Future Trends in Insurgency and Countering Strategies

Dr. Robert Johnson
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Future Trends in Insurgency and Countering Strategies

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EDITOR’S NOTE

Located in Ankara, COE-DAT is a NATO accredited international military organization that assists with transformation within NATO. The Centre contributes subject matter expertise and education for developing counterterrorism doctrine, capacity and interoperability. The Centre enhances the Alliance’s critical work in the field of counterterrorism, providing a platform for experts and practitioners.

The mission of COE-DAT is to support NATO, nations and partners in the area of Defence Against Terrorism and to serve as a hub of expertise. In accordance with its mandate, COE-DAT undertakes research projects that are relevant to the counterterrorism community of interest and based on identified gaps. With this purpose, COE-DAT works with selected institutions and academicians.

“Future Trends in Insurgency and Countering Strategies” was one of the most significant projects carried out by COE-DAT in 2015. We were lucky to work with Dr.Robert JOHNSON to identify current and future trends in insurgency. We would like to convey our deepest appreciation to our author Dr.Robert JOHNSON for his dedicated work and continuous support.
Executive Summary

• It is almost certain that religious and economic insurgencies will occur in the short term and medium term (2020-2035) in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia.

• It is likely that economic insurgencies will affect Latin America, Africa, and South-East Asia in the medium and long term.

• It is expected that there will be more continuities than changes in insurgents’ and terrorists’ strategies, but there are some significant developments.

• Projected 10-20 years from now, the capabilities and organisation of some insurgent groups will be like those of state armies but most insurgent and terrorist groups will be ad hoc, forced to improvise and remain close to the social system from which they originate.

• The type of warfighting practiced by non-state actors will continue to converge with state actors, while emphasising specific techniques; we can expect that there will be greater use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), snipers and localised ‘swarm’ attacks, particularly in urban centres.

• There is a realistic possibility that the threat will develop within our NATO member countries, threatening to overwhelm traditional civil law enforcement and security, and therefore our military response will not be exclusively expeditionary and overseas in nature.

• The likelihood of a nuclear attack will remain low but analysts expect an increasing probability of chemical and biological attack.

• NATO countering strategies will need develop a range of responses commensurate with each threat type, blending military, law enforcement and other civilian agencies where appropriate.

• Current reliance on ever greater weapons precision will, at times, prove inadequate in urban insurgencies and significant fires will be required to suppress and defeat insurgent forces.

• Counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, despite technological advances in surveillance and weapon systems, will be manpower intensive.

• Political solutions will remain the cornerstone of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, supported by other civil and military lines of operation, where appropriate.
Prologue

**DAESH Insurgent Tactics in Iraq**

‘They hammered the city with booby traps and covering fire from snipers and the fairly conventional-fighting, soft bellied, Iraqi force just was not up to the fight. So, even with Iranian General leadership the Shia militia and central government forces have stalled. To break the back of that kind of resistance you either need very accurate artillery fire or very close air support. Or you have to go house to house - a very committed form of fighting. It does not seem likely the U.S. will support the Iranian-led forces with close air support, or want to take the blame for all the casualties that everyone would say the U.S. inflicted. … So, it appears the Iranian, Shia and government forces are taking the very messy way of dealing with this; artillery. No forward control, no eyes on target, this is just going to kill and break things. But as General S—- mapped it out to me, given that they are not going to get close air support, and they do not plan to go door to door, then this is the only route. It may work, but the civilian casualties will be significant. And given the DAESH social media machine, they likely could come out of this the “winner” regardless of outcome on the ground.’

**Future Conflict**

‘We can summarise the conflict climate in terms of four drivers, sometimes called megatrends, that are shaping and defining it. These are population growth... urbanisation ... littoralisation ... and connectedness. None of these trends is new, but their pace is accelerating. They’re mutually reinforcing, and their intersection will influence not just conflict but every aspect of human life.’

**Unrestricted Warfare**

‘War which has undergone the changes of modern technology and the market system will be launched even more in atypical forms. In other words, whilst we are seeing a relative reduction in military violence, at the same time we definitely are seeing an increase in political, economic and technological violence... When we suddenly realise that all these non-war actions may be the new factors constituting future warfare, we have to come up with a new name for this new form of war: Warfare which transcends all boundaries and limits, in short: unrestricted warfare. If this name becomes established... it means that all the boundaries lying between the two worlds of war and non-war, of military and non-military, will be totally destroyed, and it also means that many of the current principles of combat will be modified, and even that the rules of war may need to be re-written.’

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1 DAESH represents all term such as ISIS, ISIL and so said Islamic State. For the purpose of consistency with COE-DAT terminology, the terms ISIS, ISIL, DA’ISH and Islamic State are changed to DAESH. (Editor’s Note)
2 Scott Atran, email to the author, Iraq, 21 March 2015.
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1. Introduction

Any study of the future of insurgency and countering strategies must necessarily acknowledge the importance of history and existing scholarship in order to provide, among other points, four advantages: one, a guide to trends; two, established principles; three, contexts in which certain approaches succeeded, prospered or failed, and, four, reflections on methodology. A synoptic approach to the problem, which acknowledges both continuities and the contingent and specific character of each conflict, which incorporates the contested nature and shortcomings of the existing literature, can deepen and broaden our perspective. This review, focussed primarily on the literature, both scholarly and official, is analysed in such a way as to take a thematic and comparative view of the trends and developments of irregular war in the past, present and projected future and the ends, ways and means that evolved and must develop to deal with the phenomenon. Works are selected for their relevance to this study but the review is by no means exhaustive. The most significant insights are highlighted as ‘deductions’.

Any literature review of future insurgency and counter-insurgency has to include the structures of irregular war, that is to say, theories of war, models, the purpose of insurgency and counter-insurgency, its relationship to revolutionary violence, irregular war and state suppression; the strategy and tactics of insurgency and counter-insurgency, the modalities of response which reflect the prevailing political system, systems of recruitment and mobilisation, the importance of information war, the specific conditions of irregular war and its counter-measures within a civil war as opposed to an armed intervention or internal security campaign; and the ‘sinews of war’, that is to say the economics of conflict that impact on both insurgency and counter-insurgency.

A review and a forecast must also acknowledge the human dimensions of war, that is, the social and political context of the participants, be they security forces, civilians or guerrillas, their loyalties, allegiances and identities, the impact of leadership, the willingness and extent of collaboration or resistance, the factors affecting motivation including religion, belief, perceptions, expectations and political aspirations; and the centrality of civilians - as victims, refugees or participants; the dynamic effect of atrocities, casualties, psychological operations and information war, and the effect of tactical victories or setbacks.

Above all, insurgency and terrorist campaigns are aspects of political action, even when couched in extremist ideological forms, and politics remains the cornerstone of solutions to this form of warfare, as it is for all war.

Under these categories of analysis, the selected literature on future insurgency and terrorism achieves some but not all of the requirements. Most studies are selective and do not use social scientific tools of evaluation in their judgements. One or two scholars acknowledge the challenges of future projection and attempt a critical review of the existing scholarship, but the overwhelming conclusion is that most studies of future insurgency and future terrorism reflect present day conditions and concerns.

This report necessarily embraces a global perspective and takes a critical look at Western interpretations of both insurgency and counter-insurgency, but it is limited to a range of works in the English language. More work needs to be done on the works that appear in other languages and regions.

Given the sheer scale of the scholarship, the forecast of trends is limited to three areas: one, principles derived from historical conflicts (including colonial wars and wars of decolonisation-liberation, and counter-irregular and partisan campaigns of the First and Second World Wars, and the Cold War conflicts in South East Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America). Two, greater emphasis is placed on trends in more recent conflicts of the post-Cold War era such as the conflicts in Somalia, Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya and Syria. In addition, one cannot neglect entirely the sponsorship of proxy wars, and the wide variety of counter-insurgency operations and counter-terrorism missions across the world, particularly after 2001, which have had a profound influence on future expectations. Three, assessments of future insurgency and counter-insurgency, where not only is the past is prologue to the future, but that we might anticipate significant changes in capability, techniques and extent of future insurgent action.

While NATO nations have been engaged in countering insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years, the overwhelming response by civil and military leaders since then is to avoid such conflicts, and refocus on conventional threats. It is a curious fact that insurgency and irregular war is still considered less significant than conventional war by scholars, military professionals and the majority of policy-makers despite its greater frequency and the sheer casualty toll it has accounted for since 1945. This is partly explained by the number of deaths, levels of destruction and great costs inflicted by two brief total wars in the twentieth cen-
tury, facts which have given conventional warfare much greater significance in the NATO psyche. The extraordinary haemorrhage of life in these two conflicts, frequently estimated to have been up to 16 million in 1914-1919 and 50 million in 1939-45, has overshadowed all other conflicts. Nevertheless, as statisticians have often pointed out, a significant number of casualties in the twentieth century died outside these two world wars and many civilians died through action outside of conventional combat during them (indeed, most conflict deaths after 1945 have been amongst civilians in similar circumstances). Moreover, the majority of civilians and combatants have died as a result of small arms carried by irregulars and regulars in the conduct of operations not considered to be conventional war, or of diseases and conditions exacerbated by ‘unconventional’ conflict.

Deductions

- The first deduction is therefore that the existing scholarship lacks scientific analysis and tends to reflect present day issues and concerns.
- There is a tendency to regard insurgency and terrorism as less important than conventional threats because of NATO’s history, but, in the medium term future (20 years), we can expect more insurgency and irregular conflicts than conventional, state on state wars and the death toll is almost certain to be as high as it has been in the last 20 years.
- The third deduction is that civilians will be the target, participants and consequently the most important ‘terrain’ in which these operations will be conducted.

The study of all forms of war is, according to British historian Professor Jeremy Black, generally under-theorised, that is to say, while data and case studies are available, coherent explanatory analyses are limited in number. This has had profound consequences for future projection. Where the nineteenth and early twentieth century produced a number of theorists of conventional war on land, at sea and in the air, which might permit some extrapolation, there are fewer analyses of irregular warfare, and the ones we have are often ineffective. Much of the explanatory theory for insurgency in the Cold War, for example, was written in an intensely ideological way, often for the purposes of recruitment and persuasion. Robert Taber, Carlos Marighella, Che Guevara, Karl Marx, Mao Zedong and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin all produced theory, with firm predictions of the future, but each has been discredited or challenged, not least for their determinism. The same might be said of the works produced by the most recent generation of insurgent/terrorist leaders: Sayyid Qutb, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Zarqawi, and Baghdadi. Nevertheless, we can assert with confidence that insurgency and terrorist campaigns are intensely political in nature. The objectives of groups that wage this form of warfare are political and ideological, and therefore any response or treatment of them must also be primarily political. The supreme first challenge of war remains to identify the grammar and character of the war one is engaged in, and not to try to change the conflict to something alien to its nature. By extension, identifying the strategic objectives of the insurgent and focussing effort to unseat this strategy must be the priority. The relevant ‘ways’ to achieve this ‘ends’ is sometimes the destruction of the insurgent force, but this is merely one option and may not be the most appropriate. David Galula, David Kilcullen and other theorists of insurgency noted that often the tactics of terrorism elicits an inappropriate and counter-productive response. Military practitioners are often eager to apply the means of force before understanding the political ends and the optional ways. Insurgents may profit by deliberately provoking a heavy-handed military reaction from a conventional force, which alienates the population and provides the insurgent group with secure bases, recruits, funding, information warfare opportunities and escalation of the conflict. All countering strategies must necessarily be politics-led. Every possible military action must be measured against likely political effect. The solution to the conflict and the insurgents’ strategy will lie in a political arrangement, be that accommodation, suppression, concession or neutralisation.

Deductions

- Theories of insurgency and counter-insurgency often conflict with reality in such conflicts.
- Insurgency and counter-insurgency are primarily political in nature and solution.
- The military instrument is only one of the tools used in such conflicts and not always the most important.
Nevertheless, the trend of increasing operational capability of insurgent and terrorist groups in the future, not least in the availability by 2035 of more lethal and sophisticated weaponry and munitions, suggest that military means will be required where traditionally law enforcement and civil security once sufficed.

In the future, and certainly by 2035, new options and enhanced older schemes of insurgency and counter-insurgency will be available. The technological capabilities of state actors and non-state actors will converge to the point where offensive forces will be confronted by parity in means or method. This is likely to produce the conceptual equivalent of a stalemate, but also places greater emphasis on alternative methods, ‘ways’, to conduct operations and achieve objectives. This might include the psychological resilience of the population, so worn down by force and information operations, that they capitulate or resist their own authorities.

Cities are likely to become the target of much more lethal terrorist activity in the future, including devastating explosives, nuclear attack, chemical attack, and mass contamination. The casualty toll in densely inhabited areas could be severe enough to overwhelm urban first responders and hospital facilities. Even relatively small numbers of assailants can cause millions of dollars’ worth of damage, inflict severe casualties and create significant, if short term disruption. The attack on Mumbai in 2008 by Lashkar-e Toiba was carried out by just five paired teams, and made extensive use of stealth for insertion, deception through secondary bomb attacks, local media for situational awareness, multiple axes of attack to overwhelm security forces, and was comprehensively prepared using open source information. Nevertheless, the attackers used low technology weapon systems and made the tactical error of concentrating in a single location, which allowed the Indian security forces the opportunity to recover, focus their efforts on one site and overmatch the terrorists with mass and fire. In the future, we may anticipate that larger numbers of attackers could be deployed, their communications systems could be more secure, and their munitions far more devastating.

In Iraq in 2004-2008, insurgents were able to sustain a protracted campaign, possessed a larger array of weapon systems and were able to mass forces locally and then disperse rapidly for specific operations. Similarly, in Mogadishu in 1993, insurgents were able to bring to bear more sophisticated weaponry, larger numbers and sustain intense combat operations for many hours. That said, in both Iraq and Somalia, insurgent casualties were severe. In the latter case, while the United States and UN forces sustained 20 killed and 82 wounded, the insurgents lost in the region of 315 killed and 812 wounded. These urban insurgencies, both rapid and protracted, are highly likely in the future.

Most insurgencies last between 7 and 30 years. According to Connable and Libiki, most successful counter-insurgencies last a median period of 8 years. Protraction is therefore a common feature of irregular warfare. This often reflects the initial or lasting weakness of the insurgents rather than being enshrined in theory. Most revolutionaries prefer a rapid overthrow of the regime they oppose. Maoist theory of protraction was an attempt to explain the period of time it took to achieve success and to sustain morale amongst the resistance. Moreover, protraction is no guarantee of success. The historical record indicates that many insurgencies fail over the long term.

That said, in many cases the criminal component of insurgency, so-called ‘economic insurgency’, which develops to sustain the fighters and their campaign, can, in some cases, become the most important activity of the movement and, in effect, become the primary ends. Criminal syndicates can attempt to ‘hollow out’ the government, parasitically derive is resources, including development aid, and through intimidation, violence and corruption, sustain itself indefinitely. These fiefdoms are likely to develop in many urban centres of the developing world in the future.

**Deductions**

- The military instrument in counter-insurgency will remain or become more important as insurgent capabilities improve
- The most devastating form of insurgency in the future will be in densely populated cities
- Campaigns are likely to be protracted in places but the preference for future insurgents will be for a rapid achievement of power
- Criminal-insurgent groups are highly likely to control many urban areas in the developing world
Future Trends in Insurgency and Countering Strategies

2. Future of Insurgency

a. Comprehensive research on published materials and summary of existing predictions and trends

(1) Overview of the Literature

The literature on insurgency and terrorism is extensive, but rarely provides the seamless linkages of its evolution, maturation or its demise, and future projections are often vague, not time bounded, and dependent on past trends. William Friedland and Amy Barton, Revolutionary Theory (Totowa, N.J.: 1982) and W. Gamson, The Strategy of Revolutionary Protest (Homewood, Ill.: 1975) offered a theoretical framework that still holds some validity, but the more recent book by Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York and Cambridge: CUP, 2006) and his ‘The Ontology of Political Violence: Action and Identity in Civil Wars’, Perspectives on Politics, 1 (2003) are rare in considering the issue of escalation from point of origin to failure. Ian F.W. Beckett is scholar who has tried to assess continuity as well as change, in his article, ‘The Future of Insurgency’ in Small Wars and Insurgencies, 16, 1 (March 2005).

The taxonomies of ‘greed’ or ‘grievance’ as causes of insurgency in Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War (2000, 2006), debates between ‘ancient hatreds’ and ‘sacred’ wars in Michael Vlahos, Fighting Identity (New York, 2008), and ‘New Wars’ theory in Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars (Stanford, 1997) represent the main divisions in the current academic scholarship. However, the main alternative theories have been offered by Stephen Metz, The Future of Insurgency (US Army War College, 1993), in which he posits a psychological categorisation of ‘spiritual’ and ‘commercial’ insurgencies, and David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains (London 2013), who endorses the school of thought which can be described broadly as ‘global insurgency’ through a more network-connected world, and new forms of ‘urban insurgency’. The latter theme is strongly related to recent interest in the ‘crime-insurgency’ nexus, and street gangs, as in the work of Max Manwaring, Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency (Carlisle, Penn., 2005).

Lewis Gann’s Guerrillas in History (Stanford, 1971) and Bard O’Neil’s Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Washington DC, 1990), S. Sarkesian’s Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago, 1975), D. Blaufarb and G. Tanham’s Who Will Win? A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary War (New York, 1989) and J. Bell’s The Dynamics of Armed Struggle (1998) have each considered the key elements in the anatomy of insurgency, while Eric Hobsbawm’s Primitive Rebels (1965) and Joel Migdal’s, Peasants, Politics and Revolution (Princeton, 1977) were focussed on largely pre-modern actors, although their observations still apply to rural Naxalite (Maoist) insurgents in South Asia. V.N Giap, The Military Art of People’s War: Selected Writings (New York, 1970) and People’s War, People’s Army (1961) were designed as manuals for resistance in other developing countries but, aside from the obvious polemical considerations, arguably they represent a specific historical epoch rather than a universally applicable tool of analysis.

A comparison of cognitive and experiential perspectives, set against the operational aspects of insurgency, open up new possibilities for analysts. Other disciplines like this have much to offer the analyst of insurgency too. Clifford Geertz’s The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, 1973), Anthony Giddens’ Central Problems in Social Theory (Berkeley, 1979) and Russell Hardin’s One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, 1995) present possible frameworks for analysis, including Social Movement Theory. The dynamics of groups, so critical to the organisation of resistance, are also examined by Mary Jo Hatch, Organisation Theory (New York and OUP, 1997); Tom Hayden, ‘The Politics of the Movement’, Dissent, 13 (1966); Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley, 1987); P.G. Herbst, Autononomous Group Functioning (London, 1968); Doug McAdam et al, (eds), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (New York, CUP, 1996); John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, ‘Resource Mobilisation and Social Movements’, American Journal of Sociology 82, 6 (1977); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Harvard, 1971); and by Thomas Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehaviour (New York, 1978). Abdelkader Sinno, Organisations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (2008) used classic organisational theory to assess the relative success and failure of NATO and the Taliban in Afghanistan. He concluded that the flexibility of structures, organic leadership and adaptability gave the Taliban an edge, despite the overwhelming military strength of NATO.
(a) The Origin of Insurgency in Political Insurrection


(b) The Psychology of Insurgency and Killing


On the security forces side, the notion of cohesion is examined in Nancy L. Goldman and David Segal, *The Social Psychology of Military Service* (London, 1976) but there is little explanation here for the fear and aggression that characterises soldiers confronted with civil unrest. Peter Karsten, *Law, Soldiers and Combat* (Westport, Conn., 1978) examined how the military were governed by legal restraints, and the Oxford ELAC research programme has produced several publications and papers in recent years on the evolving character of legal restraint or flexibility. Recent studies stress the exceptionalism of modern Jihadism, such as Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley, CA., 2000), but few of these studies make reference to historical antecedents, or do so selectively. Many new studies attempt to show that entirely new conditions, such as globalisation, are the cause of violent and lethal unrest, but there is considerable debate whether ethnicity and identity are legitimate causal factors, as in Monica Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests and the Invisibility of Territory* (Princeton, NJ., 2003); Bruce Gilley, ‘Against the Concept of Ethnic Conflict’, *Third World Quarterly*, 25, 6 (2004), James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War’, *American Political Science Review*, 97, 1 (February 2003); Crosby, Steven, ‘The Verdict of History: the inexpungable tie of primordiality - A response to Eller and Coughlan’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 17, 1 (1994); and Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, CA., 1985).
(c) Forms of Armed Resistance

One study that has drawn on organisational theory and applied it to a modern conflict, mentioned above, is Abdulkader Sinno’s Organisations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Cornell, 2008), but this was not the first: Paul Berman published Revolutionary Organisation (Lexington, MS., 1974) to comprehend groups in his own era. The various forms of armed resistance have usually emerged as individual case studies with no comparative framework or unity. Examples include: Samuel Bernstein, Auguste Blanqui and the Art of Insurrection (London, 1971); Abder-Rahmane Derradji, The Algerian Guerrilla Campaign: Strategy and Tactics (Lampeter, 1977); Maurice Faivre, Les Combattants Musulmans de las Guerra d’Algerie, (Paris, 1995) and W.D. Henderson, Why the Vietcong Fought (Westport, Conn., 1979). Broader studies were limited to regions or types, including Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1975); A. Mazrui, The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa (London, 1977); B. Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001 (New York, 2001) and Paul Avrich, Anarchist Portraits (Princeton, 1988). There are nevertheless excellent studies of fully organised resistance groups to be found in Ben Shepherd, War in the Wild East: The German Army and Soviet Partisans (Cambridge, MA., 2004); Kenneth Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas: Soviet Partisans in World War II (Lawrence, KA., 2006); Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America (London, 1968); Jose Bracamonte and David Spencer, Strategy and Tactics of Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas (Westport, CT., 1995); J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA, 1916-1979 (Cambridge, MA., 1980); Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows (London, 1994) and M.W. Daly & Ahmad Alawad Sikianga, Civil War in the Sudan (London, 1993). There are several excellent works on Afghanistan over the last three conflicts that make a useful comparative area for study, including Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, (London, 2007); Jon Lee Anderson, Guerrillas: Journeys in the Insurgent World (London, 2006 edn); Andre Brigot and Olivier Roy, (eds), La guerre d’Afghanistan (Paris, 1985); Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester Grau, Afghan Guerrilla Warfare (St Paul, MN., 2006); first published as The Other Side of the Mountain, 3 vols. (Lawrence, KS, 1995) and Rob Johnson, The Afghan Way of War (London, 2011). There are certain definitive histories which include the insurgents’ strategies and tactics, force structures, ideology and fortunes, including Edgar O’Ballance’s Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War (1966) and John Prados, Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War (2009).

In terms of ideology, Maoism has been an influential model for rural insurgencies in developing countries, not just in Asia, and the relative importance or impact of Mao’s On Guerrilla Warfare and Maoism is assessed in Franklin Mark Osanka, (ed), Modern Guerrilla Warfare (New York, 1962); Jung Gheng and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (New York, 2005) and Thomas Marks, Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (London, 1996). More recent works by new scholars, such as Serhy Yekelchyk, Birth of Ukraine; Tim Wilson on Polish-German violence; Ram Mohan on Sri Lanka, Rajesh Rajagopalan on the Indian Army counter-insurgency, Christopher Clapham, (ed) African Guerrillas (Bloomington, 1998); Charles Townshend Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion (2005); Huw Bennett, The Other Side of the COIN: Minimum and Exemplary Force in British Army Counterinsurgency in Kenya’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 18, 4 (2007); Piaras Mac Lochlainn, Last Words: Letters and Statements and Raphaëlle Branche, La torture et l’armée pendant la Guerre d’Algérie: 1954-1962, this report will draw on indirectly.

(d) Theories of Insurgency

It is noticeable that, according to Ivan Arreguin-Toft, author of the acclaimed How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (Cambridge, 2005), that ‘few international relations scholars have advanced explanations focussed specifically on the subject of asymmetric conflict’ other than Andrew J.R. Mack in 1975. T.V Paul was one of the few, in 1994, to examine why the ‘weak’ initiate wars against stronger powers, but the field is still underdeveloped. Numbers of practitioners and policy-focused scholars have tried to analyse the motivations of insurgency, including Thomas X. Hammes The Sling and the Stone (Minneapolis, 2006); David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (London and New York, 2010); Bard O’Neil, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare/From Revolution to Apocalypse (Washington, 1990, rev edn., 2005); Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York, 2006); Steve Metz, Rethinking Insurgency (Carlisle Barracks, PA., 2007), but scholarly work is still dependent on Walter Lacquer, ‘The Origins of Guerrilla Doctrine’, Journal of Contemporary History 10, 3 (1975) and Ariel Merari, ‘Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency’, Terrorism and Political Violence 5,4 (1993). More recent studies including Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars (Cambridge, 2003) rely on observations of current policy-making, unlike Faisal Devji, Landscapes of the Jihad (London, 2005) who shows examines the ideological and theoretical underpinning of recent religiously motivated

(e) Proxy War

Studies of proxy operations and the utilisation of insurgents is still in need of further academic work. Tilman Luedke, *Jihad Made in Germany: Ottoman and German Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in the First World War* (Muenster, 2005) and Suleiman Mousa, *T.E Lawrence: An Arab View* (New York and Oxford, 1966) are useful for the historic Middle East, while Steve Coll’s *The Ghost Wars* (London, 2004) represent just one agency’s, the CIA, work in this respect. Thomas Ahern examined the CIA in another context in *Vietnam Declassified: CIA and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam* (Lexington KY.: The University Press of Kentucky, 2009). There have been some studies in professional ‘think tanks’ on Russian sponsorship of Ukrainian rebel forces but, at the time of writing this report, there were as yet no scholarly works.

(f) The Changing Status of Combatants and Civilians in Insurgency

Civil wars and insurgencies frequently result in a far higher death toll than limited conventional warfare, and there is growing pressure on NATO to account for its actions in a legal sense, as a traditionally ethical concerns that were enshrined in the Law of Armed Conflict and the Geneva Conventions. The status of civilians as rebels, participants or victims is a critical aspect of this research and it is fortunate that David Rodin and Henry Shue at Oxford produced their edited work *Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers* (Oxford, 2008) to capture the transformation that was underway in this area after 2001. Other Oxford CCW publications include: Igor Primoratz (ed), *Civilian Immunity in War* (Oxford 2007) and Hugo Slim, *Killing Civilians* (Oxford, 2010), while J. Noakes (ed) examined *The Civilian in War* (London, 1992) and Frank L. Klingberg wrote ‘Predicting the Termination of War: Battle Casualties and Population Losses’, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 10, No. 2. (June1966). More recently James Griffen’s *On Human Rights* (Oxford, 2008) explores the full implications of civil wars for this international concern.

(g) The Instrument of Terror and Terrorism


The closure of terrorist groups is admirably examined by another Oxford CCW colleague, Audrey Kurth Cronin, in *How Terrorism Ends* (2009). A selection of works on future terrorism are analysed in more detail in this report.

(2) Continuities: Principles of Future Insurgency Derived from the Past and its Literature

Taking the existing literature outlined above on past and current insurgency, in theory and practice, we can make an assessment of continuities that are likely to appear in the future.
Future Trends in Insurgency and Countering Strategies

Figure 1: Frequency of Conflicts (outbreaks) since 1945

Figure 1 indicates that the number of irregular conflicts (x axis) were, on average, twice as frequent as conventional state on state war in the period since 1945 (y axis). The break-up of the former Soviet Union, and the outbreak of conflicts long suppressed by the Cold War presence of the Superpowers, accounts for the high frequency of conflicts of both types in the 1990s. The deduction we can draw from this trend is that there is a higher probability of insurgency even when the risk of major war remains low; that there is a higher frequency of insurgency; and that sudden instability in the international system of major powers increases the probability of conflict and insurgency. Matched against the trends identified in the United States’ Quadrennial Reviews and the United Kingdom’s Global Strategic Trends, and by forecasts of 2035 by commercial groups such as McKinsey’s, namely state instability, urbanization and demographic pressures, a youth bulge, unemployment rise and resource constraints in the developing world, the probability of insurgency increases. Offering a statistical probability to the projection is problematic, but a statistical range based on the lowest frequency of the 1950-59 period and the exceptional 1990-1999 period, would give us an anticipated cone of probability (P) from four new insurgencies (4) to over 30 (P, 4-30), and a median of 12 new insurgencies between 2020 and 2030 (P, 12). Some existing insurgencies may continue, given the average ‘life-span’ of 7 to 30 years, and so with at least 15 insurgencies globally in 2015, this would suggest that there could be as many as 25 insurgencies underway in 2030.

Deduction: By 2035, there is a significant probability there will be twice the number of insurgencies that exist at the present (P, 25).

6 AON, Political Violence and Terrorism Map (2014).
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Figure 2: Terrorism and Political Violence Map

In 2001, there were 55 conflicts underway globally. Of these, 40 per cent were in Africa, 35 per cent in Asia and 15 per cent in the Middle East. Using a variety of conflict causation metrics, which limits on the available space do not permit a full exposition of but which include factors such as political crises, years in conflict, and period elapsed after civil war, analysts tend to agree that Africa, the Middle East and parts of Latin America are the most prone to conflict in the future. Of the 98 conflicts that took place in the 1990s, 91 were unconventional-insurgency types, and of the casualty toll, over 5.5 million globally, the overwhelming majority were civilians.

Deduction:
- Insurgency is almost certain to occur in Africa, the Middle East and parts of Latin America between 2015 and 2035.
- The majority of casualties in future insurgency will be civilians.

(b) Proliferation or Contraction of Insurgent Groups

In 1983, only significant insurgent groups since 1945 were catalogued, but of the total of 569, some 115 were located in Asia, 114 in the Americas, 109 in the Middle East and 84 in Africa. By 2003, there had been a significant increase in numbers and, although this can be explained in part through more detailed cataloguing, there is a trend of smaller groups emerging. According to analyst Brian McQuinn (Oxford, CCW), who has studied groups in Libya and in Syria, insurgent groups tend to increase to reach a threshold of 100-200 members before splitting to form new nuclei. This is explained in part by the limits on the span of command, the desire for command independence by low level leaders, and the optimal size for a tactical unit that may need to disperse to survive, but coalesce to be operationally effective. Moreover, more sophisticated weapons technology may reinforce this tendency towards miniaturization and proliferation. Relatively small numbers of insurgents can cause disproportionate damage, costs and casualties by striking civilian and ‘soft’ targets.

Deduction:
- Insurgent groups vary in size and strength globally, but the trend is towards small tactical formations with greater capability, and this may appear across the globe, outside of the region’s most prone to conflict.

(c) Nature of Environment for Insurgency

In assessing historical and recent insurgencies, Ian Beckett argues that all insurgencies require a particular operating environment and have adopted a style to exploit that environment and thus avoid destruction at the hands of better armed and equipped security forces. These include a peripheral or ‘difficult’ terrain for sanctuary. In more urbanized societies, this sanctuary takes the form of safe houses which are dependent on a sympathetic population or a small but secure network of affiliates and allies. Insurgents require local knowledge of their environment and must be able to conceal themselves within it and the population. In addition they must align their stated ends, if not their actual objectives, with the perspective of the population in order to avoid detection or destruction. Given their relative weakness, insurgents must use the environment to prepare, strike from and then return safely, that is, they must have secure base areas from which to operate. The environment must therefore be conducive to raiding, and if the insurgents are disproportionately weaker than the state forces they oppose, the environment must be able to support a protracted campaign.

Historical examples, according to Beckett, indicate that insurgents are not dependent on gaining the support of the majority

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8 Rob Johnson, ‘Predicting Future War’, Parameters, 44, 1 (Spring 2014), 65-76.
of a population, although focoism, igniting insurgency in areas where the population are unsympathetic, is the least likely to succeed. Imposing intimidation, disciplining the population and creating an atmosphere of insecurity while demonstrating the government is able to provide security nevertheless can ‘win over’ a population which otherwise would be reluctant to participate in resistance. In the 1960s, Beckett observes there was a switch from rural to urban insurgencies and while the latter were not initially successful, the subset of terrorism was to become a long term outcome of the shift. Terrorism developed a form that owed as much to political symbolism as to any attempt to overthrow a government. The objective of terrorism thus is likely to remains the same – to alter a political policy by means of violence, regardless of popular consent. Moreover, a combined rural and urban insurgency technique became the norm. In a more urbanized world, we might deduce from Beckett’s work that urban insurgencies are more likely in the future.

Beckett also refers to the importance of external support as a ‘force multiplier’ for insurgent groups. He does not provide any statistical data on this, but Jones and Johnston suggest that, of insurgencies after 1945, external support was given in 65 per cent of successful cases, whereas insurgencies without external backing only succeeded in 39 per cent of cases.10

Deductions

- Urban insurgency, despite its failures in the past, is likely in a more urbanized world and terrorism will continue to be its subset.
- External support significantly increased (50%) the probability of insurgents’ success (note: Jones and Johnston argue that it is 65%).

(d) Insurgent Strategy

All insurgency is, in essence, part of a political strategy. Bard O’Neill suggested there are seven types of insurgency, for which there may be variations in political agenda. The seven types were anarchist (ends: revenge); egalitarian (for O’Neill this was Marxist, but can include other ideological movements); traditionalist (which O’Neill categorized as Jihadist, but this is contested, since many Jihadist movements are revolutionary rather than purely atavistic); pluralist; secessionist (separatist); reformist, and preservationist.11 Steven Sloan argued the four features of insurgency are a more useful guide to its character and nature, and emphasized: one, the primacy of a political agenda; two, the significance of psychological operations; three, protraction; and four, the use of unconventional tactics and forces. The difficulty with a list of characteristics or types is that it does not offer sufficient explanation for the insurgents’ strategy. It may offer some idea of the ends (O’Neill’s definitions) or the ways and means (Sloan’s definition), but in isolation they are inadequate.

Assessments of the insurgents’ strategy, the historical record indicates, are dependent on context. The initial objective of an insurgent movement may be to address a particular grievance, but the dynamic interaction of forces in the course of an insurgency can change the objectives radically. Some movements may opt for a compromise and sacrifice their ends; others could become more radical and determined, and will settle for nothing less than the complete overthrow of the existing powers. During negotiations to end an insurgency a similar dynamic can occur. Moreover, strategy-making is a process: the intellectual activity of weighing ends, ways and means, constraints and opportunities, risks and security, options and sacrifices can be far more important than the stated or published version. In addition, insurgent movements are prone to describe their strategy in aspirational terms, as a form of information warfare, and these objectives may bear little resemblance to the actual policy aims of the movement. We may expect a similar set of problems in the future.

Insurgent movements are forced to adapt to the environment, political and physical, in which they have emerged. Repressive counter-measures by a government or security force will compel insurgents to change their modi operandi. A weaker government response may make it easier for insurgents to mobilise, educate, train, deploy and dominate the population. As government security measures adapt, so too must the insurgent movement.

10 Jones and Johnston, The Future of Insurgency, pp.8-9.
NATO forces are perceived to enjoy a technological advantage over many insurgent movements of the globe, and the United States, as the senior partner, is able to deploy overwhelming firepower, mass, surveillance and precision against its enemies. NATO states are also perceived as risk-averse, casualty-averse, and reluctant to intervene where there is unambiguous sovereignty (respecting the Westphalia agreement) or to risk causing civilian casualties. Shawn Brimley of the US Army War College argues: ‘America’s continued strength in major force-on-force conflict will incentivize future adversaries toward distributed cellular forms of insurgency characterized by the improvised explosive devices and ambushes seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, or towards the use of organized small-unit kinetic operations buttressed with employment of advanced technology such as the anti-tank and anti-ship munitions successfully employed by Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon War’. Consequently, any insurgent movement that opposes NATO must adapt its strategy to neutralize NATO’s advantages and maximize its own potential. Its strategic options are therefore, in summary, either:

- Seize power in weakened polities rapidly, to avoid NATO intervention
- Undermine and ‘hollow out’ a polity so as to be able to dominate it and yet not be identifiable, and thus avoid NATO intervention
- Conduct a protracted insurgency within terrain that can neutralize NATO advantages (mountainous, densely populated, urbanized) to discredit and weaken a government, then use popular pressure to overthrow it

The classic model of rapid, urbanized insurgency (category a) is Leninism. Lenin believed that popular resistance lacked coherence and was easily defeated by government forces. His solution was a three phase strategy to seize power:

1. Raise awareness of the urban proletariat by ‘agitprop’ (agitation-propaganda, or information warfare)
2. Recruit a ‘Red Guard’ (Cadre or Revolutionary Vanguard of highly trained, dedicated insurgents)
3. Seize power by coup d’etat, backed by popular demonstrations

In reality, attempts to seize power by rapid insurgency were dependent on the fragility of the government and the dire nature of the economic and political situation. Lenin’s guards were able to seize power in a largely bloodless, surprise coup d’etat in October 1917, but this provoked a widespread civil war which cost millions of lives, ruptured the economy and prompted foreign intervention. Many of the strategic ends of the Bolsheviks had to be abandoned, albeit temporarily, to provide essential services, ensure the distribution of food, stabilize the economy (after the so-called 1920 ‘scissors crisis’) and mobilise support. On several occasions, the Bolsheviks were close to defeat. A German attempt to emulate the Leninist model, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg, failed in 1919. A Chinese communist attempt to replicate the Leninist strategy was defeated in the late 1920s. Nevertheless, urban insurgency theories and strategies were modelled on Marxist-Leninism throughout the twentieth century, including Carlos Marighela.

The classic strategy of protracted insurgency was exemplified by Mao’s three phase model. Designed for rural environments where the population lacked the education for the development of orthodox anti-capitalist ‘class consciousness’, the Maoist approach proved to be one of the most popular strategies for large sections of the developing world. The strength of Mao’s theory, which was not widely known until the late 1950s, was clarity and simplicity: he had to explain his ideas in such a way that would appeal to an illiterate peasantry. The fact that 90% of Chinese were peasants and the vast area of China gave Mao two opportunities. Since he lacked military equipment, sound logistics and highly trained cadres of men (the Western standards of military effectiveness), he devised a theory that made maximum use of space, time and masses of people. Moreover Mao believed that, since war was an extension of politics, the political agenda should dominate – that is, an appeal to the people. He believed the quality of military strength is directly proportional to the political commitment/attitude of the people. Better equipped armies would seek to resolve a guerrilla conflict quickly – by forcing the insurgents to give battle and inflicting defeats. Mao therefore deliberately set out to prolong war so that the enemy power would gradually tire of the campaign (politically and economically) and seek a resolution. This belief allowed Mao to convince others of the ‘inevitability’ of the
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Communist victory.

The three, overlapping phases aimed at the seizure of power by:

1. Mobilisation and organisation of the people through indoctrination
2. Guerrilla operations: to demonstrate the inability of the government to the rural population; to buy time, negotiate when under pressure; to attack when the enemy weakens or its detachments of security forces are isolated;
3. Revert to conventional war with a trained and motivated ‘people’s liberation army’ to seize power

Once again, the reality of Maoist insurgency was quite different in history. Mao wrote of his strategy in several significant works and dwelt largely on tactics and political agendas at the time of the Chinese communist insurgency. Despite subsequent claims to have ‘traded space for time’, Mao had attempted to control territory and keep out nationalist government forces. Indeed, the Long March, Mao’s most celebrated moment, was effectively a retreat following a military defeat and a strategic misjudgement. Much of the organisation that had been built up in southern China was lost. Protracted warfare was not so much a strategic choice of ‘ways’ as imposed by circumstance. In phase 1, the guerrillas attempted to establish base areas from which the population could be educated, controlled and organised into home guard, intelligence operatives and ‘regular’ units. Guerrillas were expected to win support by example, and not by terror, although in China, armies had traditionally recruited by turning up in villages and threatening to kill those who would not enlist. Mao’s communist cadre would be prevented from establishing relationships with local women and they would extort money from the better off. They would carry out limited land reform, cut taxes and other abuses and set up schools. Mao’s famous dictum was that guerrillas should be able to move amongst civilians like ‘fish in the water’. In reality, in this phase, Mao was certainly helped by the fact that the nationalist Chinese authorities were pinned down by the Japanese. Moreover, like Lenin, strategic ends, such as nationalisation of all land, had to be abandoned at times in order to retain the support of the population.

Maoist insurgent strategy offered the opportunity to move backwards as well as forwards between phases, providing a chance to deal with inevitable setbacks. In phase 2, the idea was additional areas should be overrun by insurgents and cultivated as in phase 1. This would provide additional recruits, further the establishment of an alternative political authority, and develop the experience of the guerrillas themselves. The groups would also expand in size: from the platoon and company to battalions of two-three companies. ‘Regulars’ would also form political regiments where they would be subjected to tougher discipline. By 1945, Mao had 14 base areas in China, and the largest, on the Shansi-Hopei border, had a population of between 12 and 24 million. Mao was also deliberately insincere on negotiations – these were not to reach a compromise peace (the aim of his enemies), but to buy time, or to arrange the enemy’s surrender.

Despite all the problems with the reality of the Maoist insurgent strategy, Truong Chinh and General Vo Nguyen Giap nevertheless attempted to apply the model in Vietnam against the South Vietnamese government. Initial efforts had not needed to adopt a protracted approach, but circumstances had changed the strategy. The insurgent forces that had achieved victory at Dien Bien Phu over the French in 1954 had resembled a regular army and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) of the 1960s was the mainstay of the insurgent effort in South Vietnam in the following decade. This army was sufficient to defeat the government in Saigon but it would have stood little chance against the American advisors and regular forces that intervened. Giap argued that to acquire power, he was compelled to wage a guerrilla war which he defined as: ‘the war of the broad masses of an economically backward country standing up against a powerfully-equipped and well-trained army of aggression ... The aim is [therefore] to exhaust the enemy forces little by little by small victories, and, at the same time, to maintain and increase our forces.’

To the classic Maoist strategy, Giap made additions to the ‘ways’, and urged his movement to: one, gain confidence over the enemy by means of psychological warfare (and information operations), and two, use terrorism both during and after insurgency to assert power over the population, and demoralize the counter-insurgents. The North Vietnamese nevertheless com-

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mitted several strategic errors. A premature assault was launched with the Tet Offensive. Designed to rouse the people of South Vietnam to rebellion, the NVA attackers found themselves isolated and unsupported. Despite bitter street battles, they had been ejected rapidly from Saigon (3 days) and a little longer at Hue (4 weeks). Their temporary occupation of Hue made them few friends: they massacred 2,800 civilians, a situation that would be repeated after their ‘Phase III’ victory over the south in 1975. Yet, the NVA were successful in that they persuaded the American and South Vietnamese governments to abandon the struggle. Communist military successes were rare until the very end of the conflict, but the political objective, of winning over or ensuring compliance from the majority of the South Vietnamese was achieved. Mao concluded: “Guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of warfare. They are [just] one aspect of the revolutionary struggle.”

The adaptations made by Giap were taken up by the Maoist Guerrillas of Nepal who began their insurgency in 1996. They seized control of many provinces, setting up their own ‘schools’ and taxation. They periodically kidnapped teachers and children for ‘re-education’, but they made use of terror to destabilise the government and coerce the population. A political crisis in the royal government offered the opportunity to combine military pressure with popular demonstrations, and they achieved their objective of ending the political dispensation.

**Deductions:**

- The strategy of insurgency is primarily the seizure of power, or significant change in the political order in favour of the insurgents.
- Rhetoric will not always match actual ends or ways; and insurgent strategies will evolve in response to government action.
- A rapid seizure of power, in a coup d’etat or short insurgency, in the future will be dependent on favourable political and socio-economic conditions. A revolutionary cadre would initially be small and not necessarily well-embedded within the population.
- Some rural insurgencies may be expected in the future in less developed states: they are likely to be long-term, and feature attacks on urban centres as much as traditional operations in the countryside.

**(e) Hybridised Urban-Maoist Guerrilla Warfare**

Increasing global urbanisation generated much speculation about guerrilla warfare in the urban environment from the 1960s onwards. Lewis Gann believed that, without support from the country at large, urban guerrillas were vulnerable and, despite some disruption, could not destroy a state. Even if one is to include mass demonstrations, sabotage through to assassinations and fighting from the barricades, Gann argued that there was undue optimism and romanticism about the marriage of intellectuals and oppressed urban dwellers. However, since Gann wrote, there has been a great deal of interest in the internationalism of insurgents, who have travelled from the West, from North Africa, Chechnya, southern Arabia and South Asia to participate in the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, and who have developed expertise in urban insurgency in Iraq.

Carlos Marighela and Che Guevara are perhaps the best known advocates of urban guerrilla warfare but Guevara firmly believed that small groups of urban insurgents should only act as part of a wider strategic plan using conventional or rural guerrilla forces. However Gann was prepared to acknowledge that the modern megalopolis or conurbation might recreate the sort of space and camouflage required by a Maoist strategy. The ownership of cars and trucks (for the movement of fighters, munitions or bombs), radios and mobile phones, a cadre of educated technicians, the availability of petrol and chemicals, the potential for huge demonstrations, and the ready availability of a news-hungry media for propaganda messages or incidents suggest that independent urban guerrilla warfare is possible. The activities of Al Zaqawi in Iraq and Al Baghdadi’s DAESH movement illustrate this potential for the future.

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There are, however, problems for the urban insurgents, many of which have been evident in Iraq and Syria. Attacks on city transport systems take time for planning and execution and their effects are relatively short-lived. Frequent attacks tend to alienate the urban population through disruption or fear which can mean ready recruits for the authorities and greater security risks for the insurgents. The deciding issue for the civilian population remains: ‘which side is likely to produce victory?’ If the insurgents score continual successes and appear to have the upper hand, popular backing is likely to increase, but few will support an organisation for long if it seems to court death for no gain.

(3) Causes of Insurgency

Causes of insurgency in the past and present are a guide to future causation. The causes are broadly categorised as political crises (which are dealt with in the preceding sections); economic insurgencies; ‘primordial insurgencies’, and religious-spiritual insurgencies. The latter cases are outlined below.

(a) Economic Insurgencies and the Criminal-Insurgent Nexus

Stephen Metz has identified ‘commercial insurgencies’, although W.G. Thom uses the more familiar title ‘economic insurgencies’ to describe the causal and perpetuating factor of certain conflicts. Many if not all insurgent groups are dependent on the resources of the state or its people to wage their armed resistance, and this makes them predatory, opportunistic and prone to foster corruption. In some cases, the political motive of insurgents is relegated to little more than opposing state authority in order to develop their economic or criminal activities, including drugs or mineral resources. In other words, the political nature of the insurgency is lost in favour of simply hollowing out the state’s power, to create space and local power where illicit economic activity can continue and develop unhindered. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, for example, disenfranchised youth with little stake in the existing socio-economic order conducted insurgency for their own criminal ends. In Mexico and Colombia, narcotics cartels sought to undermine government and law enforcement agencies in order to develop their share of the global drugs trade.

Up to 80 per cent of the insurgent Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone were children under the age of 17, with an estimated half of RUF fighters between 8 and 14 years. A.B. Zack-Williams indicates that the conditions for such participation began with the pre-civil war situation, but, high levels of corruption by officials, the social exclusion of the young from most employment opportunities, stark inequalities of wealth and an economic downturn were not sufficient to drive children to take up arms. The RUF offered to overturn the worsening economic situation by revolutionary action and it was their call to arms that attracted boys eager for change. They drew attention to the privileges and abuses of the urban elites, and offered any supporters the promise of housing, health care, education, clean water and food. This appeal was not lost on children of the poor who had been sent to work as servants of the wealthier families under the traditional mehn pikin (wardship) concept. The only way to avoid this system was for young people to abscond their home communities and head into the cities in the hope of better prospects. These ‘street children’ found themselves in hierarchies of gangs, roaming the streets as ‘Rarrays’, pools of embittered urban youngsters, with Agbas (big man) as leaders, Bras (strongmen), and Alagbas (lesser gang leaders), employed as pimps, thieves, porters, and stall vendors. In return for labour and service, the gang leaders provided night shel-


18 The literature on child soldiers is growing and amongst the most compelling recent studies is that of Michael Wessells, Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection (Harvard University Press, 2007); see also Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa (University of Pennsylvania, 2007); Several authors write on the subject as the means to champion its eradication: Romeo Dallaire worked with the UN in Rwanda and produced They Fight Like Soldiers, They Die Like Children (Random House, 2010) as the means to come to terms with his experiences, although critics disapproved of his use of fictional narratives to complete fragmentary interviews; Ishmael Beah, A Long Way Gone (Harper Perennial, 2008) was a far more effective autobiography which received critical acclaim. The journalist Jimmie Briggs charted several children’s experiences of child soldiering in Innocents Lost: When Child Soldiers Go To War (New York, Basic Books, 2005). The most analytical work is P.W. Singer, ‘The Enablers of War: Causal Factors behind the Child Soldiers phenomenon’ in S. Gates and S. Reich, (eds), Child Soldiers in an Age of Fractured States (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), p.103.

ters and food, but disciplining was a frequent hazard. These conditions acted as training ground for later RUF service and bush camps simply replicated the ‘arrays’ which formed the backbone of the rebel movement. The chief differences were in the more arbitrary actions against the civil, adult population, the insistence of torture or murder, sometimes of their own relatives, to ensure allegiance, and the shocking mistreatment of young girls who were kept as sex slaves and prisoners of the gang members.20 While some joined initially for the chance to survive, many found that enlistment had brought them unexpected advantages. Nevertheless, the risks were considerable. What the Sierra Leonese case indicates is that relative deprivation may have been the cause of initial violence but the dynamic of gang membership was self-perpetuating and a form of criminality became the raison d’être of the insurgency.

In Somalia, there have been a rise in sub-state forms of governance that provided basic state functions, but which were vulnerable. War in the country has often degenerated into more localised violence and inter-clan fighting. Criminal activity has nevertheless changed from purely informal looting and banditry to organised forms of economic insurgency since businesses pay for their own militias to provide security for their operations. However, these militias and business activities have vested interests which could be developed into co-operation with a nascent state.

In March 1992, after a prolonged civil war, the UN brokered a ceasefire, established UNOSOM, and organised a relief effort, but it took two months of negotiations with armed groups to enable just fifty unarmed observers to deploy. It was clear that the general lawlessness meant that aid convoys had to be protected and armed. It was not until September that the first armed UN contingents of Pakistani troops arrived on the ground in Mogadishu (to guard the UN compound). Although the UN had arranged for 4,200 men to be in place, only 900 were actually deployed. Every time a UN vehicle moved through the city or port, it came under fire. Aid convoys were hijacked because locals regarded the supplies as a reliable form of currency, and sometimes the only means of exchange. In November that year, with the situation deteriorating, the US offered to lead a UN Task Force (UNITAF) that would provide security and enable the relief agencies to do their work. The UN readily accepted the offer. Flushed with the success of Desert Storm against Iraq (1990-91), and the end of the Cold War, there was optimism about a Western ‘new world order’ based on humanitarianism and the defeat of dictatorships. The Americans staged a dramatic beach landing on 9 December 1992, just one week after the UN accepted the US lead, to announce their arrival. Eventually, 28,000 US troops had arrived, with 17,000 more from other nations. In January 1993, there was hope of progress when the UN Secretary General chaired a meeting of fourteen political movements to demand a ceasefire, disarmament and national reconciliation.

In May 1993, UNITAF was superseded by UNOSOM II, and US forced provided a Quick Reaction Force and logistical support. However, fighting broke out between the militia commanded by Aidid and the Pakistani contingent: some 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed in the street fighting, and the dead were mutilated. The US response was to target and destroy arms caches and likely bases. The militias attacked any UN facility or personnel at night. Convinced that Aidid was orchestrating the fighting, which escalated over three months, the US planned his arrest. However, on 3 October, two US SoF helicopters were shot down, and the relief teams on foot came under heavy fire, losing several casualties. In total, 18 were killed and a further 75 were wounded. The effect of the images of dead US personnel being dragged through the streets was immediate. The Americans increased the force protection of their troops with armour, but also announced a withdrawal. The militias believed that even the most advanced US technology and their elite troops could be defeated. There was also a claim by the then little known group based in Sudan, Al Qaeda, that they had been present and had orchestrated the ambush of US forces.

The US announcement encouraged other nations to pull out their own troops. UNOSOM II adopted a passive posture, avoiding confrontation by remaining on the defensive. This gave the militias license to control the city and the aid effort appeared to have failed. In March 1995, achieving nothing, UNOSOM II was wound up. A new task force, including the USMC, covered the withdrawal. The country was fought over by militias and gangs for whatever resources remained and there was no central government. On the coast, piracy developed against commercial shipping and the kidnap of foreign personnel increased. Gradual international effort were made and piracy was contained, although radical groups, most under the leadership of Al-Shabab, continued to control much of the interior.

Al Shabab’s finance is similar to other Somali militia-factions. They seek to control key airports and beach side ports across southern Somalia. Kismayo is the single most valuable resource-generating asset. They aim to control the majority of markets and many key chokepoints. They enjoy support from ideologically motivated businessmen or cartels in the country but also outside, but they impose a ‘Jihad tax’ on all other clans and businesses. For the delivery of services, they are reliant on charities or the private sector, suggesting another area of vulnerability in the long term. In the past there has been some state sponsorship, especially from Eritrea. This was important during the Ethiopian occupation and early insurgency. Support from the ideological diaspora in Africa and the West is also important. Money is sent via hawalas and couriers, but also through legitimate trade-based schemes.

In South America, drug cartels were protected by and paid subsidies to the Fuerzas Armada Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and in Peru, the Sendero Luminoso established a similar relationship. These relationships generate their own dynamic: to protect the drugs trade requires operations, but this in turn increases the demand for resources, manpower and munitions, which can only be paid for from drug profits or extortion. Metz argues that commercial insurgencies are therefore dependent on the local geography, such as the existence of mineral resources or the correct growing conditions for drugs. Beckett argues that the end of the Cold War meant the termination of sponsorship in arms and finances for revolutionary insurgent movements, and this drove them to acquire drugs as an alternative revenue. In one sense the relationship between military demands and resources, defined as military-fiscalism, characterised some seventeenth and eighteenth century operations by private or chartered companies and buccaneers. Consequently, we might posit that where there are deficiencies in other resources to perpetuate an insurgency in the future, illicit activity is likely to be generated.

**Deductions:**

- Future economic crises or outbreaks of violence where there are stark disparities of wealth or access to resources are likely to develop into economic or commercial insurgencies.
- The location of these insurgencies will be dependent on the local environment and its resources, and could be mapped in advance.
- In the developing world, a significant number of insurgent combatants, perhaps as high as ten per cent, are under the age of 18, and certain social structures make them a semi-trained force at the outbreak.
- Narcotics and mineral resources may become the ‘ends’ of an insurgency rather than the ‘means’.

**Primordial insurgencies**

Christopher Clapham identified four types of African insurgencies, which included liberation, separatist and warlord insurgencies but Steven Sloan argued that a more useful categorisation was ‘primordial’ insurgency which characterised ethnic and identity politics as the main drivers.\(^{21}\) Clan or ethnic rivalries can be unleashed when a central state authority weakens or collapses, as the various factions seek power or to protect their vital interests. Separatist or secessionist movements can also fracture from a state along ethnic or clan lines. In the 1990s, Mary Kaldor posited that a ‘new type of organized violence developed, especially in Africa and eastern Europe’:

‘New wars involve a blurring of the distinctions between war (usually defined as violence between states or organized political groups for political motives), organized crime (violence undertaken by privately organized groups for private purposes, usually financial gain) and large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by states or

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\(^{22}\) Kaldor, New and Old Wars
At the end of the Cold War, it was understandable that conflicts occurring outside of the old zones of confrontation might be seen as new, particularly when the bi-polar constraints that had contained violence were released. However, primordial conflicts owe their origins to much deeper and older identities. Such conflicts have occurred in Eritrea, Sudan, the Balkans, the Front de Liberation National (FroLiNat) resistance to the government in Chad in 1968, East Timor, Tigray, and Aceh in Indonesia. Insurgencies in this type tend to be characterized by the desire for revenge against, expulsion or annihilation of ‘out groups’. In the Marxist canon, these were characterized as class enemies and produced episodes of mass murder in the Soviet Union and Cambodia. In the future, as in the present, ‘out groups’ can be defined by class, ethnicity, sectarian identity, gender, religion and national identity. Compromise and negotiation are far more difficult in such situations, as the ends of an insurgent strategy in these cases tend to be the destruction of civilian groups or the uncompromising control of territory.

**Deductions:**
- In the future, the further ingress of economic and communications connections caused by globalisation are likely to catalyse insurgencies where identity and ethnicity are strongly represented.
- There are likely to be separatist insurgencies as some nation states are further weakened or find themselves unable to meet the burdens of providing essential services to their growing and highly urbanised populations.
- Primordial insurgencies are therefore likely by 2035.

**Religious-Spiritual Insurgency**

Religious renewal against the ingress of modernity, or the obvious successes of Western capitalism can be found throughout the historical record. Modern extremism claiming affiliation with Islam, with its overt rejection of Western culture, populations and economics, reflects a crisis within the Muslim world rather than any particular Western agenda. The strategic ends of international and localised religious insurgency remains the wholesale destruction of all Western standards and ideas. Paradoxically, critics argue, movements like Al Qaeda have borrowed heavily from Western revolutionary and insurgent thinking to justify and conduct their own anti-Western resistance. Sayyid Qutb, the Islamist writer, was the architect of modern religiously motivated insurgency. He wrote Koranic commentaries in prison, but more famous were his extremist outbursts against the West after being influenced by the Pakistani ideologue, Abdul Ala Maududi (1903-79) who had advocated a religious insurgency specifically in political rather than purely spiritual terms. Qutb took these ideas further: he rejected Western ‘reason’ as unspiritual and envisaged the radicalisation of politics using Islam across the Middle East. He advocated that the West should be destroyed and, in the 1960s, suggested using airliners to attack their cities and kill their peoples. He wanted to see the Western media manipulated to terrorise Western audiences, destroying their morale and credibility at the same time. Extremist ideas and advocacy of resistance often reflects the existence of a hegemonic system and seeks out the weaknesses of that system, and there can be no doubt that some Muslim thinkers and activists were frustrated by the continued weakness of their system compared with the West.

The politicisation and militarisation of certain Islamic groups since the 1970s has given insurgents the advantage of religious conviction to motivate their members and a tool to win over mass support, thus turning themselves into the spearhead of a revolutionary movement. Their interpretation of Islam, however twisted, has the effect of driving a wedge between its intended enemies and the *Ummah*, (the Muslim world). It causes moderate Muslims to question their identity and loyalty to a ‘secular’ state authority, whilst spreading fear.

The Iranian Revolution by the followers of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 provided an inspiration across sectarian lines. Until then, Middle Eastern leaders who had enjoyed military success had been secular and often dictatorial. Even war between shi’ites and Sunni Muslims in the Iran-Iraq War and the subsequent conflict in Lebanon did not prevent Sunni groups adopting the mantle of religious insurgency. Momentum was added to the sense of ‘Islam in danger’ by the periodic flaring of conflict between heav-

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ily armed Israelis and Palestinian rioters, by the struggle between secular government and Algerian ‘fundamentalists’ from 1962, and by the Russian operations against Chechnya. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979, and campaigns in Kashmir and East Africa are also important in this development. Islamist tried to link together all conflicts between Muslims and secular authorities, even where no such link existed, in an attempt to show that there was a single Manichean struggle to wage.

Between 1989 and 1993, Pakistan’s military-intelligence (ISI) had relied largely on indigenous Kashmiri organisations for terrorism in the Indian part of the state. But armed personnel from a number of Pakistani organisations, mainly from the Punjab, intensified and prolonged the fighting. The more prominent of these Pakistani organisations included: Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM); Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET); Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM); Harkat-ul-Jihad Al-Islami (HUJI) and Al Badr. The oldest was Al Badr, which was armed and equipped by the ISI through the intermediary of Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) in East Pakistan before 1971. ISI used the organisation to massacre a large number of Bengali Muslim intellectuals that year, in a crude attempt to neutralise political opposition. After the birth of Bangladesh, Al Badr returned to West Pakistan and was amongst the organisations used by Pakistani intelligence against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s. All of these groups focused on Kashmir, describing their objective as the ‘liberation’ of Muslims of India and the creation of two more ‘Muslim homelands’ in South Asia. The method was to destabilise the Indian authorities and develop popular unrest. However, their aims were not limited to one small region of South Asia. They described Western-style liberal democracies as anti-Islamic since they advocated that sovereignty lies with the people. According to these organisations, sovereignty lies in God. They look upon the successful functioning of democracy, especially in India, as a corrupting influence on Pakistan’s civil society.

All of the militant groups rejected the concept of national frontiers and they recognised only the frontiers of the Ummah. They asserted the right of Muslims to wage a Jihad in any country where, in their perception, Muslims are suppressed, even if it is a ‘Muslim’ country. More chillingly, they describe Pakistan’s atomic bomb as the Ummah’s weapon, the technology of which should be available to any Muslim country that needs to protect itself. Indeed, they believe Muslims have a religious obligation to acquire and even use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), if necessary, to protect their religion. They believe they have to wage an unlimited global war to achieve their objectives. All of them look upon the United States, India and Israel as the principal enemies of Islam, and, with the exception of Al Badr, they were members of bin Laden’s International Islamic Front, which was formed in 1998. To this end, they introduced suicide terrorism in Kashmir, a phenomenon that was unknown in the state before the middle of 1999.

Religiously motivated groups also advocate the strategic ends of implementing sharia law, and, in some cases of establishing a single caliphate (although the majority of groups aim for a less grandiose ‘national’ emirate). Despite the frequent refrain of unity and brotherhood, only veterans of various conflicts enjoy any real sense of lasting solidarity. Most religiously motivated organisations are factional, frequently waging war on rival groups or local regimes.

Many researchers, including psychologists, have tried to identify common characteristics that predispose people towards terrorism. It is true that terrorist recruits are often isolated and alienated young people who identify with a group and a leader because they offer a new identity and a sense of belonging, but there is little evidence to suggest that those who enlist are radically different from others embarking on military activity. Paul Wilkinson (1977) concluded that the motivations for terrorism were simply ‘multicausal’, but others have been prepared to be more specific.24 Chalmers Johnson (1978) argued that political environments were important, such as the Palestinians’ sense that they had lost their homeland. Political interpretations tend to suggest that terrorism is a rational, calculated course of action with realisable political goals, but this does not account for the actions of some religious groups. There is little agreement on whether the decision-making processes within terrorist groups are democratic or imposed by commanding leader figures, such as Abu Nidal (Jihadist) or Velupillai Prabhakaran of the Tamil Tigers.

David Hubbard (1983) believed there may be physiological reasons for terrorism – those who are repeatedly stimulated by stress or violence become more predisposed to the condition. Others speculate that those more violent people who witness violence, even on television, are more likely to become terrorists. This explains perhaps, Al Qaeda’s preference for exceptionally violent movies depicting the killing of ‘infidels’ in Chechnya, Iraq, and Afghanistan. But given that such small numbers ever reach this threshold, there must be scepticism about the universality of these conclusions. Some psychologists consider con-

tions of mental illness, frustration-aggression, and narcissistic rage but the studies conducted so far do not offer any general conclusions. In fact, terrorist groups tend to reject psychopaths since they are a risk to their operational security. It is not that the terrorists are mentally sick, or insane, rather it is simply that some of them persuade themselves of their own righteousness with a constant rhetorical justification. To date there has been little research on the psychological vulnerabilities of insurgents and terrorist groups, but there are opportunities to exploit the sense of insecurity and the risk of detection or death practised by military forces that could benefit from further enquiry.

Eric Young argues that insurgents and terrorist groups of the present and future can achieve success more readily without recourse to protracted war. Instead, he suggests, they will move to establish a base quickly and then make an attempt to seize the state capital. While this may be true in some cases (such as Libya), it was not true of DAESH in Syria and Iraq, so a generalizable conclusion is problematic. However, the speed and extent of modern communications can mobilise populations far faster than before. In Egypt and Tunisia in 2011, large numbers of citizens were able to transmit information in real time about issues, grievances, government reactions and security forces’ movements.

Beckett and Young both assess that in the future insurgents and terrorist groups will have enhanced capability. Connections facilitated by faster and less regulated means of communication such as the Internet, already offers the insurgent more opportunities to propagate an exclusive world view in an attempt to exploit conflicts over political, religious, environmental, ideological or resources issues. However, globalisation may also provide the means for detection and closer co-operation against the insurgent and terrorist too, and foster the idea of an inclusive and integrated world that will ultimately starve them of their resources. Most insurgents have websites and other social media tools, while Hezbollah has its own television channel. Internet video posting has become a common feature of the Libyan and Syrian insurgent groups.

Religious insurgents and terrorist organisations have proven very resilient. The characteristic of the extremists which have produced suicide bombers (in so-called ‘martyrdom operations’) has been strict discipline and organisation, lubricated with a heady dose of idealism. But, it would be wrong to focus only on religious movements since religion, although capable of mass mobilisation, is very often only one factor amongst many. Religion is easily recognisable as a badge of identity and therefore appears to be the most important element, but political or socio-economic issues remain the real root cause of conflict.

Al Qaeda encouraged a trans-national networking of religiously motivated terrorist organisations and promoted the transfer of funds from innumerable sources to support extremist organisations. It, like other religiously-inspired groups in the Middle East, South and South-East Asia and North Africa, used a traditional patronage network and either built on it, or replaced it, as required. This made tracking funding and communications more difficult for security personnel.

Beckett argues that the proliferation of weapons that are more mobile but have a more devastating effect, from Semtex explosive to bio-warfare (where a few droplets of certain agents or toxins can contaminate large volumes of food or water supplies) make terrorism more likely in the future. As has been shown elsewhere in the world, even impoverished regions can generate significant insurgent and terrorist activity, improvising explosive devices. Internet access and some rudimentary manufacturing techniques can produce chemicals and explosives for local effect. However, Colin Grey maintains that biological, radiological and nuclear weapons will remain beyond the reach of non-state actors as the manufacturing process requires such sophisticated processes. Assessing trends in insurgency and terrorism is difficult because of the contextual nature of each conflict, but while radiological, biological and nuclear weapons may be beyond the reach of non-state forces, since the 1970s there has been an evolution in the tactics used by globally-orientated terrorists. The ‘9/11’ attacks on the United States took an idea developed thirty years before, namely the hijacking of civilian aircraft and hostage-taking, and combined it with the effect of a major explosion in an urban centre. Car or truck bombings also offered a means to increase the destructive effect of an explosive, and provided the mobility for the device at the same time. In the Bali bombings in the 1990s, mobile phones were used not only in the co-ordination of the attack, but also to detonate the primary device. Suicide bombing (SIED) emerged as a more frequent technique after its use in 1982 in Lebanon against American and French peacekeepers. In Afghanistan, flight-


26 Young, Ibid; Beckett, ‘Future of Insurgency’, p. 34.

27 Colin Grey, Another Bloody Century
ers wearing explosive belts would make a raid into an urban centre using small arms first before detonating their explosives at the most opportune moment.

The three main attributes of changing insurgent activities are in organisation, strategy and technology. In organisation, the insurgents have periodically abandoned hierarchical structures in favour of devolved cellular groups, depending on the threat of detection. Assessments of Al Qaeda noted that the organisation was only loosely ‘controlled’ and supported by a council which was located at the centre of a star network. Cells are connected to the network, under tight security, but the disruption of one section cannot completely defeat the whole organisation. In the war in Afghanistan in 2001, the coalition dealt a heavy blow to the central council of AQ and its command and control, but remnants of the old network have survived and moved into new theatres. However, according to Marc Sageman, Al Qaeda was an affiliation of like-minded local movements which subscribe to an ideological agenda and a method: the strategy is one of ‘general resistance’ and exploitation of opportunities, hence its ‘growth’ during the Iraq War, despite disruption to its central command and control.28 Local groups, including those in Central Asia, South East Asia and Africa will likely remain fragments of religious movements, conducting their own insurgencies but drawing inspiration from a broader war effort.

Religiously motivated groups like Al Qaeda and DAESH, according to Bruce Hoffman, purport to have a dual strategy: to wage war against and overthrow secular or ‘apostate’ regimes in the Muslim World, the ‘near-enemy’ and weaken and ultimately destroy the regimes of the rest of the world, especially the West, but also China, India and Russia, as the ‘far-enemy’.29 The strategy is unrealisable and aspirational, and rarely aligns its ends, ways and means. The result is that the actual and preferred strategy in the future will be to cause systemic disruption as much as target destruction in the regions of the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, with defiant acts of terrorism against NATO in the West. Terrorism can create a disproportionate effect on the delicate and vulnerable threads of society. In Kashmir, for example, a few acts of terrorism over a period of some years eventually caused the flight of thousands of Hindus from the state. Terrorists would like to replicate the financial chaos caused by the destruction of the World Trade Centre in New York and especially in Mumbai in November 2008. In the future terrorists are likely to use advanced information technologies for offensive and defensive purposes to a far greater extent, and this will also involve economic warfare.

The prospects of urban terrorism, if not a full insurgency, are therefore considerable. Urban areas provide good concealment, and air surveillance, while already more problematic in urban areas, might be challenged by SAMs. Their densely populated terrains offer an array of targets that cannot be protected entirely by state forces. It is likely that regular law enforcement and security forces may face heavier weapons (already a problem in the United States where lightly armed policemen are sometimes attacked with assault rifles). The intimidation or alliance of local civilians who are alienated from the state authorities would provide support for the insurgents: the large numbers of urban poor in the world’s so-called ‘shanty towns’, the ‘underclass’ whose expectations can easily be dashed, provides the possibility of large scale rioting and the creation of ‘no-go’ areas for police forces. This is currently a problem in parts of Latin America and South Africa, but may conceivably appear across the urbanised developing world.

**Deductions:**

- Religiously-inspired insurgents will continue to be resilient, can use their faith to mobilise and sustain operations, even self-sacrificial ones
- Psychological profiling of religiously-inspired insurgents to determine motive is less useful than assessments of their operational vulnerabilities
- Rapid escalation of insurgency in urban centres is likely, regardless of religious motivation
- Insurgents will not always be equipped with more sophisticated arms and communications tools initially, but convergence with the capabilities of state security forces can be anticipated.
- Deliberately seeking to inflict maximum casualties, without concern for the effect it has on world opinion.

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28 Marc Sageman
29 Bruce Hoffman
can be expected.

- Economic insurgency may form part of a religious or egalitarian insurgency

**3) Selection of Works on Projected Future Insurgency and Terrorism**

*European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, Europol (2014)*

The EU assesses the threat to the European continent based on recent trends. For example, citing the statistics for 2013, where there were 152 attacks resulting in 7 deaths, 535 arrests and 313 court cases, the EU posits that the future, which is not time bounded, indicates the following trends can be anticipated:

- Attacks will be mostly small scale
- The most acute threats, and the largest, come from separatist groups
- Threats are diverse, but religiously inspired violence is on the rise
- While threats from Far-Right movements are mainly concerned with intimidation, those from the Far-Left are more lethal
- The new threat was assessed to be radicalized European citizens returning from Syria, looking to conduct terrorist attacks in the EU.

The report correctly anticipated that religiously-inspired terrorism was the short term threat. In 2014 the religiously motivated attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices in Paris, and the murder of an off-duty British soldier in London were the most prominent. However, in other respects, the report is disappointing. It is limited to annual forecasts and does not offer medium or long term assessments. It is limited to assessments of the current or recent threats and gives little indication of what planning is required for future problems. It does not offer evaluations of related issues, such as the aspiration of religiously motivated groups to utilize North Africa migratory flows into Europe to conceal sleeper cells. It assumes that terrorism will remain the most significant threat to Europe and that law enforcement techniques are the most effective and appropriate. No consideration is given to the military role in countering terrorism or insurgency in Europe.

*Terrorism and Violence in Africa, 2014, African Union Report*

The report assesses the threat of terrorism that has spread from North and East Africa to Western and Central Africa covering the Sahel, which expands from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, regarding it as the 'most serious' threat to peace and security in the continent.

The report lists terrorist threats in several categories. These include: (i) terrorist attacks on African interests; (ii) terrorist attacks on Western and other foreign interests; (iii) use of African territories as safe havens; (iv) use of Africa as a terrorist breeding ground and source of recruitment and financing; and (v) Africa as a transit point for terrorists and fund raising tied to other illicit activities. The key terrorist organisations and movements that perpetuate these attacks are: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for the Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) in North and West Africa, Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria and Cameroon, Al-Shabaab in East Africa and the LRA in Central Africa. The report also lists the recent emergence of the Ansar Al-Sharia groups in some countries of the North Africa region. The expansion of these terrorist groups in Africa particularly in the Sahelo-Saharan region is explained as:

(i) poverty, illiteracy and high rates of unemployment among the youth and the general population, which render them vulnerable to the manipulative messages of terrorist groups and their promises of quick gain;

(ii) poor working conditions, insufficient training and discipline of law enforcement personnel that make them easy prey for corruption;

(iii) the search for safe havens and refuge by criminal networks in a zone characterized by vast territorial expanses, low and insufficient security coverage and administrative presence;
(iv) the quest for new sources of funding, especially through smuggling, drug trafficking and illegal migration;
(v) the need to conquer new areas for recruitment and redeployment with the objective of expanding the confronta-
tion field beyond their traditional zone of operations; and
(vi) Government institutional weaknesses and the existence of long stretches of porous, largely ill-monitored and
poorly-controlled borders, which, combined with vast, ill-administered spaces of territory, facilitate illegal cross-bor-
der movement of people and goods and provide fertile ground for exploitation by terrorists and transnational organ-
ized criminals.

The report also notes that some of these groups, while pursuing their locally-driven agenda, are also committed to a more
global one, following their allegiance to Al-Qaeda Central (AQC). This led not only to a shift in strategy to copy the Al-Qaeda’s
model, but also to changes in terms of ideological rhetoric, recruitment, financing, propaganda methods and *modus operan-
di*. Recourse to suicide attacks and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), as well as the use of teenagers and disabled individ-
uals as suicide bombers, has become a regular pattern. Kidnapping-for-ransom and drug-trafficking have also emerged as
major sources of financing for terrorist groups in Africa.

The report outlines the contributing factors in generating terrorism, the vulnerabilities of African states and populations, and
the tactics of terrorist groups. It makes reference to the legal instruments available in international law to tackle terrorism
and emphasizes the *Plan of Action* (PoA) that was adopted by the first African Union High Level Inter_Governmental Meeting
on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa, in Algiers in September 2002. The PoA stresses the importance of joint
action, coordination and collaboration among Member States for the eradication of terrorism on the continent. It contains spe-
cific provisions on police and border control, legislative and judicial measures, suppression of the financing of terrorists,
exchange of information, and coordination at regional, continental and international levels. It also specifies the role to be
played by African Union Council and the Commission mainly in co-ordination of counter-terrorism through a defence and secu-
rity division. The Commission also has an African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), to serve as a struc-
ture to centralize information, research and analyses on terrorism and terrorist groups and develop training programmes for
AU Member States. It disseminates situation reports and orchestrates sessions to assess the threat. In 2013, it resolved to
focus on four ‘pillars’: (1) enhancing information sharing and dissemination through the ACSRT CT-Situation-Room and the CT
Early Warning System (CTEWS), in addition to enhancing collaboration with regional Focal Points; (2) enhancing the quality and
increasing the frequency of the publications of the ASCRT; (3) implementing national and regional capacity-building pro-
grammes, including the strengthening of the capacity of the national and regional CT Focal Points; and (4) enhancing the
ACSRT cooperation with regional and international partners. The report also details measures it has taken to coordinate police
activity internationally, enhance justice mechanisms, strengthen border control, develop conflict resolution and synchronise
interventions bilaterally or by AU forces.

In terms of future assessments, there is little detail in the report, suggesting that the AU is at risk of remaining reactive,
although its list of measures suggests co-ordination and intelligence-sharing could enhance early warning. The AU Report con-
cludes that the threat is becoming ‘increasingly complex’ and ‘the boundaries between political, religious and ideological
extremism and crime are blurring, while terrorist groups operate increasingly as a network.’ It calls on member states to ‘antic-
ipate future mutations’ of terrorism but contains no assessments of this or how it is to be done.

The African Union nevertheless publishes a useful map showing current zones of most intense terrorist activity. This map con-
curs with others produced by the United States’ Department of Defense, National Intelligence Council, American and European
‘think tanks’, the UK Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (*Global Strategic Trends*, 2035) private sector forecasting
organisations and academic assessments.30

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30 See, for example, National Intelligence Council (NIC), ‘Mapping the Global Future - Report of the NIC’s 2020 Project Based on Consultations with
International Cooperation in Combatting Terrorism Next Phase, 2014, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

The Potomac Institute produce videos of their conferences on the outlook for counter-terrorism at least annually, and sometimes more frequently. They have created over 100 short academic studies in the period of the institute’s existence. Despite the title of the work, ‘Next Phase’, the majority of assessments were based on current and recent situations, although the Institute engaged partners from overseas to offer a global perspective. The Institute, in common with most other organisations engaged in counter-terrorism assessments, tends to focus on law enforcement, intelligence and surveillance, international co-operation and tactical measures to prevent or pursue terrorists. It does not assess terrorist activity as a subset of insurgency or warfare but as a mode of criminal activity in its own right.

The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 2014, UK Parliament the Secretary of State for the Home Office [Homeland Security/Interior Ministry]

The UK makes assessments of the current and recent situation but does not offer trend analysis. It evaluates the situation and threat to the United Kingdom as:

- The leadership group of Al Qa’ida is weaker than at any time since 9/11. It has played no role in recent political change in North Africa and the Middle East. Its ideology has been widely discredited and it has failed in all its objectives. Continued international pressure can further reduce its capability.
- Nevertheless ‘Al Qa’ida continues to pose a threat to UK security as do groups affiliated to Al Qa’ida’, in Yemen and Somalia, which have emerged recently.
- Four factors will continue to enable terrorist groups to grow and to survive in the future: (1) conflict and instability; (2) aspects of modern technology; (3) a pervasive ideology; and (4) radicalisation.
- In the short term, the UK believes that Jihadists returning to the UK to plan and conduct terrorist operations constitute the most likely axis of threat.
- The UK also faces a threat from Northern Ireland Related Terrorism (NIRT) which grew between 2011 and 2014.

In the future, the UK counter-terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST, will continue to be organised around four themes, each comprising a number of key objectives;

Future Trends in Insurgency and Countering Strategies

- **Pursue**: to stop terrorist attacks;
- **Prevent**: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism;
- **Protect**: to strengthen protection against a terrorist attack; and
- **Prepare**: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack

The UK government acknowledges that it has to adopt a long term strategy to de-radicalise potential domestic terrorists, and emphasizes the need to working closely with other countries. This it describes as ‘a priority’. Future threats emerge from within the text without being categorised, but include concerns about the curtailing of surveillance by new legal demands in light of the disclosures by Edward Snowdon and groups like wikileaks. Moreover, it concedes: ‘We are concerned that in some areas technology is eroding our capability to obtain intelligence about terrorist related activity’. It acknowledges that: ‘at present the greatest risk to our security comes from terrorism associated with Al Qa’ida and like-minded groups’. It hints at assessments of future threat in its commitment to certain counter-measures, such as: ‘securing the Critical National Infrastructure, in assessing and managing down the risks to crowded places and in safeguarding hazardous materials which may be used by terrorists in an attack’. Nevertheless, the UK government also admits that there is work to be done: there are ‘wider issues to resolve regarding what is known as “interoperability” between the emergency services’, and emergency plans are not yet regularly tested at the local level. The report assesses that attacks using unconventional weapons, including biological, radiological, chemical or even nuclear materials are a ‘low probability’, despite their potentially high impact. However, in the Annual Report on counter-terrorism in 2013, the UK government acknowledged that:

> ‘We remain concerned about the use made by terrorists of new technologies and want to continue to invest in our own science and technology programmes to ensure we have adequate counter measures in place, suggesting that it was not yet fully prepared for such an eventuality. The Annual report continued: ‘We have increased the stocks of medical supplies and put in place better plans to improve the speed and coverage of the health response to a large-scale terrorist attack using biological agents. We have improved our capability to undertake police forensic analysis on evidence that has been contaminated by chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) material. Last year we opened the Radiological Nuclear and Explosive Conventional Forensic Analysis Centre at the Atomic Weapons Establishment which provides world leading technical support in these areas. We are in the final stages of completing a three-year programme to ensure that effective plans are in place to respond to a CBRN incident in a major city or transport hub. We are finalising a two year programme which will significantly increase the life-saving capabilities of the emergency services in the immediate aftermath of a CBRN incident.’


The Marsh Insurance report offers an assessment of the countries that are risk, and produces a map of instability. It estimates the following sources of future risk:

- Falling oil prices and divergence of wealth in emerging economies could fuel political instability
- Political violence is extending beyond the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to Ukraine and Thailand
- Separatist movements are proliferating
- There are more of the moderately powerful states in the world which may seek irrendentist agendas or wish to fulfil their interests by resort to force
- There is a risk of greater frequency in state-sponsored cyber attacks

In these assessments there is no specific reference to terrorism and insurgency although these are implicit within the areas of risk. It assesses that the areas of greatest conflict will occur in regions that have recently been affected, including the Middle East, North Africa, Central Africa and South-East Asia. Such a short assessment is limited and lacks the detail necessary even for investors or market analysts and certainly is inadequate for military and security personnel.
This report by Stephen Parr, Kurtis Toppert and Walter Seager was based on work completed in 2013. It assesses threats to US Air Force personnel within the United States. While focusing on detailed counter-measures, the report does acknowledge that, in the future, the United States will not be immune from religiously motivated extremist attack or assaults by home-grown American militias. It advocates raising awareness by the publication of bulletins and regular briefings. However, it offers no long term or short term forecasting of the terrorist threat to the United States per se, and can only be treated as an example of a regional response to a current perceived threat.

The Future of Terrorism in a Fractious World, Professor Anatol Lieven, Department of War Studies, King’s College London and Commander Richard Walton, Head of Counter-Terrorism Command MPS (London First, 2013)

The Future of Terrorism report assesses two emerging threats to the city of London and the United Kingdom which are more generalizable across NATO: (1) the unrest in the Arab world since 2011 will produce more ‘ungoverned space’. It describes Syria’s situation as ‘chaotic’ with multiple groups competing for power and control. It also notes that c.200 volunteers from the UK have joined the Islamist movements there, some of whom will wish to return to the UK and may thereafter become involved in terrorism against it. (2) Lone wolf attacks by self-starting religiously motivated terrorists. The report does not mention the threat posed by non-Jihadist lone wolves, such as Anders Breviks in Norway, but this reflects the United Kingdom’s assessment of the priority threat (see Home Office Report, CONTEST, above). The report proposes some solutions as: (1) police and security forces should establish a surveillance of the ‘dark net’ internet; (2) the UK should develop robust and persuasive counter-narratives to challenge Jihadist ones; (3) the UK should endeavour to cultivate closer relations with Muslim communities in the country and (4) the UK should develop its overseas capacity-building programmes, although little detail is given on how and at what budget. The report is complimentary to the UK government’s own strategy and reiterates some of the sentiments of the ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ initiative of the late 1990s, which focused on domestic terrorism and radicalisation.


This is a very weak report which measures public opinion and concludes, rather obviously, that there is a public perception that terrorism will occur, occasionally, in the United States and Europe. It may offer some indication that the population is prepared, anxious and anticipates further terrorist violence, but does not forecast in what form or how populations will react.

Forecasting the Unpredictable: A Review of Forecasts on Terrorism, Edwin Bakker, The International Centre for Counter Terrorism (ICCT), The Hague (2012)

This is an excellent report in three sections that assesses 60 documents between 2000 and 2012 to evaluate the quality of the assessments. The first section describes the methodology employed when selecting the literature, the scope of the paper and limitations encountered while undertaking this comprehensive study. The second discusses all of the literature reviewed and provides an overview of broad trends and patterns that were common to most, if not all, of the publications. The final section reflects on the findings and offers conclusions for future studies. It’s chief observations are:

- The majority of publications originated from the United States, and the rest from Europe and the Western world. The report did not assess reports from China or India, or other parts of the world, even though these exist.
- Most publications were undertaken to contribute to the academic understanding of trends in and possible futures of terrorism and for the purpose of knowledge generation - rather than to the benefit of (strategic) policymaking.32

• The methodology used to produce the foresights on terrorism in most publications was at least vague or not explicat-ed at all. For example, studies were not time-bounded to five, ten or twenty years and referred implicitly to ‘the future’.33

• Projections were based on empirical or ethnographic methods, model construction, reflections by expert groups, to literature reviews and the use of scenarios and rankings.

• Many publications make reference to their data sources, although not all of them describe how the data was analysed. A variety of methods were used, ranging from analysing statistics, examining case studies, reviewing literature, to reflecting on professional experiences.

• Many of the terrorism forecasts predominantly address one particular type of terrorism: Al Qaeda or religiously moti-vated terrorism (40 out of 60 publications).34

• Ethnosectarian terrorism and lone-wolf terrorism are often addressed in the more recent publications (2010–2012). This phenomenon is partly described as a type of terrorism and partly as a tactic or modus operandi.

• There is a strong focus on the use of CBRN weapons (25 studies of 60).35

• There is a relatively frequent focus on cyber terrorism and terrorist use of the Internet.36 Other future methods anticipated were arson-induced forest fires as a weapon of mass destruction, laser weapon use, cyber-terrorism, terrorist CBRN use, ‘new warfare’ [insurgency], and the threat of 9/11 becoming a model for future terrorism.37

• The most commonly cited groups as future threats were: al Qaeda, female terrorists, Sikh separatist terrorists, loyalist paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, or recidivist jihadists.38

• Most publications assessed contextual structural factors for terrorism to flourish in the future as demographics, scarcity of natural resources, globalisation, power shifts, technological innovations, changing perceptions of identity and changes in counterterrorism strategies.

• Most forecasts say more about the present state of terrorism and terrorism research, than about the future.

Deductions:

• Most publications on the future of terrorism assess the threat coming from a specific terrorist organisation or from a specific terrorist tactic, such as cyber-terrorism.

• One cited source, Ackerman, discusses the future potential threat of the Earth Liberation Front and other radical environmentalists.39

• The report concluded that (1) terrorism will continue to exist in the future, and (2) terrorism is not static, but a chang-ing phenomenon, that is likely to change in the future.

• The National Intelligence Council tacitly suggests that terrorism’s appeal could diminish by 2025 when there is con-tinuous economic growth and increased youth employment

• There was a general anticipation of ‘decentralisation’, (decentralisation of terrorist organisations is likely to lead to the emergence of dispersed sets of groups, cells and individuals, who are loosely organised and self-supportive) and ‘individualisation’ (‘lone wolf’ terrorism).


• Current risk-perceptions interfere with scientific analyses of future threats.

**Confronting an Uncertain Threat: The Future of Al Qaeda, Rick Nelson, Thomas Sanderson, CSIS, (2011)**

This report sets out scenarios and analyses of them to assess possible trajectories for Al Qaeda and its affiliated movements (AQAM) by 2025. The scenarios are (1) AQAM remains a core-driven movement; (2) AQAM becomes an affiliate group driven movement; (3) AQAM is a movement driven by lone wolves; (4) AQAM becomes a state actor; or (5) AQAM collapses.

The first scenario was assessed to be dependent on a reduction in counter-terrorism pressure against AQAM and the emergence of new safe havens. The scenario was also dependent on continued AQ networking, a new leadership, new (micro) havens in places like Central Asia and unfettered communications. The second scenario envisaged the emergence of regional but more aggressive movements that could coalesce. In addition to the factors listed above, this scenario would be dependent on more Muslims becoming dissatisfied with their governments (a fair projection of the events that led to the Arab Spring), ideological resonance, and the failure of core leadership to retain cohesion. The Lone Wolf scenario would be evidence of the atomization of AQAM, but the enduring appeal of the ideological agenda and uninterrupted global electronic communications. The fourth, state-actor scenario, was envisaged as taking place in Pakistan as state governance collapsed, US funding was terminated and experienced militant groups gained the upper hand. The final scenario of AQAM defeat was based on a disassociation from the ideology of the movement, the death of key leaders of AQAM, unrelenting counter-terrorism pressure, and safe havens are unobtainable.

The report made an assessment of strategic shocks that could be encountered in the future and which would have a significant impact on counter-terrorism globally, including the detonation of WMD devices; the collapse of the Pakistani and Saudi Arabian regimes to Jihadists; an Iran-Israel War; a Far-Right campaign of violence against Muslims in Europe; Palestine achieves statehood and Israel is recognized by Arab states; OPEC is dissolved; and AQAM attack China in a sustained campaign.

The report recommended a global overwatch programme, the directed denial of certain key assets, including finances that could be utilized by terrorists, accompanied by precise legal and military action. These would focus on disrupting and denying leadership and networking functions. The report also recommended local action to deny safe havens by supporting state governments. There was a recommendation to tackle the ‘toxic narrative’ of Jihadism. It urged further regional co-operation and the appropriate resourcing of the counter-terrorism effort.

The report also identified specific issues with future terrorist funding, including the use of fragmented networks, exploitation of illicit commerce, new technological sources (crowd funding), front companies, corruption of state resources and new financial nodes of investment in the developing world.

**Deductions:**

- Analysis of optional scenarios is useful in so far as it draws out the possible responses that governments and military forces might otherwise overlook. That said, it is remarkable how accurate some of the assessments turned out to be in the short term (2011-2014). AQAM is likely to remain a fragmented movement.

- There is often an emphasis in future assessments of the importance of charismatic leadership to Jihadists, but this is only important at the tactical or information warfare level, not at the strategic.

- Terrorist financing projections are likely to exploit weaknesses and proliferation in the developing world and the electronic environment.

**Future Trends in Terrorism, Carl Ungere Australian Strategic Policy Institute, (2011)**

The report estimates that the terrorist threat of the future will affect individuals, institutions and the internet, rather than the traditional assessments of states, citizens and governments. It concludes that the new appeal of Jihadism combined with new contexts (environments) will foster more terrorism. The report is typical in that it addresses the threat without the context or opportunities afforded by these new environments.
Deduction:

- The appeal of DAESH has been to promote the idea of the offensive, strength and success in contrast to Al Qaeda’s original appeal of self-defence and victimhood, humiliation and Western repression. This new narrative theme and the context of the civil wars underway in the Middle East has presented a new generation of disaffected Muslims with a justification for armed resistance.

- Nevertheless, the report does not acknowledge that the overwhelming response of the Muslim world has been the rejection of Jihadist extremism, that the largest casualty toll has been of Muslims and that the consequences of war in the Muslim world has been economically damaging.

The Past and Future of Terrorism Research, Todd Sandler, Create Homeland Security Center, (2009)

Sandler assesses five areas where economic analysis of terrorism has had the greatest policy relevance during the last 30 years. These areas involve evaluating the effectiveness of counterterrorism actions, identifying the causes of terrorism, measuring the economic ramifications of terrorism, analyzing the time-series dynamics of terrorist events, and formulating game-theoretic representations of terrorism. The report’s value lies in synthesizing past research and in identifying the key policy-relevant issues that require additional analysis. These issues include understanding the operation of global terrorist networks, ascertaining the payback of counterterrorism strategies, evaluating the returns from alternative forms of international cooperation, and investigating the strategic aspects of suicide terrorism. A procedure for tackling each of these policy concerns is recommended through game-theory, simulation, assessments of counter-factuals and analysis of options through tools such as experimental economics.

The criticisms made by Sandler are well-founded but the tendency of game theoretical and academic work of this nature is that it is based on the assumptions of rational choice rather than extreme behaviour and psychology. Risk thresholds are necessarily higher for those engaged in conducting terrorist campaigns and evading state security. Nevertheless, it is without question that terrorism studies need embrace not only empirical case studies and evaluation of modi operandi, but also examine strategic options and trajectories.

Deduction:

- Simulation and counter-factual analysis can assist in exploring options for terrorist movements.


Neumann assesses two future scenarios: (1) the resurgence of Al Qaeda or (2) the emergence of the leaderless Jihad. Regardless the direction of Al Qaeda, he urges his German audience to obey the rule of law scrupulously, develop community policing techniques (used in the UK), redefine the German foreign policy to pursue terrorists around the globe in order to strengthen the will to do so, and continue to use a multilateralist approach, particularly with reference to developing links with Pakistan.

Deduction:

- Counter-terrorism is a multilateral and multi-national effort requiring structures, institutions and resilience.

US Institutions on Trends in Terrorism

These are:

- Homegrown radicalized terrorism and returning Jihadist citizens
- New terrorist technological capabilities
- Future threats posed by Al Qaeda and affiliated international groups

The solutions are couched as law enforcement issues, requiring better intelligence-management and sharing, early warning within the United States, judicial reforms and border security. Reports make reference to developments outside of the United States that will foster instability and increase risk to American citizens overseas.


Metz argued in 1993 that the existing evaluation of insurgency was too narrowly focussed and he offered two new categories, both based on psychology: spiritual insurgencies and commercial insurgencies. The first would be, according to Metz, driven by the challenge of modernisation, the search for meaning and the pursuit of justice. Commercial insurgency would be driven by the desire to acquire wealth. He estimated that the regions where commercial insurgency would dominate was Latin America, while the Middle East and Su-Saharan Africa, although he believed that commercial insurgency would develop in Africa in due course. Both forms would appear, Metz argued, in South-East Asia. He assessed the stresses on populations in the developing world in ways that others have done since: misdistribution of wealth, unemployment, poverty, reactions to modernisation, collapse of traditional social systems, frustrations borne of unrealistic expectations, weak national identity or cohesion, weak governance, absence of basic services and a lack of mechanisms for peaceful change. He draws upon Ted Gurr’s work on relative deprivation and Victor Frankel’s notion of the importance of identity, showing that atavism, the failure of a social contract, urban conditions, and rural decay increasing pressure on cities, a youth population bulge, and widespread access to weapons in the developing world created the conditions for future insurgency.  

Metz noted that the new insurgencies would not be defined by Marxism but by their goals and strategies. The spiritual insurgency would emphasise the need to reorganise society and would seek justice, perhaps through revenge. He noted that the failure of governments had fostered nativist or atavist movements, especially in Latin America.

Metz’s definition of commercial insurgency is akin to that of the crime-insurgency nexus identified by other scholars since the 1990s. Opportunism and exploitation of resources is far easier when armed and accompanied by like-minded individuals, but Metz notes that organised crime seeks to legitimize its violence to gain support and ‘access’ to populations or corrupt figures in government. Naxalite Insurgents in central and eastern India have used just this technique to ensure they enjoy popular backing for otherwise criminal activity. In his assessments of the Middle East, Metz posits that the most fundamental conflict will remain that between Shia and Sunni Muslims, and insurgencies may occur under the general guise of a legitimating Jihad. He correctly identified that veteran insurgent cadres from Afghanistan would transmit their techniques and ideas across the Muslim world.

Deduction:

- Insurgency will have forms that reflect its strategic ends and its context.


Jones and Johnston assess the traditional explanations for the causes of insurgency to make projections about the future, evaluate the importance of external support in the success or longevity of insurgencies, and weigh up strategies and tactics used by insurgents for the future. They estimate that China will play a more important role in fostering insurgency but also in counter-insurgency; that insurgents will develop techniques and tactics more rapidly than in the past, and they will make more extensive use of commercial technologies for communications, information warfare and recruitment. They also estimate that


insurgents will endeavour to become stealthier in the electronic and physical environment, making them harder to detect.

Jones and Johnston review the conflict in Afghanistan and estimate that others will attempt to replicate insurgency as the most effective way to counter NATO advantages. They argue that insurgencies will develop largely through a failure of state capacity. They critique ‘greed’ (economic) and ‘grievance’ (ethnic or religious) motives and claim that these are inadequate explanations for insurgency in the past and the future. They acknowledge that profit is a motivating factor for insurgency, although it is not causal and Jones and Johnston perhaps confuse the metrics. They dismiss the greed explanation as providing evidence only for ‘mere criminality’ but they rightly note that an overemphasis on greed motives overlooks important social and political grievances. They criticise Collier and Hoeffler’s use of low literacy as an indicator for greed motives, suggesting that the same metrics would prove grievance as the primary driver too.

Jones and Johnston also criticise the ‘grievance’ motive, which places the emphasis on the more durable systems of belief, ethnicity and identity. In their assessment they found that not all insurgencies are correlated with regions of fragmentation along belief, ethnicity and identity. They cite other studies which dispute the claims of Elbadawi and Sambanis, showing that civil wars and insurgencies are less dependent on diversity and more closely aligned with repressive, autocratic governments. This leads to their conclusion that state capacity and conduct is a more reliable measure of causation in insurgency. They examine the quantitative data of government effectiveness, corruption, rule of law, and capacity such as GDP and find that states that cannot provide services, control borders, pay for institutions and infrastructure are more likely to face insurgency. They also found a correlation with remote peripheries, either jungle or mountain terrain where governance is particularly costly. They argue that changing geo-political conditions have not altered this essential finding.

What Jones and Johnston do not acknowledge is that state capacity is in part dependent on economic performance and the severity of political crises; in other words, separating greed, grievance and state capacity are only useful in helping to identify individual cases of emphasis, but they cannot be taken as universally applicable. The analysis of historical examples demonstrates the weakness of attempting to offer a single or dominant and linear causal explanation.

Links between terrain, poverty and state incapacity appear to provide environments where insurgency is more likely, if triggered by a political crisis. Poor countries are more vulnerable to strategic shocks, but if we do not nations as categories, as Jones and Johnston do, and instead use urban centres, regions and megacities, then the projected global situation is worse.

In terms of future assessments, Jones and Johnston suggest:

- Jihadists will model the Afghan insurgency as the most effective strategic ‘ways’ of confronting NATO, just as Maoism was a model in the 1960s and 9/11 set a model for anti-Western terrorism.
- Insurgents with a ‘roughly symmetric’ capability as governments will adopt a conventional war strategy.
- A globalised insurgent strategy, as posited by John Mackinlay or David Kilcullen, is dismissed on the basis that insurgencies still occur in states against national governments, and inadequate international Jihadist leadership has merely reinforced the importance of insurgencies within states and regions.
- External support remains important to the success or failure of insurgencies. Two thirds of successful insurgencies had external backing, whereas only one third without external support could prevail.

Jones and Johnston work on the assumption that states are the most significant phenomena in the international system, but this is not a verdict that all share. Even one hundred years ago, the world was dominated by empires rather than nation states, and this system co-existed with a variety of relics of previous polities, including clannish fiefdoms and tribal monarchies. It is likely that a variety of political systems will exist by the middle of the twenty-first century, even if the state system dominates by 2035. Moreover, it would be wrong to dismiss entirely the effect of trans-national communication and allegiances. Volunteering for internationalist causes or ideological military service was not unknown for millions of personnel in the twentieth century, either to serve empires, communist internationalism or anti-Bolshevism. There is substantial evidence to show that large numbers serving DAESH in Iraq and Syria originate from outside of the Middle East and the zone of conflict.

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Assessing the trends of the 1990s, it appeared that external backing of insurgencies was on the rise along with the overall number of insurgencies. However, egalitarian or Marxist insurgencies appeared to be in decline after 2000 while the number of religious Jihadist ones increased. Overall, however, the number of insurgencies globally was in decline. The statistics provided by Jones and Johnston do not more than remind us that, depending on the data selected, trends can be highly misleading. An analyst in the 1990s would have concluded that the trajectory of all insurgencies was increasing and would have made a reasonable assessment that the future trend was an increasing one. However, a decade later the steepness of the gradient is significantly reduced, and the globe appears to have reached stability in terms of numbers of new outbreaks. Moreover, their categorisation of insurgencies as ‘communist’ or ‘Islamic’ is too imprecise. Ideological causes expressed by some Palestinian groups, for example, are at the same time, egalitarian, religious, irredentist, anarchist and eschatological.

The article includes an assessment of China’s interest in fostering insurgency through specially trained PLA units, but this only emulates the United States and reflects Chinese anxieties that this is a form of warfare they need to be able to foster or counter, depending on their national interests.

Jones and Johnston evaluate future insurgent tactics, suggesting that there will be more SIEDs, more sophisticated IEDs and mines, the latter despite a decline, potentially, in the number of insurgencies. This is the result of their cheap costs, effectiveness and simplicity. Counter-insurgent forces have developed new vehicles and detection techniques to combat the IED, but one can expect a technological race between the systems, as was found in Afghanistan. There is also an expectation that IED expertise will be shared and transmitted across the internet, reducing the time taken to acquire skills in mine warfare amongst insurgents. Insurgents will be able to exploit an array of technical equipment, including GPS and mobile phone applications (apps). Commercially available chemicals can also be transformed into explosives by insurgents with the relevant knowledge from electronic means. Propaganda is more easily transmitted across distance and to a greater variety of groups, which can elicit lethal retaliation. Anders Breviks in Norway was motivated to attack the Norwegian labour party’s personnel because he believed they were too tolerant of radical Islamists and mainstream Muslims. Electronic tools may or may not be easier to monitor depending on technological advances in the future. While encryption and location-masking software may enhance stealth, big data may make concealment of an electronic signature near impossible.

Jones and Johnston argue that NATO states, like the United States, need to develop sensors, cultivate a willingness to interact with local populations, develop knowledge of developing world regions, establish both defensive and offensive electronic capabilities in the cyber domain and wage an unrelenting information war on their enemies.

**Deductions:**

- NATO’s enemies will model the Afghan insurgency as the most effective strategic ‘ways’ of confronting NATO
- Insurgents with a ‘roughly symmetric’ capability as governments will adopt a conventional war strategy, as DAESH have done against governments in Syria and Iraq
- Insurgents will be able to develop capabilities faster through electronic tools, especially in IEDs, which, along with traditional weapons, will be the most significant weapon system of the insurgent for physical and psychological reasons
- Globalised insurgency should be understood as a series of connections and access to information that can enable a local or regional armed resistance movement
- External support can significantly enhance the chances of insurgents achieving success.

**How the Weak Win Wars, Ivan Arreguin-Toft**

Although it goes without saying that not all wars are revolutionary, Arreguin-Toft’s focus on asymmetric conflict does seem particularly apt for the study of insurgency and civil wars, where asymmetry of force is often a key characteristic. Arreguin-Toft’s thesis is that, particularly for US policy, the problems of asymmetric conflict, such as catastrophic terrorism, and the necessity of involvement in ethnic conflicts and civil wars, will remain vital concerns for the foreseeable future. He posits that...
the best explanation for weak actor success in many cases of asymmetric conflict lies with a “strategic interaction” dynamic. Strong actors will win quickly and decisively only when opposing actors employ similar approaches. When opposing actors employ opposite approaches (direct versus indirect), weak actors are much more likely to emerge victorious. Professor Arreguin-Toft presents a persuasive thesis about the structural problem that inhibits stronger powers, but arguably this is a challenge primarily for liberal states. Moreover, the use of overwhelming force, even after a prolonged campaign might still prove decisive: in other words, time may be a misleading variable. In the case of Sri Lanka, despite opposite approaches, the Sinhalese government forces defeated the LTTE insurgents decisively in a civil war that had lasted two decades.

Deduction:

- In some cases, asymmetry carries a burdensome logic for liberal state counter-insurgents: its methods can sometimes be counter productive and a decisive victory or the steady erosion of the means to resist could compliment the frustration of the insurgents desire to fulfil their strategic ends.


This book takes as its starting point a setback to Islamists in Switzerland, where a referendum had banned the construction of new minarets. Radical Muslims protested on the grounds that they intended to ‘take back’ the continent of Europe, which they concluded, rather a-historically, had ‘belonged’ to the Muslim world. According to Yohannes and Menelik, Europe is the future battleground for radical terrorists claiming affiliation with Islam. The authors suggest that as early as the 1950s, members of Islamic Brotherhood (Ikhwans) established mosques in the hope of future ‘colonisation’. Today, the authors assert, the Ikwans and Asian Islamic fundamentalists, have succeeded in establishing hundreds of Mosques using funding from the strict Wahabist version of Islam favoured in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. These mosques are augmented with research institutes, charities and businesses throughout Europe. Radical Muslims in Europe allegedly conduct their under-cover strategy in support of this wider agenda -attracting educated youngsters, immigrants, students and converts.

The authors have clustered together quite unrelated developments to suggest a single conspiracy. Turkish guest workers for example did not settle in Germany to advance the cause of the Muslim Brotherhood but to take advantage of the economic development of West Germany in the Cold War. Equally, ‘missionary activity’ by Wahabi Muslim was given a stronger impetus after the Islamic Shia Revolution in Iran and growing fears that European Muslims lacked the appropriate and approved materials for religious observance. The book’s thesis is therefore weakened by its obvious attempt to portray a conspiracy, its conflation of different themes and an implied agenda. See also Ian Johnson, *A Mosque in Munich: Nazis, the CIA, and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2010). For a more useful survey see Rik Coolsaet, (ed), *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experiences* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011).

Deduction:

- While radical groups claiming affiliation with Islam use a narrative of ‘reclaiming Europe’ or exploit the inclusivity and protections of the rights of Muslim European citizens, their appeal is still limited.


This masterful handbook provides a comprehensive overview of the state of academic analysis and debate on insurgency and counterinsurgency, as well as an-up-to-date survey of contemporary insurgent movements and government counter-insurgency campaigns around the world. The volume is divided into three parts: Part I: Theoretical and Analytical Issues, Part II: Insurgent Movements, and Part III: Counterinsurgency Cases. With each of the handbook’s chapters providing extensive reference resources, it is also organized to serve as a guide for further study and research. This volume is included in the listing for this review essay because of the substantial overlap between many of these insurgent movements and terrorist organizations (e.g., Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Taliban are considered as both insurgent and terrorist organizations) and the governments’ counterinsurgent campaigns are similar in many ways to counterterrorism measures.
Future Trends in Insurgency and Countering Strategies


An updated and substantial expansion of the widely acclaimed original edition published in 1998 – despite being somewhat out of date in 2012 – is still considered one of the most comprehensive books on terrorism. Like its original edition, its chapters discuss how to define terrorism, the origins of contemporary terrorism, the internationalization of terrorism, the role of extremist religions in driving terrorism, the nature of suicide terrorism, the exploitation by terrorist groups of old and new media, terrorists’ objectives, tactics, and technological innovations in their use of weapons, targeting, and future trends in terrorist campaigns, which are referred to in this report’s introduction.


This innovative book investigates how and why terrorism’s organizational structures, *modus operandi*, political agendas and types of warfare have changed over the years as a result of certain dynamics, such as the information revolution created by modernity and globalization. It concludes that both governments and societies need to better confront the challenges created by these “new” forms of terrorism in the areas where it has evolved.


The Belfast, Northern Ireland-based author, a widely published academic expert on terrorism (who was mistakenly attacked by a terrorist group in Belfast in 1991), questions whether terrorism since 9/11 has evolved into a new form of mass-casualty, politically-motivated violence by groups of a global reach or whether it remains essentially unchanged, with small groups employing violence in their struggles against their ‘imperialist’ adversaries. He also explores the responses by governments to how terrorism has evolved and whether it is possible to facilitate the engagement of terrorist groups in a peace process in order to terminate such conflicts peacefully.


A sweeping, well-written historical overview by a prominent British historian on the nature of modern terrorism from its origins in 19th century Western Europe to the contemporary period. The book’s chapters cover terrorist groups ranging from the early Russian nihilists, the Black International anarchists, the nationalist Irish Republican Brotherhood, to post 1960s terrorism in the form of Palestinian groups, the Red Brigades, the Red Army Faction, as well as the contemporary global threats fuelled by al Qaida and its affiliated jihadist groups. Unfortunately it gives projections to the future and one is only able to extrapolate *modus operandi* and ideological similarities between terrorist movements across history.


In this important volume, the author, a prominent academic expert on terrorism, has assembled her articles, many of which were previously published in the 1980s and 1990s, with a few published after 2001. The result is a comprehensive compilation that is divided into four parts: (1) the concept of terrorism, its causes, and the distinction between “old” and “new” terrorism; (2) how terrorists organize, their strategies, and the psychology of terrorism; (3) governmental responses to terrorism, such as coercive diplomacy, the formulation of counterterrorism strategies and “grand strategies,” and (4) how terrorism ends, including why and how terrorism may be rejected or renounced by its adherents.


A comprehensive compilation of articles by leading experts on the historical context of terrorism, this reader serves as an excellent supplementary text. The volume covers issues such as David Rapoport’s notion of the four historical waves of modern terrorism; the challenges in defining terrorism; terrorism’s root causes; the psychological processes involved in the development of terrorists and motivations to join terrorist groups; the spectrum of terrorist movements, ranging from the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Provisional IRA, right-wing religious-super-nationalist groups, to Al Qaeda; narco-terrorism and insurgency; the nature of suicide terrorism; the components of counterterrorism, and future trends in terrorism, including the possibility of WMD attacks.

A well-organized and comprehensive textbook on terrorism and counterterrorism. Divided into three parts, it covers subjects ranging from (1) defining terrorism, global terrorism, terrorism in the American context, religiously driven terrorism, the causes and drivers of terrorism, state sponsorship of terrorist groups, terrorists’ goals, tactics and targeting, organizational formations, and how terrorism is funded; (2) the components of counterterrorism, such as the use of “hard” and “soft” power, balancing security and civil liberties, and the components of homeland security; and (3) the role of the media in covering terrorism, and how terrorists exploit the mass media of communications, including the Internet.


The authors are leading academics in what is called “Critical Terrorism Studies.” In this textbook, they outline their critique of “conventional” terrorism studies by providing a counter-explanation of terrorism over issues such as defining terrorism, the nature of the terrorist threat and what they consider to be effective and ineffectual counter-terrorism strategies. Chapters cover issues such as the “Orthodox study of terrorism,” “critical approaches to terrorism studies,” “the cultural construction of terrorism,” “bringing gender into the study of terrorism,” conceptualizing terrorism, reconsidering the terrorism threat, types of terrorism, understanding state terrorism, the causes of non-state terrorism, responding to non-state terrorism, and assessing the war on terror. While one may not necessarily agree with their political positions on the terrorist threat, it is important to take note of their assumptions and critiques of the field. Unfortunately, despite the utility of the text for definitions, it offers no insight into future trends.


This is an excellent textbook of the latest trends in terrorism and counterterrorism studies. Chapters cover a conceptual overview of terrorism (defining terrorism, historical and ideological origins, and causes of terrorism), terrorist environments (typologies of terrorist groups, including state terrorism), and terrorist battlegrounds (the role of the media in covering terrorism, warfare tactics and targeting), counterterrorism, and future trends and projections, which are essentially matters of electronic tools, and possible exploitation of WMD as well as continuities with the past. Also noteworthy are the discussions and case studies on a range of topics featured in each chapter and various end-of-chapter materials, including key terms and Internet-based exercises.


This widely used textbook’s fourth edition – and the author’s second textbook on terrorism – is a multidisciplinary, comprehensive examination of terrorism in general and terrorist incidents in particular. There is coverage of major theories on terrorism, case studies, terrorist group profiles, and significant events. Each chapter begins with “Opening Viewpoints” that are illustrated with relevant examples to introduce readers to the themes and theories in the discussion that follows, and ends with “Discussion Boxes” that provide controversial information, along with critical thinking questions to stimulate discussion. The text is accompanied by photographs, tables, and graphics.


An innovative pedagogic approach to studying terrorism and counterterrorism through a debate format, with scholars representing different perspectives debating one another over controversial issues. Although one may challenge the editors’ use of ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ perspectives since some of the ‘critical’ approaches can be quite dogmatic and partisan in their own way (aside from other problem areas), this is still a valuable textbook for the way its contributors address significant issues in the discipline. These include theoretical issues, such as how to define terrorism and state terrorism, substantive issues, such as the magnitude of the threat presented by Al Qaeda and its affiliates, the effectiveness of various counterterrorism responses, and ethical issues, such as the use of torture in interrogations of prisoners and targeted killings.

This work is difficult to obtain but internet reviewers have been less than complimentary about it. Dr Casserleigh is better known for work on organisational management disaster relief and health emergencies while Dr Merrick is a specialist in electronic design and disaster relief in Africa. Neither conducted more than a baseline survey of terrorism in previous work and reviewers were frustrated by the contradictory nature of the prose. This cannot therefore be considered a serious study of the literature or the science of insurgency and terrorism.


This important volume applies a theoretical and empirical economics-based methodology, together with political analysis, to qualitatively and quantitatively examine the incidents domestic and transnational terrorism, in order to generate a spectrum of terrorist warfare trends. It also evaluates the effectiveness of governments’ counterterrorism policies, including dilemmas for liberal democracies in balancing security and civil liberties. A separate case study analyzes governmental responses to hostage incidents. See also Alan B. Krueger, *What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).


When this volume was published, it represented one of the first attempts to inventory the strengths and weaknesses in terrorism research in order to identify a set of priorities for future research. Fourteen academic experts contributed chapters on topics such as new trends in terrorism studies, the impact of 9/11 on terrorism research, responding to the roots of terror, the socio-psychological components of terrorist motivations, the nature of Al Qaeda’s campaign, recruitment of religiously motivated terrorists in Europe, the landscape of intelligence analysis and counterterrorism, terrorism in cyberspace, and the components of terrorism and counterterrorism studies.


An important examination of innovations in terrorist tactics and technologies over the years in order to develop an empirical theory of innovation by terrorist groups. The book considers the critical factors responsible for the differences in such learning and innovation practices among terrorist organizations. Case studies of four terrorist organizations (Aum Shinrikyo, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command, the Riyadus-Salikhin Suicide Battalion, and the Revolutionary Organization November 17) highlight the key factors in producing innovative tactics and weaponry by such groups. The author concludes by highlighting key trends for the future in order to identify signature characteristics of innovation-based terrorist organizations, which is a critical element in predictive threat assessment and in countering such groups’ campaigns.


This insightful study examines David Rapoport’s thesis of the four waves of the history of modern terrorism to demonstrate how a new insurgent grouping has emerged to constitute a distinct ‘fifth wave’ of modern terrorism, which the author terms as the “New Tribalism”. The terrorist groups constituting the ‘fifth wave’ share similar strategic ambitions and tactics, which the author characterizes as “radical localism, tribalism and xenophobia.”


The contributors to this conceptually interesting edited volume, who come from many disciplines and contrasting perspec-
tives, apply David Rapoport’s notion of the four historical waves of modern terrorism – with each one lasting for 40 year “generations” – to explain the trajectories of terrorism and their impact on society over time, including how mob violence breaks out, how political violence spreads, the role of religion in driving terrorism and violence, the relationship between technology and terrorist warfare, and other issues, in order to analyze the questions that such phenomena present, including future trends. These essentially extend the cycles of violence and causes into future environments.


According to the author, who grew up in Northern Ireland where she experienced the effects of terrorism first-hand, terrorists are basically *rational* political actors who calibrate their tactics in a measured and reasoned way, including going to great lengths to justify their actions to themselves, their followers, and the world. To defeat terrorism, the author argues, governments must therefore understand a terrorist adversary’s motivations and grievances. These consist of three elements: a legitimizing ideology, such as a belief that they are doing the right thing or God’s will in seeking revenge for a humiliation, a real or imagined defeat of their constituency by a government’s forces, and, on a personal level, some sort of dissatisfaction. For terrorism to succeed a group requires an enabling society that views its members as “heroes’ and provides them a measure of sanctuary or safe haven. To resolve terrorist rebellions, the author proposes a strategy to contain the threat and reduce its local support.


At the time of its publication, this was considered a pioneering study on the global Salafi jihad – the interlocking radical religiously motivated terrorist networks led and shaped by Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda terrorist organization. Compiling biographies of 172 terrorist operatives claiming affiliation with Islam gathered from open sources, the author employed social network analysis to examine Al Qaeda’s operations since 1998. He identifies four large clusters of terrorist operatives: the first, consisting of the central staff of Al Qaeda and of the global Salafist jihad movement, which formed the movement’s overall leadership (many of whom were hiding in the Pakistan-Afghan border regions); the second, including operatives from core Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen and Kuwait); the third, also known as the Maghreb Arabs (the North African nations of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria), who resided in France and England; and the fourth belonging to Al Qaeda’s ally, Jemaah Islamiyah, which was centered in Indonesia and Malaysia. Such evaluation of Al Qaeda’s origins, evolution, organizational and demographic characteristics are the prerequisites for effective counteraction. The utility of this work in assessing future terrorism ad insurgency is to emphasise the ‘understanding’ aspect of an environment before action.


This book updates and expands on the author’s earlier work, on the factors that drive radicalization into terrorism within the Salafi jihadist context. According to the author, the pre-9/11 AQ “Central” had morphed into a social movement consisting of several thousand members. Although decentralized and fragmented, this made AQ even more dangerous because as a social movement it had exponentially grown beyond its organizational origins. How do AQ’s supporters become radicalized into violent extremism? The author formulates a four phase process that depends on an individual’s sense of moral outrage in response to perceived suffering by fellow Muslims around the world; interpreting such moral outrage within the context of a larger war against Islam; having such a sense of “moral outrage” resonating with one’s own personal experience, for example, a sense of discrimination or difficulty in making it in Western society, and, finally, being mobilized by networks that take one to the next level of violent radicalization in the form of terrorist cells. The author’s “leaderless jihad” paradigm has been challenged for downplaying the role of facilitators in the West who play a crucial role in recruiting new members into AQ and its affiliated groups, thereby resulting in a new organizational hybrid that characterizes how AQ and its affiliates operate. Despite this criticism, the author’s innovative use of empirically derived data to generate AQ-related trends was a significant contribution to counterterrorism studies. Indeed, his conclusions foreshadowed the evolution of AQ and its affiliates and projected AQs return to prominence in a new form.

The author also wrote *Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), which was a meticulously researched biography of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, one of al Qaeda’s most important theoreticians and strategists. In addition to writing an influential 1,600 page book, al-Suri had trained a generation of young jihadists in the Afghan training camps and helped establish the organization’s European networks. Syrian-born al-Suri was captured in Pakistan in late 2005 but released by the Syrian government in 2012. The author is a research professor at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI).

Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman, (eds), *Fault Lines in Global Jihad: Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures* (New York: Routledge, 2011)

This important edited volume focuses on the causes, nature, and impact of the ideological and theological divisions within the jihadi movement, and the splits between jihadi’s and other Islamist groups which are contributing to the weakening of the jihadi movement. After discussing the fissures dividing the jihadi’s over strategic, tactical, and organizational issues, the book’s second part addresses several case studies of jihadi disagreements with other groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and the Shi’a community, all of which affect the global jihadi movement’s overall cohesion.

Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert, editors, *Countering the Financing of Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2008)

This edited volume brings together leading experts from the disciplines of terrorism, international relations, global finance, law, and criminology, to assess the effectiveness of governments and international organizations in countering the methods employed by terrorists to fund their operations. It offers insights of utility for the future.


An authoritative primer on terrorist financing, it examines what terrorist organizations need to acquire in order to survive and operate. Vittori describes the various means used to meet these needs. Of particular interest is the author’s discussion of how terrorism financing has evolved over the years and his formulation of what he terms a “seven category typology of terrorist resourcing” based on how each selected strategy affects a group’s operational autonomy. To illustrate this typology, case studies for each category are provided, based on actual examples drawn from the history of terrorism that apply to the spectrum of groups ranging from hierarchical organizations to “lone wolf” cells.


The author presents a comprehensive framework to analyze how terrorist groups go about financing their activities. This framework is applied to empirical case studies of terrorist group financing in Europe, Africa, South Asia and the Middle East, focusing on fund raising activities ranging from donations, criminality, to legitimate enterprises. Especially noteworthy are tables that estimate the cost of various types of terrorist operations and the impact of real-world counter-terrorism financing regimes on terrorist groups’ illicit economic activities.


A comprehensive account of how terrorist groups use the Internet’s new media by examining the content of their websites, including their extremist television programs. Based on the authors’ content analysis of the discussion in such extremist forums and chat-rooms, they discuss how terrorism 1.0 has migrated to 2.0 where the interactive nature of new media is used to build virtual organizations and communities that transcend physical boundaries. Terrorist groups’ media efforts are also directed at women and children, which are part of their long term strategies to radicalize whole communities. Of particular interest is the authors’ examination of the relationship between terrorists’ media presence and their actual terrorist activity

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on the ground. They conclude that, although the use of social networking tools such as Facebook and YouTube may advance terrorist groups’ broadcast reach, the full impact of their use of such new media remains uncertain. Also discussed is the future of cyber terrorism and lessons learned from government counterterrorism strategies against terrorists’ use of the Internet.


An authoritative discussion by a veteran counterterrorism expert of terrorists’ motivations and efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, the availability of nuclear black markets, whether ‘suitcase’ nuclear bombs are feasible, and how mysterious substances such as red mercury have been thought of being instrumental in manufacturing such weapons.


A comprehensive, multidisciplinary account on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism and governments’ options for counter-action. Topics covered include terrorists’ incentives for acquiring WMD; nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons technologies and genetically engineered weapons; sensor technologies; mathematical methods for analyzing terrorist threats and allocating governmental response resources; the role of domestic U.S. politics in shaping defence investments to counter WMD; port and airport defence; response and recovery technologies for WMD-contaminated sites; research and development incentives for bio-weapon vaccines and other homeland security technologies; psychological treatment of WMD survivors, and international initiatives to limit WMD proliferation by terrorist groups.

Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett, (eds), *Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Boca Raton, FL: CRS Press, 2009)

An authoritative and comprehensive examination by leading experts of the likelihood of terrorist groups claiming affiliation with Islam resorting to WMD warfare by documenting current trends in the ideology, strategy, and tactics of jihadists as these relate to WMD proliferation. Topics discussed include terrorists’ interest in using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, an exploration of the roles of governments’ intelligence, law enforcement, and policymakers in anticipating, deterring, and mitigating WMD attacks, an overview of nonproliferation policies designed to keep WMD out of the hands of terrorists, a ground-breaking quantitative empirical analysis of terrorist behaviour, and a polling of leading experts’ estimates of the likelihood of a future WMD threat by such terrorist groups.


The volume’s editors have assembled an important collection of papers originally presented at a 2007 workshop on these issues, held at the Swedish National Defence College. The book’s chapters discuss issues such as identifying early warning indicators to identify terrorists’ possible acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction; although such inquiry is hampered by the dearth of reliable data since there have been so few cases of such terrorist warfare. To address this challenge, the volume’s essays attempt to develop a new methodological framework that encompasses both the technical factors contributing to a terrorist organization’s ability to use such weapons and the motivational factors that might drive it to plan and conduct such attacks.


With terrorists expressing interest in potentially deploying chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons in their warfare, the author evaluates the likelihood of such threats ever materializing. Also discussed are the components of
Effective governmental counter measures, such as police, military, and intelligence means, as well as carefully evaluating the politics, motivations (including personal and religious), scientific and technical abilities of the groups expressing an interest in resorting to such catastrophic warfare. The author’s previous edition of this volume, co-authored with Nadine Gurr, was published in 2001. In his assessment of the future, he concludes that there are certain scenarios where WMD could be used: ‘terrorists will use CBRN weapons if they can acquire them, regardless of the operational difficulties involved and their tactical limitations for certain roles’, adding that certain ideological taboos also have to be overcome. He posits that: ‘The majority of terrorism is now perpetrated by groups with a politico-religious ideology, there has been an increased interest in attacks causing large numbers of indiscriminate casualties, and there is increased terrorist interest in the acquisition and use of CBRN weapons. This could also be exacerbated by developments in terrorist organization, particularly the increased prevalence of ad hoc terrorist cells that come together for specific purposes. These cells are often led by hardliners, and have previously been linked to plots to use CBRN weapons and attacks intended to cause mass casualties, such as the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing.’ However, he noted that problems remain for all terrorist groups in the future: ‘The crucial determining factors are the technological opportunities that are open to them, the attitudes of individual terrorists and the nature of decision making within each group or cell. This is in turn influenced by the strategic environment in which each group operates. From these general observations it can be concluded that the future threat from CBRN terrorism is limited.’


Written by a branch chief at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, this is a highly authoritative account of the likelihood that terrorist groups claiming affiliation with Islam might resort to nuclear warfare in pursuit of their political objectives. The author’s appraisal of this threat is based on two major contending schools of thought: (1) the “conventionalists,” who view the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack as highly likely over the next five to ten years, and (2) the “sceptics” who recognize the grave consequences of a terrorist nuclear detonation but discount the potential of terrorists ever deploying a nuclear fission device in the United States because massive casualties and widespread panic can still be produced by ‘conventional’ attacks. This is an important and objective assessment of the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist threat and the range of policy options required to address such threats.


A substantially revised and updated collection of original and previously published articles by scientists, academics, and government officials from the communities of counter-WMD proliferation and counterterrorism. The volume’s first part presents an overview of key terms and significant strategic and policy debates on the current security environment and outlines how such catastrophic weapons might be employed by terrorist groups. The second part discusses the characteristics, availability, and dangers posed by specific types of such weapons, including how they play out in five case studies. The third part focuses on key dimensions of the WMD threat to a nation’s critical infrastructure. The fourth part looks at past, present, and future national and international responses to such threats. In the final part, several analytical frameworks are provided (including one co-authored by this reviewer on threat convergence) to predict future WMD threats and identify lessons and strategies for the future. The appendices include U.S. national strategy documents on countering terrorism and standards for controlling WMD materials and technologies.

Sundri Khalsa, Forecasting Terrorism: Indicators and Proven Analytic Techniques (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2004)

In this highly innovative book, the author identifies 68 indicators that span the spectrum of terrorist activity, based on terrorist capability and intention, that, when applied to an actual group, serve as an early warning framework to anticipate future terrorist activity. A CD-ROM is included to graphically display the forecasting system and explain the author’s methodology.

Pearlstein examines the evolution of terrorism in the context of the alleged new ‘global disorder’. He categorizes three generations of terrorist organizations and shows how each arose in response to the global conditions of its time. Focusing extensively on today’s transnational (privately funded, international) terrorist organizations, he examines the two most virulent types: ethnoterrorism and radical religiously motivated terrorism. He also discusses the terrorist race for weapons of mass destruction and the types of attacks, including cyberterrorism, that are likely to occur in coming years. Pearlstein concludes with a thought-provoking assessment of the many efforts to combat transnational terrorism in the post-9/11 period. However, the book does not offer any original insights and the allegation of a new global disorder is no more than a sensationalist way to describe a post-Cold War pluralism.


Hoffman and Bergen, both prominent writers on Al Qaeda, warned that the success of LeT’s 60-hour assault on Mumbai in November 2008, which involved 10 Pakistani terrorists all willing to die, was producing similar copycat operations. The verdict was that more assaults of this nature could be expected. So too were assassination attempts of American officials and diplomats. The authors wrote ‘Because we rightly think of Al Qaeda and allied groups as preoccupied by inflicting mass-casualty attacks, we tend to ignore their long history of assassinating or attempting to assassinate key leaders and American officials’.


Cordesman assessed the possible nature of the attackers, and the possible means of attack as the two key variables in order to reach a verdict on American priorities. The report assessed future home-grown and foreign terrorist threats, means of attack and state sponsors of anti-American terrorism. Sources of WMD materials, motive for proxy attacks and likelihood of supply were also assessed. The report listed the terrorist groups likely to attack the United States, including domestic militias and the types of attacks that had occurred in order to ascertain the nature of the threat to US citizens at home and abroad. Given the report’s date, just prior to 9/11, it makes some assessment of threat as ‘high-impact, low probability’ use of WMD but a range of diverse threats from both domestic and foreign terrorists using explosives and firearms.


The report assesses the Jihadist militant threat in Central Asian states which could constitute a threat to American personnel, air bases and investments in the region. The authors make little mention of the existence of such movements from 1998, with the founding of the Islamic Movement of Turkestan, which initially had limited objectives. The report nevertheless outlined the threat and recommended several measures: (1) Expand and improve U.S. intelligence in the region; (2) Strengthen border controls (3) and integrate Central Asia into the Afghanistan–Pakistan strategy [of counter-terrorism and development]. The report gave no clear indications of the likely direction of Jihadism in Central Asia. See also Rob Johnson, *Oil, Islam and Conflict: Central Asia since 1945* (Reaktion, 2007).


Pantucci concludes that since the death of bin Laden, the number of terrorist incidents in Europe has declined, despite the outbreak of the Arab Spring and its associated radicalism. However, despite the over threat, reductions in counter-terrorism in
Future Trends in Insurgency and Countering Strategies

the Middle East and North Africa, because of the unrest, and the process whereby the original AQ movement was fragmenting meant that it was being spawned in new locations outside of Pakistan and Afghanistan. He identified several problems: (1) the biggest in European counter-terrorism in the next few years was the ongoing incapacity of Europe to forge an effective and coherent voice in addressing global problems; (2) not yet found an effective and comprehensive solution to the problem of young people joining globalist Islamist anti-establishment movements, becoming persuaded to fight abroad, and, in some cases to come back and foment terrorist attacks.

Pantucci writes in a sensationalist style, collecting all future threats - including one wolf attacks - under the conveniently vague heading of greater complexity. The report is therefore hardly a useful scientific analysis of the future but expresses commonly held views about the atomisation of the Jihadist cause across the world including within NATO member states.


The Future of Terrorism contains essays submitted at the conference for Future Developments in Terrorism, Cork, Ireland in March 1999. The central thesis of the essays, which resonates in the individual essays and the editor’s introduction is that terrorism has evolved beyond the traditional view of state sponsored organizations, who commit acts of violence as an expression of nationalism. Terrorist organizations are now more complex and their motivations can stem from a more diverse range of ideologies. Two supporting views that the essayists submit, which have significant value to military and civilian strategist, expound on terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction and the emergence of some terrorists as transnational actors. As with many nations and various legitimate organizations, the ending of the cold war caused most terrorist organizations to change their modus operandi to guarantee continued survival. The authors and editors support this argument by discussing the decline of state-sponsored terrorism, facilitated against the back-drop of the post-Cold War; increases in intrastate terrorist organizations; the blurring of distinctions between terrorism and organized crime; and finally the emergence of organizations with motives based on extremism and religion. In fact, law enforcement agencies have linked terrorist organizations to crimes such as extortion and bank robbery. The commitment of terrorism for monetary gain represents a significant shift from terrorism connected to ideologies. The shift away from strong ideological motivations also affects the potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To use a WMD, the terrorist organization’s the belief in ideology must surpass their sense of survival. This runs contrary to the beliefs of many security analysts, who cite the use of a nerve agent (1995) in a Tokyo subway as a sign of future use. However, it’s important to note that the organization linked to the attack was a religious extremist organization, with an extremely strong ideology and not a terrorist organization. Finally, the emergence of terrorists as a transnational actor is a recent phenomenon. Transnationalism is a term used to describe organizations that operate internationally, but do so without official state sponsorship or direction. As noted earlier, the end of the cold war caused some terrorist organizations to expand their area of operations. This expansion, because of logistics and financial support, made coordination between the various organizations a necessity. A good example of a transnational terrorist is Osama bin Laden. Osama bin Laden reportedly has links to several states in the Middle East and Africa as well as ties to other terrorist organizations. The ability to move in and out of different circles, similar to guests at a garden party, makes prediction of terrorist strikes extremely difficult. In summary, this book provides valuable insights into the complexity of terrorist organizations and their evolution.


Kilcullen’s book is a collection of essays on his work and career in counter-insurgency. Some of the chapters are now historic, but his popular ‘twenty-eight articles’, which went viral in Iraq when Coalition subunits needed a quick reference guide, are enduring. The key observations that apply to future insurgency are included here.

Kilcullen defines insurgency and counter-insurgency as a struggle for political control. The political effects of insurgency are fourfold: (1) Polarization to extremes – creating the “empty middle” amongst the population; (2) Competition for mobilization of popular support; (3) Competition for governance (combining effectiveness and legitimacy); and (4) Competition between dis-
order or chaos (which will benefit the insurgent). The counter-insurgent endeavours to restore governance and security through the three pillars, built on a foundation of the population (see part II below on Counter-Insurgency). The conflict is defined as one of ‘competitive control’. Kilcullen posits that actions but also political messaging becomes crucial in determining the allegiance of the people. He states: ‘People are not mobilized individually, by cold consideration of rational facts’ and therefore we cannot assume people are rational actors, although they will always have their own ‘agency’. Populations are mobilized in groups, by influencers and opinion leaders, through cultural narratives that include 7 basic elements: A simple, easily expressed story or explanation for events; a choice of words and story format that resonates with the target group; symbolic imagery that creates an emotional bond (ideally at the unconscious level); elements of Myth (“sacred story”) that tap into deep cultural undercurrents of identity and appeal to universal ideals; a basis in, or a call to action (ideally, action that lies within the immediate capacity of the listeners); credibility built on a high degree of consistency between what is said, what is done, and what is seen; a future focus that inspires people to mortgage current self-interest for future benefits.

In terms of actions, Kilcullen lists four basic insurgent tactics under the mnemonic ‘PIPE’: Provocation: insurgents carry out atrocities that prompt opponents (counterinsurgents, government or sectarian opponents) to react violently, in ways counter to their interests; Intimidation: terrify and coerce members of the insurgent’s own community who cooperate with, or support the government, and members of the security forces and civil administration; Protraction: draw out the conflict to avoid strong counterinsurgent forces, control own loss rates, enhance the exhaustion effect and preserve strength after setbacks; Exhaustion: soak up counterinsurgent forces and government agencies in actions that require major effort but do not advance their mission (e.g. garrison, guard, convoy or Forward Operating Base tasks).

Kilcullen cites General Abrams at the end of the Vietnam War who noted: ‘[This] is a political as well as a military war…the ultimate goal is to regain the loyalty and cooperation of the people… It is abundantly clear that all political, military, economic and security (police) programs must be integrated in order to attain any kind of success.’ He also makes use of Migdal’s focus on the four functions of the state which gives a framework for comparing political actors on functional, rather than structural grounds, namely, to penetrate society; regulate social relationships; extract resources and apply resources to identified groups. USAID Conflict Assessment Framework Methodology for conducting a team-based interagency field assessment of a conflict emphasises reviewing existing programs and developing new responses. There should be a focus on five areas: Incentives for violence; Access to conflict resources; Institutional and social capacity to manage violence; Global and regional dynamics and forces; Windows of opportunity and vulnerability.

Deductions:

- Insurgency is a form of competitive control of the population, rather than the terrain. The Human Terrain is the centre of gravity
- Information and physical, military action are contributory components to the political ends of insurgency
- Insurgent tactics are summarised as provocation, intimidation, protraction, exhaustion


Kilcullen argued that traditional definitions of terrorism and insurgency made artificial distinctions. In his own experience, terrorism is a subset of insurgency and a tactic in a political struggle for control. Using this new definition, Kilcullen nevertheless argued that treating all terrorist and insurgent groups as a single whole in the American-led War on Terror campaign was misleading. Instead, it would be preferable to pursue a policy of ‘disaggregation’ and deal with each theatre and threat separately. Indeed, it was strategically vital to break the links on which a global Jihadist campaign depended. However, what Kilcullen describes – disaggregation – is a ‘ways’ not an ‘ends’ of strategy. The ends would, one assumes, remain the same, specifically, to weaken, disrupt, discredit, defeat and destroy Al Qaeda.

44 A. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (New York, 1988)
In the article, Kilcullen traces the evolution of Al Qaeda’s strategy into a two phase campaign. The first was to exploit revolutionary unrest and establish a secure base in Egypt and the second was to launch a global war against the West in order to establish a caliphate that extended to and then beyond the ‘original’ borders of the early Caliphate. Much of the extent of the caliphate is ahistorical and imagined. It is interesting to note that Al Qaeda failed in both strategic ends. Since 2012, the affiliates and successors of Al Qaeda have attempted to create secure bases in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq and Syria with only partial and temporary success. The global war against the West has since degenerated into a series of small and insignificant attacks and has in many cases been replaced by more important insurgencies against the ‘near enemy’ of Middle Eastern and African governments, local minorities, Christian populations and rival Shia Muslims. Al Qaeda have atomised into cells in 40 countries but conveniently explain this defeat as a God-given intention. Al Qaeda are unable to control any of the separate organisations and can only give broad direction. In the case of the conflict in Syria, DAESH personnel appear to have abandoned the narrative, command and even tactical modus operandi of Al Qaeda.

In terms of what one might learn about future insurgency, Kilcullen notes that Al Qaeda was dependent on networks, not only of information exchange, but also of veterans and their ties to each other. Some Jihadists have served on multiple fronts since the 1990s, either in Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Iraq, southern Arabia or latterly in Syria. Some veteran links were forged by marriage as well as shared service. There are also financial links, through charities, front companies, donations, hawala banking debts, smuggling, patronage, and payments to widows and their families. Al Qaeda provided some advice, specialist training and financial support until the Iraq War but since then many Jihadist groups have developed their own autonomy. DAESH for example are less dependent on the financial networks of the past given the theft of resources and smuggling of hydrocarbons in Iraq.

Where links do continue and will be prominent in the future is in propaganda through electronic communications. The Internet and social media have largely replaced the dependence on CDs, tapes and cassettes of the past, although hard copy journals and editorials are still published. Moreover, as Karl Jackson noted, the traditional client-patron dependency of the Middle East is still evident, although weakened by the Jihadist fighters’ claims to a higher authority and pedigree based on their courage and military efforts. A similar militarisation of social relations occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan during the insurgencies there. These networks and relationships are still more important than the construction of cells and other ‘modern, Western’ notions of organisation. The Taliban senior leadership’s attempt to replace local network allegiances under the Nizami Commissions and rotation of commanders in 2012-13 had to be abandoned as unworkable. Charismatic leadership founded on military achievements, piety or at least adherence to the principle narratives of Jihadist Islamism, and personal character remain the most important feature of command in the Jihadist movements going forward. The death of commanders is therefore immensely disruptive and potentially demoralising.

The multiple activities of an extended family, clan or group, from warfighting to finance, networking to mutual support, lends itself easily to concealment from law enforcement agencies, adoption of illicit commercial activity and mobilisation of personnel and resources. We might conclude therefore that the resilience of the system, and the fact that it is embedded within social groups, makes it very likely that it will continue to be used.

Deductions:

• Insurgencies should be dealt with separately and there should be a strategy to ‘disaggregate’ them that is to destroy the links that insurgents use to operate internationally.

• Jihadist strategic ends are unrealisable and offer a strategic narrative opportunity.

• Social networks in the Middle East and North Africa are far more resilient and useful than the cell structures of Western terrorist cells, and can provide finance, resources and information. It would be preferable to work with the grain of the patron-client system to defeat the insurgent networks.

• Many global Jihadist movements will operate independently of Al Qaeda or any central control.

Kilcullen assesses future insurgency as a phenomenon that will occur in cities, largely amongst populations under intolerable economic stress with governments no longer able to provide either basic services or security. In particular Dr Kilcullen identified four major trends which will have significant implications for future warfare: population growth, increased urbanisation, increased littoralisation (movement of population to coastal regions), and interconnectedness. Kilcullen argued that attention should be focussed on cities rather than states, with future conflicts likely to be centred on the periphery of sprawling coastal megacities in the developing world where non-state armed groups such as drug cartels, street gangs, and warlords compete for resources and influence.

He demonstrates how modern connectivity, the internet, mobile phones, satellite technology, Google Earth, and social networks, present both challenges and opportunities in this new operating environment. They can mobilise demonstrators as in the Arab Spring, maintain an unofficial economy in Mogadishu, train unskilled soldiers and armorers, and be employed by school children to identify the position of regime snipers in Libya. This connectivity comes into play at both local and global levels. Kilcullen’s extensive field work in the Middle East, Africa, and Central America has demonstrated the power and unintended consequences that the resulting international flow of information and resources can unleash.

According to Kilcullen, we are entering a multidimensional world where the lines between activist and civilian, war and crime, state and non-state, local and global are becoming increasingly blurred, and where the environment is in a continual state of flux. This presents major challenges for strategic thinkers and policy makers who have always struggled to keep up with a changing environment. Kilcullen is concerned that the pace of accelerating change is leaving policy makers behind. The implication is that NATO will have to understand, study, train and rehearse for urban stability operations against well-armed adversaries.

**Deductions:**

- The future operating environment against insurgency is likely to be in urban centres.
- The simultaneous role of humanitarian relief, warfighting and peace keeping within cities, so-called ‘Three Block War’ is likely to be required in the future.
- Countering strategies will require counter-network operations.
- NATO needs to understand and train for these environments.
Prediction is notoriously unreliable the further one projects in the future. Analysts have struggled with the problem for decades, applying a variety of tools, statistical, qualitative, simulated, positivist, or based on game theory. It might be said, to manipulate a well-known quotation by von Moltke, that ‘no tool of prediction survives contact with reality’. Indeed, predictions very often reflect anxieties of the present more than they tell us very much about the actual future. A cursory assessment of past projections in history reveals just how flawed were the assumptions and how difficult any prediction was.45

To summarise the findings of this report over the short, medium and long term, the results are tabulated. A guide to the language of uncertainty and the terms used here is contained in Appendix 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drivers</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
<th>Cone of Plausible Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urbanisation</td>
<td>Population growth puts pressure on available local resources, causes deterioration in standards of living and concentrates disaffected populations in confined spaces Urban environment lends itself to clandestine criminal activity and resistance to state security</td>
<td>Urban terrorism Revolutionary action Urban Insurgency Criminal-insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demography</td>
<td>Youth bulge creates localised unemployment and cadres of potential insurgents Population growth puts pressure on available local resources</td>
<td>Revolutionary action Urban Insurgency Criminal-insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Capacity</td>
<td>Political crises caused by inability to provide basic services, provide security and control territorial space leads to insurgency</td>
<td>Coup d’etat Urban terrorism Revolutionary action Urban Insurgency Criminal-insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climatic Change</td>
<td>Certain key resources are put under intense stress: scarcity creates conflict Natural disasters overwhelm limited government resources and capacity, leading to unrest</td>
<td>Insurgency Eco-terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primordialism</td>
<td>Legacies of ethnic, social and identity conflict increase chances of violence recurring</td>
<td>Terrorism Insurgency Civil War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Strategic Shocks</td>
<td>Developing world states are more vulnerable to economic failure and consequently violent unrest</td>
<td>Revolutionary action Insurgency Criminal-insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious grievances</td>
<td>Religious and pseudo-religious ideological movements seek to change the world through violence</td>
<td>Terrorism Insurgency Civil War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global economic takeoff</td>
<td>Rising global GDP and economic activity causes general improvement in standards of living with zones of maldistribution and poverty</td>
<td>Terrorism Insurgency Civil War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Insurgency</th>
<th>Short Term 0-5 yrs 2015-2020</th>
<th>Middle Term 5-15 yrs 2020-2035</th>
<th>Long Term 15-30 yrs 2035-2050</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Almost certain there will be a continuation of insurgencies in the Middle East (Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Yemen) and South Asia; Highly likely there will be 5 new insurgencies in Africa, South Asia and the Middle East regions</td>
<td>Almost certain there will be a continuation of insurgencies in the Middle East (Palestine, Syria, Iraq) and South Asia Highly likely there will be 10 new insurgencies in Africa and the Middle East regions Realistic possibility there will be up to 5 new insurgencies in other parts of the world including Latin America and South East Asia</td>
<td>Highly likely there will be up to 15 new insurgencies in Africa, South Asia and the Middle East regions Realistic possibility there will be insurgencies in other parts of the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of Insurgency and Locations</td>
<td>Almost certain occurrence of separatism, primordialism, and religious insurgency in the Middle East, North Africa, West Africa and East Africa Realistic possibility of economic insurgency in Latin America, South-East Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of Attacks</td>
<td>Almost certain that terrorist groups will use small arms, SIEDS and IEDs, other uses of explosives, kidnapping, assassination and intimidation Highly likely that terrorist and insurgents will carry out hijackings Almost certain that insurgents and terrorists will make use of electronic communications Highly likely that insurgents will use popular mobilisation</td>
<td>Almost certain that terrorist groups will use small arms, SIEDS and IEDs, other uses of explosives, kidnapping, assassination and intimidation Remote chance that terrorists will be able to use nuclear, biological or radiological weapons, but chemical weapons are likely</td>
<td>Almost certain that terrorist groups will use small arms, SIEDS and IEDs, other uses of explosives, kidnapping, assassination and intimidation Remote chance that terrorists will be able to use nuclear or radiological weapons, but biological and chemical weapons are likely</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

In the future, it is highly likely that the ‘ends’ of insurgency and terrorism will remain predictable, while almost certain that ‘ways’ and ‘means’ will be transformed significantly.

- The ends of insurgency will remain to achieve political power through control of populations and space, while the ends of terrorism will vary but will involve changing a established policy through violence and intimidation.

The use of force as an instrument of, which is almost certain, can still be stratified into limited war, the threat of absolute war (in terms of Weapons of Mass Destruction) and attempts to neutralize an enemy by the defeat of his strategy. Each of these policies could be used by state and non-state actors as a realistic possibility in the future. The principle components of those approaches are likely to include the following:

- an emphasis on concealment (or ‘stealth’);
- ranged weapons of precision and overwhelming power with which state forces, including NATO, will wish to conduct stand-off attacks, while insurgents will seek to neutralize this capability by getting as close as possible to populations and, in combat, to the counter-insurgent forces;
- the ability to inflict nodal or systemic defeat (moving from the recent aspiration to ‘degrade’ an enemy’s capacity to resist, command or communicate, to the pure ‘defeat’ of these functions), which suggests the paralysis of communications, or greater emphasis on informational-psychological, cyber or even neurological warfare. These modes will be part of a wider array of defences against the principal threats of enemies situated within domestic populations; stealth/cyber/WMD attacks; assaults on Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) which includes population, food and energy; or mass attacks (using a combination of conventional and unconventional methods) that will entail smaller versions of WMD or new, but equivalent weapons to neutralize or contain.
- The ‘means’ of future warfare will require well-trained and resilient technician-warriors, able to wield weapons of precision and power both in defence and offence, such as new generations of anti-missile technology. There will need to be multi-use platforms, able to operate on land, sea and air, and electronically, and there are likely to be smaller numbers of highly trained, well-equipped and versatile Special Forces, whose vulnerability will be compensated by a range of support options (in transport, intelligence, fires, expertise and logistics).
- The means of insurgents are almost certain to include violent transnational activism to mobilize populations against Western principles through the greater use of social media, thereby exploiting the porosity of NATO/European borders, intense actions at close quarters to avoid stand-off air power, and (suicide) terrorism. It is a remote possibility that attacks would include deniable proxy detonations of WMD, or suicide attacks by troops already condemned by the AIDS virus and with literally nothing to lose.
- It is highly likely that warfare is likely to be individualized and privatized further as smaller and smaller groups assert the right to wage war, equipped with significant and miniaturised combat power that was never available to our historical ancestors.
- It is a realistic possibility that environmentalists, animal rights, and human rights activists will turn to insurgency and terrorism.
- It is almost certain that terrorists and insurgents will adopt more devolved command and control, and favour dispersal and depth.
- It is a realistic possibility that insurgents and terrorists will acquire weapons systems of greater precision to assassinate, interdict or defeat nodes of government and security forces.
- The nature of war is unchanging: it will be necessary to break the will of the enemy, to coerce him to our will, and to inflict casualties to reduce his will and his capacity to resist. War in the future will require resilience, competent leadership, the search for advantages over the enemy, the ability to adapt to changed situations and environments, and the will to win.
3. Future of Counterinsurgency

a. Comprehensive research on published materials and summary of existing predictions and trends

For NATO personnel, it is clear that the period since 2001 has been a steep and often difficult ‘learning curve’ in missions against terrorist and insurgent groups. Counter-Insurgency has created particular demands, and has forced NATO to rethink how they are organised, balancing political requirements with alliance obligations in certain deployments, schemes of interoperability and operational methods. It has also challenged accepted practice, forced NATO to consider how to operate with host nation governments and civilian agencies, and caused some doubts about how local security forces can be created to progressively shoulder the burden of stabilisation and transition long after NATO forces have departed. The Western strategies and forces that were ‘fit for purpose’ in the Cold War, or in the 1990s, appeared less effective in the face of the challenges after 2001 although there are many champions of the NATO success story too.

If we are to assess the effectiveness of current and recent practice in countering insurgency in order to make reasonable projections about the future, we require a firm baseline for assessment. The depth of analysis of previous counter-insurgencies has in many cases unfortunately failed to meet rigorous standards of scholarship, with the result that military calculations derived from them for use in recent operations were often hasty and selective. There is therefore a need for a much more comprehensive analysis of the development of this mode of warfare, and from that evaluation some more scientific trend analysis might be possible.

Many policy-makers from the 1990s onwards have struggled with the complexities of military intervention against insurgents and terrorist groups that threaten failing or fragile states. In some cases, they did not grasp the regional context and likely outcomes, and they misjudged the mood of their own populations. Others foundered on the difficulties of resolving conflicts (which they began or which they inherited), stabilising economies, pacifying groups and grievances they barely understood or creating a new political economy. Moreover, it proved difficult to ensure co-operation between military formations and civilian agencies to create a ‘whole of government’ response, particularly when NATO states tried to work through inadequate, weak or incompetent local governments or actors.

The scholarly and analytical orthodoxy is that the solution to insurgencies lies with the people of the country concerned, the so-called ‘population-centric’ approach, even though many international borders cut through relatively homogenous groups of peoples, or, in the case of countries divided along ethnic or sectarian lines, there was no unity at all on which to build a peaceful settlement. In the past, efforts were often focussed on stabilisation: establishing human security, viable governance and a degree of development. However, the implementation of that aspect of the NATO strategy has been fraught with difficulties and studies of counter-insurgencies and low-intensity conflicts of the past have not engaged with this critical aspect.

Yet, from a strategic point of view, it is thought that the stabilisation of failing or failed states, or ungoverned spaces, will be the norm of the future, and that NATO will be compelled to intervene, perhaps militarily, where its critical infrastructure or its collective interests are threatened, and consequently where Article V of the alliance needs to be invoked. Governments of the NATO states believe they are skilled in the process of conflict prevention and in conflict resolution concerning failed or failing states using a variety of diplomatic and military tools, but the level of understanding and willingness to meet the requirements of full counter-insurgency was a mixed picture of successes and failures.

Analyses of Western withdrawal from interventions have also failed to consider the wider implications. Short term assessments suggest the Western forces extract, but the legacies that are generated are always more important in shaping policies and expectations for post-transition polities. There are far more significant implications than the simple withdrawal of troops: there are always significant changes ‘downstream’ in terms of regional geo-politics, economic activity, diplomacy and regime stability. There has been a selective approach to create templates and agendas, without acknowledging the specific and the contingent in moving a state from insurgency, in all its forms, to stable governance and economic viability. A meta-narrative has emerged, epitomised by the creation of campaign histories and military doctrines, without a full appreciation of the specific contexts of the future, including regional differences, local dynamics, or the likely agendas of the key actors.
NATO appears reluctant to engage in stabilisation and counter-insurgency. Yet, while armed forces are part of the executive arm of the state with a primary role in external defence, they have always had a secondary function of internal security. The role of the armed forces in politics and internal order, the legacies that were established in terms of maintaining links with the West after interventions or the ‘requirement’ Western powers felt they had to intervene militarily long after independence (in Suez, in West Africa or in South East Asia) have important implications for future NATO missions. Moreover, during the Cold War, NATO’s enemy was a highly politicised and ideological enemy as much as it was an existential threat. Many of the Cold War conflicts were insurgencies requiring comprehensive counter-insurgency strategies. Only one in three of the insurgencies of the Cold War were successful against counter-insurgency campaigns. NATO should therefore be more familiar, confident and rehearsed in this field, regardless of the challenges presented by operations in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014.

Most of the scholarship on counter-insurgency is concerned with the conduct of operations. Too little attention has been paid in the existing literature to the process of moving out of a counter-insurgency campaign to stable governance. The drawing down of external military presence has often been accompanied by considerable violence although some powers have managed to conduct rather more dignified handovers to a working government and an appropriate level of sustainable economic activity. When confronted by violence the most successful militaries were able to maintain control of the region, calibrate their response to each threat and keep their reactions within legal limits. Many of the critical aspects of NATO’s counterinsurgency termination in Afghanistan have not been addressed in existing scholarship, from reconciliation polices to demilitarisation and demobilisation, with many authors eliding over this important question. The exceptions to this are Richard Caplan’s Exit Strategy (which is primarily concerned with UN missions) and Rob Johnson and Timothy Clack’s (eds), At The End of Military Intervention (Oxford, 2014).

Recent conflicts have acted as a spur to writing on counter-insurgency, and there is a burgeoning literature on the practice of counter-insurgency. However, the field of military analyses suffers from a desire to find practical applications without acknowledgement of its theoretical assumptions and campaign context. Many of the historic texts were written after particular conflicts in an attempt to capture lessons and ideas that could be applicable in future campaigns and these are included in the next few pages. The classic historical views are to be found in Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations (London, 1971); Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (1966); Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, (Westport, CT., 1964) and David Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958, (1963) Santa Monica, CA., 2006) and his subsequent work on Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice ([1965], Praeger, 2006).

Attempts to assert a centralised form of national governance with only a weak local system in support, and insufficient forces for security, often held back progress, and even, in places, worsened the problem. The fundamental issues of governance in many regions of the world are the corrupt and abusive practices of those in power, the disconnect between local systems of governance and a central, state authority, and the uneven distribution of access, revenue and services with a given polity.

The question of how to terminate insurgencies has a more limited historiography compared with the resolution of conventional wars. The more prominent studies of conflict resolution include Roy Licklider, (ed), Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End (New York, 1993); George Modelski, ‘International Settlement of Internal War’ in James Rosenau (ed), International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton, 1964); and William I. Zartman (ed), Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (Washington, D.C., 1995).

Alastair Horne’s study of the Algerian War of 1954-62 in A Savage War of Peace (1977) set the standard of historical analyses of individual counter-insurgencies which conveyed continuities or ‘lessons’ for future operations. Edgar O’Ballance’s Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War (1966) represented one of the few scholarly attempts to tackle this seminal British conflict in the same way. The Vietnam War has been better served with academic treatments, most recently by John Prados, Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War (2009). However, comparative studies are fewer in number and quality and the field of campaign histories remained limited to a number of former or serving servicemen or popular writers who serve a particular market of interests. Ian F.W. Beckett’s Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies (2001) and his co-authored book with John Pimlott, Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency (1988) represents an attempt to give an overview of the campaigns, groups and key events since 1750, but the canvas is so broad that it was impossible to give any depth to the analysis. Raphaelle Branche’s La torture et l’armée pendant la Guerre d’Algérie: 1954-1962 demonstrates what is possible with a themed case study, as does Huw Bennett’s article, ‘The Other Side of the COIN: Minimum and Exemplary Force in British Army Counterinsurgency in Kenya’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 18, 4 (2007) in which he shows how a thorough archival analysis reveals the breach of accepted principles of ‘minimum force’ by the British Army in the 1950s. However, there are significant gaps in areas such as the establishment of political allies, the ‘turning’ of political prisoners and insurgents, the gathering of intelligence, the use of auxiliaries and local police, and the suspension of the law protecting the individual under ‘Emergency Powers’ legislation. In short, the field is still in urgent need of work beyond the purely military aspects of the campaigns, where the political context (and the resulting civil-military relations) is so crucial to the outcome.

(2) Enduring Features for Future Counter-Insurgency

The priority in counter-insurgency is to defeat the insurgent strategy, not the insurgent forces who, by definition, are invariably drawn from the people who have turned to violence against the government. David Galula, who captured the principles of insurgency and counterinsurgency in his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare (1964), argued that: “A victory is not only the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization. It is that, plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population.”

David Kilcullen also identified the strategic ends of counter-insurgency in this way, and emphasized the importance of adapting ‘ways’ and ‘means’ to each specific conflict. He wrote: ‘Obey the Principles; Adapt the Methods’ and argued ‘It has no fixed or standard techniques, but it does exhibit enduring fundamentals’. These he listed as:

- Control of population, resources and terrain
- Primacy of political strategy
- Resource-intensiveness
- Inherently joint and interagency
- Centrality of local support based on mobilizing and controlling population
- Population-centric methods
- Information, Political, Economic and Security pillars [need to be established]46

46 David Kilcullen, Counter-Insurgency, (London, 2010)
The principles of counter-insurgency would apply in future insurgencies. They have been derived from a long history of counter-insurgency campaigning. The British experience in this regard expressed the priorities for military forces as being:

- Adherence to the law
- Control of space
- Gradualism in political concessions or conflict resolution
- Prompt, decisive military action
- Using locals in governance, security forces and intelligence
- Combined forces and close civ-mil co-operation

Of the historic texts, that by Charles Gwynn, *Imperial Policing* (1934), added several important observations, specifically that:

- Questions of policy remain vested in the civil Government
- The amount of military force employed must be the *minimum* the situation demands
- Take firm and timely action
- Co-operation: the task of restoring order does not rest on the Army alone

To these should be added the French experience of counter-insurgency, adopted over a period of more than one hundred years. In essence, the French sought to establish economic activity and secure governments in ‘oil spots’ (*Tache d’huile*) in any region afflicted by insurgency. These havens of security and prosperity would attract the local population to return to peace. Moreover, the army would engage in raids (*Razzia*) on insurgent communications, supplies and bases. In the Algerian War, the French adopted the three ‘ways’ of *Guerre Revolutionaire*, namely:

- *Quadrillage*: the division of the country into tightly controlled sectors, separated by fences and strongpoints with which to control population movement
- *Ratissage*: the combing out of each sector to locate and arrest, or kill, insurgent cadres
- *Regroupement*: the movement of civilian populations out of areas prone to insurgency and their relocation in new, more easily controlled settlements.

Each of these elements required joint action between the civilian agencies and the military.

**Deductions:**

- Historic examples give future counter-insurgents useful and enduring principles
- The strategic ends of counter-insurgency is to restore governance and address grievances that gave rise to violence; the logic of this objective is to move the campaign from counter-insurgency to legitimate government, security and economic activity.
- The ways should combine civil and military action and remain within the law to retain legitimacy
- Military action, if used, should be decisive


Galula, although largely unknown at the time of the Algerian War, nevertheless produced a short study which was popularised by Col (Dr) John Nagl during the Iraq War. Galula noted that establishing early on what the political ends of the insurgents are, and then their ways and means, is essential, for this is the route to the defeat, not of his forces, tools and techniques but of the *raison d’etre* of his cause. If the key claim of the insurgent is legitimacy, then this must be eroded and removed; if it is to discredit the government, then the insurgents’ own credibility must be challenged, undermined, and, if necessary, ridiculed. All ways and means must be directed against the insurgent strategy, not his sympathisers or forces, except where this serves
to achieve the higher objective of undermining the insurgent strategy.

Galula urged that counter-insurgency strategies must be political in nature. He wrote: ‘Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population. A revolutionary war is “20 per cent military action and 80 percent political” is a formula that reflects the truth.’

We may suggest therefore that political solutions (80%) include:

- Dividend: show there is more to gain by peace
- Governance: enable district and provincial governors to govern
- Law: higher profile trials and faster justice; respect local systems
- Negotiation: offer package of material gain for individuals and communities

While military Solutions (20%) include:

- Capture/kill /Discredit insurgent leadership
- Deprive insurgents of resources
- Inflict heavy casualties to deter and demoralise
- Penetrate and control space including airspace and electronic space
- Provide overwatch for local security forces and auxiliaries.

Galula also laid out eight steps that are required to move a campaign on from an insurgency. He wrote that in a given local area:

- Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents.
- Detach for the area sufficient forces to oppose an insurgent’s comeback in strength.
- Establish contact with the population; control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas.
- Destroy the local insurgent political organizations.
- Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities.
- Test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the soft and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defence units.
- Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement.
- Win over or suppress the last insurgents

To this end, the strategic ‘ways’ must be to de-militarise the conflict, that is, to work towards a police-led operation which, by its nature, delegitimises the insurgents’ claim to be waging a just armed struggle. The ‘ways’ are, essentially, to take the ‘heat’ out of the insurgency and move towards pacification. The ‘means’ should ultimately be policing and intelligence, with military force held in reserve for genuine emergencies, with an array of civilian efforts to establish good and effective governance and viable economic activity.

One of the issues this has raised, however, is the process by which populations are persuaded or coerced to abandon insurgency and the insurgent cadres, and embrace a legitimate government. In ‘Wars Amongst the People’ there are different theories of how to achieve popular consent. Mao and T.E. Lawrence, both of whom led guerrilla forces as well as conventional operations, assumed in their texts that attitudinal support to insurgents produced behavioural support; in other words, if minds were persuaded then the actions of the people would follow. For this reason both Mao and Lawrence emphasised the priority as educating the people. However, David Kilcullen and Stathis Kalyvas work on the assumption that imposing controls on the population will induce popular support. Control gives the population a stark choice of remaining in the resistance to the governments and suffering the consequences or embracing the government offer. For Kalyvas, populations will flock to sources of power for protection and if they feel a government has the upper hand they will tend to support the government. Control of space and activity thus leads to public support. There are, however, diverse situations and success depends on the ability to tailor the government’s offer to address local grievances. If a government asserts control in terms of security, but there is no viable means for a population to live, there is unlikely to be automatic support. Moreover, religious or ethnic grievances, anger at government corruption or persecution, or legitimate interference with a commercial-economic insurgency
based on illicit commerce, could mean that government control makes the situation worse in the short term. In other words, control alone is insufficient: it has to be accompanied by other lines of operation in a plan appropriate to the local setting.

**Deductions:**

- Galula’s principles and ways of conducting counter-insurgency would apply in many future campaigns but they need to be tailored to new contexts.
- Political actions should account for 80 per cent of the campaign effort.
- According to Kilcullen, influence operations amongst civilian populations have two purposes: (1) Isolate Insurgents; (2) Stabilization.
- Control arises from a combination of coercion and consent. This makes the population (specifically, the perceptions of key opinion leaders in the various communities) the operational Centre of Gravity in most Counter-insurgency campaigns.
- Influence ops (IO plus targeted kinetic ops) are the key tool for generating consent.
- Winning hearts and minds (WHAM) is not ‘gratitude’; it is compelled choice.

While counter-insurgents tend to focus on governance, security and the economy, it is clear from the historical record that terrorism is only partially concerned with spectacular attacks as ‘propaganda of the deed’. The daily experience of the population is a better measure of what is being controlled and that requires a forensic examination at the tactical level. Bernard Fall, who experienced the German occupation of France and the French operations in Algeria noted: “...any sound revolutionary war operator (the French underground, the Norwegian underground, or any other European anti-Nazi underground) used small-war tactics - not to destroy the German Army, of which they were thoroughly incapable, but to establish a competitive system of control over the population. To do this...they had to kill some of the occupying forces and attack some of the military targets. But above all they had to kill their own people who collaborated with the enemy”. This suggests that insurgents must discipline the population to control them and eradicate security risks. Once again, in the future, we may expect this form of disciplining by insurgents and terrorist groups to be a recurrent feature of their campaigns but one which might be exploited.

Two British officers recorded their own observations of the principles required by counter-insurgents. Robert Thompson believed:

- The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable
- Function in accordance with law
- The government must have an overall plan
- Give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas
- In the anti-guerrilla phase, secure base areas first.

Thompson also believed that engaging locals was crucial to success in counter-insurgency operations. He wrote: ‘The government should formulate long-term political aims, backed by political and economic initiatives; these in turn will be supported by a counter-insurgency plan involving the police, the armed forces and any locally raised militias, home guards and other auxiliary forces.’ Frank Kitson added his own four principles from his experience in *Bunch of Five* (1977), that is to:

- Coordinate government machinery
- Establish the political atmosphere that enables government measures to maximise success
- Create an intelligence organisation to fit the situation
- Use the Law

To these examples of the principles of the ‘ways’ in future counter-insurgency, we can add more recent experience. The Multi-National Force-Iraq in 2007 produced the following advice:

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48 Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (1966)
• Secure the people where they sleep
• Give the people justice and honour
• Integrate civilian/military efforts: this is an inter-agency, combined arms fight
• Get out and walk: move mounted, work dismounted
• We are in a fight for intelligence, all the time
• Every unit must advise their ISF [Iraqi Security Force] partners
• Include ISF in your operations at the lowest possible level
• Look beyond the IED: get the network that placed it
• Be first with the truth
• Make the people choose

Finally, the UK ‘COIN’ Doctrine, which has evolved over the history of British counter-insurgency campaigns, is tabulated below.\(^\text{49}\)

\(^\text{49}\) Courtesy of the Land Warfare Centre, UK.
<table>
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<th>Thompson</th>
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<td>Civil Authority</td>
<td>Co-ordinated Government Action</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>The moment of intervention - Police and Military Cooperation</td>
<td>Co-operation between Civil and Military authorities</td>
<td>Establish coordinated machinery at every level for the direction of the campaign</td>
<td>Civilian Dominated, Coordinated System of Command and Control</td>
<td>Coordinated Government Machinery</td>
<td>Unity of Effort is Essential</td>
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<td>Intelligence and Security</td>
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<td>Intelligence Drives Operations</td>
<td>Intelligence Drives Information</td>
<td>Integration of Intelligence</td>
<td>Counterinsurgenks Must Understand the Environment</td>
<td>Develop and Maintain Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>Function in accordance with law</td>
<td>The Law</td>
<td>Maintain a legal system adequate to the needs of the moment</td>
<td>Separate the Insurgent from the People</td>
<td>Separating the Insurgent from his Support</td>
<td>Insurgents Must be isolated from their Cause and Support</td>
<td>Gain and Secure Popular Support</td>
<td>Gain and Secure Popular Support</td>
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<td>Training Research and Development</td>
<td>Education and Training (Chapter 9, Low Intensity Operations, 1972)</td>
<td>[Contemporary Imperative: Learn and Adapt]</td>
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- General Principles of Government Action
- Operating Principles
- Conduct of Security Force Operations
- Planning
- Legitimacy is the Main Objective
- Political Primacy and Political Aim
- Political Factors Are Primary
- Political Factors Have Primary
- Minimum Necessary Force
- Co-ordinated Government Action
- National Plan
- Civil Authority
- Co-operation
- The moment of intervention – Police and Military Cooperation
- Co-operation between Civil and Military authorities
- Establish coordinated machinery at every level for the direction of the campaign
- Civilian Dominated, Coordinated System of Command and Control
- Coordinated Government Machinery
- Unity of Effort is Essential
- Co-ordinated Government Action
- Minimum Necessary Force
- Intelligence (Chapter 7)
- Security Intelligence
- Intelligence and Security
- Set up an intelligence organisation suited to the circumstances
- Information, Collated into a usable intelligence
- Intelligence and Information
- Intelligence Drives Operations
- Integration of Intelligence
- Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Environment
- Develop and Maintain Understanding
- Neutralisation (including selective destruction) of Insurgents
- Neutralising the Insurgent
- Neutralising the Insurgent
- Population Security
- Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential
- Operate in Accordance with Law
- Development of Long-Term Government Reforms to Prevent a Resurgence of the Trouble
- Longer Term Post-Insurgency Planning
- Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment
- Plan for the Longer Term
- [Contemporary Imperative: Learn and Adapt]
David Ucko’s ‘The New Counterinsurgency Era’

Ucko traces the challenges of relearning counterinsurgency techniques and institutionalizing irregular warfare expertise in the US military in the wake of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. He concludes that the US military has historically paid little attention to the nature and requirements of counterinsurgency and stability operations, favoring preparation for “high-intensity” or “conventional” conflict against adversaries shaped and operating very much like the US military itself. This is why the US military was inappropriately prepared and configured to carry out stabilization tasks associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, a robust counterinsurgency capability for a global expeditionary power like the United States in the post-Cold War era remains necessary. The techniques and tactics associated with revolutionary wars, and how to mitigate their effects on local populations, represent the wars of the future. Ucko defines modern wars as engagements that, whether irregular or conventional, will, in virtually all cases, carry a certain complexity for which the counterinsurgency learning process is particularly relevant. In essence, the US military has confused the “undesirability of [counterinsurgency and stability operations]... with an actual ability to avoid them.”

However, Ucko concludes that simply adding stability operations to the range of tasks under the US military’s purview would not be easy. The sustained elevation of irregular warfare expertise in the Department of Defense would, he argues, require deep-rooted cultural reform that would involve changing priorities and upsetting long-established norms. Although an impressive amount of counterinsurgency learning did take place, particularly in 2007 and 2008, the learning process of irregular warfare has, through force of bureaucratic inertia, often remained peripheral to the Department of Defense as a whole. “So far the COIN community has struggled to displace traditional preoccupations and entrenched interests; to a large extent old think has prevailed.”

David E. Johnson, M. Wade Markel, Brian Shannon, The 2008 battle of Sadr City (Santa Monica Calif.: RAND, 2011)

The 2008 Battle of Sadr City, which took place in Baghdad nearly 15 months after the beginning of the U.S. ‘surge’ in Iraq, has received relatively little scholarly attention. However, the coalition’s defeat of Jaish al-Mahdi after six weeks of high-intensity fighting offered important lessons for the U.S. Army as it prepared for future operations. Using after-action reports, briefings, other primary sources, and interviews with combatants and officials involved in the fighting and its aftermath, the authors describe the battle, analyse its outcome, and derive implications for the conduct of land operations. Their analysis identifies the following factors as critical to the coalition victory: supporting ground manoeuvre elements with integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and strike assets; the key roles played by heavy forces, snipers, and special operations forces; decentralized decision-making; capable indigenous security forces; and rapid transitions from phase to phase. The authors conclude that the Battle of Sadr City presents a new model for dealing with insurgent control of urban areas: treating an urban area as a wide-area security mission. Unlike previous urban operations against insurgents, in which cities were essentially besieged and then stormed, the objective in this battle was not to take and clear Sadr City but to create conditions that would make it both impossible for the insurgents to operate effectively and possible to restore security to the broader population.


Marston and Malkesian interviewed the principal leaders in campaigns at the beginning of the twenty-first century, and compliments a work edited by Richard Iron, Blair’s Wars and Britain’s Generals (Oxford, 2012), but Marston also identified the keys to success in past counter-insurgencies as:

- Comprehension of existing doctrine
- Adaptation to local situations and learning from mistakes–humility to learn from others
- Risk-taking organizations
- Harmony of effort
- Small-unit approach

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- Corporate memory within theatre HQs
- Appropriate training
- Reconciliation amongst their enemies
- Ongoing education in COIN
- Population security
- Understand local perspectives—non-western metrics
- Raise, mentor and fight alongside indigenous forces (army/paramilitary police/local auxiliaries)


The work explains how strategies are often inappropriate results of the failure to align ends, ways and means, understand the nature of the conflict and the underlying drivers of conflict.


A significant ground-breaking volume by RAND that surveys the social-science literature on counterterrorism and then applies relevant conceptual models to examine issues such as terrorism’s root causes, radicalization into violent extremism, how terrorists generate, maintain, or lose public support, how terrorists make decisions, how terrorists disengage from violence, and why and how does terrorism decline.

Emanuel Gross, *The Struggle of Democracy against Terrorism: Lessons from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2006)

One of the best studies on the legal challenges and moral dilemmas faced by democracies in countering the threats posed by terrorists in terms of balancing security against civil liberties, human rights and the rule of law. Mr. Gross, a law professor at Haifa University and a former military court judge in Israel, covers the spectrum of topics such as defining terrorism, the laws of war in countering terrorism, interrogating terrorists, the powers of military commanders in administering areas where terrorists operate (such as in Iraq or the West Bank), administrative detention, the right to privacy by citizens during emergency periods, the use of civilians by terrorists or armies as human shields, and thwarting terrorist acts through targeted killings of terrorist leaders and operatives.


The author, a specialist in law of armed conflict and a former attorney in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), presents an interdisciplinary and global exploration of the laws, policies, intelligence gathering, and operational decisions surrounding governmental counter-terrorism strategies and tactics. The counterterrorism policies of seven nations (India, Israel, Russia, Spain, the United States, China and Colombia) are presented and discussed in a comparative perspective. As a valuable textbook, each chapter includes issues to consider, such as actual dilemmas and scenarios, including simulation exercises that put students in the role of policy decision-makers. Specific issues covered include interrogations, the proper forum for trying terrorists, judicial review, international law, intelligence gathering, and policy responses to terrorism. A separate chapter discusses future hotspots of terrorism, such as Mexico, where new types of counterterrorism against new types of threats might require the formulation of new legal requirements. An appendix includes policy documents and a discussion of terrorism incidents around the world.
Maria O’Neill, [Terrorism and Law ](New York: Routledge, 2012)
With Europe increasingly targeted by terrorism, this book examines the rapidly emerging area of European Union (EU) law and policy regarding counter-terrorism, addressing these twin disciplines from both a theoretical and practical perspective.

The volume’s contributors assess the effectiveness of the British government’s responses to terrorism in terms of preventing, pre-empting, and countering such threats, and, in the event of an attack, mitigating its consequences. Effective counter-terrorism, they point out, needs to consider a matrix of factors such as the nature of the adversaries’ terrorist networks, tactics and targeting. The contributors also compare and contrast the UK’s response with other states in the European Union and the United States. Also discussed are whether the post 9/11 era’s domestic security measures in the UK are able to balance homeland security measures and civil liberties.

Although dated, this edited volume is an important comparative study of the policies, strategies, and measures employed by thirteen democratic governments in countering the terrorist threats facing them. With many of the chapters using similar methodological frameworks, some of the findings include the need to understand one’s adversary through effective intelligence, integrating counterterrorism agencies to work in unison, employing discriminate and proportional force to avoid unnecessarily escalating a conflict, and engaging moderate elements among the insurgents’ constituencies to marginalize and reject the legitimacy of violent extremists in order to create the foundation for a possible negotiated settlement.

The three volumes bring together contributions by dozens of experts (including this reviewer) to discuss terrorist threats around the world and the components required for governments to defeat them. Volume I covers “Strategic and Tactical Considerations”, Volume II examines “Sources and Facilitators”, and Volume III discusses “Lessons Learned from Combating Terrorism and Insurgency”.

An authoritative, multidisciplinary discussion of the multiple issues affecting governmental counterterrorism, written from a legal and policy perspective as they apply to nations around the world. The author is a former senior official in the Israel Defense Forces’ Judge Advocate General’s Corps, which gives the volume a practitioner’s expertise on these issues. Issues discussed include defining terrorism, what motivates terrorists, terrorism and geo-politics, the limits of governments’ power, terrorism and the media, state-sponsored terrorism, where terrorists are to be tried, and responding to terrorism as it affects the separation of a government’s constitutional powers.

A discussion by a leading academic expert of the components required for effective counterterrorism against al Qaida-type terrorism through the use of intelligence, law enforcement, counter ideological narratives, reforms in the targeted countries, and strong international alliances.
This edited volume focuses on the components involved in the competition for strategic influence between governments and their terrorist adversaries, including ways to neutralize terrorists’ use of the Internet in spreading their propaganda. These issues are further discussed in the volume’s case studies.


The author, who served as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s first Assistant Secretary for Policy, draws on this experience to give the reader an insider’s account of his agency’s post-9/11 strategy to upgrade border and aviation security. This involved obtaining improved information about travelers who might have a nexus to terrorism, and the strong resistance from privacy advocacy groups against expanding such databases. As a result, the author argues, certain security gaps still remain open and resistance by privacy groups is making it difficult to forestall future threats posed by new technologies, such as biotech viruses, which he argues could be more devastating than 9/11.


While democratic governments recognize that their citizens expect certainty and protection in their daily lives, especially safety from terrorism, this also places enormous pressures on their institutions to balance justice and civil liberty in the pursuit of such comprehensive security. The author, a retired former senior level security official in the British government, argues that while public security is necessary for good government, it should not come at the expense of eroding civil liberties, which might tip the balance in favor of bad government and, ultimately, result in an insecure state. To remedy this problem, the author establishes a set of principles and approaches for upgrading intelligence in counterterrorism while respecting the requirements of basic civil liberties.


An examination of the components of effectiveness in counterinsurgency, based on some 30 cases of resolved insurgencies. With several of these insurgencies featuring terrorist groups, the authors’ analysis is highly relevant to counterterrorism. Also examined are the factors that serve to hinder effectiveness in counterinsurgency. Especially noteworthy are the tables and figures that illustrate the volume’s analysis.


Paul Wilkinson was one of the founders of terrorism studies in the early 1970s and became one of its most prominent experts. In *Terrorism Versus Democracy*, Wilkinson continued his assessment of the terrorism threat, which he outlined in his earlier seminal book, *Terrorism and the Liberal State*, first published in 1977. Here, he examines the terrorist networks that operate globally and analyzes the long-term future of terrorism and terrorist-backed insurgencies. This new edition discusses the political and strategic impact of modern transnational terrorism, the need for maximum international cooperation by law-abiding states to counter not only direct threats to the safety and security of their own citizens but also to preserve international peace and security through strengthening counter-proliferation and cooperative threat reduction (CTR) regimes.


The authors contend that effective counterterrorism should strive to stop terrorists before they can attack by reducing opportunities for such attacks by protecting likely targets, controlling the weapons likely to be used by terrorists, and removing any
Future Trends in Insurgency and Countering Strategies

vulnerable conditions that might make such attacks possible. The authors believe that such countermeasures are essential because response agencies need to prepare for what the terrorists are likely to do: identify vulnerable targets, analyze their specific weaknesses, consider the weapons needed to be used in an attack, and assess access to the targets. Once these countermeasures are implemented, counterterrorism agencies will then be able to provide appropriate protection, limit accessibility to potential targets, anticipate the response forces that might be required to prevent a potential attack, and be prepared to mitigate the consequences of an attack if it does occur. By employing such a methodology, terrorists can be ‘outsmarted’ and effectively defeated before they strike.


Terrorism informatics (a term invented by this reviewer in 2004) is the application of social science methodologies, information technology and computational software to analyze and model terrorism in all its configurations, making it one of the cutting edge methodologies used in the discipline of terrorism and counter-terrorism studies. The contributors to this important volume discuss a multidisciplinary spectrum of topics in terrorism informatics ranging from mapping terrorism research, including identifying key figures in “terrorism studies”; applying methodologies and templates to identify and map terrorism’s root causes in order to generate solutions; developing information technology-based knowledge management databases, such as incident databases and group profiles in order to generate future warfare trends; applying techniques to conduct threat assessments; identifying “learning patterns” by terrorist groups in order to counter them technologically; utilizing data mining technologies to “hunt” for potential terrorists in government and commercial databases and the civil liberties issues associated with such searches; applying social network analysis software tools to map how terrorist groups are organized and operate; using “web mining” technologies to analyze terrorists’ use of the Internet; and applying situational awareness technologies for disaster response.


An important collection of papers analyzing when, why, and how governments and NGOs can negotiate with terrorist groups, including recommendations for best practice in negotiation processes. Part I discusses the theory and quantifiable data produced from analysis of hostage situations, while Part II explores several high profile case studies and the lessons that can be learnt from them. Negotiations involve attempts to align what began as completely polarized parties, with governments viewing terrorism as unacceptable means used to promote extremist demands, while terrorists view their actions as completely justified, even on moral and religious grounds. If both sides are to try and reconcile these polarized positions, the authors explain, it is essential for those in charge of negotiations to understand the terrorists’ culture, profiles and personalities, their views of the world, and, for the terrorist “negotiators” to understand the nature of the government authorities, their values and how they frame the problems raised by the resort to terrorism, including hostage taking.


General Smith, having experienced the contrast between the Bosnia conflict and the 1st Gulf War in the 1990s, believed that the military instrument was a limited and often inappropriate tool for policy. He described operating amongst civilian populations as complex and believed that ‘industrial war’ was obsolete. The phrase wars amongst the people was popularised, but, many wars in the past have been ‘amongst the people’. Smith’s objective though was to highlight the limitations of using military force to intervene in civil wars, conduct humanitarian work and yet be limited by legalistic and peacetime rules of engagement. He points to the need for NATO’s enemies to adapt and exploit its vulnerabilities. He argued that developing understanding prior to the commitment of military force was essential.

This study should be consulted in conjunction with James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, ‘Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists’ (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003) as they both highlight the difficulty for air forces to engage and defeat insurgents that are embedded within populations. Much of the debate has been dominated since by the efficacy, legality and utility of unmanned aerial systems (UAVs), nicknamed ‘drones’. The focus on technology and automation has not diminished the importance of developing rules of engagement, using legal advisors and establishing doctrine for the use of air power in counter-insurgency. Drew’s article highlighted the problems.51

David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (2010)

Kilcullen notes that counter-insurgency has no fixed or standard techniques, since each campaign strategy has to be adapted to its context, but it does exhibit some enduring fundamentals:

- Control of population, resources and terrain
- Primacy of political strategy
- Resource-intensiveness
- Inherently joint and interagency
- Centrality of local support based on mobilizing and controlling population
- Population-centric methods
- Information, Political, Economic and Security pillars

Kilcullen argues that ‘the [Global] War [on Terror] is best understood as a global insurgency, initiated by a diffuse grouping of movements that seek to re-make Islam’s role in the world order. They use terrorism as their primary, but not their sole tactic. Therefore counterinsurgency rather than traditional counterterrorism may offer the best approach to defeating global jihad. But classical counterinsurgency, as developed in the 1960s, is designed to defeat insurgency in a single country. It demands measures, a coordinated political-military response, integrated regional and inter-agency measures, [and] protracted commitment to a course of action, that cannot be achieved at the global level in today’s international system. Therefore a traditional counterinsurgency paradigm will not work for the present War: instead, a fundamental reappraisal of counterinsurgency is needed, to develop methods effective against a globalised insurgency.’ He emphasised that local solutions are required: ‘counterinsurgency is about the population and it’s about building a long-term viable, genuine partnership with the population. And if you can effectively do that and you can put in place a political solution at the local level that works, then all sorts of other things become possible.’ Moreover, reflecting on NATO and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, he states: ‘when you are actually intervening in another country, the principal activity that you need to be doing is actually training the local counter-insurgents to be effective and that is actually the activity that drives your exit. So American forces will never be as good as Afghan forces at understanding Afghanistan, nor should we try and make them so. What we need to do is use the American forces in a sort of temporary holding pattern to allow a breathing space for the Afghan forces to build up to the point where they can handle the environment and then we should be handing over to them and letting them handle it.’

Kilcullen, while stressing the importance of the political priority, notes that winning over the population through information was the next single most important aspect of the campaign. He stated: ‘we [NATO] regard information ops as a supporting activity, whereas the enemy regards it as the main game. And I think until we start treating it as the main game and crafting everything else around that, that we’re going to be beaten every time.’

51 See also ‘Making Airpower Effective Against Guerrillas’ http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Making+airpower+effective+against+guerrillas.-a0122533152 (Accessed March 2015)
Deductions:

- Popular consent and political control remain the priorities of counter-insurgency
- Information operations should assume a greater significance than they are currently given in NATO doctrine


Starting with the assumption that terrorist campaigns usually “come to an end,” the author contends that it is important to examine the processes facilitating such terminal points in order for counterterrorism agencies to understand how to formulate effective strategies to hasten the decline of terrorist groups. The book addresses crucial questions such as: how long do terrorist campaigns generally last? When does targeting the leadership for assassination actually severely damage a group’s capability? When do negotiations between governments and terrorist groups result in terminating the conflict? What conditions enable terrorist groups to transition to more widespread forms of warfare, such as guerrilla insurgency or civil war? How and when do terrorist groups succeed, fail, or disappear on their own? These theoretical issues are applied to a range of historical examples, such as the anti-tsarist Narodnaya Volya, the Provisional IRA, Peru’s Shining Path, Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo, and various Palestinian groups. Her shortlist of how terrorism ends is:

- Life cycle – natural decay of the movement
- Internal divisions
- Community cohesion, local rejection of terrorists
- Death or capture of leaders
- Decline in popular support, linked to rising prosperity
- Unable to pass on ideology to next generation
- Endgame: terrorists achieve or fail in their ‘ends’
- Negotiations leading to a political process
- Amnesty, round up, voluntary defections

Utilizing empirical research, the authors find that terrorist rebellions usually end when they join the political process or local police and intelligence agencies succeed in arresting or killing key leaders. Their recommendation, however, that in dealing with groups such as al Qa’ida policing and intelligence, not military force, should form the backbone of U.S. counterterrorism efforts might be questioned, since it has been demonstrated that a comprehensive approach to counterterrorism is most effective in countering terrorist groups whose political and religious extremism is so unyielding that it needs to be countered with military measures, such as the targeted killings of their leaders, as well.


Although focusing primarily on guerrilla insurgencies, many of this important volume’s case studies also include terrorist rebellions, making their analysis of how insurgencies end highly relevant to counterterrorism studies. Their examination of 89 insurgencies finds that most last for about ten years, that being organized hierarchically increases their operational capabilities, as is the provision to them of state sponsorship. Having a sanctuary from which to organize their operations is also vital. They also contend that insurgents’ use of terrorism often backfires. The authors conclude that there are no shortcuts to defeating insurgent groups, but that some key indicators for tipping points include an increase in insurgent fighter desertions and defections.

Their list of findings is:

- Insurgencies last on average 10 years
- Insurgents cannot win just by surviving
- Victory or defeat is not apparent at the time
- Insurgent groups often splinter
- Withdrawal of state sponsorship correlates with a tipping point
- Anocracies are generally unsuccessful against insurgencies
- Defeat is marked by indicators of desertion, defection and infiltration
- Levels of civilian reporting to government forces indicates success
- Conflicts involving multiple groups of insurgencies last longer than against a single group
- Governments do better with no external support (as they are less dependent, more resourceful)
- Multiple cell insurgent networks fail more often than hierarchical ones
- Insurgencies usually fail in educated, urbanised societies
- High casualties from terrorism alienated civilians
- Weak insurgents can win: stronger insurgents create stronger military reaction
- Sanctuary is essential for insurgents

Connable and Libicki also make use of the assessment of McCormick, Horton, and Harrison (2006), specifically that there is a discernible ‘Arc of Government Defeat’ when governments fail. In other words, when governments fail, after a brief increase in their strength, they tend to do so rapidly.
Future Trends in Insurgency and Countering Strategies

Insurgents tend to fail over a slower time frame, until they reach a breaking point. The indicators of failure are: increased economic activity; increase in defection and desertions especially of core or cadre members; higher volumes of actionable intelligence; and the splintering of a movement or faction fighting.

**Deductions:**

Taking the research of Cronin, Connable and Libiki together, we might construct a list of drivers of how insurgencies end in government/counter-insurgent defeat or victory:

**Government Defeat**

- Government loses public sympathy
- Military loyalty
- Elitism/inequality
- Government neglect of public concerns
- Logistical problems
- Unreliable allies
- Insurgents trade space for time (wearing out strategy)
- Government brutality and corruption towards population
- Nationalist/revolutionary momentum
- Propaganda against discredited government
- Terrorist intimidation of own side (disciplining)
**Government Victory**

- Capture/kill /discredit insurgent leaders
- Insurgents alienate public with terrorism and violence
- Hit hard, but early
- Negotiation and elimination: there are cases where insurgents are defeated during negotiations
- Regions flooded with troops; control space with a dominant ratio of counter-insurgents
- Deprive insurgents of resources, external support, bases, logistics lines, space & popular backing
- Inflict heavy losses
- Penetrate of space, including airspace and electronic space
- Control and close borders
- Recruit local security forces and auxiliaries
- Political solution solves grievances; population feel more to gain by peace
- External third party threat emerges
- Containment (wearing out strategy)
- Re-civilisane ops: remove the need for military action and make the insurgents irrelevant
- Population seek new political climate without war
- Bankruptcy of insurgent message (they fail to ‘deliver’)
- Insurgent leaders age and fail to pass on message
- Effective leadership of the government and its forces.

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**b. COE-DAT’s Short, Middle and Long Term Predictions**

There are enduring principles in the conduct of counter-insurgency which will be of relevance in the future. Nevertheless, there will also be radically different contexts which will require counter-insurgent forces to adapt the general principles. Moreover, new technologies, not least in precision fires and surveillance will enhance the capabilities of counter-insurgent forces. New regions of conflict will also require the acquisition of local understanding, and partners to work alongside. The urban environment, especially future megacities of impoverished settlement in the developing world will create immense challenges of scale, access and humanitarian relief. Where counter-insurgency is conducted, the co-operation of civil and military actors will be essential.

The NATO alliance may choose not to conduct counter-insurgencies and counter-terrorism in parts of the world in the future. It may be better to avoid certain regions and adopt strategies of containment or purely civil or financial intervention. These are policy judgments for member states’ governments.

What is clear from the literature is that terrorist and insurgent forces can be defeated, and so can their strategies. With sufficient support, expertise and intervention, national governments faced by insurgency can prevail. Sometimes the solutions are counter-intuitive and paradoxical. For example, the vulnerability of populations, which give rise to unrest and insurgency, could actually make them more willing to co-operate against terrorist or irregular movements. Businesses especially may exhibit a willingness to work to the restoration of order.

Civilian government agencies, including civilian police forces, will possess a detailed knowledge of the area, its population, and its economy and it is to the civilian leadership that we must look for strategic solutions to insurgency. Re-civilising operations is a route to concluding the campaign.

New, emerging technologies, including social media and mobile apps, do not only work in favour of the insurgents. They offer the chance to ‘see’ popular movements, geo-spatially locate them and identify the electronic ‘signature’ of enemy forces.
Where jungle warfare can be conducted more efficiently with the ability to track heat sources with thermal imaging, so the urban, densely-populated environment has its own electronic backdrop where remote, automated tools may be stationed indefinitely to monitor and interdict.

Nevertheless, in the future urban environment, there may be great complexity and unfamiliarity with the organisation of mass evacuation or humanitarian relief. Such activity, like all military operations, requires considerable understanding and rehearsal. Tactical training in urban environments, particularly the ones NATO are likely to encounter in the developing world, is essential. It is worth noting that since combat with terrorists and insurgents is likely to be few and far between, since they will seek to avoid NATO’s main strength, devices must be sought to tempt the terrorist and insurgent into the open. This is likely to be in his own territory (mountains, jungles and urban areas) or in the West (almost certainly exclusively urban areas). In each case, the procedure will be to identify the strength and dispositions of the enemy, the human terrain (physical, social, economic and cultural situation) and the three-dimensional layout of the area where operations are to be conducted. For fighting within the West, military intelligence should be furnished with maps and plans of all urban areas in the NATO countries. Key centres and even buildings should be surveyed in peacetime as part of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

Since much of NATO work in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism will be building local capacity, training and preparation should be in the fields of security forces’ assistance, training and development of local security and government, humanitarian relief, logistics, ministerial support and working with civilian agencies, including NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations)

Where insurgencies are persuaded to resist in fixed locations, and in the consequent sustained fighting in built up areas, problems of communication and resupply are well known. For this reason, the temptation to storm continuously, like some medieval charge, must be resisted. Commanders should be encouraged to pause, consolidate and reorganise. Every effort must be made to divide the insurgent from the population by protecting civilians, creating safe havens, even within urban centres, and use information operations. At the tactical level, envelopment of the terrorist’s position is essential, but the enemy should be encouraged to move into channelled killing zones where he can be destroyed or compelled to surrender. Urban operations necessitate devolution to small tactical units, including tactical headquarters. Small groups will be preferable to large formations when trying to maintain fluidity. Friendly forces should be urged to turn the tables on the terrorist, by laying their own ambushes, pausing during the assault to encourage enemy curiosity and carelessness, and psychological weapons (sound, light, heat, information). The cordoning off of the fighting zones will also be essential if NATO is to win the media war. The sight of friendly casualties, or even enemy ones, has to be tightly controlled. Information needs to be controlled and synchronised with and preferably to lead operations.

Critics will argue the logic of smaller ground forces is greater vulnerability and minimal intelligence which can be compensated only by a greater reliance on air power. Yet, despite the advent of precision strike and enhanced targeting, reliance on air power has been the cause of higher civilian casualties. This proved counter-productive in the militarized policing operations NATO found itself in during the campaign in Afghanistan. Moreover, it took some time for NATO to realize that campaign designs, including doctrines, were not fixed but changed constantly as operations unfolded. Flexibility, adaptation and a willingness to use ground forces must therefore be accepted in counter-insurgency missions.

New technologies, from UAVs to robotics, and new methods, such as Denial of Service or disruption attacks using cyber, challenge the application of the principles of conventional war just as assuredly as air power, incendiary weapons and asphyxiating gases did in the early twentieth century. Debate had raged on the character of the war on terror and the ethics of targeted killing within states that are not at war with the West, such as Yemen or Pakistan; of temporarily removing insurgent fighters from the battlefield by extra-legal incarceration; and extraordinary rendition or torture of suspected fighters. The fact remains that the enemies of NATO subvert the laws of armed conflict; they attack while concealed by the local civilian population, do not adhere to the truth in their information operations, and declare that their intention is to inflict mass casualties on those they do not conform to their ideas. Insurgents will use every ways and every means to achieve their objectives, and they are not constrained as NATO is, and must be, in its conduct of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency.
### 4. Conclusion

#### a. The Existing Literature

1. The existing literature is extensive and includes detailed case studies, rigorous analyses of causes, drivers, strategies, tactics, structures and techniques. It is a rich resource.

2. Nevertheless, most of the existing scholarship lacks scientific analysis and tends to reflect present day issues and concerns.

3. There is a tendency to regard insurgency and terrorism as less important than conventional threats because of NATO's history, but, in the medium term future (20 years), we can expect more insurgency and irregular conflicts than conventional, state on state wars and the death toll is almost certain to be as high as it has been in the last 20 years.

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### Future Trends in Insurgency and Countering Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terrorism</th>
<th>Short Term 0-5 yrs 2015-2020</th>
<th>Middle Term 5-15 yrs 2020-2035</th>
<th>Long Term 15-30 yrs 2035-2050</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The future operating environment against insurgency is likely to be in urban centres. NATO needs to understand and train for these environments</td>
<td>Rapid deployment forces should train immediately for urban counter-insurgency; all NATO members should train and prepare for counter-insurgency <em>per se</em> and generate appropriate force structures</td>
<td>New specialist units should be established to counter urban insurgency</td>
<td>WMD attack response formations will be required, including corps of civil defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>The simultaneous role of humanitarian relief, warfighting and peace keeping within cities, so-called ‘Three Block War’ is likely to be required in the future.</td>
<td>Training and education, inter-agency co-operation, joint exercises with civilian components is required</td>
<td>Bulk transport facilities should be developed</td>
<td>Mass decontamination facilities should be created for use in NATO and out of area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countering strategies will require counter-network operations. NATO Information operations should assume a greater significance than they are currently given in NATO doctrine</td>
<td>Further understanding and development of conducting network warfare is required; counter-IED technologies require continual development; surveillance technologies also require continual research and development</td>
<td>NATO should establish training and education centres dedicated to countering future forms of insurgency; and insist on ‘literacy’ in future warfare</td>
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**Short Term 0-5 yrs 2015-2020**

- Rapid deployment forces should train immediately for urban counter-insurgency; all NATO members should train and prepare for counter-insurgency *per se* and generate appropriate force structures.

**Middle Term 5-15 yrs 2020-2035**

- New specialist units should be established to counter urban insurgency.

**Long Term 15-30 yrs 2035-2050**

- WMD attack response formations will be required, including corps of civil defense.

- Training and education, inter-agency co-operation, joint exercises with civilian components is required.

- Bulk transport facilities should be developed.

- Mass decontamination facilities should be created for use in NATO and out of area.

- Further understanding and development of conducting network warfare is required; counter-IED technologies require continual development; surveillance technologies also require continual research and development.

- NATO should establish training and education centres dedicated to countering future forms of insurgency; and insist on ‘literacy’ in future warfare.
Theories of insurgency and counter-insurgency often conflict with reality in such conflicts.

Most publications on the future of terrorism assess the threat coming from a specific terrorist organisation or from a specific terrorist tactic, such as cyber-terrorism.

b. Continuities

1. Insurgency and counter-insurgency are primarily political in nature and solution
2. The military instrument is only one of the tools used in such conflicts and not always the most important or appropriate.
3. The military instrument in counter-insurgency will become more important as insurgent capabilities improve
4. Civilians will be the target, participants and consequently the most important ‘terrain’ in which these operations will be conducted.
5. The most devastating form of insurgency in the future will be in densely populated cities. The majority of casualties in future insurgency will be civilians.
6. External support significantly increased (50-65%) the probability of insurgents’ success
7. Rhetoric will not always match actual ends or ways; and insurgent strategies will evolve in response to government action.
9. Insurgency is a form of competitive control of the population, rather than the terrain. The Human Terrain is the centre of gravity
10. Information and physical, military action are contributory components to the political ends of insurgency
11. Insurgent tactics are summarised as provocation, intimidation, protraction, exhaustion
12. Insurgencies should be dealt with separately and there should be a strategy to ‘disaggregate’ them, that is to destroy the links that insurgents use to operate internationally.
13. Insurgency will have forms that reflect its strategic ends and its context
14. In some cases, asymmetry carries a burdensome logic for liberal state counter-insurgents: its methods can sometimes be counter productive and a decisive victory or the steady erosion of the means to resist could compliment the frustration of the insurgents desire to fulfil their strategic ends.
15. Popular consent and political control remain the priorities of counter-insurgency

c. Changes

1. Campaigns are likely to be protracted in places but the preference for future insurgents will be for a rapid achievement of power
2. Criminal-insurgent groups are highly likely to control many urban areas in the developing world
3. By 2035, there is a significant probability there will be twice the number of insurgencies that exist at the present
4. Insurgency is almost certain to occur in Africa, the Middle East and parts of Latin America between 2015 and 2035.
5. Insurgent groups vary in size and strength globally, but the trend is towards small tactical formations with greater capability, and this may appear across the globe, outside of the regions most prone to conflict.
6. Urban insurgency, despite its failures in the past, is likely in a more urbanized world and terrorism will continue to be its subset.
7. A rapid seizure of power, in a coup d’etat or short insurgency, in the future will be dependent on favourable political and socio-economic conditions. A revolutionary cadre would initially be small and not necessarily well-embedded within the population.
8. Some rural insurgencies may be expected in the future in less developed states: they are likely to be long-term, and feature attacks on urban centres as much as traditional operations in the countryside.
Future Trends in Insurgency and Countering Strategies

(9) Future economic crises or outbreaks of violence where there are stark disparities of wealth or access to resources are likely to develop into economic or commercial insurgencies.

(10) The location of these insurgencies will be dependent on the local environment and its resources, and could be mapped in advance.

(11) In the developing world, a significant number of insurgent combatants, perhaps as high as ten per cent, will be under the age of 18, and certain social structures make them a semi-trained force at the outbreak.

(12) Narcotics and mineral resources may become the ‘ends’ of an insurgency rather than the ‘means’.

(13) In the future, the further ingress of economic and communications connections caused by globalisation are likely to catalyse insurgencies where identity and ethnicity are strongly represented.

(14) There are likely to be separatist insurgencies as some nation states are further weakened or find themselves unable to meet the burdens of providing essential services to their growing and highly urbanised populations. Primordial insurgencies are therefore likely by 2035.

(15) Rapid escalation of insurgency in urban centres is likely, regardless of motivation.

(16) Insurgents will not always be equipped with more sophisticated arms and communications tools initially, but rapid convergence with the capabilities of state security forces can be anticipated.

(17) There is a realistic possibility of a future potential threat from radical environmentalists.

(18) Terrorism is not static, but a changing phenomenon, that is likely to change in the future.

(19) One source suggests that terrorism’s appeal could diminish by 2025 when there is continuous economic growth and increased youth employment.

(20) There is a general anticipation of ‘decentralisation’, and ‘individualisation’ (‘lone wolf’).

(21) Terrorist financing projections are likely to exploit weaknesses and proliferation in the developing world and the electronic environment.

(22) Insurgents with a ‘roughly symmetric’ capability as governments will adopt a conventional war strategy, as DAESH have done against governments in Syria and Iraq.

(23) Insurgents will be able to develop capabilities faster through electronic tools, especially in IEDs, which, along with traditional weapons, will be the most significant weapon system of the insurgent for physical and psychological reasons.

(24) Globalised insurgency should be understood as a series of connections and access to information that can enable a local or regional armed resistance movement.

d. Religious Insurgency and Terrorism

(1) Religiously-inspired insurgents will continue to be resilient, can use their faith to mobilise and sustain operations, even self-sacrificial ones.

(2) Psychological profiling of religiously-inspired insurgents to determine motive is less useful than assessments of their operational vulnerabilities.

(3) Insurgents and terrorists deliberately seeking to inflict maximum casualties, without concern for the effect it has on world opinion, is almost certain.

(4) Economic insurgency may form part of a religious or egalitarian insurgency.

(5) There is often an emphasis in future assessments of the importance of charismatic leadership to Jihadists, but this is only important at the tactical or information warfare level, not at the strategic.

(6) The appeal of DAESH has been to promote the idea of the offensive, strength and success in contrast to Al Qaeda’s original appeal of self-defence and victimhood, humiliation and Western repression. This new narrative theme and the context of the civil wars underway in the Middle East has presented a new generation of disaffected Muslims with a justification for armed resistance.
The overwhelming response of the Muslim world has been the rejection of Jihadist extremism, that the largest casualty toll has been of Muslims and that the consequences of war in the Muslim world have been economically damaging.

While radical groups claiming affiliation with Islam use a narrative of ‘reclaiming Europe’ or exploit the inclusivity and protections of the rights of Muslim European citizens, their appeal is still limited. Jihadist strategic ends are unrealisable and offer a strategic narrative opportunity.

Social networks in the Middle East and North Africa are far more resilient and useful than the cell structures of Western terrorist cells, and can provide finance, resources and information. It would be preferable to work with the grain of the patron-client system to defeat the insurgent networks.

Many global Jihadist movements will operate independently of Al Qaeda or any central control.

e. Future Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terrorism

The future operating environment against insurgency is likely to be in urban centres. NATO needs to understand and train for these environments.

The simultaneous role of humanitarian relief, warfighting and peace keeping within cities, so-called ‘Three Block War’ is likely to be required in the future.

Countering strategies will require counter-network operations.

Simulation and counter-factual analysis can assist in exploring options for terrorist movements.

NATO’s enemies will model the Afghan insurgency as the most effective strategic ‘ways’ of confronting NATO.

Information operations should assume a greater significance than they are currently given in NATO doctrine.

f. Overall Conclusions

- It is almost certain that religious and economic insurgencies will occur in the short term and medium term (2020-2035) in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia.
- It is likely that economic insurgencies will affect Latin America, Africa, and South-East Asia in the medium and long term.
- It is expected that will be more continuities than changes in insurgents’ and terrorists’ strategies but there are some significant developments.
- Projected 10-20 years from now, the capabilities and organisation of some insurgent groups will be like those of state armies but most insurgent and terrorist groups will be ad hoc, forced to improvise and remain close to the social system from which they originate.
- The type of warfighting practiced by non-state actors will continue to converge with state actors, while emphasising specific techniques; we can expect that there will be greater use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), snipers and localised ‘swarm’ attacks, particularly in urban centres, and there will be modelling on recent conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.
- There is a realistic possibility that the threat will develop within our NATO member countries, threatening to overwhelm traditional civil law enforcement and security, and therefore our military response will not be exclusively expeditionary and overseas in nature.
- The likelihood of a nuclear attack will remain low but analysts expect an increasing probability of chemical and biological attack.
• NATO countering strategies will need develop a range of responses commensurate with each threat type, blending military, law enforcement and other civilian agencies where appropriate.

• Current reliance on ever greater weapons precision will, at times, prove inadequate in urban insurgencies and significant fires will be required to suppress and defeat insurgent forces.

• Counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, despite technological advances in surveillance and weapon systems, will be manpower intensive.

• Political solutions will remain the cornerstone of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, supported by other civil and military lines of operation, where appropriate.
Appendix 1 Definition of Terms

**Terrorism:** The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives

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**Insurgency:** an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict...an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.

**Counterinsurgency:** military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.

*FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5*

**The Language of Uncertainty**

The following assumptions are made with regard to the language of uncertainty:

- Remote or Highly unlikely: 0–10%
- Improbable or unlikely: 15–20%
- Realistic/ possibility: 25–50%
- Probable or likely: 55–70%
- Highly probable or likely: 75–85%
- Almost certain: ≥ 90%

*Defence Intelligence Analysis*
Selected Further Reading

In addition to the works cited in this report, the following publications were consulted:

**Future Warfare**


Martin van Creveld, ‘The Fate of the State’, 1996, [http://www.d-n-i.net/creveld/the_fate_of_the_state.htm](http://www.d-n-i.net/creveld/the_fate_of_the_state.htm)


**Future Insurgency**


**Future Terrorism**


‘Si vis pacem, para bellum’

Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus, De Re Militari, III