints of those individuals who are entering/leaving the country.

Effectiveness of the fight against terrorism should be enhanced through increasing sensibility of the people living in metropolises to incidents of terrorism and also through providing social support by raising awareness of the young and families.

We've observed that all crimes, and chiefly terror crimes, in our country are committed by means of using false identity cards and documents; and this constitutes the most important obstacle for us to identify and apprehend the criminals. We need legal arrangements which prevent usage of false identity cards and documents.

The network "Public-Net" should be established at once so that the counter-terrorism units could utilize the information in the hands of the government to the maximum extent possible. Waste of time would be prevented by means of accessing the true and current information related to identity and possession of properties, money transfers, addresses, communication devices being used etc. through the Public-Net.

In today's world in which there's no house without a computer and no individual who doesn't use the internet, cyber-terrorism has been also included in the context of terrorism which seeks to perform sensational acts. It's very important to provide security for national networks and all our systems which use information & communication technologies as well as to protect buildings and people against terrorism. It's necessary to allocate adequate funds and resources for counter-cyber terrorism. And along with all public organizations and institutions, private sector should also reach the set standards in terms of the measures to be taken for counter-cyber terrorism.

It shouldn't be allowed unregistered accommodation and the people without an identity card in metropolises. Crowded places

where there's a high possibility of committing a crime, such as the squares, shopping malls, hotels and public buildings should be monitored by a camera system like MOBESE.

The MOBESE is an "urban information and security system" which have been activated within the structure of İstanbul Police Department with the support of the Governor's Office, İstanbul. It's an information & communication project with a view to improving security services being provided to the people of İstanbul; facilitating the management of the police; and enhancing the effectiveness of the police in fighting against crime. Now, I'd like to present the demo we've prepared regarding this project.

We are continuing and will continue our efforts with determination and resolution, hoping that the necessary improvements regarding the issues we've suggested will be realized and we

I'd like to extend my thanks and regards to all of the participants.

Celalettin CERRAH
Chief of Police, İstanbul

EFFICIENT CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN COUNTER TERRORISM

Hon. Thomas W. O'CONNELL ASECDEF SOLIC (USA)¹



I had the opportunity to read the Chief of General Staff's introduction and I agree with his assessment – it is an excellent piece of work. I would like to thank to the Turkish General Staff for their support and the CoE for their support on global war against terrorism. Greetings to all VIPs here – and they are indeed many!

My agenda will be very quick – I want to talk about efficient crisis response, we will talk about the threat – again, my view is that of the United States – at the end, I will talk a moment about the Tactical Support Working Group, which I think will be an interest to many of you.

The threat is increasing in its diversity. Just as you have and in fact we all have, groups like PKK KONGRA GEL, other groups like the IRA and ETA, there are groups

¹ Prior to his appointment as Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr. O'Connell served as a Senior Manager for Raytheon Company's Intelligence and Information Systems, and has served as a frequent Task Force member of the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee. A 1968 Distinguished Military Graduate of the University of Rhode Island with a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Economics, Mr. O'Connell began his career as an Infantry Officer in Germany. Mr. O'Connell was assigned as a Combat Intelligence instructor in at the Army's Intelligence Center and School at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona prior to spending three years in the 82nd Airborne Division at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina as an intelligence officer at battalion, brigade, and division levels. During attendance at the Army's Command and General Staff College, he earned a Master's Degree in Management from Central Michigan University. Mr. O'Connell was assigned at different Army Divisions and attended to the Naval War College, having graduated with highest distinction and earned a Master's Degree in International Relations. After a brief assignment in the U.S. Special Operations Command's Washington Office, he served for three years at the Central Intelligence Agency till his retirement in 1995. Mr. O'Connell's career included participation in four arenas of conflict: Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, and Southwest Asia; as well as various assignments in 33 countries. He holds a Master Parachutist rating and has received numerous awards including medals.

that are more religious in their outlook right now. They form a complex web: groups that joining together forming networks. Terrorism is not new.

I will let the interpreters read through these two quotations: one by the Ayatollah HUMEYNI given in 1942 and other a 1955 quotation.

Who is the enemy? This I think is the perspective that the United States has today. We have an enemy that has no state, no uniform, lives among the population, believes religion is under attacked and call upon all Muslims to defend Islam. They are committed to their cause, their religious ideology successfully attracts new recruits and they have a sufficient population base from which to prolong a conflict. In their own words, this is what we hear, from Osama Bin Laden (OBL), from Al Zawahiri and from Mister Al Zarqawi – we talked earlier about Zarqawi – so we hear this and therefore they combine to form really an unprecedented danger: the combination of weapons proliferation, information technology, and perceived grievances. We face IEDs, suicide bombers, new types of missiles, chemical and biological weapons – which are essentially very easy to make and these mass effects can capture media's attention (information technology makes it easy to spread their message). They are perceived grievances against the United States; certainly the war in Afghanistan and Iraq fosters the perception that we are fighting a war against Islam; Palestine and Israel is a constant aggravation to men; we have tough visa and immigration policies, which disappoint many that want to come to US; and of course I do not have to tell you about the impact of the pictures of Abu Graib and the perception of Guantanamo Bay. That feeds support to the terrorists' messages.

The terrorist threat used to be a law enforcement issue. Before 9/11, we were interested in evidence collection, extradition and trials – that has been transitioned to a military issue after 9/11. If you look at the actions that we took in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attack, is much more (instead of putting them on trial) find – fix – and finish, and I suspect that we will continue to do that. But now we require complete co-operation between all forms of our Government: law enforcement, intelligence, and the military. We have a command & control & communication system, which I think is very flexible and responsive, direct and redundant. We practiced it and we have a contingency plan that allows us to integrate domestic and overseas capabilities. It is an evolution from April of 1980, when we had a disaster in the desert in Iran. We now have a permanent force that is dedicated, well resourced and it is protected in legislation. They perhaps sometimes consider that are under utilised, although we have many deployed around the world today, and we have to make

sure that our response is not too late. We have a response force option of 'force of force.' We must maintain a core capability and also develop a specialised capability that has the ability to work against WMD. We must have in the national capital regions and all around the US an ability to disassemble a WMD, being it a manufactured one or a homemade bomb. We have to be able to train this force and constantly rehearse it. We have to be able to practice a forced entry into places that may not want us in there to deal with the terrorist element. We have a process that must be deliberate, that must be time sensitive, and sensitive to the crisis, well rehearsed (*sorry*) and we have to have an ability to manage the consequences be it Anthrax, be it Small-pox, and maybe intelligence, as the previous speaker said, is the best way we can prevent some of these activities. We have to rehearse our options. If we have a cargo liner at sea is it going to be the Coast Guard or the Navy that takes it down, or are we going to quarantine the vessel or assault it on the way. So we have to demonstrate our ability in complex environments. The challenges that we have in US, specifically our unity of action and effort: we must meet the evolving threats. The old world was bombing, assassination, hijacks - the new world is NBC. We have a new set of actors and we have a new set of media domains.

I would like to talk just for a moment about our Technical Support Working Group structure. I will leave this up for a moment but what I want to do is show you how we have taken 82 different organizations and manage them under a technique that allows us to distinguish which element can best handle a particular area. For instance, our (*sorry*) secret services are best at VIP protection; investigating forensic support is also the secret service; infrastructure protection is both the DoD and FBI; IEDs are the FBI - Transportation Security Administration handles explosive detection; special projects are both DoD and intelligence community, physical security is the DoD and Department of Energy; blast effects mitigations are the Department of Justice. We work under the State Department's control – I manage the programme – and this is very, very successful. Among the things we have been able to determine and provide to our allies, are things like low cross robots, a system that allow fire fighters operate into NBC environment, forensic help for IEDs, IED disruptors, low cost escape masks. Vehicle screening is very, very important – if you notice the vehicle in the bottom left of the screen, you can see that you can detect explosives behind the front wheel and in the trunk of the vehicle. We developed this – it is called back scatter X-ray or back scatter radiation. We can move it up against a vehicle and be able to determine whether or not that vehicle has explosive in it. We

have developed training courses and personal search guys, a new detection course. These are all available to you in an unclassified manner.

Our response plan is a very, very complex one. It is not easy to set up, it is a very expensive plan and I will tell you that we have deployed many of our best counter terrorist people overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, we have maintained in each theatre – Central Command, Southern Command, Pacific Command, and European Command – a very capable counter-terrorism response force. Our forces are stretched in, they are working very hard and we believe in both Afghanistan and in Iraq they have taken a serious toll on potential terrorist enemy that would do harm the US.

PROBLEMS IN MANAGING COUNTER TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AFTER A TERRORIST ATTACK

Brig. Gen. Bekto SUPRAPTO (INDONESIA)¹



Introduction

Any country in the world would have problem in handling big scale bombing terrorist attack for the first time. Therefore, a plan of action and needs, as well as simulation involving all agencies responsible for the first handling of crime scene up to prosecution level, and re-education of suspects / perpetrators during incarceration and imprisonment as well as after they are released back to the society are therefore necessary.

Trainings, actions and coordination must also involve various government and private institutions who have the authorities and relevance to the various effort of managing the crime

scene, conducting investigation and judicial process.

However, sudden big scale terrorist attack would nevertheless create various problems even for trained officers in handling the case. But, one thing that must be underlined is that trained officers would be more ready compared to untrained officers. Thus, identifying all problems that might have to be faced and are predicted to be have

¹ Bekto SUPRAPTO was born in Yogyakarta in 1954. Having graduated from Police College and Police Academy, he received "Police Staff and Command Course" in 1994. He completed his Masters Degree on Police Studies in 1998. He also attended to the National Resilience Institute in 2002. Police Brigadier General SUPRAPTO is currently the Head of Anti-Terror Special Detachment 88/INP-HQ. SUPRAPTO is married.

been realized after a terrorist attack becomes an important issue to be discussed.

Problems

Various problems may occur in the managing of a terrorist attack crime scene as well as in the subsequent actions related to the investigation, prosecution, court proceeding, incarceration and return of released convicts to the society, could be identified to be as follows:

1. The factor of law or existence of provisions regulating terrorist attacks.
2. The factor of institutions authorized to examine crime scene.
3. The factor of infrastructures of facilities that could support terrorist eradication
4. The factor of society, that is the neighborhood where terrorist attack occurs
5. The factor of culture
6. The factor of mass media

In relation to the factor of law, let us take a look on the experience of Indonesia, when the big scale bombing attack in Bali took place on October 12, 2002, causing 202 dead victims from 21 countries and more than 180 injured victims, and scores of destroyed buildings and vehicles. At that time, Indonesia did not have any law regulating terrorism, whereas the existing regulations were not enough to overcome the law enforcement problem in terrorism. Therefore, the legislation regulating terrorism was created five days after the terrorist attack and was enacted retroactively. This newborn legislation was immediately enacted, so that in its implementation, various problems regarding interpretation of the law among law enforcers occurred. This made some parts of the legislation unable to be effectively enforced, in addition to creating various opinions that there were some other parties or government institutions who felt that they had the authorities in handling terrorism.

Another problem that occurred was also related to the substantiation in the criminal court proceeding in Indonesia that still refers to the minimum evidence principle that is very difficult to be fulfilled in the handling of secret organization network of terrorists. Lack of specific prosecutors and judges, as well as court specific in handling terrorism cases would also create various problems related to the capability, experience and courage. In addition to that, the reality of limited possibility of having full witness protection program, the reality that witnesses must face defendants on court, would create fear and inconsistency among witnesses in giving their testimonials,

due to emotional relationship. The lack of clauses and firm efforts from the government to provide compensation and health assistance for terrorist attack victims also becomes a highlight and reality that we must face after a terrorist attack occurs. The in absentia court proceeding, that is, giving verdict to terrorist defendant still at large is also still unable to be realized.

Related to the problems arising from the factor of authorized institutions and existing resources, it should first start from the readiness of police force, fire department, medical unit officers, ambulances, utility unit officers and other institutions with various authorities and personnel capability as well as their facilities. In the implementation, if each institution implements rigid Standard Operation Procedure, there would be problems that may hinder the examination of crime scene purposes. In addition to that, there are other institutions who feel authorized to come to crime scene, which in the end would actually hinder the examination of crime scene, victims and evidence collection.

The factor of society and culture also need to be attended by officers planning and assigned to examine terrorist attack scene. Experience in managing terrorist attack crime scene, such as bomb blast, in general, the local people wanted to assist officers in helping the victims. However, in reality, those assistances actually contaminate the crime scene, hinder the officers, and sometimes, they take the opportunity to steal valuable goods. There is also a culture unique to some of Moslem people in Indonesia, who provides protection to religious fighters. Thus, this culture is being taken advantage of by terrorist to harbor behind cultural attributes of Moslem people by using Moslem groups and Pesantren (Islamic Education Center) houses.

The factor of mass media also plays a key role in the handling process of terrorism. On one hand, the rapidity and accuracy of information really assist in accelerating investigation management and information dissemination to the society, but on the other hand, the rapidity of information would be counter productive for information that should have been kept confidential.

Lastly, on the factor of international cooperation, the most important are the willingness and the real action to conduct cooperation. Oftentimes, cross country cooperation is easier said than done, easier to pronounce but difficult to implement.

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Chief of Special Detachment 88 Anti Terrorism
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LESSONS LEARNED FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS BY THE AUTHORITIES

Mr. John Mc DOWALL (UK)¹



Members of the General Staff, Distinguished delegates, good afternoon to you,

As someone who has significant responsibility for the events, the bombings in London in July last year, and continuously have that responsibility concerning the investigations this day, I could probably speak about 20 days on the topic of lessons learned, sadly I have just 20 minutes, so I will try and count a three words I hope will be some lessons learned, some of them strategic, some of them tactical in nature and these are the issues I have just picked out.

What I am hoping to do is to give you the London context, the events of July. Clearly, without the aid of assistance on the audio-visual side, but nonetheless, I will try and deal with the London context the events in July very briefly. Then comments on investigate the challenges, command and control, business continuity, capacity building, communications, planning and exercising and new threats,

¹ Commander John McDowall joined the Metropolitan Police Service in 1980 on graduation from Manchester University. He first served as a detective in 1984, and since then has worked in a variety of locations in Central and South London as a uniformed officer and in the CID. In the 1990s he worked in the Commissioner's Central Staff, and while there gained a Masters degree at the University of London in Organisational Behaviour. In 1996 he was promoted and appointed to lead the SE Area Crime Squad, where he worked until 1997 before becoming Staff Officer to the Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations. In 1998, he was promoted to the role of Detective Chief Superintendent in SO10/11, Criminal Intelligence Branch, where he was involved in number of complex international investigations, and gained significant experience. He was selected for the 2002 Strategic Command Course, during which he undertook a Diploma in Criminology at Cambridge University. He was appointed Commander of the new SCD10/11, Covert Policing Branch, in November 2002. In this role he was involved in the authorisation of covert policing activity and developing doctrine, practice, and effective intelligence support to combat serious and organised crime. In January 2005 Commander McDowall moved to SO13, Anti-Terrorist Branch.

new ways to work. It sounds a lot, so I will proceed at pace. London's 620 square miles and has 21 % of the United Kingdom's economic activity and about 7,5 million people. It is the largest European Union city. 1/8 UK population live there. Another 1,5 million commute to work and we have 30 million tourists each year. The population is increasing by 40 thousand a year. In terms of policing, we have 13 of the 20 most pride boroughs--- that is local policing areas in the United Kingdom. We have 47 % of UK's minority ethnic citizens. We have 275 languages spoken in our schools. 400 thousand asylums seekers live in London so it is as with other NATO cities in the world, a challenging policing context, without the events of July befalling us.

On the 7th of July last year, we were hit with four simultaneous attacks. I say simultaneous. We had three attacks on the London underground. At all gates, where 6 died, 90 were injured, at Edgware Road where 7 died and 185 were injured, at Russell Square where I think it was 25 were killed and about another 180 were injured. Lastly we had an attack on a bus from the fourth of suicide bombers at Tethersquat Square where 13 died and 73 were injured. So a significant number of casualties, a significant number of deaths, 52 innocent lives taken and of the casualties that befell or the injuries that befell people that day, I would estimate 60 or 70 of those were life changing casualties of an extreme form.

So what are investigated challenges? I should say before I've omitted to mention, 21st of July, when a four night later we had another attempted simultaneous attack, again on our transportation network and again on three underground trains and one bus. And a fifth would be a suicide bomber who decided to abandon his device and not carry forward the attack. That of course occurrences did some 14 days later was rather unhelpful to say the least when we are still in the process of dealing with the initial crisis and consequence management phase. We had these multiple crimes scenes and multiple casualties that present all sorts of challenges to us as the first time we've been simultaneously attacked on the UK mainland in that way. And our first challenge was obviously to find sufficient trained staff to go and deal with the scenes. We managed to do that and very quickly we ascertained that we could identify what we thought were our four attackers in the 7th of July. That involved some property that was found at the scenes are clearly the message has been left that there was a linkage. It was a clue that has been left for us. We found it by using the tried and tested methodology, the anti-terrorist branch, which is minute investigation and very very detailed forensic recovery. That led us to some good all detective work, some hunches and some clues. And we caught are, what we thought were

would be bombers on the CCTV system of one of our main underground stations. From that began a huge exercise in CCTV grab. We are fortunate in UK that we have so many cameras and so many facilities around. One of the challenges however that confronted us this one of our major learning points from all of that was that unfortunately the systems overtime had devolved into different companies, different ways of doing it, different tapes, some were using hard drives. So actually bringing all that together, using it as an investigative tool and an investigative aid was extraordinarily difficult and that is one of the things we address since July. We had a multiplicity of crimes scenes. I went to the North of England where we thought we were going execute four search warrants in four houses that turned within forty hours, to fifteen search warrants. Again the challenges of trying to foresee, I suppose, how these investigations can mushroom into huge inquiries. We also had some other interesting crime scenes like one of the vehicles that had been left behind the station where are suicide bombers had left their vehicle that actually paid for a ticket, which caused to some concern and our explosives officers had some difficulty in dealing with that vehicle. We found within that vehicle, other explosive devices and traps that are clearly being left for police. These included a very crude form of mail bomb that we think would have been almost instantaneously detonated in eight of all. Had the vehicle been stopped by law enforcement and indeed a loaded fire arm in one of the front seats of the vehicle which we also believe would have been used against law enforcement had we discovered them on their way to the attack. We also had our first bomb scene of this type a bomb factory rather his type in United Kingdom, a flat in a student area of Leeds which is up in the North of England. It was set up as a factory. It had four or five rooms with each served a purpose. It was incredibly difficult to deal with that forensically and one of the learning points to come out of that from us was that we relied on the armed services explosive ordinance people and at disposal technicians who are extraordinary skilled at what they do. However, they have a slightly different concept of operations to our own explosive officers because in the anti-terrorist branch in London, we have a dozen or so folks who are former military personnel. And one of the learning points to come out of that for us was that when you marry those two capabilities and that knowledge you actually get a better product. So we brought our explosive officers up to work with military personnel in dealing with that scene. But it still took us something like 6 weeks to clear completely forensically because of the shared fact that buildings in premises impregnated with explosives. At one point we thought we

had a chemical, biological devices as well within the building and as you can imagine that significantly slowed our progress. Again, we saw sites within that scene that we have never encountered before, a complete bathtub full of a substance that was orangey-yellow in color. It had a strange appearance to it was a peroxide explosive that have been manufactured within those premises. Our understanding and our knowledge about such explosive substances at the time was very limited. I have to say today that I am not sure it has significantly increased. One other issue that came out of the investigative challenges was I think the duration certainly was a learning point for us. We are still committed with something like 100 staff out side of London working in support to us. At one point in July we were 1500 detective staff trying to deal with this issue. The longevity of the inquiry and the twist and turns it has taken I think has been a learning point. We had some difficulty with disaster bombing victim identification teams who operate to the objective of trying to identify the victims as quickly as possible. That issue brings us into slight conflict because our search has to be methodical and we have a different agenda as we have a goal to find out who is responsible for the attacks and prevent further attacks by doing so. We had no capacity, well we had some capacity but we had never confronted a manhunt of terrorist on the loose as we did on the 21st of July. That in it self presented us with some significant issues. We had to make up the way we had to police that event. Obviously, that was a very significant learning point for us and we have done our best to learn from it. We have learned to expect surprises. We found a 5th device in a park that had been abandoned. And as these things often pan out we also discovered a loaded firearm. Naturally the first inclination is to link the two items but as it turned out the would be bomb and fire arm were not linked.

We have a coronas court to confront if you like and we have the possibility we certainly without 21th of July people 17 of human our charged and most are still in custody. We have a massive job in presenting the evidence because this charges take so long to actually work through the court system so, we have learned to produce some more sophisticated methodology for producing evidence and we would give each our juries our judges and our lawyers in the court a laptop with a programme we take them with a specific events and I think that's quite a significant step forward. A learning lesson about measure intrusion on the, at the end of July I was trying the command in intervention where we were entering a premises where we felt one of our would be suicide bombers was as it end out there were two suicide bombers in the premises which was the honest but in fact

although I was confronted by bank of screens on the far left hand side was live cable television which was actually showing on the offices preparing themselves going to the premises. We didn't know whether these premises had a television on at that time and so we had to learn how to deal with that sort of intrusion. It wasn't particularly easy. Another significant learning point first was the war on us was going on more intelligence was coming in all the time and we had to find the resources stretchy dealing with that we had significant stress reemerging we thought we are ensue a reactive investigation mode but an actual fact the more the public where energise by, what they're seeing the more they're reporting to us and the more severe was our problems in resourcing.

The investigation was 50 thousand and plus exhibits now, 90 thousand plus tapes sees from CCTV cameras and systems, 45 thousand documents, 17 thousand statements, 20 thousand investigative actions, and more than 5 hundred interviews conducted by police. It is a massive challenge to us. I would like to tone on my colloquia from Istanbul's comments I entirely agree 4 days detention period in my view is completely not fit for purpose we are moving hopefully to 28 days detention before too long and we had asked 90 days detention that I don't think yet is completely that is an issue. In terms of dates of deaths it is absolutely vital that you have dates of sets of photographs finger prints and another diametric data. And so I would agree and support those remarks. And moving to command and control the typical measure instant is initial response, consolidation phase, recovery phase, restoration of normality and investigation. That actually doesn't fit with a counter terrorism investigation. Because in a counter terrorism investigation the detectives concerned of their right from, the of the need to be right their from the start and so we had some learning to do about how we commanded and controlled this incident and this investigation. We have a gold, silver, bronze system methodology for command which is borrowed I think from the military. Again gold was not within our goals, gold was a senior police officer who brought together all the other agencies. And around a goal table one would expect to find members of the health service, golds port cells intelligences, in other words transport representatives, utility representatives, other police services and so on and the military and so and so on. I think our learning point from July last year was, next time and I say that because I believe that there will be a next time we could be better in the way and which we liaise without gold counter-parts and that is significant learning point for us. I went Wellond command control but I just would say that it was good news in one sense the learning point

was the structural word this gold concept does work. The slightly last good news was the fact that it hadn't really taken into account ACT investigation. Another learning point for us some commanding and control we adapted to a flat structure. We are disciplined in high rocky conserves. We very early on realized that this would not work to result this crises, simply because it was overwhelming us. So we got colleagues at the same level we gave them pieces of the command and they worked to each other with one nominated lead that really worked extremely well for us. The kinds of areas that we gave people responsibility for scene management for a working in collaboration and cooperation with the identification manager. For the proactive response that I spoke about that dealing with that stresses that was so coming in the intelligence cell that was working between our cells and security services. Each of those areas was chunked up and given to a senior colleague and I think the rest of the British Police Services still doing quite understand how we manage to work that we believe you may it was effective for us. In terms of business continuity we have a think in London called Operation Rainbow. These key objectives are to deter terrorism, to detect or disrupt the movement of the terrorist and create a hostile environment to the terrorist to provide reassurance that kicks them the place and I think a learning point for us was that it worked really well. We worked very hard on business continuity we thought to partners in business above what they may be confronted above by in a terrorist incident. And this would really well for us in forming that staffing them away, minimizing the threats, they felt reassurance working with in accordance which we established when they could go back how safe it was to go back and advising in CCTV whether was working and so on and so on. And so we felt again that investment in what we called counter terrorism security advisers worked extraordinarily well for us in July. We have a number of published advise lines as well and we updated those as frequently as we could. That worked again really well for us. It is interesting in the age of new technology that has been refer to earlier a large number of people taken images on that mobile phones. We very quickly established a web for people to download those images to us. That was again extraordinarily useful, but it was working to us 21th century concept of operations I think. And we established an ops support office generally in the branch divert. We tend to deal with the operational time we dedicated resource to look after logistics and again that proved to be enormously useful and this learning for us for the future. Those people were also tasked as a crises assessment team. So again all that other information all that day to day business that we were doing on the 6th of July we couldn't

allow just to slide away because some of them was a significant threat to us. We gave to our crises assessment teams prioritise to worked out where we can gain resources from. The issue of staff resilience, the question we asked ourselves is where are they all. That's, is not quite as bland as it may appear the issue for us is what skills do our people have more significantly beyond London what skills asked they may have. Do they have any experience of counter terrorism work or not. And part of the work part of the learning's come out there is a police service national mobilization plan in England but it doesn't address specific skills sets in these counter terrorism operation so we are now developing a national mobilization plan for detectives who have skills in this areas. Years ago, we developed satellite staff around the country who we gave specific skills in forensic evidence retrieval. We found that has eroded over time this people either been re-tasked or they're doing it is a part time job when something that looks they do like it terrorism operation comes around. Again our learning is we need to keep much tighter control on what they start to doing or where they gone. We had an issue again a learning point about our resilience mortuary we had a 56 death and only 46 places in London mortuaries that morning to receive them. We had to create resilience mortuary very quickly, again there was a plan came off the show it worked very well. It only worked that well because of the assistance of the military in providing the premises in the site for us to you actually can strike what was a huge resilience mortuary. Our casualty bureau we had worked hard to make our casualty bureau system and that's the public call in to report missing people or making inquiries about casualties. We worked hard on that following its failure during the Tsunami crises earlier that year. We again found that it did not meet our expectations. Now have the work again to make it more fit for purpose and I think, we getting there finally. When we eventually rolled at London, we found ourselves confronted by colleagues. We had little experience in counter terrorism investigation. We found the best way overcoming that that was a body in scene so we gave a counter terrorism detective to a non counter terrorism detective from another part of the country. And they worked together the duration of the inquiry. In fact we still working in the area in question, where this really paid evidence, where you learned the different operating methodologies of different people. Unfortunately, we found ourselves having to search a compacted rubbish side equivalent to 16 Olympic Swimming Pools in size , because we had been made aware that certain items may have been removed from one of the bomb factories. Police again in the north of England have a particular way of going around this

search regime. The Metropolitan police has another, what we actually found at the end of the day was both police services had something to offer each other and the end product was extremely good. Learning point again knowledge management we are still, I think and I am sure we are not the only organization would say this not particularly good about managing the knowledge we have. And do we really know everything we know if you follow my drift. We had to set up large areas of storage acquire new premises and so on all of these things were other challenges to us. And I'll briefly rap up just some comments about communication. I mentioned the website, we set up. Some of the other issues of learning points the once we appeals to the public you have to be prepared for the wave of intelligence and information that comes out you. We have an anti terrorist branch hot line that usually runs calls in month during July and August running 1700 in the same number of staff we try to do deal with that searching capacity. Media handling we needed a very clear strategy we had one and we feel it work. I am not sure if Michael would agree with that but police perspective that was important. A number of other issues like loss of mobile phone technology. I was going to mention exercising it is very important that you exercise we exercise with all our partners to great effect we had exercised to believe it or not. All, that's identical scenario for days before the attack. That gave us some significant benefit. We didn't quite have the time to extract over learning from that exercise. We have Special Forces with us on that exercise as we did earlier this week when we exercise another scenario and that hugely helped our relationship with during July with the military their involvement with us. That's a very very quick counter some of the learning points I tried to extract some of are tactical some are strategic. I am sorry the presentation wasn't there for you probably going to have another 20 minutes, I just would like to finish by saying it is a great honour for me to opportunity to speak to you Thank you very much indeed.

“POSSIBILITIES OF COORDINATION AND COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM AMONG INSTITUTIONS”

Prof. Dr. Deniz Ülke ARIBOĞAN (TURKEY)¹



Presenting a report on “the possibility of coordination and cooperation against terrorism among institutions” could be defined as an effort to draw a picture which is actually very difficult to visualize, but also very nice to imagine. Imagining this picture is nice because it has been the main theme of all idealist philosophies in the history that international society reaches a consensus on any issue and makes

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an effort going beyond nationalities, ideologies and clashes. Great philosopher Immanuel Kant has suggested a *foedus pacificum*, that is, international peace architecture, in order to establish an eternal peace in the world. According to him, establishing such a unity would promote melting different ideas in the same pot and constitute the most important medium through which mutual tolerance could be strengthened. The main goal of this togetherness among states should be compromise and 'peace'. These idealist thoughts have maintained their popularity since the 18th century till today and, at the theoretical level, 'peace fetishism' has been able to find advocates all the time. However, definition problems could not make the world perception suggested by the idealism common in practice.

'Peace' is a concept on which there has been no agreement and it brings about the question that "whose peace?" The peace we're talking about is favorable for whom; keeps which status quo; suggests what kind of a world; and has been founded on which philosophical base? Today, the USA, Iraqi resistance fighters and radical Muslims and contemporary societies have all peace definitions different from each other. Actually, the main goal of all clashes going on in the world today is to reach peace. Their efforts to create the peace of their own could all be justified and it could be anticipated that all these "peaces" may foreshadow new fights. Thus, is there any ultimate goal or end to the war on terrorism? Could the fight against terrorism end up with peace and could terrorism be terminated once and for all? Does every achievement made against terrorism open a door to another kind of terrorism? Could it be possible to put an end to terrorism if all institutions shared the same understanding and intelligence services, the police and the military acted together against terrorism?

We have to say that it is impossible and that we cannot ignore the weakness of idealist thoughts when it comes to practice. Terrorism, that is the use of violence in order to achieve political aims in its brief definition, has always existed and will exist in the future, too. Therefore, the important thing is what we fight against and where we want to reach in the end of this fight. It is necessary to provide, at least, a long-term and more comprehensive peace or compromise; even it is temporary in the final analysis. It may not be possible to get rid of political violence; however, it is possible to marginalize these trends. It seems more meaningful to develop cooperation efforts in this way.

The way to realize this is very much related to defining well what we are up against. We must re-evaluate what terrorism is and how it could be handled. It appears to be suitable to explain it through a

metaphor. I'd like to mention an apple tree, which is so common that we can come across it almost everywhere. We can summarize the data in our hands when we want to describe it such as the following: an apple tree is a plant which yields red or yellow apples, with green leaves and brown branches. It's appropriate to cut its branches off if it blocks our scene. At first sight, an apple tree is just like this and the definition is suitable. However if you look at it through a deep analysis and see its roots; then you can have the opportunity to get to know it better. The apple tree is a much more extensive existence than it looks, with its roots going down deep for many meters. It is in harmony with the ground it stands on and it feeds from that ground. Unsuitable ground would prevent that tree from growing. In other words, an apple tree cannot grow in the desert; there must be a suitable, favorable ground for it to survive so that it can grow and leaf out.

An apple tree has no ontological meaning itself; that is, it must be a part of the ecosystem within which it exists. It is a living creature with the function of adjusting oxygen-carbon dioxide balance and yielding fruit. It needs the sunlight and the rain. It cannot survive without these. There are parasites on every apple tree. There are ants, bugs, butterflies and birds on the branches. The existence of this tree is a precondition for these parasites to live and the tree's survival is the main condition for these creatures more than anything. The apples are this tree's fruit and they also have larvae, that is, their own parasites, too. In short, a tree is much more complex being than it seems and it requires to be observed from a different perspective. Trimming its branches would make it stronger than ever.

Terrorism needs a deep-analysis just as is the case with an apple tree. If you limit your vision just with the picture you see at first, you may think terrorists with bombs and weapons in their hands as terrorism itself. However, it is impossible to make a multidimensional analysis without determining from which ground it feeds, what life cycle it needs to survive, of which system it constitute a part and who the parasites are feeding on it and its yields. Single-dimensioned picture, that is, the perspective dealing with just what is visible is a reflection of the thought that if the terrorist is killed, then terrorism will end. Yet, killing the terrorists has the same effect as trimming the tree; hence it may appear a profile much more enormous than before. Hence, it is necessary to use a deep-analysis method in establishing institutional cooperation and to base common perception on the proper foundation before waging a war against the terrorism.

After determining what kind of architecture terrorism is, the next step would be to agree on through what ways we will counter it and to

develop norms for this. To institutionalize is one of the most important details in an international war on terrorism.

International Counter-Terrorism Efforts at the Institutional Level

International counter-terrorism efforts have been continuing since the League of Nations period. Given the fact that the first large-scale war of the 20th century began with a terrorist act, it's made it clear that something must be done about it. Conventions on 'Prevention and Penalizing Terrorism' and 'Establishing the International Criminal Court' were developed during the Copenhagen Conference in 1935, and they were signed in 1937. Although the Article 8 of the convention adopted the principle 'the terrorist shall be sent back or punished', it could not be realized since it's very difficult to differentiate between the terrorist criminal and political criminal. When the attitude of Belgium in relation with Fehriye Erdal is considered, it could be seen that this ambiguity still remains. In other words, the important thing is the existence of the will to implement those conventions, rather than the existence of the conventions themselves.

Although the approach of by the United Nations is similar to that of the League of Nations, it has been shaped by a series of conventions parallel to the changing conditions. Some of the conventions are as follows:

1963 'Convention on Offences and Certain Of the Acts Committed On Board Aircraft'

1970 'Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft'

1971 'Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation'

1973 'Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents'

1979 'International Convention against the Taking of Hostages'

1980 'Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials'

1988 'Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation'

1991 'Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection'

1999 'International Convention on Terminating Terrorist Bombings'

2001 'International Agreement Against Funding of Terrorism'

2001 UN Security Council Resolution 1373: This notably comprehensive resolution can be seen as the most extensive roadmap issued by the United Nations for counter-terrorism. It

includes the ratification of all agreements related to terrorism and conviction of any action that may provide support for terrorist activities.

It is also widely known that anti-terrorism efforts go beyond the UN initiatives and receive support from international organizations as well. The Council of Europe criminalized the international terrorism in 1973, which was followed by the ratification of “European Contract for Counter-Terrorism” in 1977. Concluding documents of meetings held in Madrid (1983), follow-up meeting in Vienna (1989), concluding document of Human Dimension Conference in Copenhagen (1990), The Charter of Paris (1990), concluding documents of Helsinki (1992), Budapest (1994), and Lisbon (1996) all called for unconditional banning and denouncement of terrorism and approached the subject from various perspectives.

In summary, in the final days of the Cold War the very first signs of the extent, to which the international terrorism can stretch, were received and several international organizations felt that they should get involved in the process. Previous agreements were reviewed to meet the requirements of the day and replaced by more comprehensive arrangements.

21st Century and Institutional Reaction

21st Century is notably different than the 20th Century – a peak time for terrorism – and seems to have even more in store. This final century is witnessing the greatest change and transformation in the entire history of humankind. It can even be considered as an era of rebirth by itself. Economic, political and socio-cultural transformation created a new form of perception while the space we live in managed to cross the geographic boundaries and shifted onto a virtual plane. While our friends, neighbors, expectations, hopes, troubles and disappointments bring us – the members of this global village – closer; our own lives now seem small enough to occupy the screen of a TV or memory of a PC. Technological revolution recreated almost everything anew and the industrial society that was focused on material production entered a new phase – a post-industrial era focused on the production of information.

The major benefit of such an atmosphere is to be able to start living the world instead of just living in it. This, in turn, requires us to reorganize our lives according to the quality of information we receive. Control and manipulation of information systems became the priority for political powers allowing them to exercise their influence and any material that could be turned into information and news were claimed with great appetite. In such a world order the phenomenon of

terrorism also transformed into a news-processing factory. Every terrorist action found its place in various news sources and became critical for information manipulation.

Good, bad, right and wrong were all shaped through channels of information to represent our common judgment and as result some assumptions emerged: "Terrorism is bad, war is good, conflict is bad, resistance is good". In the political competitive environment where every action is judged to be good or bad, terrorism and counter-terrorism were both subject to exploitation. Many nations even hypocritically employed terrorism for their own good. Thus we failed to provide a common ground for institutional collaboration against terrorism and emergence of definitions like "your terrorist" or "ours". Every nation portrayed the terrorist who shared the nation's political agenda as if he/she were a defender of a holy cause while denouncing the one who conflicted with their own the national interests.

Terrorism became a tool, which nations used against each other and consequently an extension to international wars while local interests replaced what was universally right, so institutional collaboration failed.

Post-industrial society's grasp of the new world order went beyond pure economic, social and technological changes and brought about the structural transformation as well. New-emerged dynamics created a substantial difference in the quality of security perceptions. The system that was established between the nation-states was replaced by an extremely complicated structure where non-state actors played an important role. So, it became inevitable for security concerns to find a new place on the non-state platform.

The public opinion today is that one of the greatest threats to peaceful and safe existence of humankind comes from the international terrorist organizations. Now we have to fight not just against soldiers in official uniforms acting in national interest but a structure, which we do not know and are rendered helpless to provide a definition for. This structure is not bound with any law of war, national borders, sovereignty or legal measures; instead it is considerably free at acting the way it desires.

What we have here is a weapon that is organized within a global network employable not just by states but also actors competing the national authorities. Thus simply constructing a model for the interstate system to act as a basis for our analysis and considering this issue an extension to an interstate conflict will not be sufficient. So, when speaking of institutional collaboration it makes more sense

to state that a multidimensional alliance, rather than an interstate consensus, would be more beneficial.

We previously stated that a perception of interest on which all the actors compromised was almost impossible. Because, terrorism is a political phenomenon and politics depends on determining the sides and sides' reaching their interest subjectively. Perhaps this is the most significant obstacle for the realization of institutional cooperation. "Terrorist threat" is neither placed in a concrete framework nor has the virtuality that continuously changes and is renewed as the necessity of political struggle. Namely, we do not mention a phenomenon that can easily be described, classified and perceived with common perception. The definition of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' is ideological attitude and this definition is determined by materialistic conditions of politics. When this situation is fed with the general troubles of social sciences, a product that can be a matter of conflict instead of cooperation emerges. International legitimacy of the operations that were started after 11th September is open to questioning. In the Afghanistan Case, it was possible to perform a joint operation in accordance with the NATO's article 5. NATO members that came together in 24 hours following the attacks approved some decisions against terrorism including sharing information, using the air space and bases, helping the countries under threat, deployment of NATO Navy to the Eastern Mediterranean. However, the same manner was not displayed on the issue of Iraq and differences of opinion emerged. It was not possible to provide harmony between NATO members some of which supported the idea of using war method and some of which took the side of using risk management against terrorism. Because, the war method that U.S. put forward required that all the sources have to be mobilized and all individual rights and freedoms have to be restricted. However, European allies think that taking military precautions before removing the causes lying behind the terrorism will make the things worse. This shows that, at the very beginning of the action there will not be a common ground for agreement. But, there are significant warning signs that shows that 21st century will be a super terrorism era. Global terrorism, in its new form, is a by-product of the post-industrial society and it is packed with colourful papers and it can display a stronger profile because it is supported by communication systems. It cannot be said that terrorism has already reached its peak but we should not forget the saying: " all hurts but the last one kills." Then, what kind of precautions should we take before the deathblow?

Where should we start? How should a global cooperation grounds be framed?

Conclusion

First of all, although it is impossible to define the terrorism in a detailed way, the common denominators must be determined in the definition. Here, civil losses are determining details. Whatever the content, reason and aim of the an action is, in the case that it is directed towards civilians it is a precondition that it is included in the terrorism category. Even if we perceive organization as a freedom warrior, think that the action has lawful reasons, find the political goals of the organization conforming to our political goals, it must be a prior attitude to protect the civil life. There are lots of difficulties to place this tradition on a global scale. First of all, the discrimination between civilians and uniformed personnel has significantly disappeared in all the wars of the 20th century. Also in this new type of war, the front is so wide as to cover the earth surface.

The second point that deserves attention is how to approach counter-terrorism from a multidimensional perspective. The ground that acts a basis and foundation for this phenomenon needs to be rehabilitated. In this sense the Extended Middle East and North Africa Project can also be considered a strategy in counter-terrorism. In order to democratize the democratization process the foundations first need to meet the democratic culture, which in turn should be followed by the preparation of the infrastructure and become operational with its institutions and regulations. This means that the social, cultural and economic structure, which allows terrorism to be preferred as a strategy for war, would be reorganized.

No existence is independent of the factors and causes that realize this very existence. Every piece of earth yields a unique crop and basic characteristic of the crop represents that nature of that land. Fetishization of democratization and the perception that it is simply anonymous with voting may cause forming a stronger-than-before foundation for terrorism. Indeed the results in the polls today do not raise our hopes for the future of democracy.

The third point to address is that the structure and characteristics of the international system are important variables to take into consideration for the analysis of many conflicts and problems in the world today. Ever-increasing roles and power of non-state actors whose influence reached a point as to challenge the authority of the nation-state definitely need to be addressed. Nation-states employ soldiers and armed forces in official uniforms while non-state actors

have to use illegal arms. So it is inevitable to find organized crime networks and terrorist groups among these non-state actors when they fight against state authorities.

The analysis of regional and local systems may lead us to the sources reinforcing and nourishing terrorism. The ground that causes Radical Islam to be on the agenda by carrying a terror potential should be observed carefully. The reaction to the many different situations in the Middle East and the Islamic region that couldn't be the determinant of its own fate and that even couldn't be the subject of its own history for ages makes the terrorism easy to be adopted as a strategy. The cultural reaction to the extreme individualism of the modernism; the economic reaction to the global capitalist order along with the collection of the economic wealth under one power and revenue injustice; the emotional reaction to the sincerity of the charges of democratization by force; the Anti-Western reaction to the tradition of being treated as a barbarian and being degraded; the political reaction that believes that his own political structure and dictatorial traditions are fed by hegemonic powers and beside all, the desperate reaction that believes that the future will never progress to its favor and that it is stolen by "the West" serves as a source for terrorism today.

Forthly, it is necessary to satisfactorily establish the aim of the counter terrorism and to adopt attitudes conforming to the real world instead of too utopian claims. The aim of counter terrorism is to restrain its effectiveness and to make it unnecessary by means of learning to live with it instead of trying to terminate it and having a radical war. Terrorism doesn't create an event on its own, on the contrary waits for the event to occur. Its aim is to create an impact as strong as possible in an area as wide as possible, shortly to make a cost-effective but big job.

The success of terrorism is measured by the impact it causes. As Brian Jenkins said "terrorism is a theater" and its aim is the feelings it will create on the audience. To stop an action at its reaction stage which you cannot stop in its domain and to give the message that the desired reaction cannot be created, will mean that the theater is being performed in front of empty seats. Today the methods to counter terrorism is in the way to punish the ones who realizes the games and in the way to annihilate them. This doesn't cause a result no more than the theater being watched with much more pleasure and the reaction reaches a point that even the terrorists can't imagine. After 11th September not only terrorism has been countered but also a new world model has been started to be cretaed. The interesting thing

here is that “it is not the side exposed to the terrorism” but “the side exposed to counter terrorism” that is victimized in the international community.

This is the most important sign of that institutional cooperation will not be limited only to the military perspective. The aim of the struggle shouldn't be limited to punishing the terrorist action and the institutional cooperation must be shaped to lessen the emerging impacts and in this way to inactivate the terrorist actions.

Fifthly, the cooperation in which multilateral companies, dominant companies of communication industry, non-governmental organizations and international organizations will also take part may be more efficient than the alliances among the states. In this framework, it is appropriate to use the phrase “agreement between the actors” instead of the phrase international compromise and cooperation.

Sixthly, it is necessary to accept that terrorism is a complex structure that can't be handled solely from a military perspective and that has social, economical, cultural reasons. Thus, besides intelligence, police and the military forces, it is mandatory to use the non-governmental organizations and socio-cultural instruments together. Impact management is more prior than the supervision of effect. A multi-dimensional coordination is compulsory.

Lastly, from the point that it is not possible for the international community to compromise totally on the counter terrorism, it is necessary to consider that the collective actions like United Nations will stay only at the written norm level and it is necessary to consider this subject in the frame of alliance. This attitude requires counter terrorism to be evaluated as collective defense rather than international security perception and it is now becoming compulsory to fulfill the points that the idealism can not reach by means of realist practices.

THIRD SESSION

COOPERATION OPPORTUNITIES IN COUNTER TERRORISM

Co-Chair of the Session	Prof. Dr. Rob De WIJK	NETHERLANDS
Co-Chair of the Session	Prof. Dr. Ersin ONULDURAN	TURKEY
Rapporteur	Assoc. Prof. Mustafa KİBAROĞLU	TURKEY



SPEAKERS	
General Peter PACE	USA
Dr. David NAJERA	MEXICO
Prof. Dr. Fang FINJING	CHINA
Prof. Dr. Bassam TIBI	GERMANY
Dr. Shireen MAZARI	PAKISTAN
General John COLSTON	UNITED KINGDOM

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SPECIAL PAPER

“THE USE AND ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM”

General Peter PACE Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (USA)¹



¹ General Peter Pace was sworn in as sixteenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Sep. 30, 2005. In this capacity, he serves as the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. General Pace is the first Marine to serve as Chairman. General Pace was born in Brooklyn, NY. A 1967 graduate of the United States Naval Academy, he holds a Master's Degree in Business Administration from George Washington University and attended Harvard University for the Senior Executives in National and International Security program. The General is also a graduate of the Infantry Officers' Advanced Course at Fort Benning, Ga.; the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, in Quantico, VA; and the National War College, at Ft. McNair, Washington, DC. General Pace has held command at virtually every level, and served in overseas billets in Nam Phong, Thailand; Seoul, Korea; and Yokota, Japan. While serving as President, Marine Corps University, then Brigadier General Pace also served as Deputy Commander, Marine Forces, Somalia, and as the Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force – Somalia. General Pace's personal decorations include: Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal; the Legion of Merit; Bronze Star Medal, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Navy Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement Medal and the Combat Action Ribbon. General Pace is married to Lynne, and has two children.

Well, thank you very much for that kind introduction.

General Özkök, my fellow, Chiefs of Defence, and all of you taking time from your busy schedules to come here to Turkey to share ideas and information. Thank you for doing that.

I feel a little bit like in posture because my intend in coming was to listen and to learn about ways to be better partners with the folks in this room. I do appreciate the opportunity to speak for just a few minutes.

What I am going to say is not a speech, but they are things that I believe to be true. This war on terrorism is a partnership. We are certainly all in it together. There is no nation that is so large that can do it by itself. There is no nation that is so small that can not have strategic impact and participate in a very meaningful way. Well, most of us are wearing uniforms and we are discussing how to fight this war on terrorism. I believe fundamentally that there is a role for the military in providing security. But I also believe fundamentally that is the war on terrorism will not be won by force of arms. Yes, we will need to have security. If you can lighten the concept of security that a military force will provide to that of a police force in a city. There is crime in a city, yet the police force keeps it at the low level at which the government can function. So too our militaries can contribute to this war on terror. By keeping the number of terrorist acts at low level, where our governments and other governments can function. But once we have security in place, the other elements of national power will be the key to the long-term victory in the war on terror.

Good governance, governments that are representative of their people and that provide for the basic needs of their people are fundamental to winning the war on terror. So the economies; economies that provide for jobs so individuals who want to feed their families can do so without having to accept the money to plant a bomb on the side of a road.

Good education systems that do not teach hate, but teach tolerance to various religions and their various ideas and principles. And education that is available to everyone in society. How can any country reach its full potential, if it does not include various sectors of its people whether it be for religious purposes or color of skin or for any other reason like gender to not take the opportunity to educate all of our children. So there are many facades to this war on terror. But there is a military part. And as we looked to the future, we are going to have to figure out how effectively to take on the terrorist cells. Iraq and Afghanistan will overtime become stable countries and join the community of nations. The war on terror will continue long after Iraq

and Afghanistan have had success in standing up their own government.

There are some things about war that no longer apply in this case. First, geography. For my country, for most of our history, we were protected by two very large oceans. Now terrorists in small numbers can cross those oceans very easily and ideas can cross those oceans very easily.

This is not about war inside of a particular country we can look at the map and say here is where the war is taking place. Because that we all know we had terrorist attacks in Bali and in the Philippines, and in the United States, in Columbia, in United Kingdom, in Spain, in Germany, in Turkey, in Iraq, in Afghanistan, Pakistan; say simply this is a global challenge. All of the terrorist organizations are not exactly the same. Say differently, they are not all trying to hijack a religion. There are not all terrorists in Columbia and other terrorists elsewhere in the world.

Time is a unique commodity in this war. At a tactical level, we must have speed of action. But at the strategic level, we must have patience. We are talking about years and years to come a vigilance for all free nations. In understanding that today's tactical victory, it is not a guarantee tomorrow's strategic success. And understanding that we must have a long-term vision, certainly our enemies do. If you look at the map they had produced, it goes out one hundred years. We should read what they have produced. We should not repeat the mistake of World War II when Hitler published "Mein Kampf" and those who read it did not react or believe it. Our enemies have told us, we can read what their intent is. In shortened form, their intent is to ensure that meetings like this could never happen. They want to take away the way that we decide we want to live our lives. Sovereignty is an issue that we must understand and come to grips with.

How do we fight an enemy in side of nations with whom you are not at war. Boundaries for nations mean nothing to the terrorists. Collectively we are going to have to figure out how do we respect each other's sovereignty, yet understand and facilitate the ability to work closely with each other quickly inside the timelines that allow us to get away the enemy.

Truth is a weapon. We will use truth. All of us will use truth to explain our populations the reality as we know. Our enemies will distort the truth to try to create a reality which were distorted reality. The problem is that we have the internet and 24 hour news coverage. Our enemies can tell lies that rapidly circle with law. Well before those who properly take the time to ensure what they say is accurate and true. Well before they had the chance to get their story onto the net.

Somehow collectively we are going to have to find the way to respond to the lies and deceit of our enemies were not constrained as we are probably constrained by the truth .

All of our militaries seek to be victorious over our enemies with minimum collateral damage. We want to destroy our enemies without excess damage to civilians or excess damage to property. There is a fundamental of how we want to fight. Our enemy is exactly the opposite. They want to create chaos and they want to destroy things. They will destroy our most sacred shrines, just to sow fear. Fear is a short-term advantage for the enemy. It can be a long-term advantage for the enemy if we do not come to the aid of those countries that need it. If the enemy is allowed to have a population ruled by fear because we as free nations fail to respond. Then fear can be a long-term advantage for them. But thinking people everywhere understand what produces fear. And given the chance to stand up for what they believe, they will overcome that fear. But they need our help, so fear can be a long-term advantage to us by turning it against our enemies, by helping those in need, by freeing up people to fight back for their own families and for their own government.

All of us in this room do not see the threat the same way. That is not a bad thing. Diversity in populations and diversity in this room is a healthy thing for our countries. What is important and why I am so pleased to be here is that we share what we believe ourselves that we listen to others and that we find the common threads that will allow us to work together for the benefit of our countries. I don't know what the percentages are, but there is probably 10 percent of the things that my country would like to do that is not good for yours. And there is probably 10 percent of what you want to do that is not good for mine. That leaves about 80 percent by marine math of the possibilities for going forward together to find the solutions. There will be no surrenders to end this war. There will be no documents signed. There will be no victory in Europe day. There will certainly be an overall lessening of terrorism across the globe at low level at which all free people can live the way we chose. For that to happen this conference and many many more must take place so we can understand the possibilities of cooperation and partnership.

I salute General Özkök, I salute Turkey not only for the leadership for this conference but in stepping out as leaders in the world and stepping out as leaders in the fight on terrorism. Very early on Turkey took the lead in Afghanistan and continued as leaders in that country. In many ways Turkey has assisted their neighbors in Iraq, both in real material support and in education opportunities and in friendship and support to those countries that asked to transit their airspace, transit

their ground and in many many other ways that we can not talk about in this open forum. So General ÖZKÖK thank you for your personal leadership and for your country's leadership in all you do to help maintain freedom in the world. With that I am going to stop talking at you and I think I have got two minutes if someone else has questions they want to ask, I will be happy to respond.

Hakan ÇELİK, Representative of Posta for Ankara

This fight against the PKK currently seems to the most important issue for Turkey's security, especially one thinks about the big chaos continuing in the South East of Turkey and in Iraq. This issue has been discussed between you and the Turkish authorities many times. It has become an issue of argument from time to time. You, as the American side, have each time stated that you see the PKK as a terrorist organization but consider it a matter of timing and that you share the same opinion that it should be stopped. The Turkish public opinion really wants to know about this timing issue. When will the American forces act for this and provide support up to the level desired by Turkey?

General Peter PACE

Thank you. That is a very important issue between Turkey and United States. PKK is a terrorist organization. It is unacceptable for the PKK to continue to operate the way they have operated. Turkey, as you know, have been in the fight with PKK for decades. This is not an easy solution. If it were an easy solution, it would already be done. Inside of Iraq, we are still battling against terrorist acts of bombing and the like still standing up the Iraqi armed forces, which are coming along nicely, but still have a ways to go. It is important to stabilize Iraq's security, it's important to have a functioning representative government in Iraq that can then work side by side with the United States and Turkey to eliminate the PKK threat from the Northern part of Iraq that does not mean that we are not taking actions collectively with our friends here in Turkey, we are. I cannot articulate in an open forum, all the things we are doing, but there are actions ongoing not only between our two countries, but amongst many other friendly nations in Iraq to help go after finances, to help go after PKK external to Iraq. I know that after decades of fighting PKK on your own, that waiting longer to see action against the PKK in Northern Iraq is frustrating to those here in Turkey, but I believe fundamentally that we must first have a strong unified country in Iraq so that we can

collectively go after the PKK in a way that will take care that problem that once and for all. I think if I am going to hear next speakers. I am going to need to stop. I look forward now to taking my seat and listening to others' ideas about the ways to fight terrorism.

Thank you very much for your attention.

TERRORISM AND SEPARATISM, A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE FOR THE NEAR FUTURE

Dr. David Nájera (MEXICO)¹



It is evident to me that not all terrorist events are necessarily aimed at separatism. For the purposes of this symposium I will try to make reference to some specific situations and their effect on international relations.

First of all it is important to mention that contemporary times see major changes happening in the international system and that there is an economic predominance in world affairs since the end of the Cold War. Both the financial transformation and the new technologies development have been surpassed by the effects of terrorism and the growing

acknowledgement and concern that various forces are moving, not only at different speeds from those of the so called 'development', but even directly against it.

¹ Business graduated from the Iberoamericana University and internationalist from El Colegio de México, he was born in Mexico city in 1960. He has a long career as university professor as well as lecturer in several Mexican universities, especially in the Iberoamericana. As scholar he has participated in different research projects and publications about migrations, international security and Middle East affairs. He has been a career member of the Mexican Foreign Service for more than fifteen years, posted in Canada, Israel, European Union and know at the end of his tenure in Belgium, he already as the grade of Minister in his diplomatic career. As a public servant he has participated in the negotiations for the access of Mexico to OECD, as well as spokesperson for the President of Mexico. He is partner of Portico, Communication Analysis, a consulting firm in Mexico city who has develop, into several others projects, intelligence business systems in international Mexican firms. And his participation in this Symposium is as a member of the El Colegio de México.

Of course, other events are taking place, such as the reality of climate change, natural disasters and the capability or inability to respond to their causes and effects. We also see a growing disenchantment of the societies with their governments and even more with their political elites. This is just to tell you that not every major change has been a consequence of terror. In fact, what we must consider is that problems in the Global era are , indubitably, global.

I want to refer as well to what Mr. Karzai just said yesterday in the case of Afghanistan: it is a conflict related to the Cold War that vanished from the international interest while becoming a laboratory for extremists -of course those are not the words of His Excellency, but mines. And we can refer to other similar scenarios with equivalent references: Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia etcetera. Local problems escalated during the Cold War to a geopolitical perspective: the international community neglected them again until a disaster happened.

Countries or regions where in several cases the local tensions preceded by far their introduction into the geopolitical map of the Cold War and were deprived from international assistance until it was so late, that the international community was forced to intervene and to participate in operations longer than foreseen, more expensive and politically unpopular for the Governments that support them. Even worse, often with a lot of resistance and an uncooperative attitude from the local communities that were receiving the assistance as we witnessed in the former Yugoslavia.

So, an important perspective for the analysis of terrorism, even before engaging in a multilateral effort against it, is to study the nature of their specificity. It seems obvious but it is not -as the situation in Iraq demonstrates it.

It is clear that in this symposium Al-Qaeda and the Islamic extremist will figure in the center of the agenda. From my perspective this reflects the same traditional approach used during the Cold War: the security of powerful countries stands before the solution of local problems.

We see, for example, that local and basics problems -as access to education, employment, sewage, living conditions etcetera- are at the root of many situations. In the case of Central America, in order to understand the conflicts during the 80's, we have to remember that there was no land distribution, no social revolution nor development opportunities whatsoever, and that the power was restrained to a rural elite that historically exploited the Indigenous populations. At

first, communism was not a political demand; it was a basic demand for opportunities.

And even today, after Peace was established, two external phenomena created a social turmoil: one, hurricane Mitch in 1999 and its economic aftermath that propelled thousands of people from El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala to migrate to the USA; second, Washington's decision to expel illegal aliens incarcerated in American jails and to deport them to their countries of origin, exporting in fact thousands of violent inmates to Central America who recreated their criminal organizations called Maras. Only when violent events related to human and drug trafficking reached first pages of the American media, international attention was paid to local needs in those weak States.

It is obvious that the expenditures of the years of war, were never repeated in order to build stability and economic development once the war was over. Yet another problem resolved through neglecting.

The wars of Independence in the former Portuguese colonies in Africa, seen as scenarios for the fight between capitalism and communism in the seventies, seem to be the way to forget that there were already basic needs that those populations demanded... and that they are probably still waiting for answers to them.

My intervention does not intend to analyze each of the cases mentioned but to illustrate through them that we have the need to start from a specific perspective to analyze already complex situations.

So, even when the need for International Cooperation in the fight against terrorism is crystal clear, it seems very important to me to look deep into the local characteristics of each specific cause as part of an analytical audit situation before starting to provide action plans. I believe this meeting is a splendid opportunity for this approach.

To find each of the potential conflict situations, to analyze them and to provide specific data that ends in action plans, resources, timetables and budgets, can take a lot of time and money. Meanwhile, direct terrorist events can happen. But believe me, the specific political interests and the political times are basically what really stops those initiatives from a long term analysis. We decided to cover our needs with astringent rules and laws and preparing for the effects... but not for the causes.

Just look into the Muslim world. We can identify the objective of Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups of establishing a Caliphate in Dar-

al-Islam as several authors have referred². Simultaneously we identified that most of the Muslims are not looking for that purpose. Their daily concerns are their families, their communities, their beliefs. They want peace as much as we do. So, why doesn't the international community look for better ways of development cooperation?

The Muslim countries, created as a result of the decolonization processes of the XX Century, started with basic state institutions inherited from their former metropolis. The changes of the XIX Century in Europe influenced the Middle East. The idea of a constitutional monarchy that limited the power of the caliph or the sultan was attractive. Then, at the end of the Ottoman Empire, the successor states had constitutions that define the power and referred to equality between the "citizens" - by the way, a notion that didn't exist in the region and the structure of a traditional society doesn't change easily.

The creation of states with border lines decided by the European powers has been major criticized. But it is true that for a while there existed elected Parliaments and forms of popular representation that started to develop in those Nations.

The effect of the independence of Israel, at least in the Arab world, created conditions for the young military elite to access to power and remain there for many years, becoming more and more authoritarian as long as their different national projects failed to provide well being for their societies.

The idea of building "socialist" societies around a common enemy was supported also in some compromises within the population: those of development and modernization. Once the 1967 defeat took place, the regimes lost their self-confidence as well as that of the society.

Between the different changes that occurred in those years was the appearance of political proposals based on the Islam. The advent of a political Islam was supported by religious regimes as Saudi Arabia that had the economic resources to spend and the political motivation to validate its religious model. It was also a balance against the secularism of Nasser in Egypt as well as the Ba'th in Iraq and Syria.

The religious challenge was looking for a different way of social transformation than the secular modernization: a religious one based on an astringent interpretation of Islam.

² For the purposes of this presentation I will take the possibility of a "Caliphate" as a starter point for the discussion recognizing that the final aim of Islamist extremist goes much more for a radical interpretation of Islam and its control of every aspect of human life.

Facing that challenge the regimes reacted co-opting Islam as their own legitimization. Islam gave wording to political speeches and declarations, as the idea of pluralism and social participation vanished from the political arena. The space of participation paradoxically became that of the mosque, that of the prayer.

While the preachers became a source of assistance for basic needs as education, medical services and economic support for local entrepreneurs, all of this financed from abroad, the State slowly lost touch with the local needs and grievances. The idea that Islam can provide what the State cannot became a reality in several countries where many of the first mujaheddin that fought in Afghanistan were originally recruited.

Violence was not necessarily accepted by those local communities, but tolerated when it happened abroad as an explanation from the fight to free Afghanistan or Algeria from communism.

It is convenient to remember that the appeal for a political Islam preached by Khomeiny never became a reality because of his appurtenance to the Shi'ia and because the religious structure of the Sunnis is quite different -a situation that also explains the appearance in that vast majority of many different radical groups and "preachers" that not necessarily reach coordination between themselves.

In that sense we can see Al-Qaeda as a "success story", an umbrella organization that in a specific time had the conditions to coordinate and motivate separated initiatives. If this rationality is true, then it is certain that cutting modern resources as financial transactions and high tech communications will isolate Al-Qaeda and substantially reduce its capabilities to coordinate attacks.

Even when it is clear that groups like Al-Qaeda are acting with a small social base, their best element is the threat and the impact in which the mass media and Internet became a platform of dissemination. In any case that doesn't mean that to isolate Al-Qaeda and other terrorists groups from the main core of the society is not a good strategy. Being more isolated, less communicated, will make them less and less operative.

But the economic needs and the State institutions absence or limitations to attend their impoverished societies were not the only reason to provide a fertile ground for extremists. I believe it was much more the absence of political spaces, the lack of freedom to express or to participate and to question their rulers, the search for the right to participate in the decisions concerning their future.

Unfortunately, up to now, the advances of democratic values and social participation can be some of the main casualties of terrorism. While the rule of law, freedom of expression, coherence and

continuity of policies can provide Muslim societies a solid framework to resist terror by themselves.

All the necessary and legal actions that are required to fight terror must be used, but they must include a comprehensive approach that aims to provide responses to local needs. International Cooperation will only be possible through dialogue and in a common ground: that of respect.

Ladies and gentlemen;

In the contemporary world we see regionalist political forces growing, both in pacific and in violent ways. The possibility to see the creation of new Nations in the next future is a fact that Yugoslavia demonstrated. In these days in Spain, for example, the discussion for constitutional changes that provide greater autonomy to its regions is a fact that can deeply transform that country.

During several years and again with the end of the Cold War a passion was developed in weak nations through the idea that nationalisms were intrinsically bad and were also obstacles to surpass when facing the globalization process and the economic interdependence. Now in the era of terror we worry about centripetal forces destroying established nations but, just the contrast between my two mentions, former Yugoslavia and Spain, show the capabilities to approach new forms of understanding through political means.

One future for the European Union is one of a federation of states where the regions play a more important role as long as the competences passes from the nation states to the Union, and simultaneously to the regions and local communities. The principle of subsidiarity will inevitably lead to stronger communities facing the old central governments. It will take time, but it is one of the foreseen scenarios. I suggest that in the next future the better way to deal with separatism will flow through different ways of federalization that provide social access to the daily answers that individuals are searching. Doing this in a regulated process will demand political sensitivity as well as time. But that will cut the extremists and the violence from their social references making it easier to apply the law.

The fact that a conventional war is a luxury that only poor countries can pay is the contrary of some separatist process. In Quebec for example, after some terrorist events in the seventies, the part of the Quebecker society with separatist aspirations has not seen another perspective different than that of a democratic process. By the way, that initiative was electorally defeated in 1995 and won't necessarily take place in a foreseeable future.

In Spain, it has taken all of a generation to pass from the strongly centralized and nationalistic country of Franco's dictatorship to the resurgences of local identities through an educational process. Even with the presence of ETA, the immense majority of the Spaniard society supports a political dialogue instead of violence. And by the way, this doesn't mean isolationism.

In contrast, in another region of the world, we can see how political initiatives had failed in Colombia in the last years and it was not until the international community declared the FARC guerrilla a terrorist organization that the international institutional support to the armed group vanished and this helped to understand that the government needs to act both from a political and a military approach. In the Colombian case it looks as if the international community didn't want to believe in-the State.

We have diverse situations and circumstances and also different times and responsibilities. As much as the American interests continue being the targets of terrorism, the protection plans are more related between themselves. But just to mention the issue, is it possible to see the drug war as a unilateral problem of Colombia or Mexico?

But all of us know that the situations that take place in Quebec, Spain, Mexico or Colombia are nothing compared to terrorism in the Muslim communities. It is a fact that poverty doesn't automatically conduct to violence, as well as not all Muslim related terrorist actions look for separatism or even for the creation of a suprastate as a Caliphate or an equivalent. The contemporary world has to deal with a wide spectrum of challenges.

What is true is that social disasters provide a fertile ground for extremism; it can be youth unemployment, material frustration etcetera. A big impact for the West was to discover that their own sons can feel attracted to extremist options that are not always exclusively related to a terrorist recruitment process.

And it is also true that repressive regimes and the absence of political participation alienate the best part of the societies. When the West appears supporting repressive regimes and even worse, committing atrocities itself, then we are providing elements for violence as the frustrated response of a society to the absence of hope, as happens for example in Palestine. Lets be realistic, we can not continue pretending that a huge part of the Muslim populations, both in Muslim countries and in the West, can continue living in the margins of social, economical and political development.

That's the beginning and the end of contemporary terrorism.

Thank you.

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COUNTERING RELIGIOUS TERRORISM FROM ITS IDIOSYNCRATIC PERSPECTIVE

Prof. Dr. Fang FINJING (CHINA)¹

Evolution of Religious Terrorism



All world religions preach the virtues of mercy and compassion, advocate numerous nonviolent and peace-building values, respect and preserve human life, and call for peace. But, tragically and virtually, most of major religions can justify violence and have long been associated with terrorism since they contain martial metaphors. Whole books of the Hebrew Bible are devoted to the conquests of great kings. In Hinduism, warfare has contributed to great religious epics such as the Mahabharata. Warfare has spilled over into history with conflicts such as the Crusades, the Muslim conquests and the Religious wars of the

sixteenth century.² Historically, three of the most famous examples

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In the past 15 years, she wrote more than 300 research papers on Indian foreign policy, security issues in South Asia, Tibet issue, overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, ethnic and religious issues in South and Southeast Asia, Taliban phenomenon, worldwide Islamic extremism, Xinjiang issue, terrorism, etc. She participated in many activities abroad. The Emergence and Development of "Ethnic Chinese Issue" in Southeast Asia, Shi Shi Chu Ban She, ISBN 7-80009-672-6, 2001.

were the Thugs (Hindu), the Zealot (Jewish), and the Assassins (Islamic). Some point to the Crusades as the first example of large-scale Christian terrorist acts because the conversion of “unbelievers” was an important motivator behind the Crusades. Actually, within every religion, there always exist radical elements exploiting religion to preach hatred and violence, intolerance and exclusiveness. Religious terrorists seek to use violence to further their so-called divinely commanded purposes.

Modern historical moments of global transformation have provided an occasion for religion-with all its images and ideas-to be reasserted as a public force. Modern religious terrorism surfaced around 1980. It was at a time of the decline of ideologies. In 1980s and 90s, secular gods had failed, void in secular ideology became profound for religion to fill in. Modern religious terrorism very effectively married ideology to religion. In addition, during this period, many countries began to experience a great social transformation. Social and economic pressures, frustrated political aspirations, and bitter personal experiences, all contributed to the rise of religious terrorism on the world arena. Religious violence has provided a sense of empowerment to alienated individuals, marginal groups, and visionary ideologues.

In addition, globalization creates a tremendous amount of confusion for human being in terms of identity. In order to seek a clear identity, sometimes, some people can be drawn to religious extremist movements, including those promote violence. In a religious terrorist group, an enjoyment of faith, a pleasure in belief, in being in touch with God are clearly manifested, based on the idea that the self is at the center of religion. Hence the individual is at the core of identity.

Nowadays, religiously motivated terrorism has superseded other forms of terrorism and leads to more intense forms of violence and bloodshed. Religious terrorist groups include Al Qaeda network, some American white supremacist militias (the Christian Patriot movement), Kach/Kahane Chai (Jewish), Dal Khals and Dashmesh (Sikh) and the Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, etc.³

Currently, the term “religious terrorists” is often applied to Islamic groups. But actually, white supremacists are also a threat we cannot underestimate. For instance, in the US, there exist 760 hate groups with about 100,000 members. America needs to be more vigilant about the domestic white supremacists, neo-Nazis and militia

² Jay Gary, “Unmasking Religious Terrorism,” March 30, 2001.

³ CDI Primer: Terrorism Beyond Islam, March 19, 2004; Mark Juergensmeyer, “Terror in the Mind of God-The Global Rise of Religious Violence,” University of California, 2000.

members. In 2003, for example, a Texan in a militia, William Krar, was caught with 25 machine guns and other weapons, a quarter-million rounds of ammunition, 60 pipe bombs and enough sodium cyanide to kill hundreds of people. America was too complacent about Al Qaeda and foreign terrorists before Sept. 11. And now it's too complacent about homegrown threats. ⁴In Britain, Anti-Muslim attacks supported by the white supremacist British National Party have increased. They have strengthened hostility against Muslim and "Islamophobia" among the general public. Religious terrorism presents a grave challenge to national, regional and international security today.

Idiosyncratic Characteristics of Religious Terrorism

(1) Religious terrorism, as Dr. Bruce Hoffman puts it, has its radically different value systems, mechanism of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and worldviews. For the religious terrorist, violence is first and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty executed in response to some theological demand or imperative. Terrorism thus assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators are consequently undeterred by political, moral, or practical constraints. They seek to appeal to no other constituency than themselves. They see themselves not as components of a system worth preserving at all but as "outsiders" seeking fundamental changes in the existing order. This sense further enables the religious terrorist to contemplate far more destructive types of terrorist operations than secular terrorists and reinforces the tendency which anybody is a fair target. ⁵ The most extreme religious terrorists can sanction "almost limitless violence against anyone." This distortion of the teachings of religions has been most brutal and fanatical once the blood of the faith community is made sacred "by the fanatical utterances of the religiously and racially intoxicated." For the ethos of radical Islamic terrorism, they believe in martyrdom or self-sacrifice in the service of Allah, they have no moral red lines in terms of numbers of casualties and extent of destruction they were willing to inflict. They do it because the jihad must go on. "In a jihad, there are no red lines" The extent of the damage and the number of casualties are of primary importance. Cults headed by charismatic leaders are usually very dangerous, where the leaders dominate the followers spiritually and emotionally.

⁴ Nicholas D. Kristof, "Homegrown Osama bin Ladens", *International Herald Tribune*, March 10, 2005.

⁵ Bruce Hoffman, "Old Madness, New Methods: Revival of Religious Terrorism Begs for Broad U.S. Policy", *Rand Review*, September 1998.

(2) The terror inflicted by the religious terrorist is not an end in itself. Rather is a means towards a larger goal. Nor is this goal a conventional one. As the U.S. National Commission on Terrorism put it: "Today's terrorists don't want a seat at the table, they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it." While old liberation movements used terrorist tactics in pursuit of creating nation-states, the newest aim is apparently- quite the opposite: Dismantling nation-states and replacing them with the revival of a supranational Islamic caliphate. During the long march toward this aim, the jihadist terrorist knows no bounds-methods of attack, means of obtaining resources, committing crimes-everything is valid.

(3) Terrorists with religious nature or motivation see themselves as answerable only to God or their idea of God. Their ultimate constituency is God. The pure intention of desiring to serve God becomes contaminated by ego-needs arising from despair and helplessness. So, religious terrorists can be quite devout in relation to wanting to serve God but quite violent in their behavior toward others. This mixture of darkness and light, of falseness and truth, of love and hatred, and of purity of devotion combined with extreme desecration of what purity is really about, can occur within individuals who are quite spiritually focused. It is present among many who advance the cause of terrorism in the name of God.

(4) Religions mandate acts of terror as sacred duty in an endless, cosmic struggle for the best way to please God. It is their worldview that the entire universe locked in an eternal struggle. Religious terrorism has no military objective. It is endless because it has a spiritual objective. No one ever knows when God is pleased enough, and when the situation in heaven matches the situation on earth. For this reason, religious terrorism is most dedicated and unpredictable. Most religious terrorists are devout, fundamentalist, "true" believers in their mainstream religion. The divine mandate for destruction is regarded as the "neglected duty" within the mainstream religion. Religious terrorists also do not consider themselves terrorists, since they say they do not enjoy violence for the sake of violence. They regard themselves as religious activists or militants.

(5) Binary thinking. This mindset exists in many religious terror groups. Religious terrorist groups are increasingly seen as an identity group, emphasizing the "us and them" approach, a process of drawing lines between true believers and the rest of the world. Religious terrorists among Muslims, Hindus, Jews, and Christians propose a simplistic, Manichean division of people into two groups "the righteous and the unrighteous". In this dualistic world, all reality is divided into two camps, good gods and bad gods, angels and

demons, good nations and evil ones, good humans and evil ones. These groups employ forms of conceptual and emotional manipulation (oversimplification, deception, and mass suggestion) that routinely precede physical forms of terror.⁶ With their extensive indoctrination infrastructure, private and isolated gathering among members, they build strength, laying the groundwork for decades of struggle.

Moreover, in today's globalized world, religion no longer has a relationship with a territory or given society, which is what we call deterritorialisation. It means that religion has to define itself solely in terms of religion. It has to define itself in comparison with all "others" – other religions, other values, other environments.⁷ This further consolidates religious extremist binary thinking.

(6) Religious terrorists do tend to fight with a determination and spirit. Stick to their aims with persistence. Religious agendas can inspire emotional stirrings and resulting dedicated actions. They can create angry emotions and a readiness to sacrifice oneself in fighting enemies- who have also been transformed into devils.⁸ Religious terrorism is about belief. It needs very little in the way of financing to accomplish its individual missions. The religious zealots appear to be quite happy to sacrifice their own lives.⁹

(7) Religious terrorism encourages extra-territorial loyalty by holding that the requirements of loyalty to the religious solidarity among followers overrode those of loyalty to the nation-state in which he or she is a citizen. It does not recognize national borders. There is no territory they must protect. It is thus subversive to the traditional concept of loyalty to the state.

(8) A shadowy network exists outside of law-enforcement services' surveillance. It is an informal network of person-to-person relationship. In many cases, it is a friend or acquaintance in the group who recruited the subject. The recruitment process is predominantly a casual or informal process. Members know their recruiter prior to recruitment. For some this is a family member, and for others someone from the community they know casually. Another small percentage is that their recruiter is introduced to them through a third

⁶ Roderick Hindery, "The anatomy of propaganda within religious terrorism," *Humanist*, March-April, 2003.

⁷ Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam: the Search for a New Ummah*, Hurst & Company, London, 2004, p38.

⁸ Dr. Alexander Roman, "Killing for God: Religious Terrorism in the World Today," alex@unicorne.org.

⁹ Peter R. Neumann, "Wider lessons from the IRA", *International Herald Tribune*, August 3, 2005.

party.¹⁰ In fact, there is no recruitment, most volunteered. The network grows organically, like the Internet.

(9) Religious terrorists have internalized their values. They are “true believers” who subordinate their individuality to the group. They uncritically accept the direction of the destructive charismatic leader of the organization, and to them what he declares is moral is moral, indeed is a sacred obligation.¹¹

(10) Many Islamic terrorists received higher education, such as graduate training at the technological universities in the West. Most came from financially comfortable middle class families. For instance, three-quarters of Al Qaeda come from the upper or middle class. Six-three percent had gone to college, in many aspects they are the best and bright of their societies. Three-quarters were professionals or semi-professionals: engineers, architects, and civil engineers, mostly scientists. The natural sciences predominated. They are skilled in computer technology. They spoke three, four, five, six languages. Most of us don't know Arabic, these men know two or three Western languages: German, French, English.

(11) Religious terrorism uses intimidation and ideological and physical terror as weapons to let its will prevail. Religion is a weapon of coercion and intimidation with which to subjugate the “infidels and the non-practicing persons”. In March 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo used sarin gas attacking on Tokyo's subways, killing 12 and injuring more than 5000. It was the world's first mass-scale chemical terrorist attack. The group built a vast arsenal of biochemical and conventional arms, including mustard gas, anthrax, botulism, Q-fever, sarin nerve gas and TNT. It also experimented with seismic weapons designed to trigger cataclysmic earthquakes in Japan.

(12) Religious terrorists never have to win a battle but can instead profit in the realm of public opinion from the glorious martyrdom entailed in their defeats. We think the struggle is fought on the ground, but they know the struggle is really fought on satellite TV, and they are far more sophisticated than we are in using it.

(13) Youth are the prime target of religious terror groups, because one could only find such vulnerable sincerity, fervor, hunger for action, and commitment to live or die for a cause among young people. They are more readily swayed by indoctrination and propaganda. The youthfulness of indoctrinated men and women stands out within Islam, Buddhist, Hindu, Catholic and Protestant

¹⁰ Jerrold M. Post, Ehud Sprinzak and Laurita M. Denny, “The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, A Frank Cass Journal, ISSN 0954-6553.

¹¹ Jerrold M. Post, M.D., “Killing in the Name of God-Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda,” Counter-proliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series, No.18.

Christians, and new religious groups like those of People's Temple in the U.S. and Guyana.

(14) Combine religion with advanced technology. For instance, Al Qaeda alongside its embrace of Islam has achieved a sophisticated mastery over the most far-reaching technology of communications, namely, the Internet and the television media. It has provided an ideological point of reference that has harnessed the minds of countless youth and that is seductive, compelling, and in today's context, irresistible. Bin Laden's messages have attracted huge audiences, first through al Jazeera, then through broadcasts by CNN and other worldwide media networks. He has increased reliance on a media strategy to gain adherents and to spread his jihadist ideas.¹²

Challenges for Countering Religious Terrorism

What we are now confronting is an asymmetric warfare. In this war, we are facing a lot of challenges as follows:

Religious terrorism in one form or another has been around for centuries and will be around for many more. The challenge to counter religious terrorism is that the problems and root causes that fuel it can never be eradicated completely. The complexity, diversity, and often idiosyncratic characteristics of modern religious terrorism imply that there is no "magic bullet"-no single, superior solution-that can be applied to all cases. As above mentioned, religious terrorists have religious fervor, the confidence, the knowledge, the discipline and the expertise to embark on terrorist attacks. They also have learned to find the vulnerabilities in the civil society. Hence, it needs multiple creative solutions, if not to resolve, then at least to ameliorate both the underlying causes of religious terrorism and its violent manifestations.¹³

Now we are facing with a belief system, which is inimical to the state system, and aims at the theological rule. So, it will not be countered by the same measures that counter other forms of terrorism. Neither military nor political solutions seem to work. Ceasefires, political concessions, financial rewards, amnesties, and other personal inducements would be ineffective. We'll need a new way of thinking, a new set of institutions to grapple with this reality, and a new dimension to understand people who are uninterested in

¹² Karen J. Greenberg edited, *Al Qaeda Now: Understanding Today's Terrorists*, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. xii-xiii.

¹³ Bruce Hoffman, "Old Madness, New Methods: Revival of Religious Terrorism Begs for Broad U.S. Policy", *Rand Review*, September 1998..

national self-interest, traditional defined. We should be prepared to face such a reality that we have got a long struggle ahead.¹⁴

Roaming in nature, they are more globalized than the worldwide law enforcements. The jihadist movement, initially based locally, has become international in nature, in terms of both its members and the diversified objectives that it pursues. Religious terrorist groups, like other global movements, possess an extraordinarily diverse membership, one that is not united by way of commonality about class, ethnicity or personal background. Indeed it functions as a network by disrupting and disregarding old-fashioned forms of political and territorial allegiance.¹⁵ These globalized terrorist groups have realized their effective composition of manpower and resources worldwide, while the law enforcements cannot reach this level because of existing national interests, territorial borders, and barriers of law.

Winning the battle is dependent on knowing the religious terror groups' secrets, espionage and information gathering is extremely important. But till now, what we can do is mainly to gauge what has happened in the past.¹⁶ On the other hand, the governments are in the open while the foes are hidden. The foes can notice your steps through open sources, such as mass media, but you can not detect them easily. Because of its unique behavior, close community, religious identity, and person-to-person relationship, it is extremely difficult for the law enforcement agency to infiltrate and take preemptive measures to thwart their terrorist attacks. Usually, the law enforcement agency couldn't have identified the culprits until the first attack perpetrated¹⁷ After investigating the Aum attack, a U.S. Senate investigative report asked, "How does a fanatic intent on creating Armageddon, with relatively unlimited funds and a world-wide network of operatives, escape notice of Western intelligence and law-enforcement agencies outside of Japan?" The answer was alarming, "They simply were not on anybody's radar screen." Many Al Qaeda sleepers all over the world, who are also completely assimilated, perfectly comfortable, from middle-class backgrounds, are completely off law enforcement lists and intelligence screens until their apprehension. Moreover, Islamic terrorist groups, such as Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, are always structured as a sect, with a tight-knit core

¹⁴ David Brooks, "The real enemy is not terror, it's an ideology," *International Herald Tribune*, July 27, 2004.

¹⁵ Faisal Devji, *Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity*, C. Hurst & Company. (Publishers) Ltd, London, 2005, p25.

¹⁶ Waleed Ziad, "The shallow roots of the mujahedeen", *International Herald Tribune*, June 19-20, 2004

¹⁷ Marc Sageman, "Organic terrorism," *The International Jerusalem Post*, December 3, 2004.

and a looser network of sympathizers. They recruit secretly, remain largely clandestine and tend to ask their members to sever their ties with their environment. Such an attitude makes them difficult to infiltrate.¹⁸ And religious terrorist intense dedication and their unpredictability create more difficulties for governments to counter it.

Religious terrorists mostly melting into local society and quietly installed in any metropolitan city, appear to be normal, socially well adjusted, and without any crime records, they are very easy to escape the suspicions and surveillance of security services. In the West, many of them appeared westernized and integrated into the west community, with a liking for football, fashion, drinking and local girlfriends. Finding suspects is the top priority for law-enforcement services, but the dilemma is “You can’t know what you don’t know. You can only hope you catch what you need to catch” as acknowledged by Canadian Deputy Prime Minister John Manley in an interview. Pierre de Bousquet, head of France’s counterintelligence service, says, “They do not seem suspicious. They work. They have kids. They have fixed addresses. They pay the rent.” Dr. Bruce Hoffman writes, “the members of these groups are not full-time, professional terrorists...but consider themselves minuteman: ordinary citizens and patriots ready to take up arms at a moment’s notice to defend their inalienable rights.”¹⁹

The Internet has underpinned the resilience of terrorist groups and their abilities to replicate themselves. Internet is a very difficult thing to shut down.

Now, the greatest fear that most analysts have is if weapons of mass destruction get in the hands of religious terrorists—they have no fear of destroying themselves and everybody else in the process. As earlier as 1995, in commenting on the Aum gas attack in Tokyo, Dr. Bruce Hoffman stated, “We’ve definitely crossed a threshold. This is the cutting edge of hi-tech terrorism for the year 2000 and beyond.”

¹⁸ Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam: the Search for a New Ummah*, Hurst & Company, London, 2004, p50-51.

¹⁹ Bruce Hoffman, “Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by A Religious Imperative,” Rand Paper P-7834, 1993.

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COUNTERING IDEOLOGICAL TERRORISM

Prof. Dr. Bassam TIBI (GERMANY)¹



Terrorism is the most recent new pattern of warfare addressed by Martin van Creveld as “low intensity war”, by Kalvi Holsti as “war of the third kind” and by myself as an irregular war of non-state actors waged without honoring any rules.² If this warfare were not based on an ideology articulated in religious-cultural terms it would have been an easy undertaking for countering it through simple strategies of policing. A closer look at the variety of this terrorism practiced by al-Qaeda reveals with clarity the reference to religion involved – even though in an ill shape. For Islam is a faith and it by no

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² These references are Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), Kalevi J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Bassam Tibi, *Conflict and War in the Middle East. From Interstate War to New Security*, 2nd enlarged edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), herein chapter 12, and the chapter by this author included in the volume *Redefining Security in the Middle East*, fully referenced in note 29 below.

means supports any kind of action that can be identified as terrorism, it rather prohibits it. To be sure, at issue is not a proper or an ill understanding of religion, but rather the ongoing process of a religionization of politics and a politicization of religion leading to a jihadization of Islam in an invention of tradition.³ The outcome is the ideology of jihadism which is something else than the classical Islamic jihad.³ This is the basis of the ideological foundation of terrorism.

To infer from the statement made that the ideology of jihadism has nothing to do with Islam would be a wrong scriptural understanding of the issue. Jihadists are people who perceive of themselves as “True Believers”⁴ and for this reason they excommunicate those fellow Muslims from the Islamic community of the *umma*, those who disagree with them in labelling non-Jihadist Muslims as *kafirun*/unbelievers to be killed.

If these facts are and properly understand and placed in their context while inquiring into the ideology of Islamist terrorism addressed here as jihadism it becomes clear that mere military strategies not to speak of policing, are utterly insufficient instruments. For an appropriate dealing with the issue for combating of terrorism new strategies are needed. In a contribution to the Berlin-based project on countering terrorism whose findings were published in a book edited by Martin van Creveld and Katherina van Knop I argue that the war on terror is also a war of ideas and worldviews.⁵ It follows that the reference of the jihadist ideology to Islam complicates the issue. The war of ideas enables the jihadists to defame any countering of terrorism in addressing it in terms of a war on Islam. There are serious Muslims – that is not only Islamists – who voice these bias. In recognizing this dimension hampering an unfolding of strategies for countering terrorism this paper focuses on the ideology of jihadism, first to understand it and second to think how to deal with it. In fighting one needs to beware of raising any suspicion that may support the jihadist ideology claiming that Islam and its people are the target. For ensuring a successful combating of terrorism the idea of jihadism should be targeted jointly in a Muslim-Western endeavor that makes sure: The war on terror is not a war on Islam.

³ This interpretation is unfolded in my chapter on Islam in the volume *World Cultures Yearbook*, edited by Helmut Anheier and Y. Raj Isar, to be published 2007 by Sage Press, London and New York.

⁴ See the references in note 25 below.

Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer. Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: Perennial Library, 2002, reprint of the original 1951).

⁵ B. Tibi, Countering Terrorism als Krieg der Weltanschauungen, in: Martin von Creveld and Katharina van Knop, eds., *Countering Modern Terrorism. History, Current Issues and Future Threats* (Bielefeld: Bertelsmann, 2005), pp. 131-172.

1. Introduction

The point of departure is the insight that contemporary terrorism is a new kind of warfare. The term I have coined for it, i.e. “irregular war” has to be supplemented with an analysis of “Religion and Terror”⁶ for interpreting the use of religious themes in a pursuit of a justification of the practice of terror in the name of Islam. In this context, the formula “politicization of religion and religionization of politics” (see note 2) has been phrased for identifying the ideological foundations of Islamist (not Islamic) terrorism. The ideology of Islamism is based on the politicization of Islam and it justifies “terror in the mind of God”. In this regard this distinction is highly relevant: Political Islam⁷ could be institutional and peaceful, but it also has a terrorist branch. It subscribes to violence and is addressed here as jihadism. It needs to be reiterated: this is something else than the traditional Islamic jihad (see note 3) for jihadism is based on an “invention of tradition”⁸, not the tradition itself. The pending issues were debated in a variety of events dealing in a policy oriented way with “transnational terrorism”. In Madrid, London, Rome and in Monterey/California the analysis of the ideological roots of religious extremism has been established as a basic issue area in the study of terrorism. This author was involved in these projects and contributed to the related findings which are pertinent for the reasoning continued in this paper on the ideological foundations of terrorism. It is an action pursued with a religious justification and legitimation.

Among the related facts in the study of the contemporary ideology of jihadism in that its history is rooted in the 20th century’s phenomenon of political Islam, which predates Bin-Ladism for many decades.⁹ The ideology of jihadism can be traced back to the birth of the Society of Muslim Brothers in Cairo in the year of 1928. This is

⁶ See the contributions by Bruce Lincoln, *Holy Terrors. Thinking about Religion after September 11* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003) and Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2000).

⁷ On political Islam see Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam, Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London: Routledge, 1991) and Graham Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (Boulder/Col.: Westview Press, 2003) and also my book referenced in note 9.

⁸ Eric Hobsbawm, ed., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, reprint 1996) introduction, pp. 1-14.

⁹ and on democratic peace Bruce Russett, *Grasping Democratic Peace* (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). The origin of the concept is Immanuel Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden*, reprinted in: *Friedensutopien*, Zwi Batscha, Richard Saage, eds., (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979), pp. 37-82. In Islam there is a different the Islamic concept of peace. On this issue see: B. Tibi, “War and Peace in Islam”, in: Terry Nardin, ed., *The Ethics of War and Peace* (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996 and 1998), reprinted in: Sahail Hashmi, ed., *Islamic Political Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). The reference to this classical concept for the calling for an “Islamic World Revolution for achieving Islamic World Peace” can be found in Sayyid Qutb’s work.

the first movement of Islamic fundamentalism.¹⁰ In the past decades this “Brotherhood” has developed within the networking of transnational religion to an international movement also covering the Islam diaspora in Europe. The founder of this movement Hasan al-Banna published around 1930 his “*Risalat al-Djihad*/Essay on Djihad”¹¹, which is used today in textbooks for the indoctrination in the jihadist ideology. This makes clear that al-Banna’s writings are among the major sources of intellectual terrorism. The indoctrination in jihadism is based on the al-Banna essay cited as well as an several catechisms/pamphlets authored by Sayyid Qutb. The latter was the foremost thinker of political Islam and he continues to be most influential ideological founder of Islamism.¹² Qutb is also translated – in the underground – into Turkish.¹³ The idea of neo-jihad outlined by al-Banna had been upgraded by Qutb to an idea articulated in quasi Marxist terms claiming “jihad as a permanent Islamic world revolution”¹⁴ in the pursuit of establishing *Hakimiyyat Allah*/God’s rule on global grounds. This is also the ideology of a new order for the world that envisions to replace the Western secular Westphalian system. This claim is the substance of the challenge of jihadism. In short, the ideology of jihadism is much more than a religious extremism making use of force. It is also a concept of order for the world.

The preceding introductory remarks make clear that countering of terrorism cannot be successful, if it is merely restricted to narrow

¹⁰ The most authoritative work on this subject completed at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences is Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, eds., *The Fundamentalism Project*, 5 volumes, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991-1995). The fact that Islamic fundamentalism and its jihadism are not an expression of a traditionalism and that Islamists draw on modern technology, even adopt its accomplishments is also treated in this project by B. Tibi, “The Worldview of Sunni-Arab Fundamentalists: Attitudes towards Modern Science and Technology”, in: vol. 2, *Fundamentalisms and Society* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993), pp. 73-102. For a recent work on the use of modern technology by Islamists for terrorist ends see Gary Bunt, *Islam in the Digital Age. E-Jihad, Online-Fetwas and Cyber Islamic Environments* (London: Pluto Press, 2003).

¹¹ See the respective chapters in the part “Remaking the World through Militancy”, in: volume 3 of Marty and Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalism and the State* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993).

¹² On this concept of divine order see the analysis and the authentic Islamist references in B. Tibi, *Fundamentalismus im Islam. Eine Gefahr für den Weltfrieden* (Darmstadt: Primus Verlag, 2000, 3rd edition 2002) chapters 2, 4 and 5. The origin of this concept is included in the – in a way – holy book of the Islamists by Sayyid Qutb, *Ma’alim fi al-Tariq*/ Signposts along the Road, published in millions of copies in Arabic as well as in diverse translations to other Islamic languages. I use the 13th legal edition (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1989).

¹³ On the basic difference between Islam and Islamism from a perspective of security studies, see B. Tibi, “Islam and Islamism: A Dialogue with Islam and a Security Approach vis-à-vis Islamism”, in: Tamy A. Jacoby and Brent Sasley, eds., *Redefining Security in the Middle East* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2002), pp. 62-82.

¹⁴ See the chapter on the Islamic worldview in B. Tibi, *Islam between Culture and Politics* (London: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 53-68.

security confines of a policing and of military issues. In my contribution to “Countering Modern Terrorism” waged as an irregular war by jihadist terrorists I argue, this is also a war of ideas (see note 5). The ideological jihadism in point seems to be more successful in this regard than the West. Many Western experts seem to underestimate the ideological dimension in the war on terror. It is often overlooked how this ideology is now spreading with the assistance of Madrassas and faith schools both in the world of Islam and in its diaspora in Europe. On the grounds of this religious-Islamist ideological indoctrination a policy of recruitment is pursued by the respective Islamist organizations: first teach jihadism and then recruit. If these facts are seriously taken into consideration, then it follows that a counter-terrorism strategy needs to equally engage in this war of ideas for combating the virus of jihadism, not through power, but rather through education and enlightenment to win the hearts and souls of young Muslims in order to prevent their development to jihadis. In talking about security cooperation, one may add that the war on terror can only be successful, and won, if it becomes a joint Western-Islamic effort. A part of this war of ideas is to prove in deeds and not only in pronouncements that the Islamic perception that the war on terror is a general war on Islam is wrong.

In establishing itself on cultural and religious grounds the Islamist terrorism in point interprets Islamic jihad anew as a jihadism. This is a related dimension of Islamism, also addressed in terms of political Islam. As stated, it emerges from the contemporary politicization of religion in the countries of Islamic civilization undergoing a crisis situation. To be sure, the very same phenomenon can be observed in other world religions of which the result is a variety of contemporary religious fundamentalisms and not only in the world of Islam. In introducing nuances and distinctions, this phenomenon is divided by two major streams: institutional Islamism and jihadism. Unlike the exponents of political Islam of the first stream, who believe to achieve their goal, i.e. the Islamic shari’a state, through participation in the democratic game of political institutions, the latter one, i.e. the jihadists subscribe to violent direct action believed to be fought as “Terror in the mind of God” (see note 6). The related ideology of global jihad is based on an Islamist interpretation of Islamic doctrines for underpinning terrorist action with religious arguments.

Long before 9/11 Algeria, Egypt, Pakistan and many other Islamic countries were exposed to the security threat of jihadism posed by these “warriors of God” since the 1980s. It is expressed in two ways: First, the call to topple the existing order, second the resort to terror being a practice addressed in this article as “irregular war”. Clearly,

jihadist Islamism is therefore a threat to the existing state order, but it is also an issue that touches on international security. The call of Sayyid Qutb, the rector spiritus of Islamism, for a Pax Islamica, i.e. Islamic world order precedes a few decades al-Qaida and its internationalism.¹⁵ However, the post-bipolar development is the framework that paved the way for the thriving of jihadist terrorism, which existed before. This pattern heralds a shift from Clausewitzian inter-state war to the new one of irregular warriors of neo-jihad. Based on this observation it is argued that jihadism is a challenge which requires the unfolding adjusted patterns of new security. Among these is a strategy for dealing with ideological foundations of terrorism. At issue is first how to respond to "terror in the mind of God" being the new post-bipolar irregular war and second to dealing with the call to topple the international order of secular state known as the Westphalian order to replace it by a global Islamicate, i.e. a *Dar al-Islam* mapping the entire globe. In the present paper an effort is made to explain the substance and the background of the ideology of jihadism in the context of international security.

The ideology of a jihadist terrorism is embedded in the time and space of postbipolar world affairs.¹⁶ There are many new factors, one of which is the return of the sacred¹⁷ within the framework in of the cultural turn. Another factor is the ascendance of non-state actors in world politics resulting in the emergence of terrorist movements acting globally in this capacity as non-state actors. The study of terrorism in international affairs¹⁸ is becoming in this regard a major concern of security. In this context, the terrorism branch of contemporary political Islam, i.e. jihadism, has to be placed into the new environment of international affairs in the post-bipolar development affecting recent patterns of world time. For properly dealing with this recurrent issue we need both to understand the occurring changes in international politics, in general, and political Islam itself jihadism as an expression of irregular war emerges, in particular from this context. To be sure, the focus of this paper is on the ideology of jihadism and therefore it cannot be exhaustive; it does

¹⁵ For a content-based survey see B. Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism. Political Islam and the New World Disorder* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1998, updated edition 2002).

¹⁶ Richard Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

¹⁷ See Hassan al-Banna, "Risalat al-jihad/essay on jihad" in the collected writings of al-Banna, *Majmu'at Rasail al-Banna* (Cairo: Dar al-Da'wa, 1990), pp. 271-292.

¹⁸ On the impact of Sayyid Qutb see Roxanne E. Euben, *The Enemy in the Mirror. Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Nationalism* (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), chapter 3.

not claim to cover all aspects of this multifaceted complex subject matter.

In relating Islamism and also its jihadist terrorism, as a fully new phenomenon in world politics based on the already mentioned ascendancy of non-state actors¹⁹ to international studies, one is compelled to a search for new approaches. In the study of International Relations traditional wisdoms need to be questioned and subjected to a new reasoning. Among the pertinent changes to be taken into account one faces the rise of politicized religion becoming one of the major issues of international affairs.²⁰

The matter is not only restricted to looking at concrete cases of terror legitimated as jihad in the path of God, but also to view the political discourse related to it being the underlying ideology. This consideration leads to the insight that neo-jihad (global jihad) is not a goal in itself, but rather just a means in the pursuit of a new order in line with this discourse. The use of religion in politics underpinning the legitimation of irregular war matters to post-bipolar security not only in terms of incorporating terrorism in military studies, but also for dealing with the new phenomenon within the scope of "order". In the tradition of Bull's IR-work order is viewed to be the pivotal subject of world politics.²¹ In this regard we need to take a glimpse at the discipline itself for grasping the issue and for incorporating jihadism as a new issue in the respective studies.

In continuing these introductory remarks it can be stated at first that the established discipline of International Relations were, as Stanley Hoffmann once noted is an "American discipline". I hasten to add, well a discipline "of the cold war era". All major schools of the discipline concurred on sharing the view of the state being the basic actor. Long before Samuel Huntington coined the term "clash of civilizations", the French scholar Raymond Aron, who was the mentor of Stanley Hoffmann in Paris, turned our attention to the fact that bipolarity has been the "veil" concealing the real source of conflict in international politics. Aron points at "the heterogeneity of

¹⁹ Sayyid Qutb, *al-Salam al-Alami wa al-Islam/World Peace and Islam* (Cairo: al-Shuruq, 1992), p. 172.

²⁰ On the Islamist *umma* internationalism Peter Mandeville, *Transnational Muslim Politics. Reimagining the Umma* (London: Routledge, 2004), in particular chapter 6, pp. 178-191. On al-Qaida Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden* (New York: Free Press, 2001), herein chapter 10.

²¹ See the most interesting article by Daniel Philipott, *The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations*, in: *World Politics*, vol. 55,1 (2002), pp. 66-95. Much earlier, Mark Juergensmeyer gave his pertinent book the title: *The New Cold War?*, with the subtitle: *Religious Nationalism confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). On this subject see also B. Tibi, "Secularization and Desecularization in Modern Islam", in: *Religion, Staat, Gesellschaft*, vol. 1,1 (2000), pp. 95-117.

civilizations”.²² People belong by nature and by their socialization in family and society to cultures and civilizations, and only formally to existing states. In real states citizenship constitutes a part of the identity of the people, but in most countries of the world of Islam, states are “quasi states”, i.e. nominal states²³, as much as their citizenship is in that it lacks “identity”. In this context Islamism revives the identity of *umma* in Islam. Is it allowed to address this issue? Due to the rise of the political culture of the multiculturalism in the West the censorship of “political correctness” has outlawed the reference to the cultural origins of people and any relating of this to a combination with conflict studies. The cultural worldviews are now coming back, yet to the fore. Prior to September 11 it was risky to maintain that cultural differences could lead to violent conflict. This is changing slowly (see note 2). Only few scholars dared to point at “multiculturalism of fear”²⁴ in referring to some bloody outcome of cultural-ethnic conflicts. In this regard, this author, self an IR scholar and Muslim, cannot escape seeing the civilizational conflict between two positions: On the one hand we have those who are poised to revive the Kantian concept of world peace for establishing democratic peace in the age of post bipolarity; on the other – and in contrast -, we see those who revive Qutb’s vision of an Islamic peace²⁵ to be achieved by jihad. This option is determined by the worldview of acting *Sabil Allah*/path of God for expanding the abode of Islam/*Dar al-Islam* within an alleged order of the Islamicate to map the entire world. In short, the conflicting visions are: The Kantian views on world peace based on the existing Westphalian order being a model

²² On this debate see Bassam Tibi, “Habermas and the Return of the Sacred. Is it a Religious Renaissance? Political Religion as a New Totalitarianism”, in: *Religion, Staat, Gesellschaft*, vol. 3, 2 (2002), pp. 265-296.

²³ In an early contribution of 1982 to this subject, in Grant Wordlaw, *Political Terrorism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982, 2nd edition 1989), we find, for instance, no reference to Islam or to jihad. In contrast, recent books like Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) deal with this issue. Among the recent contributions are: David J. Whittaker, ed., *The Terrorism Reader* (London: Routledge, 2001) and Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy* (Washington/DC: Brookings Inst., 2001).

²⁴ In overcoming classical state-centered realism Joseph Nye, in his *Bound to lead. The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990) distinguishes between state related, and not-states challenges/challengers; he notes “private actors ... have become more powerful”, p. 182. In so arguing Nye draws our attention to new challenges and challengers related to the rise of non-state actors. Back in 1990 the jihadist private actors were there, however, not yet visible in the West, not even to Harvard scholars; Nye does not refer to them.

²⁵ On this politicization see the contributions to the special issue of *Millennium, Journal of International Affairs* (29,3/2000) on: Religion and International Relations, including B. Tibi, Post-Bipolar Order in Crisis: The Challenge of Politicized Islam, pp. 843-859. See also Jeff Haynes, *Religion in Global Politics* (London: Longman, 1998) herein in particular chapter 7 on Middle East.

challenged by the call for a *Pax Islamica* being the vision of the jihadism of political Islam.

Underlying the addressed conflict in world affairs on a non-state level is the current already stated politicization of religion, correlating to a religionization of politics. The ideology of religious fundamentalisms²⁶ includes in its centrepiece a concept of order for remaking the world.²⁷ As stated, the envisioned order of *Hakimiyyat Allah/God's rule*²⁸ is in the new ideology the ultimate divine political order. In a first step it should be established in the world of Islam and on these grounds afterwards enhanced to a new world order mapping the entire globe under the rule of Islam. This order facilitates ruling along the Islamic vision of a global *Pax Islamica*. It is unfortunate to see that only Islamists – one is asked to be aware of the distinction between Islam and Islamism²⁹ – who subscribe the view that *Dar al-Islam* ought to comprise all humanity. It is also the orthodox-Salafist worldview of Islam³⁰ that claims universality. This worldview on which the ideology of jihadism rests becomes a world-political problem articulated in the politicization of Islam.

Based on the foregoing introductory thoughts the following analysis is pursued in three steps: *First*, to establish the subject matter itself, *second* to shed light on the politicization of religion and religionization of politics that leads to the new jihadist ideology and *third*, to outline what I term as “irregular war” being the instrument of jihadism for establishing the new divine order they envision. The Islamist ideology revolves around these issue areas.

It should be noted here that the ideological foundations of terrorism are not well researched. In the West one encounters a variety of authors who reduce the ideology of jihadism to a religious fanaticism or extremism. Others mostly belittle of political Islam and of its jihadism in a viewing both in a benign manner as a mere protest against hegemonic structures in world politics. Both are wrong. The present

²⁶ In his seminal work, Hedley Bull strongly places the study of order at the center of International Relations; see his classic, *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), herein in particular part one. For an appreciation of Bull, see the essay “Bull and the contribution to International Relations”, by Stanley Hoffmann, in his book *World Disorders. Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 13-34.

²⁷ Raymond Aron, *Paix et guerre entre les nations* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1962).

²⁸ Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). On the concept of “the nominal national state” see B. Tibi, “Old Tribes and Imposed Nation States”, in: Ph. Koury and J. Kostiner, eds., *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 127-152.

²⁹ Jacob Levy, *The Multiculturalism of Fears* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), in particular pp. 19-39 and also chapter 2.

³⁰ See B. Tibi, *From Islamist Jihadism to Democratic Peace? Islam at the Crossroads in Post-Bipolar International Politics*, in: *Ankara Paper 16* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2005), 41 pages.

analysis claims to uncover political Islam and jihadism as a nostalgia for a return of the Islamic history of *futuh* conquests becoming on these grounds a mobilisatory ideology in action. This ideology is becoming a real challenge to international security.

2. The Subject-Matter and the Scope of the Analysis

It is pertinent to note at the outset that any dealing with the subject under issue is a difficult undertaking in that the needed analysis involves breaking up with taboos and thus it resembles entering an area full of mines. Nevertheless, after September 11 it has become in a way easier to speak of jihadist Islamism as a security threat. However, from an enlightened point of view, it has equally become a requirement to parallelly combat spreading Islamophobia.

However, one needs to beware that Islamists themselves are exploiting the suspicion of Islamophobia attached to constructed images of Islam for associating any pointing at the Islamist activities in security studies with an alleged demonization of Islam. In the aftermath of September 11 the situation has improved and worsened at the same time. September 11 made clear that Islamists were in action, but it unfortunately also paved the way to revive established clichés about Islam in relating this religion without distinction to terrorism.

Among the extremes we find, on the one hand the well-known and fashionable accusation of Orientalism reaching new heights hitting. Those scholars who do not share the view that terrorists were simply and have nothing to do with Islam a “crazed gang” (E. Said) were targeted. On the other hand, we face the other extreme of imputing all evils to “militant Islam”, equating it with Islam itself. The present analysis aims at enlightening against both extremes while endeavouring into introducing the analysis of the ideology of jihadism of political Islam as a political-ideological foundation of terrorism into security studies. This ideology is inspired by an Islamic nostalgia aimed at reviving Islam’s glory in the past.³¹

In fact, Islamic terrorists refer to themselves as people fulfilling the religious duty to jihad being an obligation on every Muslim. A closer look at the phenomenon shows that we are dealing with a new pattern of jihad that can be described as an “invention of tradition”

³¹ On Islamic nostalgia see John Kelsay, *Islam and War* (Louisville/KY: John Knox Press, 1993), p. 25-6. Kelsay makes clear that there is no “end of history” (see Fukuyama), but rather a return of it in a new shape accompanied new claims. This is the substance of Islamist nostalgia, which is not a mere romanticism.

(Hobsbawm, see note 8), for it is not classical Islamic jihad.³² Nevertheless – and despite clarification – we need to take the Islamic self reference of these jihadists seriously. The religious image of the jihadists of themselves to be “the true believer” is not an expression of cynicism, but rather sincere true belief, even though their action might contradict orthodox religious doctrines. Understanding this is pertinent, because it is a basic effort for enabling ourselves to grasp the current historical phenomenon of religiously legitimated terrorism under issue. The religious legitimation is neither instrumental nor it serves as a camouflage for covering otherwise criminal acts. The Islamist terrorists do not perceive of their action to be *irhab*/terrorism, but rather *jihadiyya*/jihadism, i.e. a new interpretation of religious jihad being a duty/*farida*. To reiterate: In the claimed capacity of being jihadists these Islamists believe to act as the “true believers” (see note 4). I shall take pains to shed light on religious-fundamentalist terrorism in an effort at explaining Islamic-fundamentalist jihadism, while firstly placing this terrorism in the debate on warfare in terms of a new pattern of irregular war. Then, secondly, we need to relate the purport of “remaking the world” (see note 27) to jihadism as a means for achieving the goal. This creates the background for a security approach needed to guide a policy required for coming to terms with the challenge of jihadism on two counts: First, terrorism and second, threatening the existing order of the state as well as world order itself.

Among the methodological grounds required for the analysis of jihadism as a security concern we fulfil the already addressed need of introducing the study of religion into the discipline of International Relations. In addition to this requirement, the study of war needs to go beyond legalistic constraints attached to an inter-state war (e.g. declaration of war by a state) to consider action as a war. To be sure, traditional wisdoms no longer help in grasping the recent current of irregular war of which jihadism is a case in point. In general, we are challenged to rethink the discipline of International Relations and introduce into it many innovations. There were times in the past age of bipolarity when those scholars in “The dividing discipline”³³ of International Relations not only separated through scholars of the thought, but were equally divided along ideological lines and boundaries. Those among them who deal with security were disparaged as “right wingers” in contrast to those of the left wing IR-scholars, who focus on political economy. Aside of the political

³² See note 25 above and the article “jihad” by B. Tibi in: Roger Powers and William B. Vogeley, eds., *Protest, Power and Change, An Encyclopedia of Nonviolent Action* (New York: Garland Publishers 1997), pp. 277-281.

³³ Kalevi Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985).

differences existing between these ideologies – now phased out in the light of the end of bipolarity – there existed a methodological distinction: Students of international security focus on the state actors and on their military capacities, whereas political economists in political science – most of them never professionally studied economics – believe only in the relevance and priority of economic big structures for the analysis. The global system school stretched this approach to absurdity. Clearly, in the present case no one can explain jihadism with a reference to this “global system”, unless we – as some do in an absurd manner – view terrorism as a protest movement directed against economic “globalization” run by the USA. Those who subscribe to this view unwittingly justify both jihadism and anti-Americanism.

Not only in the light of post-bipolarity, but also in that of September 11, we may discern new challenges on the rise that compel us to question both mentioned approaches of the phased out “left and right”-scheme. This would enable us to consider new perspectives for grasping changed International Relations in general, and international security in particular. Among these challenges we see the civilizational self-assertive “Revolt against the West³⁴” directed against secular Western values. In considering this revolt new areas are to be brought into the study of International Relations. As already mentioned, Raymond Aron addressed this subject in terms of “heterogeneity of civilizations”. Without a reference to Aron or his work Huntington speaks of a “clash between civilizations”. In putting the work of both scholars aside, we find an appropriate explanation of the pending issue in the work of Hedley Bull, who unravels the fallacy of the so-called global village in stating that

“it is also clear that the shrinking of the globe, while it has brought societies to a degree of mutual awareness and interaction they have not had before, does not in itself create a unity of outlook and has not in fact done so ... Humanity is becoming simultaneously more unified and more fragmented.”³⁵

Based on this observation I develop my concept of a simultaneity of structural globalization and cultural fragmentation.³⁶ The addressed gap has been generated by the European expansion which has contributed to the structural mapping of the entire world along the

³⁴ Hedley Bull, “The Revolt against the West”, in: Hedley Bull and A. Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), pp. 217-218; on Bull see also note 21 above.

³⁵ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (see note 21), pp. 273.

³⁶ On this simultaneity see B. Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism* (note 9 above), chapters 1 and 5 and also B. Tibi, *Islam Between Culture and Politics* (note 30), chapter 4.

lines of standards designed by the civilization of the West.³⁷ However, there was no successful overall universalization of Western values that matches with the degree of globalization reached. In short: I distinguish between the *globalization* of structures and the *universalization* of values. Thus, the globalization of structures coexists with the cultural fragmentation, i.e. with the lack of universally valid and accepted norms and values. The new challenges are related to new challengers, who are non-state actors. The addressed revolt against Western values (see note 16) has – more or less successfully – launched a process of de-Westernization³⁸ which starts with knowledge, values and worldviews and only then moves to political order itself. This makes clear the pertinence of the ideological foundations, if one stubbornly insists on the validity of the realist model in simply reducing jihadist terrorism to a problem of “rough states”³⁹ while overlooking the cultural roots of the phenomenon, then one is deprived of the ability of grasping the issue and thus of developing any proper response to it as a new security threat!

In the first place we need to understand in what way politicized religion serves in the post-bipolar time as a tool for articulation of the “Revolt against the West” (norms and values). Political Islam is the frame of reference for the developing the idea of classical jihad to a new concept of terrorist jihadism against the West. This new interpretation of jihad understood both as an ideology and as a pattern of an irregular war is related to an action that can be – in a way – addressed in the Georges Sorelian term of “action directe” against the existing order. It is a terrorism which heralds an end of the classical Clausewitzian inter-state war. Then, neither al-Qaida nor any similar group has an army that can be combated by regular armed forces. To threaten the states that “harbor” (G.W. Bush) jihad terrorists with punishing military intervention is utterly meaningless. In particular, democratic Western states are part of the global networking of terrorism which uses migration and the related diaspora culture for providing jihadism with a “Hinterland”. The German logistic related to the Hamburg cell of al-Qaida is a case in point for showing

³⁷ Philip Curtin, *The World and the West. The European Challenge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); see also Roger Scruton, *The West and the Rest. Globalization and the Terrorist Threat* (Wilmington/Del.: ISI-books, 2002). On the claims and on the failure as well as the future of universalism of Western civilization see David Gress, *From Plato to NATO. The Idea of the West and its Opponents* (New York: The Free Press, 1998), chapter 12. On the concept of de-Westernization see the reference in the next note.

³⁸ See B. Tibi, “Culture and Knowledge. The Fundamentalist Claim of de-Westernization”, in: *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol. 12,1 (1995), pp. 1-24.

³⁹ On this subject see Robert Litwak, *Rough States and US-Foreign Policy* (Washington/DC: John Hopkins University Press, 2000).

how migration becomes an area of international security studies. This insight has been introduced to International Relations long before September 11, 2001 by Myron Weiner⁴⁰ and shall be integrated in section V of this paper.

In dealing with the ideology of Islamism and its political movements as an issue area of national and international security in the light of September 11, we need to take a look at Islamic civilization, out of which the jihadist groups - being inventors of tradition, and also as non-state actors – are emerging. In international politics this civilization consists of Islamic states, being members of the international community. Even though Islamic civilization is being often described as "World of Islam", it does not constitute a world of its own in that its states are part of the international system. Only in one sense Islamic states exist for their own, namely as a grouping of states of a distinct civilization. These states have their own international organisation of the Islamic conference OIC. Since the rise of political Islam in that part of the world any dealing with Islamist movements has also become a policy issue on international grounds and it is no longer merely an academic concern for the traditional students of Islam, not of those of Middle Eastern studies. Neither those Orientalist philologists nor the study of cultural anthropologists in Middle Eastern studies can be helpful for dealing with the pending issues. In contrast, an International Relations oriented, placing Islamism in security studies is more promising. Underlying this view is the fact that Islamists unequivocally make clear of the target of their call, i.e. to the topple of existing order of the nation-state to be replaced by what they envisage to be a *Hakimiyyat Allah*/The rule of God being the substance of an Islamic state and a new world order. Again, here we do not face a simple cultural attitude, but rather the vision of an alternative political order. The issue of "*nizam Islami*/Islamic order" ranks as a top priority on the agenda of Islamism.

In contemporary history the very first Islamist movement, was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. It is the movement of the Muslim Brothers (see note 10). It was al-Banna himself who reinterpreted the doctrine of *jihad* thus to lay grounds for jihadism in

⁴⁰ Relating migration to security studies is an academic approach introduced by Myron Weiner, *The Global Migration Crisis* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995), chapter 6. The Hamburg cell of al-Qaida illustrates this issue. On this see Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside al-Qaida* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 129-131. Furthermore see the investigative research on this subject in Germany by Udo Ulfkotte, *Der Krieg in unseren Städten. Wie Islamisten Deutschland unterwandern* (Frankfurt: Eichborn, 2003). With the guidance of the approach of Weiner the following study on Islamic migration (in the light of September 11) was completed. B. Tibi, *Islamische Zuwanderung. Die gescheiterte Integration* (München: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2002), in particular the introduction.

the understanding of terrorism (see note 11). In this tradition, Islamists envision in the long run an international order designed by the shari'a of Islam. The outcome is the current competition between a *Pax Islamica* and the *Pax Americana* of the West. This is the substance of the challenge of Islamic fundamentalism as related to the claim to replacing the Western Westphalian order in world politics. The repeatedly mentioned "Revolt against the West", is also characterized by an effort at de-secularization. Thus, Islamism is directed against the secular character of world politics. Therefore, at issue is a civilizational conflict in world politics, because secularization and de-secularization are related to rival civilizational worldviews and related to conflicting world political visions.

As already indicated, the 57 nation states of Islamic civilization are civilizationaly grouped in the "Organisation of the Islamic Conference/OIC" – i.e. the sole regional organisation in world politics established on the civilizational grounds of religion. Among these states we find only very few – and of course in a very limited sense – that can be qualified as democracies. It follows that in these states there mostly exist no opening for practicing a political opposition. Thus, the rise of political Islam is not and also cannot be expressed in institutional channels (Turkey is an exception). Islamist movements are however the basic political opposition in the world of Islam, but they are denied a realm for their activities in the pursuit of their political goals in their own Islamic countries. For this reason, they act in the underground and in addition move their followers to the West for establishing a hinterland for their activities of opposing superficially secular regimes at home.

The major target of Islamist movements is at present to topple existing regimes at home. This leads to the question: Can one exclusively locate Islamism in the world of Islam itself? In a broadly received essay by Michael Doran on "Other Peoples War"⁴¹ we find the argument that in September 2001 al-Qaida primarily wanted to hit its enemies in the world of Islam via the United States. Even though Doran's essay is very intelligent, it overlooks or even confuses the two levels of order in the strategy of Islamism: *First*, the replacement of secular regimes in the world of Islam itself by the *nizam/system* of *Hakimiyyat Allah/God's Rule*, and on these grounds, *second*, the establishment of a global *Pax Islamica* via an Islamic "*thawra al-alamiyya/world revolution*" (see note 27). Qutb states carried out by political Islam. Thus, on September 11 the levels were both confused and intermingled. It is only in this sense that one may speak of

⁴¹ Michael Doran, "Somebody Elses Civil War", in: *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82,1 (2002), pp. 22-42.

“somebody else’s war” when addressing the assault of September 11. Jihadist Islamism is both domestic (the world of Islam) and international (world politics) internationalism is intrinsic to Islamism. It uses the Islamic diaspora in the West to achieve both goals.

Now, it is an established fact that Islamists, despite their deep contempt for Western democracy make full use of Western democratic rights for establishing their logistic for their movements in Western Europe itself.⁴² From this fact follows the need to enhance the study of Islamic fundamentalism as a security concern to include Europe itself in the scope of the analysis. I have already pinpointed at the importance of the study of Islamic migration to Western Europe as part and parcel of the needed analysis for unfolding appropriate security policies. Among the established facts is the link between radical Islamic movements in Western Europe with al-Qaida⁴³ camps established in Afghanistan under the Taliban. Among the Islamic countries we find in addition weak states (like Yemen) or almost no-state (like Somalia) which harboured those Islamists committed to jihadism being a means of an irregular war – for the realization of their goals. As already mentioned, even Western states (e.g. Germany harbours al-Qaida’s networking). But the rough states at issue have little significance in the study of jihadism and security, therefore, the focus continues to be on non-state actors themselves being the real challengers to security. Rough states do not act, but – willingly or unwillingly – provide their territory for the jihadists. This is not a criterion, and if it were so, then Germany would be counted among the rough states.

3. The Political and Ideological Background of Jihadism: The International Ideology of a Universal Islamic Umma in the Context of the Politicization of Religion

In the preceding section an outline for setting the scope of the analysis was elaborated for making clear that the politicization of

⁴² For this reason the weekly *Newsweek* in its issue of November 5, 2001 asked on the front page “Why do Islamists like Europe?” The answer was given in the article on Germany already in the headline: “Tolerating the Intolerable”. One reads in that article: “Bassam Tibi ... has warned for years ... no one wanted to hear that.” (p. 46). If one in this context reads Myron Weiner, *The Global Migration Crisis* (note 40) one would be in the position to grasp the link between migration and security. On this issue see the chapters on Islamic fundamentalism in the book by Jean-Francois Revel, *Democracy against itself* (New York: Free Press, 1993), chapter 12 and in Michael Teitelbaum and Jay Winter, *A Question of Numbers. High Migration, Low Fertility and the Politics of National Identity* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), pp. 221-239.

⁴³ For more details see Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside al-Qaida* (Note 40) and on the Taliban themselves, Ahmed Rashid, *The Taliban. Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). On Islamist networking.

religion underpins the justification of the call for a new Islamic order to be achieved by the irregular war of jihadism. These issues are at the center of the analysis. The jihadist threat to security in world politics has been illustrated by September 11, 2001 as an act of irregular war.⁴⁴ Well, the rise of political Islam precedes the end of the cold war, but first, in the light of these post-bipolar developments the study of Islamism becomes an area of *new security*. To phrase the issue with Mark Juergensmeyer, we may state that a competition between religious and secular orders is at work underlying "The New Cold War", carried out as "Terror in the Mind of God"⁴⁵. Prior to the broadening of the scope of jihadist activities from the domestic level of the state to an international level the Islamic revolution in Iran created a precedent for such a development of Islamic internationalism. It also gave an incentive to Islamist terrorism. In fact, terrorism served as foreign policy instrument for exporting the Iran's Islamic revolution".⁴⁶ This revelation in Iran motivated few scholars to venture into studying Islam as a framework for designing a foreign policy.⁴⁷

We need to remind ourselves of the fact that jihadism is not simply terrorism. It is much more than that, because the impact of politicized religion creating "the Challenge" touches on the existing order, and it is basically in this sense to a radical threat to international security. In the tradition of Hedley Bull, the Harvard IR-scholar Stanley Hoffmann has addressed emerging "World Disorders" being a post-cold-war-era source of "troubled peace". However, he failed to see the source of the emerging "new world disorder"⁴⁸ as being generated by the conflict between religious and secular order. Unlike Hoffman, this author, by coining the formula "new world disorder" refer to the real

⁴⁴ On the religious legitimation of September 11 see Bruce Lincoln, *Holy Terrors* (note 6), on jihad see herein chapter 3. See also B. Tibi, "Islamism, National and International Security after September 11", in: Guenther Baechler and Andreas Wenger, eds., *Conflict and Cooperation* (Zurich: Neue Zurcher Zeitung Publ., 2002), pp. 127-152. In my earlier book on Middle Eastern Wars (see note 1) I suggested to view the rise of Islamic fundamentalism compels within a new security approach.

⁴⁵ See Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God. The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) and his earlier book *The New Cold War* (referenced in note 16).

⁴⁶ Edgar O'Balance, *Fundamentalist Terrorism 1979-95. The Iranian Connection* (New York: New York University Press, 1997). See also B. Tibi, „Extremismus und Terrorismus als Mittel des Revolutionsexports“, in: *Jahrbuch Extremismus und Demokratie*, vol. 11 (1999), pp. 79-96.

⁴⁷ Adeed Dawisha, ed., *Islam in Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), in particular chapter 1. See also more recently Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser, *A Sense of Siege, The Geopolitics of Islam and the West* (Boulder/Col.: Westview Press, 1995).

⁴⁸ This analysis is provided in my work of 1998, updated 2002 (as referenced in note 9 above). Also Stanley Hoffmann, in his book, *World Disorders* (see note 21), employs the term "disorder", however, without any reference to religion and fundamentalism thus overlooking the basic issue on this topic politicized religion in the major sources of disorder and a threat to security, as shown in the present contribution.

threat and equally to the inability of the Islamists to create the envisaged order, because they lack the needed power. Nevertheless, jihadism does not remain without results. The outcome is international destabilization. It is true, in a way the irregular war of jihad helps Islamists to compensate the technological superiority of their enemy, but they fail to go beyond triggering destabilisation of jihadism leads to creating disorder and not to the envisaged new order of God's rule. However, this evaluation of the jihadist irregular war is not a belittling of its serious security challenge.

The claim of Islamism is to bring to an expression a civilizational competition between two concepts of order and for this reason it is argued that politicized religion leads to an international conflict. In addressing this conflict in terms of *clash of civilizations* Huntington made an effort to create a new thinking in International Relations.⁴⁹ A year ahead of Huntington's book, I, in my book "Krieg der Zivilisationen" of 1995 dealt with this issue in outlining civilizational competing concepts of order. I acknowledge my failure to be successful in introducing the concept of civilization to the IR-discipline. That has been the accomplishment of Samuel P. Huntington. In my book on civilization-based conflicts in world politics I – despite disagreement – acknowledge Samuel Huntington's *Foreign Affairs*-article of 1993 and have discussed it at length while keeping faithful to my own approach. The major points of disagreement were elaborated further upon in my contribution to the book of the former President of Germany Roman Herzog, published under the title "*Preventing the Clash of Civilizations*".⁵⁰ In these contributions, not only the seniority of Huntington in the debate but also his success are acknowledged. Nevertheless, one cannot be silent about the wanting knowledge(ing/str.??) of Huntington and the need for making corrections pertinent to placing Islam and its civilization in the study of International Relations. In this context, the argument is made that the social scientists who, in the wake of topical and increasingly important role of Islam, deal with these issues need

⁴⁹ Samuel Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations and the Framing of World Order*, (New York: Simon & Schuster 1996) the idea was first published 1993 in an article in: *Foreign Affairs*. I find myself in disagreement with Huntington and therefore elaborate on the existing differences in the new edition of my book *Krieg der Zivilisationen. Politik und Religion zwischen Vernunft und Fundamentalismus*, first published 1995 (Munich: Heyne Verlag, expanded 1998 in a further new extended edition 2001), herein chapter 7, pp. 305-333.

⁵⁰ Roman Herzog et al., *Preventing the Clash of Civilizations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999). This book includes B. Tibi, "International Morality and Cross-cultural Bridging", pp. 107-126.

to know more about Islam and its emergence of a “defensive culture”⁵¹ in world affairs.

The scholarly debate referred to touches on the present topic. I refer to it not only to dissociate myself from Huntington’s clash, but also to make determination clear, that I refuse to join the club of those practically correct scholars who demonise Huntington. I believe his work he has contributed to the debate and I find it sad to see how Huntington has been defamed as a "cold warrior" and even been accused of Islamophobia for pointing at political Islam as a security issue. It is not Huntington, but Juergensmeyer who rightly sees an emerging “New Cold War” (note 16). The security threat of jihadism is a matter of fact, it is not a view, or a distortion by the media, or by scholars seeking a “substitute to the Soviet Union”. But the traditional students of Islam are reluctant to deal with this issue in their academic Islamic studies. These are basically the Orientalists who are philologists, historians or simply students of religion, thus have no authority to judge about international security.

Their disciplines, as well as in cultural anthropological studies scholars have succumbed to Edward Said unscholarly conviction of “Orientalism”. Neither these scholars nor the late Said himself have a professional competence to deal with international affairs. We rarely find among Western Orientalists scholars with professional social-scientific background. Nevertheless, these scholars were called upon to review as authoritative "readers", submitted project proposals for the study of fundamentalism in Islam as an issue of international security. In most cases known to me, the Orientalists in point turned these research proposals down with the pseudo-scholarly argument, the issue is not serious and does not deserve funding, or simply “there exist no fundamentalism; this is a construction”.

This was belied by the event of September 11, which gave blow to traditional Middle Eastern studies, be it in the US or in Europe. In a case known to me in Switzerland the philologist readers argued that "fundamentalism" is a product of Western media and is not a reality. Certainly, it is not a transgression in this article to refer to this kind of handling of the study of political Islam and security in established scholarship. The reference merely serves to show the grave obstacles standing in the way of the research on the addressed subject matter under scrutiny in this paper. The curtailment of the right of free speech in research is a troubling disservice to scholarship in contemporary Western institutions and therefore a serious concern.

⁵¹ On this issue see B. Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam* (Salt Lake City: Utah University Press, 1988) and also B. Tibi, *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change* (Boulder/Col.: Westview Press, 1990, reprinted 1991).

Despite all odds, I find it, as a Muslim scholar living in Europe, but scholarly acting in the US easier to address the jihadist security threat at the American academe in comparison to Europe. In the US it was possible to carry out a great multimillion project for the study of fundamentalism which led to the publication of the seminal already referenced five volumes on this subject. After September 11 it has become more than clear and to what great extent we need to further pursue the study of Islamism and international security. The inquiry into the linkages between religion and international politics showcased on Islamism and world politics is the case in point. Islamist terrorism in world politics begins with the "Iranian connection" and thus predates September 11. Therefore, a Swiss prominent institution for security studies ventured into this domain.⁵² It is also worth mentioning that prior to September 11 a study group at *London School of Economics* succeeded in creating a team of experts dealing with religion and International Relations of a publication (see note 3). Up to my knowledge it was unprecedented that at the *Annual Meeting of International Studies Association* in Chicago (March 2001) some panels were admitted to be devoted to *Religion and International Relations*. In the light of the impact of September 11 it is pertinent to draw on some existing approaches to the study of politicized religion, as well as international security and to link them to one another. The analysis of jihadism suggests that there is a need to establish new approaches in International Relations. Underlying this insight is the fact that politicized religion is among the major issues of the political crisis of order in international politics after the end of the cold war. This is the new shape of the return of the sacred.

In considering the post-bipolar "cultural turn" in our world one can state a crisis of meaning growing from the crisis of modernity itself. The already mentioned lacking of a universalization of Western values along with intensifying globalization continues to generate this crisis of meaning within world political ramifications. Globalization, but not a successful Westernization⁵³ has been taking place worldwide.

⁵² Within the framework of Geneva based Security Studies Program the following study was completed before September 11. See Frédéric Grare, ed., *Islamism and Security. Political Islam and the Western World*, (Geneva: Programme for Strategic and international Security studies, 1999), see herein B. Tibi, "The Failed Export of the Islamic Revolution", contribution on pp. 63-102. It is also worth-mentioning that the Swiss *Zentralstelle für Gesamtverteidigung/Office Centrale de la Défense*, back in March 1997 summoned experts on political Islam, including myself and published the brochure *Islam et l'Islamisme*, Bern 1997 (my contribution pp. 9-20).

⁵³ On de-Westernization see notes 37 and 38 above, on Westernization see Theodore van der Laue, *The World Revolution of Westernization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). On globalization and culture see Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992, reprinted four times, new printing 1998). Robertson rightly criticizes those who overlook "the relative autonomy of culture".

The phenomenon of the return of the sacred in a political shape, being an effort at de-Westernization, is not properly understood in the West. The formula of a “post-bipolar society”⁵⁴ Juergen Habermas is nothing else than a poor concept for dealing without a proper knowledge on Islam with a real phenomenon Habermas fails to explain to the resort to religion in non-Western civilizations (see note 17), because he does not understand that the competition of secular and divine order goes along with two worldviews opposed to one another: The ideologies of neo-absolutisms and of relativism clash with one another while they are arising from the very same context.⁵⁵ We see on the one hand the politicization of religion, as showcased on Islam, assuming the shape of a neo-absolutism challenging contemporary world order. On the other hand we see post-Christian developments emerging in Western Europe ensuing a crisis of identity. Westernisation in the world of Islam is receding for the benefit of a drive at de-Westernisation (see note 19)being promoted by Islamic revival. At issue are the effects of this process on a changing world order.

The contemporary neo-absolutism of political Islam claims to decenter the West and to replace its Westphalian secular order through a divine Islamic one. Jihadism is among the means for reaching this end. In this context, it is possible to understand the reference in the introductory remarks to the French social-scientist Raymond Aron, who in his *Paix et guerre entre les nations* addresses the “heterogeneity of civilizations” . The pertinence of this issue to International Relations revolves around the existence of different world views and – along these lines – of different concepts of order. While one of them is secular, others (e.g. Islam) are based on the politicization of religion. With the exception of Western civilization, almost all other world civilizations are related to and determined by a concept of religion and the related worldview (see note 30). In the case of Islam, an Islamist concept of order is becoming a broadly accepted public choice. This concept of *din-wa-dawla*/unity of religion and state challenges the validity of the secular nation-state to the world of Islam and goes further beyond in this claim in enhancing its claim for an Islamic order to cover world politics altogether. Again, in the intellectual tradition of the philosophical approach to International Relations presented in the work of Raymond Aron and Hedley Bull I

⁵⁴ Juergen Habermas, *Glauben und Wissen* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2001).

⁵⁵ See the proceedings of the Erasmus Foundation/Amsterdam: *The Limits of Pluralism. Neo-Absolutisms and Relativism* (Amsterdam: Praemium Erasmianum, 1994). In this Amsterdam debate political Islam is presented as a variety of neo-absolutism by B. Tibi in a paper on pp. 29-36. This volume also includes the controversy between Clifford Geertz and Ernest Gellner on culture and relativism.

relate my study of religion to their study of values in international affairs. In this context, Islamism is interpreted as an expression of Islamic revival being equally political, cultural and religious. To reiterate the major findings of this inquiry: The outcome is a civilizational challenge to the world order. The Islamist claim to an alternative new order is perceived as a replacement of an alleged "Judeo-Christian conspiracy"⁵⁶ believed to be directed against Islam therefore it is bound to a "Revolt against the West. In this regard I draw on Bull's essay "Revolt against the West" (see note 16), explaining the resort to religion as a cultural-political articulation in the pursuit of de-Westernisation. For unfolding in a world-political perspective for understanding jihadism we need to go *Beyond Left and Right*⁵⁷ and equally to overcome in the study of International Relations the burdens of the traditional boundaries of a dividing discipline. For reaching this end I in my work operate on the following two methodological assumptions:

First, we need a serious International Relation's oriented study of religion, considering its politicization which leads to religious fundamentalism. Of course, the prevailing clichés and catchwords transmitted in the media, which convey the phenomenon under issue in terms of "fanatism, terrorism and extremism" ought to be contradicted, but this is not the business of IR-discipline. It is dishonest to refer to this deplorable image of Islam in the West in order to turn down the study of the jihadist threat of Islamism to world order as an expression of "Islamophobia". Jihadism and not Islam is under issue, although this threat emerges from the politicization of Islam. The indiscriminate reference to the Saidian formula of "covering Islam" for denouncing Western media has served as a tool for turning down any critical approach is not helpful.⁵⁸ I do not defend Western media, the concern is the bashing of the West.

Second, the under point one addressed politicization reaches its height when it embraces Islamic universalism. The results is a concept of world order designed and articulated in divine Islamic terms. This is unique to Islam because of its universalism. For instance, the politicization of religion in Hinduism only leads to a concept of order restricted to the envisaged Hindu nation of

⁵⁶ See the allegation of "Une vaste conspiration judeo-chrétienne", by Mohammed Y. Kassab, *L' Islam face au nouvel ordre mondial*, (Algier: Editions Salama, 1991), pp. 75-93. Not only Islamists, also Germans (left and right) claim that September 11 was a home-made conspiracy. This is done in a dozen of German anti-American bestsellers: See the special issue *Verschwörung/conspiracy* of the news magazine *Der Spiegel* 37/2003 criticising these bestsellers.

⁵⁷ Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right. The Future of Radical Politics*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).

⁵⁸ Edward Said, *Covering Islam* (New York: Pantheon, 1981). There are numerous reprints.

Hindustan. It follows, Hindu-fundamentalist threat to security is confined to the territoriality of Hindu civilization, i.e. it is exclusively regional and pertinent to South Asia. In contrast, Islam is a universalist religion and its politicization touches on the international order. As the intellectual precursor of political Islam, Sayyid Qutb, proposed, international peace can only be based on spreading *Hakimiyyat Allah*/God's rule on global grounds. The implication of this view is that there can be no world peace without the global domination of Islam. This is the articulation of an Islamist internationalism made by Qutb with a bid for a related new international order⁵⁹. This is the ideological background of persons like Bin Laden and of globally networked movements like al-Qaida, which provide the internationalist model for all of the contemporary jihadist movements acting *fi sabil Allah*/in the path of God for establishing the Islamist order of *Pax Islamica*. It can be safely stated that the jihadist internationalism has become a security concern. To enlighten about this threat has for sure nothing to do with any Islamophobia.

Cultural diversity is natural and it could be enriching for humanity. However, the politicization of the already addressed heterogeneity of civilizations results in raising claims – as is the case in political Islam – for a political order. It does not only create herewith a challenge to the existing world order, but also lead to dividing lines that separate humanity. One should have been alerted in the 1950s, when the precursor and foremost thinker of contemporary political Islam, Sayyid Qutb, challenged the existing world order; he maintained a deep civilizational crisis of the West to be resolved by Islamic dominance. In his pamphleteering, in particular in his *Signposts along the Road* and also in his *World Peace and Islam* he proposed that only Islam is in a position to overcome this crisis and to save humanity. To be sure and to reiterate: This is the very source of the worldview of Bin Laden and of all of the al-Qaida-*jihad* fighters. Clearly, this is not the view of a “crazed gang”, but rather the authoritative expression of a mainstream of jihadist Islamism in the world of Islam. Is it desirable that the Westphalian order in world politics⁶⁰ be replaced by an Islamic order? I shall come back to this question.

Hedley Bull did not know of Qutb and of his views, but he was aware of the fact that the stated civilizational "Revolt Against the West" is best "exemplified in Islamic fundamentalism"⁶¹. In the course

⁵⁹ Sayyid Qutb, *al-Salam al-alami wa al-Islam* (note 14), pp. 167-199.

⁶⁰ Lynne Miller, *Global Order* (Boulder: Westview 1990), on the Westphalian system chapter 2.

⁶¹ Hedley Bull, *The Revolt Against the West* (see note 34), p. 223.

of the post-bipolar crisis of international order these ideas (e.g. Qutb) became more topical enjoying a mobilisation function in the world of Islam. The reference to these ideas reinforces Islam's new role as well as its appeal as a public choice as seen by the Islamists. The fact that political Islam can be traced back to the year 1928 when the Society of Muslim Brothers was founded provides an evidence that Islamism predates the demise of the Cold War as has been already argued. Yet, political Islam and its ideology did not get the assumed nature of mobilisation and in its appeal before the end of bipolarity. The heterogeneity of civilizations stated then to come to the fore in the shape of politicized religions. The concept of order in Islam has been given the name of *al-dawla al-Islamiyya*/the Islamic State. The reader is asked to recall that the Islamist neo-jihad in the 21st century is an effort – at times with means of irregular war – to reach this end of materialising the new order political Islam claims, at home and internationally as well.

In summing up the analysis accomplished in this section it can be safely stated that the foremost issue related to the pertinence of politicized religion – in Islam for International Relations, being an expression of "The revolt against the West" is its rejection of the existing secular order and its Westphalian origins. One may ask, are we heading in a direction "Beyond Westphalia"⁶²? There is no doubt, the Westphalian order is not a sacred cow and therefore it is fully legitimate to question its existence in a changed world. However, neither the violent jihadist means of Islamism nor the ideology of *hakimiyyat Allah*/divine rule as a concept of order seem to be the appropriate alternative humanity is looking for overcoming the crisis of the secular nation-state. For a religiously diverse humanity, no alternatives based on the political concepts of order grounded on religion can be accepted. Why? On the state level, "the *nizam Islami*/Islamic system"⁶³ is a totalitarian political pronouncement of Islamism not even acceptable to all Muslims, in particular to those committed to freedom and democracy. Some jihadists yearn for the traditional order of the caliphate of *sunna* which is not acceptable to the *shi'a*. The exponents of political Islam believe that they in the long time perspective will prevail in being in a position to materialize Qutb's vision of world peace under the banner of Islam. This kind of peace is a threat to non-Muslims, who – according to the shari'a –

⁶² See the contributions in the volume *Beyond Westphalia*, ed. by Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995).

⁶³ See Salim Al-Awwa, *fi al-Nizam al-Siyasi li al-dawla al-Islamiyya* (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Masr, 1975, 6th reprinting 1983).

would be discriminated as subdued *dhimmi*.⁶⁴ This is a violation of human rights of non-Muslims, not – as alleged – a variety of tolerance.

To put minds at ease, of course, we are not heading towards a new political order pertinent to International Relations based on the politicized rules of Islamic shari'a. Clearly, on grounds of feasibility this Islamist goal will continue to be difficult to achieve in the foreseeable future: Nevertheless, if the conclusion out of this statement were that the jihadist call for an Islamic world order is practically irrelevant and meaningless, then it would be premature and wrong. On domestic and regional grounds the call for an Islamic shari'a state serves as a mobilisatory device with great appeal to deprived Muslims. The result would be to destabilise and to undermine the legitimacy of existing order. The political terrorist "action directe" of jihad on the path of God aims at establishing a *Hakimiyyat Allah*/rule of God. This is much more than a rhetoric of a romantic order because it contributes to generating real disorder.

The provided overall assessment of jihadism needs to be placed in the broader debate in the study of religion and politics in our age of the cultural turn. Therefore a reference to the inquiry into religion in social-scientific terms is a part of this summing up. Let me first mention the two approaches employed in the academic literature on political Islam. We first find the approach applied by political scientists interested in religion and politics. Some focus on country studies, others on the study of Islamist movements: these are viewed as an indication of dissent and an expression of political opposition. Some scholars operate on the assumption of an instrumental use of religion by Islamists for giving their movements a religious legitimacy. I disagree with this approach and support this disagreement with my empirical survey completed among Islamists. It leads exactly the opposite assumption: The Islamist is a political man of action, this is true, but he is also a "true believer". Jansen addresses this fact appropriately as "the dual nature of Islamic fundamentalism."⁶⁵

There is also another approach, which looks at civilizations in history⁶⁶, being recently introduced to International Relations. These

⁶⁴ On the discrimination of non-Muslims in the shari'a see the work of the Muslim reformist Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, *Toward an Islamic Reformation* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990), chapter 7. Islamic shari'a contradicts individual human rights. On all counts see B. Tibi, "Islamic Law/Shari'a, Human Rights, Universal Morality and International Relations", in: *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 16,2 (1994), pp. 277-299.

⁶⁵ Johannes Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism* (Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), see also notes 26 and 30 above.

⁶⁶ In the first place Arnold Toynbee in his multi volume opus magnum, *The Study of History*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947) and then and more recent Will Durant, *The Story of Civilizations*, 11 volumes (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1963- 1967). Leslie Lipson, *The Ethical*

efforts are pursued without overlooking the fact that international actions and international behaviour are related to states, not to civilizational entities. However, civilizations have their own distinct worldviews and provide substance for the understanding of notions of order, war and peace being pivotal for the study of international affairs. Along civilizational patterns not only local cultures (e.g. Indonesia and Senegal), but also states (e.g. OIC) can group to form entities in world politics. Therefore the, approaches of studying world civilizations and world politics can be linked to one another. Now, what approach proves more promising for studying the rise of jihadism and of its impact on international affairs in a changed world after the demise of bipolarity? Of course, this question does overlook the focus of this inquiry, namely of the politicization of religion by Islamist movements being an issue of security. There are different levels of the analysis to which the study of political religion, understood as an element of potential conflict can be related. It is preliminary to deal with the significance of religion, ethnicity, culture, and other sources of conflict. Earlier they were ignored by subsuming them beneath the East-West rivalry. Since the demise of bipolarity and the bisected world of the Cold War, hitherto suppressed conflicts related to these factors are now on the rise. Islamist movements are among the new forces related to politicized religion. In fact, emerging religious fundamentalism and ethnicity cannot be properly understood without studying religion in its links to culture and ethnicity, and of course, the mapping civilizations. In addition, neither Islamic fundamentalism nor its jihadism can be viewed as passing phenomena; it is wrong to reduce these ideologies to topicalities of current events. Experts like Gilles Kepel doing this re mistaken.⁶⁷ Currently, all regional conflicts around the world are related to the ideologies of fundamentalism or to ethnicity. In some cases, like in the Balkans, Chechnia, and Kashmir, we even find a mixture of both, merging to a kind of ethno-fundamentalism.

In conclusion, any understanding of the background of jihadism placed in a comprehensive security analysis requires a new approach open to drawing on a variety of disciplines. In this regard, religion, ethnicity, culture and civilization are the issues to be included of the study of ideological foundations of terrorism.

Crisis of Civilizations (London: Sage, 1993). On the introduction of this approach to International Relations see note 49 and 50 above.

⁶⁷ So Gilles Kepel, *Jihad-Expansion et le Déclin de l'Islamisme* (Paris: Gallimard, 2000). For a contrast to Kepel see my introduction to the updated edition of my book *The Challenge of Fundamentalism*, referenced in note 9 above.

4. The Ideology of Jihadism and its Challenge as an Irregular War to Security

Traditional security studies can no longer provide adequate perspectives for studying the new challenges of irregular war and its Islamist ideology. In view of the necessity for a new approach there has been a few promising revisionist, however to general approaches, the one like presented by Barry Bazan⁶⁸. However, we are still at the beginning of the road. It has been an improvement when Bazan broadened the perspective in looking at security beyond the conventional military wisdoms. Then came September 11, 2001, to remind us that security studies will have to deal with the violence of terrorism in a fully new perspective. In crossing the traditional boundaries and stepping beyond the constraints of the organized military force of the state the place of culture, religion and ideology is acknowledged as an issue area for strategies aimed at countering terrorism.

The ideology of jihadism underlying the irregular jihad waged by warriors as a non-state actor is the ideological foundation of this new terrorism. This is a declaration of jihad war on Western civilization by the private actor Bin Laden and his al-Qaida is a threat to international security based on an understanding of jihad with a reference to a concept of a world religion. The jihadists believe to mobilize the fellow religionists creating one fifth of the world population (1.6 billion of about 6 billion people of world population) for their world revolution. All Muslims together constitute a transnational community addressed in as Islam *umma*. In their name al-Qaida has declared jihad as war, not only on the West, but also on those Muslims who do not join in. Can political Islam succeed in the political mobilization of the Islamic *umma* to put it in the service of its Islamist and jihadist ideology?

Islamists refer to religion in the pursuit of non-religious ends and these groups constitute only of a minority in the Islamic *umma*, but they (e.g. al-Qaida) are well organised and well equipped. Therefore they cannot be either ignored or belittled of. Their numbers matter little, what matters is their efficiency. These groups are very capable of destabilizing and creating disorder through their means of irregular war. In what way is the new jihad an irregular war? And how can it be contained?

⁶⁸ See Barry Buzon, *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder/Col.: Lynne Rienner Publ., 1991). See also note 64 below.

To be sure, Jihadism in the shape of terrorism is no longer the classical jihad of Islam⁶⁹ it is the outcome of the politicization of religion in Islam. It follows the earlier introduced need for a differentiation between Islam and 'Islamism'. The latter includes jihadist fundamentalism, which creates a security concern. We should recall that Islam is a religion and it builds up the framework for the respective civilization⁷⁰ which however manifests great cultural and religious diversity in itself. The difference between Sunnite and Shi'ite Muslims⁷¹ is significant as the Shi'i-Sunni conflict in Iraq reveals. Add to this the great variety of religious and cultural denominations and numerous sects within Islam. In considering the cultural diversity one can see for instance that African Islam is entirely different from the pattern of Islam prevailing in Southeast Asia, or that of the Indian subcontinent. All of these varieties differ from one another and foremost from the original Arab pattern. The addressed religious and cultural diversity is also reflected in Islamic fundamentalism throughout the world of Islam. Jihadism is a Sunni ideology.

After 9/11 some experts – with a reference to Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' – contended the existence of an overall Islam collectively acting as a monolith, but they are wrong given the above listed distinctions. Even Sunni jihadist political Islamist movements are diverse. They legitimize themselves through religion for toppling existing orders, but they are not so coherent, despite their claim for an Islamic internationalism.

Despite the indicated great diversity it can be stated that all Islamist groups adhere to similar concepts of political order based on politicized religion and shari'a-divine law. These groups are committed to an interpretation of jihad in the understanding of an irregular war. Thus, the argument for including jihadism in security studies and for unfolding a new security approach is based on empirical solid grounds. Some of those who refuse to include Islamism in security studies fearing an Islamophobia confuse Islam and Islamism. In our age of the 'cultural turn' it is clear that cultures and civilizations play in identity politics an increasingly important role in international politics. It goes beyond sayings that civilizations

⁶⁹ On the traditional origins of this concept and its current relevance see John Kelsay, *Islam and War* (Louisville/KY: John Knox Press, 1993), chapter 5 and furthermore James T. Johanson, *The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Tradition* (University Park/PN: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); see also the references in note 25 and 32 above.

⁷⁰ See Sir Hamilton A.R. Gibb, *Studies on the Civilization of Islam* (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962, reprint 1982) and also note 66.

⁷¹ On this Sunna-/Shi'a-conflict carried out by Shi'i movements in Iraq after Saddam's fall see Faleh A. Jabar, *The Shi'ite Movements in Iraq* (London: Saqi, 2003). Earlier, Andrew and Patrick Cockburn, *Out of the Ashes. The Resurgence of Saddam Hussein* (New York: Harper and Collins Publ., 1999) analyzed the Saddam era.

cannot act, as actors in world politics. Huntington believes to find a way out of this impasse in stating that each civilization can be led by a 'core state'. In the case of Islam, this construct does not work for the simple reason that none of the fifty-six existing Islamic nation-states is in a position to lead the entire Islamic *umma* and its civilization. In addition, even though there are many rough states among these Islamic entities, none of them cause the real problem of jihadism. That was the greatest flaw in the planning of the Iraq war. The war there was justified by a pointing at the 'security threat' posed by Saddam Hussein and it was falsely related it to the jihadist threat in a continuation of the war on terrorism. This state focus proved to be in terms of security, utterly wrong, because it overlooked the real issue. The threat is related to the jihadist movements which all are non-state actors, not to Iraq as a state. Therefore, the de-Saddamization of Iraq did not affect these groups at all, let alone any weakening of them. In contrast, jihadism and its ideology received a boost through the Iraq war. This is an empirical fact.

The interpretation of jihadism as an Islamist "Revolt against the West" is a notion which refers to a civilizational conflict being an international conflict. This is the issue to make abundantly clear to what extent the worldviews of civilizations play a vital role in world politics. In Iraq for instance the US views the de-Saddamization as a liberation while Iraq condemn US presence as a military occupation of crusaders. These are different worldviews. In considering this fact and in continuing this line of reasoning, war is not understood here simply as a military conflict between states. In my earlier book *The War of Civilizations* (see note 49), I suggest to consider the conflict of different worldviews and of particular set of norms and values in the analysis of security. After all the idea of order is always based on civilizational values. In the analysis presented in that book, conflict is viewed to revolve around the normatively different understanding of five issue areas: 1) the state, 2) law, 3) religion, 4) war/peace and 5) knowledge. Civilizations differ over these issue areas and therefore there are conflicting concepts of the needed world order. One may argue, value related conflicts have nothing to do with military capabilities, but nevertheless could contribute to the emergence of real conflicts. At the beginning, the 'war of civilizations' could be looked at as a war of values and worldviews that directly affects conflict on all three levels: domestic, regional, and international. On September 11 this kind of war undeniably assumed a military shape. It follows: Jihadism contributes to the militarisation of conflicts between civilizations. This supports the idea that differences in world view, if cannot be negotiated, could lead to an armed conflict. Now,

the West is strong, but the irregular war of terrorism is the weapon of the weak, it cannot be defeated by conventional military force. The irregular war of the Islamist Intifada ongoing in Palestine since September 2000 is a convincing case in point. Earlier, Israel was in a position to win all Arab-Israel inter-state wars in short time, but it is fully incapable to win this irregular war or even to come to terms with it.

In the light of the presented distinctions the needed news security approach has to deal with the pending issue on two levels: First, conflicts of values which have political implications, but cannot be settled by military means; and second, the irregular use of force by the fundamentalists believed to be pursued in the 'mind of God' (see note 45). It is extremely important to distinguish between these two levels at this stage of the analysis for shedding light on the military dimension of the politicization of religion, while beware of any involvement in Islamophobia. Nevertheless, the event of September 11, as well as the ensuing jihadist attacks 2002/03 worldwide have revealed how interrelated the aforementioned levels are. I have already maintained that the jihad-terrorists of al-Qaida have militarised in New York and Washington value conflicts concerning "order" existing between Islamic and Western civilization, they were not an action by a "crazed gang", but an act of irregular war by jihadism, which is a stream within Islamic fundamentalism. This resort to terrorism was an actualization of the conflict related to civilizational worldviews. In short, the value related fight over "what world order" assumes a military form. "Gangs" do not involve themselves of this business of international affairs.

The irregular war at issue is a militarization of the war of ideas. The combination of dissent over worldviews with an incalculable and unpredictable use of force results in terrorism. In this interpretation jihadism is the Islamic variety of contemporary terrorism being the current shape of use of force by irregular warriors in a new pattern of war. To this pattern belongs the use of bodies by jihadists to assail persons and buildings of the "enemy" in their "action directe". The major target is political; it is the order of the secular nation-state. The enemy should be demoralised and made uncertain about what lies ahead. The rejection of the secular state applies to fundamentalists in all religions. It is however, unique to Islamic fundamentalists to go beyond the level of the nation-state in embracing the universalism of Islam and in the course of the politicization of this universalism call for an establishing of an Islamic world order. This belief leads to a contestation of existing concepts about world order. On these grounds, a conflict emerges between two competing concepts of

world order, the prevailing secular Western and the Islamic one of God's rules envisaged for the future. The jihadist terrorism of the Islamists is an irregular war for this end. John Kelsay, scholar of Islam, states, 'in encounters between the West and Islam, the struggle is over who will provide the primary definition to the world order'. And then on the same page, he asks, who will lead the world in the future:

"Will it be the West, with its notions of territorial boundaries, market economies, private religiosity, and the priority of individual rights? Or will it be Islam, with its emphasis on the universal mission of a transtribal community called to build a social order founded on pure monotheism natural to humanity?"⁷²

For Islamic fundamentalists the answer to this question has is clear and it has been already provided by the quoted spiritual father of their ideology, Sayyid Qutb. In his *Signs along the Road* (see note 11) he states that only Islam is designed to lead the entire humanity in a world order to be established in the years to come. It is clear that the questions asked and the answers given indicate a competition between Western and Islamist concepts of world order. At issue are normatively different understandings of the notions of war and peace, as well as law and justice. Again, this is the content of the values related to the scenario of a 'war of civilizations' (see note 49) that can be averted. It follows that we are confronted not only with a new era for the study of security but also with new substance. At issue is the ideology of global jihad waged against the West in a 'New Cold War' (Juergensmeyer) confrontation. Jihadism serves to escalate this conflict of worldviews through militarization to one related to irregular war of terrorism. Thus, the politicization of religion is not simply a state of mind or a dispute over different. If it were, one may prescribe "tolerance". But this prescription does not work when violence as terror is at work. We have here a great security problem. Long before the world was confronted with the case of September 11 there were the earlier cases of Kosovo, Macedonia, Chechnia, and Kashmir and, of course, the *al-Aqsa Intifada* in the Middle East, in which jihadism is involved. The fight over Erez/Israel versus Islamic Palestine is related to religion and to conflicting civilizational worldviews, in this exceptional case both are religions. Even the late secular Arafat declared on January 26, 2002 in calling for Islamic jihad responded to the Israeli tanks encircling his residence. By then one could see him on BBC-World shouting in a row five times: "My answer is

⁷² Kelsay, *Islam and War* (note 31), p. 117.

Jihad...". This slogan of declaration of an irregular war is equally most appealing and most difficult to cope with conventional means.

To be sure, the irregular war is not exclusively based on terrorist acts committed by Islamic fundamentalists. It is a general phenomenon, regardless of the substance of conflict and can be stated without referring to related cases. Not only in Kashmir, but also on the soil of India Muslims and Hindus fight over their political beliefs under religious disguise. The known reports about the destruction of the *Ayodhya* Mosque in India by terrorist acts back in December 1992 was followed by revenge in terror of the jihadists. Similarly, the actions by those of the Jewish settlers in the occupied territories of Palestine (e.g. Hebron massacre, February 1994) are revenged by Hamas and Jihad Islami. It does not serve to belittle of the threats of Islamic jihadists posed to international security when the terror of other mentioned and differentiations are undertaken. My intention is merely the generalizable action for supporting the following three central observations related to the security oriented study of jihadism:

First: The problem of political order. Islamic fundamentalism, as a powerful variety of the politicization of religion does not only bring existing cultural differences to expression. In this regard the revived worldviews touch on a concept of order with the implication of creating a gap between existing civilizations. Whereas religious fundamentalism is a global phenomenon which can be found in almost all world religions, all of them share, despite whatever variations a certain kind of family resemblance, which allows generalization. However, Islamism is very specific variety when it comes to the issue of international order. In terms of security jihadists mobilize on religious grounds and are in this pursuit most appealing and subsequently successful. Despite the need for military security measures needed to face their irregular war, we have to acknowledge that fundamentalists cannot only be fought with armies to undermine their appeal and their call for an Islamic order. For dealing with these issues we need a security approach, which is neither fixated on the state nor on the predominance of conventional military thinking and its traditional wisdoms.

Second: Holy terror and irregular war. Not all fundamentalists fight for their goals in institutions with political means. Among them we also find those who resort to violence within the framework of terrorism to enforce their concept of order. Jihadism is a variety of 'terror in the mind of God' (see Juergensmeyer, note 45). Which combines fundamentalism and the related worldviews about order

including the politicization of a conflict of values with terrorism, i.e. "holy terror"⁷³ with irregular war.

Third: is 'Islamism' different from 'Islamic fundamentalism'? In this contribution, the terms 'political Islam', Islamism, and Islamic fundamentalism are used interchangeably. This is not common, because some dispute the application of the fundamentalism-concept to Islam with the intent to combat the spreading prejudice. However, this is utterly misleading. It is true, the term 'fundamentalism' has been ill handled as a cliché, but it is – despite all odds – a scholarly and analytical concept for studying the politicization of religion. By using the term Islamism as an alternative to the one that refers to the global phenomenon of fundamentalism, the respective scholars are unwittingly contributing to the stereotyping of Islam by implicitly restricting the politicization of religion to it. In contrast, I argue that 'Islamism' is only a depiction of a specific variety of the phenomenon of political religion addressed as a religious fundamentalism. This phenomenon does not only occur in Islam. However, jihadism as the military dimension of this phenomenon is specifically Islamic. It compels for including the inquiry into Islamism in the field of security studies. The new reasoning in this field has to be addressed as 'new frontiers of security'⁷⁴, setting out from a demand to go beyond the traditional concept of security dominated by military thinking. In so doing one smoothes the way for broadening the scope and deepening the insights of the analysis to enable oneself of dealing with the new pattern of irregular war being the challenge.

Jihadism is not only an ideology of religious extremism, but also a new concept of warfare. The issue is political, namely the Islamist aspiration for a new world order. With the end of the East-West confrontation it seems that conventional Clausewitzian wars are no more likely to take place. Wars between states and between organized, institutionalised armies have almost disappeared being replaced by wars waged by non-state actors as irregulars. It is suggested that this pattern is likely to prevail in the foreseeable future.⁷⁵ Therefore, most of the issues must be thought through anew. Security experts have been arguing for a long time that this change be taken into consideration and have underscored the need for a new security approach. Scholars like Barry Buzan, and later Martin van Creveld and Kalevi Holsti, have ventured into ground-breaking study of security and war going for beyond the fixation with institutionalized

⁷³ See Bruce Lincoln, *Holy Terror* (see note 6).

⁷⁴ Leonore Martin ed., *New Frontiers in Middle Eastern Security* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), introduction.

⁷⁵ See the reference in note 1.

armies. Both, the changed character of wars of the new kind and non-military aspects are to be emphasized more and more strongly, and need to become central subjects of security studies. In this sense, and in this sense only. It is proposed to deal with the religious Islamist ideology and with its jihadism within the framework of a new security approach. Jihadism is both a propaganda fight for a new order and is an irregular war which on September 11 2001 and the following events have proved powerful. Organized armies are helpless against the terrorist acts of violent jihadists, in particular the suicide bombers among them. Prior to these recent development earlier events in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Afghanistan, as well as in Xinjiang, Kashmir, Kosovo, and Macedonia make this issue clear.

One can take it for granted that the West will not be able to properly cope with jihadism and the related challenges to international security within the framework of the old state-centered approach. In earlier conflicts with other states the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces were able to overpower its foes, for example the Serbian army with its regular and armed forces in 1999. The same applied in an effort to oust Saddam in the Iraq war back in March/April 2003. In contrast, neither the religious-ethnic UÇK irregulars' acts of revenge against the Christian Serbs and Macedonians or elsewhere, nor the irregular war against coalition troops in Iraq and in Afghanistan could be curtailed. Another example is the already mentioned inability of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) to cope with Intifada "against the infidels". This understanding is currently gaining topicality responding to the irregular war of jihadism as practiced on September 11, 2001. This jihadist threat continues. The victory over the Taliban and over Saddam cannot be repeated against the jihadists in both countries, or elsewhere.

In being confronted with jihadist Islamism, both as an ideology and as an international movement one is also exposed to some parts of the Islamic diaspora in the West being hijacked by the Islamists. Those claim to be the true representatives of the 'true voice of Islam'. In fact they are seeking a "hinterland" for their action. Jihadists of the diaspora abuse basic democratic rights and demonize their critics as the 'voice of Islamophobia'. At issue is a camouflaging of their activities to establish their logistics in the West. Important components of Islamic jihadism exist for instance in Germany being a case in point. With these facts in mind, the study of security must cover an inquiry into the networking between the region of conflict itself, in this case, the world of Islam, and its extension though global

migration abroad for which the term 'gated Diaspora'⁷⁶, i.e. Islam in the West, has been coined. The denunciation of references to the conflict between political Islam and the West as an indication of Islamophobia is used as a cover to obscure these issues and is both utterly misleading and detrimental, both for the integration of Muslims and for Western security itself. After all, this kind of political correctness served camouflaging fundamentalism and does not contribute protecting neither Muslims nor democracy. In this free spirit the ensuing section of this study addresses the abuse of Islamic diaspora in Europe for camouflaging the Islamic terrorists around al-Qaida Hamburg cell of Mohammed Atta and for facilitating the activities of these fundamentalist warriors of God in their pursuit of irregular war as jihad for a new international order based on the Islamist notion of "*Hakimiyyat Allah/Gods rule*".

5. Global Migration, International Security and the Ideology of Jihadism in the European Battlefield

Of course, there exists an alternative to Islamism for Muslims living in the West and also for Turkey in its bid to join the EU. This alternative is Euro-Islam both for Muslim migrants and for Turkey in its bid to join Europe.⁷⁷ The debate over this issue took place in many international projects. At the University of California, Berkeley a research project addressed this issue under the apt heading "Islam and the Changing Identity of Europe". The project was conducted by two major Berkeley centers and it led to a publication under the title "Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam?"⁷⁸. If this alternative proves to be unfeasible, the Islamist dream of "Muslim Europe" to be accomplished piecemeal in a politics of Islamization becomes within the reach and it is a serious security threat. Underlying this assumption is the fact that the operation of al-Qaida on September 11, 2001 was carried out in New York and Washington, but it was prepared and rooted in the German Islam diaspora. To put it bluntly: The networking of Islamism and the related supporting systems of jihadism are based and located in the Islamic diaspora in Western Europe making of Europe a battlefield. Clearly, at issue is a small minority among the Islamic diaspora. In the case of Germany there are about 100.000 Islamists

⁷⁶ I borrow the term „gated diaspora“ from Nikos Papastergiadis, *The Turbulance of Migration* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).

⁷⁷ See B. Tibi, The Quest of Islamic Migrants and of Turkey to Become European, in: *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, vol. 3:1 (Spring 2004), pp. 13-28.

⁷⁸ Nezar al-Sayyad and Manuel Castells, eds., *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam?* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), this volume includes B. Tibi, "Muslim Migrants in Europe: Between Euro-Islam and Ghettoization", pp. 31-52.

among the 3.5 millions diaspora community. The figure is in average never more than 3 to 5 %. However, the issue is not the number of jihadists, but their ability to launch a strike. Islamists are institutionally well organized, both vocal and powerful. Above all they dispose over resources and they are in the control of major mosques of the diaspora in Europe.

After September 11 and the cracking down on the fifty five al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan the world precisely knows, despite all the conspiracy driven thoughts, that the Bin Laden al-Qaida-connection is not a “gang” but rather a powerful organisation of jihadist fundamentalism with a considerable logistic basis in Western Europe, in particular Germany.

In another international project on “Religion in an Expanding Europe”⁷⁹ run at Cornell University I have formulated the options in the formula “Europeanization of Islam or Islamization of Europe”. The standing of the jihadists in the Islamic diaspora is clear. In a propagandist war of ideas they reject the use of the notion of fundamentalism for indentifying those who go for the unity of religion and the state in Islam, the so-called *din-wa-dawla*-concept (*din-u-devlet*), as fundamentalists. They nevertheless believe that only they draw on the true *usul*/fundamentals of Islam and deny all others to be true believers and thus to have any representation in the Islamic diaspora of Europe. And in this capacity they claim religious freedom as basic human right. It is sad to acknowledge that Osama Bin Laden does the same; he continues to be popular⁸⁰ both in the world of Islam and in the diaspora. The language of political Islam is popular for declaring the *jihad*-war on the West, believed to be one of *iman*/belief against *al-kufr al-alamii*/international unbelief is also used in the Koran schools in the Islamic diaspora in Germany. It is not the person of Bin Laden, but rather the symbolic incorporation of this jihad war that renders this popularity. In short, at issue is also to win the Islamic diaspora for the security battle against jihadism. In this sense we are dealing with a novelty, lying the fact that Islamist movements and the related conflicts in the world of Islam are now being exported to the West, thus concretely touching on Europe and on its own security. The Islamists come to Europe in joining the ever increasing number of asylum seekers and migrants. In this way,

⁷⁹ See Peter Katzenstein and Tim Byrnes, eds., *Religion in an Expanding Europe* (Cambridge/UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006) including my chapter on the Europeanization of Islam.

⁸⁰ I agree with the editorial by Thomas Friedman. He wrote after a visit to a variety of Islamic countries: “Quietly, Many in the Muslim World Want Bin Laden to get Away”, *International Herald Tribune*, January 24, 2002, p. 8. Yossef Bodansky, *Bin Laden. The Man Who Declared War on America* (Rocklin/Cal.: Forum/Prima Publ., 1999).

political Islam has been exported to the West and it is becoming a domestic European issue. Being myself a liberal Muslim, I have been warning for years that totalitarian-minded Islamists have been abusing both democratic freedoms and the European Islam diaspora in itself for establishing a logistical basis for their activities in the West. Newsweek wrote after September 11 about me: "Bassam Tibi ... has warned for years that Westerners need to differentiate between good Muslims and the bad ... no one wanted to hear that, verging as it does on the politically incorrect."⁸¹

Due to a wrong understanding of the concept of an "open society"⁸² fundamentalist activities in Europe and generally in the West are mostly ignored. European politicians – despite the warning of security apparatus – are more concerned about political correctness and worry to be related to any conflict that would associate them with political an alleged Islamophobia. Of course, it is right to curb prejudices against non-Western cultures, and to combat all kinds of related racism and real, not alleged Islamophobia. However, Islamophobia is one thing and a security related containing of Islamic jihadism and its "new totalitarianism"⁸³ is another.

The success of the Islamist networking in Europe's civil society and the spread of the related ideology in the diaspora are an evidence for the ability of the movement to establish an equation of the critique of jihadist Islamism with an ugly Islamophobia in a war of ideas. In particular in Germany, the media fell into this trap and assisted in protecting the Islamic fundamentalism against any disclosure while overlooking the interrelation between migration and security.⁸⁴ Opinion leaders were less concerned about the enemies of open society and in turn preoccupied with combating any expression of political incorrectness. Even liberal Muslims engaged in Islamic reform, like this author elaborating on a reformist Euro-Islam⁸⁵, were victimised by this European drive perceived to be an indication of an alleged tolerance toward an indiscriminate Islam. It was no surprise that the Islamists have been giving a priority for Germany and Scandinavia for establishing their logistical bases. In particular Germany – due to its shameful past – has been the one with highest standards of political correctness when it comes to non-Western

⁸¹ See "Tolerating the Intolerable", in: *Newsweek*, November 5, 2001, p. 46.

⁸² Karl Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, 2 volumes (London: Routledge and Paul Kegan, 1945).

⁸³ Karl Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, 2 volumes (London: Routledge and Paul Kegan, 1945).

⁸⁴ See Myron Weiner, referenced in note 40 above and the related study by B. Tibi, *Islamische Zuwanderung* (referenced in that note as well).

⁸⁵ On this issue one reads in *Time Magazine*, December 24, 2001, p. 49: "Bassam Tibi ... who coined the term Euro-Islam insists on the integration of Europe's Muslims", p. 49.

cultures. The story of the liberal German journalist, who disclosed the "Krieg in unseren Städten" is telling story; he was silenced by lawsuits and arbitrary court decisions. In an earlier article of *The New York Times* republished in *The International Herald Tribune* we find an explanation for this German behavior. Germany is addressed as "safe haven" for the Islamist⁸⁶. In addition, *Newsweek* asked on its cover the question: "Why terrorists like Europe". For Germany this answer was given with the formula "Tolerating the Intolerable". Three of the four neo-jihad terror-pilots came from Germany, where the finance and the infrastructure of the operation being the supporting system of jihadism were located. Their appointment was called "Dar al-Ansar/house of supporters". The anti-terror laws legislated in Germany and the United Kingdom in 2002, put European governments in position to legally persecute fundamentalists and to curb their activities in Europe. Britain is doing well, in Germany there is little will for low enforcement in this field. By any rate, it is a very long way to go for a better security given that the threat continues to be there, it certainly has not abated, despite all measures. In my most recent book "The New Totalitarianism" (note 84) I argue that the European awareness of the security threat is weak and lies far beyond the realities. Here we face the dilemma of security versus liberty. The Islamists came to Europe not because they like it, as *Newsweek* ironically put it, but for using its democratic freedoms to facilitate their activities. A French author suggested the formula "Democracy against itself" for depicting the issue⁸⁷. But this formula can also be put the other way around: in combating Islamic fundamentalism in Europe one can touch upon the foremost credentials of Western democracy. This is truly a predicament: how can we secure security in stopping the intrusion of Islamic fundamentalism coming from the world of Islam to Europe without doing any damage to democratic rules and values? How can we defend the "open society" of the West against its new enemies of Islamist totalitarianism without succumbing to the rules of the jihadist Islamists themselves? How can we protect Muslim migrants against a collective accusation of being supportive for jihadism? These are tough questions and I do not answer to them.

An essential part of countering terrorism and combating its ideology in the West is a successful integration of Islamic migrants in Europe within the framework of an Euro-Islam. This would provide efficient

⁸⁶ Steve Erlanger, "Extremists Found Safe Haven in Germany", in: *International Herald Tribune*, October 6-7, 2001, p. 3 (published before in *New York Times*).

⁸⁷ Jean-Francois Revel, *Democracy against itself* (see note 28 above); on Islamic terrorism see herein chapter 12.

means for combating fundamentalism within the confines of democracy. In my view, there are two areas in which Islamists were successful in Europe. We need a security approach in a war of ideas to curb them. There are, however, two other areas. *First*, to dry out the supporting systems, and *second*, to get a grip over the institutional outlets for mobilizing parts of the Islamic diaspora in the name of ethno-religious solidarity. The so-called Islamic welfare organisations in the diaspora were and still are the camouflage the supporting systems of jihadism covered in the name of religious associations. And some basic Islamic schools serve the unfolding of ethno-religious solidarity, not integration in European societies. Only Euro-Islam⁸⁸ can help reach the goal of making the Muslim diaspora in Europe immune and keep it away from the susceptibility to Islamist ideology of terrorism.

6. Conclusions

In concluding this paper on countering ideological terrorism serving as a legitimization of an irregular war presented as a *jihad* by the Islamists it is argued that a new concept of security is needed for properly dealing with the pending challenges. In distinguishing between political organisations and real religious institutions of Muslim migrants we put ourselves in a position to draw a line between Islamic jihad fundamentalists and ordinary Muslim migrants. The new security approach had to be attached to a democratic strategy both against the ideology of jihadism and the other one of a clash of civilizations. Without the assistance and cooperation of Muslims in the pursuit of this strategy a war on terror can never be won. An essential part of this assistance needs to come from the Islamic diaspora itself. The supporting system of the jihadist internationalism are located in Western Europe. A line has to be drawn between Islam and Islamism for countering jihadist ideology.

The painful disclosure that there were British, German and French migrant Muslims fighting both as volunteers on the side of the Taliban as well as acting as *al-Qaida jihadist* has been alarming. Again, this is not an issue to be coped with adequately through policing. The geopolitical setup within jihadist acts is the triangle: The world of Islam, the West and the Muslim diasporic culture in Europe. In the latter issue area, i.e. in Europe things have not been going well. Being a Muslim migrant myself, I believe, the worst case is Germany.

⁸⁸ See chapter VI "The Fundamentalist Abuse of the Islam-Diaspora: Western Europe a safe haven" in: B. Tibi, *Die fundamentalistische Herausforderung* (Munich: C.H. Beck, fully rewritten 4th edition, 2003), pp. 184-214.

The ethnic determination of what is *German* precludes Muslim migrants from becoming members of the core community and thus increases the appeal of political Islam to them. Being a Muslim descending from the nobility/*ashraf* of Damascus I have been treated in German society as a “guest worker” and discriminated upon in my university career. For me it was not possible to become in substance a German citizen, beyond legally holding a German passport since 1976 and living in Germany for four decades. My education in rational philosophy and the knowledge about Islam help me to distinguish between Islam and Islamic fundamentalism and also not to be affected by the appeal of a jihadist defensive culture, despite the experience of discrimination in Europe. In an interview with the German magazine *Focus* after the jihadist assaults of London, July 7, 2005 I stated bluntly: “Had I not been educated in European philosophy I would have become in view of the discrimination subjected to a jihadist fighting Europe.”⁸⁹

The bulk of the poorly educated Muslim migrants is not protected against their “othering” by European societies. This makes them an easy catch for jihad-Islamists. Earlier, in this paper, my concept of Euro-Islam has been presented for combating Islamism. The concept is underpinned by the conviction that it is possible to be both European and Muslim. Again, a Euro-Muslim would not be susceptible to the appeal of jihadism. It follows that the lack of integration boasts the feeling by migrants of being excluded. In fact, this is the domain in which Islamic fundamentalists find people like the Egyptian Mohammed Atta and even the German born Moroccan Said Bahaji, who are willing to join their fundamentalist network for ideological reasons. A Muslim with a European civilizational identity would presumably not act in this manner, but rather as a guardian of Western values, not as a jihadist. But the othering of young Muslim migrants in treating them as aliens and denying them full membership in the polity is an indirect assistance to the ideology of Islamism seeking to undermine any effort at integration. It remains to be hoped that such an open and enlightened Islam that could unfold in Europe among Muslims would affect the addressed triangle in shaping the world of Islam itself. This part of countering terrorism is essential for the security approach needed supplement the other areas of policing and of military issues. The politics of integration of Muslim migrants would be the best security approach against jihadism.

Security is for me not a means for preserving the status quo, but for defending freedom and democracy. How can we prevent the enemies

⁸⁹ Interview with B. Tibi, *Focus*, issue 29 of July 18, 2005, pp. 150-51.

of the “open society” from abusing its freedom? Among the principles of civil society is its decoupling from the state. Islamists as religious fundamentalists (see note 26) have been successful at this level in establishing themselves in Europe on the level of civil society applied to Islamic communitarism. In this regard we see some basic differences between France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Despite all flaws, the French model has proved to be more promising than others for stopping the intrusion of jihadist Islamic fundamentalists to Europe. France expects from the Imams of the mosques to express their loyalty to constitution, democracy and the laïcité.⁹⁰ This is not the case in the United Kingdom nor in Germany. Back in 2001 after the November debate in the British parliament on Muslim Britons fighting in Afghanistan against Britain and USA, the by then British home secretary David Blunkett in office requested in an unprecedented manner loyalty from Muslim migrants, but the Labour politician was accused of using “right wing slogans” against Muslims, simply for requiring loyalty. After the assaults of July 7, 2005 the United Kingdom could no longer afford this “multicultural tolerance” facilitating within the multiculturalism of “anything goes” the actions of jihadism.

In concluding this analysis on the roots of ideological terrorism the politicization of Islam in a context of a religionization of politics has been referred to to explain jihadism as an ideology of an irregular war. In instrumentalising democratic freedoms, but also in abusing the weakness of European values the exponents of jihadist Islamism succeeded in finding safe haven in Europe and ideologically safeguarding it. Fundamentalists, who are against the political integration of Muslim migrants as citizens of heart were able to hijack parts of the Islamic diaspora. Integrated ordinary Muslims could become true European citizens, whereas Muslims at the fringe of society can be mobilized as ethnic-religious minorities for the political ends of religious fundamentalism being the ideology of jihadist terrorism.

An ideology based on religion and culture in a political shape is an essential part of terrorism. For deterring the security threat of jihadist Islamism, we need a new approach for dealing with the addressed triangle: The world of Islam, the West and the Islamic diaspora in Europe. Jihadist terrorism as irregular war is to be located in this

⁹⁰ Paul A. Silverstein, *Algeria in France* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). see also B. Tibi, Les conditions d'Euro-Islam, in: Robert Bistolfi and Francois Zabbal, (eds.), *Islam d'Europe. Intégration ou insertion communautaire* (Paris : Editions de l'Aube, 1995), pp. 230-234. See also the report on Dalil Boubakir, the Imam of the Paris mosque, “Muslim and French and Proud to be Both” by Katrin Bennhold in *International Herald Tribune*, March 16, 2006, p. 2.

triangle. The war against jihad terrorism is also a war of ideas and it neither can be restricted to military means or to a formal legal understanding of war. The war on terror cannot be declared, because one cannot declare war on invisible non-state actors.

The instruments needed for undermining Islamic fundamentalism as an ideological foundation of terrorism in the world of Islam and in Europe are multifaceted. In this contribution I have been at pains to analyze and shed light on the challenge posed by jihadist Islamic ideology to Western as well as to Islamic and to international security. Political Islam is primarily a challenge to Muslims themselves in their dealing with the pending predicament with modernity. The solution for Europe lies in Europeanizing Islam⁹¹ for countering the efforts at an Islamization of Europe. In the world of Islam itself the option is either to accept the subjection to the new totalitarianism or to smooth the way through reforms for an Islamic embracing of secular democracy⁹² within the framework of an open liberal Islam. This would open the way for Muslims to join the rest of the world within the framework of democratic peace (see note 3). Democracy in Islam would help Muslims to come to terms with the rest of the world and to give up the illusion of a global Islamization. The jihadist-terrorist internationalism of political Islam is not a contribution to world peace. Terrorism⁹³ alienate Muslims from the rest of humanity; therefore, Muslim politicians are best advised to join the war on terror and to dissociate themselves from global jihad. The European approach of a democratization of the EU's neighborhood⁹⁴ is the best for countering ideological terrorism.

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⁹¹ B. Tibi, "Between Communitarism and Euro-Islam. Europe, Multicultural Identities and the Challenge of Migration", in: John Docker and Gerhard Fischer (eds.), *Adventures of Identity. European Multicultural Experiences and Perspectives* (Tübingen: Stauffenberg, 2001), pp. 45-60; see also note 80 above.

⁹² On Islam's compatibility with democracy and modernity see William M. Watt, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity* (London: Routledge, 1988), and Rahman Fazlur, *Islam and Modernity. Transformation of Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982). B. Tibi, "Democracy and Democratization in Islam. The Quest of Islamic Enlightenment", in: Michèle Schmiegelow, ed., *Democracy in Asia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 127-146. On Islam and democratic peace see note 25 above.

⁹³ See Richard Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terrorism. A Portrait of Middle Eastern Terrorism 1994-1999* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002) and Paul Berman, *Terror and Liberalism* (New York: Norton & Company, 2003).

⁹⁴ See the work of the EU Think Tank CEPS edited by Michael Emerson, *Democratization in the European Neighborhood* (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 2005), herein B. Tibi, *Islam, Freedom and Democracy*, pp. 93-117.

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ANALYSIS ON FUTURE OF TERRORISM

Dr. Shireen MAZARI (PAKISTAN)¹



With war, in the traditional sense of violent conflict between states, gradually losing validity in terms of state policy – except within the context of self-defence – and with the end of bipolarity, states have been increasingly confronted with non-traditional security issues and threats. In fact, since the end of bipolarity, the traditional notion of security in terms of conventional military threats was expanded to a notion of comprehensive security – which included economic and environmental issues. However, even here, the state was seen as the primary actor. By the mid nineties we saw the notion of human security creep into the

security paradigm – and this put the individual as a central concern within security strategies. Unfortunately, in many ways, by having an all-inclusive security framework, the notion of security as a distinct concept has tended to be undermined. After all, if we are to include health, education and other such welfare issues within a security paradigm, then how do we distinguish the notion of security from other notions such as justice, social welfare and so on?

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This is not to say that issues like poverty do not impact security within states as well as between states, but we need to maintain a certain identifiable notion of security within the language of international relations. In that sense then, while there are non-traditional security issues, I would limit these to issues within states and societies and between states that pose a threat to stability through the use of violent interaction. In other words, when poverty or ethnic differences threaten civil society and state structures, as well as interstate relations, then they enter the realm of security. So, in a sense, then this paper does treat the basic notion of security in terms of absence of violence or a fear of violence. But it also sees states as merely one set of actors within the overall international security paradigm with non-state actors becoming increasingly critical players both at national and international levels. As for the individual, it is still not clear how relevant human security is within international relations since international cooperation still tends to frame rules that undermine individual well-being in poor and developing states – as shown in the WTO arrangements and the policies of state subsidies/support programmes for agriculture in the EU and the US. So, at the end of the day, it is groups, rather than individuals, that have become important players impacting on intra and inter state relations. And many of these groups have transnational linkages in terms of recruitment and financing. This was highlighted most dramatically with the devastating terrorist attacks against US targets on September 11, 2001, which tended to focus on one growing non-traditional security concern – that of terrorism.

Assessment of the Post-9/11 War Against Terrorism

Post-9/11, the international war on terrorism was declared, supported by UN resolutions, and since then it has become a priority agenda for almost all member states of the international system. Has the war been successful in containing terrorism? Although one cannot give a definitive answer to this question, especially in terms of long-term assessments, one can answer tentatively, based on the situation prevailing on the ground in terms of acts of terrorism and the fate of the terrorist networks. Within this framework, one can say that, at best, the war on terrorism has reached a stalemate.

While the massive military power of the US, aided by the international community's support for anti-terrorist conventions through the UN, has broken up and scattered the networks of the terrorist organisations; the manner in which the US has led and conducted the war against terror has not only failed in denying political space to the terrorists, it has in fact, created more space for

them. In order to examine this assertion, there is a need to also look at, briefly, the conduct of the war against international terrorism by the US.

Having identified Osama bin Laden (OBL) and his Al-Qaeda as the central terrorist enemy, and the Taliban as cohorts in crime for providing sanctuary for Al-Qaeda, the US, supported by the international community, launched the war on terrorism in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. Massive air power sent OBL and Al-Qaeda on the run and toppled the Taliban government in Kabul with the surviving Taliban leadership also going underground. A massive haul of prisoners resulted and many were taken to Guantanamo Bay to be incarcerated with no trial or POW protection – as required under the Geneva Conventions. As the war in Afghanistan unfolded in the full glare of the international media, the horror of the “Daisy Cutters” and “Bunker Buster” bombs against a hapless Afghan population first began to create space for the terrorists. The killing of POWs at a camp, Qila Jhangi in Afghanistan, and the death by suffocation and shooting of prisoners incarcerated in containers of trucks added to the tales of horror relating to the conduct of the US-led war in Afghanistan. Gradually, in the face of these developments, the horror of 9/11 diluted with a growing sense that the US was now actively targeting Muslims, both abroad and within the US. All these factors created space for the terrorists in terms of shelter and even future recruitments. The framing of the terrorist issue within a religious framework – the notion of “Islamic terrorism” – also allowed space to the terrorists on the run.

So the war on terror failed to adopt a basic strategy – that of space denial to the terrorists. After all, the war was an unconventional war with an ill-defined and mobile enemy, so the first goal should have been of military and political space denial, but this was never part of the US strategy. Sheer military power was seen as the counter to the terrorist threat. To make matters worse, the US then dissipated the focus of the war itself on the transnational network of terrorism, by moving into Iraq through an illegal invasion of a sovereign state which had no links to Al-Qaeda or OBL. Bush’s invasion of Iraq also added a new dimension to the terrorism issue – that of WMD. The US began its new doctrine of the “axis of evil” and “rogue states” with WMD. That no WMD were found in Iraq has since shown the Iraq invasion for what it was – an effort to enforce regime change and control energy resources.

However, the problem was that the invasion of Iraq, with no legitimation by the UN, allowed the terrorists to expand their operational milieu; and with the US occupation of Iraq, linkages

between international terrorism and local groups resisting the invasion became intertwined, with the former feeding on the anger and frustration of the latter. Also, members of the US-led “coalition of the willing” found their nationals and territories being targeted by international terrorists – as in the case of the Madrid bombings. As the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi told *La Stampa*, in March 2004, “Clearly the fight against terrorists cannot be resolved through force. We should remember that the war in Iraq began a year ago ... The results are not good, whether we are talking about Iraq or elsewhere – Istanbul, Moscow and now Madrid.”²

Despite intelligence information to the contrary, President Bush, in his State of the Union address in January 2003 claimed: “Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications and statements by people now in custody reveals that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al-Qaeda.”³ And this claim was persuasive enough to persuade 44% of the US public to believe that some if not all the 9/11 hijackers had been Iraqis and 45% of the public thought Saddam Hussein was behind the 9/11 attacks.⁴ Now, however, it has come to be generally accepted that not only did Iraq have no WMD but that Saddam Hussein had no link to al-Qaeda. Ironically, post-Saddam Iraq is now seeing increasing space for al-Qaeda acting together with disgruntled elements in Iraq as well as those opposed to the US occupation.

The impact of the Iraq war on terrorist recruitment was admitted to by the CIA Director, Porter Goss before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in February 2005, when he stated that, “Islamic extremists are exploiting the Iraqi conflict to recruit new anti-US jihadists. ... These jihadists who survive will leave Iraq experienced and focused on acts of urban terrorism. ... They represent a potential pool of contacts to build transnational terrorist cells, groups and networks in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other countries.”⁵ According to Goss, Abu Musab Zarqawi, a Jordanian terrorist, who joined al-Qaeda after the US invasion of Iraq, hoped “to establish a safe haven in Iraq” from where he could operate against Western states and certain Muslim governments.⁶ And Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency admitted, to the same

² *La Stampa*, 15 March 2004.

³ Bernard Adam, “United States: Losing the War on Terror: ‘The Harder We Work, The Behinder We Get’”, in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, April 24, 2004.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Priest & White, “War Helps Recruit Terrorists, Hill Told”, in *Washington Post*, February 17, 2005.

⁶ *Ibid.*

Senate panel that US “policies in the Middle East fuel Islamic resentment.”⁷

The massive increase in terrorist counter attacks against American targets finally led the US government to actually abandon the publication of its annual report on international terrorism for the year 2004 which should have come out in early 2005. According to one report, the US government’s main terrorism centre concluded that there had been more terrorist attacks in 2004 than in any year since 1985 – the first year covered by its publication entitled, “*Patterns of Global Terrorism*”.⁸ Even in 2004, the numbers of incidents for 2003 were undercounted, which led to a revision of the publication in June 2004—two months later. What finally came out was a much higher number of significant terrorist attacks and twice the number of fatalities that had been presented in the original report.⁹

So, clearly by all accounts, international terrorism has been on the increase in the aftermath of the internationally-declared war against terrorism led by the US – both in terms of intensity and operational milieu. Of course, in his acceptance speech at the Republican Convention in 2004, in New York, Bush painted a picture which attempted to show that the war on terrorism was being won. As he put it: “*The government of a free Afghanistan is fighting terror; Pakistan is capturing terrorist leaders; Saudi Arabia is making raids and arrests; Libya is dismantling its weapons programs; the army of a free Iraq is fighting for freedom; and more than three-quarters of al-Qaeda’s key members and associates have been detained or killed.*”¹⁰ At the politico-diplomatic level, there have been a plethora of global and regional conventions and agreements aimed at fighting terrorism, including focusing on the financing of terrorism, as well as a number of UN Security Council Resolutions.

However, on the other side, OBL and his deputy, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, as well as Taliban leader Mullah Omar, have neither been captured nor killed. Al-Qaeda seems to have “gone global” and Afghanistan has yet to become truly free. Presently not only are there foreign forces controlling security, warlords still reign supreme in many regions and President Karzai, despite being elected, has his security controlled by US guards. Additionally, in Afghanistan, linkages between drugs, organised crime and terrorism have increased. As for Iraq, it is seen as under military occupation by the

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Jonathan S. Landay, “Bush Administration Eliminating 19-Year-Old International Terrorism Report, *Knight Ridder*, April 15, 2005.

<http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/terrorwar/analysis/2005/0415elimreport.htm>

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ P. Escobar, “Why al-Qaeda Is Winning”, *Asia Times* September 11, 2004

US and its allies and there is an almost daily increase in the intensity of terrorist attacks. In addition, both Asia and Europe have become more vulnerable to acts of terror and the Arab world is highly destabilised.

As for al-Qaeda, it has become what some have termed a “brand name”, having mutated into a “multi-headed hydra” comprising international leaders and local heads.¹¹ Worse still, with no central command or organisation, any group that wishes to come into the limelight selects the al-Qaeda label or “brand”. This ensures publicity which is part of the intent of such groups. New local obscurantist groups have surfaced that have no operational links to OBL and his leadership cadres, but they state an affiliation because this intensifies the context of a specific local act of terror. Using the brand name “al-Qaeda” allows them space for recruitment and support. Equally interesting is the fact that many of the born-again obscurantists are not citizens of Muslim states but are part of first and second generation Muslims belonging to European states. As Pepe Escobar points out, members of al-Qaeda’s new elite were “either born in Western Europe – many hold a legitimate European Union passport – or came to the West while still very young and then became radicalized.”¹²

That is why there is a growing perception amongst European states that a more encompassing strategy is needed to fight international terrorism. The EU’s Romano Prodi argued that the use of military force as the main weapon in the fight against terrorism has not worked – as he put it, “Terrorism is now more powerful than ever before”.¹³ In March 2004 the EU adopted a wide-ranging counter-terrorism policy in which they recognised that they had to deal with the roots of terrorism which they saw as the “social economic and political problems in the Mediterranean and Middle East countries on which Islam fanaticism has built”.¹⁴

So, it becomes clear that, at the very least, there is a stalemate in the war against terrorism and at worse, the terrorist threat seems to be on the increase both in terms of intensity and operational milieu. The causes for this are also clear.

To begin with, failure to deny space to the terrorists and an almost total reliance on military means to deal with the problem of terrorism have been major mistakes. Simply by using heavy weaponry as means of reprisal against suspected states and groups will not end

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ As cited in Ibid.

¹⁴ “EU counter-terrorism policy”, March 31, *EurActiv.com*

the problem. Asymmetrical warfare, if fought in this traditional manner, is ineffective and costly, and merely aggravates the problem.

Terrorism itself is merely a symptom of deep-seated political and economic problems which is why there has to be a long term multiple-level strategy that includes security measures but also focuses on the root causes of terrorism, which are primarily political. Amongst the recognised causes are unresolved political-territorial disputes affecting Muslim populations – especially the Palestinian problem, Kashmir and Chechnya. A sense of deprivation and injustice creates the necessary space for the terrorists.

Framing the terrorist issue in religious terms is equally counterproductive since terrorism has political roots. Even al-Qaeda is not proselytising for Islam, so if the IRA's acts of terrorism were not seen as "catholic terrorism" why should al-Qaeda's terrorist actions be referred to as "Islamic terrorism"?

Additionally, at the tactical level, what is being seen as a continuous abuse of Muslims, Islam, its Prophet (PBUH) and its Holy Book in the US and Europe and parts of the Dominion territories, is increasing the divide between Muslims and the West and this is also creating more space for the obscurantists, by exploiting feelings of hatred and victimisation that have increased amongst Muslims in Europe and the US post-9/11.

Linking issues of WMD and regime change-democracy in Muslim states has also diluted the focus of the war against terrorism.

What Constitutes Terrorism?

Separating perpetrators of pathological violence from those who indulge in political violence, the word "terrorist" - denoting the latter - is a term that has been fastened on political enemies since the time of the French Revolution in 1789. If a political movement, which has used terror as a tactic, succeeds then the label of terrorism disappears – with many political "terrorists" of yesteryears transformed into national or revolutionary leaders, once they have succeeded in their aims! Herein lies the problem of defining terrorism on its merits, in a manner that allows it to be a punishable offence through international treaties. Certain terrorist acts have been isolated and deemed punishable by the international community through international conventions. For example, there are the international conventions on hostage taking and hijacking. But there is, as yet, no comprehensive international convention on terrorism itself, despite the ongoing efforts in the United Nations. Also, special UN committees have continuously condemned acts of international

terrorism in principle, but no agreeable definition has been forthcoming. There is still no consensus on how to define terrorism.

This is not to say that acts of violent political terror cannot be identified, nor is such terrorism new to the world scene. A German, Johannes Most pioneered the idea of the letter bomb.¹⁵ Since then, many political scientists have sought to define and explain political terrorism. According to one definition, 'terrorism involves the intentional use of violence or the threat of violence by the perpetrators against an *instrumental* target in order to communicate to a *primary* target a threat of future violence'.¹⁶ Interestingly, barring the distinction between instrumental and primary targets and the actual use of violence, the difference between terrorism and nuclear deterrence is very fine!

E.V. Walters, in his work on terrorism, refers to a process of terror, which he says has three dimensions: 'the act or threat of violence, the emotional reaction and the social effects'.¹⁷ So, three actors are involved – the source or perpetrator of the violence, the victim and the target. The victim perishes and the target reacts to the destruction. Here, there is a distinction between the process of violence on the one hand and, on the other, an act of destruction, which is complete in itself, and not an instrument of anything else. The former - as process - comes within the category of political violence, the latter seems to be closer to the pathological, or what Chalmers Johnson calls the 'nonpolitical' terrorism.¹⁸

As long as terror is simply a means directed towards a goal beyond itself, it has to be limited in its dimensions so as to remain a process. Annihilation is not the intent of such terrorism – rather, the intent is to politically and psychologically hurt the enemy. When terror becomes unlimited and crosses the invisible line into irrationality, then it moves on from being a process to simply an end in itself – and then it loses its relevance within the political context. In a similar vein, political scientist Raymond Aron also highlights the distinction between the actual deeds of terrorists and the significance given to these acts by observers remote from the scene.¹⁹ This then brings up the issue of a third target relevant to the act of political terror – the international audience and the international victim. Aron feels that a violent act can be categorized as terrorism if the psychological effects are out of

¹⁵ Walter Laquer (Editor), *The Terrorism Reader*. Meridian Books, NYC; 1978.

¹⁶ Jordan J Paust, as cited in Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*. Stanford University Press, California, 1982.

¹⁷ E.V. Walter, *Terror & Resistance: A Study of Political Violence*. Oxford University Press, London; 1969.

¹⁸ Chalmers Johnson, op.cit.

¹⁹ Raymond Aron, *Peace & War*. Garden City, N.Y., 1966

proportion to its purely physical result. However, this leaves the categorization primarily at a subjective level, of measuring the psychological impact and how far it is “out of proportion”.

It is the subjectivity brought to bear on the issue of terrorism that has prevented the international community from formulating an all-encompassing definition of terrorism. Despite the intensity of activities post-9/11 to create laws and conventions against terrorism at the global, regional and national levels, the international community has still not evolved any acceptable definition of what constitutes terrorism. International conventions have found it easier to sidestep the issue, while many of the prevailing conventions that deal with specific acts of terrorism, like the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages and the OIC’s Convention on Combating Terrorism, focus on making a distinction between terrorism and struggles for self-determination against colonial rule, alien occupation and racist regimes.²⁰

Also, the 1973 UN General Assembly Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism makes a similar exemption, and this is further backed up by Article 7 of the General Assembly’s 1974 Definition of Aggression, which states:

‘Nothing in this definition, and in particular Article 3²¹ could in any way prejudice the right of self-determination, freedom, and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; or the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and seek and receive support ...’.

Beyond the issue of self-determination, there is also the issue of state terrorism. Many states perpetrate violence against the people of other states to send a message to their governments to fall in line “or else”. An all-encompassing definition of terrorism would bring the

²⁰ The International Convention against the taking of hostages (came into force June 1983) clearly states that the Convention “shall not apply to an act of hostage-taking committed in the course of armed conflicts ... in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on principles of International Law...”(Article 12).

In a similar vein, the Convention on Terrorism adopted by the OIC, in 1999, also confirms “the legitimacy of the rights of peoples to struggle against foreign occupation and colonialist and racist regimes by all means, including armed struggle to liberate their territories in compliance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations”(preamble).

²¹ which gives an inventory of the acts that are regarded as aggression

perpetrators of such violence within the ambit of penalties for such acts. When the state in question is a major or even a super power, then the issue will arise as to who will ensure that an act of terror by that state is punished? Also, if deterrence between states fails and the threatened action is undertaken, does that also become an act of terror – especially if the action threatened is against civil society? And what of cases where, in a state of war, the laws of war and the Geneva Conventions are ignored, and massacres and revenge killings become the order of the day? It is all these issues, and the reluctance of states to give up their final right to violence, that has made it almost impossible to evolve an all-encompassing definition of terrorism.

Therefore, within the UN the focus is becoming increasingly on a way to move beyond this problem – indeed to sidestep the issue of definition and simply deal with the specifics of the acts of terrorism and their penalties. The draft (originally floated by India) of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, that continues to be under consideration in the UN, seeks to do this by simply ignoring the issue of defining terrorism specifically. Instead it just links terrorism to any person who commits an offence, “unlawfully and intentionally” which is intended to cause either “death or serious bodily injury to any person” or “serious damage to a State or government facility, a public transportation system, communication system...”²² Another major failing of this draft is that it totally ignores the exemption, internationally recognized, for struggles of self-determination – despite the fact that self-determination is a peremptory international norm.²³

Muslim states have also pointed out that the preamble of this Draft Convention contains no reference to the underlying causes of terrorism and while there is a reference to “State-sponsored terrorism”, there is no mention of “State terrorism”. In any event, so far the Draft remains in the process of negotiations.

However, one major shortcoming in the way the international community is looking at the issue of terrorism is to focus on what is seen as “international terrorism”. Yet “international terrorism” is simply one form of the trend in terrorism, and once can identify at least two other important trends. One of the problems confronting the war on terrorism is that none of the three trends function totally independently of the others.

²² Article 2 of the Working document submitted by India on the draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.

²³ This norm (of self-determination) is not only a part of customary international law but is also enshrined as one of the principles of the UN, as laid out in Article 1:2 of its Charter.

I – International terrorism can also be seen as transnational terrorism, with groups having linkages across national borders and subscribing to an international agenda. Included in this are members and sympathisers of al-Qaeda and some of the Taliban leadership. Al-Qaeda remnants are thought to be present in the tribal belt of Pakistan, but a number of acts of terror in India also are now being linked to al-Qaeda. Also, Muslim groups fighting in Chechnya and Uzbekistan are also being lumped with al-Qaeda – at least those thought to be sheltering along the Pakistan-Afghan border. Since the US-sanctioned 'jihad' against the Soviets in Afghanistan, various Muslim groups seeking political change through violent means are thought to have created linkages with each other since the US recruited Muslim fighters from across the Muslim world to fight in Afghanistan.

Within this mode of terrorism, the US policies in Afghanistan and Iraq are creating breeding grounds for supporters and sympathisers of these groups who are increasingly seen to be challenging US oppression towards Muslims. At the same time, in states like Pakistan, there is a proactive policy to isolate them from their support base. It is this policy, which has led the Pakistan army to enter the tribal belt of the country for the first time since Independence. However, after sending a strong military message to the tribals in the form of military action, the military has realized the need to adopt a more fruitful policy of pacification through reward and punishment so that the locals hand over the foreigners in their midst. The problem has, however, been aggravated on three counts: one, the local hospitality tradition of the tribes whereby they give sanctuary to any one seeking it; two, many of the foreigners have been in the area since the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan and have married into local families; and, three, the violations by US forces of Pakistan's sovereignty through military action on Pakistani territory. This creates a political issue domestically for the Pakistan government and undermines the credibility of the military in the operational area.

II – The second trend in terms of terrorism is the local, sub national extremist groups that are prevalent across many regions. In Pakistan, for example, there has been the problem of sectarian terrorism and the state had begun outlawing many groups linked to this, much before September 11, 2001. However, with a focus on transnational extremist groups, the sectarian problem has tended to take second place with the result that it has become exacerbated once again. Also, Al-Qaeda has fed into this problem directly by creating linkages between itself and some of the extremist Sunni groups. The same

has happened in southeast Asia in countries like Indonesia where local terrorist groups have gained a new revival with the Al-Qaeda label. In Iraq also one is seeing the linkages between local Iraqi resistance and Al-Qaeda.

One of the most violent subnational, separatist insurgencies was the LTTE movement of the Hindu Tamils in Sri Lanka. Initially, the Tamils got support from India but over the years India suffered the backlash of this – culminating in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. While a peace process brokered by the Norwegian government gave some hope that this over 18 years conflict would finally be resolved, at present uncertainty prevails. Over 64,000 civilians, security force personnel, and LTTE cadres have died so far in this conflict – which saw the emergence of suicide bombers as an integral part of the Tamil strategy.

III – The third terrorist trend is that of state terrorism. This has become more acute in the post-9/11 period with the US declaring its pre-emptive doctrine, invading Iraq without a UN resolution and lending support to the Sharon policy of political assassinations. Strong regional powers like India have also claimed for themselves the right of pre-emption. Even before 9/11, the issue of state terrorism dominated the discourse on Palestine and Kashmir. The international community has shown no inclination to deal with this aspect of global terrorism. Yet one of the major factors aggravating the terrorist threat across the globe is the linkage between these three broad trends.

Future Terrorist Threats

It is already becoming clear that terrorism is going to be the new unconventional war to confront the international community. The present effort to deal with terrorism through military means and the curtailment of domestic political liberties has proven to be inadequate – especially in denying political space to the terrorists. Part of the problem is that these policies have been accompanied by aggressive external policies of the US and its allies, especially towards the Islamic world. Furthermore, perceptions within the Islamic World of being targeted by the West have also been growing – especially as a result of developments in Europe and the fallout of the US occupation of Iraq. It is not only at the politico-military level that the civil societies of the Muslim World are sensing a growing targeting of themselves and their religion. At the socio-cultural level also, especially within the migrant communities of Western Europe, there is a growing cleavage between the Muslim immigrants and the indigenous populations. Polarisation is becoming more evident in European states with large Muslim migrant populations. Intolerance on the part of many of the

right-wing European establishments further aggravates the situation as has been reflected in the blasphemous cartoons' issue.

Within this milieu, the extremists find ready recruits, so one is bound to see the political space of what could be future terrorists increasing, especially in the West itself. As has already been seen, the new Muslim radicals are neither primarily from the Muslim World nor are they Madrassah educated. Instead, as the July 2005 London bombings showed, the terrorists were British Muslims. Although efforts have been made to attribute their terrorist leanings to their brief stay in Pakistan, the fact is that they were marginalised within their own British societies. Even the 9/11 terrorists were Western educated. So for the future one will see a growing threat of terrorism coming from within Western societies as their migrant communities feel targeted and/or marginalised. The issue is primarily politico-social and requires an effort to focus on root causes so that potential terrorists never realise that potential and, instead, are coopted into the mainstream. This means that the war on terrorism has to have a new direction and emphasis.

In fact, a more holistic approach is required to deal with the terrorist threat which is going to be with us for the future because of the ease with which destruction can be caused, especially in modern, technologically-advanced societies. In this context it serves no purpose to give religious labels to what are essentially acts of political terror. There is no "Islamic terrorism" just as there was no "Catholic" or "Christian terrorism" when the IRA and Ulster Unionists were carrying out their violent struggles and before the IRA became an accepted political dialogue partner of the British state. After all, Al-Qaeda is not proselytising for Islam. However irrational, theirs is a political agenda which has expanded from getting the US out of Arab lands to a wider conflict with the US. So if the Vatican was not held responsible for the excesses of the IRA in Northern Ireland, then Islam cannot be held responsible for the actions of Muslims using violence to achieve their political goals. In fact, by bringing in Islam into the equation of terrorism, the West itself is merely creating potential new support sources for these groups amongst Muslim communities, just as the UK did for the Catholics of the US – many of Irish descent – who lined up to provide assistance to the IRA for many decades.

The framing of what are basically political struggles, in religious terms has hardly helped in dealing with the problems in terms of seeking a sustainable solution. It may make demonisation of the enemy easier, but it will hardly create the environment for conflict resolution. And the argument that the 'Islamic' terrorists cannot be

dealt with rationally because they glorify martyrdom makes no sense, because one of the largest number of suicide bombings have been by Hindu Tamils in Sri Lanka, who had committed massive acts of violence against innocent civilians and had been put on the list of terrorist organisations by many countries across the globe.

Nor does it help understand the issue of terrorism better by talking in terms of a “clash of civilisations” in terms of an “Islam” versus the rest context. Huntington’s emotive ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis added the intellectual force for this mind-set and 9/11 has provided the final ‘proof’ of this thesis! But the lines were drawn much earlier on. As Sandra Mackey wrote in 1996:

*‘The very term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ was given common coinage at the zenith of the Iranian revolution. Since then it has grabbed and held an American public emotionally scarred by military casualties and civilian hostages in Lebanon; violence inflicted against Westerners by Islamic militants in Algeria and Egypt; fear engendered by the shadowy group that detonated a bomb in New York’s World Trade Center; and anger roused by the endless slogans of Islamic zealots that damn the West. Regardless of the range of grievances and geography of militant Islamic groups, the American mind sees the Islamic Republic of Iran as the fount of Islamic extremism’.*²⁴

There is a basic flaw in this thesis in that it creates artificial monoliths of an Islamic civilization, a Western civilization and so on. Facts on the ground reveal the contrary. For instance, there is a diversity amongst the Western and Christian worlds. Just as Christian states come in many cultural and geographical dimensions – ranging from Latin America to Europe to Asia – so do Western ‘secular’ democracies. There is a whole political framework now being accepted that Islam has replaced Communism as the major threat to ‘Western’ civilisation - especially the underlying concept of ‘secularism’ on which this civilisation supposedly rests. Yet the fact of the matter is that this is nothing more than a dangerous myth. So-called Western secularism is simply a reflection of Christian values.²⁵

²⁴ Sandra Mackey, *The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation*, New York: Plume Publishing, 1996. p. 384.

²⁵ To begin with, secularism refers to a belief ‘that the state, morals, education etc. should be independent of religion’ (*Chambers English Dictionary*). Yet in most Western states this is not the case - Christian values pervade their legal and moral belief systems even at the level of the state. At a very basic level, all Western states claiming to be secular - be they Northern European or North American - belie this claim when they only declare Christian holidays as national holidays. Even though people of other beliefs can claim their religious holidays, these are seen as special concessions whereas the Christian holidays are for the whole nation/country. Beyond this, the degree of ‘secularism’ really varies from state to state and

However, the intent in this paper is not to show the long list of abuse of Muslims at different levels in the international system today. The point is that on the ground it is Muslims who are under threat because of their religion. But coming to the point of this so-called 'clash of civilizations' focusing on Islam. There really is no one monolithic 'Islamic' civilization. Islam binds many diverse civilizations together through a religious bond. However, beyond that, which 'Islamic' civilization is in clash with the West? After all, Islam ranges from North Africa to East Asia and there is even an OIC member in Latin America – Surinam. Now the civilization of Muslim Nigeria is totally diverse from the civilization of Pakistan in Southwest Asia or Malaysia further to the East. The Arab world's cultural and historical legacies, which build its civilizational identity, are diverse from the Iranian civilization and the Turkish civilization ... and so on. So to talk of a clash of the West with an 'Islamic' civilization makes absolutely no sense. In other words, there are many socio-political civilizations that have embraced Islam as a religion in the same way as other

religious prejudices at the state level come to the fore every time traditional norms are challenged.

Many northern European countries consistently show their Christian credentials in the manner in which the law is applied to other religions - especially the Muslims. Take the case of Britain. Their Queen is the head of the Church of England and for an heir to the British throne marrying even a member of another Christian sect is a road fraught with difficulties, let alone marrying into another faith. More ominous is the fact that the British Blasphemy law (it still exists) deals only with Christianity. In other words, you may blaspheme all you want against Islam - the law will not apply! Given that there is an increasing Muslim British population, one would have assumed that the British legal system would have begun to treat all its citizens equally! As for France - the whole controversy surrounding the scarf issue revealed the religious bias of the French State. Somehow French 'secularism' was not threatened by Christian schoolgirls wearing crucifixes around their necks, but when Muslim schoolgirls wore scarves on their heads, the state's educational system felt itself threatened! Prejudicial revelations like these show that it is the European psyche that is still so heavily burdened with the legacy of the Crusades that it now finds Islam an easy substitute-threat, with the demise of Communism. As for Eastern Europe, their whole struggle against Communism was church-centred, so the aftermath has naturally seen persecution of the Muslims, which reached new heights of barbarity in Serbia. A similar picture was revealed in February 2002 in the Indian State of Gujarat. However, while the persecution of whole ethnic Muslim populations has gained new heights after the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of Communism in Eastern Europe, Muslims in Europe have had to face systematic persecution at the hands of European governments for a while now. For instance, the Greek State aided and abetted Greek Cypriots in their genocidal policy of *Enosis*, which entailed the mass killings of Turkish Cypriots. The remains of mass graves can be seen in what is now the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. The most recent reflection of this prejudice against Muslims and Islam has been reflected in the US policy towards the Muslims taken prisoners in Afghanistan during the War on Terrorism and kept confined in Guantanamo Bay Cuba. Whereas international law relating to war and prisoners of war was strictly followed even for the Nazis in the Nuremberg Trials and presently in the trial of the Serbian leaders, for the Guantanamo Bay prisoners no such laws are being accepted by the US government. Even at the micro level, when a criminal in the West happens to be a Muslim, this becomes the central point to be emphasized – as if Islam is responsible for his criminal bent. Yet, if a Christian commits a crime, the religious factor is left out.

equally different civilizations have embraced Christianity. Even Confucianism cannot be confined to China, given the Confucian influence across East Asia. Perhaps the closest that one can talk of monolithic religio-political civilizations are the Hindu and Zionist civilizations – and both have shown an extremism and intolerance of diversities and other religious groupings.

The Linkage Between Globalisation and Terrorism

A major source of an increasing terrorist threat is the globalisation that is taking place today. Globalisation has increased the ability of obscure groups to use violence and gain international focus. Communications have allowed groups to link up and global transfer of funds has allowed the funding of groups in one part of the world by groups in other parts in a matter of hours or days. So just as the international community has come together to share information and strategies to deal with the terrorist problem, extremist groups and fringe elements in different societies have developed the ability to support each other and share information and finances.

Beyond this, globalisation itself is a growing source of terrorism, especially by disgruntled elements of different types in differing societies. To understand the impact of globalization, one needs to be clear what one means by the term itself. For the purposes of this paper, Stanley Hoffman's typology of 'globalization' is used, in order to try and understand what the West means by globalization, and to examine what, if any, is the linkage between this phenomenon and Islamism. Stanley Hoffmann has identified three types of globalization: economic, cultural and political.²⁶

The first – *economic globalization* – is a reality in terms of economic interdependence across nations, which is defined by certain rules of the game created by the powerful, but which are enshrined in international institutional frameworks such as the IMF, the IBRD (World Bank) and now the WTO – with other international norms flowing from these agreements. Here the clash, as is being witnessed increasingly, is between the haves and have-nots of the world. It is the economic disparities created by economic globalization that has created great inequalities between and within states, so that the clash has come from those who have suffered deprivation and injustice as a result of the policies and demands of international economics.

Hoffmann's second category – *cultural globalization* – is seen as originating from technological and economic globalization which has

²⁶ Stanley Hoffmann, "The Clash of Globalizations", in *Foreign Affairs* July/August 2002. P 107.

led to the efforts to uniformise the world civil societies by selling what is basically an American-dominated Western culture as a universal culture – what many refer to as the ‘McDonaldisation’ of the world. So, the conflict here comes from those wishing to retain global diversity and local cultures. The clash here again comes from those seeking to resist being overwhelmed by the forces of global economics and “global” culture. Hence one has seen a resurgence of local cultures and languages and a condemnation of efforts at global uniformity as being one more attempt to assert American hegemony.

Which brings one to the third Hoffmann category – that of *political globalization*. This is reflected in the prevalence of one sole superpower – in politico-military terms – that is the US. Post-9/11, this aspect of globalization has come to dominate, with the US embracing economic issues also within a politico-military framework. Also, with the US moving towards increasingly unilateralist interventionism in the world, international norms and treaties created over the decades stand threatened. In many ways, the post-9/11 trend towards political globalization within the US unilateralist mode will threaten economic and cultural globalization – since it will push a global agenda through national power rather than international cooperation.

In all three Hoffman typologies, one can find a link between globalization and terrorism. To begin with, there is now very clearly the growth of transnational terrorism whereby different groups across the globe interact and learn from each other – as well as cooperating with each other. Just as states and civil societies have become more interlinked, so have marginalised groups with political agendas who feel left out of the mainstream processes; or who have reductionist agendas in the era of globalization. Nor are these links new – they have been there for decades, with the Red Brigade in Europe having their liaison with the PLO and so on. Nor was religion the binding force. Rather it was a common perception of struggling against the Establishment and against perceived injustices – all political goals.

So, as the mainstream international system has become more globalised, so has terrorism – especially with the advent of the internet and global electronic media through satellite. This is now the age of ‘netwar’, a term used by Bruce Hoffman to describe, ‘an emerging mode of conflict and crime at societal levels, involving measures short of traditional war, in which the protagonists use network forms of organisation and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age.’²⁷ Also, with the technical barriers broken to create global access, the weapon of the weak has

²⁷ Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism Trends and prospects”, in Ian Lesser, et al, eds. *Countering The New Terrorism*. Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1999. P.47.

become transnational – from the protests that accompany meetings of the powerful states and institutions like the IMF and IBRD to the most extreme form that led to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

Also, the marginalization of many developing states and groups within developed states as a result of the three strains of globalization, identified above, have created more dissensions in civil societies and states across the globe. Terrorism has been one of the fallouts – as a weapon of the weak. The North-South divide has been further aggravated by global economic developments with the countries of the South being polarised between the haves and have-nots divide within their own countries as well as the developed-underdeveloped global divide. From the bread riots of 1976 in Egypt to the anti-IMF riots across continents inhabited by developing states, survival is the major issue for the man in the street. To make matters worse, people in these states see their natural resources being controlled by outside forces and with the state losing control over critical decisions. Nowhere is this clearer than over strategic resources like oil.

Even in developed states, there are groups who feel marginalised and out of the mainstream because they are no longer in control of their economic destinies. Hence the growth of radical, anti-global trends and ideologies both in the West and in the under-developed world. Radicalism of multiple types is growing as globalization continues in the direction it is going. This radicalism is not particularly 'Islamic' in nature – it finds its expression in neo-Nazi movements in the West, in the rise of fundamentalist forces in countries like India and in Muslim states, turning to religion becomes the norm because religion still continues to play an important part in the lives of people in this part of the world. When that religion is perceived as being abused by groups in states where the governments are not prepared to take legal action against the guilty, then frustration and anger spills over into violence and this rages across national borders.

Add to this the Western control of global communications and the economic anger and frustration is given a cultural expression through the rejection of the trend towards trying to compel global cultural expression in Western terms. When events are also interpreted through a particular prism in terms of news and current affairs language then the dialectical pulls in non-Western societies become further exacerbated.

Finally, the political-military globalization which in effect is a new type of imperialism, is now reflected most clearly in the new US National Security Strategy that seeks to justify a military preemptive unilateralism on the part of the US across the globe. Mr. Bush

proclaimed, at West Point on June 1, 2002, 'Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense', reflecting clearly a 'no-bounds' global agenda.

What has further aggravated the terrorist threat today is that terrorism has also become the instrument of the powerful states – from the US to Israel to India. And all acts of terror – barring pathological violence – have a political framework not a religious, proselytising one.

All in all, in the future the problem of terrorism is going to become aggravated because of the growing political space still being available to terrorists. Globalisation has also created many levels of the threat with linkages amongst these levels.

What Can be Done to Counter the Multifaceted Terrorist Threat

Simply barricading oneself against the terrorist threat will not work. In other words, for the developed states to think they can barricade themselves from the rest of the world is unrealistic. Globalisation, both economic and in terms of culture and ideas, is increasing movement between goods and people so fundamental liberties need to be maintained and these make all societies more vulnerable. That is why there is a need to focus on the root causes of terrorism, not simply the symptoms. In this, political dialogue and peaceful resolution of conflicts become essential tools with which to fight terrorism.

Rami Khouri has rightly pointed out that the world needs to accept "three important but uncomfortable facts" if it wants to achieve substantive results against terrorism and not just "feel-good revenge".²⁸

First, the Arab-Asian world, primarily Islamic, is the "heartland and major wellspring of the spectacular global terror attacks of recent years." That is why the reasons for this have to be tackled intelligently. According to Khouri, "*The most important and recurring historical root cause of terror in, and from, the Arab-Asian region is the home-grown sense of indignity, humiliation, denial and degradation that has plagued many of (the) young men and women.*" Because the governments and societies of the region have been unable to come to grips with this, space has been allowed to states like Israel, the US and Britain to send in their armies to deal with the misperceived problems and disastrously faulty analyses.²⁹

²⁸ Rami G. Khouri, "Needed: A Global Strategy to Reduce, Not Increase, Terror", in *Daily Star* (Beirut, Lebanon), September 8, 2004.

²⁹ Ibid.

Second, Khouri points out that terrorism is a global phenomenon that also emanates from non-Islamic regions in the world which are not linked to Arab or the Islamic Middle East. That is why local environments and causes have to be understood, rather than linking everything to “a single, global Islamic militant ideology that is fuelled by hatred for America.” There are, in fact, historical causes that have allowed terrorism to emerge over a period of time so it is important to address the different local root causes of terror.³⁰

Three, the existing Israeli and US policy of fighting terror militarily, which is also being adopted increasingly by other governments, can, at best, have only limited and temporary success. Especially in the case of suicide bombers, you cannot deter someone who wishes to kill himself or herself, by threatening to kill them. According to Khouri, the British experience in Northern Ireland is one of the best contemporary examples of how “an intelligent, inclusive political response effectively brought an end to the terror that harsh police and military methods on their own could not stop.”³¹

There is also a need to ensure that just and legitimate liberation and self-determination causes do not become victims of the war against terrorism. After all, so many of yesterday’s “terrorists” are today venerated as freedom fighters and national heroes. That is why the war on terrorism has to be redefined within the issue’s proper political and social milieu – rather than continuing down the path of a narrowly-defined, primarily militaristic operational framework which not only failed to deny space to the terrorists but is creating increasing space for future terrorists.

Also, in an effective war against terrorism, a major prerequisite is to stop talking in terms of ‘Islamic terrorism’. Otherwise, mainstream Muslims will feel marginalised and victimised because of their religion and the global spread of Islam will then create what one assumes one is seeking to avoid: a clash between Islam and the US and its allies. As Dr Waseem points out, there is a danger of constructing a new collectivity: *‘the world of Islam ... is increasingly understood as a bunch of Muslim states that shared the broadest denominational identity with the terrorist groups. This is a grim indicator of the fact that the contemporary world is passing through the fateful process of the crystallisation of an Islamic identity sans culture and tradition, history and geography, language and literature as well as public and private behaviour patterns. Here is the construction of the ‘other’*

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

*going on in a massive way.*³² This is a most dangerous reductionism. Just as the West, led by the US, made an expedient use of Islam as a policy instrument, in the 80s, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, so it is now trying to make the same expedient use of 'Islamic terrorism' as an instrument of policy.

There is also a very real need to study the root causes of the problem of terrorism. Military power may deal with the immediate problem, but it can only aggravate the long-term threat. At the political level, the issues of Palestine and Kashmir need to be resolved in a manner committed to by the international community. Within this context, where deomcratisation has taken place, the results of that democratisation must also be accepted.

At the economic level, globalization has to proceed in a manner in which groups and states feel less marginalised and where more equitable norms apply – so as to give all states a 'level playing field'. For instance, while Europe and the US continue to subsidize agriculture in different forms, it only creates resentments to have the IMF and IBRD tell developing countries to remove all traces of agricultural subsidies. Again, access to markets is critical for developing states as is freedom of movement of professionals – given that the service sector has been brought under the trade regime.

The problem of marginalization of groups within states and of states within the system needs to be addressed. What is needed is not a forceful attempt at compelling the world to become an artificial monolith economically, politically and culturally. Unfortunately, that is what the US is presently attempting to do through its National Security Strategy in which preemption is justified on many counts ranging from ridding certain states of their weapons of mass destruction and what the US sees as unacceptable governments to imposing the free market economy and capitalism on the world at large. The heterogeneity of the world has to be recognized by the powerful and adapted to.

The fear of Islam as a powerful global force has to be replaced by an acceptance of this reality. Just as the world has learnt to live with a military super power, there is a need for this super power and its allies to accept the spiritual power of Islam for people across the globe. Cultural and political pluralism have to be accepted with greater force even as economic globalization cannot be stayed. If Islam continues to come under the sort of attack one is seeing in the


³² Mohammed Waseem, "Observations on the Terrorist Attacks in New York and Washington" at a Symposium on 11 September, 2001, *Terrorism, Islam and the West, in Ethnicities, Vol. 2(2)*. London: Sage Publications, 2002, p. 139.

Western media and amongst Western political circles, then Muslims of all shades will feel under threat and react. In fact, the debate on terrorism has to rid itself of the Islamic context, if it is to get anywhere substantive. The context of terrorism is political and that is the starting point in dealing with the issue. By removing terrorism from this false, religious context, dealing with the terrorists – including isolating them – will become much easier for states, especially Muslim states.

Perhaps the most critical need for dealing with the problem of terrorism is to break the cycle of violence at the correct phase. The Oxford Research Group (ORG), in a Briefing Paper on *'The War on Terrorism: 12-month audit and future strategy options'* (September 2002), has identified seven stages in the 'classic cycle of violence' which they assert has been evident in the Palestine-Israeli conflict as well as in the different Yugoslav regional conflicts. The seven stages begin after the act of terror which leads to 'shock terror' and on to 'fear pain' then 'grief' and on to 'anger' and then 'bitterness' leading to 'revenge' and 'retaliation' and the cycle goes on as another act of violence is set in motion (See Figures I & II). The post-9/11 'War on Terrorism' can also be analysed within this classic cycle. The ORG suggests that in order to break this cycle, intervention is needed at the stage of 'anger' so that it does not go on to revenge and retaliation. Instead, a peace-keeping or peace-making intervention at the anger stage, followed by a series of other actions to contain violence through protection, deweaponisation, rule of law, bridge building, etc. can help undermine the cycle of violence (See Figure III).


Without adopting a holistic global strategy to deal with the problem of terrorism, which focuses on root causes and politico-social measures to accompany the military means, the international community will allow the terrorists continuing, if not an increasing political space.

Figure I



Source: Paul Rogers & Scilla Elworthy, *The 'War on Terrorism': 12 – month audit and future strategy options*, Oxford Research Group, Briefing Paper, September 2002.


Figure II



Source: Paul Rogers & Scilla Elworthy, *The 'War on Terrorism': 12 – month audit and future strategy options*, Oxford Research Group, Briefing Paper, September 2002.

Figure III

Transforming the Cycle of Violence



Source: Paul Rogers & Scilla Elworthy, *The 'War on Terrorism': 12 – month audit and future strategy options*, Oxford Research Group, Briefing Paper, September 2002.

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ANALYSIS ON FUTURE OF TERRORISM ROLE OF UN, NATO AND EU IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

Asst. Sec. Gen. John COLSTON (UK)¹



Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am John Colston, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning of NATO's International Staff.

I am responsible for the work of NATO Headquarters' Terrorism Task Force, the TTF, which was set up in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of September 2001 to lend additional urgency and coherence to the Alliance's contribution to the fight against terrorism. NATO's actions in the fight against terrorism are being coordinated through the TTF.

It is a particular pleasure for me to be here today, the second time following the opening ceremony of the Centre of Excellence-Defence against Terrorism. I would like to thank the

¹ John Colston joined the NATO International Staff as Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning in September 2003. From 2000 to 2003 he had served as the Command Secretary to the UK Commander-in-Chief Fleet in Northwood and Portsmouth, responsible for Planning, Policy and Resourcing of the Operational Command of the Royal Navy. From 1996 to 2000, he served on secondment to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office as Defence Counsellor to the UK Delegation to NATO/WEU, during preparations for the Washington Summit and the Kosovo Campaign. John Colston joined the UK Ministry of Defence in 1976. His previous appointments have included the Head of the UK MOD's Central Resources and Programmes Division (1993-1996); Director of Finance for the UK Trident Project (1990-1993); Assistant Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence (1988-1990); Policy Team Leader on UK Relations with NATO and the WEU (1987-1998); Senior Administrative Officer in the Sovereign Base Areas Administration, Cyprus (1984-1987); and Assistant Director, Nuclear Policy from 1982-1984. Earlier appointments included support to Defence Ministers; Force Planning in support of NATO and Industrial Relations in the UK in the MOD. John Colston was born in Reading, England and educated in Bristol and at Oxford University, where he took a degree in English. His wife (Eileen) is a teacher; they have three children.

Turkish authorities for organising this symposium; and I would applaud more generally the energy and sense of purpose which this Centre of Excellence is bringing to its important work. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your invitation.

For me, there is a special satisfaction in taking part in this event since, as its title suggests, it is very appropriately based on the recognition that the fight against terrorism depends on international cooperation: The problem, terrorism, being global, the answer needs to be international.

I should like to offer a brief general account of NATO's evolving stance in the fight against terrorism; say a word about some of the principal aspects of our current work; and make some suggestions about areas where I believe more should be done.

Before September 2001, terrorism did not feature prominently on NATO's agenda. NATO had – notably in the Strategic Concept agreed at the Washington Summit in 1999 – recognised terrorism as one of a class of new risks to the security interests of the Allies that had appeared since the end of the Cold War, but Allies gave it little collective attention. In the years before 2001, some Allies, including Turkey, had direct and acutely painful experience of terrorism. But even these countries did not press for active involvement by the Alliance in their counter-terrorism endeavours. Before 2001, there was little political discussion of the nature and source of terrorism, and even less attention to drawing out the implications of terrorism for the Alliance's concepts, political initiatives, or military structures and capabilities.

But all this changed dramatically on 11 September 2001. Within 24 hours, the NATO Allies invoked, for the first time in its history, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. A NATO Ally had come under armed attack and the Allies collectively confirmed their determination to respond.

Although the invocation of Article 5 had and continues to have a practical impact, its primary value was I believe political: demonstrating the solidarity of the Allies in the face of the terrorist threat. That solidarity remains critically important.

Defence against terrorism is and will remain high on NATO's agenda. Our work is multi-faceted. At their Summit meeting in Istanbul in June 2004, NATO Heads of State and Government reaffirmed their commitment to the struggle against terrorism and committed themselves to strengthening NATO's efforts, in particular by enhancing the effectiveness of Operation Active Endeavour, our counter-terrorism maritime surveillance operation in the Mediterranean; improving intelligence sharing; and reinforcing our

cooperation with our partners. We are implementing these decisions and are working in the perspective of the Riga Summit, on how to build on NATO's strengths.

Let me first of describe in general terms what NATO is doing. I will then elaborate on some of the main activities and discuss why international cooperation is important in this fight.

NATO seeks to generate strategic consensus through consultations and exchanges among Allies and with partners on a common understanding of, and united stance against, terrorism. It aims at creating the largest possible front against terrorists through its partnerships and cooperation with other international organisations; it has reviewed nearly all its concepts and plans to take account of the evolving threat; it is conducting operations that, in one sense or another, are a response to the threat to terrorism; it is preparing for consequence management and is developing necessary capabilities relevant to the fight against terrorism. I should also mention the work conducted on the economic aspects of terrorism and scientific cooperation against it. In sum, NATO has a multi-faceted approach building on its strengths and on international cooperation.

Let me highlight some particular aspects of these activities.

Consultations and exchanges: Our consultations do not only involve 26 Allies, but also 46 EAPC, 7 Mediterranean Dialogue and 6 ICI partners and Russia and Ukraine through the NRC and NUC. This network of partnerships provides an extremely useful tool to address, together with countries coming from different geographical regions, cultures and faith, all the aspects of the fight against terrorism and to express solidarity against it.

With respect to concepts: at the Summit in Prague in November 2002, the Alliance's Heads of State and Government approved a concept for defence against terrorism, a concept that remains in force and is being reflected in subordinate concepts and doctrines. Among other important features:

It states that the Alliance's forces must be ready to deter, disrupt, prevent and defend against terrorist attacks – including by acting against terrorists and those who harbour them;

It directs that the Alliance must be ready to deploy its forces for these purposes wherever that might be necessary – without a geographical limitation (a demand that put a definite end to the old out-of-area debate);

It directs Alliance forces to stand ready to assist national authorities – on request – in coping with the consequences of terrorist attacks; and

It indicates that Alliance assets and capabilities will be available to other international organisations for operations against terrorism.

Important aspects of this concept have also been reflected in the newly agreed Comprehensive Political Guidance which will govern NATO's planning activities for the next 10 to 15 years

On operations: This is an area where NATO has a unique capability. Operation Active Endeavour, NATO's first operation launched under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, has been conducted successfully since October 2001, now in the whole Mediterranean Sea. Beyond its operational value, it also serves to involve partners in NATO's operational activities against terrorism. We are negotiating the modalities for receiving contributions from Russia, Ukraine, Algeria, Morocco, Israel, Georgia and Albania. ISAF was not launched under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, but it should be considered in the context of NATO's contribution to the fight against terrorism, through stabilisation. KFOR is also providing an indirect contribution to this fight. I should like to add to this list NATO's support to specific Allies to ensure the security of high visibility events such as summit meetings and other activities.

On capabilities: As you know, the adaptation of Alliance military capabilities to the new threats and risks we face is a continuing challenge. We are meeting this challenge in a number of ways, including through the creation of the NATO Response Force, the modernisation of the command structure, and the pursuit of particular capabilities through force planning, the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the Programme of Work of the Conference of National Armaments Directors. Part of this development of new capabilities concerns terrorism.

Alliance's defence planning mechanisms have been adapted to the specific requirements, as we understand them, of defence against terrorism; and we are eager to draw lessons from ongoing operations – for example with respect to force protection.

As I have mentioned, this is a multi-fronted endeavour which builds on NATO's strengths.

Against this background, I should like to elaborate on the importance of international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

It was striking and heartening to see, in the days immediately following the attacks in Washington and New York, how the various cooperation institutions of the Alliance – the EAPC, the predecessor to the NATO Russia Council, and the NUC – also joined the Allies in condemning the attacks.

As I have mentioned earlier, we continue to work closely with our Partners. In addition, we are working to deepen our cooperation with

the EU, the UN, and the OSCE – as well as with specialised agencies like EUROCONTROL.

Underlying this is a recognition that a threat like terrorism requires a broad response. While most cooperation between governments will necessarily be bilateral and primarily among law enforcement and intelligence agencies, international organisations have an important coordinating role among their members but also among themselves.

I think that there are two basic reasons that clearly demonstrate why international cooperation is needed:

First is that all nations and international organisations taking part in the fight against terrorism should have a common vision of a threat which casts a shadow on our societies and our future. In this context, we are following very closely the difficult discussions held within the United Nations with a view to reaching an agreement on a common definition of terrorism, which, unfortunately, does not send the right signals to public opinion in general and to terrorists in particular. I frankly believe that we need to fight against terrorism, against all persons and networks making use of terrorist methods regardless of their motivation - - political, religious, economic or social. Frank and close consultations is the sine qua non condition of arriving at such a common vision and one should not await other terrorist atrocities to arrive at such a vision.

Second, we need to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts in our response to terrorism because duplication not only wastes scarce resources but also presents the risk of confusion of strategies and even of goals. NATO certainly claims no monopoly or preeminence in the struggle against terrorism; it rather favours a concerted approach of all the international players drawing on their respective advantages and strengths.

It is clearly recognized in NATO that the UN, the principal norm-setting institution and source of legitimacy for international action, the EU with important political and economic tools at its disposal, and the OSCE with its broad membership and expertise in relevant domains, all have an important role to play and responsibility in promoting the international community's response to terrorism.

We should create the best synergy between these players. We have no time or energy to waste on institutional niceties. The cost of learning lessons has been extremely high in the fight against terrorism. I am saying this as a citizen of the United Kingdom here in an Allied country which has also suffered very much from terrorism and I hope that others shall not have to pay such a heavy bill. This is exactly why we are making all these efforts in NATO and together with partners and other international organisations.

To conclude Mr. Chairman, to the question of “are we doing what needs to be done both in NATO and with others”, my answer would be a qualified yes. But this is not enough. We should consult more closely, we should ensure better intelligence and assessment sharing, we should better coordinate our efforts, and we should give a stronger public message that we will remain united against terrorism and fight it as long as necessary. Continued vigilance is required. I am afraid that, despite our efforts, we will be painfully surprised and we need to think harder about and prepare for the worst cases. But I am also confident that at the end we will win.

Thank you for your attention and I stand ready for your questions.

FOURTH SESSION

OPEN DISCUSSION ON “CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM AND ITS IMPACTS”, EVALUATIONS OF MODERATORS OF THE FIRST THREE SESSIONS AND PRESENTATION OF THE SYMPOSIUM RESULTS BY THE RAPPOORTEURS



SPEAKERS	
Mr. Ercan ÇİTLİOĞLU	TURKEY
Prof. Dr. Michelle Van CLEAVE	USA
Prof. Dr. Ali DOĞRAMACI	TURKEY
B. E. Shunji YANAI	JAPAN
(Ret) Gen. Edip BAŞER	TURKEY
Prof. Dr. Rob De WIJK	NETHERLANDS
Prof. Dr. Ersin ONULDURAN	TURKEY
Assoc. Prof. Türel YILMAZ	TURKEY
Assoc. Prof. Çınar ÖZEN	TURKEY
Assoc. Prof. Mustafa KİBAROĞLU	TURKEY

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“AN ASSESSMENT OF ENVISAGED COOPERATION AND ACTIVE COLLABORATION OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATION IN THE GLOBAL FIELD”

Mr. Ercan ÇİTLİOĞLU (TURKEY)¹



We see the anti-terrorism initiatives for formulating a common international consent and mutual cooperation have gained momentum recently. Can terrorist organizations, notwithstanding the disintegration in their motives and organizational structure, engage in similar collaborative deals or alliances well aligned with their normative values to maintain their very survival?

This rhetoric at first glance may be perceived as to resemble a utopia. The idea of terrorist organizations that employ different structures and arrangements, pursue different ideologies and agendas, and – with respect to their origins – bear differences with high risk

of conflict would ignore their disagreements and start working

¹ He was born in Dörtöy, 1943. He graduated from İstanbul University, Faculty of Economy, Institute of Journalism and Institute of Business Administrations. From 1967 to 1985 he served in Ministry of Tourism and Information and Prime Minister's Office as the Director of Research and Planning Department, Private Secretary to the Minister, Press and Information Counsellor to the Turkish Embassy in London, Deputy Director General of General Directorate of Press and Information. In 1974 he was rewarded as War Veteran at Cyprus Peacekeeping Operation. He resigned from the Civil Service in 1985 and began to work as a lecturer in the Faculty of Communication and International Relations at different Universities. He maintains his duty as a consultant for Terrorism at ASAM, is now the President of Strategic Research Center of Bahçeşehir University and he is the lecturer at International Cyprus University. From 1999 to 2003, Mr. Çitlioğlu who was the strategy adviser of NTV and CNNTURK, was the columnist at Nokta Magazine from 1998 to 2001, Financial Forum and Reference Daily Newspapers from 1999 to 2004. He maintains as a columnist at The New Anatolian and Forum newspapers as well as of Cumhuriyet Strategy. Mr. Çitlioğlu who has conversations and researches at National TV, newspapers and magazines, giving conferences at various universities both in and abroad of Turkey. Mr. Çitlioğlu has published 6 books and rewarded Man of the Year in Research field in 1980.

together for the same cause might seem as an artificial or guided suggestion.

Yet there is no evidence of a profound and scientific study on the potential response of terrorism, which itself evolves and mutates vis-à-vis global changes and maintains a surprisingly dynamic composition, to counter the international collaboration aimed at destroying it.

Should the probability that the terrorist organizations, which agree on their destructive struggle against the common enemy to achieve their objectives and goals as a result of their own subjective judgment despite the variety in enemy resources and profiles, can suspend their conflicts until the annihilation of the enemy and seek out collaboration be really considered as a utopia or should it at least be taken into consideration as an option that deserves some attention?

Whatever their ideologies and objectives the organization means the source of life, even resurrection, to the terrorist. With this in mind, can terrorists abstract themselves from their rebirth and ignore an international joint struggle that may cost them a moral death and simply accept their destiny?

One of the main reasons for a terrorist to join a terrorist group is to resist destiny designated for and imposed on him by the system. And these people assuming this fight against predestination as a way of life, would they really accept their imposed destiny without showing any resistance and allow themselves to get melted in individual struggles.

Will terrorist groups carrying out individual fights against individual systems, when these individual systems turn into an anonymous formation aimed at destroying them, continue to express individual reflexes and choose to vanish or will they form a temporary common front and exercise anonymous and organized reflexes?

One should remember that today's terrorism, which has been transformed into a perceived global threat, poses an anonymous risk that we – who unite around normative values within systems we produce and share – have to fight against. Similarly terrorists or terrorist groups who deny and fight against our system to destroy it and accept none of our normative values see us and our current system a source of threat in equal measures.

No option, even ones seen utopian, should be exempted so we can provide an impartial answer to this enduring rhetoric and perform a proper risk analysis.

In this context I'd like to shed light on two related issues – normative values and motives of the terrorists and dynamic structure of terrorism that allows mutation and change in dimension.

Terrorism is a way of expressing itself, seeking rights and justice in its own normative principles, taking revenge and also an uprising that may be caused by challenges, which represent a dynamic – not a static – case that still moves forward in its incomplete evolution and maintains its existence conditional upon changing circumstances and is unpredictable in its nature. In this regard the difficulty at providing an invariable and rational definition in this variable environment for terrorism shall be apparent.

Once we take the ever-changing metamorphosis-like nature of terrorism that continuously alters and renovates itself in addition to causing and supporting reasons into consideration one may realize that confinement of such a hyper-dynamic structure into a static definition would shortly annul the very definition.

As a result legal arrangements and sanctions would be insufficient and a definition that is incapable of fully defining terrorism in addition to legal enforcements that lack capacity would result in a vacuum, which may encourage terrorist actions instead of preventing them.

At this point it might be useful to recall the single common ground for terrorist organizations employing different structures and origins whatever their ideologies, beliefs or sects.

This common ground is that terrorists, despite all their differences, do not share a sense of belonging. The terrorist sees his fight against the order, which he describes as immoral, non-normative and unjust, to represent his origins. Terrorism promotes collective – not individual – group identity and all members of the organization, like of a sect, are to follow orders of their leader without questioning and in full obedience.

This includes abstraction from anything that is individual and seeing the group as family, cause of existence, and purpose and source of life.

Forgetting concepts symbolizing emotional ties, such as family, name and friendship, and refusing the whole values determining socio-economical status within the society, such as possession, money and social position, are deemed as preconditions to form a new identity and personality in order to refuse the sense of belongingness and the strong tie between the terrorist and the system he/she fights against; and also to possess a new identity, breaking down the bridge between the organization and the system.

People who have become members of a terrorist organization soon begin to consider the organization they have participated in as the only reason for their existence and the only factor which gives a meaning to their life, as a result of the theories and practices aiming to destroy systematically their individuality and sense of

belongingness. Within the course of time, the organization occupies such an important place inside the mind of the terrorists that being left outside the organization or, somehow, the organization's disappearance or dissolution means the end of their life and breaking up any important ties rendering them important. Because, in the eyes of this people who refuse whatever referring to the sense of belongingness and whose individualities and identities have been destroyed systematically, the organization becomes the only reason which keep them alive and bind them to life.

The organization, for terrorists believing that they could maintain their existence only within the organization's identity, gradually transforms into a lifestyle, going beyond its initial objectives; and people who have found out their reason to live within this new life now act not for their goals and ideologies but to maintain their existence, moved by their primal instincts telling that dissolution of the organization would put an end to their reason to live.

Having explained this indisputable, common point which terrorists agree on, we can return to our initial question and ask,

Could we still argue that the suggestion is utopian or rather groundless which states that these terrorists, no matter how they are different from each other, whose common point is the collective identity of their organization, could temporarily cooperate with each other against a common enemy, when an international platform for war on terrorism is formed which would end up their very existence?

Having mentioned the common ground for terrorists regarding maintaining their existence, it's also necessary to mention the dynamic structure of terrorism, which have gone through a mutation process and evolved.

The most important characteristics noted in the third wave we have observed currently is that terrorism has transformed into a general warfare against sovereign powers, by whichever justification it is employed.

These sovereign powers could be an authoritative, oligarchic or monarchic regime in a Middle East country, or in a country in the Middle or Far Asia, as well as a democratic regime in a European country such as Italy, Spain, France or Great Britain.

Or, terrorist organizations could see the sovereign and hegemonic power of today, the USA, as their target and decide to send a message through the USA, concentrating their efforts on the targets which would undermine her interests.

In this scope, it should not be seen as a quite far possibility that ideology-based terrorist organizations fighting against sovereign powers would become natural allies with separatist terrorist

organizations and they would act together in intelligence, logistics and operational issues ultimately, with a sense of common threat and danger.

Moreover, when past examples of such cooperation and solidarity among the terrorist organizations whose origins, ideologies, aims, and religions and sects are different from each other, this cooperation, or ‘the joint front against the common enemy’ which may be perceived as utopian at first, as we have mentioned, appears to be based on quite rational, not utopian, grounds.

It could even be argued that this ‘joint front against the common enemy’ idea have been in force in some respects when we remember the cooperation among the Red Brigades in Italy, Germany and Japan in the near past; logistics cooperation among the separatist IRA, ETA and the Corsican separatists; joint action practices performed by ideology-based terrorist groups in Latin American countries; and the cooperation, and a kind of “Cosa Nostra” meaning not interfering in each other’s area of domination, among Hamas, Hizbollah, Islami Jihad and al-Qaeda.

It’s quite natural for terrorist war fighters to move towards a unity of power among themselves after a while, when one remembers that terrorism has transformed into a new and covert war fighting method, and that this war fighting is, intrinsically, the most cost-effective and efficient one among others; moreover, due to its asymmetrical characteristics, it has a sophisticated striking power and a high level of mobility and above all, there is no certain authority to address it in accordance with the international law.

When it is considered that terrorists’ lack of identity and sense of belongingness, with their perception that the organization is the only reason to live, overlaps the new war fighting method used by terrorist organizations against the sovereign system through whichever justification; then the suggestion “the idea of international common front against terrorism would –if it has not already begun to – bring about the idea of joint war on terrorism” should be taken into account for the purpose of making a realistic risk analysis at this point.

At this stage it could be asserted that it’s not possible for the terrorist organizations to collaborate among themselves whose diversities are clear-cut and whose religious differences appear to be dominant over them.

As a response to this assertion, we can remind a past example that the separatist PKK terrorist organization and revengeful Armenian terror organization ASALA, despite both ethnic and religious differences and historical disputes between themselves, issued a joint declaration in Saida, Lebanon on 8 April 1980, stating that:

“...our warriors will come together with the Kurdish warriors in the near future. This would constitute our strongest weapon against the fascist Turkish regime. Down with the Turkish State, long live the joint fight of the suppressed people of Armenia and Kurdistan. Long live the solidarity among the Armenian, Arabian and Kurdish people...”

After remembering this example, it will be a genuine approach that rather than being an utopia ‘common front’ is a method conducted in the past and an experience that will be repeated against it if exposed to a common threat.

The fact that, with its horizontal structure, forming an example out of the classical terrorist organizations that has a vertical and hierarchical structure and mostly working with a franchising system, Al-Qaeda may give intelligence, logistics and action support to all the terrorist organizations in the world and that it may use the terrorist organizations as a subcontractor by financial means to reach its devastating goals will constitute the main pillar of the global treat in the future.

Why not a separatist terrorist organization PKK that declared a Marxist pronunciation and philosophy in the earlier years but that later turned to using Islamic sayings to slip out from this identification in the following years be an ally to Al-Qaeda in this context?

Or why not some terrorist organizations that need to make financial cooperation with the underground world to continue their actions use Al-Qaeda’s outstanding financial means with a subcontractor identity and make attacks?

Let’s consider together what the terrorist organizations will sacrifice to have a mini nuclear bomb and which terrorist organization will say no for example to Al-Qaeda that will provide this opportunity while anticipating something in return.

If you can answer these questions as “these can never be possible” and believe it sincerely, I will have to accept that my imagination is too broad.

But I want to finish with a question hoping that it will stay somewhere in your mind and that you will sometimes think about it.

Today, as we gathered here to reach a consensus and to formulate international struggle methods to counter terrorism which is a global threat, can we refuse the fact that the leaders of the terrorist organizations will have or can have a similar meeting somewhere in the world and can we be absolutely sure that things like that can never happen?

My regards.

EVALUATION OF THE FIRST SESSION

Assoc. Prof. Türel YILMAZ (TURKEY)

Prof. Sertaç BAŞEREN presented the paper “A Conceptual Approach To Terrorism; Historical And Legal Dimensions”. In his paper he outlined those points mentioned below:

Terrorism, which is principally a means of political struggle based on reactions, would be utilized both in domestic or foreign political affairs. Different cases utilizing terrorism pave the way for this phenomenon to diverge and to receive different characteristics.

Emergence of new kinds of terrorism with different characteristics in new groups does not necessarily mean that neither utilizing in the old groups comes to an end nor does the old kinds vanish.

Terrorism is utilized in different groups and show up with the other types of political violence.

Despite the collapse of almost all totalitarian regimes, which have constituted the major source of state terrorism, widespread persecution, state violence and human rights abuses should be seen as a sign that dictatorships have continued to facilitate state terrorism to maintain their power and existence. Principally these states utilize terrorism not only in domestic but also in foreign affairs. Although their numbers are very few, there have still been states, which sponsor terrorism. This kind of terrorism with this type of support is more destructive and difficult to deter.

Using violence for resistance against globalization bears upon global terrorism. Organizations utilizing terrorist means in this regard are not under any state's control.

They would be described as sub-state organizations and actors. Their organizational ties are very loose fitting. They try to legalize their violence by using religious aphorisms.

Terrorism has not seen a marginal saying anymore. Any kind of terrorism has in time been matured not to differentiate for target and become more destructive in effect. Likewise, terrorism against ethnic masses in the ethnic-based civil wars has proved to be the most destructive terrorism type without any comparison.

Dr. Boaz GANOR; presented a paper, “Passing through the Cold War and Terrorism”. Mr. GANOR stated out the following points in his paper:

International terrorism has put a new face on itself on 11 September 2001. After the Cold War, a more dangerous type of terrorism has emerged: "Jihadi Terrorism".

To better understand the threat, it is necessary to go back to the Russian Invasion of Afghanistan in late 1970s and early 1980s. In the above-mentioned war, many volunteers from all over the World had gone to Afghanistan to support Mujahideen.

The Islamic Radical War fighters who ended their mission have been separated into three main groups: First group stayed in Afghanistan and brought together by Usame Bin Ladin to form up Al-Qaeda. Members of the second group went back to their countries and joined the already operating local Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organizations there. (Even some of them had been in these organizations before fighting in Afghanistan) The third group members had wanted to return home, but their governments did not permit it. Upon all these, they demanded asylum from Western Countries, and this was realized. This third group disseminated their radical activities in the USA, UK, and European countries.

Mr. Michael SMITH pointed out the following remarks in his paper "Effects of Terrorism in the New Age and the Dimensions of Terrorism":

In 1970s, terrorists declared themselves (PLO, IRA, ETA) "freedom fighters". These terrorists had not been happy with the life conditions of their societies and been using violence to reach at their targets. But now, modern types of Islamic terrorists represented initially by Islamic Jihad and then Al-Qaeda are not operating for the same demands package. They do not see themselves as a part of the society.

Immediate response from Bush Administration and numerous European countries to 11 September attacks along with the Iraqi War 11, unwillingly pave the way for the recruiting campaign of Al-Kaida.

Immigrant Muslim societies in the Western Europe have been living in ghettos under poverty and poor living conditions. Young Muslims are not happy with the Western reactions to 11 September incidents and since this feeling is fed by negative conditions like unemployment, and lack of opportunities, they join Al-Qaeda.

Al-Kaida and the other radical Islamic groups use Internet to recruit potential terrorists. Then, they make email communications for ideological training and direct them towards terrorist actions.

In military sense, Al-Qaeda fights on the basis of classical guerilla doctrines and special operations tactics. They employ classical asymmetrical warfare.

Dr. Kimberley Lynn THACHUK outlined those points in her paper; "Fight Against The Sources Supporting Terrorism":

Terrorist groups, which use technological methods of our age, are more destructive than before. In this regard, international cooperation against the enemies of states has been reluctant and vulnerable.

There are three main pillars of terrorist support. The First one is financial sources; the second one is absence of criminal liability and bribery/corruption, and third one is community support/passive approval.

Terrorists have been into several efforts to afford their daily expenditures. Thus, they have succeeded to create important financial sources. (Blackmail, trafficking of narcotics and arms, crooking, money laundry, etc.) Although there are no certain official records, it is so clear that they have serious amount of financial incomes.

In this regard, Dr. Thachuk suggested those points:

To form an international dialogue is necessary in order to generate a legal cooperation to prosecute and arrest the terrorists for their criminal activities,

Bribery/corruption is an important means for the terrorists to gain support from officials. States should make efforts to eliminate bribery in the private and public sectors.

Prof. Dr. Ali KARAOSMANOĞLU; evaluated Al-Qaeda and PKK cases in his paper "Dimensions Of Global Terrorism And Lessons Learned".

It has not been reached to a consensus on an internationally recognized definition of terrorism.

Terrorism is a political issue and violence is used to achieve the political target.

Many people see al-Kaida as a religious Nihilist organization without a long-term strategy and political end state.

To the Al-Qaeda militants, their own defeat does not show the victory of enemy. They even believe that it shows the weakness of enemy who tries to cover up his spiritual disadvantage by using high technology. This logic shows us that Al-Qaeda militants have been motivated by their religious dogmas originated from marginal analysis of Islamic organizations.

But, it does not prove that Al-Qaeda has no political goals as an organization.

Usame Bin Laden's ideology has been tailored by Selefi Mucahid Movement: His goal is firstly, to make free all Muslim lands from the hands of non-Muslims; secondly, to unite all Muslim lands by terminating the nation states like Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the others; thirdly, and the ultimate goal is to reestablish the Caliphate.

The goal of PKK terrorist organization has been always a political one. It was established in 1970s as a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist organization.

Its goal has been to establish a democratic united Kurdish state in the southeastern region of Turkey.

PKK, in time, has become a typical trans-border terrorist organization, which has numerous connections in Europe and the Middle East. It has been supported actively by regional and European governments as well as civil organizations. Its financial base has been in Western Europe.

Since Syria provided this terrorist organization with shelter and training facilities, PKK has become more active and mobilized in mid 1980s. In this regard, it has performed numerous bloody terrorist activities. Eventually, Prof. Karaosmanoğlu points out that:

Our experiences confirm the Clausewitz paradigm's suitability on our fight against terrorism. Classical strategic thinking should not be blamed for solid ethical and strategic approaches or unsuitable strategies adopted in fighting terrorism. Clausewitz's theoretical outline helps us to conceive openly what has changed or not and what the continuity and the interruption is.

EVALUATION OF THE SECOND SESSION

Assoc. Prof. Çınar ÖZEN

Co-chairmen to the second session which was held on Thursday afternoon, 23 March 2006 were (Ret.) Gen. Edip BAŞER from Turkey and (Ret.) Ambassador Shuni YANAI from Japan. The speakers who presented their remarks during this session were Celalettin Cerrah, Chief of Police Department; Thomas W. O'Connell, Undersecretary of Department of Defense; Brig. Gen. Bekto Suprpto, Chief of Special Forces of Counter-terrorism, Police Department, Indonesia; John McDowall, Chief of Counter-terrorism Department, British Metropolitan Police Service; and Prof. Deniz Ülke Arıboğan, a lecturer from İstanbul Bilgi University.

Mr. Cerrah, the first speaker, emphasized, in the first instance, that metropolises were more exposed to terrorist attacks and expressed the importance of the counter-terrorism activities to be carried out in metropolises in fighting against terrorism in this sense. After stressing that globalization and technological development had increased the influence of terrorism and terrorists, Mr. Cerrah pointed out the capabilities and new areas of terrorism which were made available to terrorists by especially information technologies. In this context Mr. Cerrah strongly underlined the concept of cyber-terrorism. During his presentation, Mr. Cerrah, Chief of the İstanbul Police Department, expressed his opinions in the light of the experience of 15-20 November attacks in İstanbul and apprehending the criminals who had organized these attacks in specific; and experience of Turkish Police Force in its counter-terrorism efforts in general. The first point Mr. Cerrah emphasized was problems encountered in international cooperation for counter-terrorism efforts. Mr. Cerrah mentioned, for example, the activities of PKK/KONGRA-GEL in Europe and ROJ-TV, as well as the Belgium Government's attitude quite far away such cooperation regarding Fehriye Erdal, the perpetrator of the Sabancı Towers assassinations organized by DHKP/C. He stresses priority areas for an effective fight against terrorism. In this context he pointed out issues such as robust intelligence; effective crisis management; information-sharing at national level; importance of crime-scene investigation and securing evidence; effective control of entry into/exit from the country; and international cooperation. On the other hand, he expressed certain suggestions regarding legal arrangements. Within this framework he proposed changes such as extending police supervision; giving authority to the police force in case of emergency in searches; limiting the right to communicate of suspects of terrorist crimes when they were arrested; and establishing data banks which

maintains information regarding personal characteristics such as DNA, fingerprints, etc.

Having explained briefly the international and global terrorism phenomena, Mr. Thomas W. O'Connel, the second speaker, described the change in the functional area of the state, federal and local administrations in the USA and influence of this change on the public administration. O'Connel, first of all, expressed that the new enemy had no state, uniform or public, but they claimed to act on behalf of Islam and protecting Muslims. In this context, this enemy calls Muslim people to take action against both their own governments and some other states, in the name of Islam. This threat has been getting more serious than ever before with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, enhanced usage of capabilities provided by the information technologies and increased opportunities in abusing distress of peoples. O'Connel also mentioned that counter-terrorism efforts performed in the USA in that developing a command and control network in war on terrorism and providing coordination and cooperation among public institutions with this regard and also improving technical means and equipment in this area.

The third speaker was Brigadier General Bekto Suprpto, Chief of Special Forces Division of Counter-terrorism, Police Department, Indonesia. Mr. Suprpto, firstly, summarized the jihad commando groups and their activities which had been on the scene since 1980s in Indonesia. He mentioned especially the experience gained through a series of bomb attacks performed by certain groups in Indonesia, chiefly in Bali, during 2000s. Mr. Suprpto mentioned that there were no legal arrangements regarding terrorist crimes when those attacks happened and underlined that legal arrangements regarding simple offenses were quite inadequate for investigating such crimes. He secondly mentioned problems encountered in organizing crime-scene inquiry. In this context Brigadier General Suprpto stated that it's mandatory that medical, police and firefighting crew intervene immediately in the crime-scene but that groups such as other public officials, politicians and representatives from media also wanted to see the crime-scene and that situation created certain problems. In this regard, it's very important according to Mr. Suprpto both to help those in need, to inform the society and to organize and manage the crime-scene with a view to secure evidence. Brigadier General Subrpto emphasized that the shockwave caused by a terrorist incident made it even harder to manage the crime-scene. He, for this reason, underlined that special preparations should be made in case of a terrorist attack. Another issue he stressed was training of public prosecutors and judges to execute judicial process regarding terrorist

crimes. The Indonesian experience has shown the importance of trained public prosecutors and judges specialized in such legal arrangements as well as the importance of legal arrangements regarding terrorist crimes. Another issue underlined by Mr. Suprpto was cultural communication channels being used by those groups. Institutions established on cultural purposes such as Islam Culture Centers have been used widely to spread the messages of such groups among people in Indonesia. Hence, Mr. Suprpto pointed out the importance of developing education, especially on religion, and communication strategies and channels aiming at people, for fighting against terrorism. Finally, Mr. Suprpto mentioned problems encountered in the international cooperation. He stressed the problems regarding extraditing the criminals and operational issues. According to Brigadier General Subrpto, it's easy to talk about international judicial and operational cooperation against terrorism but it's quite hard to realize this.

Mr. John McDowall, Chief of Counter-terrorism Department, British Metropolitan Police Service, was the third speaker of this session. Mr. McDowall mentioned the experience gained through investigating the London bombing attacks. The most important point there was sufficient number of trained personnel's arriving at the crime-scene immediately and their organizing and managing that location. Another issue which was difficult to handle was evaluating the collected evidence and information from witnesses and intelligence at one single center. Investigating the crime-scene lasted for 6 weeks and 1500 personnel were assigned duty for this job. The collected evidence was as much as to fill up an area with the size of totally 16 olympic swimming pool. Mr. McDowall stated that their EOD information was inadequate during investigating these incidents but that they had gained experience in the subject field. He also mentioned the judicial process. Having emphasized that judicial process should be appropriate for the complex investigation process, Mr. McDowall expressed that they provided the judges and public prosecutors with laptops in order to show them evidence. Mr. McDowall expressed that he agreed with Mr. Cerrah, Chief of Istanbul Police Department, on the latter's suggestion of extending supervision periods and he said that the duration of 4-day police supervision was too short and it should be extended to 28 or even 90 days for the sake of the success of investigation. Mr. McDowall also underlined the issue of coordination among command and control center and different institutions of counter-terrorism. In this framework he stressed that it's important for the investigation team to work together and face to face with different specialists through

evaluation meetings, following a horizontal line of hierarchy rather than a vertical one. Mr. McDowall mentioned also the strategy of public communication. He explained that important components of that strategy were both gathering witness information, collecting images shot by the public with their mobile phones and hand-cams and informing the public. A website has been established for this purpose in the London case. People who shot on the incident and who want to provide information sent their findings to this site. However, the investigation team faced with an important problem in that evaluating these data, discarding trivial ones and focusing on the significant ones, according to Mr. McDowall.

The last speaker of the second session was Professor Deniz Ülke Arıboğan from İstanbul Bilgi University. Ms. Arıboğan firstly underlined the asymmetrical characteristics of the threat and deepening this asymmetry by rapidly developing technologies and means of communication. In this context, a large number of personnel have had to perform duty at high cost at the global level in order to neutralize rather small groups. According to Prof. Arıboğan, the reason for this is the domination of post-industrial societal conditions over the world. The context and environment have been totally changed but perception of threat and the methods toward this have left quite behind this change. According to Ms. Arıboğan, in the first instance, definition of threat, or a description based on differences in civilization and culture in determining the “other” is not appropriate to today’s conditions. In her views, the attitude of “clash of civilizations” deepens the problem in overcoming the challenges posed by the post-industrial society. A strategy to “otherization” on a cultural basis neutralizes the communication strategies towards the functional area. In this context, she stressed that realistic practices had been contributing the infrastructure of terrorism. Secondly, Ms. Arıboğan emphasized that the link between terrorist organizations and communication systems and channels should be broken. So, the media’s self-control and self-monitoring and its consciously screening and limiting itself when relating the news on terrorist incidents is crucially important. Ms. Arıboğan also mentioned the difficulties encountered in cooperation for counter-terrorism, and pointed out the problems especially arisen among state institutions. She expressed that it’s necessary to determine an intra-state common institutional methodology in order to overcome this problem. Prof. Arıboğan established an analogy between terrorism as a part of ecosystem and an apple tree which has grown up within this ecosystem and expressed that terrorist groups had been developing within the international environment, by feeding itself through the conditions of

this environment. The rehabilitation of the grounds of terrorism is very important according to Ms. Arıboğan. Today's terrorism phenomenon is the reaction of the third world against the pressure of long years passed, in Arıboğan's view. So, crucially important is contributing and helping the economical and democratic development of the third world for the purpose of this rehabilitation. Ms. Arıboğan underlined the significance of the Enhanced Middle East and North Africa Project even it has some deficiencies. Finally, she made some evaluations on the cooperation within the framework of international organizations. Prof. Arıboğan emphasized that it's necessary to define common ground on which such an international cooperation would develop and to search for the ways of cooperation within this framework. From the perspective of Ms. Arıboğan, differentiating between the attacks aiming at civilian targets and others should be concerned in this context. At least, an agreement should be reached on such acts against civilian targets. Ms. Arıboğan also pointed out that it's important to enhance the international cooperation not only to include interstate actors, but also to include non-state actors.

During the questions and answers part of the second session, in response to the question of when the time to commence an action plan would come, Ms. Arıboğan said that the Counter-Terrorism Center of Excellence and this symposium constituted important steps taken towards this end.

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EVALUATION OF THE THIRD SESSION

Assoc.Prof. Mustafa KİBAROĞLU

Dr. Najera claims that not all terrorist events are necessarily aimed at separatism.

Major changes happening in the international system and that there is an economic predominance in world affairs since the end of the Cold War. But not every major change has been a consequence of terror.

Local problems escalated during the Cold War to a geopolitical perspective: the international community neglected them again until a disaster happened.

Even before engaging in a multilateral effort against it, it is important to study the nature of their specificity.

In the case of Central America, in order to understand the conflicts during the 80's, we have to remember that there was no land distribution, no social revolution nor development opportunities whatsoever, and that the power was restrained to a rural elite that historically exploited the Indigenous populations.

The wars of Independence in the former Portuguese colonies in Africa, seen as scenarios for the fight between capitalism and communism in the seventies, seem to be the way to forget that there were already basic needs that those populations demanded... and that they are probably still waiting for answers to them.

So, even when the need for International Cooperation in the fight against terrorism is crystal clear, it seems very important to look deep into the local characteristics of each specific cause.

The Muslim countries, created as a result of the decolonization processes of the XX Century, started with basic state institutions inherited from their former metropolis. The changes of the XIX Century in Europe influenced the Middle East.

The effect of the independence of Israel, at least in the Arab world, created conditions for the young military elite to access to power and remain there for many years, becoming more and more authoritarian as long as their different national projects failed to provide well being for their societies.

The advent of a political Islam was supported by religious regimes as Saudi Arabia that had the economic resources to spend and the political motivation to validate its religious model.

The religious challenge was looking for a different way of social transformation than the secular modernization: a religious one based on an astringent interpretation of Islam.

While the preachers became a source of assistance for basic needs as education, medical services and economic support for local entrepreneurs, all of this financed from abroad, the State slowly lost touch with the local needs and grievances.

Al-Qaeda as a “success story”, an umbrella organization that in a specific time had the conditions to coordinate and motivate separated initiatives.

The economic needs and the State institutions absence or limitations to attend their impoverished societies were not the only reason to provide a fertile ground for extremists. It was much more the absence of political spaces, the lack of freedom to express or to participate and to question their rulers, the search for the right to participate in the decisions concerning their future.

All the necessary and legal actions that are required to fight terror must be used, but they must include a comprehensive approach that aims to provide responses to local needs. International Cooperation will only be possible through dialogue and in a common ground: that of respect.

In the contemporary world regionalist political forces are growing, both in pacific and in violent ways.

One future for the European Union is one of a federation of states where the regions play a more important role as long as the competences passes from the nation states to the Union, and simultaneously to the regions and local communities.

The better way to deal with separatism will flow through different ways of federalization that provide social access to the daily answers that individuals are searching.

The fact that a conventional war is a luxury that only poor countries can pay is the contrary of some separatist process. In Quebec for example, after some terrorist events in the seventies, the part of the Quebecker society with separatist aspirations has not seen another perspective different than that of a democratic process.

In Spain, it has taken all of a generation to pass from the strongly centralized and nationalistic country of Franco’s dictatorship to the resurgences of local identities through an educational process. Even with the presence of ETA, the immense majority of the Spaniard society supports a political dialogue instead of violence.

In contrast, political initiatives have failed in Colombia in the last years and it was not until the international community declared the FARC guerrilla a terrorist organization that the international institutional support to the armed group vanished and this helped to

understand that the government needs to act both from a political and a military approach.

The situations that take place in Quebec, Spain, Mexico or Colombia are nothing compared to terrorism in the Muslim communities.

It is a fact that poverty doesn't automatically conduct to violence, as well as not all Muslim related terrorist actions look for separatism or even for the creation of a suprastate as a Caliphate or an equivalent. The contemporary world has to deal with a wide spectrum of challenges.

What is true is that social disasters provide a fertile ground for extremism; it can be youth unemployment, material frustration. Repressive regimes and the absence of political participation alienate the best part of the societies.

According to Dr. Jinying, most of major religions can justify violence and have long been associated with terrorism since they contain martial metaphors. Whole books of the Hebrew Bible are devoted to the conquests of great kings. In Hinduism, warfare has contributed to great religious epics such as the Mahabharata.

Actually, within every religion, there always exist radical elements exploiting religion to preach hatred and violence, intolerance and exclusiveness.

Modern religious terrorism very effectively married ideology to religion. Religious violence has provided a sense of empowerment to alienated individuals, marginal groups, and visionary ideologues.

Globalization creates a tremendous amount of confusion for human being in terms of identity. Nowadays, religiously motivated terrorism has superseded other forms of terrorism and leads to more intense forms of violence and bloodshed.

Religious terrorism has its radically different value systems, mechanism of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and worldviews.

The terror inflicted by the religious terrorist is not an end in itself. Rather is a means towards a larger goal. Nor is this goal a conventional one.

Terrorists with religious nature or motivation see themselves as answerable only to God or their idea of God. Their ultimate constituency is God. The pure intention of desiring to serve God becomes contaminated by ego-needs arising from despair and helplessness.

Religions mandate acts of terror as sacred duty in an endless, cosmic struggle for the best way to please God. It is their worldview

that the entire universe locked in an eternal struggle. Religious terrorism has no military objective. It is endless because it has a spiritual objective.

Binary thinking exists in many religious terror groups. Religious terrorist groups are increasingly seen as an identity group, emphasizing the “us and them” approach, a process of drawing lines between true believers and the rest of the world.

Religious terrorists do tend to fight with a determination and spirit. Stick to their aims with persistence. Religious agendas can inspire emotional stirrings and resulting dedicated actions.

Religious terrorism encourages extra-territorial loyalty by holding that the requirements of loyalty to the religious solidarity among followers overrode those of loyalty to the nation-state in which he or she is a citizen.

A shadowy network exists outside of law-enforcement services’ surveillance. It is an informal network of person-to-person relationship.

Religious terrorists have internalized their values. They are “true believers” who subordinate their individuality to the group.

Many Islamic terrorists received higher education, such as graduate training at the technological universities in the West. Most came from financially comfortable middle class families.

Religious terrorism uses intimidation and ideological and physical terror as weapons to let its will prevail.

Religious terrorists never have to win a battle but can instead profit in the realm of public opinion from the glorious martyrdom entailed in their defeats.

Youth are the prime target of religious terror groups, because one could only find such vulnerable sincerity, fervor, hunger for action, and commitment to live or die for a cause among young people.

What we are now confronting is an asymmetric warfare. In this war, we are facing a lot of challenges.

The challenge to counter religious terrorism is that the problems and root causes that fuel it can never be eradicated completely.

Neither military nor political solutions seem to work. Ceasefires, political concessions, financial rewards, amnesties, and other personal inducements would be ineffective.

Religious terrorist groups, like other global movements, possess an extraordinarily diverse membership, one that is not united by way of commonality about class, ethnicity or personal background.

Winning the battle is dependent on knowing the religious terror groups’ secrets, espionage and information gathering is extremely important.

Religious terrorists mostly melting into local society and quietly installed in any metropolitan city, appear to be normal, socially well adjusted, and without any crime records, they are very easy to escape the suspicions and surveillance of security services.

The Internet has underpinned the resilience of terrorist groups and their abilities to replicate themselves. Internet is a very difficult thing to shut down.

Now, the greatest fear that most analysts have is if weapons of mass destruction get in the hands of religious terrorists—they have no fear of destroying themselves and everybody else in the process.

Prof. Tibi argues that terrorism is the most recent new pattern of warfare or an irregular war of non-state actors waged without honoring any rules.

There is the ongoing process of a religionization of politics and a politicization of religion leading to a jihadization of Islam in an invention of tradition. The outcome is the ideology of jihadism, which is something else than the classical Islamic jihad. This is the basis of the ideological foundation of terrorism.

The ideology of jihadism has nothing to do with Islam would be a wrong scriptural understanding of the issue. The war of ideas enables the jihadists to defame any countering of terrorism in addressing it in terms of a war on Islam. The ideology of Islamism is based on the politicization of Islam and it justifies “terror in the mind of God”.

The contemporary ideology of jihadism in its history is rooted in the 20th century’s phenomenon of political Islam, which predates Bin-Ladism for many decades. The ideology of jihadism can be traced back to the birth of the Society of Muslim Brothers in Cairo in the year of 1928. This is the first movement of Islamic fundamentalism.

Long before 9/11 Algeria, Egypt, Pakistan and many other Islamic countries were exposed to the security threat of jihadism posed by these “warriors of God” since the 1980s.

Long before 9/11 Algeria, Egypt, Pakistan and many other Islamic countries were exposed to the security threat of jihadism posed by these “warriors of God” since the 1980s.

The ideological foundations of terrorism are not well researched. The religious legitimation is neither instrumental nor it serves as a camouflage for covering otherwise criminal acts.

In dealing with the ideology of Islamism and its political movements as an issue area of national and international security in the light of September 11, we need to take a look at Islamic civilization, out of which the jihadist groups - being inventors of tradition, and also as non-state actors – are emerging.

The major target of Islamist movements is at present to topple existing regimes at home.

In considering the post-bipolar "cultural turn" in our world one can state a crisis of meaning growing from the crisis of modernity itself.

Any understanding of the background of jihadism placed in a comprehensive security analysis requires a new approach open to drawing on a variety of disciplines. In this regard, religion, ethnicity, culture and civilization are the issues to be included in the study of ideological foundations of terrorism. The ideology of jihadism underlying the irregular jihad waged by warriors as a non-state actor is the ideological foundation of this new terrorism.

Islamists refer to religion in the pursuit of non-religious ends and these groups constitute only of a minority in the Islamic *umma*, but they (e.g. al-Qaida) are well organised and well equipped. Therefore they cannot be either ignored or belittled of. Their numbers matter little, what matters is their efficiency. These groups are very capable of destabilizing and creating disorder through their means of irregular war. To be sure, the irregular war is not exclusively based on terrorist acts committed by Islamic fundamentalists. It is a general phenomenon, regardless of the substance of conflict and can be stated without referring to related cases.

Jihadism is not only an ideology of religious extremism, but also a new concept of warfare. The issue is political, namely the Islamist aspiration for a new world order.

The success of the Islamist networking in Europe's civil society and the spread of the related ideology in the diaspora are an evidence for the ability of the movement to establish an equation of the critique of jihadist Islamism with an ugly Islamophobia in a war of ideas.

An essential part of countering terrorism and combating its ideology in the West is a successful integration of Islamic migrants in Europe within the framework of an Euro-Islam. This would provide efficient means for combating fundamentalism within the confines of democracy. The bulk of the poorly educated Muslim migrants is not protected against their "othering" by European societies. This makes them an easy catch for jihad-Islamists.

The instruments needed for undermining Islamic fundamentalism as an ideological foundation of terrorism in the world of Islam and in Europe are multifaceted.

Dr. Mazari questions if the war has been successful in containing terrorism. One can say that, at best, the war on terrorism has reached a stalemate.

The war on terror failed to adopt a basic strategy – that of space denial to the terrorists.

International terrorism has been on the increase in the aftermath of the internationally-declared war against terrorism led by the US.

There is a growing perception amongst European states that a more encompassing strategy is needed to fight international terrorism.

International terrorism can also be seen as transnational terrorism, with groups having linkages across national borders and subscribing to an international agenda.

The second trend in terms of terrorism is the local, sub national extremist groups that are prevalent across many regions.

The third terrorist trend is that of state terrorism. This has become more acute in the post-9/11 period with the US declaring its pre-emptive doctrine, invading Iraq without a UN resolution.

It is already becoming clear that terrorism is going to be the new unconventional war to confront the international community.

Within the migrant communities of Western Europe, there is a growing cleavage between the Muslim immigrants and the indigenous populations. Polarisation is becoming more evident in European states with large Muslim migrant populations.

A major source of an increasing terrorist threat is the globalisation that is taking place today. Globalisation has increased the ability of obscure groups to use violence and gain international focus. Simply barricading oneself against the terrorist threat will not work. In other words, for the developed states to think they can barricade themselves from the rest of the world is unrealistic.

There is also a need to ensure that just and legitimate liberation and self-determination causes do not become victims of the war against terrorism. In an effective war against terrorism, a major prerequisite is to stop talking in terms of 'Islamic terrorism'. Otherwise, mainstream Muslims will feel marginalised and victimised because of their religion and the global spread of Islam will then create what one assumes one is seeking to avoid: a clash between Islam and the US and its allies.

There is also a very real need to study the root causes of the problem of terrorism. Military power may deal with the immediate problem, but it can only aggravate the long-term threat.

The fear of Islam as a powerful global force has to be replaced by an acceptance of this reality. Just as the world has learnt to live with a military super power, there is a need for this super power and its allies to accept the spiritual power of Islam for people across the

globe. Perhaps the most critical need for dealing with the problem of terrorism is to break the cycle of violence at the correct phase.

Without adopting a holistic global strategy to deal with the problem of terrorism, which focuses on root causes and politico-social measures to accompany the military means, the international community will allow the terrorists continuing, if not an increasing political space.

Mr. Colston acknowledges that before September 2001, terrorism did not feature prominently on NATO's agenda. NATO had – notably in the Strategic Concept agreed at the Washington Summit in 1999 -- recognised terrorism as one of a class of new risks to the security interests of the Allies that had appeared since the end of the Cold War, but Allies gave it little collective attention.

But all this changed dramatically on 11 September 2001. Within 24 hours, the NATO Allies invoked, for the first time in its history, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Defence against terrorism is and will remain high on NATO's agenda.

NATO seeks to generate strategic consensus through consultations and exchanges among Allies and with partners on a common understanding of, and united stance against, terrorism.

Alliance's defence planning mechanisms have been adapted to the specific requirements, as we understand them, of defence against terrorism

While most cooperation between governments will necessarily be bilateral and primarily among law enforcement and intelligence agencies, international organisations have an important coordinating role among their members but also among themselves.

All nations and international organisations taking part in the fight against terrorism should have a common vision of a threat which casts a shadow on our societies and our future.

We need to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts in our response to terrorism because duplication not only wastes scarce resources but also presents the risk of confusion of strategies and even of goals.

The cost of learning lessons has been extremely high in the fight against terrorism. Continued vigilance is required.

**CHIEF OF TURKISH GENERAL STAFF
GENERAL HİLMİ ÖZKÖK'S
CLOSING SPEECH OF INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM**



Dear Guests,

We have come to the end of the symposium which is titled “Global Terrorism and International Cooperation” and has been continuing for two days. At the end of those two days on which very precious speeches were presented and diverse ideas put forward, I would like to present my appreciation to all lecturers and participants and close the symposium with a general evaluation.

It is doubtless that terrorism has been standing in front of us as the plague of this century; it still keeps its aim to infect our world without minding time, place and power. We should not forget that our aim is not to acquire immunity to this virus but to destroy the virus completely as one of the greatest shame of history of mankind. By moving from the reality that some groups still make profit from terrorism so they support it, I definitely know the difficulty and almost impossibility of reaching the aim which I mentioned just now, namely to destroy terrorism completely. But, because this aim is our final target, it is doubtless that it will increase our determination and resolution for doing better jobs to reach it.

Therefore, the organisation of this symposium entitled “Global Terrorism and International Cooperation” and discussing this topic in

detail were one of the main concern of Turkish General Staff. I think that we succeeded to create a very comprehensive and efficient discussion atmosphere in this symposium where terrorism was dealt with its all aspects from the historical development of terrorism to the precautions which should be taken for counter terrorism. I hope that the conclusions we reached after those four sessions in which different views and suggestions put forward will constitute a platform for all the steps to be taken for counter terrorism and common effort. And I wish that the efforts we made here would be perpetual next years; not only terrorism but also similar international platforms for other cross-border matters that we pay great attention would be supported similarly.

As I expressed in my opening speech with emphasis, the success in counter terrorism depends on a common understanding the constituting of joint culture beyond nations' interests and inter state conflict of interest. So, as I expressed at the beginning of the symposium, I express one necessity one more. I accept that to form a common understanding against terrorism, "terrorism parameters" should be determined and large scale of agreement should be provided.

The day when our states, armies, judicial bodies, international and non-governmental organizations, media, local governments and above all our citizens have the same attitude towards terrorism, start to speak the same language will be our victory day against terrorism.

In other words, "the day on which we succeeded to think as one brain, to beat as one heart and feel one another's pains in deep side of us, and to give the terrorism the deathblow is our victory day". I am saying this firstly with the belief of a Turkish citizen, secondly a soldier who dedicated his life to the security of his motherland and sovereignty of his nation.

I am addressing to all statesmen, all mankind and all my colleagues who share the same fears, determination and sensitivity with us about reaching the solution: In counter terrorism, to be as strong as a giant, stable and determined as whole world nations and to be able make terrorism be aware of its own weakness have to continue to be our major ambition in this way.

About mobilizing the power and values, which we had, for mankind, we have to use them without any hesitations and by getting rid of our prejudices. We should not forget that the power we had in our hands for this struggle would be greater when it is shared. It will be easier to reach our aims as long as the information, technology, finance are shared and every nation continue to contribute to this common pool in their capacity.

Before ending my speech, I would firstly like to thank to president of Afghanistan dear Hamid Karzai and our dear President in their absence, to NATO, to the dear participants of Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialogue Countries, to the academicians, scientists and specialists who presented their declaration and shared their ideas and suggestions with us and lastly to you, our dear guests, for your participations and contributions, and I present my sincere gratitude and respect.

General Hilmi ÖZKÖK
Chief of Turkish General Staff



Presentation of Symposium Souvenirs and Participation Certificates

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“ GLOBAL TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION”

Symposium

(ANKARA, 23-24 MARCH 2006)

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